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What does it mean to “address displacement” under the UNFCCC? An analysis of the negotiations process and the role of research

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What Does It Mean to “Address Displacement” Under the UNFCCC?

An Analysis of the Negotiations Process and the Role of Research

Olivia Serdeczny

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April 2017

Olivia Serdeczny

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Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|---|
| AOSIS | Alliance of Small Island States |
| COP | Conference of the Party |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
| LDCs | Group of Least Developed Countries |
| SBI | Subsidiary Body for Implementation |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNU-EHS | United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security |
| US | United States |
| WIM | Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts |

Executive summary

This discussion paper investigates the treatment of climate-related human mobility under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Specifically, it investigates the mandate “to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” that was given to the task force on displacement, the establishment of which was decided in the context of negotiations on the Paris Agreement.

If the broader issues of migration, displacement and planned relocation were already included in the Cancun Adaptation Framework, then why was it also inserted under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM)? Moreover, why the specific focus on displacement in later documents? Do approaches to displacement differ from migration governance? Finally, what does it mean to “avert, minimize and address” displacement? Guided by these questions, this discussion paper looks at the science-policy interface of climate-related human mobility and analyses the negotiations process that has led to the different mandates on the issue under the UNFCCC.

The analysis of submissions that led to the inclusion of human mobility under the Cancun Adaptation Framework in 2010 shows that it was mostly non-Party stakeholders who established the issue under the UNFCCC. In the later 2012 context of the loss and damage work programme, human mobility is mentioned by a few Parties and negotiating blocks in addition to non-Party stakeholders. Successive submissions mentioning human mobility as input into the initial two-year workplan of the WIM, which was adopted in 2014, were again only provided by the same non-Party stakeholders. Wording around climate-related human mobility in these early UNFCCC texts is mostly uncontroversial, pointing to the need for enhanced expertise, understanding, coordination and cooperation. Only with the 2015 decision to establish a task force on displacement did the focus become narrower and more substantial.

A review of the research that provides the context for including human mobility under the UNFCCC shows that empirically-based insights provide arguments for both the inclusion of the issue under the Cancun Adaptation Framework and its inclusion under the WIM. On the one hand, the potential benefits of migration are clearly recognised in the literature: mobility allows people to move out of harm’s way and multiplies their livelihood opportunities. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that mobility comes at high human costs, including non-economic losses of cultural identity and sense of place. Furthermore, acknowledging the limited degree of choices that people who are faced with rising climatic risks are left with, mobility is often framed as a measure of “last resort”.

In further addressing the questions of why a specific focus on displacement was taken in the Paris decision and what it means “to avert, minimize and address” displacement, the political context of wider loss and damage negotiations needs to be considered. An analysis of early decisions and Party submissions on loss and damage shows that the wording “to avert, minimize and address” is the result of a broadening of the scope of loss and damage measures. Early decisions on loss and damage only speak of “addressing loss and damage”. Such language was associated with controversial, backward-looking

measures, in particular liability and compensation. A broadened scope including preventive measures – “to avert and minimize” – weakened such controversial notions and allowed for all Parties to agree on vague terms. Concurrent with this reduced weight of backward-looking measures is a shift from collective effort-sharing to country-driven approaches, taking the focus off of questions concerning international responsibility and introducing the possibility of shifting the burden onto individual countries.

Based on this analysis, the specific focus on displacement can be interpreted as an effort to re-introduce questions of international responsibility and backward-looking measures. The specific wording to “avert, minimize and address” represents the outcome of negotiations and reflects divergent positions among Parties who are concerned with being affected by climate change and Parties who are concerned with being allocated the duty of sharing in efforts to cope with such adverse effects.

Following this interpretation, it is argued that policies to “avert and minimize” displacement coincide with policies on migration governance. The goal of such policies is not to suppress displacement but either to reduce the need for people to become mobile through the engagement in mitigation and in-situ adaptation or to manage mobility, such that the human costs of displacement are reduced and empowered migration is enabled. “Addressing” displacement requires international engagement in effort-sharing and support. Such effort-sharing would result in the protection of internally displaced persons, whereby a nation is overburdened and can no longer protect its citizens, the protection of persons displaced across borders and the long-term support of host communities. In addition, policies “addressing” displacement should include those that are specifically directed at non-economic losses due to climate-related displacement. Providing support for the maintenance or re-establishment of non-economic values can constitute one form of recognition that counteracts the shift in responsibilities by acknowledging losses rather than simply writing them off.

Based on the analysis provided in this discussion paper, the following policy recommendations are being made. Recommendations are specified for scenarios in which climate change is assumed to be a morally relevant factor in respective paragraphs a) and in parentheses of each heading.

1. Expedite international effort-sharing on protecting (climate-)displaced people

Parties to the UNFCCC should aim to contribute to developments of the “global compacts” under the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in order to ensure the scale of expected challenges is adequately taken into account. The task force on displacement could serve as a communication channel between the relevant processes under the UNHCR or the IOM and the WIM under the UNFCCC. Effort-sharing needs to include support for enabling overburdened countries to protect their internally displaced citizens as well as host communities, both within and across borders.

- a) If climate change is considered as a morally relevant factor, then an adequate definition of climate-related persons needs to be provided and included in the global compact with reference to effort-sharing. The task force on displacement could

contribute to developing such a definition.

2. Develop and implement guidelines for reducing and addressing non-economic losses (including means of recognition and restitution)

Research shows that the human costs of mobility, often psychological or cultural, can be very high. Lessons learnt from planned relocations should be extracted and adequately applied to non-economic losses in the context of climate-related displacement. These should be implemented as standard procedure at the national and local levels. The task force on displacement can provide guidance in this effort.

- a) If climate change is considered as a morally relevant factor, then a process for the adequate means of recognition of and restitution for irreversible non-economic losses needs to be implemented at the international level.

3. Engage at the science–policy interface

The Executive Committee of the WIM could consider systematically establishing a channel to communicate relevant research questions to the research community.

1 Introduction

The question of whether human mobility can result from climate change has occupied scholars since at least the 1970s (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Following decades of research and controversy, the scientific evidence for the present or future occurrence of migration as a consequence of climate change can be considered uncertain: the answers to the basic question of whether climate change would cause migration have ranged from “yes”, with high numbers of future migrants being cited by some scholars (e.g. Myers, 2002), to “it’s complicated”, referring to the multi-causal pathways that lead to the decision to migrate (e.g. Black et al., 2011). The latter view has come to constitute the general consensus among migration scholars, with a general acknowledgement that climate change provides additional pressures to become mobile.

Since 2010, the issue of migration and displacement has also entered the political realm of negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): It was first included under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, later in 2012 under the loss and damage work programme and under the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) in 2014. Most recently, the establishment of the task force on displacement under the WIM was decided as an outcome of the Paris negotiations in 2015. At the time of writing, the task force is in the process of being established (UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], 2016b). Table 1 lists the relevant Conferences of the Parties (COPs), decisions and textual references to human mobility.

| Table 1: COP documents that refer to human mobility | | | |
|--|--------------|---|---|
| Year | Event | Context | Mandate according to text (verbatim) |
| 2010 | COP16 | Cancun Adaptation Framework (decision 1/CP.16) | enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation |
| 2012 | COP18 | Approaches to address loss and damage (decision 3/CP.18) | advance the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage, which includes [...] How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility |
| 2014 | COP20 | Adoption of the initial work programme of the Executive Committee of the WIM (decision 2/CP.20) | <i>No direct mention in decision text.</i> <i>From initial work programme:</i> [e]nhance the understanding of and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility |
| 2015 | COP21 | Adoption of the Paris Agreement – task force on displacement (decision 1/CP.21) | develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change |
| 2016 | COP22 | Adoption of the indicative framework of strategic workstreams for the five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM as contained in its 2015 report (decision 3/CP.22) | <i>No direct mention in decision text. From WIM Report 2015:</i> migration, displacement and human mobility, including the task force on displacement |

As can be seen in Table 1, a shift can be observed, both in terms of the type of mobility that is considered and the actions that follow from this. The Cancun Adaptation Framework speaks of enhancing understanding, cooperation and coordination on displacement, migration and planned relocation. Similarly, first mentions under the loss and damage work programme and the WIM refer to enhancing understanding and expertise on human mobility in a broad sense. With the establishment of the task force on displacement, the focus and the language on what is to be achieved becomes somewhat more substantive with the task force mandate “to develop recommendations on integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement”.

Yet, the scope of policies that follow from these different decisions are far from clear. Instead, a number of questions arise. Why is human mobility included under both the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the WIM, particularly given that adaptation is typically something to be promoted, whereas loss and damage refers to something that is to be averted? What does it mean “to avert, minimize and address displacement”, and is it different from migration governance? If yes, how? If not, then why this narrow focus on displacement in the mandate of the task force?

