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ABSTRACT

A Couples-Based Approach to the Problem of Workless Families*

The goal of this paper is to evaluate a “couples-based” policy intervention designed to reduce the number of Australian families without work. In 2000 and 2001, the Australian Government piloted a new counseling initiative targeted towards couple-headed families with dependent children in which neither partner was in paid employment. Selected women on family benefits (who were partnered with men receiving unemployment benefits) were randomly invited to participate in an interview process designed to identify strategies for increasing economic and social participation. While some women were interviewed on their own, others participated in a joint interview with their partners. Our results indicate that the overall effect of the interview process led to lower hours of work among family benefit recipients in the intervention group than the control group, but to greater participation and hours in job search and in study or training for work-related reasons. At the same time, there are few significant differences in the effect of the interview process on the economic and social activity of women interviewed with and without their unemployed partners.

JEL Classification: H3, I38, J68

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1. **Introduction**

The shares of fully-employed and workless families have both risen over the past two decades leaving employment in many countries increasingly concentrated (polarized) within certain households.¹ Shifts in family composition toward more single-adult households—in which rates of non-employment are typically higher—account for only a small fraction of the rise in the overall fraction of workless households (for example, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; 2000; Dawkins et al. 2002b). More important has been the increasing rate of non-employment within household type.

The impact of these changes on children is of particular concern. While the proportion of couple-headed households in which both partners are employed has increased, so too has the incidence of joblessness (for example, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; OECD, 1998; Dawkins et al. 2002a; Gregory, 1999; Dorsett, 2001). The end result is that substantial numbers of children now grow up in families that have no earned income and are reliant on income support. Between 1986 and 1999, for example, the number of Australian children living in workless households more than doubled, leaving 1.2 million children—almost one in four—living in families reliant on income support (McCoul and Pech, 2000).² Similarly, nearly one in five British children now live in families in which no adult is in paid employment despite near record employment levels generally (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000). Most troubling is the close link between

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² See also Gregory (1999).
joblessness and poverty and the fear that children growing up in poor households have above average probabilities of adverse outcomes as adults.  

Given these trends, it is not surprising that workless families are beginning to be specifically targeted by income-support policies. In the U.K, for example, the New Deal for Partners offers—on a voluntary basis—job search assistance and training opportunities to partners of income-support recipients, while many young, workless couples without dependent children are required to file a Joint Claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). The joint claim process requires both partners to be available for work and to accept equal responsibility for reporting any change in circumstances. This “couples-based” approach is consistent with recent research (see for example, Dorsett 2001) which suggests that to be effective in addressing joblessness at a household level, employment policies must explicitly take into account the joint (as opposed to individual) nature of labour supply decisions within families.

The goal of this paper is to evaluate one such “couples-based” policy intervention in Australia. Between September 2000 and April 2001, the Australian Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) trialed a new counseling initiative targeted towards couple-headed families with dependent children in which neither partner was in paid employment. Selected women on family benefits (Parenting Payments—Partnered (PPP)), who were partnered with men receiving unemployment benefits (Newstart Allowance (NSA)) were invited to participate in an interview process designed to identify

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3 In Britain, 89.2 percent of workless couples with children live in poverty (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000), while 74 percent of similar Australian families are in the poorest income quintile (Dawkins, et al, 2002b). Israel and Seeborg (1998) discuss a range of factors influencing the likelihood that impoverished youth will escape poverty, while in related reviews Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Haveman et. al. (2001) discuss the results of a large literature linking family and community investments in children and children’s subsequent outcomes.
strategies to increasing economic independence. Although all unemployed individuals are obliged to look for work and some are required to undertake additional activities (for example, voluntary work or training) which are expected to increase their chances of employment, in practice most Australians have little contact with the income-support system beyond the initial 12 months of benefit receipt. Given this, we are interested in the following questions. Is the increased contact inherent in such an intensive interview process helpful in increasing the economic participation of these women? Further, are outcomes for family benefits recipients enhanced if—rather than attending on their own—they and their unemployed partners attend a joint interview in which a joint plan for increased economic activity is developed? Although our primary focus is on the economic activity of the family benefit recipient, we will also discuss the implications of the trial for social participation and for the activity levels of unemployed partners. Random assignment into intervention and control groups provides the basis for evaluating the results of the trial.

Our results indicate that the overall effect of the interview process led to lower hours of work among family benefit recipients in the intervention group than the control group, but to greater participation and hours in job search and in study or training for work-related reasons. At the same time, there were few significant differences in the effect of the interview process on the economic and social activity of women interviewed with and without their unemployed partners.

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4 See the website for the U.K. Department for Work and Pensions (http://ssd.dwp.gov.uk), and Bonjour et al. (2001; 2002) for more details about these two programs.
5 Although in some families it is the woman who receives unemployment benefits and the man who receives family benefits, this case is quite uncommon (about 10 per cent of partnered individuals selected for the trial were male) and for ease of exposition we will refer in the discussion to the more traditional case.
Both the background to and the implementation of the pilot are discussed in Section 2, while Section 3 outlines several methodological issues and describes the estimation strategy. Estimates of the impact of the intervention on the economic and social activity of women in workless families are presented in Section 4 of the paper. These estimates are based on two data sources—survey data from the pilots themselves and administrative data from the income-support system. Finally, conclusions can be found in Section 5.

