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Working Paper, No. 2018:7

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*Suggested Citation:* Andersson, Josefine (2018) : Financial incentives to work for disability insurance recipients: Sweden's special rules for continuous deduction, Working Paper, No. 2018:7, Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU), Uppsala

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201445

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# Financial Incentives to Work for Disability Insurance Recipients

Sweden's Special Rules for Continuous Deduction

Josefine Andersson



## Financial Incentives to Work for Disability Insurance Recipients

Sweden's Special Rules for Continuous Deduction<sup>a</sup>

by

Josefine Andersson<sup>b</sup>

2018-04-11

## Abstract

Evidence from around the world suggests that individuals who are awarded disability benefits in some cases still have residual working capacity, while disability insurance systems typically involve strong disincentives for benefit recipients to work. Some countries have introduced policies to incentivize disability insurance recipients to use their residual working capacities on the labor market. One such policy is the continuous deduction program in Sweden, introduced in 2009. In this study, I investigate whether the financial incentives provided by this program induce disability insurance recipients to increase their labor supply or education level. Retroactively determined eligibility to the program with respect to time of benefit award provides a setting resembling a natural experiment, which could be used to estimate the effects of the program using a regression discontinuity design. However, a simultaneous regime change of disability insurance eligibility causes covariate differences between treated and controls, which I adjust for using a matching strategy. My results suggest that the financial incentives provided by the program have not had any effect on labor supply or educational attainment.

Keywords: disability insurance, financial incentives, continuous deduction, regression discontinuity design, propensity score matching, nearest neighbor matching JEL-codes: H53, H55, I18, J22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Anders Forslund, Stefan Eriksson, David Seim, Johan Vikström, Lisa Laun and seminar participants at the Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU) and the Members Meeting for the project "The Effects of an Ageing Population: A Life-time Perspective on Work, Retirement, Housing and Health". Financial support from the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE) is gratefully acknowledged.

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## 1 Introduction

There is a large literature on the labor supply effects of disability insurance (DI). Evidence suggests that DI recipients have residual working capacities (e.g. Bound 1989, Gruber & Kubik 1997, Gruber 2000, Staubli 2011, Marie & Vall Castello 2012, Fevang, Hardoy & Røed 2013, Borghans, Gielen & Luttmer 2014, Moore 2015) and it is argued that disability insurance systems disincentivize recipients to use these capacities. Costs for sickness absence are at the same time large in many countries, enhancing the importance of this issue. Many of these studies compare recipients to non-recipients who were denied DI benefits, or DI recipients with different benefit levels, and find that (higher) disability benefits decrease labor supply. The literature on work incentives for already awarded DI recipients, however, is not as large as the literature the on work disincentives of DI benefits. Recently, however, a number of examples of policy initiatives to increase the return to work among DI recipients have been introduced (e.g. the U.S.' "1\$ for 2\$ offset", the UK's "Pathways-to-Work"-program, Canada, Norway and Sweden). These programs provide incentives for DI recipients to use their residual working capacity and return to the labor market. The question is, can these financial incentives induce people with reduced working capacity to return to work and use any residual working capacity? Studies of some of these reforms suggest that there is a positive effect of such policies (Weathers & Hemmeter 2011, Campolieti & Riddell 2012, Kostøl & Mogstad 2014, Delin, Hartman & Sell 2015).

In January 2009, a reform was implemented in Sweden which gives certain disability insurance recipients the possibility to work while receiving benefits under so called *special rules of continuous deduction*. Those who are eligible can work or study without their recipient status being questioned and, additionally, they can keep some or all of their benefits while receiving a working income. Income below a specified level does not induce a reduction in benefits, while having income above this level reduces benefits by 50 percent of that income. Recipients can receive benefits according to this scheme as long as the benefits and the working income together are below a cap, and when the cap is hit benefits are reduced one-to-one with additional income. This reform is quite similar to the return-to-work scheme introduced in Norway in 2005. Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) evaluate the Norwegian reform and find positive effects on labor force participation and earnings.

In this study, I evaluate the Swedish continuous deduction program and its effects on labor market outcomes. I study effects on labor force participation and earnings, as well as having earnings above the earnings disregard. My study contributes to the relatively small literature on incentives for DI recipients to increase labor supply, by studying the effects of financial incentives to do so within a new context. Within this literature, even fewer studies evaluate the effects of work incentives for both full- and part-time recipients of DI benefits. Different responses to work

incentives are expected for these groups as their working capacity and connection to the labor market differ. The Swedish continuous deduction program applies to both these two groups, and I study the effects of the program for full- and part-time recipients separately. The program also allows DI recipients to study without affecting benefits. Therefore, I also study its effects on increasing ones level of education, a use of residual working capacities possibly associated with fewer restrictions from the demand side than finding a job opportunity.

I use the criterion for eligibility to the program, based on time of DI award, for identification through a regression discontinuity (RD) setup. However, the retroactively set award date threshold for eligibility matches the timing of the enforcement of stricter requirements for being awarded disability benefits, causing compositional differences between DI recipients above and below the eligibility threshold. I therefore complement the RD design with a matching strategy, to compare only recipients who were not affected by the tightening of the DI eligibility criteria. This implies that I study the effects for a relatively weaker group in terms of health than the group of treated in general. My results suggest that the financial incentives provided by the continuous deduction program did not induce these DI recipients to increase labor supply or educational attainment.

The rest of the study is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the Swedish disability insurance system and the continuous deduction program. Section 3 provides theoretical expectations and a review of the related literature. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy in detail and section 5 describes the data used. Section 6 provides the empirical results and section 7 concludes.

## 2 Institutional background

## 2.1 The Swedish disability insurance system

Individuals who partially or fully lose their ability to work due to health impairments can claim DI benefits through the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. Sick pay from the employer and longer periods<sup>1</sup> with sickness benefits usually precede DI benefits. Disability benefits are awarded when the working capacity is considered persistently reduced.

The Swedish DI system consists of two types of benefits designated for people of different ages. Disability benefits are awarded permanently<sup>2</sup> to people between the ages of 30 and 64. To

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Before the reforms in 2008, disability benefits were usually awarded after being on sick leave for one year (Government Bill 2007/08:124).

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  Although called permanent benefits, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency can still revoke the right to these benefits if they find that the working capacity has increased. An assessment of the working capacity should be conducted every two years for disability insurance recipients (if not eligible for the continuous deduction program). The possibility to do this type of assessment is removed for those eligible, as part of the program.

qualify for permanent disability benefits, the individuals' health impairment must be severe enough for their working capacity to be considered permanently reduced. Benefits can be awarded full- or part-time depending on the severity of the impairment. To claim fulltime benefits, the working capacity must be considered fully or almost fully reduced, meaning a reduction of at least seven eights of fulltime work (i.e. 35 out of 40 hours per week). Part-time benefits can be claimed in quarters of fulltime (i.e. 25, 50, or 75 percent). To claim benefits of 50 or 75 percent of fulltime, the working capacity must be reduced by at least 50 or 75 percent, respectively. Claims of 25 percent benefits is more restrictively awarded, but can be awarded when the working capacity is considered reduced by at least 25 percent even after a longer period of sickness benefits or rehabilitation. Prior to July 2008, disability benefits could also be awarded temporarily for periods between 12 and 36 months depending on how long the reduction in the working capacity was predicted to last. Together with many other changes to the Swedish sickness and disability insurance system in 2008, temporary disability benefits where abolished.<sup>3</sup>

The counterpart to disability benefits for people between the ages of 19 and 29 is called activity benefits. Activity benefits can only be awarded for a fixed time period, between 12 and 36 months, at a time. When activity benefit recipients turn 30, they can instead be awarded disability benefits if their working capacity is considered permanently reduced. This study focuses on individuals between 30 and 64 years old, receiving permanent disability benefits, as this is the group that can be eligible for continuous deduction.

#### 2.2 The situation before the reform

Large changes were made to the Swedish sickness and disability insurance system in 2008. The main motive behind the reforms was to increase the propensity to return to work among recipients of sickness and disability benefits. The changes were enforced in response to high costs for health-related insurances and the recent increase in the inflow to the DI system; the total number of DI-recipients had increased by around 25 percent in the five years prior to 2008. (Government Bill 2007/08:124)

The age-distribution among permanent DI-recipients was highly skewed to the right, with almost 40 percent in their 60s at the introduction of the continuous deduction program. Figure 1 shows the age distribution of my sample at program start.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Individuals already awarded a period of temporary disability benefits at the time of its abolition could be awarded an additional period of up to 18 month of temporary disability benefits after the period already awarded. The same was true for individuals with activity benefits who lost the right for this type of benefits due to age after July 1, 2008. Temporary disability benefits thus remained until the end of 2012.



Figure 1. Age distribution at program start

The general retirement age in Sweden is 65 years of age. Almost all the outflow from DI-benefits is due to old-age retirement or death. Less than one percent of all DI-recipients (including temporary disability and activity benefit recipients) returned to the labor force each year before the reform. Among these, younger recipients were most likely to return; while the average age in the stock of DI-recipients was 55 years, the average age among the few who exited disability insurance for work or unemployment was around 40. Around 2.5 percent of activity benefit recipients returned to the labor force, while only around 0.2 percent of DI-recipients above the age of 50 did the same. In the ages 30 to 49, the share was around one percent. (Jans 2007)

The continuous deduction program was introduced to increase the propensity to return to work among permanent DI-recipients. Since 2000, DI-recipients have had the opportunity to work for a limited time without losing their benefit status, within a system called *resting benefits*. Resting benefits meant that DI-recipients could put on hold part of their benefits in quarter steps of fulltime work and work on this "resting" part.<sup>4</sup> Resting benefits was not possible the first 12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Fulltime benefit recipients could work on one eighth of fulltime without directly affecting benefits, while part-time benefit recipients could not work at all on the part with benefits. This corresponds to the eligibility criteria for the different benefit extents, as a reduction to the working capacity of at least seven eights is required to receive fulltime benefits while to receive part-time benefits the working capacity must be reduced by *at least* the percent of full time work that is awarded.

months with DI-benefits. To *rest* part of benefits meant that this part of the benefits were held back beyond the first three months, but the DI-recipient could at any time notify the Social Insurance Agency that he or she wanted to return to benefits and end the work trial period. Resting benefits was possible for a maximum of 12 months within a 24 month period before the benefit status could be reevaluated. The Social Insurance Agency had to be notified before starting work, and benefits also needed to be rested in order to study or do volunteer work.

Fewer than expected had used this opportunity, only about one percent of all DI-recipients (Ds 2008:14). Policymakers were convinced that more recipients could return to work, for instance because regional differences in the number of DI awards were considered too large to be explained by regional differences in health and working capacity among the awarded. A survey conducted by the Social Insurance Agency also revealed that, with some work adaptions, as much as twelve percent of responding DI-recipients believed that they would be able to do work to some extent (Larheden 2008). With this in mind, the continuous deduction program was introduced, to increase the financial incentives to return to work among recipients of permanent disability benefits. (Government Bill 2007/08:124)

## 2.3 The continuous deduction program

Since January 2009, certain disability insurance recipients have been eligible to work while receiving benefits under the so called special rules of continuous deduction. These involve the possibility to work or conduct studies without ones recipient status being questioned. Eligible DI-recipients get to keep some or all of their benefits while earning a working income. The aim of the reform was to increase incentives for DI-recipients to return to work and to improve the opportunities to make use of any residual working capacity present. The previous rules of resting benefits implied high marginal effects of increasing labor supply, which was believed to be the reason for the low take-up among individuals receiving disability insurance benefits.

Working under the rules of continuous deduction implies no reduction of benefits if annual income<sup>5</sup> from work is below an earnings disregard. If annual income exceeds the earnings disregard, benefits are reduced by SEK 0.5 for every additional SEK earned. The level of the earnings disregard depends on the extent of benefits, to take into account that part-time benefit recipients are presumed to work on the part without benefits. For fulltime DI-recipients the earnings disregard was SEK 42,800 in 2009, which corresponded to around USD 6,000.<sup>6</sup> If annual earnings and benefits taken together exceed a cap, benefits are reduced one to one with earnings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Annual income is defined as any income source that is counted as pensionable income, such as wage, business income, sickness and unemployment benefits, parental insurance benefits, some education grants and stipends etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In 2009 the earnings disregard was SEK 111,280 for recipients of 75 percent benefits, SEK 179,760 for 50 percent benefits and SEK 248,240 for 25 percent benefits. These amounts are adjusted each year to account for e.g. inflation.

above this level. The marginal effect of working when income is above the cap is thus 100 percent due to lost benefits. However, considering previous income levels of DI-recipients in general, this cap is set at a high level and was therefore not expected to affect labor supply decisions negatively. The cap was SEK 342,400 in 2009, while the average annual earnings of a person with fulltime benefits before their first long sick leave was around SEK 100,000.

There is no time limit for working with continuous deduction. The earnings disregard scheme is instead constructed to stimulate outflow from the DI system. It is beneficial for DI-recipients to initiate a reduction of the extent of benefits, e.g. from fulltime benefits to 75 percent benefits, if their residual working capacity is large enough. This is because, if earnings are high enough, recipients will benefit from reducing the benefit level in terms of total income since the earnings disregard is higher with a lower benefit level. Even as initial benefits are reduced to a lower benefit extent, the higher earnings disregard means that total income will be higher with sufficient labor supply. The idea is that recipients will self-select the optimal level of DI-benefits given their working capacity, so that those with fully regained working capacity will exit the disability insurance system on their own accord.

#### 2.3.1 Implementation

Eligibility for working under the special rules of continuous deduction is based on the date of benefit award. Those awarded permanent DI-benefits for a period starting before July 1 2008 are eligible<sup>7</sup>, while those awarded thereafter are not. I use this setup in a regression discontinuity design to study the effects of program eligibility. However, this cutoff coincides with another reform, as eligibility for disability benefits was changed from July 1 2008 onwards. Stricter rules were imposed for being awarded permanent DI-benefits and temporary DI-benefits were abolished. I account for the resulting differences above and below the cutoff by combining the regression discontinuity approach with a matching strategy.