1.1 Approach and structure of this discussion paper

In order to address these questions, this paper takes a closer look at the science–policy interface concerning human mobility under the UNFCCC. It analyses the technical process and negotiations dynamics under the UNFCCC that gave rise to, and resulted in, the different mandates listed in Table 1. Section 2 traces the inclusion of human mobility under the UNFCCC back to submissions made by Parties and non-Party stakeholders. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the research findings on climate-related human mobility. Notably, Section 3 does not provide a comprehensive overview of the current literature on climate-related human mobility. Rather, the broad lines of evidence are sketched that have emerged over the last years and that arguably motivated submissions that triggered the inclusion of the theme under the UNFCCC. Section 4 looks at the broader loss and damage negotiations, which provide the political backdrop of the specific language in which the mandate of the task force on displacement is framed. Section 5 outlines some of the policy implications that flow from this analysis and provides policy recommendations.

2 Tracing the issue of human mobility under the UNFCCC

In the following, a chronological overview is given of the process that led to the inclusion of human mobility under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the loss and damage work programme and the WIM, including the task force on displacement. The analysis is conducted at a technical level, meaning that documents that were submitted under the UNFCCC process are screened without yet considering the dimension of political negotiations, which is considered in Section 4.

3.1 Human mobility in the Cancun Adaptation Framework

Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (decision 1/CP.16) constitutes the first mention of human mobility under the UNFCCC. It reads as follows:

Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following:

(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels. (UNFCCC, 2011)

Placed like this, climate-related human mobility is clearly related to adaptation to climate change. Acting towards coordination and cooperation on human mobility are understood as ways to “enhance action on adaptation”. The inclusion of human mobility under the Cancun Adaptation Framework has been interpreted in various ways. According to Koko Warner (2012), the inclusion of sub-paragraph (f) at the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancun (COP16) meant that human mobility was considered as a subject that would remain relevant in the context of adaptation and that it might qualify for adaptation-related funding under the emergent climate finance architecture. Other scholars sometimes perceive it as a recognition of the need for resettlement in the face of climate change impacts (e.g. López-Carr & Marter-Kenyon, 2015).

Prior to the adoption of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, mentions of human mobility under the UNFCCC first appeared in documents that prepared the elements of a new climate agreement, to be adopted in 2009 at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP15). This process under the so-called Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was the entry point for the theme of human mobility into the climate negotiations under the UNFCCC (Warner, 2012). Parties and non-Parties had been invited to submit their views on relevant inputs. These were collated into a document summarising the submissions by Parties and accredited observer organisations (FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/Rev.1 [Framework Convention on Climate Change/Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention], 2009). Within this document, first references to human mobility – in the form of migration – can be found (for a comprehensive overview of relevant inputs, see Table A1 in the Annex).

According to Warner (2012, p. 1067), “migration and displacement entered the discussion through particular strategic interests and views of two or more specific observer groups”. An analysis of submissions made under this process confirms this view. It shows that references to migration are made by a number of observer organisations but not by Parties. Warner continues to describe the ensuing negotiations process: “A handful of delegates from particular parties – both Southern and Northern – have championed the issue [...] with the support of research and humanitarian organizations. [...] The major negotiating blocks place relatively little emphasis on the topic” (Warner, 2012, p. 1068).

It appears that the issue was not yet considered to be particularly relevant by Parties. However, its relevance must have been recognised, as reference to it was included in the negotiations text: “At one point it was in a section on transboundary issues; later, it was a

stand-alone paragraph; and, finally, it was bundled with the list of emerging activities that could be considered for adaptation funding support” (Warner, 2012, p. 1065).

Although the prospect of reaching a new global agreement was not met in Copenhagen, considerable passages of text on adaptation had developed into a format fit for agreement and were finally adopted as the Cancun Adaptation Framework at COP16. Human mobility had thus been introduced as a theme by observer groups and later adopted in relatively uncontroversial language as a topic for enhancing knowledge, coordination and cooperation.

3.2 Human mobility under the loss and damage work programme

The next mention of human mobility under the UNFCCC is under the loss and damage work programme. This programme was initiated at the same time as the adoption of the above-referenced paragraph 14 (f), namely under the Cancun Adaptation Framework. Its goal was to “consider, including through workshops and expert meetings, as appropriate, approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2011, paragraph 26).

Decision 3/CP.18 is a result of this work programme. It is here that under paragraph 7 human mobility first appears in the context of loss and damage. In it, the COP “[a]cknowledges the further work to advance the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage, which includes, inter alia, [...] (vi) How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility” (UNFCCC, 2012).

The inclusion of human mobility in the context of approaches to address loss and damage will have implications for the work undertaken under the WIM, as is explained further below.

The process leading to the adoption of decision 3/CP.18 listing approaches to address loss and damage consisted of three calls for submissions as well as a series of regional expert meetings. One of these calls for submission was issued by the COP, the two others by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) in the following order:

- (1) COP16 – views and information on elements to be included in the work programme on loss and damage;
- (2) SBI at its 34th session (SBI34) – views and information on the thematic areas in the implementation of the work programme: (a) assessing the risk of loss and damage and the current knowledge on the same; (b) a range of approaches to loss and damage; and (c) the role of the Convention in enhancing the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage;
- (3) SBI at its 35th session (SBI35) – views and information on the possible elements to be included in the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16.

A review of submissions made in response to these calls that are available online shows that little mention of human mobility was made in response to the COP16 and SBI34

invitations (see Tables A2-A4 in the Annex for a comprehensive overview of submission text and authors). Input specifically addressing the calls from COP16 and SBI34 was provided only by the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). The UNU-EHS by design works closely with the United Nations (UN) process, including the UNFCCC. Accordingly, the submissions not only listed the main gaps in knowledge and management arrangements but also offered further support in providing background material and studies. The submission in response to the call by SBI34 was later endorsed by the UNHCR.

A stark increase in references to human mobility can be observed in response to the call issued by SBI35: five submissions mentioned human mobility, four of which are Party of Party Group submissions. This relatively high number of submissions referring to human mobility can partly be explained by the much larger number of submissions received to this call overall. This general increase likely goes back to a number of regional expert meetings on a range of approaches to address loss and damage that had been triggered under SBI34 and consecutively organised under the UNFCCC. These workshops might also explain the sudden rise in Parties’ interest in the issue of human mobility. Although a review online yields no documented evidence, Bolivia, Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, Philippines and Nicaragua directly refer in their submission to “several regional meetings”, in which the work on human mobility, as requested under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, “has been identified [...] as important; [and] adequate support will need to be designed in collaboration with relevant international institutions to consider how to address the issue of migration” (FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.14/Add.1 [Framework Convention on Climate Change/Subsidiary Body for Implementation], 2012). It thus appears that expert workshops contributed to the rise in awareness of the issue of human mobility and its relevance in the context of the loss and damage work programme.

Notably, the purpose for which human mobility is mentioned in submissions differs across actors. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) lists migration as a risk and as one of the “strong socioeconomic reasons for developed countries to participate in new insurance mechanisms” (FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.14, 2012). This reference is made in the context of a call for an international mechanism to address loss and damage which was to consist of three components: an insurance component, a rehabilitation/compensatory component and a risk-management component. The reference to migration was given in a passage titled “demonstrated need for an international mechanism to address loss and damage”. Thus, migration did not feature as something to be considered directly under the loss and damage work programme. Rather, the prospect of migration was seen as a reason to engage in risk-spreading activities. The remaining submissions mention migration as an element in itself to be considered under the loss and damage work programme. The submission by the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) points to knowledge and management gaps that need to be addressed through institutional cooperation. Similar inputs are provided in the submissions by Ghana, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, the Philippines and Nicaragua. The joint submission by the UNHCR, the UNU-EHS, the Norwegian Refugee Council and its Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and the IOM also elaborates on knowledge and management gaps – albeit more comprehensively – and includes concrete suggestions for the role of the Convention in filling these gaps.

Inputs received in response to these three calls formed the basis of negotiations at COP18, where decision 3/CP.18 was adopted. Human mobility had thus entered through the submissions of observer organisations and later those from concerned Parties and Party Groups. It appears that regional expert workshops, which had been held throughout the process, helped in raising awareness of the issue. The issue had thus been established as a theme also under the loss and damage work programme, which was to result in the establishment of the WIM in the following year.

3.3 Human mobility under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts

In 2013 the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts was established. Although its establishment was triggered under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, it has repeatedly been claimed that the inclusion of a separate article on loss and damage in the Paris Agreement posits the body as a structure that is different than as well as independent from the Cancun Adaptation Framework. The Paris Agreement further puts the WIM directly under the Authority of the Conference of the Parties, serving as the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).

In 2014, the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) was adopted. It includes Action Area 6, which tasks the Executive Committee to “[e]nhance the understanding of and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility; and the application of such understanding and expertise” (UNFCCC, 2014).

