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BIRMINGHAM BUSINESS SCHOOL

# Birmingham Business School Discussion Paper Series

## Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US

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### Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US\*

Tommaso Aquilante<sup>†</sup>

#### Abstract

Antidumping (AD) is the most widely used contingent protection measure. In the United States, key decisions on AD are delegated to the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency composed of six non-elected commissioners. Using a newly collected dataset, I study the determinants of all final ITC votes on AD during the 1980-2010 period. Contrary to the view that ITC commissioners are bureaucrats who simply follow technical rules, I find that their decisions crucially depend on which party has appointed them (the selection effect) and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party (the pressure effect): whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in favor of AD depends crucially on whether the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employment) in the states represented by leading (Democratic) Republican senators.

*Keywords:* Antidumping Policy, Political Parties. *JEL:* D72, F10, F13, F14, P16.

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#### 1. Introduction

Policies can be decided by elected politicians and appointed, non-elected, bureaucrats. In many countries, key decisions are taken by appointed officials. Examples are the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Bank in the US or the European Central Bank in the EU. One reason that is often mentioned to motivate the delegation of policymaking to non-elected people is that, their decisions can be isolated from political pressure. Economists have mostly focused on the independence of central bankers (Rogoff, 1985; Waller, 1989, 1992; Persson and Tabellini, 2002). However, motivations for delegation also apply to other important policies and institutions.

A notable case is the US International Trade Commission (ITC), a quasi-judicial agency headed by six non-elected commissioners delegated by Congress to administer, in a fair and objective manner, a large part of the US antidumping (AD) proceedings. Essentially, ITC commissioners administer one of the most important non-tariff barrier allowed by the WTO/GATT rules to protect domestic industries from unfair business practices of foreign firms.<sup>1</sup> In particular, a foreign firm is considered to be dumping if it sells a product abroad at lower price than the one charged in its domestic market, or at a price that is below an estimate of cost plus a normal return. To counter this behavior, domestic firms can ask their governments to be protected by AD measures. To impose such measures, the importing country must prove that dumping has occurred and has caused material injury to domestic producers.

AD has increasingly been used by governments.<sup>2</sup> Conceived as a tool to restore the "level-playing field", vested interests can turn it into a protectionist device, widening the risk of trade-chilling effects (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010).<sup>3</sup> To deflect pressure from lobby groups, politicians have delegated AD to independent agencies (see Anderson and Zanardi, 2009). As mentioned above, this is the case in the US, where the verification of material injury has been delegated to the ITC.<sup>4</sup> Baldwin (1985), Destler (1986),

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>With the remarkable decrease in the level of import tariffs, AD has become one of the most used trade barriers (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003; Bown, 2013; Blonigen and Prusa, 2015).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The number of countries with an AD law has almost tripled since 1980. In a world where tariffs have decreased dramatically, AD measures might be used as a substitute to grant import-protection (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Several papers (e.g. Durling and Prusa, 2006; Bown and Crowley, 2007; Besedeš and Prusa, 2013) have shown that AD has sizable restrictive effects on trade. In the case of the US, for instance, these effects have been estimated to be equivalent to a 6 percent tariff applied to all firms (Ruhl, 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The existence of dumping is instead investigated by the US Department of Commerce. Section 2 describes in detail the AD proceedings in the US.

and Anderson (1993) argue that, in line with its mandate, the ITC follows technical rules when deciding on AD. This is also the view of former ITC commissioner Deanna Okun:

"...No, it's not a political role. That's one of the interesting things about the ITC, in terms of independent agencies."<sup>5</sup>

This paper asks whether ITC commissioners are independent "bureaucrats" who simply follow technical rules when voting on AD, or whether their decisions are affected by political parties. There are two main channels through which parties can shape ITC decisions. First, when new commissioners are appointed, they must be approved by the Senate.<sup>6</sup> By law, no more than three of the six commissioners can be appointed by the same political party. Effectively, this means that the ITC is composed of three Democratic and three Republican commissioners implying that parties can influence the selection of ITC officials. Second, once appointed, they regularly interact with the Senate, in particular with the Finance committee (e.g. when the ITC is heard on key trade matters). This paper shows that ITC commissioners' decisions crucially depend on which party appointed them and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party.

To carry out the analysis, I have constructed a new dataset containing all ITC commissioners' final votes on material injury during the 1980-2010 period and I combined it with information on commissioners' characteristics (e.g. party affiliation, gender, age, employment background). For each AD vote, I also constructed measures of trade policy interests of leading Democratic and Republican senators, based on data on industry-level employment for the states they represent.

I first examined whether the voting behavior of ITC commissioners depends on the party that appointed them: Democratic-appointed commissioners are systematically more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones. The effect is sizable: the increase in the predicted probability of voting in favor of AD associated to a Democratic-appointed commissioner ranges from 8 to 39 percentage points. This is in line with studies showing that, during the last decades, Democratic congressmen have been systematically more protectionist than their Republican counterparts (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Hiscox, 2002; Conconi et al., 2014). The results thus show that the voting behavior of Democratic and Republican-appointed commissioners reflects the trade policy preferences of the party that appointed them, against the presumption that they are bureaucrats who only follow

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Extract from "The ITC explained: WIPR talks to Deanna Tanner Okun", *The WIPR* (October 1, 2010). Deanna Okun has been ITC commissioner from January 2000 to September 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>See Section 2.2 for a more detailed description of the appointment process.

technical rules. This suggests that political parties can play an important role on AD by appointing ITC commissioners with similar trade views. I will refer to this finding as the *selection effect* of political parties.

I then study whether commissioners' votes on AD depend on the trade policy interests of the party that appointed them. In particular, I focus on senators who belong to the Trade sub-committee, the subset of the powerful Finance committee which deals with trade matters. I find that whether (Republican) Democratic-appointed ITC commissioners vote in favor of AD at a given time depends crucially on whether this is an important industry in the states represented by (Republican) Democratic members of the Trade sub-committee at the time of AD votes. This result suggests that leading members of both parties might put pressure on ITC commissioners to vote in line with their own trade policy interests. While other studies (e.g. Hansen, 1990; Moore, 1992; Hansen and Prusa, 1997) have shown that politics can influence the ITC voting behavior, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first one to show that this influence is party-specific. I will refer to this result as the *pressure effect* of political parties.

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the AD proceedings in the US and the link between Senate and ITC commissioners. Section 3 briefly reviews the related literature. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 and 6 present the results. Section 7 reports the robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.

#### 2. AD in the US

As mentioned in the previous section, a country can only impose AD measures if it can prove that foreign firms have been dumping and that this behavior has caused (or threatened to cause) material injury to the domestic industry.

#### 2.1. The AD Proceedings

In the US, dumping and material injury investigations are respectively the tasks of the US Department of Commerce (Commerce hereafter) and the ITC. The process leading to the imposition of an AD measure consists of five stages.

The first stage is the filing of an AD petition, that is a request of protection against alleged dumped imports of a given product from a given country.

Petitions must be filed by interested parties (i.e. firms, trade or business associations and unions of workers) on behalf of a US industry which is allegedly materially injured (or threatened to) by reason of imports that are being, or are likely to be, sold in the US at less than fair value.<sup>7</sup> Once a petition has been filed, Commerce has 20 days to decide whether petitioners' claims are sufficiently reasonable for the dumping investigation to start. If this is the case, Commerce initiates the investigation; if not, all the proceedings terminate.

The second stage involves the *preliminary injury decision* by the ITC. Once Commerce decides that petitioners' allegations are reasonably grounded, the ITC has 45 days to determine whether there is convincing indication that an industry in the US is materially injured (or is threatened with material injury) by imports of the product under investigation. The determination is affirmative if the number of commissioners who find material injury is larger than (or equal to) the one of those who do not (evenly divided votes are counted as affirmative ones). If the ITC vote on material injury is negative, proceedings are ended.

The third stage and fourth stages are respectively the *the preliminary dumping decision* and the *final dumping decision* of Commerce.<sup>8</sup> The preliminary (final) decision must be taken within 160 (235) days after the date on which the petition was filed. A negative preliminary decision on dumping does not stop the investigation process, which goes on until the final decision. If this is negative, the entire proceedings ends.

