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Authority, politicization, and alternative justifications: endogenous legitimation dynamics in global economic governance

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**Endogenous Legitimation Dynamics in Global Economic Governance:
Authority, Politicization, and Alternative Narratives**

Christian Rauh / Michael Zürn

Review of International Political Economy

Online Appendix

Version: July 2019

Appendix A: Authority of the four global economic governance institutions in comparison

The International Authority Database (IAD) is part of a set of recent and related efforts to systematically code authority of international organizations. Along an IO's founding and statutory documents and treaties, the IAD Project codes and aggregates bindingness, policy scope and the extent of pooling and delegation across seven policy functions (agenda setting, rule making, monitoring, norm interpretation, enforcement, evaluation, and knowledge generation). It is a common effort of a number of scholars (formerly) located at the WZB. The group consists of Martin Binder (now University of Reading), Xaver Keller (now GIZ German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH), Autumn Lockwood Payton (now Alfred University), Alexandros Tokhi, and Michael Zürn. For further details, see Zürn et al. (2018).

A1: Authority over the four IOs and time




Figure A1: IO authority over time
Data from the WZB International Authority Database (Zürn et al. 2018)

A2: Locating the four IOs under analysis in a broader sample of IOs




Figure A2: Locating the four IOs across a broader sample and different dimensions of IO authority
Data from Hooghe and Marks (2014)

The cross sectional perspective in a sample of 72 international institutions in 2012 offered by Hooghe and Marks (2014) provides a suitable cross-validation of the IAD values above. While these data put the World Bank somewhat higher than the IAD on the ‘pooling’ dimension of international authority, the aggregate perspective across all three dimensions arrives at a similar ranking of the four institutions under analysis here. The figure furthermore indicates that the four institutions analyzed here are fairly representative of the larger IO population on the pooling and delegation dimensions of authority.

Appendix B: Retrieving newspaper articles covering the four institutions under analysis

After careful scrutiny of various pre-tests, the following search strings were applied to both the BODY and HLEAD fields in the LexisNexis database:

IMF: 'i.m.f. OR imf OR "international monetary fund"

World Bank: 'CAPS ("World Bank")'

WTO: 'wto OR w.t.o. OR "world trade organization" OR "world trade organisation" OR gatt
OR g.a.t.t. OR "general agreement on tariffs and trade".

NAFTA: 'CAPS("NAFTA") OR CAPS("N.A.F.T.A.") OR "North American Free Trade
Agreement"

The cleaning and pre-processing procedures we use in order to build the final analytical corpus are described in greater detail by [anonymized], the respective R rescripts are available for inspection upon request.

Appendix C: Constructing the CSO dictionary

To capture the *presence of CSOs* - i.e. groups representing interests going beyond the immediate material interests of their membership – ¹ we initially build a list of all non-governmental organizations ever accredited to a WTO ministerial conference² and, more importantly, all organizations in the Civil Society Database provided by the United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs.³ The latter source provides information on any organization that has ever requested access to UN mailing lists, participated in UN events, or applied for consultative status with the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). We thus cover an immense variety of non-governmental actors active in numerous global policy fields.

We then extensively cleaned the combined list to bring the raw NGO entries into the form by which they will most likely be figured in newspapers. Amongst other things, this involves collapsing various regional organizations, removals of organizational markers such as 'Ltd', 'e.V.', etc., and the disambiguation of acronyms. The procedures are describe in greater detail by Rauh and Bödeker (2013). The resulting dictionary contains 22,121 long-form NGO names and 2,815 uniquely identifiable acronyms.

A tagging script then automatically counts the occurrences of each NGO within the five-sentence contexts around each institutional reference in the newspaper corpus. All NGOs actually appearing in the corpus were then manually classified to distinguish CSOs (i.e. groups representing interests going beyond the immediate material interests of their membership) from other types of non-governmental actors such as business representations, unions, or think tanks. The classification rests on the self-descriptions of the NGOs on their websites, Wikipedia entries, or classification in national registries. For 198 organizations (accounting for a total of 627 hits in the overall corpus), we could not find relevant online information. These organizations are disregarded in the subsequent analyses. The list of all tagged organizations and the corresponding classifications are part of the replication package and is available for inspection at [anonymized].

¹ We intentionally employ a very broad definition of CSOs here, essentially referring to any organization that is not a national government agency, an IO, or an individual company. In other words, we initially capture such various actors as business federations, occupational associations and unions, academic institutions and finally the CSOs we are after.

² The raw data can be retrieved from http://wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm (last accessed: 23.05.2013).

³ The raw data was retrieved from <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do> (last accessed: 23.05.2013).

