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Big results now? Emerging lessons from results-based aid in Tanzania

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Big Results Now?

Emerging Lessons from Results-Based Aid in Tanzania

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Abstract

Ongoing experiments with results-based aid (RBA), a development cooperation modality that disburses grants or loans in response to the achievement of pre-defined results, constitute an important and influential trend in international development cooperation. This discussion paper seeks to contribute to the emerging literature that assesses the wide-ranging RBA experiments by different donors. The paper analyses design features and initial implementation experiences of three ongoing RBA programmes in Tanzania that support government reforms in the water, education and decentralisation sectors. In addition to their design elements, these three programmes share a common context in the Big Results Now! (BRN) programme, which the government launched in 2013 to improve the provision of public services. Based on its analysis, with particular attention to the specific capacity development support related to the RBA programmes, this paper concludes that the overarching BRN set-up as well as the nature of capacity development support clearly prioritises short-term gains over longer-term sustainability. More importantly though – and given the overall context and interests of all involved – the paper suggests that these tendencies are not intrinsic to RBA as a modality but rather a more common feature of development cooperation as such.

Key words: Tanzania, results-based aid, results-based approaches, capacity development, development cooperation, aid effectiveness, technical cooperation
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Bonn, June 2015

Niels Keijzer
Abbreviations

BRN  Big Results Now
CDS  Capacity Development Support
DFID Department for International Development
DLI  Disbursement-linked Indicator
GoT  Government of Tanzania
JAST Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
LGA  Local Government Authority
LGDG Local Government Development Grant
MDU  Ministerial Delivery Unit
MKUKUTA II *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kapunguza Umaskini Tanzania* (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PbR  Payment by Results
PEMANDU Performance Management & Delivery Unit
PforR Program-for-Results
PDB  President’s Delivery Bureau
PMO-RALG Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government
RBA  Results-based Aid
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
TA  Technical Assistance
1 Introduction

Achieving results remains high on the domestic political agenda of countries that provide as well as those that receive development cooperation. Governments are increasingly incorporating private-sector principles in administration – a trend that has led to an increased emphasis on results, value for money and effective use of taxpayer “inputs”. This broader agenda of New Public Management has influenced the emergence and use of results-based approaches in development cooperation (Holzapfel, 2014b). Results-based approaches are designed to disburse development funds once pre-agreed results have been reached by a developing country. A specific form of a results-based approach is the cooperation between governments and is referred to as results-based aid (RBA) (see Box 1).

Box 1: Working definitions of RBA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of RBA in development cooperation is still emerging, and empirical research on its application in practice is limited. Research and policy papers capture the present understanding of RBA by the following criteria:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RBA is based on a transparent contract between funder and partner government, whereby the partner takes responsibility for achieving results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results have to be agreed upon in advance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results should be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o quantifiable,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o achievable in incremental steps,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o verified regularly (e.g. annually) and independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment upon achievement of results. No payment is made if results are not achieved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Keijzer and Janus (2014, p. 3)

Many of the assumed benefits of RBA have yet to be confirmed by practice, especially whether the modality can lead to sustainable development effects and not just short-term and largely unsustainable “quick wins” (Klingebiel & Janus, 2014). Other contributions to the scholarly debate dismiss RBA by judging that it is based on an oversimplified incentive model and has been tailored to that image, as opposed to how developing-country institutions function in reality (Paul, 2015, p. 320).

Current pilot programmes by bilateral donors and development banks help to deepen understanding on how RBA programmes are conceptualised and translated in practice within different contexts and settings (see also Janus, 2014; O’Brien & Kanbur, 2013; World Bank, 2013). An emerging body of literature assesses first experiences, whereas other studies are of a more comparative nature (e.g. Musker, Clist, Abbott, Boyd, & Latimer, 2014), including an ongoing study commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that maps out approaches in use today. Another research strand investigates how RBA relates to, and interacts with, the wider development cooperation system in specific developing countries. A conceptual analysis of the relation

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1 For an overview and comparison of RBA programmes in the education sector, see Holzapfel and Janus (2015).
between RBA and capacity development support (CDS) concluded that, due to a range of reasons, RBA interventions tend to be less results-oriented in practice than they appear to be on the drawing board (Keijzer & Janus, 2014). In this context, the term “capacity” has been defined as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2006, p. 113), with RBA programmes seeking to facilitate the development of that capacity through the provision of performance-based finance. In addition, RBA interventions may either include or otherwise relate to dedicated interventions that provide direct support to capacity development. The act of relating can involve a wide range of possible activities, ranging from a basic association in terms of “cross-reference” between RBA and CDS in respective programme documents, to full integration in terms of both RBA and CDS being prepared and implemented as one unique intervention.