The cutoff date for being eligible for the special rules of continuous deduction was set retroactively, which works to avoid increases in inflow to permanent disability benefits in order to be eligible to work with benefits within the continuous deduction program. The parliamentary decision to pass the reform was made on October 30 2008, with retroactive eligibility for recipients awarded DI prior to July 2008<sup>8</sup>. Applying for disability benefits can be done retroactively for up to three months before the month of application, and a doctor's note has to be attached validating the claim for the full period. This means that in order to be considered for DI

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Eligibility is lost if the extent of benefits is expanded after July 1 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The cutoff date was originally proposed to be in August 2007. After complaints by referral organizations that July 1 2008 would be a more appropriate cutoff date also for eligibility to work within the continuous deduction program, due to the changes in eligibility for DI-benefits after this date, the cutoff date was adjusted accordingly.

award by the less strict regulation that was applicable for benefit periods starting before July 1 2008, the application needed to have been submitted in September 2008, before the continuous deduction program was passed in the parliament. Therefore, there is little concern for self-selection into treatment based on anticipated potential outcomes.

For the rules of continuous deduction to be applied, an application must be submitted to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency before work starts. The continuous deduction program also allows beneficiaries to conduct studies or do volunteer work which is not otherwise allowed without affecting benefits. For doing unpaid work or studying within the program, no application is needed.

Since the introduction of the program, the share of eligible recipients applying to work with continuous deduction has risen steadily each year, from just above two percent the first year to around nine percent in 2014. (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2015) At least some of this increase is likely to be explained by a gradual change in the age distribution of eligible recipients, as a large proportion has left the DI system for retirement over time. The number of applicants increased the first few years, from around 7,500 in 2009 to 9,900 in 2012, and has since decreased a little each year. Two surveys were conducted in 2009 and 2010 among eligible beneficiaries. The first showed that the continuous deduction program was well-known among eligible recipients<sup>9</sup> (Demoskop, 2009). According to the second survey, working within the continuous deduction program is more common among women, younger, well-educated, and non-single recipients. Around 2.4 percent of the total number of eligible had applied when the second survey was conducted, and among these 80 percent was currently working while 10 percent had been working. The survey suggests that the working hours were increased by about as much for fulltime as part-time recipients. 8 percent of those that had not yet applied stated that they would likely apply in the coming years. 1.1 percent were studying with benefits and 4.5 percent were doing unpaid volunteer work. (Demoskop, 2010) This indicates that there is some residual working capacity among the eligible recipients, but also suggests that labor demand for workers with disabilities does not match their willingness to work since twice as many eligible beneficiaries were doing unpaid work as the share doing paid work. Unfortunately, unpaid volunteer work is unobservable in administrative data, therefore this study is limited to studying the effects on paid work and education.

Permanent DI-recipients not eligible for continuous deduction receive essentially the same treatment as before the rules of continuous deduction were implemented. Those who were awarded DI-benefits after July 1 2008 can only try to work if they rest part (or all) of their benefits. The only change that was made to the system of resting benefits was that recipients could

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 82 percent of non-applicants responded that they knew about the new rules.

previously maintain their benefits the first three months of work with resting benefits, but now they instead continuously maintain 25 percent of the resting amount tax free during the work trial period. This system provides high marginal effects from working, since benefits need to be rested by a quarter of full time work even if working hours are only increased by a few hours a week. This implies a high marginal cost of using ones residual working capacity if it is not high enough, which might discourage workers from trying to return to work.

## 3 Theoretical framework and previous empirical evidence

## 3.1 Theoretical predictions

Figure 2 shows the financial effects from the continuous deduction program compared to the rules for resting benefits, the option that is available for the control group. It is a simplified illustration of the basic economic forces at work for individuals maximizing utility, assumed to depend positively on consumption (corresponding to total income) and leisure (the negative of working income, corresponding to a certain number of working hours when wages are given).<sup>10</sup> Panel A shows a type case recipient of fulltime disability insurance benefits, and panel B shows a type case part-time disability benefit recipient with half-time benefits.

The solid and dashed lines show the budget constraints with continuous deduction and resting benefits, respectively. The diagonal line shows when total income corresponds to work income, and thus the distance between this line and the solid and dashed line illustrates the size of DI benefits under the continuous deduction program or resting benefits, respectively. The kinks in the dashed lines show when the benefit extent must be reduced within the system of resting benefits, to enable more working hours. The part AB of the continuous deduction budget constraint in panel A and B, respectively, is the part below the earnings disregard, where benefits are not reduced with earnings, while the part BC is the income range where earnings are reduced by half of the work income, and therefore has a flatter slope than the part AB. Fulltime work is reached between B and C in the examples above, as shown by the dashed vertical line. The small part CD in panel A shows were the fulltime case recipient would reach the cap and benefits would be phased out one-to one with additional income.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Figure 2 does not take into account taxes or the effects on other benefits such as the means tested housing allowance. Work income is related to working hours in both cases by the hourly earnings that would be earned if the case individual was working. Both case individuals would earn an annual income of SEK 240,000 if working fulltime, which yields annual benefits of SEK 153,600 for the fulltime case recipient and combined annual benefits and earnings of 196,800 for the half-time case recipient, with 64 percent DI benefits.

Panel A Case example for a fulltime recipient



Panel B Case example for a part-time recipient



Figure 2. Case examples of the financial effects of the continuous deduction program

The figure also shows the responses of individuals of different types (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) with respect to their utility functions. Leisure is assumed to be a normal good. The shape of the utility function is determined by preferences for consumption and leisure, which depends on the disutility from work, partly determined, of course, by the severity of the work related health impairment.

The effect on labor supply from the financial incentives induced by the continuous deduction program depends on where along the budget constraint each beneficiary's utility is maximized with and without continuous deduction. A fulltime recipient who would choose zero labor supply with the system of resting benefits, will either increase labor supply or not if faced with the option of continuous deduction, depending on the shape of his or her utility function. This is shown in panel A and B by individuals of two types with different utility functions; type 0 and type 1. For a type 0 individual, the labor supply does not change since utility is maximized at zero irrespective of which budget constraint he or she has. For a type 1 individual on the other hand, utility functions are such that zero working hours is chosen with resting benefits because the loss of benefits from increasing labor supply moves the individual to a lower utility level. With continuous deduction, however, the type 1 individuals' utility is increased by entering the labor force. Since both types have no previous labor income, there is no income effect and the predicted labor force participation response of the reform is thus positive (or zero if all fulltime DI-recipient are type 0 individuals). Since the budget constraint is not changed for the part without benefits, the same prediction is made for the effect on the intensive margin for part-time recipients who do not work on the part with benefits with the resting benefit system, as shown for type 1 in panel B.

Since the budget constraint with continuous deduction is always above the budget constraint for resting benefits when labor supply is above zero, there is a negative income effect from moving from the resting benefits budget constraint to the continuous deduction budget constraint at all other levels of (initial) labor supply. For both full- and part-time recipients maximizing utility at a kink other than zero labor supply, continuous deduction makes increasing working hours more profitable than with resting benefits, which induces a positive substitution effect from increasing labor supply. At these kinks, income and substitution effects have opposite signs and the labor supply response is thus ambiguous, as shown by the responses of types 2 and 3 in panel A. While both type 2 and 3 individuals maximize utility at the same labor supply level with resting benefits, depending on the type, individuals either increase (type 3) or decrease (type 2) labor supply when faced with the new budget constraint with continuous deduction. This case is not illustrated in panel B, but holds for part-time recipients at the one kink to the right in the figure as well.

For types choosing positive labor supply with resting benefits, but *not* positioned at any of the kinks along the budget constraint, the predicted labor supply response from getting continuous deduction is less ambiguous. Within segment AB of the continuous deduction budget constraint, the relative price of leisure is the same with both budget constraints, so there is only a negative income effect. Within segment BC, since benefits are reduced by 50 percent of the additional income earned, the relative price of leisure is lower than with resting benefits. This creates a negative substitution effect (Eissa & Liebman 1996). Since the income effect is also negative, the labor supply effect is unambiguously negative. This is illustrated for type 4 in panel B.

If benefits and earnings together exceed the cap level, benefits will be phased out one-to-one with additional income, further lowering the price of leisure. Within such a segment, an even more negative substitution effect would supplement the negative income effect, and decrease labor supply. This would be the case in segment CD in panel A in Figure 2. The case recipient in panel B does not have an income path high enough to ever hit the cap since benefits are fully phased out before the cap level.

The predicted total labor supply response of the continuous deduction program is thus ambiguous. The predicted response at the extensive margin is unambiguously nonnegative, but at the intensive margin, for full- and part-time recipients working on the part with benefits, the direction of the response depends on the shape of the utility functions of the DI-recipients. Nonetheless, because of the low share of DI-recipients returning to work prior to the reform, the expected labor supply response is, despite of this, positive. All but a few DI-recipients had zero labor supply, or zero labor supply beyond the part without benefits for part-time DI-recipients, before the continuous deduction program was introduced. For both of these cases, a positive labor supply response is predicted (assuming there are residual working capacities among DI recipients and not all being type 0 individuals).

#### 3.2 Previous literature

This paper is related to the literature on the effects of financial incentives to work for disability insurance recipients. This literature is fairly limited, even though a few studies have been done recently. The earlier literature on the labor supply effects of disability insurance receipt suggests a presence of residual working capacities among DI recipients (Bound 1989, Gruber & Kubik 1997, Staubli 2011, Moore 2015). This literature has generally focused on the labor supply of rejected DI-applicants as the counterfactual for DI-receipt. Another related literature concerns the relation between the level of disability benefits and labor supply of DI-recipients. These studies show that higher benefit levels imply a lower labor supply (Gruber 2000, Marie & Vall Castello 2012, Fevang, Hardoy & Røed 2013, Borghans, Gielen & Luttmer 2014, Koning & van Sonsbeek

2016). The negative relationship between the benefit level and labor supply suggests that residual working capacities exist also among DI-recipients.

The more directly related literature on the effects of financial incentives that encourage people with disability benefits to return to work generally suggests positive effects from this type of treatment, although not all financial incentives seem to work. Weathers & Hemmeter (2011) show that the "\$1 for \$2 offset" pilot program in the U.S., which provides a gradual decrease instead of a full reduction of benefits if earnings are above an earnings disregard level, similar to the Swedish continuous deduction program, increased the share of beneficiaries with earnings above the earnings disregard (i.e. the substantial gainful activity (SGA) level, which amounts to earnings of USD 1,130 per month in 2016). However while their results show a positive effect on earnings for beneficiaries with earnings disregard before the program, beneficiaries with earnings and the earnings disregard before the program, beneficiaries with earnings on average. The lack of any effect on labor force participation also found in the study might be explained by the composition of the sample since program eligibility was randomized among program volunteers. Delin, Hartman & Sell (2015) study the same program and find a delayed but positive effect on employment outcomes for the treated which increases with time since program start.

Campolieti & Riddell (2012) find an increased propensity to work after the introduction of an earnings disregard within the Canada Pension Plan disability program. They find no effects from the introduction of an automatic reinstatement without re-application for up to 24 months for DI-recipients who want to come back to disability insurance after working. Bütler et al. (2014) study the effects of a randomized experiment in Switzerland, which provided large financial incentives to work for DI-recipients. Recipients were offered a claim of up to the equivalence of USD 71,000, comparable to the average disposable yearly income of Swiss households, to expand work hours and reduce benefits. The call-back rates were low and unaffected by the size of the claim offered. The take-up rate was only half of a percent, and Bütler et al. conclude that the program most likely provided windfall gains to recipients who would have returned to work anyway, rather than incentivized work.

A reform similar to the one under study here, in terms of both content and setting, was implemented in Norway in 2005.<sup>11</sup> The cutoff for program eligibility was set retroactively with respect to time of DI award in Norway as well. Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) use an RD design to estimate causal effects of the Norwegian reform. The setting in which treatment is based on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The setting of the Norwegian return-to-work-program for DI recipients is similar to the rules of continuous deduction in Sweden. Benefits are reduced if earnings exceed an earnings disregard by approximately NOK 0.6 for every additional NOK 1 earned, up to an earnings ceiling level where all remaining benefits are lost. This ceiling is generally above fulltime work earnings. For more details see Kostøl & Mogstad (2014).

date of DI award makes it possible to use the RD framework to compare individuals who are assumingly similar in all other aspects, except for the date of DI award. There was no other confounding differences between those awarded just prior to and just after the cutoff date in Norway. The retroactive setting of the cutoff increases the credibility of the RD design as no manipulation of the forcing variable in order to become eligible is possible. Kostøl & Mogstad find positive effects from the program on labor force participation and earnings for recipients aged 18 to 49 years. The positive effect is strongest and statistically significant three years after program introduction, at the end of their follow up period. They also show that the response to the financial incentives is highly heterogeneous. The response is stronger among males, well-educated, and recipients with more labor market experience. Areas with low unemployment also triggered a larger response, pointing to labor demand posing a problem for DI-recipients in returning to the labor market. Among DI-recipients above the age of 50, the study showed no positive effect from the return-to-work program.

In many of these studies, positive effects on beneficiaries' labor supply seem to be driven by the response of younger beneficiaries. Koning & van Sonsbeek (2016), who find that lower benefit levels after the income-related benefit period is exhausted for Dutch part-time disability beneficiaries increase labor supply, show that this effect is confined to younger recipients and strongest in the youngest age group below 35 years old. Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) find positive effects only among DI-recipients aged 18 to 49. Moore (2015) studies the employment response of recipients with alcohol- or drug-related disabilities that lost the eligibility for disability insurance in 1997 in the U.S. The positive effect was stronger for younger recipients, in this case 30-39 year olds, than for recipients aged 40-49, and even more so than for those aged 50-61. Moore also finds an interesting u-shape in the size of the effect over time spent with disability insurance. The effect was strongest for those who had received benefits for 2.7 years prior to termination.