2. The Workless Families Pilot:

The Workless Families Pilot was targeted towards workless Australian couples with school-aged children. This pilot was one of three randomized trials conducted by FaCS between September 2000 and April 2001 involving interviews with 10,504 income-support recipients nationwide. These trials were targeted towards especially disadvantaged groups—in particular, workless families, the very long-term unemployed, and mature-aged unemployment recipients—who are in some sense outside the mainstream of Australian service delivery. Evaluation of these trials was undertaken in order to inform a broader process of welfare reform.

2.1 Background

Australia—like many countries worldwide—is currently undergoing a process of welfare reform. This ongoing reform process has made economic and social activity a cornerstone of Australian policy. On the one hand, policy makers increasingly embrace

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6 See Breunig et al. 2003 for results of the trial targeted towards very long-term unemployed individuals.
the notion of "mutual obligations" and are demanding more of income-support recipients. In this context, economic and social participation is seen as a way of fulfilling one’s “obligation” to the broader community. At the same time, being economically and socially active is seen more generally as the primary mechanism for avoiding the persistent disadvantage accompanying the long-term receipt of income support.

Against this backdrop, reducing the numbers of workless families has become a key policy objective. In particular, a recent task force on welfare reform raised concerns over the growing numbers of workless families and recommended that reducing the numbers of Australian families without work should be one of the government’s three targets for welfare reform. The expectation is that reduction in the number of workless families would provide immediate as well as long-term, intergenerational benefits to society (McClure, 2000).

Internationally, there is a large literature pointing to the inverse relationship between husbands’ unemployment and wives’ labor supply (see Davies et al. 1992; Dilnot and Kell, 1987; and the references therein). While much of this can be accounted for by correlation between husbands and wives in key factors associated with non-employment (for example, low skills or poor labor market conditions), a large share is due to cross-couple state dependence (Davies et al. 1992). Women are less likely to participate in the labor market when their partners are unemployed even after heterogeneity is taken into account, an outcome which many experts feel results from the tax and benefit-induced disincentives to work which are inherent in many income-support systems (Dilnot and Kell, 1987). Given this, policy initiatives to help workless couples must be undertaken within the context of the income-support system.
Important institutional differences in the Australian income-support system add depth to this international literature on workless couples. In Australia, unlike in many other countries, unemployment benefits are non-contributory and funded from general revenue. Provided that recipients meet program requirements, they are entitled to receive benefits for an unlimited time period. Parenting payments provide income support for people who are the primary carers of dependent children. Both unemployment and family benefits are components of a broader income-support system managed by FaCS and administered by a large, service delivery organization known as Centrelink. Centrelink serves as a “one-stop-shop” for clients by administering a range of services and programs across several government departments and its income-support case-load is governed by a contract with the Australian Government. This contractual arrangement between FaCS (which conceived of the intervention and designed the evaluation) and Centrelink (which administered it) is an important backdrop to understanding the implementation of the trial.\footnote{This is similar to the arrangement in the United States where although the responsibility for the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) lies with the federal government, in particular the U.S. Department of Labor, JTPA is implemented in hundreds of service delivery areas at the state and local level. This raises the possibility that state and local governments may wish to pursue different objectives than the federal agency providing the funding. Barnow (2000) explores the relationship between the performance indicators in service providers’ contracts and measured program impacts.}

2.2 Implementation:

The pilot was designed to assess whether an intensive interview with Centrelink staff and the development of a participation plan would improve economic and/or social activity among family benefit (Parenting Payment Partnered – PPP) recipients and their unemployed partners receiving unemployment benefits (called the Newstart Allowance –
Some family benefit recipients were interviewed with their unemployed partners, some without them. Individuals (and couples) participating in the pilot were assisted in developing a participation plan that addressed their particular needs in overcoming their barriers to work or to achieving greater social participation. Interviewers specifically asked participants to begin thinking about and planning for the time when their children would reach the age threshold and the family would no longer be eligible for family benefits. As with Joint Signing for JSA claims in the U.K. (see Bonjour, et al, 2002), one goal of the intervention was to bring family benefit recipients in closer contact with Centrelink offices.

The process of the trial was as follow. Eligible Centrelink sites from across Australia were randomly chosen to participate in the trial. Sites were selected from the available list with a probability proportional to their populations of the pilot target groups. Selected sites were randomly assigned as ‘intervention’ (thirty-two sites) or ‘control’ sites (twenty-four) with three of these sites selected as both intervention and control group sites. Next, eligible customers from each site were randomly selected until specified quotas for each site for the two Parenting Payment target groups had been reached. Family benefit (PPP) recipients were then randomly assigned to be interviewed with or without their unemployed (NSA) partners.

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8 The trial also included a group of Parenting Payment recipients who made repeated transitions between single and partnered status. This “repeated transitions” group was much smaller in size and are not analysed here, as they do not fit into the with/without partner framework of this analysis.
9 The eligibility criteria were that the population of the ‘repeated transitions’ group of Parenting Payment recipients at the site exceeded 30 and that the site was not involved in another trial that targeted the Parenting Payment population.
10 The term ‘sites’ here is used loosely. These were clusters of Centrelink offices serviced by the same specialist Centrelink staff member who conducted the interviews. The thirty-one sites used for the intervention group comprised eighty-four separate Centrelink offices.
11 One intervention site subsequently became unavailable for participation in the pilot, so the final number of intervention sites was thirty-one.
Centrelink then sent a letter to each individual selected for the intervention group asking him or her to attend an interview, in some cases a joint interview with their partner. The NSA partners of those family benefit recipients selected for interview with their partners received a separate letter along similar lines. These letters formed one part of the intervention, which also involved two face-to-face interviews.12

The first set of interviews was conducted in September or October 2000. Interviews were conducted by Centrelink staff who had been trained in research interviewing techniques. Individuals were required to attend the interview, but subsequent participation in the trial was voluntary. For those who agreed to participate, the interviewers administered a detailed questionnaire designed to elicit information about individuals’ (and, where relevant, their partners’) employment and educational background, current circumstances, and goals and aspirations regarding economic and/or social participation. The questionnaire also canvassed any barriers to increased participation faced by individuals to facilitate discussion between participants and their interviewers about how they could become more economically and socially active. The outcome of that discussion was formalized in a participation plan, which may have included referrals to other government programs or forms of assistance.