Analysing the experiences with RBA and the role of CDS helps to understand how RBA interventions co-exist with other external interventions. This discussion paper builds on the German Development Institute’s earlier research by describing and analysing RBA interventions in the specific setting and context of Tanzania. Tanzania is often at the forefront of development cooperation reforms, which at the same time implies it has also witnessed failed experiments of the past (Tripp, 2012; Edwards, 2014). In regard to own approaches to delivering results, it has sought to introduce New Public Management reforms. The government’s most ambitious effort to date was the recent launch of the Big Results Now! (BRN) initiative in 2012. The aim of BRN is to identify and resolve constraints to results delivery in priority policy areas (OECD, 2013, pp. 30–31) by the end of 2015. BRN is an ambitious approach to accelerate performance in key areas of the government’s present national development strategy (MKUKUTA II) and its longer-term vision 2025.

Given the support provided by different donors that also are at the forefront of promoting RBA, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank, BRN provides a relevant context to further investigate the ongoing practical application of RBA. In addition, the country’s own past in critically reflecting on international CDS (see Hauck & Bana, 2009) moreover indicates that the government has clear ideas and priorities for capacity development. For these reasons, Tanzania provides a relevant context to examine the following three questions:

- **Results-based approaches in Tanzania:** Which common features of results-based approaches, as currently implemented in Tanzania, can be identified?
- **Results-based approaches and capacity development measures:** How are RBA and CDS combined in concrete development interventions and what are initial implementation experiences?
- **Results-orientation:** To what extent do the three interventions differ in terms of the balance between long- and short-term results, both in terms of design as well as in their initial implementation?

This paper concentrates on the water and education sectors within the larger BRN initiative. These two sectors have attracted substantial contributions from Tanzania’s donors and feature RBA pilot programmes that pursue a more outcome-focused approach to aid. In the education sector, the World Bank launched a new PforR pilot programme with support from DFID and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), to provide funding for
achieving BRN results. In the water sector, DFID has launched a payment by results (PbR) pilot programme that is also closely linked to the BRN initiative. A third sector, decentralisation, is not directly linked to the BRN initiative but also features an RBA intervention. The World Bank funds 18 urban local governments through a pilot programme under the PforR instrument (Janus, 2014). Though lacking an explicit link to BRN, the decentralisation pilot programme offers an additional perspective of an RBA programme in Tanzania, where capacity development measures play an important role.

The methodology consisted of interviews with 16 respondents during a one-week visit to Dar es Salaam in September 2014, as well as a structured desk review of general literature and programme documents on the development interventions.

The remainder of this paper is structured in four chapters. Chapter 2 continues the introduction to the history of development cooperation in Tanzania as well as the genesis and nature of BRN. Chapter 3 introduces the interventions in the three sectors chosen and presents the main findings of the research in relation to the abovementioned questions. These findings are then analysed in more detail in Chapter 4, whereas Chapter 5 sets out this paper’s main conclusions, recommendations and priorities for future research.

2 Overview: Development cooperation in Tanzania and Big Results Now!

2.1 Development cooperation in Tanzania

The Tanzanian government’s engagement in the management of development cooperation started in the late 1960s after its first years of independence, when it became apparent that the envisaged amounts of foreign financial assistance were not forthcoming. In view of this situation, the government resolved to appropriate the available foreign assistance to strengthen its capacity for self-reliance. The 1967 Arusha Declaration of Socialism and Self-Reliance sought to give overall guidance and direction for mobilising and directing incoming foreign resources, but the absence of concrete economic development policies meant that it was not effective as a development strategy (Wangwe, 1997, p. 1). Whereas foreign aid was initially used to close the investment gap in relation to Tanzania’s overall development strategy, in the decades that followed the government’s policies became more reactive in responding to economic crises. Development cooperation was provided with a heavy emphasis on structural adjustment programmes and policy-related aid conditionality, which went against the principles of the Arusha Declaration and resulted in more “donorship” and less ownership (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011, p. 5; Manyelezi, 2011, p. 32).

