

Batut, Cyprien; Maurin, Eric

**Working Paper**

## From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent: The Effects of Changing Employment Protection Doctrine

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12440

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Batut, Cyprien; Maurin, Eric (2019) : From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent: The Effects of Changing Employment Protection Doctrine, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12440, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202786>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12440

**From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent:  
The Effects of Changing Employment  
Protection Doctrine**

Cyprien Batut  
Eric Maurin

JUNE 2019

## DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12440

# From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent: The Effects of Changing Employment Protection Doctrine

**Cyprien Batut**

*PSE*

**Eric Maurin**

*PSE and IZA*

JUNE 2019

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.

The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

ISSN: 2365-9793

**IZA – Institute of Labor Economics**

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9  
53113 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Email: [publications@iza.org](mailto:publications@iza.org)

[www.iza.org](http://www.iza.org)

## ABSTRACT

---

# From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent: The Effects of Changing Employment Protection Doctrine\*

In many countries, the termination of employment contracts has to be either on employer initiative or on employee initiative. Furthermore, the cost of the procedure is borne mainly by the contracting party who takes the initiative and there is little room for sharing costs. The implicit doctrine is that employment termination has to be the last resort, the ultima ratio. In 2008, the French government initiated a change in doctrine: it became possible to terminate employment contracts by mutual consent, at lower costs. Building on firm-level data, we develop an event analysis which reveals that the reform was followed by a decline in dismissals as well as by a significant rise in overall separation rates. By promoting separation by mutual consent, the reform reduced labor litigation risks, boosted workers' flows, but, eventually, we do not detect any effect on firms' employment levels.

**JEL Classification:** J23, J52, J63

**Keywords:** employment termination, dismissal, quit, labor litigation, severance payment

**Corresponding author:**

Eric Maurin  
Paris School of Economics  
48 Bd Jourdan  
75014 Paris  
France  
E-mail: [eric.maurin@ens.fr](mailto:eric.maurin@ens.fr)

---

\* We would like to thank Eve Caroli, Dominique Goux, Sara Signorelli and participants at PSE seminars for their comments on early versions of this work.

# 1 Introduction

In many countries, especially in Europe, the termination of employment contracts can be either on employer initiative or on employee initiative, there is little alternative<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, the cost of the procedure is borne mainly by the contracting party who initiates the separation. For example, when an employee takes the initiative and decides to quit, he or she typically loses eligibility to receive unemployment benefits, whereas the employer bears no direct costs. By contrast, when an employer decides to dismiss an employee, the employer has typically to observe a notice period, pay a severance package and be able to prove that the circumstances of the dismissal correspond to circumstances under which it is legally possible to dismiss workers. Eventually, the employer bears the risks of being sued for unfair dismissal, especially when the dismissal cannot be justified by clear economic difficulties.

These legal constraints on job separation aim at protecting each one of the two contracting parties from the various problems involved by enduring an unexpected separation. One issue with these constraints, however, is that they may discourage workers' reallocations and hamper productivity growth<sup>2</sup>. Also, because they make it difficult to share the costs and liability of separations, existing rules can be a source of conflicts between the two contracting parties. In particular, when employers take the initiative, they cannot avoid stigmatizing the employees that they dismiss, especially when these dismissals cannot be motivated by economic problems, but only by performance-related problems (Gibbons and Katz (1991), Okatenko (2010)). The vast majority of labor litigations are actually about non-economic dismissals and about their justifications (Guillonnet (2015)).

With the objective of reducing litigations and facilitating workers' reallocations, the French government introduced in 2008 a new legal procedure for terminating indefinite-term employment contracts, called *rupture conventionnelle* (hereafter, termination by agreement). The new procedure makes it possible for employers to terminate employment contracts without any justifications, provided that they get the consent of employees and accept to grant severance payments at least as high as the severance payments granted to dismissed workers. For employers, the new procedure has the advantage of reducing dramatically the risk of being sued in labor court. With respect to employees, it makes it possible to leave one's employer without losing eligibility to receive severance payments and unemployment benefits (which would not be the case after a quit) and without enduring the stigmatization associated with dismissals.

---

<sup>1</sup>An overview of employment termination procedure in Europe can be found in European Commission (2006). For a broader discussion and description of the various employment regulations across the world (i.e., European-type doctrine vs US "employment at-will" doctrine) see ILO (2015) or OECD (2013)

<sup>2</sup>On these issues see, e.g., Autor et al. (2007), Boeri and Jimeno (2005), Bassanini et al. (2009), OECD (2010) Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Martin and Scarpetta (2012)

The reform was a success, even though it took time for many employers to start using the new procedure. One year after the reform, only about 30% of French establishments had started to use terminations by agreement. Six years after the reform, the same proportion was about 80%. After a termination by agreement, the vast majority of workers spend time unemployed, receiving benefits, and only a very small fraction (less than 0.1%) sue their employer in court.

From a theoretical viewpoint, this rise in terminations by agreement after 2008 may simply be due to the fact that they represent an option which is less risky for employer and less stigmatizing for employees than dismissals, especially dismissals justified by non-economic reasons. In this scenario, the rise in terminations by agreement would merely coincide with a decline in dismissals. But the rise in terminations by agreement may also reflect that, before 2008, some employees stayed with their employers only because the sole ways to become unemployed (and have time to look for another job) involved either losing eligibility to receive benefits or enduring the stigmatization of dismissals. After the reform, termination by agreement may represent the best option for both these would-be movers and their employers. In this second scenario, the rise in terminations by agreement would not simply coincide with a decline in dismissals, but also with an overall rise in exit flows.

To test these assumptions and explore the effects of the 2008 reform, our paper builds on an establishment-level administrative dataset with detailed quarterly information on workers' entries and exits across the 2004-2014 period. These data first reveal that the introduction of terminations by agreement was followed by a significant decline in dismissals justified by non-economic reasons, in line with one of the objective of the reform. When we compare establishments who started to use terminations by agreement relatively early with those who started several quarters (or years) later, we find that the decline in non-economic dismissals in each establishment coincides closely with when it started using terminations by agreement. This event analysis is suggestive that employers were able to take advantage of the new regulation to partly substitute terminations by agreement for dismissals for non-economic reasons, so as to reduce litigation risks.

When we develop the same event analysis on dismissals justified by economic reasons, we do not find any effect, consistent with the fact that they involve very little litigation risks and do not really entail more costs than terminations by agreements. Similarly, we find little evidence that the introduction of terminations by agreement has any effect on retirements or on quits. As a matter of fact, quits have declined a lot just after 2008, but this early decline is as significant for establishments who started using terminations by agreement just after the reform as for establishments who started only several years later. The decline in quits appears to be driven by the recession which took place in 2008-2009, not by the introduction of terminations by agreement. We checked that a similar decline in quits was already seen in the

1990s, just after the 1993 recession. From a theoretical viewpoint, there is actually little reason for employers to accept to substitute terminations by agreement for quits, since the later entail no procedure cost nor severance payments.

Eventually, when we look jointly at dismissals, retirements, quits and terminations by agreement, we find clear evidence that the introduction of terminations by agreement in 2008 coincide with a very significant rise in aggregate separation rates (+18%). This result is suggestive that a significant number of terminations by agreement occur in situations where no termination at all would have occurred pre-reform, consistent with the assumption that (pre-reform) a significant number of workers were staying with their employer only because it was impossible to become unemployed without either losing eligibility to unemployment benefits or enduring the stigmatization associated with dismissals. The reform induced a decline in termination costs for these would-be movers and this is the likely reason for the rise in overall separation rates.

When we further compare the number of employees of establishments before and after they start using termination by agreements, we find no evidence that this decline in termination costs was followed by an increase in employment levels, we even find some evidence of a marginally significant decrease in employment levels after the reform. The introduction of termination by agreement coincide a decline in dismissals justified by non-economic reasons, a (much larger) rise in aggregate separation rates, but no real increase in employment levels.

Our paper contributes to the literature exploring the impact of employment termination regulations on firms' behaviors and workers' flows. Most existing literature focuses on reforms which entail reductions in dismissal costs either for groups of firms defined by their size or for groups of workers defined by their age or their seniority level<sup>3</sup>. Such reforms are in general strongly contested if only because they tend to increase unemployment risks for workers who are not willing to lose their job (and would likely have a hard time in getting re-employed). The 2008 French reform is an attempt to circumvent this problem by promoting separation by mutual consent and reducing termination costs for a specific group of workers only, namely workers who are willing to leave their employers but cannot afford losing eligibility to unemployment benefits. Consistent with the implicit working assumption that there exists a significant number of such would-be movers, our results reveal that this change in doctrine is able to boost significantly long-term workers' reallocation while at the same time reducing dismissal for non-economic reasons and labor litigation risks.

The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the 2008 reform while

---

<sup>3</sup>See e.g. [Dias et al. \(2013\)](#), [Behaghel et al. \(2008\)](#), [Marinescu \(2009\)](#), [Garibaldi and Pacelli \(2008\)](#). In these papers, the impact of change in separation costs is identified by comparing targeted and untargeted groups before and after the reform, the identifying assumption being that indirect effects on untargeted groups can be neglected. For an early analysis of separation costs using the same administrative data see [Goux et al. \(2001\)](#) as those used in this paper.

section 3 propose a simple conceptual framework to understand it. Section 4 describe our administrative dataset and our working sample. Section 5 provides evidence on the progressive spread of terminations by agreement across French establishments. Sections 6 and 7 provide graphical and econometric evidence on how this spread affected firms' behavior, using an event study methodology. Eventually, section 8 concludes.