Previous results are generally in line with the theoretical predictions described in the previous section. Both Campolieti & Riddell (2012) and Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) find positive effects on the extensive margin for treatments where the budget constraint shifts similar to the continuous deduction in Figure 2. Weathers & Hemmeter (2011) find a positive effect for individuals previously positioned at the kink created by the full reduction of benefits at the SGA-level, suggesting that the positive substitution effect at the kink outweighs the negative income effect in their setting. The effect for individuals previously positioned above the kink is negative, corresponding to the predictions for individuals positioned away from the kinks where both the income and substitution effects are negative. Bütler et al. (2014), however, found no effect of a lump sum offer to expand work hours and reduce benefits. Perhaps the experimental setting

provided more uncertainty than financial incentives within the DI-system would have, discouraging recipients from accepting the offer.

## 4 Empirical strategy

## 4.1 The regression discontinuity design

The objective of the empirical strategy is to estimate the causal effects of the reform by coming as close to a randomized experiment as possible. The basic idea of the regression discontinuity design is that there is a discontinuity in treatment assignment, caused by some policy rule, which can be considered to provide exogenous variation in treatment status. Treatment is assigned according to some assignment variable, denoted the *running* or *forcing* variable, and there is a threshold value of that variable which determines whether an individual is treated or not. In this case, treatment is determined by the time of award of DI-benefits. Outcomes are allowed to vary by the values of the forcing variable itself, and the approach builds upon the notion that close to the cutoff threshold for treatment, individuals are so similar with respect to the forcing variable that treatment can be considered as good as randomly assigned. Critical for the validity of the approach is that individuals cannot precisely determine the value of the forcing variable and thereby their own treatment assignment, which would invalidate the local randomization concept.

As the cutoff date for eligibility was set retroactively, there is little concern for self-selection into treatment, at least based on anticipated potential outcomes, which would be difficult for the researcher to control for using observables. However, the local randomization concept is nonetheless invalidated by the fact that there was a regime change with respect to DI eligibility at the same time as the cutoff threshold for eligibility for the continuous deduction program. Above and below the cutoff, recipients therefore differ in terms of working capacity. Above the cutoff, the sample consists of individuals with more severe health impairments, directly related to their labor market prospects. From July 1 2008 and onwards, only beneficiaries with impairments severe enough for their working capacity to be considered permanently reduced were qualified for permanent DI benefits. This involved chronical illnesses or irreversible injuries where further rehabilitation measures could not improve the working capacity. Previously, these requirements were less strict, and other considerations than the health impairment such as age, education or residential considerations, could also be taken into account for the award of DI-benefits.<sup>12</sup> (Government Bill 2007/08:136)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> According to Social Insurance Agency representatives, this possibility was rarely used in practice, and therefore this part of the eligibility changes would not imply any significant changes to the award of DI-benefits (Dutrieux et al. 2011a). As I will show (section 5.2) however, this does not seem to be the case.

Using the terminology of the potential outcomes framework (e.g. Rubin 2005), one of the assumptions for the RD approach to be valid is that the expectations of potential outcomes,  $Y_1$  and  $Y_0$ , are continuous with respect to the forcing variable,  $C_i$ , at the cutoff value  $c_0$ , i.e.:

$$E(Y_1|C_i)$$
 and  $E(Y_0|C_i)$  are continuous at  $C_i=c_0$  (1)

Due to the differential selection into permanent DI-benefits before and after the cutoff, this assumption is not fulfilled. Formally, before July 1 2008, award of permanent DI-benefits required a reduction in work capacity,  $H_i$ , which satisfied  $H_i \ge H_t$ . Thereafter, award of permanent DI-benefits instead required a larger reduction in work capacity that satisfied  $H_i \ge H_c > H_t$ . It is expected that potential labor market outcomes will depend on the reduction in work capacity, such that  $Y_{1i}$ =f( $H_i$ ) and  $Y_{0i}$ =f( $H_i$ ) (Koning & van Sonsbeek 2016). In fact, I expect potential outcomes to depend negatively on  $H_i$  so that a more severe reduction in the working capacity (i.e. a higher value of  $H_i$ ) worsens potential labor market outcomes.

Additionally, the unconfoundedness assumption states that conditional on covariates treatment and potential outcomes are independent, or formally

$$(\mathbf{Y}_{1i}, \mathbf{Y}_{0i}) \perp \mathbf{T}_i | \mathbf{X}_i \tag{2}$$

where  $X_i$  is a vector of observable characteristics. This assumption is often used in a broader context when causal effects are estimated, with the assumption of selection on observables. The RD approach generally fulfills this assumption by design, and also allows for selection on unobservables, since the design itself is expected to provide balance in all covariates due to local randomization. Conditioning on  $X_i$  is therefore not necessary, the only covariate conditioned on is the forcing variable, and in the common case that covariates are included in RD analyses, the purpose is to reduce variability in estimates (Lee & Lemieux 2010).

In my case, however, the RD design alone does not ensure balance, even when individuals do not manipulate treatment assignment. I do not expect any exact manipulation of the forcing variable just around the cutoff in order to be eligible for the continuous deduction program. To do so, the individuals would have had to know what the cutoff date was going to be and have had the ability to affect their own value of the forcing variable. The cutoff date for the rules of continuous deduction was set retroactively, so manipulation around the cutoff to become eligible for these rules is improbable. There is, however, a clear surge in the inflow to permanent DI just before the cutoff (see Figure 3).

Besides applications for permanent DI, caseworkers could initiate transfers of cases from sickness benefits to disability benefits<sup>13</sup>, and the reduction in these transfers is the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> This was usually done after about a consecutive year with sickness benefits (Government Bill 2007/08:124).



Figure 3. Inflow by award date

main source for the drop in the number of DI-cases granted after July 2008 (Dutrieux et al. 2011b) According to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, the increase in inflow just before the cutoff can be interpreted as a surge in case-worker output due to the announcement of the stricter requirements from July 2008 onwards (Swedish Social Insurance Agency 2014). This means that there is an increase in the density of the forcing variable just before the cutoff which does not reflect manipulation of the forcing variable in order to get the treatment I study here, but instead reflects case-workers trying to give those with  $H_i \in (H_c, H_t)$  (i.e. outside the region of common support in this estimation, see below) a greater chance to be awarded permanent DI by working down their (transfer) caseloads just before the cutoff. Case-worker initiated transfers are always executed the month after the transfer is decided, so this is a probable explanation for the peak in July 2008 for both full- and part-time recipients. Retroactive applications had to be sent in no later than September 2008 to be awarded according to the less strict rules starting June 2008. There is a peak in applications coming in in September (Sjögren Lindquist & Wadensjö 2011). The peak in June 2008 for fulltime recipients is therefore likely more problematic than the peaks in July.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> There is a peak in applications September 2008, although the share of workers applying in September is not much higher than the monthly average before July 2008. With the exception of September, after July 2008 the share of workers applying for disability benefits declined substantially (Sjögren Lindquist & Wadensjö 2011).

## 4.2 Inference with the local randomization violation and matching

#### 4.2.1 The naive RD estimate

A valid RD design presumes local randomization, which ensures that covariates are balanced when restricting the analysis to a tight region around the cutoff of the forcing variable. In this case, as I have explained above, this is not fulfilled with regard to  $H_i$ . I therefore need to condition on  $H_i$  to be able to make credible inference even within the RD framework. There is little advice in the literature on how to do so.

Gerard, Rokkanen & Rothe (2016) show how sharp bounds on causal treatment effects can be derived within the regression discontinuity framework in case of manipulation of the forcing variable. They show that, if one is willing to assume that units who manipulate the forcing variable so that they are always on one particular side of the cutoff, have higher average potential outcomes under treatment than units that do not manipulate the forcing variable, and can thus be observed on either side, the naive RD estimate that ignores selection concerns is an upper bound of the treatment effect for the non-manipulators.<sup>15</sup> In this study, the direction of the intended selection is clear. The strictness of the DI-system was tightened, so that individuals awarded DI benefits above the cutoff are on average of worse health, i.e. have more severe working capacity reductions, than those awarded DI benefits below the cutoff. I have argued that potential outcomes depend negatively on the reduction in working capacity. If this expectation is valid, a traditional RD comparison between awarded just prior to and after the cutoff date would thus overestimate the effect, since those treated on average have better health than the control units.

It could of course be questioned whether case-workers have complied with the stricter regulations, and it is also possible that different components of the regime change had opposing effects on the expectation of potential outcomes of recipients before and after the regime. The regime change implied stricter screening with respect to health impairments directly, but also on other considerations that could potentially yield bias in the opposite direction.<sup>16</sup> As I will show, however, an analysis of pre-program outcomes indicates that working capacities are better among the treated.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For details, see Gerard, Rokkanen & Rothe (2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Processing times were higher for applications coming in before the cutoff, and for applications coming in during the peak in September, which means that processing times are likely discontinuous at the cutoff. Autor et al. (2015) show that a longer processing time reduce long run labor supply and earnings in the U.S. However, they show that this effect is entirely driven by processing times that postpone the start of the trial work period. Since untreated can apply for resting benefits only after 12 months after award, average processing times are not likely to push the start of the trial work period above this time for treated. Instead, since the 12 month waiting period does not apply to the continuous deduction program, the results of Autor et al. further suggests that the bias should go in the expected direction.

## 4.2.2 RD and matching

Conditional on  $H_i$ , who ends up in the treatment or control group can be considered as good as random. I must thus include  $H_i$  together with the forcing variable in  $X_i$  in (2) even within the RD design for the unconfoundedness assumption to hold. Conditional on  $H_i$ , the continuity assumption holds. One way to obtain balance would be to restrict the sample based on some exclusion criteria, in this case including only observations where  $H_i \ge H_c$ . The question then becomes how to determine the exact cutoff value  $H_c$ .

Keele et al. (2015) and Linden & Adams (2012) try to manage the issue of covariate imbalance within the RD framework. Both suggest combining the RD framework with matching to obtain balance in covariate distributions between the treatment and control groups. Linden & Adams (2012) identify three potential ways to balance covariates; i) to apply some exclusion criteria in the data processing stage that ensures balance, ii) to apply regression adjustment to the RD model, and iii) to use the propensity score as a complement to the RD design to correct for imbalances in characteristics between the treated and control groups. In my case, there is no simple indicator to use as an exclusion criterion to ensure that balance is achieved. Regression adjustment is easy to apply, but may elicit biased results, especially in cases like this where overlap is limited. There is also no way to validate that imbalances have been properly adjusted, or that the correct functional form has been used (Linden & Adams, 2012). Linden & Adams propose to use the propensity score matching method combined with the RD design, either by matching pairs based on the propensity score and conducting statistical analysis in the usual manner on the matched pairs alone, or by constructing weights based on the conditional probability of each individual being in the group he or she is in (treatment or control), i.e. the inverse probability treatment weighting (IPTW) technique. They argue that these weights easily can be added to the existing RD modelling methods, and show that their weighting strategy outperforms standard regression adjustment using example data.

Keele et al. (2015) suggest combining the regression discontinuity approach with conditioning on observables when balance in the covariates is lacking at the cutoff, under some conditions. They argue that, even if there may be an issue of selection on unobservables for the full sample, there may be cases where it is reasonable to assume that, within a tight region around the cutoff, such selection is ignorable, and selection on observables is plausible. They formulate a local unconfoundedness assumption under which this combination of methods is valid. Transforming this assumption to suit my notation, it reads:

Within a small region 
$$c_l < c_0 < c_u$$
, we have that  $(Y_{1i}, Y_{0i}) \perp T_i | \mathbf{X}_i$  (3)

This means that, within a region around the cutoff, unobservables are balanced after conditioning on observables. Similar arguments are made in several studies (i.e. Battistin & Rettore 2008,

Mealli & Rampichini 2012, Angrist & Rokkanen 2015). Keele et al. additionally argue that, if unconfoundedness holds within the region, this design allows for estimation of the treatment effect for the entire region around the cutoff as opposed to only at the cutoff value. They, too, propose using a matching strategy to implement this combined design.

The identifying assumption for the matching method is, aside the same unconfoundedness assumption as with the RD approach, the overlap condition:

$$0 < P(T_i=1|\mathbf{X}_i) < 1 \tag{4}$$

This means that the covariate distributions of the treatment and control groups are similar so that there is a comparable unit in the other group for each observation. In my case, this assumption is also not fulfilled with respect to the observable H<sub>i</sub>. The requirements for the working capacity reduction in order to be awarded DI-benefits was changed at the same cutoff, which implies that there is not complete overlap in this variable, such that  $0 < P(T_i=1|\mathbf{X}_i) \le 1$ . To avoid bias, the treatment group must be trimmed so that I am able to find comparable control units for each treated in the estimation sample. Limiting the analysis to the region of common support with respect to the reduction in working capacity means that the estimation sample will only include observations that fulfill H<sub>i</sub>  $\ge$  H<sub>c</sub>. Therefore, I will not be able to estimate the average treatment effect of all treated (ATT), but only for a subgroup of the treated who satisfy H<sub>i</sub>  $\ge$  H<sub>c</sub>, i.e. the average treatment effect of the untreated (ATU), since H<sub>c</sub> > H<sub>t</sub>. This estimate is however interesting in itself in the sense that it is the average treatment effect for the non-treated, which corresponds to the treatment effect for the group that is relevant if the program would be extended to more or all recipients of permanent DI.