The two specific activities spelt out are to

- (a) Invite relevant organizations and experts to provide scientific information on projected migration and displacement based on projected climate and non-climate related impacts in vulnerable populations
- (b) Invite United Nations organizations, expert bodies and relevant initiatives to collaborate with the Executive Committee to distil relevant information, lessons learned and good practices from their activities. (UNFCCC, 2014)

Again, the adoption of the initial two-year workplan goes back to submissions. These had been invited when the WIM was established at COP19 in 2013 (Table A5 in the Annex presents an overview of submissions on inputs into the initial two-year workplan of the WIM Executive Committee that gave consideration to the issue).

In these submissions, it emerged that – although Parties had agreed in 2012 on the need for further knowledge and understanding on human mobility in the context of loss and damage – the issue did not feature in any Party submission for inputs in the Executive Committee of the WIM. It was again the non-Party stakeholders who stressed the need to close the gap in the understanding of human mobility in the context of climate change. A number of humanitarian groupings as well as the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative also called for the inclusion of consideration of human mobility under the initial two-year workplan. Furthermore, a large group of observer organisations had formed into an Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility and provided a submission

suggesting the establishment of “a suitable group” to advise the WIM regarding climate-related human mobility. The Advisory Group includes authors of previous submissions, such as the UNU-EHS, the IOM and the UNHCR.

It was thus, again, the observer organisations that motivated the inclusion of human mobility in the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM. It appears that, despite not having included the issue in their submissions, Parties considered the issue as relevant, as indicated by the final version of the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM.

3.4 The task force on displacement

It can be expected that the main work on human mobility in the context of climate change under the UNFCCC will be conducted by the so-called task force on displacement. This task force is the result of negotiations on the Paris Agreement in 2015. The decision accompanying the Paris Agreement, decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49 requests the Executive Committee of the WIM to “establish [...] a task force [...] to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 2015).

With the establishment of the task force delegated to the Executive Committee of the WIM, the task force is effectively a sub-structure of the WIM. Although the Executive Committee retains the main responsibilities, it is likely that it will delegate activities on human mobility to the task force.

The origins of the task force on displacement can be found in the negotiating text, which was collated leading up to the Paris Agreement. The text is an outcome of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action in Geneva, which collated all received inputs. It lists a so-called Option 1, paragraph 33.3, which was put forward by the LDCs and which includes reference to a “climate change displacement coordination facility” that “[p]rovides support for emergency relief; [a]ssists in providing organized migration and planned relocation; [u]ndertakes compensation measures” (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 2015).

Throughout the negotiations process in Paris, the coordination facility was transformed into an expert group under the guidance of the Executive Committee of the WIM. The Executive Committee of the WIM established the task force during its meetings in 2016.

The task force is composed mostly of experts from the organisations that submitted proposals for the inclusion of the issue under the UNFCCC and the establishment of an expert group in the previous years.

As a result of the negotiations process, the mandate also considerably shifted, as the coordination facility put forward by the LDCs was transformed into the task force on displacement. As stated above, its mandate now is “to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 2015).

As an outlook on work in the coming years, the report of the Executive Committee of the WIM indicates that future work on human mobility under the WIM will include all dimensions – migration, displacement and human mobility – merging them with the task force in a so-called strategic workstream (d) on “migration, displacement and human mobility, including the task force on displacement” (UNFCCC, 2016b). Specific activities under this workstream are being developed at the time of writing this discussion paper.

3.5 Emerging questions

A review of submissions under the UNFCCC shows that many of the same actors who had promoted the inclusion of the issue under the Cancun Adaptation Framework had also done so under the work programme on loss and damage, and later the WIM: both the research- and humanitarian organisations working on the issue of human mobility raised awareness of its importance in the context of climate change. Although Parties had, in the interim, agreed on the relevance of the issue, they had made no submission mentioning human mobility for the initial two-year workplan of the WIM. Notably, the establishment of a displacement facility was later put forward by a Party Group.

The initial tasks under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the loss and damage work programme and later the WIM are similar and similarly uncontroversial, namely to enhance the understanding, coordination and cooperation of how climate change would affect patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility, and to invite relevant organisations to distil information on the subject. The type of human mobility in both cases is left open, potentially encompassing all forms: from temporary to permanent, and from internal to transboundary movements. The enhancement of understanding and cooperation also leaves open which policies ought to be promoted and by whom, although submissions do point at the gaps in migration governance in general.

With the establishment of the task force on displacement, the focus becomes narrower. The scope is no longer displacement, migration and planned relocation, and the mandate no longer to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation. Rather, the focus of the task force is on displacement only, and the task is to derive recommendations geared towards averting, minimising and addressing displacement. This evolution brings up several questions, including: What to make of this narrower focus? Which policies ought to be recommended for displacement, and should they differ from policies on human mobility under the Cancun Adaptation Framework?

An intuitive response to the first question would be that the task force on displacement is mandated to work on involuntary, forced displacement. The assumption here would be that there is a distinction between voluntary (planned) and involuntary (forced) human mobility. The former is proactive and yields overall benefits. It thus falls under the category of adaptation, in that it productively allows people to move out of harm's way. The latter is reactive, in that high human costs are incurred. It thus falls under the category of loss and damage. Following such a categorisation, displacement – rather than being promoted and supported – should be averted, minimised and addressed.

However, even if one were to follow such a categorisation – which has often been criticised on the grounds of empirical difficulties in distinguishing between degrees of

voluntariness (e.g. Martin, Weerasinghe, & Taylor, 2014) – the second question remains as to which policies would be needed to avert, minimise and address displacement, and whether they differ from wider mobility policies. Surely, policies that hinder (“avert and minimize”) the displacement of people who face imminent risks of climate change, that is, policies that force them to stay in harm’s way, cannot be intended under a framework dedicated to avoiding dangerous climate change and, by extension, its human costs. Again, an intuitive response would be that policies need to promote people’s agency to become mobile at low human cost and maximum benefits. Put bluntly, policies would turn the involuntary displacement of victims into the voluntary migration of empowered agents. However, such policies are typically recommended in the context of migration as adaptation (e.g. Foresight, 2011; Warner, 2010). Why, then, this specific focus on displacement? After all, the issue was already included under the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM. On top of it all, how do “compensation measures” play into the topic of displacement, as suggested in the run-up to the Paris Agreement?

In order to address these questions, the following sections look at both the research that informed and perhaps motivated early submissions by non-Party stakeholders (Section 3) and at the negotiations dynamics on the wider topic of loss and damage, which provided the backdrop of the call for a displacement facility, and eventually the establishment of the task force on displacement (Section 4).

3 The academic context

Research into climate-related human mobility arguably played an important role in establishing it as a theme under the UNFCCC. As can be seen in early submissions, for example, the UNU-EHS (or UNU, as in the submissions) played a key role in putting the issue on the policy agenda. At the time of these submissions, the UNU was in the process of completing a series of 23 case studies on human mobility in the context of climate change (Warner, Erhart, de Sherbinin, & Adamo, 2009). Research insights were thus directly available and informed submissions, building on previous work that had been done within the research community.

Both the academic and humanitarian actors in the field of human mobility continue to play an important role in recommending policies on human mobility under the UNFCCC. Current members of the task force on displacement, for example, include representatives from the UNHCR, the UNDP, the IOM, the International Labour Organization, the Platform on Disaster Displacement,¹ the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a yet-to-be-determined member of the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (for members of the Advisory Group, see Table A5). Although the task force will be guided by the Executive Committee of the WIM, it can be

1 The Platform on Disaster Displacement is a follow-up from the Nansen Initiative, which was launched in 2012 by Switzerland and Norway as a consultative process to address the protection gap of cross-border displacement in the context of disasters and climate change. The process led to the endorsement of the Protection Agenda, which the Platform on Disaster Displacement is tasked with implementing. For more information, visit <http://www.nanseninitiative.org> and <http://www.disasterdisplacement.org>

expected that positions and arguments brought forward by these actors will shape much of the policies that will be recommended.

Notably, throughout the negotiations process, research insights become subject to politically motivated interpretations and lines of argument. Reflecting them here is thus not to state that research insights were pragmatically and uncontroversially translated into policy processes. Rather, it is understood that research insights provide the first step for ensuing policy processes and, thus, needs to be reflected when attempting to understand the dynamics that have led to current mandates on the topic under the UNFCCC.

3.1 The landscape of research into climate-related human mobility

When it was first suggested as a potential consequence of climate change, human mobility in the context of climate change was a controversial issue. Dun and Gemenne (2008) identify what they call “alarmists” and “sceptics” of the environmental migration debate – a divide that begins to emerge in the 1970s. According to the authors, alarmists “tend to isolate environmental factors as a major driving force of migration” whereas sceptics “tend to insist on the complexity of the migration process” (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Although the high numbers of people expected to become mobile due to climate change are typically associated with the “alarmist” camps (e.g. Myers, 2002), more sceptical voices caution against the use of numbers in this context, arguing that quantified estimates inadequately abstract from the social context and human experience of mobility (Jakobeit & Methman, 2011).