Under these conditions, the relations between donors and the government deteriorated. Donors become sceptical of the government’s commitment to reform and engaged strongly in Tanzanian internal affairs, whereas the government blamed donors for unrealistic and excessive demands and for not sticking to their promised resource inflows. This led to a reduction in the level of development cooperation, as International Monetary Fund and World Bank credits were put on hold and other donors suspended non-project assistance. In the middle of the 1990s, a team of independent advisors led by Prof. Gerald Helleiner, an eminent expert on development cooperation with Tanzania, carried out an independent evaluation of government-donor relationships. The government then initiated a discussion of the report’s findings with Nordic countries, which was a key step towards
an agreement made with all donors in 1997 on principles to renew their partnership (Government of Tanzania [GoT], 2004, p. 5; Furukawa, 2014; Edwards, 2014). Both in their substance as well as the process through which they were elaborated and endorsed, these partnership principles reflect an aid effectiveness agenda “avant la lettre”.

Given its long history of formal efforts to structure and manage development cooperation, Tanzania has often been considered a laboratory for innovative approaches in this area, which was partly driven by the government’s explicit critique of uncoordinated projects and its call for balance of payment and budget-support operations (Manyelezi, 2011, pp. 31, 52). Whereas projects were seen to promote parallel systems, drain government capacity and add transaction costs, the government felt that budget support did not suffer from these deficiencies. Rather, general budget support was seen to increase predictability and strengthen planning, ownership and accountability (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011, p. 8). Tanzania was one of the first countries to establish a harmonised framework for the monitoring of “poverty-reduction budget support” through a common “performance assessment framework”, signed up to by nine donors (Lawson et al., 2013, p. 3).

Table 1 shows Tanzania’s relatively strong reliance on general budget support, but also the heavy fluctuation in use from one financial year to the next. The fluctuations also indicate that these approaches did not always bring the predictable funding that the government sought. Nonetheless, a recent joint evaluation of eight years of general budget support observed that budget support influenced economic growth, improved outcomes in the education sector as well as contributed towards non-income poverty improvements. Despite the fluctuating levels, budget support accounted for 17 per cent of public spending in the period from financial years 2005/2006 to 2011/2012 (Lawson et al., 2013, pp. vii, 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General budget support</th>
<th>Basket funding</th>
<th>Project support</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on GoT (2011, p. 26)

Principally among the measures taken by the government to strengthen aid effectiveness was the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), which – similar to strategies adopted in other African countries – can be described as “document measures to realize the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” (Furukawa, 2014, p. 4). By targeting and managing donor-specific strategies, JAST was seen as a key instrument to help implement Tanzania’s national development plan. JAST thus constituted a key element of the government’s elaborate system for development cooperation. In recent years this system has evolved into a hybrid one, with OECD donors being managed by the Ministry of Finance, whereas the Office of the President takes charge of cooperation with non-OECD donors, principally China (Furukawa, 2014, p. 39).
Tanzania has been a “donor darling” for several decades and for a long time has been a heavily aid-dependent country, with ODA accounting for around 40 per cent of the national budget during the period from 1994 to 2010 (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011, p. 8). In the 1990s, the OECD estimated that ODA represented 80 per cent of the net total inflows of external capital, which meant that private investments in Tanzania were negligible (Wangwe, 1997, p. 2). In recent years, government statistics have shown a declining trend, which points to slow but gradual increases in domestic revenue mobilisation (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011, p. 8). World Bank statistics similarly show a decline in ODA as a percentage of gross national income, decreasing from 13.1 per cent in 2010 to 10.4 per cent in 2011 and 10.2 per cent in 2012. In the national budget of 2014/2015, the share of ODA was only 15 per cent (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The decline can be linked to economic growth and growth of the population (currently 45.9 million people), and partly to increasing concessional finance from non-OECD sources, including China (Furukawa, 2014).