## 2 Institutional context

This section first describes the institutional context that prevailed in France before the 2008 reform, when termination by mutual consent was not really an option and when the termination of an employment contract had to represent the last resort, the *ultima ratio*. Second, we describe how the reform contributed to promote a new doctrine, by providing employers and employees with the possibility to terminate employment contract by mutual consent, at potentially lower cost than dismissal or quit.

### 2.1 Institutional context before 2008

Before 2008, indefinite term labor contracts can be terminated in France either on employers' initiative (dismissals) or on employees' initiative (quits), there is no third option. Furthermore, the costs of the procedure are mainly borne by the contracting party who initiate the procedure.

Employees who choose to quit lose their eligibility to receive a severance package as well as their eligibility to receive unemployment benefits<sup>4</sup>. Employers who decide to dismiss employees have to justify their decisions and run the risk of being sued for unfair dismissal. This risk is often painted as one reason for the sclerosis of the French labor market.

Dismissals can be justified by economic reasons. In such a case, the employer has to prove the seriousness of its economic problems and has to pay severance payments. In case of collective dismissals for economic reasons, the employer has also to justify the choice of who is dismissed and who is not. French labor laws ask employers to dismiss lower seniority workers first, as well as workers with lower family responsibility (see article 1233-5 of French labor laws).

Dismissals can also be justified by non-economic reasons, most notably when employers consider that employees are guilty of misconduct. There are three levels of misconduct, namely simple, serious or very serious misconduct<sup>5</sup>. Employers have to

---

<sup>4</sup>Specifically, employees who choose to quit can become eligible to receive unemployment benefits only after 4 months out of the labor force and only after obtaining a specific agreement from a regional committee of employer and employee representatives (called *Instance Paritaire Regionale*).

<sup>5</sup>Serious misconducts include insubordination (refusal to perform tasks listed in the labor contract), abandonment of post, negligence (e.g. the night watchman sleeping during his shift), safety



pay severance payments, except in case of serious or very serious misconduct (article L.1234-9 of French Labor law). The vast majority of litigations follow dismissals justified by non-economic reasons<sup>6</sup>. Between 1996 and 2003, about 25% of these non-economic terminations have been challenged in French courts (Fraisie et al. (2015)).

## 2.2 The 2008 reform

In June 2008, the French government introduced a third type of labor contract termination, called *rupture conventionnelle* (hereafter, termination by agreement). When an employer and an employee opt for such a termination, the liability is shared and the consent is mutual.

For employees, terminations by agreement bring several advantages compared to quits. After a termination by agreement, employees remain eligible to receive a severance package at least as important as the one they receive in case of an employer-initiated termination. They also remain eligible to receive unemployment benefits. To the best of our knowledge, France is the first country who introduced a procedure of termination by mutual agreement which does not entail, for employees, the loss of eligibility to receive unemployment benefits and severance packages.

For employers, the main advantage of terminations by agreement over dismissals is that terminations by agreement need not be justified. Termination by agreements do not exempt employers from giving layoff notices or paying severance package, but save them from having to explain why they wish to terminate the labor contract<sup>7</sup>. This alone reduces dramatically the risk of subsequent litigation<sup>8</sup> and, consequently, the termination costs expected by employers, especially in periods where terminations cannot be motivated by clear economic problems.

As shown by Figure 1, many employers and employees started to use the new procedure very soon after the reform and the number of termination by agreement has kept increasing since then. At the end 2014, we observe about 30,000 termina-

---

rule violation (drunk driving), violence in the workplace, harassment, theft. Very serious misconducts involve the wish to harm: deliberate deterioration, disloyalty (leaking intelligence to the competitor), embezzlement, etc.

<sup>6</sup>According to the French Ministry of Justice, there are about 200,000 labor litigations each year in France. Close to 80% are about the justifications of non-economic dismissals while close to 15% are about unpaid wages. Only a very small fraction (about 2%) are about dismissals justified by economic reasons (see Guillonnet (2015)).

<sup>7</sup>The procedure involves a preliminary interview as well as the writing and signing of an agreement where the contract termination date and the amount of the severance pay are made explicit. After a period of 15 days (during which cancellation is possible), the agreement is sent for approval to local labor authorities. Local authorities have 15 days to either reject or approve the agreement. If not rejected after this period, the agreement is deemed valid. For more detail see Articles L. 1237-11 to L. 1237-16 of French Labor laws. See also: <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F19030>.

<sup>8</sup>According to Berta et al. (2012), only about 0.1% of termination by agreement lead to a litigation.

tions by agreement each month, namely twice as many terminations by agreement as dismissals for economic reasons. Building on administrative data, the Figure also confirms that the vast majority of these terminations by agreement are followed by a period of receipt of unemployment benefits.

### 3 Potential effects of the reform : a conceptual framework

In the remainder of the paper, our basic research question is to understand the causes of the rise in terminations by agreement after 2008. Does it simply reflect the substitution of terminations by agreement for quits and dismissals? Or does it reflect an overall increase in separations and a more fundamental change in employment dynamics?

Compared to dismissals, terminations by agreements represent an option which is less risky for employers and less stigmatizing for employees. Hence, we can hypothesize that the 2008 reform induced the substitution of terminations by agreements for some dismissals. In fact we can expect such substitutions to be even more likely for dismissals justified by non-economic reasons, since they represent the strongest risk of litigation for employers and the most stigmatizing terminations for employees (Gibbons and Katz (1991), Okatenko (2010)).

Compared to quits, terminations by agreements represent an option which is much less costly for employees, but not for employers. Hence, we can hypothesize that the 2008 reform had much weaker substitution effects on quits than on dismissals<sup>9</sup>.

Eventually, terminations by agreement may in some cases represent an improvement over no termination at all, for both employers and employees. Before 2008, no termination at all means that dismissal would be too costly for the employer while quitting would be too costly for the employee. But, it does not rule out that some workers would prefer to be on unemployment rather than with their current employer: they choose to stay with their current employer because the only possible ways to leave their employer involve either stigmatization costs (dismissal) or the loss of eligibility to receive unemployment benefits (quit). If the number of such would-be movers is significant and if terminations by agreement are perceived by employers as less risky and costly than dismissals, the 2008 reform may induce a rise in overall separation rate, i.e., a rise in terminations by agreement signed by people who would have stayed with their employer before the reform.

In Appendix C, we develop a simple conceptual framework that makes more precise how the introduction of terminations by agreement may affect firms' be-

---

<sup>9</sup>We cannot exclude, however, that some firms end up agreeing to sign terminations by agreement rather than keeping unmotivated potential quitters in their staff.

havior. The model builds on the assumption that terminations by agreement are perceived as less costly than dismissals by employers and that (pre-reform) there exists a significant number of would-be movers.

In this framework, it is possible to show that the introduction of terminations by agreement may or may not entail a rise in overall separation rates depending on how the magnitude of adverse labor demand shocks (denoted  $\Delta$ ) compares to exogenous outflows of workers (denoted  $S$ ). In a nutshell, when  $\Delta$  is larger than  $S$ , the difference  $\Delta - S$  represents the downward adjustment that the firm would like to perform when it is hit by an adverse shock. In practice, the firm performs this downward adjustment only if labor adjustment costs are not too high. Hence, if the adjustment costs associated with terminations by agreement are sufficiently low compared to the adjustment costs associated with layoffs and if there exists a sufficiently large number of would-be movers, it may become possible for firms to make the  $\Delta - S$  adjustment after the reform (using termination by agreements) whereas no adjustment would have been seen pre-reform (because of layoff costs).

In the remainder of this paper, we will build on an administrative establishment-level dataset with exhaustive quarterly information on workers' flows to test these different assumptions and to explore the likely effects of the 2008 change in employment doctrine.

## 4 Data

We use administrative data from the "Declarations des Mouvements de Main d'Oeuvre" (DMMO) collected between the first quarter of 2004 and the last quarter of 2014<sup>10</sup>.

For each quarter and each establishment with 50 employees or more, the DMMO provide the number of entries and exits of workers for each type of hiring and termination. In particular, we have quarterly information on the number of dismissals for economic reasons, the number of dismissals for non-economic reasons, the number of quits as well as on the number of retirements and (after 2008) the number of terminations by agreement. Our empirical analysis will mostly focus on the panel of 7085 establishments continuously observed throughout the 2004-2014 period. For each one of these establishments, we are able to precisely identify whether (and when) it starts using terminations by agreement. Table A.1 in the appendix provides some descriptive statistics about the establishments in this working sample. They have on average 160 employees, 37% are in the manufacturing industry. About 18% have still not used terminations by agreement by the end of 2014. Before 2008, dismissals justified by non-economic reasons represent on average, each quarter, about 0.4% of total employment, whereas dismissals justified by economic reasons represent 0.1%

---

<sup>10</sup>Several papers have already used the DMMO to analyze workers' flows in France, see e.g. [Abowd et al. \(1999\)](#) or [Goux et al. \(2001\)](#).

and quits about 1.2% of total employment each quarter.