Consider that DI recipients are of two types; an "always-type" with reductions in working capacity,  $Hi \ge Hc$ , such that they are eligible for DI benefits both before and after the regime change, and a "before-type" that only fulfill the screening requirements before the regime change, i.e. with reductions in working capacity according to  $Ht \le Hi < Hc$ . Under the previous regime, both before types and always types were awarded DI, but after the regime change, DI awardees only consist of always types. If there were no before-types in the analysis, the naive RD estimates would be valid estimates of the causal effects of the reform. Before types are assumed to have higher average potential outcomes than always types, implying, as I have argued above, that a naive RD analysis of the effects of the difference in financial incentives at the cutoff should be interpreted as an upper bound of the effect for the always-types. To estimate the true causal effect for the always types among those that were awarded DI benefits before the regime change, i.e. limiting the analysis to the region of common support. To do this, I use a propensity score matching strategy. The aim of this strategy is to adjust

the distribution of observables of treated and untreated recipients toward a target population<sup>17</sup>, here the always types. The always types are well-defined in the sample of untreated, who were awarded benefits after the regime change, toward which I want to adjust the sample of treated, who were awarded benefits prior to the regime change. The propensity score is thus defined as the probability of not receiving treatment. To identify always-types among treated DI recipients, I match the sample using a nearest neighbor propensity score matching approach, where closest matches for the untreated sample are chosen without replacement from the treated sample. The nearest neighbor matching approach is more likely to avoid bad matches and thereby adjust the sample in terms of both observables and unobservables than, i.e. the IPTW technique proposed by Linden & Adams (2012), which gives some weight to all observations.

This matching approach instead assumes unconfoundedness within the target population of always types. With respect to one particular covariate, the forcing variable, this assumption always fails in RD-type situations. With the RD framework, individuals will be compared that are awarded DI quite close in time, reducing the bias that could arise from these effects. The tradeoff is between balance in the forcing variable and other covariates. My matching approach is, for this reason, also restricted to observations close to the cutoff. The identifying assumption is that, within a tight region around the cutoff, the forcing variable is ignorable given other observables, as stated in (3). This means that, unless we can assume constant treatment effects over the range of the forcing variable, what I estimate is a local average treatment effect (LATE). In my case, this means that the estimated treatment effect is valid for those who were awarded permanent DIbenefits in the middle of 2008 on outcomes in years thereafter, while the effect might be different for people who had been DI-recipients for a longer time when the reform was introduced. Date of award of permanent DI-benefits can directly affect outcomes in two ways. First, more time spent away from the labor market can make the return to work more difficult, for example due to depreciation of human capital. The time away is however not deterministically determined by the forcing variable since most beneficiaries have been on other forms of sickness leave before being awarded permanent DI-benefits. In fact, due to the stricter criteria for DI-benefits enforced at the same cutoff, total time spent away from the labor market on sick leave is on average longer for the control group. Second, the decision to award permanent DI-benefits takes into consideration the prospects of returning to the labor market at the time of award. What it of course cannot take into consideration is future innovations that improve these prospects, for example new work aids. The possibility of such innovations that increase the possibility of working with a permanent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The target population concept was introduced by Lechner & Wunch (2009), who match participants and nonparticipants in labor market programs over time to analyze the effectiveness of these programs over a 10-year period.

impairment might induce an opposite effect on outcomes from time since award of permanent DIbenefits.

#### 4.2.3 Plausibility of the matching approach

In principle, the matching estimator requires the same assumptions as OLS. If the unconfoundedness assumption holds, regression adjustment would suffice to produce unbiased results. If we are worried about selection on unobservables, we need a more sophisticated method like the RD which has a greater credibility in providing an as good as randomized treatment assignment. Here, since unconfoundedness is not fulfilled, the matching estimator can more efficiently adjust for covariate imbalances by only comparing comparable individuals. The strategy however relies on the selection on observables assumption, at least within a region, as specified in the local unconfoundedness assumption (3).

In my case, unobservables I might worry about include trends in the selection into permanent DI. Unobservable changes in e.g. administrative norms, or the quality or importance of medical testimonials etc. may have occurred over time. A large time span brings variety in political majorities, with different views on the generosity of public insurance schemes which might affect caseworkers' decisions. Such effects could cause a selection on unobservables problem. Restricting the analysis to a tight region around the cutoff reduces these concerns. It also reduces variability of the forcing variable, for which we have no overlap between treated and controls.

For the local unconfoundedness assumption to hold, it must also be assumed that differences in the selection into DI under the different regimes is not determined by unobservables. This selection is determined by the change in eligibility criteria, selection by case-workers, and self-selection. The availability of rich data related to the changes in eligibility criteria makes this assumption more plausible. Case-workers of course have some discretion under both regimes and observe factors that are difficult to observe by the researcher, such as for example motivation. I use rich data on both health indicators and other basic characteristics, together with detailed information about labor market histories, which should provide a good proxy for such factors. Caliendo et al. (2017) show that, even though usually unobservable variables<sup>18</sup> matter for selection into, in their case, labor market programs in Germany, these variables do not make a significant difference in the estimation of the treatment effects of these programs when detailed administrative data are available. This is particularly true when observable information is used that is correlated with the unobservable variables of concern, as is labor market histories when evaluating program effects on labor market outcomes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Unobservable variables examined include personality traits, expectations about the relevant treatment, labor market flexibility, intergenerational information, social networks and life satisfaction (Caliendo et al. 2017).

I have argued that self-selection in order to receive the treatment that is being studied is unlikely, due to the retroactive determination of the eligibility criteria for treatment. Self-selection due to the regime change in DI eligibility is, however, even probable, and may be related to the potential outcomes from the treatment. The heap in the number of awards just before the cutoff, at least for fulltime recipients, indicates this. According to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, the peak reflects a surge in case-worker output, which means that selection at the peak should be made on the same grounds as before. This explanation is likely true for the peak in July. Caseworker initiated transfers are always executed the month after the transfer is decided. The peak in June, however, is more likely due to self-selection. Retroactive applications to be awarded DI benefits for June 2008 were possible three months ahead, and there was a peak in DI applications in September 2008, suggesting that individuals were trying to self-select into DI on grounds of the old regime. I will show that observable characteristics are clearly different for the sample awarded benefits in June 2008 compared to both before and after, suggesting that this is the case. Consider the presence of a third type of DI recipient, a "heap-type", with different average potential outcomes than both always- and before-types. This violates the continuity assumption further. Barreca, Lindo & Waddell (2011) argues that the most robust alternative is to use what is referred to in the literature as a "donut-RD" approach (e.g. Barreca et al. 2010, Almond & Doyle 2011, Bajari et al. 2011) in such cases, i.e. excluding observations at the peak. This assumes that the potential outcomes at the peak, without the presence of the heaped types can be extrapolated using adjacent points (Eggers et al. 2015, Angrist & Rokkanen 2015)<sup>19</sup>. If the self-selection is made on the grounds of observables, the matching strategy should of course already take care of this problem. I will also show that results are more similar with and without excluding observations at the peak with the matching approach than with the naive RD estimator. However, it is more likely that selection on observables is not sufficient to single out heaped types than before types, especially with respect to those awarded in June 2008, since unobservables such as motivation are more likely to differ among self-selectors than when selection is made by caseworkers. In the main analysis, I therefore exclude the data at the peaks. In the main specification, I calculate propensity scores using observations three months from the cutoff on each side, after excluding recipients awarded DI in June and July 2008.<sup>20</sup> To produce the main RD estimates, I

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Excluding recipients awarded DI-benefits in July 2008 is necessary also for another reason. A special rule was added by the parliament to the Government bill stipulating the special rules for continuous deduction, that benefit spells decided in June but starting in July 2008 (i.e. case-worker transfers made in June 2008), also qualifies the recipients for the rules of continuous deduction. This special rule means that it is unclear from the data what recipients awarded permanent DI from July 2008 onwards are treated and which are not, since the data do not contain information on what date the decision to award benefits was made. The fact that the treatment status of these observations is unknown is another reason I must exclude spells of permanent DI that start in July 2008, besides the peak in inflow.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This is in agreement with excluding these in the estimation model. I am thus using awarded in March, April, and May as well as August, September and October for the main specifications.

use a triangular kernel model with the same bandwidth around the cutoff.<sup>21</sup> Standard errors are clustered on municipality.<sup>22</sup> The matching model matches nearest neighbors for untreated without replacements, and I trim the sample to increase the common support by dropping control observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the treated. I use heteroscedasticity-consistent analytical standard errors proposed by Abadie & Imbens (2006).

## 5 Data

This study is based on administrative data. Administrative records from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency with information about social insurance spells and benefit types from the MiDAS database is used to identify permanent disability recipients and their sickness absence histories. Data from the Social Insurance Agency on diagnoses that beneficiaries are awarded permanent DI-benefits for are not available in the data. Instead analogous data is collected from the National Patient Register and the Prescription Drug Register from the National Board of Health and Welfare. The Prescription Drug Register contains information about all pharmacy collected drug prescriptions from July 2005, including drug type.<sup>23</sup> The National Patient Register contains information about all concluded inpatient care events, admissions to geriatric and psychiatric care and compulsory psychiatric care, acute outpatient care events, and doctors' treatments from outpatient care not categorized as primary care. I observe ICD-10 diagnose code category<sup>24</sup> for the main and secondary diagnoses for each observable care event. An advantage of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> There are some data-driven methods to find optimal bandwidth sizes. The optimal bandwidth size according to, for example, Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012), varies between 1.4 and 22 months across the outcome variables in this study. I have chosen the baseline bandwidth of three months, as a trade-off between precision and balance of the forcing variable, and I investigate the sensitivity of my results to the choice of bandwidth in section 6.1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Card & Lee (2008) suggest clustering standard errors on distinct values of the forcing variable when the forcing variable is discrete. However, in my application the number of clusters within the bandwidth is very small. There could be regional correlation of the error term due to regional differences in DI award and labor demand, which is why standard errors are clustered on municipality of residence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The drug prescription data follows the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System and separates between the anatomical main group (first level ATC-codes): alimentary tract and metabolism (A), blood and blood forming organs (B), cardiovascular system (C), dermatologicals (D), genito-urinary system and sex hormones (G), systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones and insulins (H), antiinfectives for systemic use (J), antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents (L), musculoskeletal system (M), nervous system (N), antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents (P), respiratory system (R), sensory organs (S), and Various (V).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The ICD-10 categorization in the data separates between certain infectious and parasitic diseases (A00-B99), neoplasms (C00-D48), diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving the immune mechanism (D50-D89), endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (E00-E90), mental and behavioral disorders (F00-F98), diseases of the nervous system (G00-G99), diseases of the eye and adnexa (H00-H59), diseases of the ear and mastoid process (H60-H95), diseases of the circulatory system (I00-I99), diseases of the respiratory system (J00-J99), diseases of the digestive system (K00-K93), diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue (L00-L99), diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (M00-M99), diseases of the genitourinary system (N00-N99), pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium (O00-O99), certain conditions originating in the perinatal period (P00-P96), congenital malformations, deformations and chromosomal abnormalities (Q00-Q99), symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified (R00-R99), injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes (S00-T98), transport accidents (V00-V99), external causes of morbidity and mortality (V01-Y98),

using historical diagnose information from the National Patient Register is that these data are less likely to be affected by the changes to the DI-criteria in 2008. A diagnosis from at least one care event is available for 95 percent of the main sample; those awarded permanent DI within a three month bandwidth from the cutoff. The distribution of diagnoses in the data used is in line with statistics on diagnoses for disability insurance recipients published by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. Table 1 compares the ranking of the ten most common diagnoses (plus "Other") according to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) official statistics for new awards of disability insurance 2006 with the ranking of these diagnoses according to the diagnose with most care time for each awarded permanent DI recipient 2006 from the National Patient Register (NPR).

	SSIA,	SSIA,	NPR,	NPR,
	percent	rank	percent	rank
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue	41.1	1	17.7	1
Mental and behavioral disorders	26.7	2	12.6	2
Diseases of the circulatory system	7.7	3	9.8	3
Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes	5.3	4	7.8	4
Diseases of the nervous system	3.8	5	4.8	5
Neoplasms	2.7	6	-	-
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases	2.3	7	2.7	8
Diseases of the respiratory system	2.0	8	2.7	7
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process	1.6	9	2.5	9
Diseases of the eye and adnexa	0.5	10	3.3	6
Other	6.1		38.1	
Sum	99.8		102.0	

Table 1. Most common diagnoses, SSIA vs NPR data

*Note:* Source for the SSIA ranking and shares is Ds 2008:14. "Burnout and similar" shares have been added to mental and behavioral disorders in this table. The SSIA shares and ranking includes all new recipients of DI above 30 years of age. It thus includes temporary DI, while the NPR data only includes new recipients of permanent DI. NPR shares sum to more than 100 percent since recipients with two diagnoses with the same care time are counted in both shares. SSIA does not sum to 100 percent, most likely due to rounding.

Apart from the "Other"-category, rankings are the same for the first five categories. The four remaining categories do not have the same exact ranking but their shares in the NPR data are quite similar. One diagnose category is not singled out by the NPR data however, neoplasms.

The data also contain a rich set of background characteristics and outcome measures from Statistics Sweden. I study short- to middle-term outcomes as data is available up to 2013, five years from program start. I study labor supply outcomes on the extensive and intensive margin.

and factors influencing health status and contact with health services (Z00-Z99). The data also includes more specific information (subcategories) for the two most common main categories, musculoskeletal (M00-M99) and mental (F00-F98) diseases.

The extensive margin is examined as whether an individual is working at all in either of the follow-up years. This is defined as having a positive income from work either of these years. Effects on the intensive margin is measured as having earnings above the individual earnings disregard<sup>25</sup> in the years following program start, and is also indicated by total earnings in these years. Since it is also possible to conduct studies and do volunteer work within the continuous deduction program, I also study the effect of the continuous deduction program on increasing ones educational level since program start.<sup>26</sup>

To construct the sample, I use spells of permanent DI that were ongoing at program start, in January 2009. Some individuals have multiple separate spells of permanent DI in the data, and I only use the first spell of each individual. The forcing variable used for the regression discontinuity is the date of award for permanent DI. Disability benefits are awarded monthly and the cutoff is July 2008 since those awarded prior to that month are eligible while those awarded thereafter are not.