A second interview was conducted in November or December 2000. This interview was used to identify how participants’ circumstances had changed and determine implementation of the participation plans, such as the take up of referrals. A final telephone interview was conducted by an independent market research company in March and April 2001.

12 A copy of the letter sent to those selected for interview with their partner is in the Appendix. Letters for other participants of the pilot were suitably modified to reflect the target group to which they belonged.
Comparison of data from the first face-to-face interview (Wave 1) and the follow-up telephone interview (Wave 3) forms the basis of the analysis of the impact of full participation in the trial. We define “full treatment” to be the receipt of the letter and participation in the two face-to-face interviews.

In September to October 2000 control group members were sent letters informing them of the proposed interview process. Those who agreed were interviewed at the same three points in time as the intervention group by the market research firm that conducted the Wave 3 intervention group interviews. The control group interviews were designed to elicit comparable information to that obtained from intervention group members at the various stages of the trial. The initial control group interview also covered their aspirations and barriers to economic and/or social participation.

In this analysis we will make use of two data sources: detailed survey data from the pilot itself and administrative income-support data from FaCS's Longitudinal Data Set (LDS) merged to the pilot data. The LDS provides fortnightly observations on benefit details (including benefit levels, reported income, both earned through work and unearned and duration of benefit receipt) and limited demographic characteristics (age of payment recipient, age of youngest child, geographic area, housing type and the like). The availability of these administrative data for all individuals selected for the pilot (irrespective of whether or not they participated) allows us to test random assignment and to assess the factors related to an individual's decision to fully participate in the treatment (or in the case of the control group to agree to be interviewed in all three Waves). We discuss in more detail in the following sections how the administrative data were used.
3. Methodological Issues and Estimation Strategy

Random assignment into the control and intervention groups was intended to simplify estimation of the impact of the interview process on the economic and social activity of family benefit recipients (see Heckman et al. 1999). However, a failure to achieve complete randomization, variation in interview methods, and dropout from both the intervention and control groups (all discussed further below) lead us to prefer a non-experimental, propensity-score matching estimator over the simpler experimental estimator. Still, the initial randomized design of the trial implies that intervention and control group members by and large operate in the same economic environment, have essentially the same observed characteristics and that outcomes and characteristics are generally measured in the same way for both groups. These data features greatly enhance our ability to use propensity score matching to estimate the impact of the intervention.  

3.1 Randomization, Interview Methods, and Dropout

Analysis of our administrative data suggests that the initial assignment into the intervention versus control group is not completely random with respect to geographic location and nativity. Members of the control group are significantly more likely to live in large, capital cities, while intervention group members are significantly more likely to reside in towns with populations between 2,000 and 40,000 residents. Similarly, relative to intervention group members, individuals in the control group are more likely to be

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13 In particular, Heckman, et al., (1997) point to these data features as being crucial in reducing the bias in evaluation studies.
immigrants from a non-English speaking country, and less likely to be Australian-born.\footnote{These patterns are likely to be related to the geographic clustering of immigrants to Australia. Foreign-born individuals—in particular, those from non-English speaking countries—are heavily concentrated in Australia’s capital cities. Results of these randomization tests are available upon request.} These differences in local labor markets and nativity may be quite important in influencing the relative economic and social participation of pilot participants.

At the same time, comparing the characteristics of the family benefit recipients assigned to the “individual” as opposed to the “joint” interview intervention groups suggests that randomization is not a large problem for this comparison. Differences in the geographic distribution of these individuals—though significant—are small in magnitude. Thus, it appears that the overall difficulty in achieving randomization between the control and the aggregated intervention group may stem from the process used to select intervention and control group sites and not with randomization within site.

It is also important to note that although the same questionnaire was administered to intervention and control groups, different data gathering techniques – i.e., face-to-face and via telephone – were used for the control and two intervention groups in Waves 1 and 2. Wave 3 data were gathered by the same market research firm in the same way for all groups. (See Table 1.) Systematic differences in responses across the groups may therefore be due to the survey method itself and not due to the effect of the intervention. As we note below, this will complicate the interpretation of the results to a degree.

\textbf{Table 1 Here}

Finally, a substantial amount of dropping out occurred in both the control and intervention groups. Correlation between the decision to participate in the pilot once selected and individual characteristics could easily confound the effects of those
characteristics and participation in the treatment on subsequent outcomes.\textsuperscript{15} Treatment dropout is not an insurmountable problem and there are several strategies in the literature for dealing with treatment group dropout.\textsuperscript{16} Heckman et al. (1998), for example, propose a method of estimating the “effect of the intention to treat” which can be calculated in the face of treatment dropout. For programs which will be imperfectly implemented, this may in fact provide a more realistic estimate of the ‘real-world’ policy impact.