Appendix D: Legitimation dictionary

Legitimation narrative	Dictionary string
Technocratic	(economic gdp income) (growth development)
	(exchange rate financial market (macro){0,1} economic monetary) (stability stabilization)
	(trade market economic financial investment) liberalization
	deregulation privatization
	((un){0,1} biased (in){0,1} consistent credible (in){0,1} efficient (in){0,1} effective impartial independent neutral nonpartisan objective predictable rational (un){0,1} reliable)
	(action(s){0,1} adjudication(s){0,1} advice choices conduct decision(s){0,1} decision-making expertise for(a um) governance judgement(s){0,1} measure(s){0,1} method(s){0,1} operation(s){0,1} practice(s){0,1} procedure(s){0,1} proceedings process(es){0,1} recommendation(s){0,1} regulation(s){0,1} rule(s){0,1} ruling(s){0,1} structure(s){0,1})
	((un){0,1} biased (in){0,1} consistent credible (in){0,1} efficient (in){0,1} effective impartial independent neutral nonpartisan objective predictable rational (un){0,1} reliable)
	(authorit(y)ies bod(y)ies bureaucrac(y)ies organizational(s){0,1} institution(s){0,1} bureaucrat(s){0,1} technocrat(s){0,1})
	((in){0,1} consistency credibility (in){0,1} efficiency (in){0,1} effectiveness expertise impartiality independence neutrality objectivity predictability professionalism rationality reliability) (of in within) (the){0,1}(action(s){0,1} adjudication(s){0,1} advice choices conduct decision(s){0,1} decision-making expertise for(a um) governance judgement(s){0,1} measure(s){0,1} method(s){0,1} operation(s){0,1} practice(s){0,1} procedure(s){0,1} proceedings process(es){0,1} recommendation(s){0,1} regulation(s){0,1} rule(s){0,1} ruling(s){0,1} structure(s){0,1})
	((in){0,1} consistency credibility (in){0,1} efficiency (in){0,1} effectiveness expertise impartiality independence neutrality objectivity predictability professionalism rationality reliability) (of in within) (the){0,1}(IMF WBANK WTO)
Fairness	(IMF WBANK WTO) s ((in){0,1} consistency credibility (in){0,1} efficiency (in){0,1} effectiveness expertise impartiality independence neutrality objectivity predictability professionalism rationality reliability)
	(IMF WBANK WTO) (is as more less)
	((un){0,1} biased (in){0,1} consistent credible (in){0,1} efficient (in){0,1} effective impartial independent neutral nonpartisan objective predictable rational (un){0,1} reliable)
	poverty (alleviation eradication elimination reduction relief)
	(alleviation eradication elimination reduction relief) of (mass global world){0,1}poverty
	(alleviat(e)ing eradicate(e)ing eliminate(e)ing ease(e)ing fight(ing){0,1} redress(ing){0,1} reduce(e)ing relieve(e)ing tack(e)ing) (against){0,1}(mass global world){0,1}poverty
	(social income economic wage) ((in){0,1} equality(y)ies (in){0,1} justice(s){0,1})
	debt (cancel(l){0,1} ation forgiveness relief)
	(cancel(l){0,1} ation forgiveness relief) of (the){0,1}debt(s){0,1}
	cancel(l)ing(s){0,1} foregiv(e)ing relieve(e)ing) debt(s){0,1}
Participation	unpayable debt(s){0,1}
	(environment(al){0,1} ecological) (concerns degradation damage gains impact issues problems protection standards)
	(basic human fundamental) right(s){0,1}
	((in){0,1} accessible (un){0,1} accountable (un){0,1} democratic inclusive open participatory (un){0,1} representative (un){0,1} responsive (un){0,1} transparent secretive)
	(action(s){0,1} adjudication(s){0,1} advice choices conduct decision(s){0,1} decision-making expertise for(a um) governance judgement(s){0,1} measure(s){0,1} method(s){0,1} operation(s){0,1} practice(s){0,1} procedure(s){0,1} proceedings process(es){0,1} recommendation(s){0,1} regulation(s){0,1} rule(s){0,1} ruling(s){0,1} structure(s){0,1})
	((in){0,1} accessible (un){0,1} accountable (un){0,1} democratic inclusive open participatory (un){0,1} representative (un){0,1} responsive (un){0,1} transparent secretive unelected) (authorit(y)ies bod(y)ies bureaucrac(y)ies organizational(s){0,1} institution(s){0,1} bureaucrat(s){0,1} technocrat(s){0,1})
	((un){0,1} accountability inclusive(ness ivity) openness participation representat(ion iveness) transparency secrecy) (of in) (the){0,1}(action(s){0,1} adjudication(s){0,1} advice choices conduct decision(s){0,1} decision-making expertise for(a um) governance judgement(s){0,1} measure(s){0,1} method(s){0,1} operation(s){0,1} practice(s){0,1} procedure(s){0,1} proceedings process(es){0,1} recommendation(s){0,1} regulation(s){0,1} rule(s){0,1} ruling(s){0,1} structure(s){0,1})
	((un){0,1} accountability inclusive(ness ivity) openness participation representativeness representation transparency secrecy) (of in within) (the){0,1}(IMF WBANK WTO)
	(IMF WBANK WTO) s ((un){0,1} accountability inclusive(ness ivity) openness representativeness transparency secrecy)
	(IMF WBANK WTO) (is as more less)
	((in){0,1} accessible (un){0,1} accountable (un){0,1} democratic inclusive open participatory (un){0,1} representative (un){0,1} responsive (un){0,1} transparent secretive)
	(public civil society equal full popular democratic) (accountability consultation(s){0,1} inclusion participation representation scrutiny)