Finally, the fifth stage is the *final material injury decision* by the ITC. This has to be taken within 280 days from the date when the petition was filed. If the vote is affirmative, an AD measure is imposed.<sup>9</sup> My empirical analysis focuses on these final ITC votes. Notice that the stages before the final-injury one have historically proven to be highly unselective: from 1980 onwards, more than 90% (80%) of the dumping (preliminary injury) decisions have been affirmative (Bown, 2015). This is not the case for the final ITC decisions, for which the same percentage is less than 65% (Bown, 2015).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>According to the WTO AD agreement (1994), a product is sold to a price that is below the fair value if a foreign firm sells at home, the same product (or a similar one) at a higher price or it sells abroad the product at a price which does not cover the cost of production plus a reasonable addition for the cost of selling and profits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>With the *the preliminary dumping decision*, the magnitude (margin) of the dumping margin is also computed. If the dumping margin is very small (less than 2% of the export price of the product) the so called *de minimis* rule applies and the investigation has to be terminated immediately.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>AD measures can take the form of a duty (i.e. a tax on imports of the product under investigation) or of price undertaking (i.e. an agreement to increase the price of the product that was unfairly exported to the US).

#### 2.2. The ITC and the Senate

The ITC has a central role in shaping the use of AD in the US. Established by Congress in 1916 as an independent agency, it is composed of six commissioners who are appointed for nine non-renewable years.<sup>10</sup> By law, no more than three commissioners can be from the same political party (19 U.S. Code § 1330). As a result, three of its members are usually from the Democratic party and three from the Republican party, with terms scheduled to end 18 months apart. When a new commissioner needs to be appointed, the Senate plays an important role: once the President has put forward a nominee, the Senate has to confirm (or not) the name through a two-stage procedure. A first vote takes place in the Finance committee (by simple majority rule). If this approves the nominee, a second vote takes place in the Senate at large (again by simple majority).<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the interaction between the Senate (and in particular the Finance Trade sub-committee) and the ITC commissioners goes beyond the approval of the presidential nominees. In particular, under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC can be heard on any matter involving tariffs or international trade, e.g. the Trade sub-committee may ask the ITC general to produce fact-finding investigations (see also Moore, 1992).<sup>12</sup>

#### 3. Related Literature

This paper relates to several streams of research. First, it contributes to the analysis of the political economy of AD.<sup>13</sup> The peculiar characteristics of US AD proceedings have triggered a large literature studying the political economy motives behind the ITC voting behavior. The evidence is mixed. Baldwin (1985), Destler (1986), and Anderson (1993), for instance, find that the ITC voting behavior is not influenced by political pressure, i.e. in voting on AD, the ITC follows the rules. In a seminal paper, Finger et al. (1982) argue instead that, despite the requirements set by the US law, the injury decisions of the ITC are subject to some discretion. Moore (1992) shows that AD petitions involving (the powerful Finance Senate) Trade sub-committee members' constituencies are more likely to be favored by the ITC. Similarly, Hansen (1990) and Hansen and Prusa (1997) find that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>In reality, the tenure of ITC commissioners is often shorter and (in a few cases) longer than 9 years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Section 4.3 provides more details about the interplay between ITC commissioners and the Finance Trade sub-committee.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The Trade sub-committee also authorizes the ITC's budget, which is however set in detail by other committees (see DeVault, 2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>See Nelson (2006) and Blonigen and Prusa (2015) for a review of the literature on the political economy of AD.

the ITC, though keeping into account economic factors, it is also influenced by domestic political forces when deciding on AD. My results also suggest that Congress can exert influence on the ITC with one important novelty: political influence is party-specific, i.e. ITC commissioners are more likely to protect the interests of the parties that appointed them.<sup>14</sup>

Second, it contributes to the literature on bureaucrats and politicians. Some papers have focused on why some policy tasks are more frequently delegated than others. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that politicians are more likely to forgo policy tasks that have little redistributive impact. Focusing on the US, Anderson and Zanardi (2009) argue that they could be willing to delegate in order to reduce the influence of lobbies in determining the electoral outcome. Other papers, like Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) explicitly compare the suitability of bureaucrats and politicians in performing (single or multiple) policy tasks, concluding that bureaucrats should be preferred in technical ones (i.e. for those in which ability is more important than effort). This paper provides evidence of the responsiveness of bureaucrats to politicians' interests, showing that delegation is not enough to make the ITC immune from political influence: the voting behavior of its commissioners crucially depends on which party appointed them and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party. This result is closely related to the literature on judges' preferences and courts' neutrality in the US (see for instance Nagel, 1961; Brace et al., 2000; Iaryczower et al., 2013; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014): judges' characteristics (e.g. political affiliation) crucially shape their voting on fundamental issues, questioning the objectivity of the courts' sentencing.

Third, it relates to the literature emphasising the role of career concerns in shaping the performance of managers (e.g. Holmström, 1999; Brickley et al., 1999) or bureaucrats (e.g Dewatripont et al., 1999a,b). The finding that commissioners votes on AD are influenced by political parties could be interpreted through the lens of career concerns: career-motivated commissioners could please their party or in order increase the chances of finding a good job once the their mandate expires.

Finally, the paper also relates to the extensive literature on the political economy of trade policy. Several studies have focused on voting and elections (e.g. Mayer, 1984;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>A recent study by Avsar (2014) uses a panel of twenty countries to show that the increase in the leftist orientation of governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative AD outcome from the petitions of labor intensive industries. In this paper, I take into account the ideology of people who actually vote on AD for the US (i.e. the ITC commissioners), showing that their voting behavior relates to trade policy interests of the political parties they are linked to.

Baldwin, 1985; Magee et al., 1989; Dutt and Mitra, 2002; Helpman and Grossman, 2005). Much attention has also been devoted to the role of lobby groups (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Helpman, 1995; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Mitra, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000). Other studies have focused on different political factors, such as governments' inability to commit to policy choices (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998), ratification rules (Conconi et al., 2012), term length and election proximity (Conconi et al., 2014). This study examines the influence of political parties on AD decisions.

#### 4. Data

To perform the analysis, I collected all ITC commissioners' final votes on material injury during the 1980-2010 period. Over the time span covered in this paper, 1,230 AD petitions were filed in the US. Of these, 798 reached the final-injury-decision stage.<sup>15</sup> I focus on the final-injury decisions because, of the two taken by the ITC, it is arguably the most important. In fact, over the sample at hand, 86% of the preliminary injury decisions were affirmative. The same percentage drops to 65% when computed for the final injury decisions, suggesting that material injury standards are lower at the preliminary stage than at the final decision (see also Prusa, 1991; Moore, 1992).

#### 4.1. Votes on AD

Using the information made available in the ITC reports and in other ITC official documents, I collected 4,644 commissioner-level final injury votes.<sup>16</sup> For each vote, ITC reports also list the country/countries that allegedly caused material injury to the petitioning US industry. The number of commissioners who votes on AD is sometimes different from six, e.g. when the Senate is late in approving the presidential nominee. Also, in some cases, commissioners do not participate in an AD vote. This happens, for example, if they are unable to follow the bulk of an investigation because they were recently appointed. Since non-participation is considered as a non-vote, I exclude these observations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>I concentrate on petitions initiated after the entry into force of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 that reached the final-injury stage by the end of December 2010. Data before that date could in principle also be collected. Nevertheless, the Act significantly changed some AD proceedings, making the combination of pre-Act and post-Act cases inappropriate (see Baldwin and Steagall, 1994). In particular, the Act shortened the AD investigations' time limits and shifted the determinations of the less than fair value from the US Treasury Department to Commerce. Importantly, it also required injury to be *caused by reason* of imports being sold at less than the fair value in order for an AD measure to be imposed (Sklaroff, 1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>See the Appendix for a complete description of data sources.

from the sample.<sup>17</sup> I also dropped the 173 votes of the Independent commissioners (see below) and the petitions for which the votes of the ITC commissioners were not disclosed (e.g. for confidentiality reasons). Finally, is some cases (see below), it was not possible to map the codes of the product under investigation into industry codes. The sample used for the analysis is thus made of 3,983 commissioners' final votes on material injury.