In providing an overview of the current state of the science on climate-related human mobility, Susan Martin (2014) distinguishes four paths by which environmental change may affect human mobility directly or indirectly:

1. Changes in weather patterns that contribute to longer-term drying trends that affect access to essential resources such as water and negatively affect the sustainability of a variety of environment-related livelihoods including agriculture, forestry, fishing, and so forth;
2. Rising sea levels that render coastal and low-lying areas uninhabitable in the longer term;
3. Increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related natural disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones that destroy infrastructure and livelihoods, requiring people to relocate for short to long periods;
4. Competition over natural resources that may exacerbate pressures leading to conflict, which in turn precipitates movements of people. (Martin, 2014, pp. 215-216)

In addition to these paths, Kniveton, Smith and Black (2012) note that remotely caused climate-related effects, such as impacts on seed and produce prices, can also influence individual economic behaviour, including decisions to become mobile. The complex interplay of factors motivates the authors to describe climate-related mobility as a “complex adaptive system” (Kniveton, Smith, & Black, 2012).

Relevant for the form of governance needed to respond to, or manage, human mobility, different forms of human mobility in the context of climate change have been categorised:

Migration can be planned or spontaneous, involving individuals and households or entire communities. It can be internal, with people moving shorter or longer distances to find new homes and livelihoods within their own countries, or it can be international when people relocate to other countries. It can proceed as an orderly movement of people from one location to another, or it can occur under emergency circumstances. It can be temporary, with most migrants expecting to return home when conditions permit, or it can be permanent, with most migrants unable or unwilling to return. (Martin, 2014, p. 219)

As Martin further notes, “[e]ach of these forms of migration requires significantly different approaches and policy frameworks” (Martin, 2014, p. 219). It is generally expected that climate change-related impacts will contribute particularly to internal displacement, although in extreme cases entire populations might need to be relocated. In terms of international mobility, this will likely occur “immediately across borders, from one poor, developing country into another” (Martin, 2014, p. 218).

The current science on climate-related human mobility thus shows a complex picture of different forms of mobility being associated with a multitude of complex factors playing into the process of mobility. Individual studies have attempted to model the climatic factors and their influence on migratory patterns and behaviour (e.g. Smith, 2014). Given the complexity of factors at play and the importance of non-climatic contextual factors driving responses to climate change, the relative strength of the climate signal in driving mobility remains uncertain and likely case-specific. Accordingly, the broad consensus among researchers seems to be that climate change does factor into decisions to become mobile, but it remains uncertain how strong a factor this is, as it is mediated by other significant factors, including socio-economic conditions, governance, demographic drivers and social networks (Kniveton, Smith, & Black, 2012).

3.2 Research on human mobility as an adaptive strategy and as a human tragedy*

Much of the available literature stresses the beneficial aspects and historical “normality” of human mobility as an adaptive strategy in response to environmental changes. The UK Foresight report 2011, for example, states that “[c]ritical improvements to the lives of millions are more likely to be achieved where migration is seen as offering opportunities as well as challenges” (Foresight, 2011, p. 6). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) chapter on human security, which includes a section on migration (understood in the broadest sense of human mobility), refers to the potentially beneficial effects of human mobility in terms of adaptation: “Research drawing on experience of migration policy concludes that a greater emphasis on mobility within adaptation policies would be effective when undertaken in a sensitive manner” (Adger et al., 2014).

* I borrow the juxtaposition of climate-related human mobility as strategy vs. tragedy from a presentation by Michael Oppenheimer delivered at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in 2013.

As Bettini (2014) describes, the focus on human security in the context of climate-related mobility, which underlies the framing of migration as a beneficial adaptation strategy, presents a shift in registers away from earlier arguments of mobility as a security threat. Bettini argues that “[s]uch a rationale makes climate migration compatible with mainstream positions on the migration-development nexus” (Bettini, 2014, p. 185). Such mainstream positions typically regard migration as being beneficial for socio-economic development, including through higher earnings and remittances (e.g. Collier, 2013).

Often, statements stressing the potential of migration to be an adaptation strategy are based on the analysis of the behaviour of people faced with environmental stresses and historical observations that human mobility has always been a commonly used strategy. McAdam, for example, states that

migration is a normal, rational response to natural disasters and the more gradual impacts of environmental change. In some contexts such as the Pacific islands, mobility is a core part of historical (and present) experience. Movement therefore needs to be understood as an adaptive strategy that is part of a historical continuum. (McAdam, 2014)

Empirical case studies on the potential of human mobility to serve as an adaptation strategy confirm such a positive reading, albeit not for all socio-economic conditions. Investigating the relationship between rainfall, food and livelihood security and human mobility (Warner et al., 2012), for example, reveals different migration patterns of rural households in eight developing countries. They find that temporary or seasonal migration is commonly used as an adaptive strategy, with either young single migrants or the head of the household migrating for work and sending back remittances. However, as Warner et al. (2012, p. 99) note, not all households are able to use migration as a “successful” adaptation strategy. For many, in particular the poor and landless, it is a necessity for survival and may result in cycles of debt, as migration is always an investment.

Accordingly, in providing joint recommendations on how to address migration in the context of National Adaptation Plans, the UNU-EHS and the Nansen Initiative differentiate between “measures to prevent migration that diminishes human welfare and results in displacement” and “measures to facilitate beneficial movements that enable improved adaptation to the effects of climate change” (Warner et al., 2014). Human mobility is thus regarded as relevant in terms of adaptation in two ways: on the one hand, human mobility can be regarded as an adaptation strategy and policies should be promoted to facilitate it; on the other hand, in-situ adaptation strategies should be promoted and implemented in order to avoid detrimental mobility.

A different body of literature looks at the negative effects of human mobility. There appears to be some general consensus that mobility can come at considerable costs. As the IPCC states: “It is well established in demography that while migration is a common strategy to deal with livelihood risk, movement is costly and disruptive and hence may be used only as an adaptation of last resort” (Adger et al., 2014, p. 767).

Losses cited as the costs of migration are often in the domain of cultural identity, place or occupational attachment (Adger et al., 2014, p. 767). The economist and public policy expert Paul Collier, while cautioning against the currently weak evidence base, states that a

tentative interference from [two selected] studies is that migrants incur substantial psychological costs that may be broadly commensurate with their large economic gains. The implications of this interference may appear to be far-reaching. The massive productivity gains from migration that so excite economists and that migrants capture appear not to translate into additional well-being. (Collier, 2013, p. 175)

The psychological costs Collier refers to include separation from family, feelings of cultural alienation and nostalgia. Notably, he claims that the psychological costs might be higher for international migration than for internal movements, where he sees them as “unavoidable costs of progress [having] the status of investments” (Collier, 2013, p. 175) with net beneficial effects across generations.

Individual case studies that look at the short-term effects of human mobility indicate a picture of “mixed feelings”. Tschakert, Tutu and Alcaro, for example, who interviewed 23 internal migrants who had moved from rural areas of Ghana to the slums of Old Fadama and Nima-Maamobi in the city of Accra, relate that “every single interviewee revealed his/her nostalgia for the place left behind” (Tschakert, Tutu, & Alcaro, 2013. p. 20). However, the authors observe that “an overall uneasiness about the scarcity and vulnerability in the North [left behind] remained” and that “longing for the distant home, the lost rural identity, and a place that provides true solace was less pronounced among the women” (Tschakert, Tutu, & Alcaro, 2013. p. 20). With degrading environments quoted as a reason to leave the place of origin, the psychological effects of mobility thus appear to sway between sadness and relief.

The high human costs of relocation are often voiced by representatives of Small Island Developing States, who see themselves faced with the potential prospects of relocation due to sea level rise. McNamara and Gibson interviewed ambassadors of Small Island Developing States to the United Nations and report statements such as “we do not want to leave our land” and “I think we all are proud islanders and it’s not that we want to just look for another place to migrate to” (McNamara & Gibson, 2009, p. 481). Loss of culture and identity are sometimes referred to as a consequence, particularly of involuntary replacement – as, for example, in the case of Marshall Islanders, who were evacuated in the context of the United States’ nuclear weapons testing during the 1940s and 1950s (Kirsch, 2001).

The IPCC lists a number of publications showing the reluctance of different communities in Australia and the Caribbean to become mobile in response to environmental changes, viewing the option instead as one of “last resort” (Adger et al., 2014, p. 767). Reasons for such reluctance include high place and occupational attachment (Marshall, Park, Adger, Brown, & Howden, 2012). In the context of the UNFCCC, the psychological and cultural costs of mobility are included under the category of so-called non-economic losses, which outside the UNFCCC are more often referred to as non-market or non-monetary losses (Serdeczny, Waters, & Chan, 2016; UNFCCC, 2013b).