Dropout is a particular problem, however, because we do not have complete survey data for intervention and control group members who chose not to participate in an interview (or who could not be contacted). Although FaCS was able to deal with any ethical concerns associated with the initial random assignment, legal and ethical constraints regarding data privacy precluded collection of data from individuals opting out of the interview process. This complicates the analysis, but fortunately the availability of administrative data from the income-support system for all individuals (and their partners) selected for the trial allows us to adopt a non-experimental, propensity score matching approach to estimate the effect of the intervention. (See below.)

\textbf{3.2 Estimation Strategy}

We pursue a two-pronged approach. First, we use survey data from the trial itself and attempt to estimate “treatment on the fully-treated”. Second, we use administrative LDS information—which is available for all individuals selected for the trial—to estimate the “effect of intention to treat”. Two sorts of comparisons will be made: first,

\footnote{In our case, participants who did not drop out were more likely to be Australian-born or immigrants with English-speaking backgrounds, live in major cities or towns, and own homes. Not surprisingly, individuals who had moved in the last six months were less likely to participate. Detailed results are available upon request.}
between family benefits (PPP) recipients in the aggregated intervention group and family
benefits (PPP) recipients in the control group and second, between family benefits (PPP)
recipients in the two intervention groups. This later comparison allows us to assess the
marginal impact of participating in a joint interview (and developing a joint participation
plan) as opposed to individual interview.

To illustrate, consider the first comparison. We wish to compare the economic
and social activity of those who fully participated in the interview process and developed
a participation plan to that of individuals in the control group who would have done the
same had they been selected for the intervention. In other words we wish to estimate

\[ \Delta^{TOT} = E(Y^1 - Y^0 \mid X, P = 1) \]  

where \( Y^1 \) and \( Y^0 \) are potential activity levels given completion and non-completion of
the interview process respectively, \( X \) is a vector of controls, and \( P = 1 \) when an
individual completes the entire treatment and 0 otherwise. We use propensity score
matching techniques to overcome the practical difficulties associated with determining
which comparison individuals would have completed the interview process had they been
assigned to the intervention group.

More specifically, we use the administrative LDS data for intervention group
members to estimate a logit model of the probability of completing the final interview.
Using these estimates, we then create a propensity score (\( \hat{p}_i \)) (predicted probability) for
each family benefit recipient in the intervention and control group. Using kernel
propensity score matching, individuals in the intervention group are then matched to a
weighted average of control group members with similar propensity scores. Weights are

\[ \text{Control group dropout is an uncommon problem that has not been discussed in the literature.} \]
positively related to the similarity in propensity scores. The effect of full treatment for an individual \(i\) completing treatment (\(\delta_i\)) is then given by

\[
\delta_i = y_i^1 - \frac{1}{n_{\text{th}} \sum_{j=1}^{n_{\text{th}}} K \left( \frac{\hat{p}_j^i - \hat{p}_j^c}{h} \right) y_j^0}
\]

where \(\hat{p}_i^j\) and \(y_i^j\) are the propensity score and realized outcome for individual \(i\) in the fully-treated intervention group, \(\hat{p}_j^c\) and \(y_j^0\) are the propensity score and realized outcome for individual \(j\) in the control group, and \(n_{\text{th}}\) is number of control group individuals in the band surrounding individual \(i\). We use a standard normal kernel for \(K\) and choose the bandwidth (\(h\)) using Silverman’s (1986) suggested robust bandwidth for density estimation.17 The \(\delta_i\) from equation (2) are then averaged across members of the fully treated intervention group to generate a cross-sectional estimate of the effect of full-treatment on fully-treated individuals based on activity levels at the third interview. We also use \(\delta_i\) to construct a standard difference-in-difference estimate of changes in activity levels between the first and third interviews. Results from both measures are presented in Section 4.

In addition to the overall comparison between family benefit recipients in the intervention and control groups, we would also like to assess whether participation in the interview process with one’s partner (as opposed to alone) had any additional effect on economic and social activity. In order to make this comparison, we repeat the above matching process taking family benefit recipients participating in an individual interview as the “control” group and those participating in a couple interview as the “intervention” group. These results are also discussed in Section 4.
The probability density functions of the propensity scores for the intervention and control groups are presented in Figure 1 in the Appendix. The propensity score density for the control group has more mass at smaller values, reflecting the greater concentration of individuals from non-English speaking backgrounds among that group and the negative effect that characteristic has on the probability of full-participation. In general, the matching procedure appeared to be satisfactory. No match was found for three intervention group observations and these were dropped from the analysis.18


4.1 The Interview Process and Economic and Social Activity: Survey Data Results

Detailed survey data for pilot participants allows us to estimate the impact of the interview process on the economic and social participation of those individuals who completed the final interview. We concentrate on five measures of economic participation (paid employment, study or training for work-related reasons, voluntary work for work-related reasons, job search, and a combined measure of these four which we call “total economic participation”) and two measures of social participation (study or training and volunteer work undertaken for non work-related reasons). In each case, we consider both total hours and overall participation in the specific activity.