The dependent variable  $Vote_{ikct}$ , i.e. the vote of commissioner *i*, at time *t* (i.e. at the time when the decision on AD was taken), on whether to grant AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*, equals 1 if the commissioner votes in favor of AD and 0 otherwise. Table 1 collects summary statistics of the dependent variable: the mean of  $Vote_{ikct}$  across all the commissioners is 0.639 indicating that in the majority of the cases they voted in favor of AD.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Observations
<i>Vote<sub>ikct</sub></i>	0.639	0.480	0	1	3,983
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.489	0.500	0	1	3,983
Republican <sub>i</sub>	0.511	0.500	0	1	3,983
<i>Female</i> <sub>i</sub>	0.444	0.497	0	1	3,983
Age <sub>it</sub>	52	9.94	33	71	3,983
Legislative <sub>i</sub>	0.369	0.482	0	1	3,983
Executive <sub>i</sub>	0.260	0.439	0	1	3,983
Academia <sub>i</sub>	0.123	0.329	0	1	3,983
Private <sub>i</sub>	0.248	0.432	0	1	3,983
$Pressure_{tk}^{Dem}$	0.154	0.361	0	1	3,983
Pressure <sup>Rep</sup>	0.198	0.399	0	1	3,983

Table 1	1:	Summary	statistics
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#### 4.2. Commissioners' Characteristics

Combining information contained both in the biographies provided by the ITC as well in the Marquis' "*Who's Who*" database, I constructed several variables that capture important characteristics of commissioners.

First, commissioners are usually appointed by the President as Democratic or Republican.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>The cases of non-participation were only 3.21% of the sample and were not concentrated in any particular industry and year or against a specific target-country.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Out of 29 commissioners who were at the ITC during the time span of the sample, only 2 were Independent.

To verify whether party affiliation shapes their votes on AD, I constructed two dummy variables:  $Democratic_i$  and  $Republican_i$  equal 1 if commissioner i is appointed as Democratic or Republican and 0 otherwise.

Gender and age have been shown to be important drivers of individuals' preferences for trade policy (see for instance Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). To account for the role of these demographic characteristics, I construct the variables *Female<sub>i</sub>*, a dummy equal to 1 if the commissioner *i* is female, and  $Age_{it}$ , which captures the age of commissioner *i* when he or she voted on material injury at time *t*. I have also collected data on commissioners' employment background. Baldwin (1985) and DeVault (2002) argue that previous employment of commissioners might affect their preferences on trade. To explore this relationship, following DeVault (2002), I construct the following (mutually exclusive) dummies: *Legislative<sub>i</sub>*, *Executive<sub>i</sub>*, *Academia<sub>i</sub>* and *Private<sub>i</sub>*. These are equal to 1 if the last employment of commissioner *i*, before joining the ITC, was in a legislative or executive body, in academia or in the private sector and 0 otherwise.

Table 2 lists all the ITC commissioners during the sample period and their key characteristics. Table 1 reports summary statistics of commissioner-level controls. The average of  $Democrat_i$  (or  $Republican_i$ ) confirms that the ITC is equally split between Democraticand Republican-appointed commissioners.

Between 1980 and 2010, the number of female and male commissioners appointed at the ITC has been very similar, while the age of commissioners ranges from 33 to 71 years (with an average of 52). In terms of employment background, most commissioners were employed as legislative assistants of congressmen before being nominated at the ITC. The number of those who came from an executive body (e.g. an undersecretary) is very similar to the one of those who joined from the private sector (typically a law firm). Only three commissioners were academics.

One important issue to notice is that while the votes of commissioners can be influenced by their previous employment experience, future job perspectives can influence their voting behavior on AD too. In particular, once their mandate at the ITC comes to and end, commissioners might have a higher chance of finding certain types of jobs depending on the voting behavior they have had during their time at the ITC. Some commissioners had indeed influential "political" jobs after the ITC. This is the case of commissioner Hillman who became a member of the WTO Appellate Body. Others, like commissioner Pearson, joined the CATO institute, a think tank that is often associated with the Republicans. So, knowing (in some detail) what commissioners do once they leave the ITC, could help explaining their voting behavior on AD. Unfortunately, this information is only available for a few of them and cannot be used to systematically analyze the effect of commissioners' career concerns on their votes on AD (see also Section 8 for a discussion on how career concerns could play a role).

Democratic				Republican			
Commissioner	Employment	President	Gender	Commissioner	Employment	President	Gender
Alberger	Legislative	Carter	Male	Askey	Legislative	Clinton	Female
Aranoff	Legislative	W. Bush	Female	Bedell	Legislative	Nixon	Female
Cass	Academia	Reagan	Male	Bragg	Private Sector	Clinton	Female
Hillman	Executive	Clinton	Female	Brunsdale	Academia	Reagan	Female
Koplan	Private Sector	Clinton	Male	Crawford	Executive	Bush	Female
Miller	Legislative	Clinton	Female	Devaney	Private Sector	W. Bush	Male
Newquist	Private Sector	Reagan	Male	Eckes	Legislative	Bush	Male
Nuzum	Legislative	Bush	Female	Frank	Private Sector	Reagan	Male
Pinkert	Executive	W. Bush	Male	Haggart	Private Sector	Reagan	Female
Stern	Academia	Carter	Female	Lane	Executive	W. Bush	Female
Williamson	Private Sector	W. Bush	Male	Lodwick	Executive	Reagan	Male
				Moore	Private Sector	Nixon	Male
				Okun	Legislative	Clinton	Female
				Pearson	Private Sector	W. Bush	Male
				Watson	Executive	Bush	Male

Table 2: Commissioners' Characteristics

#### 4.3. Senators' Interests

To capture the influence of political parties on the voting behavior of ITC commissioners, I constructed variables that measure the interests of leading senators of those parties for each ITC vote on AD during 1980-2010.

To do that, I followed several steps. Using Congressional Directory records, I first collected the names of all senators who have been members of the Trade sub-committee, i.e. a unit of the Finance committee dealing with trade matters. I focus on them because, as described in Section 2.2, senators of the Finance committee play an important role in the process leading to the appointment of ITC commissioners. Moreover, being the unit of the Senate Finance which deals with trade matters, the Trade sub-committee frequently interacts with the ITC.

Second, I collected data on industry-level employment in the states represented by Trade sub-committee senators from the County Business Patterns (CBP).

Using these data, I coded a senator as being in favor of imposing an AD measure at time *t* (i.e. the time when the ITC takes its final decision on material injury) on a product belonging to industry *k* if, at time *t*, industry *k* belongs to the top 10 industries in terms

of employment in the state in which the senator is elected.<sup>19</sup> Based on this information, I define the dummy variables  $Pressure_{tk}^{Dem}$  and  $Pressure_{tk}^{Rep}$ , which are respectively equal to 1 if there is at least one Democratic or Republican senator (i.e. j = 1, ..., M, where M indicates the maximum number of Trade sub-committee senators) in the Trade sub-committee who is in favor of imposing an AD measure on industry k at time t (senator<sub>jkt</sub><sup>Dem</sup> or senator<sub>ikt</sub><sup>Rep</sup>):<sup>20</sup>

$$Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \sum_{j=1}^{M} senator_{jkt}^{Dem} \ge 1 \\ 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \qquad Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \sum_{j=1}^{M} senator_{jkt}^{Rep} \ge 1 \\ 0 \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(1)

The idea behind these dummies is that senators in the Trade sub-committee are in the position to influence the voting behavior of ITC commissioners, particularly those who have been appointed by their party.<sup>21</sup> They are more likely to put pressure in favor of AD if the decision involves a key industry in their state.<sup>22</sup>