Given these trends and the gradually changing role of development cooperation, donors are being challenged to innovate their approaches to development cooperation to optimise what today is commonly referred to as “leverage”. Still, donors face the same structural constraints that have characterised their engagement for decades. Most notably, there is a persistent, challenging political dialogue between the GoT and the large number of donor agencies competing for its attention. This is compounded by the donor agencies’ high turnover of staff and generally low levels of institutional memory. The recent joint evaluation of budget support found that donors proved to be institutionally unfit to use available structures for an open and strategic dialogue on development (Lawson et al., 2013, p. viii). In September 2014, the United Kingdom and 11 other international donors withheld US$ 490 million in general budget support over concerns that officials were siphoning off public funds to private offshore bank accounts via Independent Power Tanzania Limited. Although many donors were already in the process of reducing general and sector budget support contributions, the scandal accelerated the search for – and use of – alternative modalities for financial cooperation, including forms of RBA. Other donors, including the European Union, will continue to provide budget support in Tanzania.

On the part of the government, one recurring challenge is the structural absence of conducive working conditions and adequate levels of salary in the public sector (Wangwe, 1997). As in most other sub-Saharan states, the public sector in Tanzania has been the largest employer and consumer of expertise in the country for decades. In 2007 some 3 per cent of the population aged 15 years and above were employed by the government. Notwithstanding isolated and disconnected human resource plans developed by some sector ministries, the overall lack of good quantitative and qualitative information about human resource demands creates differing perceptions about the availability of Tanzanian expertise. There is a strong demand in the public sector for young and well-qualified professionals, but their first choice is to work for the private sector or in the “aid system”, where they believe they will not suffer from the systemic constraints imposed by the

2 However, Wangwe (1997, p. 2) points out that in per capita terms, levels of official development assistance in Tanzania have been comparatively modest, since the country ranked 19th out of the then 46 sub-Saharan states in 1992.

public sector. It has been noted that the government’s strong reliance on retired senior officials as short-term consultants further distorts incentives, as these senior consultants may dominate younger staff (Hauck & Bana, 2009, pp. 35–36). Interviewees confirmed these constraints and clarified that people at an individual level possess the required job skills but that the government’s hierarchical bureaucracy discourages risk-taking and inhibits the mobilisation and use of these skills.

The Tanzanian government itself has gone on record about the negative effects of development cooperation on the public sector’s capacity due to the creation of parallel systems as well as the replacement and crowding out of the domestic labour market through supply-led technical assistance (GoT, 2007, pp. 10–11). Twenty years earlier, the government adopted its Development Vision 2025, in which it recognised donor dependency, an absent development mindset and ineffective implementation as being key impediments to realising its development vision (GoT, 1995, pp. 7–8). A study reviewing past efforts of public-sector reform observed that “few low-income countries can have embarked on as many simultaneous institutional and organisational reforms as did Tanzania”, based on which doubts could be expressed as to the actual reform-readiness of the public sector (Morgan & Baser, 2007, p. v).

2.2 Big Results Now!

Tanzania’s real annual gross domestic product growth increased to an annual average of around 7 per cent during the 2000s, yet this failed to support corresponding rates of poverty reduction. A key observed deficit is that government programmes implemented to increase access to public services were not accompanied by an increase in the quality of these services. A document by DFID states: “About 40% of rural water points are non-functional, only 30% of children passed their primary school leaving examination last year, there are stockouts of essential medicines in 50% of health facilities, 42% of all children are stunted through chronic malnutrition, one woman in every 23 will die in childbirth, the fertility rate is still over 5, and yet there is an unmet need for contraception of around 25%” (DFID, 2013b, p. 6). The challenge of accelerating poverty reduction fuelled the disappointment of some donors providing general and sectoral budget support (Lawson et al., 2013, p. 5).

Tanzania is in the process of implementing its National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, which it adopted in 2010 (better known under its Kiswahili acronym MKUKUTA II). MKUKUTA II is widely considered to be a credible development strategy, but its implementation has remained challenging, given the low execution rate of the development budget, which declined to 59 per cent in 2010/2011. Given these circumstances, the government and many donors realised that a “business as usual” approach would not suffice to successfully realise the development strategy. The Tanzanian president recognised the need for a “strong and effective system to oversee, monitor and evaluate the implementation of its development plans” (Kikwete, 2014, p. 4). He therefore decided to introduce a large-scale public-sector reform initiative, called Big Results Now!, whose design and management structure was to be inspired by its Malaysian equivalent.