## 5.1 Graphical evidence

One of the advantages of the RD-design is that it provides a way to clearly illustrate the results graphically. In this case, as the RD-design needs to be combined with matching the observations with respect to health and other characteristics to estimate the causal effect of the program, the graphs in Figure 4 should illustrate an overestimate of the ATT. Figure 4 shows the total effect over the years after program start up to 2013 for the four separate outcomes<sup>27</sup>. The graphs in panel (a)-(c) measure labor supply effects. The graphs in panel (a) illustrate the effect of the program on the extensive margin, i.e. earning any income during these years. As shown in the graphs, around 16 percent of fulltime recipients work either year while above 80 percent of part-time recipients do.<sup>28</sup> The share with positive earnings either year is lower, around 8-10 percent respectively, for fulltime recipients. Panel (b) shows the labor supply outcome on the intensive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The earnings disregard level for each individual according to their benefit extent at program start.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The data provides information on highest education level on December 31 each year. Highest education level is reported as compulsory education up to nine years, compulsory education at least nine years, high school education, post-secondary education up to two years, post-secondary education at least two years, and graduate education.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> All labor supply outcomes are measured as sums from 2010 onwards. The reason for this is that, due to long processing time for each application, there is a chance that many of the awards from 2008 were not decided before the start of 2009. The average processing time for new DI-applications (temporary and permanent) during 2004-2009 was 120 days (Sjögren Lindquist & Wadensjö 2011). This could affect the labor supply 2009 and thereby the results if 2009 is included in the combined outcome variable. For example applicants could decrease their labor supply intentionally before their application is processed to "prove" their lack of working capacity to the case-worker to affect the outcome of the application. Including the outcomes in 2009 does not change the overall conclusions, however.

 $<sup>^{28}</sup>$  The reason for the rising share working at the end of the period in the graph for fulltime recipients is most likely residual payments in the beginning of 2010 for work conducted before the award of DI-benefits. This is supported by graphical illustrations of the outcome each year separately. The graph starts moving upwards closer to the cutoff in plots of outcomes 2009 and is not visible in plots with the same range on the x-axis for outcomes year 2011, 2012 or 2013.



## (b) Earnings above earnings disregard



(d) Increase in education level

Figure 4. Outcomes by award date

margin, as the share of beneficiaries earning more than the individual earnings disregard at least one of the years 2010-2013. This share is lower than the share working at all for both part-time and fulltime recipients, around 22 and 5 percent respectively. Total earnings during 2010-2013 in hundreds of SEK is shown in panel (c). The amount is around SEK 20,000 over a four-year-period for fulltime recipients, which is around four percent of the average benefit amount, showing the extent of work for those with positive income is on average very low. The graphs in panel (d) illustrate the effect on the level of educational attainment.

The graphical illustrations show no clear jump around the cutoff in these outcomes for either fulltime or part-time recipients. Note, however, that the labor supply and average earnings of recipients awarded permanent DI-benefits from June 2008 onwards is substantially larger than that of recipients awarded benefits both before and after the cutoff. This implies that something affects the labor supply of recipients awarded permanent DI from June 2008 onwards that is not necessarily attributed to the continuous deduction program. This coincides with the increase in inflow to permanent DI which peaks in June for fulltime recipients.<sup>29</sup> A possible explanation is self-selection and/or that case-workers were less restrictive just before the regime change, so that individuals awarded benefits from June 2008 onwards are of better health than those awarded both before and after. Due to the peak in inflow, observations for awarded in June and July are excluded in the estimation of the main results.

## 5.2 Covariate (im)balance

As discussed above, changes to the eligibility criteria for permanent disability insurance induces imbalance in important characteristics between treated and untreated within the bandwidth. Table A.1 shows how observed characteristics differ around the cutoff for full- and part-time recipients, respectively.

It is clear from the table that significant differences between the groups are present in many respects. Treated fulltime recipients are on average one year older than untreated, and have 0.2 years less education. They are also more often married and have on average 0.06 fewer children. Treated also seem to have better labor market histories; their average previous income is around five percent higher than untreated and they have 0.6 years longer labor market experience (the latter could, however, be explained by the difference in age). Treated also face worse labor market conditions in terms of local unemployment rates at program start.

Previous sickness absences confirm that individuals awarded permanent DI after the cutoff are of worse health than those awarded prior to the changes in eligibility. The length of the sickness absence spell is often used as an indicator of health status. Treated individuals have shorter

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> And in July 2008 for both full- and part-time recipients.

previous sickness absence in total as well as with respect to the current sickness spell. The average length of the current sickness spell for treated fulltime recipients is 1,457 days compared to 1,575 days for untreated; or around four months shorter than the average spell length for untreated of approximately four years and four months. Treated fulltime recipients have also spent a shorter time on fulltime sickness benefits directly prior to award of permanent DI, and more were receiving sickness benefits before award, while more untreated were receiving temporary DI-benefits before the award of permanent DI-benefits.

When it comes to the diagnose data, there are few differences between treated and controls. Diagnoses for which the individual has spent most time in care, which should capture the cause for sickness absence, displays two clear differences – treated are less often mainly diagnosed with mental or behavioral disorders (F00F98).

For part-time recipients similar patterns are observed, however fewer significant differences are observed than between treated and untreated fulltime recipients. Treated part-time DI-recipients are on average 0.7 years older and have 0.3 years shorter education than the untreated. Treated part-time recipients, like fulltime recipients, seem to have better labor market histories, but for part-time recipients the only significant difference is that they have on average around a third of a year longer labor market experience, and they also face worse labor market conditions at program start. Treated part-time recipients are in better health than untreated part-time recipients according to previous sickness absence – they have around five months shorter total sickness absence and a four months shorter current spell, also with the same extent of benefits, when permanent DI is awarded. Like fulltime recipients, a larger share of treated versus untreated were receiving sickness benefits versus temporary DI-benefits, respectively, before award, and according to diagnose data, treated part-time recipients are less often diagnosed with mental or behavioral disorders (F00F98).

Since the eligibility criteria for permanent DI were made stricter from July 2008, I expect the differences in characteristics between treated and controls to create an upward bias in the estimation of the effects using the regression discontinuity approach. Health characteristics often used to summarize health status, such as length of previous sickness absence, support this interpretation, and previous labor market outcomes also point to the treated being of better health or having better labor market prospects than the untreated in the sample. Evidence shows that DI-recipients with shorter DI-spells more often return to the labor market. Returnees are also mainly part-time recipients. (Jans 2007). There are however some other differences that could point towards bias in the opposite direction. Since the changes in eligibility criteria also removed the opportunity for case-workers to take some other characteristics into account than health when awarding DI, differences between treated and untreated are observed that could instead cause a

downward bias to naive RD estimates. Some observed differences are in line with case-workers being more lenient in awarding DI before the cutoff with respect to characteristics that could affect labor market prospects negatively but are not directly related to health status. For instance, previous evidence on labor force returns of Swedish DI-recipients implies that being older, married, and less educated is associated with a lower probability of returning to the labor force. Also, mental and behavioral disorders are associated with a greater chance of returning to work (Jans 2007). If health differences are less important than imbalances in other characteristics, this might balance out or outweigh the upward bias caused by the health differences. Combining the RD with matching on observed characteristics serves to smooth these imbalances.

Discontinuity plots of some of these differences are shown in Figure A.1, including variables describing basic characteristics as well as labor market and sickness absence histories. The five most common diagnose categories (diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, mental and behavioral disorders, diseases of the circulatory system, diseases of the nervous system and injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes) are plotted. These show the same patterns as described in this section.

## 5.3 The propensity score

The matching method aims to identify comparable units on both sides of the cutoff, i.e. identifying the always types, to estimate causal effects of the continuous deduction program for these. Units should ideally be matched along all dimensions that matter for the outcome. In this study, I observe a rich set of background characteristics. Basic characteristics such as age, gender, education etc., as well as previous labor market outcomes and sickness absence are discussed in the previous section, as well as some previous diagnosis indicators. In addition to these, I have access to more detailed diagnosis data and data on drug prescriptions. I also observe region of residence and educational orientation.

To match directly on all these characteristics would most likely yield zero matches. Propensity score matching is a matching method that solves this problem. The propensity score is an index variable that measures the probability of being treated given the observed characteristics. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) have shown that if potential outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on a set of observed covariates, potential outcomes are also independent of treatment conditional on the propensity score based on these covariates. For the propensity score, aside from characteristics from the descriptive statistics table in the previous section, I use dummies for each diagnose category from the National Patient Register, specifying whether such a diagnose has ever been determined for the individual (main or secondary) as well as whether it has been determined at an admission the last twelve months or five years before award of permanent DI. The most common diagnoses for permanent DI-recipients are musculoskeletal and mental

disorders. An interaction term between these is included, for both the full time span as well as the last five years. To include a measure of the severity of the illness, I use, as indicators, care time with each diagnose as the main diagnose, in the full time span as well as the last five years before award. I also include an indicator of which diagnose category individuals have spent the most time in care with as the main diagnose in these time spans. I use information on drug prescriptions, by dummies for having been prescribed drugs of each main drug type since July 2005 at award.

Since the month of DI award completely determines treatment, it cannot be included in the calculation of the propensity score. However another indicator of time spent away from the labor market is included; total days on sick leave prior to DI award. I calculate propensity scores separately for treatment for full- and part-time recipients, using the same observations as for the main RD specification bandwidth, i.e. awarded in March-May and August-October 2008. The density of the propensity score for treated and untreated is shown in Figure A.2. I use nearest neighbor propensity score matching without replacement to find matches for untreated and thereby receive a comparable sample. Figure 5 illustrates the discontinuity in the propensity scores the matched sample.



Figure 5. Propensity scores by award date, matched vs unmatched sample

A similar table as Table A.1 for the matched sample is found in Table A.2. It shows that in the matched sample there are no significant differences between treated and controls, except for the month of award, which is impossible to balance because of the institutional setup of the program.

Only one other variable is, weakly, significant for part-time recipients; total days of sickness absence before award.<sup>30</sup>

However, within the three month bandwidth, observations are distributed so that not all characteristics are balanced just at the cutoff, even in the matched sample. Table A.3 shows RD estimates of pre-treatment characteristics for the unmatched and the matched sample. While the balance at the cutoff is better within the matched sample, some variables are significantly discontinuous also within the matched sample. For fulltime recipients, basic characteristics and most previous labor market outcomes, as well as sickness absence histories, are balanced at the cutoff in the matched sample. According to the RD estimates, the number of consecutive days with fulltime benefits is significantly discontinuous at the cutoff with the matched sample. A few diagnose- and drug prescription dummies are also not balanced at the cutoff. For part-time recipients, the same is true for diagnose and drug prescriptions for which there are some significant differences at the cutoff. This is due to the fact that the matching approach does not balance the forcing variable. The RD versus matching approaches means a trade-off between balance in the forcing variable and other unit characteristics.

## 6 Results

Table 2 shows the regression results for fulltime DI-recipients. Neither of the two models indicates any significant effect on any outcomes. The estimates from the propensity score nearest neighbor matching model in column 2 are close to zero and insignificant. The naive RD model in column 1 shows the upper bound of the effect of the continuous deduction program, under the assumption that potential outcomes depend negatively on the reduction in working capacity. In this model, the point estimates for the effects on the labor supply related outcomes are even negative, although the 95 percent confidence intervals are quite broad.

Panel A in Figure A.3 plots estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for each year separately for all four outcome variables studied. These plots show that there is no trend in the effect over time. The nearest neighbor matching estimates are not significant in any year for the effect on labor force participation or change in education level. The intensive margin outcomes, earnings above the earnings disregard and total earnings, are significantly negative in 2009, but not the following years. As previously argued, the outcomes in 2009 might be affected by processing times and should therefore be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Due to space limitations, Table A.2 does not include all variables used for the calculation of the propensity score, only the most important indicators. The analysis of all variables used for the propensity score shows that there are no significant differences at the 95 percent level in the matched sample.

interpreted with more caution. The naive RD estimates, which should provide an upper bound of the effect, are not significantly different from zero for any outcome in any year from 2009 to 2013.

Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM
Working	-0.013	0.004
	(0.024)	(0.011)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.016	-0.002
	(0.014)	(0.007)
Total earnings	-81.004	6.174
	(58.541)	(30.421)
Increase in education level	0.005	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.004)
Observations	7,250	4,940

Table 2. Main results for fulltime recipients

*Note:* Each cell represents the result from a separate regression, with each row showing the regression discontinuity (RD) and propensity score nearest neighbor matching (NNM) results for a separate outcome. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, \*/\*\*/\*\*\* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent level respectively.

Since part-time recipients are expected to work on the part without benefits, and this part is not affected by the continuous deduction program, I do not expect the program to have an effect on the extensive margin for this group. It is however probably easier for parttime recipients to increase their labor supply, if they are already working on the part without benefits and thereby have an employer with whom it is probably easier to increase working hours than it is to find work as a non-working DI recipient.

The results in Table 3 show that neither the nearest neighbor matching model, nor the naive RD model, suggests any significant effect on labor supply at the extensive margin for part-time recipients. The results from the matching model in column 2 do not show any significant effects on either outcome. The naive RD model, however, shows a positive effect on total earnings in 2010-2013. As this is interpreted as an upper bound on the true effect, there may be an effect for the full sample of part-time recipients if the estimated effect is not solely due to compositional differences, but if so it is unlikely to be greater than the estimate in column 1.

Separate regressions for each year for these outcomes, plotted in panel B in Figure A.3, show that the naive RD effect of labor supply has a positive trend over time and is significantly positive the second half of the follow up period for all labor supply outcomes. The results from the matching model, however, show that there is no effect for the always types. Estimates for all three labor supply outcomes are close to zero and insignificant all years. Neither model suggests any effect on educational attainment.

Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM
Working	0.038	-0.013
	(0.024)	(0.010)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.038	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.013)
Total earnings	646.963**	21.537
	(302.742)	(118.593)
Increase in education level	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.014)	(0.005)
Observations	5,455	4,044

Table 3. Main results for part-time recipients

*Note:* Each cell represents the result from a separate regression, with each row showing the regression discontinuity (RD) and propensity score nearest neighbor matching (NNM) results for a separate outcome. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, \*/\*\*/\*\*\* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent level respectively.