Overall, a body of research looking at the psychological and cultural effects brings into focus the human costs of mobility. Just as with the effects and different scenarios of mobility as an adaptive strategy, the type and scale of such costs is highly context-dependent. The strength of place attachment, for example, differs across space, and perhaps also time. In general, the value of non-economic items such as social cohesion,

cultural identity or sense of place is highly context-dependent (Serdeczny, Waters, & Chan, 2016), rendering a generalised assessment of the net effects of mobility likely impossible.

The framing of human mobility as a “last resort” provides an argument for including human mobility under the loss and damage work programme and the WIM. To view something as a “last resort” implies that there are no other options: one has no choice. To frame such a situation as “adaptation”, which, as stated above, has positive empowering connotations in the context of climate-related human mobility, might be perceived as cynical by those potentially affected. Similarly, the recognition of the weight and importance of non-economic losses may have additionally motivated the inclusion of human mobility under the heading of loss and damage.

Almost mirroring the complexity and diversity of the theme, diverse research contributions thus look at different facets of climate-related human mobility. Depending on the perspective and particular focus of studies into climate-related human mobility, they can provide a basis for either arguing for human mobility to be a form of adaptation or as a form of loss and damage, and they are likely to be used as an argumentative basis for Parties defending their respective interests.

4 The political context of loss and damage negotiations

As shown in Section 2, a closer look at the process of including the issue of human mobility under the UNFCCC in Section 2 shows that the submissions made by research and humanitarian actors have led to the inclusion of relatively uncontroversial language on “enhancing understanding, coordination and cooperation” and “enhanced understanding and expertise”. Such uncontroversial framing allowed for the issue to be recognised as relevant under the UNFCCC without triggering specific recommendations or creating pressures for parties to act in specific ways. The mandate of the task force on displacement is more substantive. It is the outcome of political negotiations at the high level, as it was negotiated as part of the loss and damage thematic area in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. In order to understand the nuances behind its specific focus on displacement and the specific wording on “integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement”, it is therefore necessary to put into focus the broader political context of the loss and damage negotiations. As is shown in the following, this reveals underlying notions of responsibility allocation as well as tensions between collective action and individual country approaches.

4.1 Tracing the changing scope of measures to address loss and damage and implications of its broadening

Since the Paris Agreement, to “avert, minimize and address” has become akin to a formula for the goal of action on loss and damage under the UNFCCC. This has not always been the case and, on closer inspection, represents an oxymoron, which is the outcome of a negotiated understanding of loss and damage. As is argued below, it encapsulates

divergent positions on the policies that are needed for loss and damage and on the role of the international community in implementing these policies.

Loss and damage was a critical issue in the lead-up to the Paris Agreement. Major developed Parties opposed the inclusion of a stand-alone article on loss and damage in the agreement, whereas many developing Parties fought for the recognition and permanence of the issue as separate from adaptation. Such a recognition, it was generally understood, would come with a stand-alone article. The separation of loss and damage from adaptation has long been a sensitive issue. Following the understanding of many developing countries, loss and damage is “beyond adaptation”: it is the burden of losses that can no longer be avoided through adaptation because too much greenhouse gas had already been emitted. Vulnerable countries saw themselves faced with high losses and demanded that these losses be shared among developed countries with high levels of greenhouse gas emissions (see Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1991, p. 192ff.).

Following the understanding of loss and damage as being “beyond adaptation”, it appears paradoxical to speak of “averting and minimizing” loss and damage, as in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 2015) and later documents (e.g. decision 3/CP.22 in UNFCCC (2012)): something that is defined as the remainder of losses after all mitigation and adaptation efforts have been made, can by definition no longer be avoided or averted. Accordingly, early decisions on the loss and damage work programme, and later the WIM, only speak of addressing loss and damage. In decision 3/CP.18, for example, the Conference of the Parties “notes that a range of approaches, methods and tools is available to assess the risk of and to respond to loss and damage” (UNFCCC, 2012, paragraph 2), and further

agrees that the role of the Convention in promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, inter alia, the following:

(c) Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. (UNFCCC, 2012, paragraph 5)

The very paragraph of decision 2/CP.19 establishing the WIM speaks of addressing loss and damage:

Establishes the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage, under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, subject to review at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (November–December 2016) pursuant to paragraph 15 below, to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. (UNFCCC, 2013a, paragraph 1)

Notably, however, within the same decision, the meaning of “addressing” is broadened through the acknowledgement of “the contribution of adaptation and risk management strategies towards addressing loss and damage” (preamble). The very fact that this preamble was inserted indicates that “to address” without this addition would be understood as not encompassing preventive measures such as adaptation. At the same

time, this passage arguably already marks the beginning of a process that would broaden the scope of approaches for loss and damage.

Such a broadening has been further solidified in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, where “Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage” (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 2015). This language was also adopted in the paragraph requesting the establishment of the task force for displacement during the same 21st Conference of the Parties in 2015. The report of the WIM Executive Committee also reverts to this wording, for example when it recommends to the 22nd Conference of the Parties in 2016 to “invite constituted bodies under the Convention [...] to continue to integrate efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage” (UNFCCC, 2016b).

The broadened scope of approaches to loss and damage has several implications in terms of interpreting what the appropriate actions are regarding loss and damage and who should be carrying them out. One implication is that it takes the focus off the controversial issue of compensation. Addressing loss and damage was interpreted as relating to backward-looking approaches: measure that “address” loss and damage become effective ex-post. In the context of loss and damage negotiations, backward-looking approaches to loss and damage were interpreted to imply questions of compensation, fault and liability. Broadening the scope to include measures to avert and minimise loss and damage shifted the focus away from these sensitive issues. It allowed developed country Parties to still engage in discussions on loss and damage but without locking themselves into a path that might lead to claims for compensation. Less precise, the issue had thus become less controversial. The question of international (causal and moral) responsibility for loss and damage – and the related duty to support those affected – that was once opened up by discussions on loss and damage (e.g. Verheyen & Roderick, 2008) could be left unaddressed. The inclusion of paragraph 51 in decision 1/CP.21 stating an agreement that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” further shifted the weight from backward-looking to forward-looking preventive measures, erasing notions of liability and compensation all together.

Another, related implication of the broadened scope of loss and damage measures is the implicit shift from collective action to country-driven approaches. At the outset, loss and damage was associated with some form of collective loss-sharing or another. Different proposals were made. First, an “insurance pool” resourced by developed countries based on a combination of the polluter-pays and the ability-to-pay principles was proposed by the AOSIS (Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1991, p. 126ff.). Later, a form of “collective loss sharing” based on solidarity was suggested by technical experts discussing the possibilities of financial risk-management for climate impacts in developing countries (FCCC/TP/2008/9, 2008). Recent submissions on activities for the five-year rolling workplan of the WIM Executive Committee include considerations of “the potential establishment of a global reinsurance facility” (Climate Action Network, 2017) or a Solidarity Fund called for by the LDCs (Ethiopia on Behalf of the LDC Group, 2017) and the Alliance of Small Island States (The Maldives on Behalf of the AOSIS, 2017). Finally, discussions on innovative sources of finance for loss and damage typically include reference to a Fossil Fuel Levy or a Carbon Tax Levy (e.g. Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, 2016) – both being approaches that imply the polluter-pays principle and, in effect, a form of loss-sharing among high emitters.

With the broadening of approaches to include preventive measures, the scope of loss and damage measures comes to overlap with the scope of adaptation: many measures to “avert and minimize” loss and damage can be sensibly grouped under the banner of adaptation. Adaptation, in turn, as agreed by Parties under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, “should follow a country-driven [...] approach” (UNFCCC, 2011, paragraph 12). Insisting on a country-driven approach to adaptation supports a bottom-up approach, which is context-sensitive and takes into consideration preferences and values of affected communities. It is thus beneficial on many accounts, in particular when it comes to planning and implementing measures on the ground. However, in the context of loss and damage, it might also carry the risk of supporting interpretations that shift the responsibilities to become active away from the international community and onto affected countries.

Before further elaborating on the possibility of such a shift, an important qualification is due: in the context of the UNFCCC, a country-driven approach does not mean that countries are left to deal with the burden of adaptation themselves. On the contrary, under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Conference of the Parties “[c]onfirms that Parties, especially developing country Parties that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the long-term cooperative action under the Convention, should be given full consideration” (UNFCCC, 2011, paragraph 9), and

[a]grees that adaptation is a challenge faced by all Parties, and that enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to enable and support the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing country Parties. (UNFCCC, 2011, paragraph 11)

In reflecting this agreement, half the resources of the Green Climate Fund are earmarked for adaptation activities, 50 per cent of which are to be spent or invested in Small Island Developing States, LDCs and countries in Africa that are vulnerable to climate change impacts (Green Climate Fund, 2014). Thus, a country-driven approach to adaptation does not exclude international support for adaptation.