In 2012, a high-level government delegation that included the president visited Malaysia to learn about the principles, methodology and techniques of a transformational government programme managed and facilitated by the Performance Management & Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), a special-purpose vehicle located in the bureau of the Malaysian prime
minister (DFID, 2012). A key aspect of PEMANDU’s work involved the use of so-called labs, which bring together sector experts with a range of backgrounds to work collaboratively for a period of eight weeks. In this period, they diagnose constraints and identify strategies to quickly improve the situation. The experts then construct detailed implementation plans and budgets to deliver tangible change in a period of two years (Attfield, 2013). The use of labs reflects the main theory of change that “by implementing some key innovations at critical points in the way government does business, the existing system can be made to deliver more effectively and efficiently” (DFID, 2013b, p. 15).

Following the visit, the Tanzanian Cabinet resolved to “adopt and customize the Malaysian BIG FAST RESULTS model to suit the Tanzanian environment” and to work with PEMANDU to deliver this. DFID agreed to provide support to assist the government in the contract negotiations with PEMANDU. There was a broad perception in the government and among key international donors that the Big Results Now! initiative was an appropriate and effective approach to bridging the implementation gap that the president of Tanzania himself had recognised as a binding constraint (DFID, 2012, p. 1).

In addition to being deemed an approach for better operationalising and more effectively implementing MKUKUTA II, it should be noted that there is also a strong political dimension to the government’s support of BRN. President Jakaya Kikwete is serving his final term as president – during which time BRN was introduced in 2012 – following the presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2010 that gave the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution), a much lower proportion of the vote (60 per cent). These results, combined with a low voter turnout of 43 per cent, have created tensions and fragmentation within the ruling party, which is also being challenged externally by a stronger and popular opposition being voiced through parliament as well as societal debate. The BRN initiative therefore also serves to build up a credible and visible performance pattern that should help the party renew its leadership of the government in the 2015 elections (DFID, 2013b, p. 12).

BRN is not a results-based aid programme, according to the definition provided above, but rather a domestic results-driven reform agenda that follows the model of “delivery units” (Todd, Martin, & Brock, 2014). BRN is therefore a domestic results-based approach and an “umbrella” for a number of public sector reforms. Within the larger BRN umbrella, however, several sectors are financed through foreign aid and RBA programmes (see examples below). Although BRN is inspired by the Malaysian example and has been portrayed as a “South-South learning exchange”, the original idea for delivery units comes from the United Kingdom, where the principle of “deliverology” and a Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit were introduced in 2001 under the Tony Blair administration (Barber, 2003). Its development agency, DFID, had a significant conceptual influence on shaping the design of BRN in Tanzania. Overall, the influence of the larger results agenda in public-sector debates and in development cooperation is clearly visible in the BRN initiative.

BRN was approved at a High-Level Cabinet Retreat in October 2012. The Cabinet subsequently chose six priority focus areas, which – through the aforementioned labs approach – were further detailed to identify the results to be achieved and the innovations required to realise it. The main targets to be achieved under each of the six National Key Results Areas are shown in Figure 1.

4 For more information see: http://www.pemandu.gov.my/orgchart.aspx
The government has budgeted the BRN initiative at 17.3 trillion Tanzanian shillings (TSH) for its first three years of operation, which in 2014 amounted to EUR 7.8 billion. The financing needs would be covered through revenue generated by the key results areas (electricity and water charges), revenue from resource mobilisation initiatives and private-sector participation. Donors were expected to provide additional finance (European Union [EU], 2014, p. 14). Based on the 2013 Public Expenditure Review, a recent study shows that the BRN initiative faced a 58 per cent funding gap during its first year of implementation (African Union Commission and New Partnership for Africa’s Development Planning and Coordinating Agency, 2010, p. 60).

Since the 2013 Public Expenditure Review, additional donor funding has come in. For instance, the World Bank, SIDA and DFID agreed in 2014 to provide a total of US$ 252 million in support of BRN’s education goals (World Bank, 2014, p. 7). Still, the government faces the challenge of ensuring predictable and stable financing to BRN. In his foreword to the first BRN annual report, presented in March 2015, the chief executive officer of the President’s Delivery Bureau (PDB) for BRN had to acknowledge that reported results for the first year had fallen short of the targets in some areas. He linked this to misalignment of the budgets for implementing the initiatives, in the sense that the plans were finalised in the labs after the government budget for the year had been tabled in parliament. Further budget realignments were therefore necessary. Finally, a specific challenge was “the concurrency of implementation and institution building” (GoT, 2015, p. 9). In view of the current state of play, donors already anticipate a continuation of BRN, which is shown, for instance, in DFID’s overall support and the joint donor support to education continuing one and two years, respectively, beyond the current duration of BRN (DFID, 2013b; World Bank, 2014).