Both the cross-sectional Wave 3 and the difference-in-difference estimates of the overall impact of FaCS’s interview process on the economic and social participation of family benefit (PPP) recipients partnered with men receiving unemployment benefits are

17 We tried bandwidths ranging from 0.001 to 0.05 and the qualitative results are insensitive to this choice.
18 These were the three observations with the highest propensity score values.
presented in Table 2. While difference-in-difference estimators have the advantage of ‘differencing out’ any time-invariant group-specific effects that might remain after matching, their validity rests on the assumption that any differential change in the relative activity levels of the two groups can be attributed solely to the effects of the treatment itself. Changes in the method of interview (from face-to-face to telephone) for the intervention (but not control) group imply that this assumption may not hold in our case. This—along with our relative confidence in our ability to match individuals participating in the full interview process to comparable control group members (see Section 3.2)—leads us to have a preference for the cross-sectional estimates.

Table 2

Our estimates imply that individuals participating in the full interview process had lower hours of (and participation in) paid work than members of the control group, but higher weekly hours of (and participation in) work-related study or training and job search. In particular, the time spent in work-related study or training was one and a half hours per week higher amongst those participating in the full treatment—perhaps as a result of individuals undertaking the activities agreed to in their participation plans. These women also spent more time in job search (approximately one hour per week), but less time (approximately one hour and 45 minutes) in paid employment each week. Voluntary work for work-related reasons was also more common amongst women participating in the interviews with Centrelink advisors, though there was no significant difference in the hours the two groups spent in work-related volunteering. Overall, although the average total hours spent in these economic activities was not significantly
affected by the intervention, there was a slight increase (seven percentage points) in the proportion of individuals engaged in some form of economic activity.

There is also evidence that the interviews led to an increase in some forms of social participation. Post-intervention, both hours of and participation in non work-related study or training were higher for those women taking part in the interview process.19

These results provide evidence that interviews centering around future planning and the development of participation plans can lead to modest increases in the economic and social activity of family benefits recipients whose partners are unemployed. Are these outcomes enhanced further when family benefit recipients participate in these interviews jointly with their unemployed partners? In addressing this question, we compute both cross-sectional and difference-in-difference estimates that compare family benefit recipients participating in joint interviews (the “intervention group”) with family benefit recipients participating in individual interviews (the “control” group). (See Table 3.) This provides estimates of the marginal impact of a joint as opposed to an individual interview. Because the move from face-to-face interviews to telephone interviews occurred between Waves 2 and 3 for both groups (see Table 1), we are more confident that the identifying assumptions of the difference-in-difference estimator hold leading us to have a slight preference for the difference-in-difference estimates.

Table 3 Here

There is no evidence that requiring family benefit recipients to participate in a joint interview and planning process with their partners leads to higher levels of

19 These results are not presented here, but are available upon request.
economic or social activity. Hours of (and participation in) paid work, study and training (whether for work or not), and work- and non work-related volunteer work are all unaffected by the inclusion of one’s partner in the interview process. In fact, difference-in-difference estimates suggest that participation in a joint–rather than single–interview resulted in a reduction in the hours that family benefit recipients spend looking for work each week. Recall that both groups are interviewed alone by phone at the third wave, but at the first wave one group was interviewed in-person with partners while the other was interviewed in-person, but alone. This estimate will therefore also reflect any differential effect on reported job search arising from interview technique.20

4.2 The Interview Process and Economic and Social Activity: Administrative Data Results

Administrative data from the FaCS LDS allow us to assess the impact of the intervention on another set of outcome measures. These outcomes are measured in June 2001, about two months after the completion of the trial. The measures are available for both those who participated fully in the intervention and those who were assigned to it but did not participate fully.

This allows us to isolate any effects of assignment to the trial (the effect of intention to treat) from full participation (treatment on the fully treated). We consider four outcomes: movement off of income support payments; the presence of earned income; and average earned income. We use average values\(^{21}\) over two fortights of data (from

\(^{20}\) There was an increase in job search activity among the unemployed partners of family benefits recipients who were part of the joint interview process compared to the partner control group.

\(^{21}\) We use average values to eliminate high frequency variation in the data. Individuals sometimes disappear from the administrative data for one fortnight, only to return the following fortnight on the same payment type. Logically, these can not be thought of as true departures from welfare receipt.
17 May through 14 June 2001) to construct the outcome measures, which are reported in Table 4 for the total family benefits recipient group.

The second column of Table 4 addresses the intention to treat, comparing the outcomes of all individuals assigned to the intervention group with all those assigned to the control group. The third column compares the intervention group who participated fully in the intervention with the total (assigned) control group and the last column compares the fully participating intervention group with control group members who participated in the interviews through Wave 3.

**Table 4**

Overall, the administrative data provide important support for one key feature of the survey results: the impact of the intervention generally was small. Nearly all (over 95 per cent) members of both intervention and control group remained on income support immediately after the conclusion of the trial.

In terms of the effect of the intervention, there are very few significant differences between the outcomes of members of the intervention group, either those assigned or participating fully, and those of the control group. (See Table 4.) Intervention group members who participated at Wave 3 may have been more likely to remain on benefits than control group members. In contrast to the survey results, members of the intervention may have been more likely to report earned income (be employed) than control group members.

In general, the effects appear to be modest. The data cover a period just after the completion of the trial. The survey results indicate that many intervention group
participants remain engaged in job search and education and training, which may eventually provide better longer-term outcomes.