Yet, a country-driven approach can also be interpreted as seeing the primary responsibility for acting on adaptation with individual countries rather than the international community. Countries might be eligible for support, and Parties might agree that international cooperation is needed to enable adaptation, but the actor bearing the duty to act is the individual adapting state. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the United States (US) stressed the benefits of a country-driven approach, using it as an argument *against* the establishment of a mechanism for loss and damage. In their 2012 submission on possible elements to be included in recommendations on loss and damage, the US claim that “an international mechanism with an international insurance pool and a compensation/rehabilitation pillar **would inhibit a country-driven approach to Adaptation**” (FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.14/Add.1, 2012, p. 33; emphasis in the original).

Further stressing this point, they continue:

Such a mechanism undermines the ability of individual countries to develop their own priorities based upon their specific circumstances and needs. We believe vulnerable countries should be able to decide to reduce risks and avert loss and damage. An international mechanism with insurance and compensation pillars could severely

undermine countries' abilities to make those decisions at the national level, and reduce resources left for those kinds of measures. (FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.14/Add.1, 2012, p. 33)

This statement is based on the assumption that no additional funding for loss and damage would become available, thus cutting into the limited adaptation budget. Given such a limited budget, countries should not be prescribed to which ends they choose to use the finance. Based on such a purposeful interpretation, the US upholds the value of country-driven approaches as something to be preserved and as something incompatible with an international loss and damage mechanism. The fact that it is the vulnerable countries themselves that call for a loss and damage mechanism is ignored, which gives reason to assume that the US is arguing in its own interest. In the context of loss and damage, this interest was clearly to avoid discussions on compensation that would result in allocating a large share of the burden on the US. The very fact that it was later the US that reportedly insisted on the inclusion of paragraph 51 in the Paris decision supports such an interpretation. It thus needs to be assumed that insisting on a country-driven approach is motivated not by the belief that this is for the benefit of developing countries but rather that it protects the interests of those who would be asked to contribute to an international mechanism for loss and damage: countries should decide for themselves. Apparently, the assumption is that there is no room – and thus no duty – for the international community to get involved.

The broadened scope of approaches to loss and damage and the resulting overlap with adaptation, which follows a country-driven approach, may thus invite interpretations that insist on the need for country-driven approaches to loss and damage. Similar to adaptation, country-driven approaches are certainly adequate when it comes to questions of choice about instrument and its implementation. However, in the context of international climate negotiations and proposals for international loss-sharing schemes, a focus on country-driven approaches may also imply a shift away from questions of international responsibility.

4.2 Explaining the focus on displacement

The controversy of backward-looking approaches and questions of international responsibility also plays out in the context of human mobility. The statement of a United Nations ambassador to a country of the Small Island Developing States interviewed by McNamara and Gibson (2009) indicates how a focus on adaptation is being perceived by vulnerable Parties:

When framed as adaptation it [migration] may put the onus totally on the Party to provide a level of restitution. It says no one else is responsible for any permanent “loss and damage” due to climate change such as loss of islands and atolls (home, livelihoods, culture, social keepsakes etc.). The issue of human rights comes into play and the responsibility of the Party becomes muddled. It doesn't support any restitution from developed Parties that largely contributed to the problem. (SIDS representative in McNamara and Gibson (2009))

Accordingly, tensions similar to those described for the loss and damage negotiations marked the debate on including human mobility under the UNFCCC. Warner (2012) relates that, at one point during the negotiations, the issue of human mobility was framed as a transboundary issue. This was highly controversial and hindered progress and agreement, as Warner explains: “To flag the issue as a transboundary issue and to bundle it with issues like resource management may have meant migration and displacement would be cast in a controversial light or one that touched upon the compensation strand” (Warner, 2012, p. 1065).

To engage in discussions on transboundary migration would have implied discussions of the duties of receiving states. In the context of climate change and concurrent discussions on the duty of compensation (e.g. Verheyen & Roderick, 2008), such duties might have fallen on major emitters as receiving states. Such discussions were judged to be politically infeasible in the consensus-driven context of the UNFCCC. The final text, according to Warner, thus framed migration “as matters for cooperation, rather than issues of fault, liability, or legality” (Warner, 2012, p. 1066). Questions of international responsibility and burden-sharing (which in the context of human mobility might be better described as effort-sharing) were once again left aside.

The implications of the observed broadening of the scope of approaches to loss and damage might thus explain the narrower focus on displacement. Understood as involuntary, forced relocation, climate-related displacement is perceived as an undue and unjust burden on those affected. Contrasted to migration as a form of adaptation, displacement puts the international level and questions of burden- and effort-sharing back into focus. It highlights the need for backward-looking approaches that recognise and respond to situations that can no longer be prevented. This also explains the reference to the compensatory function of the climate displacement facility that was called for in the run-up to Paris.

5 Policy implications and recommendations for addressing displacement

Research insights can and should drive the development of policy recommendations in the context of climate-related human mobility. In a vibrant field of research, much is to be gained from close interactions at the science–policy interface. Insights from the empirically based arguments that provided the context for inclusion of human mobility under the UNFCCC at the outset can provide technical guidance on which policies ought to be recommended and promoted on human mobility under the WIM.

At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that recommendations are made in an inherently political sphere: the issue of human mobility under the UNFCCC cannot be addressed without also addressing its international political dimensions. For the specific context of climate-related displacement, this means reflecting all positions that are represented in the adopted language under the UNFCCC. As the analysis above shows, the wording “to avert, minimize and address” encompasses both positions: those who have an interest in pointing to the international responsibility of loss and damage, and those who have an interest in pointing to the national responsibility of coping with adverse situations on the ground. “To avert” and “to minimize” are more reflective of the latter position focusing on preventive measures and stressing the importance of country-driven

approaches. “To address” refers to positions insisting on the importance of backward-looking measures and international loss-sharing.

The focus in the following is on the specific notion of “addressing displacement”. This narrow focus builds on the assumption that the tasks “to avert” and “to minimize” displacement fall under the realm either of in-situ adaptation, which creates options to stay, or under the realm of overall migration management. Both of these realms have received ample attention in the literature (e.g. Brookings, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, & Georgetown University, 2015, p. 6), to which the interested reader is referred. It should also be noted that an analysis of the legal frameworks and wider context of migration governance is beyond the scope of this discussion paper. Rather, recommendations are provided that flow from the analysis in this paper and are mostly confined to processes under the UNFCCC.

Box 1: Policy recommendations in a nutshell

This discussion paper makes the following policy recommendations, which are further elaborated in Sections 5.1 to 5.3. Recommendations are specified for scenarios in which climate change is assumed to be a morally relevant factor in respective paragraphs a) and in parentheses of each heading.

1. Expedite international effort-sharing on protecting (climate-)displaced people

Parties to the UNFCCC should aim to contribute to developments of the “global compacts” under the UNHCR and IOM in order to ensure the scale of expected challenges is adequately taken into account. The task force on displacement could serve as a communication channel between the relevant processes under the UNHCR or the IOM and the WIM under the UNFCCC. Effort-sharing needs to include support for enabling overburdened countries to protect their internally displaced citizens as well as host communities, both within and across borders.

- a) If climate change is considered as a morally relevant factor, then an adequate definition of climate-related persons needs to be provided and included in the global compact with reference to effort-sharing. The task force on displacement could contribute to developing such a definition.

2. Develop and implement guidelines for reducing and addressing non-economic losses (including means of recognition and restitution)

Research shows that the human costs of mobility, often psychological or cultural, can be very high. Lessons learnt from planned relocations should be extracted and adequately applied to non-economic losses in the context of climate-related displacement. These should be implemented as standard procedure at the national and local levels. The task force on displacement can provide guidance in this effort.

- a) If climate change is considered as a morally relevant factor, then a process for the adequate means of recognition of and restitution for irreversible non-economic losses needs to be implemented at the international level.

3. Engage at the science–policy interface

The Executive Committee of the WIM could consider systematically establishing a channel to communicate relevant research questions to the research community.

An important question appears when discussing the policy implications and recommendations for climate-related displacement: Does it even matter whether people are displaced due to climate-related reasons or other reasons? Politically, the question is relevant in two inter-related regards, namely (i) in determining the rights and the status of displaced persons, and (ii) in determining who is responsible for granting these rights and supporting displaced persons.