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5 The US$ 252 million consists of a World Bank credit of US$ 122 million, as well as grants by DFID and SIDA of US$ 100 and 30 million, respectively (World Bank, 2014, p. 7).
In terms of the governance of BRN, the Tanzanian government has adapted the Malaysian system that revolves around the central PDB, a so-called delivery unit (Todd, Martin, & Brock, 2014). This central unit coordinates the work of Ministerial Delivery Units (MDUs), which are located in the ministries that are responsible for the six areas. Its governance structure is presented in Figure 2, which accentuates that the BRN approach creates a complementary delivery system with its own hierarchy and reporting lines on top of the existing government structures.

This organisational set-up was agreed by the Cabinet during a retreat held in Dodoma from 22–24 October 2012, with the PDB being established as an independent department in the office of the president. On 13 April 2013 the Cabinet endorsed the mandate, structure, roles, skills and competency requirements, recruitment procedures, remuneration and relationship between the PDB and the other MDUs based in the respective line ministries. Whereas the PDB itself is not accountable for the delivery of BRN results, its chief executive will have the authority to direct resources and hold ministries and agencies accountable for their targets and programmes (DFID, 2013b, p. 21).

The staff ceiling of the PDB was set at 75, with personnel being drawn from both the public and private sectors, primarily on fixed-term contracts or secondments. It also houses PEMANDU staff from Malaysia as well as other technical assistants funded by donors. Delays encountered in recruiting PDB staff also meant that expatriate staff had to take up significant executive roles in the early phases of BRN. Labs for key results areas were undertaken between February and March 2014, with implementation commencing in 2014/2015. In addition, another lab phase was organised for health care during the autumn of 2014. As is detailed in its first annual report, BRN has also expanded further: the number of National Key Results Areas doubled to 12 during its first year of operation, with all new areas focusing on strengthening the business climate. Increasing the involvement of the business sector and introducing the Regional Delivery Units at sub-national levels have been important additions since starting BRN implementation (GoT, 2015, p. 9.)

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**Figure 2: BRN governance structure**

Source: Figure reproduced from GoT (2013, p. 12)
Taking into account the long-term development of the Tanzanian government’s effectiveness – a key priority of Vision 2025 – the recent evolutions in BRN raise some concerns. First of all, the set-up chosen by the PDB and MDUs carries the risk of “mission creep” beyond their catalytic role into the day-to-day tasks of the line ministries responsible for them. Such a phenomenon is similar to donor-financed project implementation units that Tanzania pushed hard to further integrate into the government. Second, similar to long-standing experiences with technical advisors in developing countries, differences in pay between BRN staff and line-ministry staff may have the unintended effect of demotivating the latter, which could negatively affect their performance. Third, the CDS activities undertaken through BRN have to be coordinated with capacity development activities being managed by the ministries themselves, as they may not be consistent to one another. Fourth, the high number of National Key Results Areas – six in the first phase, and the addition of business environment and health care in a second phase – shows that the government has difficulties in prioritizing. Coupled with many of the sometimes overambitious – BRN initiatives being underfunded, this might create false expectations. Finally, the BRN initiative in essence reflects a philosophy that recognises and accepts the trade-off involving the prioritisation of achieving results over longer-term capacity development. The latter will depend on the successful integration of BRN change-makers into the government post-BRN, yet the differential pay and conditions may raise doubts as to whether this is likely. Also, the BRN initiative is being strongly driven by domestic political motivations before the general elections in October 2015, and it remains to be seen whether the same momentum for reform can be maintained beyond the elections.

In light of these concerns, it is evident that BRN represents a clear calculated risk, with donors that support it betting on its potential incentivising effects. DFID’s business case for supporting BRN’s National Key Results Area of education explicitly recognises that the sector’s organisation culture is not conducive to performance, and that the process of changing it is both long-term and challenging, yet it assesses that BRN can provide “further momentum and commitment to a wider systemic reform agenda” (DFID, 2014b, p. 8).

3 Results-based aid programmes in Tanzania

This section describes three ongoing results-based pilot programmes in Tanzania. The RBA programmes in education, water and decentralisation are linked to BRN in direct as well as indirect ways. Overall, the BRN experiences described above and the RBA descriptions below illustrate the challenge of introducing a greater results-orientation in public-sector administration and development interventions. A specific interest of the analysis below is to describe and understand the different ways in which donors and partner countries combine RBA and other development interventions with one another, with a particular focus on CDS.