These results suggest that the continuous deduction program has not had any effect on labor supply or educational attainment, for either full- or part-time DI recipients. The upper bound RD estimates on the effect on labor supply is negative but insignificant for fulltime recipients, and while the upper bound estimates for the effect on total earnings is positively significant for part-time recipients, and there is a positive trend in the labor supply effect over time, the matching results, estimated to come closer to the true causal effect for the always types, show that there is no effect from eligibility to the program for part-time recipients either.

## 6.1 Robustness analysis

Two other approaches to finding the effect for always takers proposed in the literature is to simply include covariates to the naive RD model, and to perform the usual RD analysis within the matched sample. I show results from these two approaches, for both full- and part-time recipients, in Table 4. The drawback of the covariate adjustment approach is that it is unclear how this method performs with respect to achieving balance, especially in this case when there is a lack of common support in important characteristics across the cutoff. Performing the usual RD analysis within the matched sample could be an attractive alternative since the propensity score matching model is unable to balance month of award within the bandwidth. If the timing of award is important even within this reasonably close region of the forcing variable, the lack of balance may bias the matching results, and RD within the matched sample provides better balance with respect to the forcing variable. However, since the nearest neighbor matching model does not provide balance of the forcing variable, it does not necessarily balance all characteristics included

in the estimation of the propensity score right at the cutoff, only within the bandwidth used as a whole.

Outcome	(1)	(2)
	RD with	RD within
	covariates	NNM sample
Panel A. Fulltime recipients:		
Working	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.027)	(0.037)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.021	-0.018
	(0.015)	(0.019)
Total earnings	-64.671	-90.775
	(66.736)	(80.620)
Increase in education level	-0.004	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.013)
Observations	6,557	4,940
Panel B. Part-time recipients:		
Working	0.015	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.029)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.058*	0.101***
	(0.031)	(0.038)
Total earnings	563.912**	636.345*
	(243.265)	(368.855)
Increase in education level	-0.009	-0.000
	(0.012)	(0.020)
Observations	5,358	4,044

Table 4.	Results	usina	alternative	models

*Note:* Each cell represents the result from a separate regression, with each row showing the results from a regression discontinuity model with covariate adjustment and the regression discontinuity results within the matched sample, for a separate outcome. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, \*/\*\*/\*\*\* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent level respectively.

It turns out, as I have shown, that there are imbalances at the cutoff with respect to characteristics other than the forcing variable. The choice between the propensity score matching model and RD within the matched sample is thus a trade-off between balance in the forcing variable, even within the bandwidth close to the cutoff, and balance in other covariates. Since limiting the sample to recipients awarded DI within a small region around the cutoff provides small differences in the forcing variable, the imbalance in other covariates at the cutoff should yield more bias to the RD estimates using the matched sample than the baseline nearest neighbor matching model. The results show that both the RD model with covariate adjustment and RD within the matched sample model yield estimates that are closer to the naive RD estimates, with negative but insignificant estimates for the effect on labor supply for fulltime recipients, and positively significant estimates for both intensive margin outcomes for part-times recipients.

In the estimation of the main results I have excluded observations close to the cutoff through the so called "donut" RD approach. Individuals awarded DI benefits from June and July 2008 onwards may be systematically different since there is a peak in the inflow these months. There is a peak for fulltime recipients both months, while mostly in the later for part-time recipients. Another reason for excluding individuals awarded DI benefits in July is that it is unclear from the available data which of these are in fact eligible for continuous deduction. I have investigated the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of these observations. The results when reducing the donut to only July are presented in Table A.4. The results show that, for fulltime recipients, the nearest neighbor matching model is less sensitive to the inclusion of individuals awarded DI in June 2008 than the naive RD model. The estimates for the effect on labor force participation and having earnings above the earnings disregard are positive and larger than the main estimated but not significant. There is, however, a significantly positive effect on total earnings also with the matching model, although the point estimate is much smaller than with the RD model. The naive RD, or upper bound, estimates, on the other hand, suggest that the continuous deduction program has a strong positive and significant effect on labor supply on both the extensive and intensive margin, while not on educational attainment. The results from this model are thus, as expected, very sensitive to the outlier values in June. This confirms that awardees from June 2008 are systematically different and have stronger working capacities than awardees both before and after. The selection on observables assumption is less likely to hold with respect to the previously excluded June-observations, and therefore the matching model is also expected to perform poorer when these observations are included, which may explain the difference compared to the main results also with the matching model.

For part-time recipients, the peak in inflow is prominent only in July. Including June in the estimation also does not affect the results as much for this group. This is in line with the hypotheses that the peak in June for fulltime recipients is due to self-selection with respect to the DI eligibility changes, while the peak in July consists of case-worker initiated transfers that may not be subject to as large differences in characteristics. The nearest neighbor matching model shows no significant effect on any outcome, as in the main results. The naive RD results again suggest an effect on labor supply on the intensive margin.

Since it is unclear from the available data which recipients awarded permanent DI from July onwards are eligible for the continuous deduction program, it is not clear on which side of the cutoff these should be included. To test the sensitivity of the results, I have included these observations on either side of the cutoff in separate regressions. The nearest neighbor matching model shows no significant effects and the point estimates are close to zero when July is treated as treated, while the effect on total earnings is significant (as above) when July is treated as untreated. Including the July-awards as treated yields significantly negative estimates of the effect with the naive RD model for fulltime recipients, while including them as untreated yields positively significant estimates as above, again because of the June outlier. For part-time recipients, there are no significant estimates with either model when July is also included, regardless of on which side of the cutoff.

A common robustness check when regression discontinuity designs are used is to change the bandwidth and see what happens to the results. The results from this exercise are shown in Figure A.4. The plots show results for bandwidths of 2 to 16 months, and their 95 percent confidence intervals are visible as dashed lines. The propensity score nearest neighbor matching model is close to zero and insignificant with bandwidths up to around six months for fulltime recipients, and becomes increasingly negative, even significantly so, as the bandwidth increases further. Since this model does not provide balance to the forcing variable, the differences in time since DI award, increases with the bandwidth. As time away from the labor market is negatively correlated with labor market prospects, difference in the time away between treated and untreated in the matching model is a likely explanation for the increasingly negative effects estimated as the bandwidth is increased. For part-time recipients, the same pattern is observed, but while the effect estimated by the matching model is closer to zero for the education and earnings above the disregard outcomes, it turns negative with quite small increases in bandwidth for the effects on labor force participation and total earnings. The naive RD estimates go toward zero when the bandwidth is increased, for both full- and part-time recipients, for all outcomes. Note that the significant effect on total earnings for part-time recipients using the baseline bandwidth is insignificant when the bandwidth is increased even by one month.

Another robustness check is to exclude the oldest individuals from the sample. These have often been excluded in previous studies, to make sure that the results are not driven by individuals close to retirement or those who have retired when the outcomes are measured. To check robustness in this dimension, I have excluded all individuals above the age of 61 within the follow-up period in the results shown in Table A.5. Excluding these observations does not change any conclusions.

I have also estimated results for a number of placebo cutoffs. If the cutoff in the RD model is set where there was no reform, the results should show no effect. Figure A.5 plots such results from the regular RD model with each month from January 2006 to December 2012 used as cutoffs. No donut hole is used in these RD estimations. We see large and significant estimates using June, July and August 2008 as cutoffs for fulltime recipients. The evidence provided in this study shows that this is due to compositional differences accompanying the increase in the inflow in June and July 2008, and the corresponding decrease the month after. For part-time recipients,

compositional differences at the cutoff where not as prominent, and consequently there are no peaks in effects estimated around the true cutoff for this group as for the fulltime recipients. The horizontal lines in each plot at the original cutoff show the main results on the outcome for the naive RD model (i.e. the "donut" RD model), and the dotted horizontal lines show the 95 percent confidence intervals. These are included in the plot to show how my baseline results relate to changes at other, placebo, cutoffs. This analysis shows that my upper bound RD estimates are not larger or more or less precise than estimates obtained when using these placebo cutoffs. This supports the conclusion that there was no effect from the reform.

If important characteristics are balanced, an analogous analysis to the main results for the years preceding program start should show no effect from the treatment. As a last robustness check, I examine whether the two models show any effect on two types of outcomes, referring to labor supply on the extensive and intensive margin, for five years preceding the introduction of the continuous deduction program. Estimated effects from the program on working and having an income above the earnings disregard, in 2004-2008, are shown in Table A.6. For fulltime recipients, all the results from the naive RD model are positive, and the estimate is significant with respect to working in 2007, and weakly significant for working in 2004 and having earnings above the earnings disregard in 2005. This suggests that imbalances in characteristics result in an overestimate of the effect from the program using the naive RD model, as I expected. The nearest neighbor matching model seems to smooth these differences. These estimates are close to zero and insignificant, except for having earnings above the earnings disregard in 2007 and 2008, where the estimates from the matching model are even weakly significantly and significantly negative, respectively. This may suggest some overcorrection by the matching model, but since both models show no effect of the reform, the conclusions are nonetheless straightforward. For part-time recipients, there are two positively significant estimates with the naive RD model, working in 2005, and weakly so for working in 2004. Most estimates are positive, although there are some negative but insignificant estimates. With the nearest neighbor matching model, however, there are no significant differences between the treatment and control group, and estimates are generally close to zero. This suggests that the naive RD estimates may be an overestimate of the effect within this group as well, while treated and untreated are more similar with the matching model.

## 6.2 Heterogeneity analysis

To investigate whether the average impacts presented above hide some effects for responsive subgroups, I have conducted a subgroup analysis. The results are presented in Tables A.7-A.11. The fact that I do not find any positive effects from the continuous deduction program could be associated with the age distribution of those awarded permanent DI in Sweden. 40 percent of

those eligible were above the age of 60 at program start. Earlier studies of similar interventions find larger effects for younger DI-recipients. For example, Kostøl & Mogstad (2014), find no effect in the age group 50-61 year olds. Conducting the analysis separately for different agegroups, however, does not show that there is a stronger response to the continuous deduction program among younger recipients. There are no significant effects at the five percent level for any age group.

The previous literature has also detected stronger effects among males, better educated, and individuals residing in low unemployment areas. In this study I find no significant effects for men, nor women, at the five percent level. For women receiving part-time DI benefits, there is a weakly significant positive effect on income according to the naive RD model, but the point estimate for the same outcome for men is very similar to that of women, and it is in any case not robust to adjusting for covariate differences in the matching model. Naive RD results show stronger negative effects among higher educated for all labor supply outcomes for fulltime recipients, but nearest neighbor matching results show no effects for any educational level. For part-time recipients, the estimated effects on having income above the earnings disregard and on total earnings are positively significant for those with compulsory education with the naive RD model, but these effects are not robust to the matching model. Naive RD estimates also suggest a strong positive response among part-time recipients in low unemployment areas, a positive response with respect to labor supply on the intensive margin, and a negative response with respect to increasing the level of education, but neither of these effects are robust to adjusting for compositional differences through matching.

Labor market attachment might have a big impact on the labor market responses of the disabled as labor demand might be low for these individuals in comparison to other individuals on the labor market. The matching models suggest positively significant effects on labor supply on the extensive margin for fulltime recipients who were working at or closely before DI-award, and a negatively significant effect on the same outcome for part-time recipients who were not working at or closely before DI-award. However, for both these groups the sample size is small.

## 7 Conclusions

Concerns about costs for sickness absence have brought a discussion about residual working capacities among disability insurance recipients and the disincentives to work provided by the DI system. Evidence from around the world suggests that individuals who are awarded disability benefits in some cases still have residual working capacity that could be utilized, and there are a few examples of policies introduced to incentivize that ability to be put to use in the labor market. One such initiative is the introduction of the continuous deduction program in Sweden in 2009.

In this study, I investigate whether the financial incentives provided by the continuous deduction program can induce people with reduced working capacity to increase their labor supply.

The theoretical predictions imply that the response should be positive, since almost all of both full- and part-time recipients have zero labor supply before the reform on the part of fulltime work that they receive benefits on. The labor supply response predicted for these recipients is nonnegative. If there is residual working capacity among these individuals, the response should be positive, given that not all have preferences placing them at zero labor supply regardless of the benefit scheme.

My empirical findings, on the other hand, do not suggest that the program has had any effect on labor supply. The retroactively determined eligibility to the program with respect to time of DI award can be used as a natural experiment to estimate the effects of the program, combining a regression discontinuity design with matching to ensure balance in recipient characteristics between treated and untreated. Changes to the eligibility for DI at the same time as the retroactively set cutoff for eligibility to the continuous deduction program make the results from a naive regression discontinuity model biased due to compositional differences between treated and controls. I match similar individuals in the treatment and control groups close to the eligibility threshold using a nearest neighbor propensity score matching model to estimate unbiased results. The matched sample consists of individuals with more severe health impairments than the overall sample of treated. Assuming that potential outcomes are negatively related to the severity of the reduction in working capacity, it is reasonable to expect a lower response within this group, and the naive RD model then provides upper bound estimates of the true effect for this group. However, no positive effects are established for the unmatched sample using this approach for fulltime recipients, and the significant effect on total earnings for part-time recipients is sensitive to the bandwidth choice.

My results suggest that the financial incentives provided by the continuous deduction program do not induce eligible DI recipients to increase labor supply, neither for full- nor part-time recipients. The main upper bound results of the effects provided by the naive RD model imply that there may be an effect on the intensive margin for part-time recipients, but the results from the matching model does not suggest that this is the case, nor is the effect significant using a bandwidth larger than the baseline. The upper bound estimates are also not larger or more or less precise than RD estimates using placebo cutoffs to the forcing variable where there is no discontinuity in treatment. I have also studied the effects of the reform on educational attainment, an outcome that is less dependent on labor demand, but do not find any effects on that outcome either. These results may imply that the financial incentives provided by the program are not enough to induce the eligible DI recipients to use their residual working capacities and increase their labor supply. One possibility is that there is a lack of credibility with respect to some program components. The continuous deduction program involves a promise not to reevaluate recipients' eligibility for permanent DI benefits. Even if financial incentives are strong, the effect may be absent because recipients do not trust that their recipient status will remain unquestioned after demonstrating a residual working capacity. Another possible explanation could be a lack of labor demand for workers with reduced working capacity. It should however, if this is the case, be easier for part-time recipients to increase labor supply, since they most often already have an employer and work on the part that they are not awarded DI for. My results do not show any effect for this group either, nor for educational attainment which is not directly affected by labor demand. There is also no conclusive evidence that responses are higher in low unemployment areas, or that people who were working closely before DI award respond positively to the reform.