To match senators' trade policy interests to a given AD vote, the products under investigation had to be mapped into the industry (k) they belong to. In doing that, the votes of 15 petitions were coded as missing and dropped from the sample. This is because the product belonged to more than one 2-digit SIC or 3-digit NAICS industry. Moreover, mainly because CBP (employment) data contain very little information for agricultural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Results (not reported here to save space) do not change if key industries are defined as those belonging to the top 20 in terms of employment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>The pressure variables are constructed to capture the interest of senators belonging to each of the two parties. Other papers (e.g. Moore, 1992) have highlighted that the Senate can put pressure on the ITC when AD measures protect key industries of senators: the main novelty in this paper is to model this channel as being party-specific.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The main advantage of defining the pressure variables as dummies is that they allow for an easier interpretation of the results. In Section 7, I will show that the results are robust to using alternative measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Industries are identified based on 2-digit SIC codes (for years before 1998) or 3-digit NAICS industry (for years from 1998 onwards). The choice of aggregating employment at 2-digit SIC and 3-digit NAICS is first driven by data comparability over time. While state-level employment is available at 4-digit SIC for years between 1986 and 1997 and at 6-digit NAICS from 1998 onwards, for years before 1986 it is only available at 2-digit SIC. However, mixing detailed NAICS and SIC employment data might be problematic (see Pierce and Schott, 2012), while aggregating at 2 and 3 digits should ensure a higher degree of harmonization over the different years the sample spans. Moreover, since employment figures in the CBP are withheld when their disclosure would allow the identification of firms, using 2-digit SIC and 3-digit NAICS data, rather than at more disaggregated levels, reduces the presence of undisclosed data. Also, when employment data are not disclosed, a flag gives the interval where the actual data belongs to. Following Conconi et al. (2014), I used these flags to input values (i.e. the midpoint between the 2 extreme values of each interval) for the missing observations.

products, 34 petitions (250 votes) were not matched with the pressure variables.

Notice that in constructing the pressure variables, I exploit several sources of variation. First, the size and the composition of the Trade sub-committee vary over time: the Standing Rules of the Senate do not explicitly limit the size of sub-committees which are determined by the full Finance committee. So, for instance, during 1980-2010 it has changed considerably, ranging from a minimum of 11 members in years from 2008 to 2010 to 17 in years from 1987 to 1994.<sup>23</sup> The composition of the Trade sub-committee also varies according to which states are represented and to which parties represent them. So, for example, when comparing two votes in a given case, say on a steel-related product, one may happen when a senator from a steel producing state (like Pennsylvania) sits in the Trade sub-committee and one when there is no senator from that state. Finally, within-state changes in employment, over time, determine whether a given industry is key for Trade sub-committee senators. For example, in two votes on the same product at different times, the same state may be represented in the Trade sub-committee but, employment in the industry to which the product belongs might not be high enough for that industry to be ranked in the top ones. This is for instance the case for the votes on automotive glass windshields in 2000 and 2002: while Senator Lott, a Republican from Mississippi, was representing his state in the Trade sub-committee in both years, only in 2002 the level of employment in the transportation equipment manufacturing industry was such that the industry was ranked as key.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics for  $Pressure_{tk}^{Rep}$  and  $Pressure_{tk}^{Dem}$ : the relatively low values of the averages (0.154 and 0.198) indicate that only in a few cases there is at least one Trade sub-committee senator whose trade policy interests are heavily linked to the ITC vote.

#### 5. Does Party Affiliation Matter?

In this section, I look at the relation between the political party affiliation of the appointed ITC commissioners and their final votes on AD. I estimate the following Linear Probability (LP) and Probit models:

$$Vote_{ikct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \delta_t + \vartheta_k + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ikct}$$
(2)

$$Pr(Vote_{ikct} = 1) = \Phi[\beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \delta_t + \vartheta_k + \gamma_c].$$
(3)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Table A1 in the Appendix lists the number of Trade sub-committee members per each year of the sample.

The dependent variable,  $Vote_{ikct}$ , is the vote of commissioner *i*, at time *t*, on whether to protect industry *k* from products allegedly unfairly imported from country *c*. It equals 1 if the commissioner votes in favor of AD and 0 otherwise. The dummy *Democrat<sub>i</sub>* is the variable of interest and captures the party affiliation of commissioners.  $X_{it}$  contains a set of commissioners' characteristics (i.e. gender, the age of commissioner *i* at the time *t*, and the employment background).<sup>24</sup>  $\delta_t$  and  $\vartheta_k$  are respectively time and industry fixed effects (at 3 digits of NAICS).<sup>25</sup>  $\gamma_c$  are fixed effects for the countries whose firms have (allegedly) unfairly exported the product under investigation to the US (hereafter called target-country fixed effects).<sup>26</sup>  $\epsilon_{ikct}$  is the error term. In equation (3),  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the cumulative normal function. To allow for correlation in the views of commissioners on a request for protection, errors are clustered at petition level (results obtained by clustering at different dimensions are discussed in the Section 7).

When the dependent variable is binary, using a probit model is a natural choice: this takes into account residuals' heteroscedasticity and ensures that the predicted probabilities are between 0 and 1. However, when specifications include fixed effects, one of the advantages of estimating a LP model is that the size of the sample is not reduced, i.e. no observations are lost (this is instead what happens when one uses a probit model and the outcome does not vary at some levels of the independent variables). Since there are pros and cons in using the two econometric methodologies, I will always show the results of both probit and LP regressions.<sup>27</sup>

The results can be found in Table 3. The estimates of the LP model are in Panel A, while those of the probit model are in Panel B (to ease the interpretation of the coefficients, I report the marginal effects computed as means of marginal effects at each observation).

In the first three columns of each panel, I report the results of minimalist specifications, in which I include only the key regressor of interest and different sets of fixed effects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>See Section 4 for a detailed description of the variables used in the regressions of this section.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>As mentioned in Section 4, industries are identified based on 2-digit SIC codes for years before 1998 or 3-digit NAICS industry for years from 1998 onwards. When including industry fixed effects in the regressions, one has to convert all the industries to NAICS or SIC codes. I will always report the results obtained using 3-digit NAICS fixed effects. However, results are unaffected if I instead include them at 2 digits of NAICS or at 2 or 3 digits of SIC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>A list of the target countries is provided in Table A2 of the Appendix.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>When fixed effects are included in a probit specification, estimates could suffer from the incidental parameters bias, i.e. yield biased coefficients and standard errors (Lancaster, 2000). Notice, however, that this is not the case in equation (3), where the sets of fixed effects always refer to a more aggregate dimension than the unit of the analysis, i.e. commissioners' votes (see Table 3).

			Panel	A: LPM			Panel B: Probit					
<i>Vote<sub>ikct</sub></i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.093***	0.107***	0.106***	0.079***	0.094***	0.094***	0.095***	0.207***	0.166***	0.076***	0.167***	0.123***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Female <sub>i</sub>				-0.004	-0.009	-0.007				-0.015	-0.056*	-0.048**
				(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)				(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Age <sub>it</sub>				-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***				-0.003***	-0.007***	-0.005***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Legislative <sub>i</sub>				-0.131***	-0.118***	-0.120***				-0.122***	-0.217***	-0.167***
				(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)				(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Executive <sub>i</sub>				-0.132***	-0.117***	-0.117***				-0.129***	-0.212***	-0.180***
				(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)				(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Academia <sub>i</sub>				-0.285***	-0.274***	-0.277***				-0.266***	-0.463***	-0.363***
				(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.035)				(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Observations	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,893	2,010	2,482	3,893	2,010	2,482
$R^2$	0.177	0.581	0.450	0.207	0.609	0.478						
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>							0.140	0.202	0.149	0.166	0.295	0.202
Predicted Probability							0.636	0.528	0.559	0.636	0.529	0.559
3-digit Industry FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Target-Country FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Year FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Petition FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Case FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Table 3: Commissioners' Characteristics and Votes on AD

The table reports coefficients of a LPM (columns (1)-(6)) and marginal effects of probit regressions, computed as means of marginal effects at each observation (columns (7)-(12)). Significance: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at petition level, are in parentheses. *Vote<sub>ikct</sub>* is 1 if commissioner *i*, at time *t*, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*; it is 0 otherwise. *Republican<sub>i</sub>* is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. *Private<sub>i</sub>* is omitted.