#### 4.1 Terminations by agreement and plants' survival

As mentioned above, the basic advantage of focusing on a balanced panel of establishments is that we are able to precisely identify whether (and when) each one of them starts using terminations by agreement. It makes it possible to identify the effect of using terminations by agreement by comparing those who start using the new procedure early after the reform with those who start later, through a very simple event analysis. One potential issue, however, is that selection into the balanced panel may be endogenous to the date at which establishments start using terminations by agreement. For example, it may be that establishments which start using terminations by agreement early after the reform tend to have a stronger probability to survive and, consequently, a stronger probability to be seen in our balanced panel. In such a case, the comparison of changes in behavior of early starters and late beginners may not necessarily isolate the effect of using termination by agreement ; it may also reflect differential sample selection.

To explore this assumption, we have tested whether the probability to be selected in the balanced panel was dependent on whether (and when) establishments start using terminations by agreements. Specifically, for each possible date of adoption  $t_0$  of terminations by agreement, we have compared the selection probability of establishments which survived until  $t_0$  and started using terminations by agreement on  $t_0$  with the selection probability of establishments which survived until  $t_0$ , but did not start using terminations by agreement on  $t_0$ . Figures A.1 and A.2 in the online Appendix show that the survival rates and sample selection probabilities are on average very similar for these two groups of establishments. The rate of survival on  $t_0+k$  (with  $k = 1, \dots, 12$  quarters) is on average slightly stronger for establishment who starts using terminations by agreement on  $t_0$ , but the difference between the two groups is only about 1 percentage point and not significantly different from zero at standard level.

Overall, the date at which establishments start using terminations by agreement does not seem to have any significant influence on the probability to survive and be selected in the balanced panel, so that sample selection appears to be negligible. However, as a robustness check, we will replicate most of our regression analysis on a much larger unbalanced panel (N=17,965), which include all the establishments for which information on workers' flows are available for 80% (or more) of the quarters of the 2004-2014 period under consideration. As discussed below, we obtain very similar results with the unbalanced panel and with the balanced one.

In addition to plant level data from the DMMO, we will also use aggregate administrative data on workers' flows from the Ministry of Labor and from the Statistical Office. They provide us with information on the overall number of terminations

by agreement signed each month (as well as with the number of such terminations which are followed by unemployment benefit receipt). They also provide us with quarterly aggregate information on rates of entries and exits of workers in establishment with 10 or more employees<sup>11</sup>. These aggregate rates are constructed from the DMMO and from a survey conducted each quarter on a representative sample of establishment with 10 to 50 employees (EMMO survey). Eventually, we will use aggregate data from older DMMO to compare aggregate flows observed before and after the 1992 recession with aggregate flows observed before and after the 2008 recession<sup>12</sup>.

## 5 The rise in terminations by agreement: early vs. late adopters

Given our ambition to develop an event analysis, one first question is whether terminations by agreement began to rise at about the same time in all firms or whether the timing was different across firms. To shed light on this issue, Figure 2 focuses on our balanced panel and shows the cumulative proportion of establishments which began to use terminations by agreements between 2008 and  $t$ , for each quarter  $t$  between 2008-Q1 and 2014-Q4. The Figure reveals that terminations by agreements were far from being adopted at the same time by all establishments. By contrast, the use of terminations by agreement spread smoothly across establishments over the period under consideration. In 2009, one year after the reform, only about 30% of establishments had already sign a termination by agreement. In 2014, the same percentage was still not 100%, but about 80%.

To take one step further, Figure 3 focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement at some point between 2008 and 2014 and shows the evolution of their number of terminations by agreement per employee over time, with the date of the first termination by agreement being taken as the origin of the time scale. The Figure shows that the number of termination by agreement per employee jumps almost immediately after the first one. Afterward, it remains stable.

Overall, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the smooth rise in the aggregate number of terminations by agreement observed after 2008 reflect their spread across firms, not their rise within firms. Once adopted by a group of firms, the number of terminations by agreement per employee remains actually very stable within these firms. In the

---

<sup>11</sup>See <https://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/statistiques-de-a-a-z/article/les-mouvements-de-main-d-oeuvre>.

<sup>12</sup>See Corbel and Laulhe (1987), Laulhe (1991), Laulhe and Le Goff (1989, 1990, 1991), Baudry and Le Goff (1992), Chazal (1993), Thiery (1995), Thiery et al. (1997), Chazal and Levezac (1997), Roux and Levezac (1998, 1999, 2000). These publications are available at <https://www.epsilon.insee.fr/>.

remainder of the paper, our purpose is to explore whether the date at which a firm starts using terminations by agreement coincides with a decline of the other form of terminations and/or with a rise in the overall number of terminations.

## 6 Graphical Analysis

In France as in many developed countries, the vast majority of labor litigations deal with the reasons given by employers to initiate dismissals for non-economic reasons. One of the main goals of the 2008 reform was precisely to reduce the number of such employer-initiated terminations, so as to reduce labor litigations. In this section, our first objective is to evaluate graphically the extent to which the introduction of terminations by agreements achieved this goal. We will also ask whether the introduction of terminations by agreement impacted the other types of terminations of indefinite term contracts, be they initiated by employers or by employees.

### 6.1 Effects on dismissals

Building on aggregate data from the ministry of labor, Figure 4 shows the evolution of dismissals for non-economic reasons between 2004 and 2014. It reveals that their number per employee declines just after the 2008 reform and end up stabilizing at a level which is about 20% lower than the pre-reform level. Assuming that these dismissals have no strong links with the up and down of the economic activity, their persistent decline after 2008 is likely a consequence of the reform, not a consequence of the 2009 recession<sup>13</sup>. For the sake of comparison, Figure 4 also shows the evolution of dismissals for economic reasons. Not surprisingly, their number per employee increases temporarily during the 2009 recession, but soon returns back to its previous level. Overall, the Figure is suggestive that the reform was followed by the partial substitution of terminations by agreement for dismissals justified by non-economic reasons (the most litigious ones), but had no effect on those justified by economic reasons (the least litigious).

To further explore this assumption, it is possible to build on the fact that all establishments did not start using terminations by agreement at the same time. Some started as early as 2009, but others started several years later only. If the main driver of the decline in dismissals was the 2009 recession, this decline should be seen 2009 in most firms, regardless of the date at which they started using

---

<sup>13</sup>Using statistics published by the French statistical office between 1987 and 1999, Figure A.3 compares economic growth rates and dismissals rates before and after the 1993 recession in France (the most severe post-war recession of the last century). The Figure confirms that the annual rate of dismissals justified by non-economic reasons remains very stable over this period (about 1.6%), without any clear links with the sharp variations in economic growth. By contrast, the rate of dismissals justified by economic reasons shows very significant fluctuations from one year to the next (between 1% and 2.5%) in relation to the business cycle.

terminations by agreement. By contrast, if the decline in dismissals is driven by the rise in terminations by agreement, it should coincide in most firms with the date at which they start using the new procedure, even when this date is long after 2009.

To shed light on this issue, Figure 5 compares establishments which start using terminations by agreement at some point between 2008 and 2011 (early adopters) with establishments observed at the same dates, in the same industry, but which have still not started using terminations by agreement in 2014 (late adopters). Specifically, the solid line shows the evolution of dismissals justified by non-economic reasons in the first group of establishments, before and after the date at which they first use terminations by agreement (the date of first use is taken as the origin of the time scale). The dotted line shows the evolution of the same variable in the second group of establishments<sup>14</sup>.

The Figure shows that the date at which early adopters start using terminations by agreement (i.e.,  $t = 0$ ) coincides with a significant decrease in their use of dismissals for non-economic reasons whereas no change is seen in the use of these terminations in late adopters. Specifically, the solid line stays above the dotted line until early adopters start using terminations by agreement. After that date, the situation is reversed. These results are clearly consistent with the assumption that establishments used terminations by agreement as substitutes for dismissals justified by non-economic reasons<sup>15</sup>.

To take one step further, the Figure 6 shows the evolution of the difference between the solid and the dotted lines of Figure 5. The Figure confirms that this difference declines significantly just after early adopters start using terminations by agreement.

It is possible to develop a similar event analysis for dismissals justified by economic reasons (see Figure 7 and 8). This analysis shows no variation in the difference between the two groups of establishments after the date when early adopters start using terminations by agreement. There is no evidence that terminations by agreement were used as substitutes for dismissals justified by economic reasons

---

<sup>14</sup>To be very specific, for each date  $t$  and each establishment  $j$  in the first group, it is possible to define (a) the distance between  $t$  and the date  $t_0(j)$  at which  $j$  starts using terminations by agreement and (b)  $Y_{jt}$  the number of dismissals per employee in  $j$  at  $t$  and (c)  $Y_{-jt}$  the average number of dismissals per employee at  $t$  in establishments of the second group (i.e., same industry as  $j$ , but the date of the first termination by agreement is after 2014). The Figure shows the evolution of the average of  $Y_{jt}$  et  $Y_{-jt}$  conditional on  $d$ , for  $d$  between -12 to +12. The two groups are defined so that each given observation contributes to either the solid line or the dotted line, never to both lines.

<sup>15</sup>The decline starts even a little before the approval of the first terminations by agreement by local labor authorities, which suggests that these very first agreements corresponds to terminations that would have taken place a little earlier, had the employer been obliged to resort to dismissals.