On the one hand, arguments can be made in favour of disregarding climate change as a relevant factor. Concerning the rights of displaced people, two arguments emerge. For

one, displaced persons deserve protection no matter what the cause of their departure. Why should a person displaced by an earthquake not merit the same protection as one displaced by anthropogenic sea level rise? At the same time, there are concerns of “opening up” the carefully negotiated definition of refugees, as this might weaken the protection status of those recognised as refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Adger et al., 2014, p. 771). Furthermore, the empirical basis is inconclusive. Climate change is always quoted as being one contributing factor among many others, rendering the identification of a cause difficult and prone to different interpretations. This also problematises the question of determining who should be responsible for protecting climate-displaced persons: assigning causal and moral responsibility and associated protection duties to high emitters thus appears to be a futile exercise. Rather than triggering effective responses and protection, insisting on the relevance of climate change risks stalling political progress and fruitful cooperation among those willing to help.

On the other hand, there are arguments in favour of insisting on the relevance of climate change. The uncertain evidence base notwithstanding, it is undisputed that climate change has – and increasingly will have – *some* effect on human mobility. It is also clear that no protection would currently be granted to climate-displaced persons. Although in some cases protection has been granted to people who became mobile in response to sudden-onset extreme events classified as disasters, “there are no examples of legislations or policies that address migration of persons from slow-onset climate change that may destroy habitats or livelihoods in the future” (Martin, 2014, p. 222). People who become mobile in response to, or anticipation of, slow-onset climate change will typically be treated as economically motivated migrants. However, the degree of involuntariness that needs to be taken into account for climate-related displacement suggests that treating climate-displaced persons as economic migrants would be inappropriate and morally dubious. For these reasons, it might matter to people affected by anthropogenic climate change whether they are being assisted (if at all) out of pure compassion or whether they are recognised as victims of wrongful acts. In terms of assigning protection responsibilities, it also seems obvious that causally contributing to an adverse condition creates stronger moral pressure to assist than purely humanitarian duties.

Notably, absent a world with open borders, extending protection rights to displaced persons not covered under the Geneva Convention would require a universally agreed definition of environmentally, involuntarily displaced persons, whose protection would be the duty of the international community. As has been pointed out, arriving at such a definition – irrespective of taking anthropogenic climate change into account or not – would necessitate lengthy negotiation processes of uncertain ratification (Schraven, 2012).

It is thus open to debate whether the relevance of climate change should be taken into account when discussing policy implications and recommendations for climate-related displacement. Accordingly, where climate change is assumed to make a morally relevant difference in terms of granting rights to those displaced or assigning protection duties, recommendations are specified under paragraph a) in the respective section.

5.1 Expedite international effort-sharing

Analysis of the specific wording that describes the mandate, and therefore scope, of efforts of the task force on displacement under the WIM – “to avert, minimize and address displacement” – has shown that it is the result of a negotiations process under the UNFCCC and, as such, encompasses divergent interests. The original intent of discussions on loss and damage in the negotiations was associated with backward-looking notions of compensation, which in turn are based on questions of fault, liability, responsibility and collective loss-sharing. This dimension can be responded to at the international level of policy-making through enhanced efforts in collective action and effort-sharing. This would address an important gap, irrespective of the dimension of climate change. As Betts observes, the “principle of burden-sharing is by far the weakest aspect of the refugee regime” (Betts, 2009, p. 12), despite the fact that the refugee regime is arguably the most developed and stringent regime on migration. As Luecke and Schneiderheinze (2017) note, this gap poses serious risks to both refugees and host communities, endangering economic and political stability in several world regions.

The international community has begun to address this gap: the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, acknowledges climate change as a potential factor of human mobility and makes explicit reference to the element of shared responsibility in paragraph 11: “We acknowledge a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016).

However, despite this introductory paragraph, the issue of burden- and responsibility-sharing is only taken up again in the context of refugees. In 2018 two “global compacts” for refugees and migrations are scheduled to be adopted. The compact on refugees will be based on a comprehensive refugee response framework to be developed by the UNHCR “based on the principles of international cooperation and on burden- and responsibility-sharing” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016). Given that people migrating in the context of climate change are not recognised as refugees, it is not clear if the question of shared responsibility for human mobility in the context of climate change needs to be further discussed or whether it will precipitate into the global compacts to an extent that satisfies all Parties under the UNFCCC. Parties to the UNFCCC should thus aim to contribute to developments under the global compacts process so as to ensure climatic risks are taken into account and adequate funding mechanisms established. The task force on displacement could serve as a communication channel between the relevant processes under the UNHCR and the WIM under the UNFCCC.

Notably, the scope of effort-sharing is not confined to granting rights to those displaced across borders. As mentioned in Section 3, research indicates that much of climate-related displacement will be within borders. The primary responsibility for protecting its citizens lies with the nation-state. However, where a nation-state is overburdened with this task, the international community should provide support so as to enable the state in protecting its citizens. This can include financial support as well as capacity-building, sharing of best practices and provision of appropriate technologies and infrastructure. As further indicated by research insights in Section 3, support measures need to be context-sensitive so as to allow for community values to be preserved.

Support must be predictable and adequate, including assistance to meet the longer-term needs of both displaced persons and host communities so as to allow for employment and entrepreneurship of newly settled people as well as the host community (Luecke & Schneiderheinze, 2017). The task is of immediate concern. The situation in several countries is already dire at present. With projected climate change, there is much reason to expect the situation to further deteriorate, as also host communities will not be immune to climate impacts and the risks of deteriorating livelihoods. As cross-border displacement is likely to be within neighbouring regions, exposure to similar climatic challenges must be expected for both displaced persons and host communities (see Martin, 2014, p. 218). There is little reason to expect humanitarian assistance, which is already falling short in meeting current needs, to be of sufficient scale and continuous supply to meet rising challenges under rising global temperatures.

- a) If climate change is considered as a morally relevant factor, then the specific inclusion of climate-displaced persons should be included in the global compact with reference to effort-sharing. For this, an adequate definition of climate-displaced persons would need to be developed. The task force on displacement might be in a good position to facilitate the development of such a definition. The IOM definition of environmental migrants might serve as a starting point:

Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad. (IOM, 2007, in Martin, 2014, p. 215)

If used as a basis, this definition would need to determine the degree to which environmental changes can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change in order to trigger protection rights and duties of the international community. It would also need to critically reflect the extent of voluntariness in climate-related displacement, necessitating some sort of agreed threshold, above which the decision to become mobile is no longer interpreted as an “investment” or act free of coercion. Once such a definition is developed, reference to climate-displaced persons should be included in the global compact with reference to effort-sharing and support.

5.2 Develop and implement guidelines for reducing and addressing non-economic losses

Research investigating the human costs of mobility points to another relevant dimension for addressing displacement. Indeed, the UNHCR has recently suggested a specific activity on non-economic losses due to mobility in its submission on inputs into the five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017).

Displaced persons should be given the opportunity to re-establish what they deem valuable. For example, if occupational identity is high, people should be given livelihood opportunities that allow for identities to be continued. Marshall et al. echo this motive when they conclude that “[i]nnovative solutions that match or support current identities

will need to be identified if farmers are to adapt” (Marshall et al., 2012, p. 7). Irreversible non-economic losses might require specific forms of remembrance (Barnett, Tschakert, Head, & Adger, 2016)

On a national level, lessons learnt and good practices on maintaining non-economic values despite mobility should become standard in the protection of displaced persons, including considerations of locale and vocational training. In this context, insights gained in the context of Development-Induced Displacement and Rehabilitation can provide fertile ground for identifying best practices and deriving adequate principles and policies (e.g. Cernea, 2003). Insights include analyses into the implementation gap between policies and the local level as well as recommendations at different levels, ranging from inter-ministerial coordination to social-sensitivity training for resettlement officers (e.g. Rew, Fisher, & Pandey, 2006). Development-induced displacement mirrors planned relocation as a policy in the context of climate change, in that it presents a slow process, which allows ample time for planning. In the case of development-induced displacement, mobile people remain in the jurisdiction of the state, which is not necessarily the case for planned relocation or displacement in the context of climate change. Nevertheless, lessons learnt from development-induced displacement should be extracted and analysed for their applicability in the climate change context for both internal and cross-border displacement. The task force on displacement could provide guidance for the development of specific guidelines for addressing non-economic losses due to displacement.

- a) Research shows that it makes a difference to people whether they are perceived as being victims of fate or victims of other agents’ wrongful behaviours (see Thompson & Otto, 2015). Accordingly, if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, in times when their consequences are known, are considered wrongful acts, then irreversible non-economic losses require the establishment of a process for the adequate means of recognition and restitution at the international level. Insights into historical analogues of loss and restitution might provide guidance.

5.3 Engage at the science–policy interface

The analysis in this discussion paper has shown the importance of the science–policy interface in the context of negotiations on climate-related displacement. Research results provide the basis for the recognition of themes as being relevant and worthy of deliberations under the UNFCCC.