Table A1: Dictionary to identify evaluative patterns of global economic governance

Dictionary strings present regular expressions as used in the R programming language (fixed = FALSE, PERL = FALSE). A ‘|’ denotes a logical OR, ‘{0,1}’ indicates that the preceding item is matched zero times or exactly once, parentheses guide the sequential execution of the matching algorithm.

Appendix E: CSO presence in the corpus of institution-specific articles

The presence of CSOs in our corpus of transnational elite-level newspapers is rather low in total. Our encompassing dictionary detects their presence in only 2.9 per cent of all World Bank-specific reports in the elite newspaper under analysis. For the NAFTA, the WTO, and the IMF, this drops to 1.7, 1.4 and 1.2 per cent respectively. Across the whole corpus of 93,255 elite newspaper articles, CSOs appear only 1,572 times in the immediate context of the institutions under analysis. Of the 693 individual CSOs that are mentioned, furthermore, 258 figure only once in the overall corpus.⁴

CSO access to this elite-level segment of the public sphere is not only very constrained, but also heavily skewed in favor of CSOs of Western origin. As Table A2 underlines, it remains limited to well-endowed and transnationally organized CSOs with Western origin (cf. Thrall, 2014). More than the half of all CSO occurrences can be attributed to the top five organizations. Particularly, Oxfam – a confederation of 17 national organizations mobilizing on poverty and social injustice – dominates the picture, followed by Transparency International, Greenpeace, Christian Aid, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

⁴ Compare this to US governmental actors who appear in total 2,583 times in the immediate IO context. Data for this comparison were retrieved with the following regular expression: ‘us (authorities|cabinet|congress|delegate(s){0,1}|government|head of state|leader|minister(s){0,1}|[a-z]*minister|ministry|[a-z]*ministry|negotiators(s){0,1}|official(s){0,1}|parliament|politician(s){0,1}|president|representative(s){0,1})’.

CSO	Total occurrences	% of CSO occurrences
Oxfam	903	31.40
Christian Aid	179	6.22
Transparency International	178	6.19
Greenpeace	165	5.74
World Wide Fund For Nature	116	4.03
World Development Movement	97	3.37
Sierra Club	86	2.99
Human Rights Watch	74	2.57
Amnesty International	50	1.74
Global Witness	47	1.63

Table A2: Top 10 occurring CSOs in the corpus

Appendix F: Variable distributions and bivariate relations




Figure A3: Distributions and transformations of endogenous variables




Figure A4: Bivariate relationships of the model variables

Appendix G: CSO presence and alternative legitimization narratives in left-leaning national newspapers (Washington Post / The Guardian)




Figure A5: Cross-sectional newspaper comparisons




Figure A6: Public-interest CSOs in Guardian and Washington Post over time




Figure A7: Relative yearly share of legitimization narratives (The Guardian/Washington Post)

Appendix H: Replicating the path analysis without the NAFTA case

As the only regional institution in the sample, the NAFTA case might be qualitatively different from the other three institutions with more global outreach even beyond the variation in authority that is of interest to us in this article (see section 3 in the main text). To ensure that our results are not only driven by such (unobserved) differences, we replicate our path analysis here on a sample that excludes all NAFTA observations.

Given that this dramatically reduces sample size and leaves us with even less variation on the authority variable, the results are of course less robust in statistical terms. Yet and still the coefficients point into the theorized directions and reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Due to limited variation on the independent side, only the authority-politicization link fails very closely ($p > .11$) on this latter criterion. Thus we are confident that our major findings are not driven by the NAFTA case alone. This additional analysis is also part of the replication materials.




Figure A8: Path analysis results excluding the NAFTA observations