## 6.2 Effects on quits and retirements

The previous section provides evidence on the effects of the reform on employer-initiated terminations. In this section, we explore its effect on employee-initiated terminations, i.e., quits.

In theory, there is little incentive for employers to sign terminations by agreement with potential quitters, if only because signing a termination by agreement involve paying a severance package. In practice, some employers may end up agreeing to sign terminations by agreement rather than keeping demotivated potential quitters in their staff.

To shed light on this issue, Figures 9-10 focus on the same two groups of establishments as Figures 7-8 and compare the evolution of quit rates in these two groups before and after early adopters start signing termination by agreements. The Figure shows that quit rates remain very similar in both groups before and after early adopters start using terminations by agreement. The introduction of terminations by agreement does not coincide with any specific decline in quit rates, consistent with the assumption that the reform did not induce any substitution of terminations by agreements for quits.

To take one step further, Figures 11 and 12 explore the effect of terminations by agreement on retirement rates, using the same design as Figures 9 and 10. They show that the difference in the number of retirements per employee between early and late adopters remain very similar before and after early adopters start using terminations by agreement. There is no evidence that terminations by agreement were used as an early retirement device.

## 6.3 Effect on separation rates and employment levels

As discussed above, terminations by agreement entail the payment of severance packages and, as such, are more costly for employers than quits. In this context, it is not surprising that we see little substitution of terminations by agreement for quits.

Similarly, during economic downturn, it is not clear why employers should try to substitute terminations by agreement for dismissals justified by economic reasons. During such periods, the former are not necessarily easier to bargain and implement than the latter. The former are not necessarily less costly either, since the severance packages associated to terminations by agreement have to be as generous as those associated to dismissals. By contrast, when economic conditions are not bad and do not justify downsizing, dismissals are difficult to justify and terminations by agreement represent an interesting alternative option for employers who are willing to reorganize their staff, i.e., destroy some old jobs and create new ones. After the reform, it became possible to terminate labor contracts in circumstances when no



terminations would have been possible before the reform. To further explore this assumption, we looked at whether the introduction of terminations by agreement was followed by an increase in the overall number of terminations of indefinite-term contracts, as measured, each quarter, by the sum of dismissals, quits, retirements and (after 2008) terminations by agreement. Using the same sample and method as in previous sections, Figures 13 and 14 confirm that this is the case. When we compare the group of early adopters with the group of late adopters, we see that the overall number of terminations per employee increases in the first group (but not in the second one) just after it starts using terminations by agreement.

The DMMO do not provide direct evidence on the number of new indefinite term contracts which are signed, each quarter, in each establishment<sup>16</sup>. Hence, it is not possible to rigorously assess whether the rise in the overall number of terminations was provoked by the adoption of terminations by agreement is followed by a parallel increase in the number of new indefinite-term contracts signed each quarter. It remains possible, however, to test whether the rise in terminations coincide with a decline in the overall number of employees. Figures 15 and 16 suggest that this is not the case. The date at which an establishment starts using terminations by agreement does not appear to coincide with any specific decline in its number of employees.

## 7 Regressions analysis

The previous section provides graphical evidence suggesting that the date at which an establishment starts using terminations by agreement coincides with a significant rise in the overall rate of terminations of indefinite-term contracts in this establishment. By contrast, the date at which an establishment starts using terminations by agreement does not seem to coincide with any significant change in its level of employment. In this section, we develop a simple regression analysis to test the robustness of these findings as well as whether they hold true in all industries. We focus on the panel of establishments who starts using terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2014 and we assume the following very simple two-way fixed effects model,

$$Y_{jt} = \gamma Post_{jt} + \alpha_j + \tau_t + \epsilon_{jt} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{jt}$  represents the outcome under consideration in establishment  $j$  during quarter  $t$  whereas  $Post_{jt}$  is a dummy variable indicating whether quarter  $t$  is before

---

<sup>16</sup>More specifically, DMMO provide evidence on direct hiring under indefinite term contracts, but not on transformations of fixed term contracts (FTC) into indefinite term contracts (ITC), which represent a very significant proportion of the total number of ITC which are signed each year. According to Goux et al. (2001) the rate of hiring through FTC transformation is actually almost as high (and even more cyclical) as the rate of direct hiring under ITC.

or after the quarter  $t_0(j)$  during which establishment  $j$  starts using terminations by agreement. Parameters  $\alpha_j$  et  $\tau_t$  represent a full set of quarter and establishment fixed effects. Eventually  $\epsilon_{jt}$  represent unobserved factors which affect  $j$  during  $t$ , but which variations over time are assumed uncorrelated with the dates at which establishments start using termination by agreement.

Following [Abraham and Sun \(2018\)](#), it is possible to cast model (1) in a potential outcomes setting where treatment effects are defined (for each establishment  $j$ , each potential date of treatment  $e$  and each date  $t$ ) as the difference between outcomes that would be observed at  $t$  if establishment  $j$  started using the new procedure on  $e$  and outcomes that would be observed at  $t$  if establishment  $j$  were never treated. In this framework, [Abraham and Sun \(2018\)](#) show that a "parallel trend" and a "non-anticipation" assumption are sufficient for the two-way fixed effects estimator of parameter  $\gamma$  in model (1) to capture an average treatment effect. The "parallel trend" assumption states that - had terminations by agreement not been introduced - outcomes would have followed similar trends in establishments who start using terminations by agreement early after the reform and in establishments who start later. The "non-anticipation" assumption states that - had terminations by agreement not been introduced- we would have observed the same outcomes in the period before establishments start using terminations by agreement. Put differently, we assume that the reform did not induce establishments to adapt their behavior in anticipation, namely before they actually start using terminations by agreement. Under these two assumptions, the two-way fixed effects estimator of parameter  $\gamma$  recovers a weighted average of cohort-specific average treatment effects, where cohorts are defined by the date of introduction of termination by agreement. Assuming treatment homogeneity across cohorts, parameter  $\gamma$  can simply be interpreted as the difference between the average outcome observed after the introduction of terminations by agreement and the average outcome that would be observed in the same establishments, had terminations by agreement not been made available<sup>17</sup>.

Generally speaking, the Figures presented in the previous section are consistent with our two identifying assumptions. As it turns out, when we compare establishments who start using terminations by agreement at a given date with establishments who will start only later, Figures do not show any significant divergence in their behavior in the period before the first group starts using termination by agreement<sup>18</sup>.

---

<sup>17</sup>When treatment effects are heterogeneous across cohorts of adoption, the two-way fixed effects estimator of parameter  $\gamma$  can be more difficult to interpret since it recovers a linear combination of cohort-specific average treatment effects where weights are not necessarily positive, as shown by [Abraham and Sun \(2018\)](#). In Appendix C, we build on the recent work by [Cengiz et al. \(2019\)](#) to show that our results are robust to the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects.

<sup>18</sup>As discussed above, the only exception is seen for dismissals justified by non-economic reasons : the decline in these dismissals starts a little before establishments actually starts using terminations by agreement. To further test the robustness of our results, however, we replicated our regression analysis on the sample obtained after dropping for each establishment the observa-

The panel A of Table 1 shows estimated  $\gamma$  when we focus in turn on the two types of dismissals, quits, retirements as well as on aggregate separation rates and on employment levels. Consistent with our graphical findings, these regression results confirms that terminations by agreement induce a significant decline in the rate of dismissals justified by non-economic reasons ( $\gamma \approx -0.031^{***}$ , which corresponds to a -8% decline), but has little effects on quits, retirement or on dismissals justified by economic reasons. Regression results also confirm that the introduction of terminations by agreement coincides with a very significant rise in the aggregate separation rates (+18%). Eventually our regression models detect a small negative effect on employment levels (-0.9%), which suggest that the rise in terminations was actually only partly offset by additional hiring.

Panels B and C of Table 1 shows our regression results when we look separately at establishments in the manufacturing industries and establishments in the service sector. They show that terminations by agreement induce a very significant rise in aggregate separation rates in both sectors. By contrast, the decline in dismissals justified by non-economic reasons is mainly seen in the service sector, which is also the sector where this type of terminations is, by far, the most used<sup>19</sup>. Eventually, when we look separately at manufacturing and service industries, the small negative impact on employment levels appears to be significant at conventional levels in neither sector.

To take one step further, Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the results of replicating our econometric analysis after dropping - for each establishment - the observations which correspond to the two quarters before the establishment starts using terminations by agreement, so as to minimize anticipation effects. We find very similar regression results with this subsample as with the main sample, namely a positive effect on aggregate separation rates and a smaller negative effect on dismissal justified by non-economic reason. However, when we work with this subpanel, the negative effect of terminations by agreement on employment levels is not significant at standard level anymore.

Eventually, to further test the robustness of our results, we consider establishments for which DMMO information is available for 80% of more of the quarters (i.e. 36 quarters or more, out of 44) and we replicated our econometric analysis on this much larger unbalanced panel (see Table A.3 in the appendix). Generally speaking, we obtain similar results with this unbalanced panel as with the balanced one.

---

tions that correspond to the two quarters before the quarter at which it starts using termination by agreement (i.e., two observations that may be affected by anticipation effects). As discussed below, we obtain very similar results on this subsample and on the main sample.