4.3 Robustness of the Results

The results contained in Tables 2 through 4 are not sensitive to alternative matching approaches. Alternative matching techniques produced estimated effects that were similar to those reported in Tables 2 through 4. These alternatives included other kernel weighting methods and the use of nearest neighbour techniques, with comparisons made between members of the intervention group and varying numbers of ‘nearest neighbours’ on the basis of their propensity scores.\(^{22}\)

Similarly, where the matching procedures included use of the characteristics of the partners of family benefit recipients the impact estimates were similar to those already presented. One explanation for this outcome is that the partners’ data added little new information to improve the matching procedure. After all, the partners were all unemployed, overwhelmingly male and lived in the same regions in the same types of housing as the family benefit recipients. The ages of members of the couples were also strongly correlated.

The impact of the interview process on the outcomes of the NSA partners of the family benefit recipients was also similar to those achieved by the recipients themselves. The survey data suggest that unemployed NSA partners who participated fully in the pilot worked less in a job or as a volunteer and undertook more job search than NSA partners.

\(^{22}\) These alternative estimates available upon request from the authors.
who were included in the control group.\textsuperscript{23} There were similarly few differences in outcomes between unemployed partners in the intervention group and those in the control group in the FaCS administrative data.

4.4 Discussion

These results provide evidence that interviews centered on future planning and the development of participation plans can lead to modest increases in economic activities by family benefits recipients and their unemployed partners. That modest interventions lead to only modest successes is perhaps not surprising given the high level of correlation within couples in terms of characteristics and unemployment outcomes. Worklessness may simply be concentrated within households that are particularly hard to help (Dorsett, 2001). The U.K.’s experience with JSA also suggests that it may take time for effects of policy interventions to materialize (Bonjour et al., 2002), and the outcomes we have measured here are rather short term.

What is more surprising is the apparent substitution between market work and other activities. Compared with the control group, the planning process and its implementation may have lowered the hours and incidence of work by members of the intervention group. This effect is observed in both the cross-sectional Wave 3 and difference-in-difference estimates reported in Table 2. What behavioural responses or features of the trial may have brought about this employment effect?

One possible explanation for the difference-in-difference result (though not the cross-sectional Wave 3 result) is that intervention group members may have overstated

\textsuperscript{23} The study or training and volunteer work results are based on the difference-in-differences results, not the Wave 3 comparisons for the unemployed partners. Survey and administrative data outcomes for this
their participation and hours of work in their initial face-to-face interviews with Centrelink advisors. The answers of individuals may have been more accurate in response to questions asked over the telephone by an employee of a market research company. Alternatively, both the difference-in-difference and cross-sectional results could be explained by specific family responsibilities that constrain the time that family benefit recipients can allocate to other activities. Any increase in non-work activities associated with the implementation of the participation plan may only have been possible at the expense of participation in or time spent on current employment.

The data do not support either explanation, however. Both participation in employment and average hours worked by those employed increased for members of the intervention group between the Wave 1 (face-to-face) and Wave 3 (telephone) interviews. The increases in employment and hours worked were simply greater for the control group. In fact, participation in and total hours of economic activity (see Table 2) increased for both the intervention and control groups between the interviews. These changes in economic participation are summarised in Table 5. The increase in economic activity is similar for both groups between the interviews. However, the increased activity is less employment-focused for the intervention group than the control group. This makes sense as implementation of intervention group members’ participation plans extended beyond employment outcomes and involved the take-up of referrals to other government services and courses of study or training.

Table 5 here
Individuals’ responses to Wave 3 interviews also do not suggest that they are so time constrained that they might not have been able to work if offered a job. While these families all had dependent children, the trial was restricted to those families in which the youngest child was school-aged. Furthermore, over one in four members of the intervention group engaged in voluntary work, most without specific work-related objectives. This work may serve very valuable community purposes. Nevertheless, such participation indicates there was potential flexibility among the intervention group in their allocation of time towards economic activities.

It is difficult to know why the marginal effect of a joint interview was not greater. Evaluations of Joint Claims for JSA in the U.K. suggest that individuals—particularly men—participating in an interview with their partner were more likely to feel that the interview process had been helpful (Bonjour, et al, 2002). In addition to facilitating the provision of required information, couples found joint interviews to be helpful because they allowed partners to support one another. In their evaluation Bonjour, et al (2002), however, did not attempt to measure the impact of the mode of interview on subsequent outcomes. In this trial, however, the family payments recipients interviewed with their partners were no more likely than counterparts interviewed alone to indicate that they had found the interview quite or very helpful.

5. Conclusions

The increasing concentration of unemployment and dependence on welfare within families is a serious policy concern. Children growing up in such families are at

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24 Unlike in our case, couples were not randomly assigned to joint versus individual interviews, suggesting that selectivity may play a role in generating the U.K. results.
particular risk of academic failure, social exclusion, and welfare dependence in adulthood.

With this in mind, the Australian Department of Family and Community Services conducted a randomized experiment to test a policy of intensive interviews with couples and individuals in workless families. The interviews resulted in the formation of individual roadmaps toward increased economic and social participation. This paper has reviewed that experiment and its outcomes.

Over the three waves of data collection associated with the trial, we find that both the control and intervention groups showed significant increases in economic activity. For control group members, this manifested itself as increased participation in paid work, while intervention group members showed significant increases in work-related study and training. Both control and intervention groups participated in three interviews in a six-month period—a stark contrast to the limited contact that this group would normally have with the welfare system. That both groups responded to this contact is therefore not surprising. The differential response may perhaps be explained by the formation of participation plans in the face-to-face interviews with the intervention group. For this group of individuals who are entrenched in unemployment, job counselors may help in moving people towards richer economic participation through training and study programs.