Another possible explanation for my results is that there are no residual working capacities among recipients of permanent disability insurance benefits in Sweden. Some evidence does, however, suggest that there is in fact residual working capacity among the targeted group (Government Bill 2007/08:124, Larheden 2008). My analysis focuses on always types, recipients with so severe impairments that they are or would be awarded DI benefits also under the tighter regime. However, the analysis does not provide evidence of any effect even without adjusting for the compositional differences between treated and untreated due to the regime change, at least not for fulltime recipients. The findings are not in line with e.g. previous findings from the neighboring country of Norway; 95 percent confidence intervals are far below the point estimates found for comparable outcomes in Kostøl & Mogstad (2014). It is possible that working capacities among DI recipients in Norway are higher than in Sweden. In Norway, disability pension is a universal right not restricted to those previously on the labor market. The award of disability pension in Norway considers the applicants overall ability to engage in any substantial gainful activity, taking into account health status, age, education and work experience as well as the transferability of the applicant's skills (Kostøl & Mogstad, 2014). The OECD has voiced criticism for it being too easy to get disability benefits in Norway, which has the highest spending on sickness and disability benefits in the OECD (Kvam, 2013). It could also be that age is a very important factor for the response on these kinds of financial incentives. The age composition within the eligible DI recipients in Sweden is high, although my subsample analysis does not suggest any positive effect among young recipients of permanent DI either. However, compared to previous evidence, even the youngest recipients of permanent DI in Sweden are older than in other countries. Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) find positive effects in Norway only within the age group 18-49. Their analysis does not further indicate how the response is distributed over ages within this group. As individuals below 30 years of age with steadily reduced working capacities are awarded temporary disability benefits in the form of activity benefits in Sweden, and thus are not eligible for the continuous deduction program, the question whether incentives like these would be more effective if targeted to even younger recipients in Sweden remains unanswered.

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## Appendix



Figure A.1, part 1. Basic characteristics by award date



(d) Diagnosed with injury, poisoning etc. (external caus

Figure A.1, part 2. Health characteristics by award date



Figure A.2 Density of the propensity score







2011 Year

2012

2013

2010

RD

2009



Figure A.3 Results year by year



(b) Earnings above the earnings disregard



(d) Increase in education level



(b) Earnings above the earnings disregard



(d) Increase in education level

Panel A. Fulltime recipients





(b) Earnings above the earnings disregard



(d) Increase in education level





Figure A.4 Results using different bandwidths

Panel A. Fulltime recipients









(d) Increase in education level



(b) Earnings above the earnings disregard



(d) Increase in education level

Figure A.5 RD results with placebo cutoffs Jan 2006 - Dec 2009

## Table A.1 Descriptive statistics, close to cutoff

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients			
	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test
Month of award (months elapsed since Jan 1960)	579.0	584.2	-5.178*** (-272.66)	579.0	584.2	-5.187*** (-237.51)
Extent of benefits, 1=100 percent	0.999	1	-0.00143**	0.442	0.436	0.00588
Gender	0.551	0.535	(-2.72) 0.0160	0.662	0.675	-0.0131
Verre of education	10.00	11.00	(1.34)	11.40	44 70	(-1.00)
rears of education	10.88	11.00	-0.177	11.40	11.70	-0.300
No. of children in household below 18	0.310	0.372	-0.0624**	0.375	0.414	-0.0395
			(-3.27)			(-1.79)
Married	0.450	0.415	0.0342**	0.551	0.528	0.0233
			(2.87)			(1.68)
Age	52.67	51.69	0.983***	53.63	52.91	0.712**
			(4.40)			(3.04)
Mean annual earnings before award	112129.7	106829.4	5300.3*	161544.2	160459.0	1085.1
(SER 100)			(2.35)			(0.44)
Mean annual earnings five years before	64012.8	64650.6	-637.8	151305.8	152300.5	-994.7
			(-0.27)		<b>00</b> 44	(-0.33)
No. of years with income	15.75	15.15	0.603	20.45	20.11	0.339
No. of years with income five years	2 520	2 4 1 6	(3.49)	4 416	4 260	(2.60)
before award	2.000	2.410	(2,50)	4.410	4.300	0.0505
No. of years with income above	1 570	1 540	(2.50)	1 691	1 701	(1.57)
earnings disregard level five years before award	1.579	1.549	(0.69)	1.001	1.721	(-0.77)
Years since working	3.534	3.659	-0.124	0.338	0.322	0.0156
			(-1.16)			(0.36)
Working at award	0.108	0.125	-0.0173 <sup>*</sup>	0.863	0.872	-0.00900
			(-2.28)			(-0.96)
Time in unemployment	1453.0	1481.2	-28.19	1186.6	1244.2	-57.59
			(-0.72)			(-1.26)
Unemployed at award	0.379	0.366	0.0139	0.664	0.646	0.0175
			(1.21)			(1.33)
Local unemployment rate at program	8.429	8.312	0.117***	8.510	8.426	0.0841
			(4.42)		o=	(2.84)
Received sickness benefits at award	0.337	0.262	0.0755	0.537	0.435	0.102
Dessived estivity benefits at award	0.0000	0.0217	(6.88)	0.0112	0.0100	(7.41)
Received activity benefits at award	0.0233	0.0317	-0.00630	0.0113	0.0106	(0.10)
Received temporary DI benefits at	0 540	0 597	-0.0565***	0.476	0 568	-0.0921***
award	0.040	0.001	(-4.78)	0.470	0.000	(-6.67)
Extent of sickness benefits at award	0 322	0 246	0.0761***	0 251	0 206	0.0459***
	0.022	0.210	(7.15)	0.201	0.200	(6.07)
Extent of activity or temporary DI	0.549	0.614	-0.0652***	0.235	0.281	-0.0461***
benefits at award			(-5.62)			(-5.99)
Days of sickness absence before award	1836.5	1968.1	-131.7***	1739.6	1902.5	-163.0***
			(-4.62)			(-5.89)
Average extent of benefits five years	0.959	0.962	-0.00243	0.603	0.612	-0.00826
before award			(-0.99)			(-1.48)
Length of current sickness spell at	1457.2	1574.8	-117.6***	1409.6	1528.9	-119.2***
award	L		(-4.24)			(-4.40)
				C	continues c	on next page

## Table A.1 cont.

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients			
	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test
Length of current sickness spell with same extent or higher at award	1236.8	1326.1	-89.31*** (-3 45)	1255.0	1372.2	-117.3*** (-4 47)
No. of sickness absence spells	4.086	3.921	0.165	4.323	4.524	-0.201 (-0.95)
Diagnose spent most time in care, ICD-			( - )			( )
A00B99	0	0	0	0	0	0
C00D48	0	0	0	0	0	0
D50D89	0.0187	0.0118	0.00687* (2.29)	0.0287	0.0258	0.00283
E00E90	0.0291	0.0300	-0.000897	0.0251	0.0272	-0.00216
F00F98	0.207	0.254	-0.0469***	0.0732	0.103	-0.0302***
G00G99	0.0445	0.0484	-0.00395	0.0585	0.0601	-0.00160
H00H59	0.0275	0.0247	(-0.79) 0.00279	0.0331	0.0324	0.000735
H60H95	0.0170	0.0125	0.00441	0.0340	0.0333	0.000691
100199	0.0949	0.0955	(1.51) -0.000557	0.0979	0.105	(0.14) -0.00680
J00J99	0.0277	0.0244	(-0.08) 0.00336	0.0308	0.0254	(-0.82) 0.00539
K00K93	0.0564	0.0554	(0.88) 0.000975	0.0618	0.0653	(1.17) -0.00348
L00L99	0.0286	0.0223	(0.18) 0.00633	0.0290	0.0296	(-0.52) -0.000627
M00M99	0.166	0.157	(1.66) 0.00855	0.223	0.212	(-0.13) 0.0104
N00N99	0.0630	0.0540	(0.97) 0.00897	0.0803	0.0714	(0.91) 0.00893
000099	0.0185	0.0188	(1.59) -0.000317	0.0281	0.0282	(1.21) -0.000114
P00P96	0	0	(-0.10) 0	0	0	(-0.02) 0
Q00Q99	0.00154	0.00139	(.) 0.000148	0.00328	0.00141	(.) 0.00188 (1.24)
R00R99	0.0769	0.0728	0.00403	0.0800	0.0752	(1.34) 0.00487 (0.65)
S00T98	0.0808	0.0690	0.0118	0.0851	0.0813	0.00384
V00V99	0.0198	0.0192	0.000656	0.0352	0.0310	0.00423
V01Y98	0	0	0	0	0	(0.85)
Z00Z99	0.0683	0.0836	(.) -0.0154 <sup>*</sup>	0.0723	0.0803	(.) -0.00806
No. of observations	4,541	2,870	(-2.40) 7,411	2,129	3,349	5,478

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients			
	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test
Month of award (months elapsed since Jan 1960)	579.1	584.3	-5.201*** (-232.71)	579.1	584.2	-5.176*** (-209.86)
Extent of benefits, 1=100 percent	1	1	0	0.434	0.435	-0.00161
Gender	0.543	0.547	-0.00364	0.681	0.679	0.00198
Years of education	11.05	11.10	(-0.26) -0.0514	11.71	11.76	(0.13) -0.0519
No. of children in household below 18	0.347	0.360	(-0.84) -0.0126	0.380	0.413	(-0.71) -0.0326
Married	0.433	0.432	(-0.54) 0.00162	0.535	0.530	(-1.32) 0.00495
Age	52.28	52.14	(0.11) 0.147	53.40	53.02	(0.32) 0.378
Mean annual earnings before award	116216.1	115412.5	(0.57) 803.7	165429.8	163631.4	(1.43) 1798.4
(SEK 100) Mean annual earnings five years before	68749.5	70051.1	(0.30) -1301.6	157127.8	155752.3	(0.62) 1375.6
award (SEK 100) No. of years with income	16.40	16.35	(-0.46) 0.0490	20.57	20.43	(0.39) 0.135
No. of years with income five years	2.632	2.648	(0.27) -0.0166	4.471	4.445	(1.00) 0.0262
before award No. of years with income above	1.671	1.694	(-0.29) -0.0231	1.779	1.766	(0.70) 0.0134
earnings disregard level five years before award	2 247	2 204	(-0.44)	0.072	0.252	(0.23)
Years since working	3.347	3.294	(0.46)	0.273	0.253	(0.49)
Working at award	0.128	0.137	-0.00931 (-0.96)	0.882	0.885	-0.00346 (-0.34)
Time in unemployment	1506.9	1524.4	-17.52 (-0.37)	1197.3	1217.3	-20.00 (-0.38)
Unemployed at award	0.360	0.346	0.0138 (1.01)	0.651	0.647	0.00445 (0.30)
Local unemployment rate at program start (county level)	8.286	8.313	-0.0274 (-0.87)	8.404	8.427	-0.0237 (-0.69)
Received sickness benefits at award	0.304	0.299	0.00526	0.473	0.448	0.0257
Received activity benefits at award	0.0251	0.0275	-0.00243	0.0114	0.0109	0.000495
Received temporary DI benefits at award	0.645	0.649	-0.00405	0.561	0.579	-0.0173
Extent of sickness benefits at award	0.287	0.281	0.00567	0.223	0.212	0.0110
Extent of activity or temporary DI benefits at award	0.652	0.660	-0.00709	0.275	0.285	-0.00977
Days of sickness absence before award	1988.3	2018.6	-30.23	1833.8	1905.9	-72.13*
Average extent of benefits five years before award	0.960	0.961	(-0.92) -0.00104	0.603	0.610	(-2.29) -0.00652
Length of current sickness spell at award	1685.3	1714.8	(-0.37) -29.56	1507.7	1554.7	(-1.03) -47.01
	L		(-0.91)	lc	ontinues c	n next page

## Table A.2 Descriptive statistics for matched sample, close to cutoff

## Table A.2 cont.

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients			
	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test	Treated	Controls	Difference, t-test
Length of current sickness spell with same extent or higher at award	1419.2	1437.5	-18.30 (-0.59)	1353.4	1395.0	-41.59 (-1.39)
No. of sickness absence spells	4.231	4.186	0.0445 (0.40)	4.445	4.596	-0.151 (-0.57)
Diagnose spent most time in care, ICD- 10:						
A00B99	0	0	0 (.)	0	0	0 (.)
C00D48	0	0	0	0	0	0
D50D89	0.00972	0.0109	-0.00121	0.0287	0.0262	0.00247
E00E90	0.0332	0.0312	0.00202	0.0272	0.0277	-0.000495
F00F98	0.246	0.255	(0.40) -0.00850	0.0846	0.0999	(-0.10) -0.0153
G00G99	0.0538	0.0522	(-0.69) 0.00162	0.0559	0.0579	(-1.68) -0.00198
H00H59	0.0275	0.0243	(0.25) 0.00324	0.0341	0.0326	(-0.27) 0.00148
H60H95	0.0126	0.0130	(0.72) -0.000405	0.0371	0.0341	(0.26) 0.00297
100199	0.0992	0.100	(-0.13) -0.000810	0.105	0.105	(0.51) 0.000495
J00J99	0.0279	0.0251	(-0.10) 0.00283	0.0252	0.0262	(0.05) -0.000989
K00K93	0.0603	0.0571	(0.62) 0.00324	0.0673	0.0673	(-0.20) 0
L00L99	0.0219	0.0219	(0.48) 0	0.0242	0.0282	(0.00) -0.00396
M00M99	0.162	0.164	(0.00) -0.00162	0.217	0.217	(-0.79) 0.000495
N00N99	0.0538	0.0551	(-0.15) -0.00121	0.0732	0.0747	(0.04) -0.00148
O00O99	0.0170	0.0178	(-0.19) -0.000810	0.0277	0.0292	(-0.18) -0.00148
P00P96	0	0	(-0.22) 0	0	0	(-0.28) 0
Q00Q99	0.00121	0.00121	(.) 0 (0.00)	0.00148	0.00148	(.) 0 (0.00)
R00R99	0.0794	0.0733	0.00607	0.0816	0.0762	0.00544
S00T98	0.0721	0.0704	0.00162	0.0900	0.0811	0.00890
V00V99	0.0190	0.0182	0.000810	0.0331	0.0307	0.00247
V01Y98	0	0	0	0	0	0
Z00Z99	0.0826	0.0879	(.) -0.00526 (-0.66)	0.0786	0.0811	(.) -0.00247 (-0.29)
No. of observations	2,470	2,470	4,940	2,022	2,022	4,044