Given the broad orientation of BRN, this paper only concentrates on the water and education sectors. These two sectors have attracted substantial contributions from Tanzania’s donors, which include RBA pilot programmes that pursue more outcome-based approaches. In the education sector, the World Bank launched a new PforR pilot programme, with support from the United Kingdom and Sweden, to provide funding for achieving BRN results. In the

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6 The term “mission creep” originates from reporting on UN peacekeeping missions and refers to the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals, often after initial successes.
water sector, DFID has launched a PbR pilot programme that is also closely linked to the BRN initiative. A third sector, decentralisation, is not directly linked to the BRN initiative but also features an RBA intervention with capacity development elements. The World Bank funds 18 urban local governments through a PforR pilot programme that illustrates the challenge of introducing a greater results-focus at the city level.7

3.1 DFID Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme

DFID supports the Tanzanian government’s Water Sector Development Programme (Phase II, 2014–2018) through a Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (DFID, 2014). The programme runs from 2014 to 2017, and the intended outcome is an increase in the number of people in rural areas using improved sources of water and sanitation facilities. This objective thus relates closely to the water-related BRN objectives, as shown in Figure 1. The BRN targets for the water sector are to improve access to clean and safe water for rural citizens. The aim is to provide more than 15.4 million people living in rural areas with access to the facilities, raising the percentage of people with sustained access to clean water to 74 per cent by 2016.

A report by the non-governmental organisation Twaweza8 (2014) comments that the BRN results may be unrealistic, but that more attention on the water and sanitation challenge is very timely. For instance, access to clean water in Tanzania has either stagnated or declined over the past two decades, counter to generally positive regional trends, and despite significant investments. Also, the majority of Tanzanians (89 per cent) collect water for their daily needs from public sources, with the work typically being done by women and girls.

The Ministry of Water has developed an ambitious and long-term plan (2006–2025) for the water sector, currently in its second phase (2014–2019). The objective is to increase rural populations’ access to water and sanitation, improve sustainability and strengthen the institutional delivery capability of water and sanitation services. The second phase of the Water Sector Development Programme has a total budget of around US$ 3.3 billion (MoW Tanzania, 2014, p. xvii). The DFID programme supports this plan and consists of four main components:

1) **fixed-tranche input** of GBP 75 million to the Water Sector Development Programme, a sector-wide approach that the government of Tanzania is currently implementing in a second phase (2014–2019);

2) **results-based aid programme** of up to GBP 66.6 million, namely a PbR scheme that incentivises rural local government authorities (LGAs) to maintain and expand water access points;

3) **monitoring and evaluation** with a volume of GBP 3.4 million, including for the results-based component and for maintaining a Development Partners Group Secretariat;

4) **technical assistance** of GBP 5 million for LGAs, regional secretariats, the Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) and the Ministry of Water.

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7 For a detailed analysis of the World Bank pilot programme, please refer to Janus (2014).
8 Twaweza is Swahili for “we can make it happen”; for more information see: http://www.twaweza.org/
Table 2: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme

| Objective | An increase in the number of people in rural areas using improved sources of water and sanitation facilities |
| Sector | Water and Sanitation | Donor | UK Department for International Development |
| Budget | Up to GBP 150 million | Period | 2014–2019 |

Results and capacity-building components

| Results component | PbR scheme (up to GBP 66.6 million) | Capacity-building component | Technical assistance |
| Level of intervention | LGAs | Level of intervention | LGAs, regional secretariats, PMO-RALG, Ministry of Water |

Source: Authors’ elaboration

The RBA programme

The results-based aid programme is a pilot programme based on the PbR scheme. It is the first outcome-based PbR pilot programme in the water and sanitation sector. DFID provides funding through the government of Tanzania’s water-sector basket fund, with payments linked to independently verified results.

The indicator used in the PbR scheme is closely linked to BRN performance indicators for rural water supply. Hence, there is an overlap of interests between the BRN initiative and the PbR scheme, which had already been under preparation before BRN was introduced. The PbR scheme makes two levels of payments to around 50 rural LGAs: 1) GBP 1,500 for every additional functioning water point; and 2) GBP 50 for each existing (and functioning) water point. The larger amount is paid on the basis of increasing the number of functioning water points and not on the basis of the number of new water points. The rationale behind this design is that local governments have a strong incentive to maintain existing water points in a sustainable manner and to fix broken water points instead of simply building new ones.