<sup>19</sup>It likely reflects that the quality of employees' work is more likely to be subject to different interpretations in the service sector than in the manufacturing industry, maybe because service tasks tend to be more difficult to codify and evaluate.

## 8 Conclusion

In 2008, French labor laws introduced a new employment termination procedure, called *rupture conventionnelle* and it became possible to terminate employment contract by mutual consent at lower costs. By comparing employers who started to use the new procedure just after the reform with those who started a little later, we provide evidence that the adoption of the new procedure coincides with a significant decline of dismissals justified by non-economic reasons (i.e., those associated with the highest litigation risks), but also with a significant rise in overall separation rates. The latter result is consistent with the assumption that pre-reform many employment contracts were not broken only because termination costs could not be shared and litigation risks difficult to avoid.

Overall, our paper reveals that a reduction in separation costs does not necessarily come at the price of increased conflicts between employees and employers, even when it is followed by an actual increase in separation rates. As it happens, by changing employment doctrine and promoting separations by mutual consent, the 2008 reform induced both an increase in separation rates and a reduction in litigation risks. Eventually, we do not see any significant change in firms' employment levels after the reform, which suggests that the increase in overall separation rates induced by the reform was offset by a symmetrical increase in hiring rates, consistent with standard model of labor demand dynamics.

## References

- Abowd, J. M., Corbel, P., and Kramarz, F. (1999). The entry and exit of workers and the growth of employment: an analysis of french establishments. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(2):170–187.
- Abraham, S. and Sun, L. (2018). Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects. *Unpublished Manuscript*.
- Autor, D. H., Kerr, W. R., and Kugler, A. D. (2007). Does employment protection reduce productivity? evidence from us states. *The Economic Journal*, 117(521):F189–F217.
- Bassanini, A., Nunziata, L., and Venn, D. (2009). Job protection legislation and productivity growth in oecd countries. *Economic policy*, 24(58):349–402.
- Baudry, O. and Le Goff, E. (1992). Moins d'embauche en 1991. *INSEE Premiere*, 228.
- Behaghel, L., Caroli, E., and Walkowiak, E. (2008). Innovation and skill upgrading: The role of external vs internal labour markets. *Unpublished Manuscript*.


- Berta, N., Signoretto, C., and Valentin, J. (2012). La rupture conventionnelle : objectifs officiels versus enjeux implicites. *Revue Francaise de Socio-economie*, 9(1):191–208.
- Boeri, T. and Jimeno, J. F. (2005). The effects of employment protection: Learning from variable enforcement. *European Economic Review*, 49(8):2057–2077.
- Cengiz, D., Dube, A., Lindner, A., and Zipperer, B. (2019). The effect of minimum wages on low-wage jobs: Evidence from the united states using a bunching estimator. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Chazal, J. (1993). Ralentissement des mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1992. *INSEE Premiere*, 284.
- Chazal, J. and Levezac, A. (1997). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre dans les établissements de 50 salaries ou plus : annee 1996. *INSEE Resultats*, 628.
- Corbel, P. and Laulhe, M.-C. (1987). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1986. *Premiers resultats*, 87.
- De Chaisemartin, C. and D’Haultfoeuille, X. (2019). Two-way fixed effects estimators with heterogeneous treatment effects. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Dias, D. A., Marques, C. R., and Martins, F. (2013). Wage rigidity and employment adjustment at the firm level: Evidence from survey data. *Labour Economics*, 23:40–49.
- European Commission (2006). Termination of employment relationships legal situation in the member states of the european union. *Directorate General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities*.
- Fraisse, H., Kramarz, F., and Prost, C. (2015). Labor disputes and job flows. *ILR Review*, 68(5):1043–1077.
- Garibaldi, P. and Pacelli, L. (2008). Do larger severance payments increase individual job duration? *Labour Economics*, 15(2):215–245.
- Gibbons, R. and Katz, L. F. (1991). Layoffs and lemons. *Journal of labor Economics*, 9(4):351–380.
- Goodman-Bacon, A. (2018). Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing.
- Goux, D., Maurin, E., and Pauchet, M. (2001). Fixed-term contracts and the dynamics of labour demand. *European Economic Review*, 45(3):533–552.

- Guillonnet, Maud, S. S. (2015). Les litiges individuels du travail de 2004 a 2013 : des actions moins nombreuses, mais toujours plus contencieuses. *Infostat Justice*, 135.
- Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R. S., and Miranda, J. (2013). Who creates jobs? small versus large versus young. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 95(2):347–361.
- ILO (2015). World employment and social outlook 2015: The changing nature of jobs. *Geneva: ILO*.
- Laulhe, M.-C. (1991). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre dans les établissements de plus de 50 salariés : années 1984 a 1990. *INSEE Resultats*, 158-160.
- Laulhe, M.-C. and Le Goff, E. (1989). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1988 dans les établissements de plus de 50 salariés. *INSEE Premiere*, 51.
- Laulhe, M.-C. and Le Goff, E. (1990). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1989 dans les établissements de plus de 50 salariés. *INSEE Premiere*, 115.
- Laulhe, M.-C. and Le Goff, E. (1991). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1990 dans les établissements de plus de 50 salariés. *INSEE Premiere*, 165.
- Marinescu, I. (2009). Job security legislation and job duration: Evidence from the united kingdom. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 27(3):465–486.
- Martin, J. P. and Scarpetta, S. (2012). Setting it right: Employment protection, labour reallocation and productivity. *De Economist*, 160(2):89–116.
- OECD (2010). Moving beyond the jobs crisis. *OECD Employment Outlook*.
- OECD (2013). Protecting jobs, enhancing flexibility: A new look at employment protection legislation. *OECD Employment Outlook*.
- Okatenko, A. (2010). The impact of the reason for layoff on the subsequent unemployment duration. *Annals of Economics and Statistics/Annales d’Économie et de Statistique*, pages 285–315.
- Roux, E. and Levezac, A. (1998). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre dans les établissements de 50 salariés ou plus : année 1997. *INSEE Resultat*, 628.
- Roux, E. and Levezac, A. (1999). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre dans les établissements de 50 salariés ou plus : année 1998. *INSEE Resultat*, 679.
- Roux, E. and Levezac, A. (2000). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre dans les établissements de 50 salariés ou plus : année 1999. *INSEE Resultat*, 734.
- Thiery, P. (1995). Les mouvements de main-d’oeuvre en 1994 dans les établissements de 50 salariés et plus. *INSEE Premiere*, 407.

Thiery, P., Brasseur, J., and Levezac, A. (1997). Les mouvements de main-d'oeuvre en 1994 dans les établissements de 50 salariés et plus. *INSEE Resultats*, 515.


## Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Number of terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2017




Note: The solid line shows the evolution of the number of terminations by agreement approved each month and the dotted line shows the evolution of the number of terminations by agreement which are followed by a registration into unemployment.

Figure 2: Cumulative proportion of establishments that have already used terminations by agreement



Note: The curve shows the evolution of the proportion of establishments in the balanced panel that have already used terminations by agreement. Reading: At the end of 2010, about 50% of establishments had already used terminations by agreement.


Figure 3: Rate of termination by agreement before and after the first use of the procedure



Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The curve shows the evolution of the number of terminations by agreement per employee and quarter, taking the quarter of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. Reading: Four quarters after the first termination by agreement, the number of terminations by agreement per employee is on average about .0025 each quarter.




Figure 4: Terminations by agreement and dismissals, 2004-2014




Note: The upper solid line shows the evolution of the rate of dismissal justified by non-economic reasons, the lower solid line shows the evolution of the rate of dismissal justified by economic reasons and the dotted line shows the evolution of the rate of terminations by agreement. Source: DMMO and EMMO.

Figure 5: Rate of dismissal justified by non-economic reasons before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement.




Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of the rate of dismissal justified by non-economic reasons over a period of 6 years, taking the date of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the rate observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 6: Difference in rates of non-economic dismissal between early adopters and late adopters




Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 5. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 5.

Figure 7: Rate of dismissal justified by economic reasons before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement




Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of the rate of dismissal for economic reasons over a period of 6 years, taking the date of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the rate observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 8: Difference in rates of dismissal justified by economic reasons between early adopters and late adopters




Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 7. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 7.

Figure 9: Quit rate before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement




Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of the quit rate over a period of 6 years, taking the date of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the quit rate observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 10: Difference in quit rates between early adopters and late adopters




Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 9. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 9.

Figure 11: Retirement rate before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement




Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of the retirement rate over a period of 6 years, taking the date of first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the rate of retirement observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 12: Difference in retirement rates between early adopters and late adopters




Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 11. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 11.

Figure 13: Overall rate of termination of permanent contracts before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement




Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of the overall rate of termination of permanent contracts over a period of 6 years, taking the date of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the overall termination rate observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 14: Difference in overall rates of termination of permanent contracts between early adopters and late adopters




Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 13. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 13.

Figure 15: Number of employees before and after the adoption of terminations by agreement



Note: The figure focuses on establishments which began to use terminations by agreement between 2008 and 2011. The solid line shows the evolution of their number of employees over a period of 6 years, taking the date of the first termination by agreement as the origin of the time scale. The dotted line shows the number of employees observed at the same dates in establishments that had still not begun to use terminations by agreement by the end of 2014.