I start by including a set of time, industry and target-country effects.<sup>28</sup> I then report the results of more demanding specifications, in which I replace time, industry and target-country effects with either petition or case fixed effects. Including petition fixed effects accounts for the whole variation in characteristics of requests for AD protection that have been filed against a specific country.<sup>29</sup> The difference with AD case fixed effects is that the latter control instead for the characteristics of petitions that have been filed, for the same product, against more than one country, at the same time.<sup>30</sup> Irrespective of the econometric methodology used and the fixed effects included, I find that the estimated coefficient for the variable *Democrat<sub>i</sub>* is always positive and highly significant. Thus, Democratic-appointed commissioners are always more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones.

However, the size of the effect (i.e. the coefficient of the variable  $Democrat_i$ ) is generally smaller when using LP, ranging from 7.9 (column (4)) to 10.7 (column (2)) percentage points. Probit estimates yield instead an effect spanning from 12 (column (10)) to 39 (column 8) percentage points.<sup>31</sup> These effects are higher (both with respect to the other LP and probit results shown in Table 3) when petition and case fixed effects are included in the probit specifications. In fact, while this allows to control for any unobserved characteristic at the petition and the case level, it also reduces the number of observations dramatically. Nevertheless, the fact that even in the case of these very demanding specifications,  $Democrat_i$  is systematically positive and significant, it is an indication that commissioners' party affiliation is a crucial determinant of their voting behavior on AD.

The role of party affiliation is robust to the inclusion of additional commissioners' characteristics. In particular, even if their magnitudes are slightly reduced (columns from (4) to (6) for LP and columns from (10) to (12)), the coefficients on  $Democrat_i$  remain positive and strongly significant. The variable  $Female_i$  is never significant, suggesting that the gender of commissioners has no effect on their voting behavior on AD.  $Age_{it}$  is instead negatively associated with the probability of voting in favor of AD, showing that older commissioners are less protectionist.

The results of Table 3 suggest that political parties can affect AD policy by appointing ITC commissioners who have similar views on trade policy. I refer to this as the *selection effect* of political parties.

$$Vote_{ikct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \mu^{FE} + \epsilon_{ikct}$$
$$Pr(Vote_{ikct} = 1) = \Phi[\beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \mu^{FE}]$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Estimates reported in Table 3 are obtained with 3-digit NAICS fixed effects. However, results are unaffected if industry fixed effects are included at 2 digits of NAICS or at 2/3 digits of SIC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>A list of the petitioning industries can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>When petition and case fixed effects are included in the models, the LP and probit specifications become

where  $\mu^{FE}$  is either petition or case fixed effects (all the other variables are defined as in equations (2) and (3)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>These effects are computed by taking the ratio between the marginal effects of the variable  $Democrat_i$  and the predicted probabilities of voting affirmatively on AD (Table 3).

#### 6. Does Party Pressure Matter?

In the previous section, I have shown that Democratic-appointed commissioners are more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones. This result suggests that one channel through which political parties can influence ITC voting on AD is by selecting commissioners whose stance on trade policy is similar to theirs.

In this section, I show that a second channel might also be at work: parties can exert their influence on ITC commissioners when they are in office. To show this, I include in the regressions the dummy variables  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$  and  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$  and interact them with commissioners' party affiliation (the dummy  $Democrat_i$ ). This allows me to link the interests of leading Democratic and Republican senators of the Senate Trade sub-committee, to AD votes.<sup>32</sup> I estimate the following LP and Probit models:

$$Vote_{ikct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \beta_3 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} + \beta_4 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} + (4) + \beta_5 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + \beta_6 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i + \delta_t + \vartheta_k + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ikct}$$

$$Pr(Vote_{ikct} = 1) = \Phi[\beta_0 + \beta_1 Democrat_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \beta_3 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} + \beta_4 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} + (5) + \beta_5 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + \beta_6 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i + \delta_t + \vartheta_k + \gamma_c].$$

As discussed in Section 4, the idea is that, if the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employment) in the states in which senators who belong to the Trade sub-committee are elected, they might put pressure on the commissioners appointed by their party in order to protect their constituency. If this is the case, one would expect the estimated coefficients of  $\beta_4$  (which captures the pressure on Republican senators on Republican-appointed ITC commissioners) and  $\beta_5$  (which captures the pressure on Democratic senators on Democratic-appointed ITC commissioners) to be positive and significant.

In equations (4) and (5), I thus examine how party pressure affects the voting behavior of different ITC commissioners. The dummies capturing party influence vary with the composition of the Trade sub-committee and with the petitioning industry. Importantly, to account for unobserved characteristics of commissioners that might affect their voting behavior on AD and be correlated with the pressure variables, I estimate a Linear Probability

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$ The pressure variables are equal 1 to if there is at least one Democratic/Republican member of Trade subcommittee of the Finance committee, who is elected in states where, at time *t*, the product under investigation belongs to the top 10 industries in terms of employment (equation (1)). In the robustness section, I will show that findings are in line if the stake variables are instead constructed as the number or the shares of Trade sub-committee senators who care about the outcome of an ITC vote.

Model (LPM) that includes commissioner fixed effects ( $\varphi_i$ ):<sup>33</sup>

$$Vote_{ikct} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} + \alpha_2 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} + \alpha_3 Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + (6)$$
$$+ \alpha_4 Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i + \varphi_i + \delta_t + \vartheta_k + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ikct}.$$

In these regressions, I exploit the fact that the vote of individual ITC commissioners on AD changed depending on the trade interests of key senators in their party.<sup>34</sup> If ITC commissioners are influenced by their parties, then  $\alpha_3$  and  $\alpha_2$  should be positive and significant.

The results are reported in Table 4. In all specifications, I find that the estimated coefficients of the variable  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$  and the interaction term  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$  are positive and significant. This finding indicates that political parties can have a pressure effect on AD: the probability that ITC commissioners vote in favor of protection is significantly higher when leading senators in the party that appointed them support this measure. Importantly, the pressure effect is also confirmed in column (3) of Table 4, where any time-invariant unobserved characteristics of commissioners (e.g. their state of origin or education) that might affect their voting behavior on AD (and be correlated with the pressure variables) are absorbed by commissioner fixed effects.

The coefficients of interest are thus positive and statistically significant both when using LP and probit. However, interactions must be cautiously interpreted when using probit: their values may have different signs for different values of the covariates (Ai and Norton, 2003). This is the case also in Table 4 where the magnitude, the sign and statistical significance of marginal effects vary depending on the values of  $Democrat_i$  and on those of the pressure variables (column (2) of Table 4).

When no Trade sub-committee senators care about a vote of the ITC on AD, the effect of *Democrat<sub>i</sub>* is positive and statistically significant but much smaller than the same effect when at least one Democratic Trade sub-committee senator (and no Republicans) has a stake in a vote on AD (8 vs. 25 percentage points). The effect is instead negative and statistically significant when at least one Republican senator (and no Democrats) is interested in the outcome of an ITC vote: being a Democratic-appointed commissioner when  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$  is equal to 0 and  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$  is equal to 1, decreases the probability of voting in favor of AD by 7.2 percentage points. When both  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$  and  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$  are equal to 1, the same probability increases by 9.4 percentage points. Moreover, the effects of  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$  and  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$  on the probability of voting affirmatively on AD, when  $Democrat_i$  equals 0 are -

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>Notice that when commissioner fixed effects are included, using a probit model rises concerns about the incidental parameters problem: the unit of observation and the dimension of the fixed effects coincide. For this reason, whenever commissioner effects are included in the regressions, only the results of LP models are reported.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Consider, for instance, the behavior of Democratic-appointed commissioner Miller on petitions filed on the behalf of the Primary Metal industry, an historically important industry in the US. When no Democratic senators of the Trade sub-committee had a stake in those investigations (e.g. in 2000), commissioner Miller's votes were almost equally split between affirmative and negative ones. On the contrary, when the industry was key in states represented by leading senators of his party (i.e. in 2003), his vote was always is favor of granting protection.

8 and 14.9 percentage points. If instead  $Democrat_i$  is equal to 1, the change in the probability of voting in favor of AD associated with is of 9.2 percentage points for  $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$  and not significant for  $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$ .