As has been further shown, important questions remain. These concern general, abstract as well as applied questions. An example of a relevant abstract question is that of the moral relevance of climate change in the allocation of rights and duties with respect to climate-related displacement. Research contributions systematically analysing the arguments and underlying assumptions could be helpful in moving the debate forward. A similar case can be made for the question of defining a threshold for voluntariness in the context of decisions on climate-related displacement. The high levels of uncertainty in the evidence base further call for contributions from research on decision-making under uncertainty and the ethics of risk. Examples of applied questions include what the appropriate means of restitution for irreversible losses are, and what determines the success of good practice in addressing non-economic losses.

An enhanced effort should be made to channel the questions that emerge from the policy context to the research community. The UNFCCC’s last Conference of the Parties in Marrakesh recognised such need and recommended that the WIM Executive Committee improve its interactions with relevant scientific and technical experts (UNFCCC, 2016a). The Executive Committee of the WIM could consider systematically establishing a channel to communicate relevant questions to the research community, for example through regular newsletters, workshops or a dedicated section on the website.

6 Conclusion

The analysis in this paper shows that the specific focus on climate-related displacement that emerged in negotiations of the Paris Agreement can be interpreted as an effort to bring back into focus questions of responsibility and collective burden-sharing – questions that had been weakened in the negotiations process on loss and damage. The moral relevance of climate change in assigning rights and duties in the context of climate-related mobility and an uncertain evidence base is not clear and subject to debate. However, research indicates that climate change does contribute to mobility. Climate change projections imply that the factors contributing to mobility might increase in the future. Research insights further show that mobility can have beneficial effects but also can come at the price of high psychological and cultural costs.

Based on the current evidence base, policies that protect the rights of displaced persons and aim to minimise the costs of displacement thus need to be called for. Depending on the position one takes regarding the moral relevance of climate change, specific rights would be granted to climate-displaced people, and the specific duties for the adequate recognition of – and restitution for – irreversible losses would fall on the international community, and specifically big emitters. Systematic analysis of the moral question can contribute to this debate. However, it is clear that there are limits to what research can do, as the core of the question has an utterly political character with no neutral basis.

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Annex

**Tables listing party and observer submissions to different calls discussed in Section 2
of this discussion paper**

| Table A 1: Inputs on human mobility into the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention | |
|---|---|
| Submission by | Text |
| International Labour Organization (ILO) | On measurability, reportability and verifiability, organizations proposed: Measuring positive and negative social and environmental impacts (GW, WWF, TWS), including impacts on local communities, including indigenous peoples (Christian Aid, FERN/FOEI/RFUK) with respect to income, employment, migration and cultural identity (ILO, MISC.6) |
| United Nations University (UNU) | On adaptation planning and implementation, organizations proposed that: Regional migration observations, detailed regional and country level assessments of environmental states and migratory flows, and pilot projects of adaptation measures should be envisaged (UNU, MISC.3) |
| United Nations University (UNU) | On enhancing knowledge sharing, organizations noted that: Raising public awareness about climate-related migration is essential (UNU, MISC.3), and increased data exchange and tailored climate services based on improved climate observation are important (GCOS, MISC.6) |
| Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) | On adaptation planning and implementation, organizations proposed that: The following should be taken into account: gender analysis and sex-disaggregated data (WEDO/GGCA); biodiversity-related impacts of climate change, and the knowledge and assessments thereof (CBD, MISC.6/Add.2); migration as a result of climate change (IASC, MISC.6/Add.2); and the link between poverty and vulnerability (ILO, MISC.6/Add.2) |

Table A 2: Submissions referring to human mobility in response to the call by COP16 for views and information on elements to be included in the work programme on loss and damage

| Submission by | Text |
|--|--|
| The United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) | The articulation of approaches to manage loss and damage for longer-term issues may be in an early stage. For example, the processes mentioned above [slow onset events such as sea level rise and glacial retreat] could have implications for population distribution, migration, displacement, and planned relocation in the distant future. Yet it will likely take a process of gathering evidence over time, building dialogue (as outlined in para 14(f)), exploring policy implications, and possibly building a multi-stakeholder process for identifying guiding principles to shape thinking about human mobility in the context of climate adaptation. |
| World Bank Group | The World Bank has further supported analytical work that is relevant to resilience building, economic diversification and rehabilitation under elements (b) and (c) of the work program on loss and damage. Some highlights are presented below. [...] <p>viii. Social Dimensions of Climate Change looks at pro-poor adaptation, local institutions, gender, and migration among other issues.</p> |

Table A 3: Submissions referring to human mobility in response to the call by SBI34 for views and information on the thematic areas in the implementation of the work programme

| Submission by | Text |
|--|---|
| The United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) | <i>(nearly entire submission on migration and human displacement, listing knowledge gaps; proposing for the SBI Chair to recommend the identification of guiding principles help governments in developing appropriate laws, policies and programs to address environmentally induced internal and international migration; offering UNU support through case studies, workshops, briefing papers etc.)</i> |
| United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | UNHCR associates itself with and fully endorses the submission presented on 15 August 2011 by the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security |

| Table A 4: Submissions referring to human mobility in response to the call by SBI35 on views and information on the possible elements to be included in the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16 | |
|---|--|
| Submission by | Text |
| Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) | The technical paper [FCCC/TP/2008/9] noted that in addition to humanitarian motives, there are strong socioeconomic reasons for developed countries to participate in new insurance mechanisms: if not intercepted, climate impacts could lead to a downward socio-economic and humanitarian spiral, which could result in social collapse in vulnerable countries which could spread to other areas through economic and societal interdependence and migration, ending in even higher costs, including economic, social and humanitarian costs, for developed countries. |
| Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, Philippines and Nicaragua | <p>There are a number of important gaps related to loss and damage from the adverse effects of climate change that must be addressed under the Convention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migration: The needs of climate migrants (from migration, displacement and planned relocation) require appropriate consideration. Many people will be forced to move from affected areas and adequate provisions will need to be designed in collaboration with relevant international institutions and other stakeholders to consider how to address the issue of migration, displacement, and planned relocation. The COP has the capacity to make recommendations to other international bodies along these lines and accordingly to help coordinate their efforts. <p>As the COP has the capacity to make recommendations to other international bodies along these lines, the Doha outcome could specifically target this issue and call for joint-discussions with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration as part of the SBI Loss and Damage Work Programme Second Phase, with collaboration of the AC.</p> |
| Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) | <p>Understanding and analysis of issues such as social resilience, livelihoods, food security, and human mobility (migration, displacement, planned relocation) must be included in assessments to give policy makers a comprehensive view of loss and damage.</p> <p>Slow onset: Human mobility and displacement. Slow onset changes may render wider areas of land less habitable, render livelihoods unviable and decrease the food security of many people. Gaps exist in understanding the interactions between climatic stressors, livelihood, food security, and migration decisions. Gaps also exist in institutional frameworks needed to address the needs of mobile populations as some may need to move from areas subject to sea level rise, glacial retreat, and desertification / changes in regional rainfall regimes. Gaps exist in coordination and design of regional arrangements to help affected populations access safe, dignified livelihoods in origin and destination areas. Adequate provision will need to be designed in collaboration with relevant international institutions and other stakeholders to consider how to address interrelated issues of livelihood and food security, migration, displacement, and planned relocation.</p> |
| Ghana | <p>The role of the Convention with respect to gaps in addressing loss and damage including managing long-term issues and emerging challenges such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migration: The needs of climate migrants (from migration, displacement and planned relocation) require appropriate consideration. |
| UNHCR, UNU-EHS, the Norwegian Refugee Council and its Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (joint submission) | <i>(Entire submission on human mobility; calling for inclusion of the issue under the loss and damage work programme and proposing areas of work, including knowledge and management gaps)</i> |

| Table A 5: Submissions on inputs into the initial two-year workplan that mention migration/human mobility (emphasis in original) | |
|--|---|
| Submission by | Text |
| ACT Alliance | 1. To assess through a cross cutting approach (considering e.g. particular contexts such as migration, displacement and noneconomic losses) the current and future situation of potential losses and damages in LDCs, AOSIS and Most Vulnerable Countries (MVCs). |
| Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility: IOM, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, UNU-EHS, The Norwegian Refugee Council and its Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Centre d'études et de recherches internationales de Sciences Po, Refugees International | The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility suggests that the Excom's workplan contributes to the articulation of the Warsaw International Mechanism by establishing a suitable group (expert group, task force, forum) in order to advise the Warsaw International Mechanism regarding the impacts on, needs of, and solutions for populations vulnerable to climate change including those affected by climate-related human mobility. |
| Climate Action Network International | Enhance understanding and expertise and its application on how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility. |
| Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) | Address gaps in understanding of and expertise in approaches to address L&D in the areas in para. 7 (a) of the Doha decision (3/CP. 18 para. 7 (a) i-vi, para. 6 (b)); 2/CP. 19 para 5 (a) i How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility. |

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