Figure 16: Difference in number of employees between early adopters and late adopters



Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure 15. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure 15.

Table 1: The effect of adopting terminations by agreement on permanent contract terminations and number of persons employed


	Non-econ. Dismissal	Quit	Economic Dismissal	Retirement	Overall termination	Nb Employees (log)
A- All industries						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.031*** (.007)	.001 (.013)	.004 (.011)	.001 (.006)	.348*** (.022)	-.0081*** (.0027)
Obs.	256739	256739	256739	256739	256739	256739
m	0.41	0.99	0.09	0.37	1.92	4.85
B- Construction and manufacturing						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.012 (.009)	.003 (.012)	.000 (.019)	-.001 (.009)	.373*** (.028)	-.0066 (.0086)
Obs.	135309	135309	135309	135309	135309	135309
m	0.398	0.67	0.13	0.40	1.65	4.90
C- Service						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.052** (.010)	-.014 (.025)	-.000 (.009)	-.003 (.008)	.328*** (.035)	-.0051 (.0039)
Obs.	120202	120202	120202	120202	120202	120202
m	0.46	1.36	0.05	0.35	2.23	4.80

*Note:* Panel A refers to the balanced panel of establishments which adopted terminations by agreement before the end of 2014. Panel B covers the subpanel of establishments in manufacturing and construction sectors whereas panel C refers to the service sector. The table shows the result of establishment-level regressions where the dependent variable is the quarterly rate of (a) dismissals for non-economic reasons (column 1), (b) quits (column 2), (c) dismissals for economic reasons (column 3), (d) retirements (column 4) as well as the overall rate of termination of permanent workers (column 5) and (e) the number of employees (in log) (column 6). The set of regressors includes a *Post<sub>jt</sub>* dummy indicating that the observation is after the beginning of the use of terminations by agreement, as well as a set of establishment fixed effects (5837 establishments) and quarter fixed effects (44 quarters). We only report estimated impact of *Post<sub>jt</sub>*. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.




## Appendix A Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Adoption of terminations by agreement and establishments' survival in the balanced panel




Note: For each potential date  $t_0$  of adoption of terminations by agreement, it is possible to consider (i) establishments continuously present in the DMMO database from 2004 $_{Q1}$  to  $t_0$  and adopting terminations by agreement in  $t_0$  and (ii) establishments continuously present in the database from 2004 $_{Q1}$  to  $t_0$ , but not adopting terminations by agreement in  $t_0$ . For each of these two groups, it is then possible to compute the survival rate in the balanced panel  $k$  quarters after  $t_0$ . For  $k = 1$  to 12, the solid line represents the average of the survival rates of the establishments in the first group across all possible  $t_0$ 's while the dotted line represents the average of the survival rates of the establishments in the second group. Reading: 90% of the establishments that were present in the balanced panel at the time of their adoption of terminations by agreement are still in the balanced panel 4 quarters later. The survival rate is only slightly lower for institutions that were still in the balanced panel at the time the first adopted terminations by agreement, but had not yet adopted terminations by agreement at that time.

Figure A.2: Adoption of terminations by agreement and differential rate of survival in the balanced panel



Note: The curve shows the evolution of the difference between the solid line and the dotted line shown in Figure A.1. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals. The source and field are the same as those used in Figure A.1.

Figure A.3: Dismissals and the business cycle between 1986 and 1997



*Note:* The bold solid line shows annual rates of dismissals for non-economic reasons, the thin solid line shows annual rates of dismissals for economic reason and the dotted line shows annual GDP growth.

Table A.1: Description of the balanced panel

	All	Adoption before 2014	No adoption before 2014
Nb of employees 2004-Q1	163	167	143
Manufacturing and construction (%)	49	52	34
Service (%)	50	47	65
Parisian region (%)	5.2	5.3	4.9
Non-economic dismissals 2004-Q1 (%)	.48	.49	.45
Quits 2004-Q1 (%)	1.10	1.09	1.17
Economic dismissals 2004-Q1 (%)	.09	.10	.06
Terminations of permanent workers, 2004-Q1 (%)	1.84	1.84	1.80
<i>N</i>	7085	5837	1248

*Note:* The table shows the main characteristics (as measured in 2004-Q1) of the establishments of the balanced panel, i.e., the establishments present in the DMMO database from 2004-Q1 to 2014Q4. The characteristics under consideration are the number of employees, the industries (manufacturing/service), the location (Paris region/other) and finally the different rates of permanent contract separation. The Table gives the average characteristics for all the establishments in the sample (first column) and then separately for those which adopted terminations by agreement before the end of 2014 (second column) and for those that had not yet used terminations by agreement by the end of 2014 (third column). Reading: the establishments in the balanced panel had an average of 163 employees at the beginning of 2004 and 49% of these establishments were in industry. During the first quarter of 2004, 1.10% of the workforce quitted the establishments.

Table A.2: The effect of adopting terminations by agreement on permanent contract terminations and number of persons employed: an analysis on the subsample where the two quarters prior to the first termination by agreement are dropped.

	Non-econ. Dismissal	Quit	Economic Dismissal	Retirement	Overall termination	Nb Employees (log)
A- All industries						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.038*** (.008)	-.006 (.015)	.002 (.012)	-.005 (.007)	.315*** (.025)	-.0056 (.0030)
Obs.	245070	245070	245070	245070	245070	245070
m	0.41	1.00	.09	0.37	1.93	4.85
B- Construction and manufacturing						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.017 (.010)	-.006 (.014)	-.001 (.021)	-.003 (.010)	.377*** (0.032)	-.0029 (.0031)
Obs.	129112	129112	129112	129112	129112	129112
m	.38	.68	.13	.40	1.65	4.90
C- Service						
<i>Post<sub>jt</sub></i>	-.059*** (.012)	-.019 (.028)	.004 (.011)	.001 (.010)	.333*** (.040)	-.0031 (.0041)
Obs.	114782	114782	114782	114782	114782	114782
m	0.46	1.36	0,05	0.33	2.23	4.80

*Note:* the Table replicates the regression analysis of Table 1 when we drop (for each establishment) the two observations before the adoption of terminations by agreement. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A.3: The effect of adopting terminations by agreement on permanent contract terminations and number of persons employed: an analysis on the unbalanced panel.

	Non-econ. Dismissal	Quit	Economic Dismissal	Retirement	Overall termination	Nb Employees (log)
A- All industries						
$Post_{jt}$	-.020*** (.005)	.009 (.010)	.013 (.008)	-.008* (.004)	.415*** (.018)	-.0081*** (.0020)
Obs.	617855	617855	617855	617855	617855	617855
m	.49	1.16	.11	.35	2.17	4.92
B- Construction and manufacturing						
$Post_{jt}$	-.017* (.007)	-.019 (.011)	-.017 (.018)	-.003 (.006)	.436*** (.026)	-.0092*** (.0031)
Obs.	268393	268393	268393	268393	268393	268393
m	.40	.70	.16	.39	1.76	4.95
C- Service						
$Post_{jt}$	-.023** (.008)	-.008 (.016)	.005 (.007)	-.005 (.005)	.409*** (.026)	-.0032 (.0027)
Obs.	345739	345739	345739	345739	345739	345739
m	.55	1.51	.06	.31	2.50	4.89

*Note:* the Table replicates the regression analysis of Table 1 for the unbalanced panel of establishment which adopted terminations by agreement before the end of 2014 and for which we have DMMO observations for 80% or more of the quarters between 2004 and 2014. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## Appendix B Conceptual Framework

In this appendix, we develop a simple conceptual framework to make precise how exactly the introduction of terminations by agreements may affect firms' behavior. We first develop a model for firms' behavior before the introduction of terminations by agreements. In a second step, we look at how (and when) the introduction of terminations by agreement entails a change in these behaviors.

### B.1 Technology and adjustment costs

As regards technology, we assume that the production function (denoted  $F$ ) depends on labor input only. Specifically, we assume that  $y_{jt} = F(x_{jt}, \pi_{jt})$  where, for each time interval  $[t, t + 1]$ ,  $y_{jt}$  represents the output of firm  $j$ ,  $x_{jt}$  the number of workers and  $\pi_{jt}$  a productivity parameter.

Entries and exits of workers are assumed to take place at the beginning of each

time interval. We denote  $h_{jt}$  the number of hiring and  $l_{jt}$  the number of workers who are dismissed for economic reasons at the beginning of  $[t, t + 1]$ . Also, we denote  $q_{jt}$  the number of workers who quit,  $f_{jt}$  the number of workers who are dismissed for non-economic reasons and  $r_{jt}$  the number of workers who retire at the beginning of  $[t, t + 1]$ .

Hiring and dismissals justified by economic reasons are assumed to be under the control of the firm whereas the flows of quits, dismissal justified by non-economic reasons and retirements are assumed to be taken as given by the firm<sup>20</sup>. We denote  $s_{it} = q_{it} + f_{it} + r_{it}$  the aggregate number of exogenous exits at the beginning of  $[t, t + 1]$ . In this framework, the objective of the firm is to choose  $h_{jt}$  and  $l_{jt}$  as a function of  $\pi_{jt}$  and  $s_{jt}$  so as to maximize an objective function which can be written as,

$$V_{jt} = E_t \left\{ \sum_{k \geq t} \delta^{k-t} (F(x_{jk}, \pi_{jk}) - w_{jk}x_{jk} - c_H h_{jk} - c_L l_{jk}) \right\} \quad (2)$$

subject to conditions (a)  $x_{jk} = x_{jk-1} + h_{jk} - l_{jk} - s_{jk}$ , (b)  $h_{jk} \geq 0$  and (c)  $l_{jk} \geq 0$ , where  $w_{jt}$  represents the wage rate and where adjustment costs are assumed linear, with  $c_H$  representing the per unit hiring cost and  $c_L$  the per unit lay off costs. The discount rate  $\delta$  is assumed to be less than one (i.e.,  $\delta \leq 1$ ).