	LPM	Probit	LPM
<i>Vote<sub>ikct</sub></i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.082***	0.078***	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Pressure <sup>Dem</sup>	-0.093*	-0.081*	-0.098**
κ.	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Pressure <sup>Rep</sup>	0.150***	0.146***	0.137***
λ <i>ι</i>	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)
$Pressure_{tt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$	0.186***	0.175***	0.193***
λ <i>ι</i>	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.044)
$Pressure_{1}^{Rep} \times Democrat_{i}$	-0.162***	-0.155***	-0.134***
kt kt	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Female;	-0.001	-0.012	()
i.	(0.015)	(0.015)	
$Age_{it}$	-0.003***	-0.003***	
0 **	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Legislative <sub>i</sub>	-0.126***	-0.118***	
0	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Executive <sub>i</sub>	-0.127***	-0.123***	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	
Academia <sub>i</sub>	-0.279***	-0.260***	
	(0.035)	(0.033)	
ME of Democrat; at Pressure $^{Dem}_{lu}=0$ and Pressure $^{Rep}_{lu}=0$		0.080***	
, KE KE		[0.053,0.107]	
ME of Democrat: at Pressure $^{Dem}=1$ and Pressure $^{Rep}=0$		0 254***	
in Demoerturg at Pressure kt		[0.175.0.333]	
ME of Democrate at Pressure Dem - 0 and Pressure Rep -1		_0 072**	
$\frac{1}{kt} = 0 \text{ and } 1 \text{ ressure}_{kt} = 0 \text{ and } 1 \text{ ressure}_{kt} = 1$		-0.072 [_0 128 _0 017]	
ME of Demonstration Demonstration Rep 1		[-0.120,-0.017]	
ME of Democrat <sub>i</sub> at Pressure <sub>kt</sub> =1 and Pressure <sub>kt</sub> =1		0.094	
ME - ( Duranne Dem - ) Dama and ( )		[0.019,0.169]	
ME of Pressure $kt$ at Democrat <sub>i</sub> =0		-0.083	
Ren		[-0.177,0.012]	
ME of $Pressure_{kt}^{iop}$ at $Democrat_i=0$		0.149***	
		[0.059,0.239]	
ME of $Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$ at $Democrat_i=1$		0.092*	
Dan		[-0.062, 0.190]	
ME of $Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$ at $Democrat_i=1$		-0.007	
		[-0.098, 0.083]	
Observations	3,983	3,893	3,983
$R^2$	0.214		0.241
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.173	
Predicted Probability		0.646	
3-digit Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Target-Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Commissioner FE	No	No	Yes

Table 4: Party Pressure and Votes on AD

Column (1) and (3) report coefficients of a LPM while column (2) lists marginal effects of probit regressions, computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at petition level are in parentheses. Column (2) also reports the marginal effects of the pressure variables (*Democrat<sub>i</sub>*) computed at the different values of *Democrat<sub>i</sub>* (pressure variables); confidence intervals are in squared brackets. *Vote<sub>ikct</sub>* is 1 if commissioner *i*, at time *t*, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*; it is 0 otherwise. *Republican<sub>i</sub>* is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. *Private<sub>i</sub>* is omitted.

Overall, the marginal effects reported in Table 4, indicate that, in voting on AD, both Democratic and Republican-appointed commissioners are sensitive to the interests of Trade sub-committee senators of the party they are associated to (the pressure effect).<sup>35</sup>

The pressure effect of political parties also emerges from Table 5, in which I report the predicted probabilities of voting in favor of AD (first part of the table) and their differences for different values of the pressure variables and their interactions (second part of the table).

First, comparing the predicted probabilities associated to Democratic and Republicanappointed commissioners, it is clear that the first ones are statistically more protectionist, except in one case: when Republican senators have a stake in AD votes and Democratic senators do not.

Values of the			
Pressure Variables	$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[\cdot]$	$\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[\cdot]$	Observations
[0,0]	0.660	0.580	2,795
[1,0]	0.748	0.494	284
[0,1]	0.653	0.725	512
[1 1]	0 741	0.647	384
Differences in PPs	0.7 11	0.01/	501
of Voting in Favor of	AD		
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}_{-}[0,0] - \widehat{Prob}^{Dem}_{-}[0,0]$	$b^{Rep}[0,0]$		0.080***
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,0] - \widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,0]$	$b_{p}^{Rep}[1,0]$		0.254***
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,1] - \widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,1]$	$b_{p}^{Rep}[0,1]$		-0.072
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,1] - \widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,1]$	$b^{Kep}[1,1]$		0.094***
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,0] - \widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,0]$	<i>Dem</i> [1,0]		-0.080**
$\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}_{Rep}[0,0] - \widehat{Prob}$	[0,1]		-0.145***
$\widehat{Prob}_{prob}^{Rep}[1,0] - \widehat{Prob}$	[0,0]		-0.086*
$\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}_{-}[1,0] - \widehat{Prob}$	<sup><i>Rep</i></sup> [1,1]		-0.153***
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,0] - \widehat{Prob}$	Dem [0,1]		0.007
$\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,0] - \widehat{Prob}$	b [1,1]		0.007

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities (PPs) of Voting in Favor of AD

The table reports predicted probabilities (PPs) of voting in favor of AD and their differences calculated at different values of the pressure variables and their interactions. Probabilities are computed on the results of column (2) of Table 4. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10

So, even if Republican-appointed commissioners are generally less protectionist, when the industry asking to be protected is important in the states represented by Republican

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>The results of Table 4 also show that Democratic-appointed commissioners are overall more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones: the hypothesis  $Democrat + Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i=0$  is always strongly rejected. The value of the *F* statistic is 7.74 for the LPM in column (1). The  $\chi^2$  for the probit specification is 5.65 in column (2). Moreover, the sign, significance and magnitude of the coefficients and the marginal effects attached to other commissioners characteristics in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 are largely comparable to those of Table 3. In particular, *Female<sub>i</sub>* is never significant; *Age<sub>it</sub>* decreases the probability of voting in favor of AD, and commissioners who last job, before the ITC, was in the private sector (academia), are the most (least) protectionist.

senators, they become more protectionist (first part of Table 5). In particular, the third row of the second part of Table 5 also shows that when only republican senators care, there is no statistical difference between  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,1]$  and  $\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[0,1]$ .

Moreover, the first rows of both parts of Table 5 also confirm the existence the selection effect discussed in Section 5:  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,0]$  is larger than  $\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[0,0]$  and their difference is statistically significant, indicating that when no senator cares, ITC commissioners vote according to the trade policy preferences of the parties they are linked to.

In addition, when Democratic or Republican senators have a stake in AD votes, the predicted probabilities associated to the commissioners of their political area are higher (0.660 vs. 0.748 for Democratic-appointed commissioners; 0.580 vs. 0.725 for Republican-appointed ones) and statistically different from each other (rows one and two of Table 5). This suggests that the selection effect can be strengthened by the pressure effect: when key industries ask for AD protection, ITC commissioners are more influenceable by the parties that appointed them.

Interestingly, Republican-appointed commissioners change their behavior depending on whether Democratic senators are interested in a vote of the ITC:  $\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[1,0]$  is lower (and statistically different from) than  $\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[0,0]$  and  $\widehat{Prob}^{Rep}[1,1]$ . This is not the case for Democratic-appointed commissioners:  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,0]$  and  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[0,1]$  (and  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,0]$ and  $\widehat{Prob}^{Dem}[1,1]$ ) are not statistically different from each other, indicating that Republicanappointed commissioners are more influenceable when Democratic senators do not care.

#### 7. Robustness

To assess the strength of the results presented earlier, in this section, I perform a number of robustness checks using different definitions of the pressure variables and clustering the at different dimensions.

The pressure variables used in Section 6 are constructed as dummies equal to 1 if at least one Democratic/Republican Trade subcommittee senator has a stake in a given AD vote at time t. To exclude that the results presented in Section 6 are driven by the way pressure variables are defined, I run the same regressions presented in Table 4, using two more definitions of the those variables.