The differences we find between the control and intervention groups are fairly small. Three things mitigate against finding larger results. First, both groups increased economic participation in response to the trial. Given this, there may have been less

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25 Family benefit recipients (who are predominately female) interviewed with their partners were significantly more likely than their (male) partners to indicate that they had found the interview helpful.
potential for there to be a marginal impact of the interview process itself. Secondly, the interviews for both groups were voluntary. There was no penalty for refusing to participate in the trial or for dropping out of the trial. Thirdly, the time frame we analyze is fairly short. Future releases of administrative data may provide evidence about medium and long-term impact of the experiment.

Interestingly, we also find no differential impact on outcomes for individuals interviewed together as a couple compared to individuals interviewed alone.

This study provides further evidence that moving individuals entrenched in unemployment off welfare is a difficult task. Unemployed individuals in workless families are among the most disadvantaged of welfare recipients. Nonetheless, the small, voluntary intervention studied here was successful in increasing certain forms of economic participation. In a sense, these were ‘intermediate’ activities – individuals did not increase their employment levels or move off benefits, but undertook activities that might eventually contribute to such outcomes. It seems that any welfare reform process that has as its goal the reduction in workless families requires a longer-term perspective than the time frame examined here. The resources required by a successful program are also likely to be greater than those expended in this intervention.
References


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intervention with partners</th>
<th>Intervention without partners</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
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<td>Letters sent</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1413</td>
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<td>715</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interviewed in Wave 2</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewed in Wave 3</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>244</td>
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</table>

Data gathered in face-to-face interview
Data gathered in phone interview
Table 2:
Economic Participation for PPP Recipients: Intervention versus Control Group
(Cross-Sectional and Difference-in-Difference Propensity Score Matching Impact Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Participation Measures</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
<th>Difference in Difference</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
<th>Difference in Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average Weekly Hours</td>
<td>Proportion Working</td>
<td>Average Weekly Hours</td>
<td>Proportion Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Group</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
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<td>Impact Estimate</td>
<td>-1.73**</td>
<td>-0.06 *</td>
<td>-1.75 ***</td>
<td>-0.07 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
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<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hours Study or Training (Work)</th>
<th>Proportion Studying or Training (Work)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Estimate</td>
<td>1.30 ***</td>
<td>0.05 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>Proportion Volunteering (Work)</th>
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<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>0.03 **</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>Proportion Looking for Work</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact Estimate</td>
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<td>0.08 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Hours Economic Participation</th>
<th>Proportion in Economic Participation</th>
</tr>
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<td>Intervention Group</td>
<td>6.46</td>
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<td>Control Group</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: 1. Bandwidth for kernel match is 0.027. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
2. *** significant 1 percent; ** significant 5 percent; * significant 10 percent.
3. Sample sizes vary due to missing data for some questions and range between 236 – 244 (control) and 438 – 457 (intervention). For this reason, the total hours estimates are not the sum of the individual elements. Total participation is also not the sum of the individual elements because individuals may participate in more than one activity.
Table 3: Economic Participation for PPP Recipients Interviewed with and without Partners  
(Cross-Sectional and Difference-in-Difference Propensity Score Matching Impact Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Participation Measures</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
<th>Difference in Difference</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
<th>Difference in Difference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Weekly Hours</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with Partner</td>
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<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview without Partner</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Estimate</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion Working</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Study or Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview with Partner</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview without Partner</td>
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<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>Standard Error</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hours of Voluntary Work</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with Partner</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hours Looking for Work</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview with Partner</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview without Partner</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Estimate</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-2.07**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion Participating</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with Partner</td>
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<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>3.61</td>
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<td>-0.11*</td>
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<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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Notes:
1. Bandwidth for kernel match is 0.027. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
2. ***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent; *significant at 10 percent.
3. Sample sizes vary due to missing data for some questions and range 127 – 136 (partner interviewed) and 297 – 307 (partner not interviewed). For this reason, the total hours estimates are not the sum of the individual elements. Total participation is also not the sum of the individual elements because individuals may participate in more than one activity.
**Table 4:**
Economic Participation for PPP Recipients: Intervention versus Control Group

**Administrative Data Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All individuals assigned to intervention and control groups</th>
<th>Wave 3 intervention group participants compared to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Randomized Experiment Estimator</td>
<td>Matched estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>On payments June 2001 (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact estimate</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Has earnings June 2001 (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact estimate</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average earnings June 2001 ($)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<td>Impact estimate</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
<td>(5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average earnings June 2001 given had earnings ($)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>252.1</td>
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<td>Control</td>
<td>294.8</td>
<td>290.6</td>
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<td>Impact estimate</td>
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<td>-38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>(48.0)</td>
<td>(95.4)</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
1. Bandwidth for kernel match for column two is 0.019; for columns three and four it is 0.027. Standard errors are bootstrapped for columns two to four.
2. ***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent; *significant at 10 percent.
3. Sample sizes: for column two, 2346 intervention group members, 1413 controls; for column three, 457 intervention group members, 1413 controls; for column four, 457 intervention group members, 244 controls.
Table 5: Change in Economic Participation for PPP Recipients between Waves 1 and 3: Intervention and Control Groups\(^{(1)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intervention (per cent)</th>
<th>Control (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Wave 1 and Wave 3:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the proportion participating in economic activities among those not working(^{(2)})</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion employed who were previously not economically active</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion employed who were previously economically active, but not employed</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Wave 1 and Wave 3:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase in the proportion working</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the proportion participating in other economic activities</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes:
1. This categorization of activities or outcomes is incomplete. For example, small numbers of individuals employed at Wave 1 were not employed at Wave 3 and some were no longer participating in economic activities.
2. These are proportions measured as proportions of the total intervention and control groups. For example, the increase in individuals who participated in non-work economic activities between Waves 1 and 3 constituted 9 per cent of the total intervention group.
APPENDIX

Figure 1: Density of Propensity Scores for the Intervention and Control Groups
Workless Families Pilot-Component 1 - Letter requesting couples to attend together- PPP Partner letter.