## B.2 First-order conditions and state variables

After dropping subscript  $j$ , the (three) first-order conditions can be written,

$$F'(x_t, \pi_t) - w_t - \lambda_t + E_t \{ \lambda_{t+1} \} = 0, c_H + \lambda_t + \gamma_{Ht} = 0 \text{ and } -c_L - \lambda_t + \gamma_{Lt} = 0 \quad (3)$$

where  $\lambda_t$ ,  $\gamma_{Ht}$  and  $\gamma_{Lt}$  represent the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (a), (b) and (c). These Lagrange multipliers satisfy  $\gamma_{Ht}h_t = \gamma_{Lt}l_t = 0$  so that, taken together, the two last first-order conditions imply that

$$(c_H + c_L)h_t l_t = 0 \quad (4)$$

It entails that hiring and layoffs for economic reasons cannot be strictly positive at the same time and that there are only three possible optimal responses at the beginning of each period. The first response involves some dismissals for economic reasons ( $l_t > 0$ ), but no hiring ( $h_t = 0$ ). It corresponds to periods of employment downsizing through both exogenous exits and layoffs for economic reasons. The second response involves neither hiring nor dismissals for economic reasons ( $l_t =$

---

<sup>20</sup>The model assumes implicitly that non-economic dismissals can occur only in very specific cases (serious misconduct, individual performance-related problems, etc.) and that, in these instances, firms cannot avoid terminating employment contracts (using either dismissals for non-economic reasons or terminations by agreement). The fact that non-economic dismissals do not really increase during economic downturn is consistent with their being difficult to manipulate.

$h_t = 0$ ). It corresponds to periods of employment downsizing through exogenous exits only. The last response involves some hiring ( $h_t > 0$ ), but no dismissals ( $l_t = 0$ ). It corresponds to periods of expansion (when the flows of hiring exceeds the flows of exogenous exits) or to periods of downsizing through partial replacement of quitters and retirees (when the flows of hiring are not as large as the flows of exogenous exits).

Eventually, given that  $h_t l_t = 0$ , both  $h_t$  and  $l_t$  depends only on  $(x_t - x_{t-1})$ , namely  $h_t = (x_t - x_{t-1} + s_t)$  and  $l_t = 0$  when  $x_t - x_{t-1} + s_t \geq 0$  while  $h_t = 0$  and  $l_t = -(x_t - x_{t-1} + s_t)$  when  $x_t - x_{t-1} + s_t < 0$ . Hence the only endogenous state variable is  $x_t$  and the only question at the beginning of each period is to define the value of  $x_t$  which maximize the objective function as a function of present and past productivity shocks.

### B.3 Pre-reform optimal strategies

To further analyze how firms choose between the different possible strategies, we are going to focus on the case where  $F$  can be proxied by a linear-quadratic function (i.e.,  $F(x, \pi) = \pi x - \frac{bx^2}{2}$ ) and where the shocks  $\epsilon_t = \pi_t - w_t$  to the marginal profit per worker follow a two-state markovian chain. We denote  $\epsilon^+$  and  $\epsilon^-$  the two values that  $\epsilon_t = \pi_t - w_t$  can take over time and  $p(q)$  will represent the probability of moving from  $\epsilon^+$  to  $\epsilon^-$  ( $\epsilon^-$  to  $\epsilon^+$ ) from one period to the next.

Parameter  $\Delta = \frac{\epsilon^+ - \epsilon^-}{b}$  represents the magnitude of the downward shift in labor demand that would be observed after a bad shock if adjustment costs were negligible (i.e., if  $c_H$  and  $c_L$  were negligible). Eventually, we assume that exogenous exits are constant over time and we denote  $S$  their aggregate level. In this set up, it is possible to show that the optimal adjustment strategy of the firm depends not only on adjustment costs (as measured by  $c_H$  and  $c_L$ ), but also on the  $\Delta - S$  parameter, namely the magnitude of the downward adjustment that firm would find optimal to perform if adjustment costs were negligible.

**Proposition 1 (pre-reform behavior):**

Denoting  $\Delta = \frac{\epsilon^+ - \epsilon^-}{b}$  the magnitude of labor demand shocks,  $C_{pre} = \frac{c_H + c_L}{b}$  the magnitude of adjustment costs and  $S$  the aggregate flows of exogenous exits, the pre-reform behavior of firms depends on  $\Delta - S$  and  $C_{pre}$ .

- If  $\Delta - S < 0$  firms' employment level follows a two-state markovian chain and firms adjust to changes in economic context through changes in hiring rates only. Hiring is below the replacement level during economic slowdown, above the replacement level during economic recovery and at the replacement level the rest of the time.
- If  $0 < \Delta - S < (1 + (1 - \delta)p)C_{pre}$ , firms' employment level follows a three-state markovian chain and firms adjust to labor demand shocks either through

changes in hiring rates or by staying put. Specifically, they stay put during economic slowdown and hires workers the rest of the time, with hiring being either below, above or at the replacement level depending on the economic context.

- If  $\Delta - S > (1 + (1 - \delta)p)C_{pre}$ , firms' employment level follows a three-state markovian chain and firms adjust to labor demand shocks either through changes in hiring rates or by dismissing workers. Specifically, they dismiss workers during economic slowdown and hires workers the rest of the time, with hiring being either below, above or at the replacement level depending on the economic context.

[Proof :

- If  $\Delta - S < 0$ , one checks that the two state markovian chain defined by  $x(\epsilon_t) = \frac{\epsilon_t - c_H(1-\delta)}{b}$  satisfies the first-order conditions. Given that the return function is concave, first-order conditions are also sufficient, so that this plan represents the optimum. The firm adapt to shocks by setting  $h_t = S + \frac{\epsilon_t - \epsilon_{t-1}}{b}$ , namely by setting  $h_t$  either above, below or at the replacement level  $S$  (depending on  $\epsilon_t - \epsilon_{t-1}$ ).
- If  $0 < \Delta - S < (1 + (1 - \delta)p)C_{pre}$ , we can use a similar reasoning to show that the solution is now given by the three state markovian chain defined by  $x_t = x(\epsilon_{t-1}, \epsilon_t)$  with:  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) = x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^+) = \frac{\epsilon^+ - (1-\delta)p c_H + \delta(1-p)\lambda^{+/-}}{b}$  ;  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- + \delta c_H - \lambda^\pm}{b} = x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) - S$  and  $x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- - (1-\delta)c_H}{b}$ , where  $\lambda^{+/-} = \frac{b(S-\Delta) + (1+\delta(1-p)c_H)}{1+\delta(1-p)}$  is the Lagrange multiplier when  $\epsilon_t = \epsilon^-$  and  $\epsilon_{t-1} = \epsilon^+$ . It is easy to check that  $-c_L < \lambda^\pm < c_H$  which is the condition for both hiring and lay off to be zero when  $\epsilon_t = \epsilon^-$  and  $\epsilon_{t-1} = \epsilon^+$ .
- Eventually, if  $\Delta - S > (1 + (1 - \delta)p)C_{pre}$ , the solution is given that the three-state markovian chain defined by  $x_t = x(\epsilon_{t-1}, \epsilon_t)$  with :  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) = x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^+) = \frac{\epsilon^+ - (1-\delta)p c_H - (1-p)\delta c_L}{b}$  ;  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- + \delta c_H + c_L}{b}$  and  $x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- - (1-\delta)c_H}{b}$ .]

## B.4 After the reform

After the reform, employers may first find of interest to sign terminations by agreement with workers that would otherwise be dismissed for non-economic reasons. Among the  $f_t$  workers who are about to be dismissed for non-economic reasons during  $[t, t + 1]$ , we denote  $f_{rt}$  (with  $f_{rt} \leq f_t$ ) the number of those with whom it is possible to sign a termination by agreement at a cost which is not as large as the expected cost of dismissing these workers for non-economic reasons. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that  $f_{rt}$  is taken as given by the firm.