First, I re-define them as the number Democratic and Republican Trade sub-committee senators with an interest at time t ( $Count_{kt}^{Dem}$  and  $Count_{kt}^{Rep}$ ). This takes into account the full variation in the composition of the Trade sub-committee. Second, as the ratio between Democratic and Republican senators with an interest in an ITC vote and the total number of senators of the Trade sub-committee at time t ( $Share_{kt}^{Dem}$  and  $Share_{kt}^{Rep}$ ): shares keep into account that the size of the Trade sub-committee varies over time (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Observations
$Count_{kt}^{Dem}$	0.241	0.816	0	9	3,983
$Count_{kt}^{Rep}$	0.257	0.608	0	5	3,983
Share $L^{Dem}_{kt}$	0.015	0.050	0	0.529	3,983
$Share_{kt}^{Rep}$	0.016	0.038	0	0.294	3,983

 Table 6: Summary statistics

 (Alternative Definitions of the Pressure Variables)

The relatively low averages of the pressure variables reflect the fact that in many cases the number of Democratic/Republican senators with a stake in an AD vote is either 0 or 1 (the number of times in which the pressure variables take either value 0 or 1 account for roughly 96% of the cases).

The results using the re-defined pressure variables are shown in Table 7.  $Democrat_i$  is always positive and significant both the panels, confirming the existence of a selection effect whereby the ITC commissioners' voting behavior on AD mimics the trade preferences of the appointing parties.

Moreover, the coefficients and the marginal effects on the interactions  $Count_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$ and  $Share_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$  are always positive and significant. This is also the case for  $Count_{kt}^{Rep}$  and  $Share_{kt}^{Rep}$ : the presence of the pressure effect is thus strongly confirmed.<sup>36</sup> The coefficients and the marginal effects on other commissioners' characteristics are almost identical to those reported in Table 4.<sup>37</sup>

As a final check, I assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the clustering dimensions. All the regressions results presented earlier have been obtained by clustering the errors at petition level. However, errors can also be correlated at different dimensions. First, different AD votes of the same commissioner are likely to be correlated to his preferences and characteristics.

Also, commissioners might care more about protecting some industries than others. In Table 8, I run the same regressions of Table 3, allowing for correlation at commissioner level in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) and at (3-digit) industry level in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12).

The significance of the coefficients and the marginal effects on  $Democrat_i$  is never affected by the change in clustering dimensions in all the twelve specifications. This confirms that commissioners tend to vote according to the preferences of the parties that appointed them (selection effect).<sup>38</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Democratic-appointed commissioners are overall more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones: the hypotheses  $Democrat_i + Count_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + Count_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i$  and  $Democrat_i + Share_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + Share_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i$  are always strongly rejected for the specifications reported in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Table 7 (*F* and  $\chi^2$  tests are computed at the mean of the pressure variables).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>The set of findings obtained using the number and the shares of Trade sub-committee senators are confirmed if their interests are defined relative to the top 20 industries in terms of employment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Results are unaffected if correlation is allowed at the 2 digits of NAICS or at industry and commissioner level at the same time, i.e. if errors are double-clustered (see Petersen, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Cameron et al., 2011).

	LPM	Probit	LPM		LPM	Probit	LPM
<i>Vote<sub>ikct</sub></i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	Vote <sub>ikct</sub>	(4)	(5)	(6)
Count <sup>Dem</sup>	-0.029***	-0.028***	-0.028***	Share <sup>Dem</sup>	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
$Count_{kt}^{Rep}$	0.064***	0.065***	0.062***	$Share_{kt}^{Rep}$	0.010***	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
$Count_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$	0.026**	0.025**	0.023**	Share <sub>kt</sub> <sup>Dem</sup> × Democrat <sub>i</sub>	$0.004^{**}$	$0.004^{**}$	0.003**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$Count_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i$	-0.049***	-0.051***	-0.043***	$Share_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i$	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***
NL	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	RI .	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.092***	0.088***			0.092***	0.088***	
	(0.013)	(0.013)			(0.013)	(0.013)	
Female <sub>i</sub>	-0.006	-0.016			-0.005	-0.016	
	(0.016)	(0.016)			(0.016)	(0.016)	
Age <sub>it</sub>	-0.004***	-0.003***			-0.004***	-0.003***	
2	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)	
Legislative <sub>i</sub>	-0.129***	-0.120***			-0.129***	-0.120***	
-	(0.015)	(0.015)			(0.015)	(0.015)	
Executive <sub>i</sub>	-0.130***	-0.126***			-0.130***	-0.126***	
	(0.017)	(0.017)			(0.017)	(0.017)	
Academia <sub>i</sub>	-0.277***	-0.257***			-0.277***	-0.257***	
	(0.035)	(0.033)			(0.035)	(0.033)	
Observations	3,983	3,893	3,983		3,983	3,893	3,983
$R^2$	0.214		0.241		0.214		0.241
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.172				0.172	
Predicted Probability		0.636				0.636	
3-digit Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Target-Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Commissioner FE	No	No	Yes		No	No	Yes

**Table 7:** Party Pressure and Votes on AD, (Number and Shares of Senators)

Column (1), (3), (5) and (6) report coefficients of a LPM while columns (2) and (4) lists marginal effects of probit regressions, computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at petition level are in parentheses. *Vote<sub>ikct</sub>* is 1 if commissioner *i*, at time *t*, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*; it is 0 otherwise. *Republican<sub>i</sub>* is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. *Private<sub>i</sub>* is omitted.

			LP	'M				Probit				
Vote <sub>ikct</sub>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.079**	0.094***	0.094***	0.079***	0.094***	0.094***	0.076**	0.167***	0.123**	0.076***	0.167***	0.123***
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Female <sub>i</sub>	-0.004	-0.009	-0.007	-0.004	-0.009	-0.007	-0.015	-0.056	-0.048	-0.015	-0.056	-0.048
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.048)	(0.084)	(0.074)
Age <sub>it</sub>	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.003**	-0.007**	-0.005*	-0.003**	-0.007***	-0.005*
-	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Legislative <sub>i</sub>	-0.131***	-0.118**	-0.120**	-0.131***	-0.118***	-0.120***	-0.122***	-0.217**	-0.167**	-0.122***	-0.217***	-0.167***
-	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.088)	(0.075)	(0.032)	(0.074)	(0.054)
Executive <sub>i</sub>	-0.132***	-0.117**	-0.117**	-0.132***	-0.117**	-0.117**	-0.129***	-0.212**	-0.180**	-0.129***	-0.212**	-0.180**
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.044)	(0.084)	(0.071)
Academia <sub>i</sub>	-0.285***	-0.274***	-0.277***	-0.285**	-0.274**	-0.277**	-0.266***	-0.463***	-0.363***	-0.266**	-0.463**	-0.363**
	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.121)	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.072)	(0.136)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.231)	(0.178)
Observations	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,893	2,010	2,482	3,893	2,010	2,482
$R^2$	0.177	0.581	0.450	0.207	0.609	0.478						
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>							0.140	0.202	0.149	0.166	0.295	0.202
Predicted Probability							0.636	0.528	0.559	0.636	0.529	0.559
Clustering (Commissioner)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Clustering (Industry)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
3-digit Industry FE	Yes	No	No									
Target-Country FE	Yes	No	No									
Year FE	Yes	No	No									
Petition FE	No	Yes	No									
Case FE	No	No	Yes									

Table 8: Commissioners' Characteristics and Votes on AD (Different Clustering Dimensions)

The table reports coefficients of a LPM (columns (1)-(6)) and marginal effects of probit regressions computed as means of marginal effects at each observation (columns (7)-(12)). Significance: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at commissioner level in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) and at 3-digit industry level in columns (4)-(6) and (9)-(12)). *Vote<sub>ikct</sub>* is 1 if commissioner *i*, at time *t*, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*; it is 0 otherwise. *Republican<sub>i</sub>* is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. *Private<sub>i</sub>* is omitted.