Dear (name)

My name is (name). I am a Centrelink specialist customer adviser and my job is to help couples who don’t have paid work to start thinking about their future plans. There are many ways that couples can work together to combine looking after children with planning for future jobs. I can talk to you about making the most of the opportunities that exist now for you, and help you to make a plan that suits you both.

I have arranged an interview with you and your partner at:

Centrelink (address of office)
At (time) on (day and date).

The request for you to attend the office at the time stated above is made under section 63 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999. It is important to note that if you do not attend this interview your Parenting Payment may be stopped.

I have sent a similar appointment letter to your partner.

At the interview I will check both your details to make sure you are getting all the assistance you are entitled to. As part of a new pilot programme, I will also be available to discuss with you both, your plans for the future and how I can help you. If you wish to bring your children along, that is fine. Whilst you must attend this interview to have your payment details checked, further involvement in this pilot is voluntary. This pilot programme is confidential and free from cost or obligation.

In order for this interview to be of most benefit to your family, I need to talk to you and your partner together. If the interview time is not suitable for either you or your partner, please ring me to make another time. If you have very strong reasons for not being interviewed with your partner, please ring me about this.

I can be contacted on (Phone Number). If you don’t have a phone and need to use a public phone or a friend’s phone, the best time to ring me is between (time) and (time) on (days).

The total interview should take around 70 minutes. You do not need to bring anything except this letter with you. When you arrive at the office, please hand this letter to the officer at reception.

Yours sincerely
Workless Families Pilot-Component 1 - Letter requesting PP partner to attend alone

Dear (name)

My name is (name). I am a Centrelink specialist customer adviser and my job is to help families who don’t have paid work to start thinking about their future plans. There are many ways that couples can work together to combine looking after children with planning for future jobs. I can talk to you about making the most of the opportunities that exist now for you, and help you to make a plan that suits your family.

I have arranged an interview with you at:

Centrelink (address of office)
At (time) on (day and date).

The request for you to attend the office at the time stated above is made under section 63 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999. **It is important to note that if you do not attend this interview your Parenting Payment may be stopped.**

At the interview I will check your details to make sure you are getting all the assistance you are entitled to. As part of a new pilot programme, I will also be available to discuss with you your plans for the future and how I can help you. If you wish to bring your children along, that is fine. Whilst you must attend this interview to have your payment details checked, further involvement in this pilot is voluntary. This pilot programme is confidential and free from cost or obligation.

I can be contacted on (Phone Number). If you don’t have a phone and need to use a public phone or a friend’s phone, the best time to ring me is between (time) and (time) on (days).

The total interview should take around 45 minutes. You do not need to bring anything except this letter with you. When you arrive at the office, please hand this letter to the officer at reception.

Yours sincerely
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>S. P. Jenkins&lt;br&gt; L. Osberg</td>
<td>Nobody to Play with? The Implications of Leisure Coordination</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>851</td>
<td>J. D. Angrist</td>
<td>Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Theory and Practice</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>852</td>
<td>A. Kugler&lt;br&gt; M. Kugler</td>
<td>The Labor Market Effects of Payroll Taxes in a Middle-Income Country: Evidence from Colombia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>853</td>
<td>I. Ekeland&lt;br&gt; J. J. Heckman&lt;br&gt; L. Nesheim</td>
<td>Identification and Estimation of Hedonic Models</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>854</td>
<td>A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell&lt;br&gt; B. M. S. Van Praag</td>
<td>Income Satisfaction Inequality and Its Causes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>855</td>
<td>B. Irlenbusch&lt;br&gt; D. Sliwka</td>
<td>Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>856</td>
<td>D. Sliwka</td>
<td>Management Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>857</td>
<td>M. Francesconi&lt;br&gt; A. Muthoo</td>
<td>An Economic Model of Child Custody</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>858</td>
<td>C. U. Chiswick</td>
<td>History of Historical Statistics of the United States</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>859</td>
<td>R. Fahr</td>
<td>Loafing or Learning? The Demand for Informal Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>860</td>
<td>J. Bonke&lt;br&gt; N. Datta Gupta&lt;br&gt; N. Smith</td>
<td>Timing and Flexibility of Housework and Men and Women's Wages</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>861</td>
<td>Y. L'Horty&lt;br&gt; C. Rault</td>
<td>Inflation, Minimum Wage and Other Wages: An Econometric Study on French Macroeconomic Data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>862</td>
<td>J. T. Addison&lt;br&gt; C. R. Belfield</td>
<td>Union Voice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>863</td>
<td>C. U. Chiswick</td>
<td>Immigrant Religious Adjustment: An Economic Approach to Jewish Migrations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>864</td>
<td>D. Cobb-Clark&lt;br&gt; C. Ryan&lt;br&gt; R. Breunig</td>
<td>A Couples-Based Approach to the Problem of Workless Families</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>08/03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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