Some other workers are not about to be dismissed for non-economic reasons, nor about to quit their firms, but are nonetheless ready to sign a termination by agreement. As discussed above, these workers are typically those who would like to leave their employer, but have no clear outside option yet. For them, signing a termination by agreement represents a better option than quitting, because it does not involve losing eligibility to severance payments and unemployment benefits. Denoting  $c_R$  the cost for the employer of signing a termination by agreement with these workers and assuming that  $c_R$  is weaker than the cost of dismissing these workers for economic reason (denoted  $c_L$ ), employers may find of interest to sign terminations by agreement with these workers. In the remainder, we denote  $rc_{mt}$  the number of such workers, which also represent the maximum number of terminations by agreement that the employer can sign with employees who are neither about to be dismissed for non-economic reason nor about to quit. We assume that  $rc_{mt}$  is taken as given by the firm, exactly as quits. For each time interval and each firm, we will keep on denoting  $h_t$  the number of hiring,  $l_t$  the number of layoffs and we will denote  $rc_{jt}$  the number of termination by agreement that are actually signed (with  $rc_t \leq rc_{mt}$ ). With these notations, the post-reform objective of the firm becomes to choose  $h_{jt}$ ,  $l_{jt}$  and  $rc_{jt}$  as a function of  $\pi_t$  and  $s_t$  so as to maximize an objective function which can be written as,

$$V_{jt} = E_t \left\{ \sum_{k \geq t} \delta^{k-t} (F(x_k, \pi_k) - w_k x_k - c_H h_k - c_L l_k - c_R rc_k) \right\}, \quad (5)$$

subject to :  $h_k \geq 0, l_k \geq 0, rc_{mk} \geq rc_k \geq 0$  and  $x_k = x_{k-1} + h_k - l_k - rc_k - s_k$ ,

where  $\delta, w_t, c_H$  and  $c_L$  represent the same economic variables and parameters as in the previous subsection and where  $c_R$  captures per unit cost of termination by agreements. We keep on assuming that exogenous outflows are constant over time (still denoted  $S$ ) and, for the sake of simplicity, we further assume that  $rc_{mt}$  is constant over time (denoted  $R$ ). Also, we still denote  $\Delta = \frac{\epsilon^+ - \epsilon^-}{b}$  the magnitude of the downward shift in labor demand that would be observed after a bad shock if adjustment costs were negligible (i.e., if  $c_H, c_L$  and  $c_R$  were negligible), so that  $\Delta - S$  still represents the magnitude of the downward adjustment that firms would find optimal to perform if adjustment costs were negligible. In this set-up, the optimal strategy of the firm still depends on  $\Delta - S$ , but also on  $R$ .

**Proposition 2 (firms' behavior after the reform)**

Denoting  $C_{post} = \frac{c_H + c_R}{b}$  a measure of post-reform adjustment costs and  $R$  the number of workers who are not about to quit or to be dismissed, but who are nonetheless ready to sign a termination by agreement, the behavior of firms after the reform is the same as before the reform only when  $R$  is negligible or when  $\Delta - S$  is not too large. Specifically, we have,

- If  $\Delta - S < 0$ , the adjustment regime is the same after the reform as before the



reform. Firms keep on adjusting labor input by setting the number of hiring either above, below or at the replacement level.

- If  $0 < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post}$ , the adjustment regime is again the same after the reform as before the reform. The firms stay put during economic downturn and adjust the number of hiring the rest of the time.
- If  $(1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} + R$ , the optimal adjustment regime is not the same after and before the reform. For these values of  $\Delta - S$ , firms start using terminations by agreement during economic downturn whereas they would have stayed put pre-reform. For these values of  $\Delta - S$ , the reform induces a rise in separation rates, but no substitution of terminations by agreement for dismissals justified by economic reasons.
- If  $R + (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{pre} + R$ , the optimal adjustment regime is not the same after and before the reform. For these values  $\Delta - S$ , firms use the maximum number of terminations (i.e.,  $R$ ) by agreement during economic downturn whereas they would have stayed put pre-reform. For these values of  $\Delta - S$ , the reform induces again a rise in separation rates, but no substitution of terminations by agreement for dismissals justified by economic reasons.
- For even larger value of  $\Delta - S$ , firms use terminations by agreement in contexts where, pre-reform, they would have used dismissals for economic reason only. For these larger values  $\Delta - S$ , the reform induced a rise in overall separation rates as well as substitution of terminations by agreement for dismissals justified by economic reasons.

[Proof: The proof follows the same line as the proof of proposition 1.

- When  $\Delta - S < 0$  or when  $0 < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post}$ , it is not difficult to check that the two-state and three-state markovian chains described at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 1 still remain optimal plans.
- By contrast, when  $(1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} + R$ , the optimal solution is given that the three-state markovian chain defined by  $x_t = x(\epsilon_{t-1}, \epsilon_t)$  with :  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) = x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^+) = \frac{\epsilon^+ - (1 - \delta p)c_H - (1 - p)\delta c_R}{b}$ ;  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^+ + \delta c_H + c_R}{b}$  and  $x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- - (1 - \delta)c_H}{b}$ .
- When  $(1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{post} + R < \Delta - S < (1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{pre} + R$ , the optimal solution is given by the three-state markovian chain defined by  $x_t = x(\epsilon_{t-1}, \epsilon_t)$  with :  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) = x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^+) = \frac{\epsilon^+ - (1 - \delta p)c_H + \delta(1 - p)\lambda^{+/-}}{b}$  ;  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^+ + \delta c_H - \lambda^{+/-}}{b} = x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) - S - R$  and  $x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- - (1 - \delta)c_H}{b}$ , where  $\lambda^{+/-} = \frac{b(S + R - \Delta) + (1 + \delta(1 - p))c_H}{1 + \delta(1 - p)}$  is the Lagrange multiplier when  $\epsilon_t = \epsilon^-$  and  $\epsilon_{t-1} = \epsilon^+$ .

- Eventually, when  $(1 + \delta(1 - p))C_{pre} + R < \Delta - S$ , the optimal solution is given that the three-state markovian chain defined by  $x_t = x(\epsilon_{t-1}, \epsilon_t)$  with :  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^+) = x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^+) = \frac{\epsilon^+ - (1 - \delta p)c_H - (1 - p)\delta c_L}{b}$  ;  $x(\epsilon^+, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- + \delta c_H + c_L}{b}$  and  $x(\epsilon^-, \epsilon^-) = \frac{\epsilon^- - (1 - \delta)c_H}{b}$ .]

In our set up, the difference  $\Delta - S$  represents the magnitude of the downward adjustment that firms would like to perform when they are hit by adverse shocks. In practice, firms will perform these adjustments only if adjustment costs are not too large. Assuming that  $c_R < c_L$  and that the number  $R$  of would-be movers is positive, it may become possible for firms to perform some downward adjustments after the reform (through terminations by agreements) in cases where no adjustments would have been seen pre-reform (because of layoff costs). In this scenario, the introduction of terminations by agreement coincides not only with a decline in non-economic dismissals, but also with a rise in the overall number of separations. It is an empirical question, however, whether firms meet these conditions.

## Appendix C A "stacked" difference-in-difference approach

In an event analysis with a staggered design (where all units are progressively treated, cohort by cohort), the two way fixed effect estimator of parameter  $\gamma$  in our main model may be difficult to interpret (see [Abraham and Sun \(2018\)](#), [Goodman-Bacon \(2018\)](#), [De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille \(2019\)](#)). Specifically, when treatment effects are heterogeneous across cohorts; this estimator recovers a linear combination of cohort specific average treatment effects where some weights can be negative, mostly because early and late cohorts are not observed on intervals of time of same length.

To test the robustness of our results to heterogeneous effects, we developed an event-by-event analysis in the spirit of [Cengiz et al. \(2019\)](#)). The first step of the procedure consists in estimating the impact of the treatment separately for each cohort, using cohort-specific sample covering time intervals of same length (so that effects for early and late cohorts are estimated on time intervals of same length). The second step consists in taking the average across these cohort-specific effects.

To be more specific, for each one of the twelve quarters  $e$  between  $e = 2009\text{-Q1}$  and  $e = 2011\text{-Q4}$ , we first consider  $A_e$  the subset of establishments which introduced termination by agreements either in  $e$  or after  $e + 12$  (i.e., three or more years later). Secondly, for each establishment  $j$  in  $A_e$ , we consider  $S_{j_e}$  the sample of observations of establishment  $j$  made between  $t = e - 12$  and  $t = e + 12$ , namely between three years before and three years after  $t_e$ . Eventually, for each  $t_e$  between 2009-Q1 and 2011-Q4, we define  $S_e$ , the union of the different  $S_{j_e}$  for  $j$  in  $A_e$ . For each  $e$ , sample

$S_e$  makes it possible to compare over the period  $[e - 12, e + 12]$  the establishments that are treated in  $e$  with the establishments that will be treated three or more years later. Specifically, we re-estimated our main model (1) on each one of the twelve cohort-specific samples  $S_e$  so as to obtain twelve estimated parameters  $\gamma_e$ . Table C.4 shows the weighted average of these estimated  $\gamma_e$  for the different outcomes of interest, where weights are proportional to the size of the different  $S_e$ . Generally speaking, we obtain average effects that are very similar to those shown in Table 1.

Table C.4: The effect of adopting terminations by agreement on permanent contract terminations and number of employees: Event-by-event analysis.

	Non-econ. Dismissal	Quit	Economic Dismissal	Retirement	Overall termination
A- All industries					
$Post_{jt}$	-.031*** (.008)	0.010 (.015)	.004 (.011)	-0.019* (.008)	0.272*** (.024)
Obs.	1262349	1262349	1262349	1262349	1262349
m	.49	1.16	.11	.35	2.17

*Note:* The table shows the result the event-by-event analysis described above where the dependent variable is the quarterly rate of (a) dismissals for non-economic reasons (column 1), (b) quits (column 2), (c) dismissals for economic reasons (column 3), (d) retirements (column 4) as well as the overall rate of termination of permanent workers (column 5).