	LF	°М	Pro	obit	LPM		
Vote <sub>ikct</sub>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$Pressure_{kt}^{Dem}$	-0.093***	-0.093*	-0.081**	-0.081	-0.098***	-0.098*	
κι	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.053)	
$Pressure_{kt}^{Rep}$	0.150***	0.150**	0.146***	0.146**	0.137**	0.137*	
κι	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.080)	
$Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i$	0.186**	0.186*	0.175**	0.175*	0.193**	0.193*	
κι ·	(0.073)	(0.110)	(0.069)	(0.101)	(0.071)	(0.103)	
$Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i$	-0.162***	-0.162*	-0.155***	-0.155**	-0.134**	-0.134*	
κι	(0.052)	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.077)	
Democrat <sub>i</sub>	0.082**	0.082***	0.078**	0.078***	. ,	. ,	
	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.021)			
Female <sub>i</sub>	-0.001	-0.001	-0.012	-0.012			
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.044)			
Age <sub>it</sub>	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Legislative <sub>i</sub>	-0.126**	-0.126***	-0.118***	-0.118***			
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.035)			
Executive <sub>i</sub>	-0.127**	-0.127**	-0.123***	-0.123***			
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)			
Academia <sub>i</sub>	-0.279***	-0.279**	-0.260***	-0.260**			
	(0.076)	(0.115)	(0.070)	(0.113)			
Observations	3,983	3,983	3,893	3,893	3,983	3,983	
$R^2$	0.214	0.214			0.241	0.241	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>			0.173	0.173			
Predicted Probability			0.646	0.646			
Clustering (Commissioner)	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Clustering (Industry)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
3-digit Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Target-Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Commissioner FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	

Table 9: Party Pressure and Votes on AD (Different Clustering Dimensions)

Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) report coefficients of a LPM. Columns (3) and (4) report marginal effects of a probit model computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at commissioner (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and 3-digit NAICS level (columns (2), (4) and (6)), are in parentheses. *Vote<sub>ikct</sub>* is 1 if commissioner *i*, at time *t*, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry *k*, imported from country *c*; it is 0 otherwise. *Republican<sub>i</sub>* is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. *Private<sub>i</sub>* is omitted.

Consistently with the results shown in Section 5,  $Female_i$  is never significant. The coefficients on  $Age_{it}$  confirm that overall age affects negatively the probability of imposing an AD measure (the significance is reduced in some cases). Employment background's controls show that commissioners who were lately employed in the private sector (academia)

were the most (least) protectionist (in line with the results of Table 3).

Finally, the results presented in Table 9 confirm the findings on party pressure: although the significance of the key regressors is sometimes reduced, the coefficients attached to them remain significant at conventional levels, leaving the general picture unchanged.<sup>39</sup>

#### 8. Conclusions

This paper studies the effect of partisanship on US AD policy. I focus on the voting behavior of the ITC, a quasi-judicial agency composed by six non-elected commissioners who are supposed to conduct material injury investigations in a fair and objective manner.

Using a newly collected dataset containing all ITC commissioners' votes on AD over the period 1980-2010, this study shows that political parties can affect the ITC voting behavior. While other studies have emphasised that Congress can influence the ITC, the novelty of this paper is to show that this influence is party-specific. Political parties can influence AD policy in two ways.

First, Democratic-appointed commissioners are consistently more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones. This effect is sizable (the probability of voting in favor of AD is from 8 to 39 percentage points higher for Democratic-appointed commissioners) and suggests that political parties can play an important role on AD policy by selecting ITC commissioners who have a similar stance on trade policy as their own (selection effect). This result is robust to several changes in the econometric specifications and to the use of different methodologies.

Second, whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in favor of AD depends crucially on whether the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employment) in the states represented by leading Trade sub-committee (Democratic) Republican senators at the time (pressure effect). Importantly, this result holds when controlling for any unobserved time-invariant characteristic of ITC commissioners (e.g. the state of origin) that could influence their votes on AD and be correlated with the pressure variables, i.e. when commissioner fixed effects are included in the specifications.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>The hypothesis  $Democrat + Pressure_{kt}^{Dem} \times Democrat_i + Pressure_{kt}^{Rep} \times Democrat_i=0$  is always rejected for the specifications reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table 9, confirming that Democratic-appointed commissioners are overall more protectionist then Republican-appointed ones. Both the selection and the pressure effect are confirmed at conventional levels of significance also when errors are clustered at AD case level.

The analysis indicates that both parties, when they care, tend to exert protectionist influence on the ITC commissioners, suggesting that electoral motives could play a role in determining the intensity of this pressure (see Conconi et al., 2014). Indeed, even Republican-appointed commissioners who are generally less protectionist than Democraticappointed ones, are more likely to vote in favor of AD if the measure shields key industries in states where leading Republican senators are elected.

More research is needed to further detect the mechanisms behind the voting behavior of the different commissioners. If more information on their post-ITC careers were to come available, it could be used to investigate whether career concerns also play a role in shaping their voting behavior on AD, e.g. by checking whether the way some commissioners vote is correlated with the likelihood of getting a certain (political?) job once they leave the ITC (see for instance i Vidal et al., 2012).

#### 9. Appendix

# of senators	Period
11	2007-2010
12	1980
14	1995-1996, 2005-2006
15	1981-1986, 2003-2004
16	2001-2002
17	1987-1994

Table A1: Size of the Trade sub-committee

Table A2: List of Target Countries

Argentina (69)	Hong Kong (7)	Russia (55)
Australia (26)	Hungary (10)	Singapore (31)
Austria (24)	India (141)	Slovakia (4)
Bangladesh (5)	Indonesia (76)	South Africa (64)
Belarus (10)	Iran (5)	South Korea (251)
Belgium (47)	Israel (19)	Spain (78)
Brazil (196)	Italy (154)	Sweden (47)
Canada (171)	Japan (454)	Taiwan (252)
Chile (15)	Kazakhstan (27)	Tajikistan (6)
China (665)	Latvia (6)	Thailand (86)
Colombia (26)	Luxembourg (5)	Trinidad & Tobago (12)
Costa Rica (16)	Malaysia (41)	Turkey (29)
Czech Republic (6)	Mexico (103)	USSR (5)
East Germany (2)	Moldova (11)	Ukraine (49)
Ecuador (28)	Netherlands (33)	United Arab Emirates (6)
Egypt (6)	New Zealand (14)	United Kingdom (99)
El Salvador (10)	Norway (4)	Venezuela (56)
Finland (10)	Philippines (10)	Vietnam (21)
France (138)	Poland (16)	West Germany (60)
Germany (112)	Portugal (5)	Yugoslavia (8)
Greece (6)	Romania (46)	

The table reports the list of countries whose products exported to the US have been under AD investigation over the sample period. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of commissioners' votes.

Industry Code	Industry Group	# of votes
(SIC87)		
10	Metal Mining	16
14	Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels	17
17	Construction Special Trade Contractors	15
20	Food And Kindred Products	47
22	Textile Mill Products	46
23	Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics	
	And Similar Materials	17
25	Furniture And Fixtures	16
26	Paper And Allied Products	24
28	Chemicals And Allied Products	303
29	Petroleum Refining And Related Industries	3
30	Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products	107
32	Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products	41
33	Primary Metal Industries	873
34	Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery	
	And Transportation Equipment	282
35	Industrial And Commercial Machinery	
	And Computer Equipment	222
36	Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment	
	And Components, Except Computer Equipment	139
37	Transportation Equipment	51
38	Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments;	
	Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks	51
39	Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries	21
50	Wholesale Trade-durable Goods	25
51	Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods	27
55	Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations	6
59	Miscellaneous Retail	88
Industry Code		
(NAICS2007)		
114	Fishing, Hunting and Trapping	39
115	Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry	5
237	Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction	6
311	Food Manufacturing	58
313	Textile Mills	18
continued		

#### Table A3: List of Petitioning Industries

321	Wood Product Manufacturing	4
322	Paper Manufacturing	60
323	Printing and Related Support Activities	6
325	Chemical Manufacturing	313
326	Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing	33
327	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	83
331	Primary Metal Manufacturing	774
332	Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing	58
333	Machinery Manufacturing	18
334	Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing	14
335	Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing	12
336	Transportation Equipment Manufacturing	5
337	Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing	24
339	Miscellaneous Manufacturing	6
423	Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods	10
Total		3,983

The table reports the list of products that have been under AD investigation over the sample period. Figures in the right hand side of the table indicate the number of commissioners' votes.

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