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients		
	Unmatched sample:	Matched sample:	Unmatched sample:	Matched sample:	
Month of award (months elapsed since	0.001	-0.000	0.003	-0.003	
Jan 1960)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.019)	
Gender	0.019	-0.037	-0.053	-0.044	
	(0.029)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.065)	
Years of education	-0.179	-0.174	-0.356**	-0.043	
	(0.126)	(0.239)	(0.170)	(0.271)	
No. of children in household below 18	-0.084	0.182**	0.007	0.044	
	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.053)	(0.091)	
Married	0.032	-0.045	-0.020	-0.112*	
	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.064)	
Age	1.005	-1.176	0.360	0.285	
	(0.659)	(1.118)	(0.610)	(1.095)	
Mean annual earnings before award	9123.171	911.353	8956.579	11792.812	
(SEK 100)	(6319.918)	(11380.312)	(6642.869)	(11271.564)	
Mean annual earnings five years before	1890.878	-9114.215	5509.372	10232.202	
award (SEK 100)	(6600.573)	(11785.650)	(8212.689)	(15346.581)	
No. of years with income	1.560***	-0.249	0.959**	0.842	
	(0.459)	(0.737)	(0.456)	(0.568)	
No. of years with income five years	0.327***	-0.148	0.198*	0.106	
before award	(0.131)	(0.248)	(0.107)	(0.152)	
No. of years with income above earnings	0.192	-0.184	0.114	0.400	
disregard level five years before award	(0.128)	(0.222)	(0.129)	(0.245)	
Years since working	-0.047	0.616	-0.098	-0.016	
	(0.263)	(0.516)	(0.124)	(0.175)	
Working at award	-0.003	-0.012	0.052*	0.023	
	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.042)	
Time in unemployment	52.221	60.304	-122.551	-21.982	
	(95.000)	(185.148)	(118.430)	(198.777)	
Unemployed at award	-0.000	0.003	0.040	-0.029	
	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.066)	
Local unemployment rate at program	0.234**	0.222	0.049	-0.170	
start (county level)	(0.102)	(0.200)	(0.093)	(0.171)	
Received sickness benefits at award	0.164***	0.014	0.186***	0.053	
	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.066)	
Received activity benefits at award	-0.021*	-0.009	-0.005	-0.010	
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.015)	
Received temporary DI benefits at award	-0.066*	0.005	-0.113***	0.013	
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.068)	
Extent of sickness benefits at award	0.166***	0.020	0.084***	0.034	
	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.036)	
Extent of activity or temporary DI	-0.089***	0.000	-0.070***	-0.005	
benefits at award	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.039)	
Days of sickness absence before award	2.909	193.991	-49.579	-19.965	
	(77.624)	(145.946)	(80.747)	(138.119)	
Average extent of benefits five years	-0.004	0.005	-0.010	-0.026	
before award	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.024)	
Length of current sickness spell at award	86.632	265.425*	37.689	36.935	
	(70.793)	(154.101)	(79.274)	(125.845)	

## Table A.3 RD estimates of pre-treatment characteristics

continues on next page

## Table A.3 cont.

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients		
	Unmatched sample:	Matched sample:	Unmatched sample:	Matched sample:	
Length of current sickness spell with	86.710	330.599**	41.235	73.935	
same extent or higher at award	(69.295)	(153.965)	(73.651)	(123.512)	
No. of sickness absence spells	0.249	-0.096	-1.183	-1.824	
	(0.264)	(0.500)	(0.982)	(1.300)	
Diagnose spent most time in care, ICD- 10:					
A00B99	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
C00D48	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
D50D89	0.007	0.015	-0.008	-0.015	
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.021)	
E00E90	-0.001	0.006	-0.015	0.007	
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.021)	
F00F98	-0.051*	-0.028	-0.028	-0.047	
	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.030)	
G00G99	0.023*	0.052*	-0.010	-0.031	
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.026)	
H00H59	-0.003	0.008	-0.002	0.010	
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.023)	
H60H95	0.008	0.005	-0.009	-0.010	
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	
100199	-0.017	-0.014	0.006	-0.014	
	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.041)	
J00J88	0.011	0.016	0.032***	0.009	
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.022)	
K00K93	-0.006	-0.017	0.011	0.072***	
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.030)	
L00L99	0.016*	0.018	0.002	0.021	
1001100	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.022)	
M00M99	0.052**	0.018	-0.006	-0.063	
NOONOO	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.054)	
NUUN99	0.014	-0.012	0.022	0.007	
000000	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.036)	
000099	-0.002	0.015	-0.018	-0.021	
DOODOG	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.020)	
F00F90	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
000000	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	0.000)	
000039	(0.002	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	
POOPOO	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	0.075**	
1001035	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.033)	
500798	0.028*	-0.023	0.029	0.066*	
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.038)	
V00V99	-0.006	-0 019	0.001	0.018	
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	
V01Y98	0.000	0 000	0 000	0.000	
	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	
700799	-0.015	0.068**	-0.019	0.009	
	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.031)	
No. of observations	7,250	4,940	5,455	4,044	

Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM
Panel A. Fulltime recipients:		
Working	0.093***	0.015
	(0.031)	(0.010)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.054***	0.011
	(0.019)	(0.007)
Total earnings	320.501***	68.700**
	(95.063)	(32.892)
Increase in education level	0.005	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.004)
Observations	8,297	4,952
Panel B. Part-time recipients:		
Working	0.021	-0.014
	(0.024)	(0.010)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.080**	0.015
	(0.035)	(0.013)
Total earnings	497.679	70.589
	(327.736)	(115.861)
Increase in education level	0.010	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.006)
Observations	5,982	4,068

## Table A.4 Results not excluding June 2008

Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM
Panel A. Fulltime recipients:		
Working	-0.009	-0.013
	(0.027)	(0.012)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.017	-0.004
	(0.015)	(0.007)
Total earnings	-23.666	-3.014
	(18.261)	(9.297)
Increase in education level	0.001	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.006)
Observations	5,547	3,942
Panel B. Part-time recipients:		
Working	0.032	-0.001
	(0.027)	(0.010)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.046	-0.016
	(0.038)	(0.015)
Total earnings	179.826**	30.779
	(86.359)	(34.686)
Increase in education level	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.008)
Observations	4,101	3,188

## Table A.5 Results excluding individuals aged above 61

Table A.6 Pre-program	effects
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Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM
Panel A. Fulltime recipients:		
Working 2004	0.059*	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.013)
Working 2005	0.038	0.003
	(0.030)	(0.014)
Working 2006	0.051	-0.009
	(0.032)	(0.014)
Working 2007	0.099***	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.013)
Working 2008	0.047	0.006
	(0.030)	(0.013)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2004	0.052	0.005
	(0.033)	(0.013)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2005	0.055*	0.003
	(0.032)	(0.013)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2006	0.026	-0.002
	(0.029)	(0.012)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2007	0.011	-0.019*
	(0.025)	(0.010)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2008	0.008	-0.019**
	(0.022)	(0.009)
Observations	7,250	4,940
Panel B. Part-time recipients:		
Working 2004	0.043*	0.006
0	(0.024)	(0.010)
Working 2005	0.063***	-0.003
-	(0.027)	(0.010)
Working 2006	0.040	0.004
	(0.029)	(0.010)
Working 2007	-0.005	0.011
	(0.023)	(0.009)
Working 2008	0.019	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.008)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2004	0.041	0.012
	(0.037)	(0.015)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2005	0.026	-0.009
	(0.031)	(0.015)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2006	-0.016	-0.010
	(0.034)	(0.014)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2007	0.026	-0.008
	(0.030)	(0.013)
Earnings above the earnings disregard 2008	-0.005	-0.017
	(0.025)	(0.013)
Observations	5,455	4,044

## Table A.7 Results by age

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients	
Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM	(3) RD	(4) NNM
Panel A. Age 30-44				
Working	-0.034	-0.025	0.019	-0.034*
	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.018)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.015	-0.016	0.001	-0.008
	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.079)	(0.029)
Total earnings	-32.105	25.888	564.621	206.516
	(143.625)	(85.871)	(625.716)	(261.641)
Increase in education level	-0.011	-0.002	-0.033	-0.010
	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.016)
Observations	1,634	1,118	1,020	774
Panel B. Age 45-54				
Working	-0.014	-0.002	0.016	0.020
	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.045)	(0.018)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	0.004	0.003	0.052	0.006
	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.063)	(0.025)
Total earnings	-135.967	-32.228	559.571	267.937
	(130.275)	(65.417)	(586.817)	(230.094)
Increase in education level	0.026	-0.011	-0.011	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.012)
Observations	1,814	1,266	1,380	1,088
Panel C. Age 45-64				
Working	-0.005	0.023	0.056	-0.028*
	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.015)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.019	0.003	0.057	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.041)	(0.018)
Total earnings	-49.989	-1.135	770.578*	-123.568
	(78.524)	(35.530)	(400.710)	(159.236)
Increase in education level	0.012	0.001	0.000	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Observations	3,528	2,360	2,843	2,020

## Table A.8 Results by gender

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients	
Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM	(3) RD	(4) NNM
Panel A. Women				
Working	-0.020	-0.002	0.034	-0.017
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.012)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.011	0.003	0.013	0.005
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.016)
Total earnings	-64.252	12.232	654.146*	66.782
	(93.736)	(44.072)	(336.882)	(139.171)
Increase in education level	0.002	-0.009	-0.014	-0.006
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.007)
Observations	3,951	2,700	3,641	2,746
Panel B. Men				
Working	-0.005	0.011	0.050	-0.020
	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.019)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.022	-0.007	0.084	-0.018
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.060)	(0.024)
Total earnings	-106.617	-17.898	694.012	-184.362
	(76.922)	(45.067)	(549.180)	(220.497)
Increase in education level	0.008	0.003	0.015	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Observations	3,299	2,240	1,814	1,698

## Table A.9 Results by education level

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients	
Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM	(3) RD	(4) NNM
Panel A. Compulsory				
Working	0.001	0.026	0.120*	-0.011
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.065)	(0.025)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.005	0.001	0.134***	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.055)	(0.024)
Total earnings	70.176	30.085	1292.696**	-512.523**
	(93.429)	(39.994)	(590.037)	(226.014)
Increase in education level	-0.007	-0.001	0.002	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.009)
Observations	2,213	1,370	1,125	708
Panel B. High school				
Working	0.002	-0.003	0.026	-0.005
	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.014)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.023	-0.011	-0.017	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.016)
Total earnings	-63.736	-34.076	479.395	233.830
	(94.113)	(40.166)	(386.546)	(150.961)
Increase in education level	0.012	-0.009	-0.006	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.010)
Observations	3,634	2,580	2,772	2,040
Panel C. Tertiary				
Working	-0.089*	0.012	0.021	-0.025
	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.016)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.029	0.014	0.117*	0.022
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.069)	(0.027)
Total earnings	-395.204***	21.238	851.301	-3.888
	(137.976)	(103.947)	(613.745)	(243.567)
Increase in education level	0.000	0.004	-0.018	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Observations	1,331	980	1,546	1,256

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients	
Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM	(3) RD	(4) NNM
Panel A. Low unemployment				
Working	0.004	0.011	0.043	-0.009
	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.014)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.006	0.011	0.086**	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.043)	(0.018)
Total earnings	-129.012*	1.918	851.051**	244.845
	(71.440)	(38.403)	(408.814)	(166.585)
Increase in education level	0.018	-0.006	-0.039**	-0.011
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Observations	3,867	2,816	2,757	2,114
Panel B. High unemployment				
Working	-0.030	-0.007	0.034	-0.014
	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.015)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.029	-0.017*	-0.013	-0.022
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.019)
Total earnings	-26.214	-18.389	430.780	-190.051
	(90.281)	(49.691)	(439.830)	(168.158)
Increase in education level	-0.009	-0.003	0.030	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.008)
Observations	3,383	2,108	2,698	1,916

## Table A.10 Results by local unemployment

	Fulltime recipients		Part-time recipients	
Outcome	(1) RD	(2) NNM	(3) RD	(4) NNM
Panel A. Working				
Working	0.001	0.081**	0.015	0.002
	(0.086)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.113	-0.006	0.024	-0.001
	(0.074)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.014)
Total earnings	-361.882	-13.960	523.845	63.635
	(425.019)	(190.630)	(341.557)	(125.121)
Increase in education level	0.009	0.003	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Observations	851	780	4,748	3,580
Panel B. Not working				
Working	-0.012	-0.004	-0.012	-0.104***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.096)	(0.044)
Earnings above the earnings disregard	-0.001	0.002	0.058	0.022
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.018)
Total earnings	-34.925	7.752	-57.808	-290.898
	(37.894)	(15.689)	(336.148)	(179.933)
Increase in education level	0.005	-0.005	-0.011	-0.026
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.020)
Observations	6,399	4,262	707	460

## Table A.11 Results by labor market attachment