Local governments will have discretion over payments for improving water supply and sanitation services in their respective districts. The underlying assumption is that the GBP 1,500 payment for an additional water point would not be sufficient to cover the average cost of constructing a new water point, which would cost about GBP 7,000. But the money would be sufficient to repair a broken water point. Also, the PbR money marks a significant increase over the average LGA budget for maintaining water points, which is roughly GBP 5,000 (for maintaining all water points). This incentive structure therefore rewards local governments that are successful in regularly refurbishing and maintaining water points, rather than those governments that only invest in setting up new water points.

Payments will be made upon an independent verification of results, building on the existing Water Point Mapping System. The tendering process for the verification of water points is managed by DFID and financed through the programme component dedicated to monitoring.
and evaluation. Finally, the PbR scheme will first be introduced in those LGAs with the least water coverage and weak capacity in terms of available human resources; there is an intended link to capacity-building support that will also be financed by DFID. The government has already demonstrated a significant degree of ownership for the results-based component – the Ministry of Water has actively promoted and explained the incentives to local governments by organising workshops independently, without DFID engagement.

**Capacity development**

The DFID programme features the provision of technical assistance (TA) of GBP 5 million and builds on earlier support provided for the implementation of the BRN initiative in the water sector. TA is provided at the level of LGAs, regional secretariats, the PMO-RALG as well as the Ministry of Water.

The TA will primarily focus on improving institutional delivery capabilities in strategic programme management and analytical capacity at the national and sub-national levels. Specialised TA will be provided for project management; the promotion of sanitation and hygiene approaches; design standards; and the appraisal of appropriate low-cost water and sanitation technologies, for example. This can take the form of training, mentoring and coaching or hired staff, for instance.

About half of TA support will become part of basket funding. The Ministry of Water then uses the funds for technical assistance to competitively contract a firm that will work with national- and sub-national-level government institutions to improve delivery of programme results. The other half will be used by the DFID advisory team to commission research and analytical work to inform policy as well as provide short-term, flexible TA as needs arise. Part of this technical assistance will be dedicated to supporting the implementation of the PbR scheme, especially in those local governments with lower capacity. The TA provision will prioritise districts with weak capacity and low water coverage over other, more advanced districts.

**Lessons and challenges**

First, the DFID Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme has just started implementation and it is premature to draw any lessons on the development effectiveness of this intervention. At this point, only design features and very early experiences in setting up the programme can be considered.

Overall, the set-up of the whole programme is very innovative, as different aid modalities are brought together in order to take maximum advantage of the comparative strengths of each modality. Input financing provides the government of Tanzania with predictable support on the national and local levels, whereas the RBA component incentivises accelerated performance. The monitoring and evaluation as well as the TA are used to complement this. This general design also reflects the government’s priorities well. The government demanded a separate component dedicated to TA and asked DFID to manage the programme’s monitoring and evaluation function. Most importantly, the majority of funds are managed through the sector basket, which is the government’s preferred aid modality for the water sector. The set-up thus represents the alignment of DFID with structures of the Tanzanian government and harmonisation with other donors that support
the water-sector basket fund. Another envisioned benefit of combining these different modalities is the close link with the results-focus of the BRN initiative.

Taylor (2014) overall commends the innovative approach of the DFID programme but points out that local government might not be the main bottleneck responsible for slowing down performance in the rural water sector. For instance, the central government might be inefficient in releasing budgets to the local level, or other external factors might impede the ability of local governments to perform. Also, the verification of results needs to be very reliable, and increased attention has to be paid to the potential danger of “gaming”, a purposeful manipulation of results (Taylor, 2014). Another challenge lies in the added costs of introducing the PbR mechanism compared to simply expanding input-based financing. DFID estimates these additional costs to be around GBP 7.62 million, mainly due to the costs for the design of a PbR scheme (GBP 0.1 million), costs for the provision of additional TA (GBP 4.6 million) and costs for the evaluation and independent verification of results (GBP 2.92 million). Going forward, it has to be closely observed as to whether these transaction costs are justified and really translate into improved development results.

3.2 “Big Results Now in Education” programme

The World Bank, together with DFID and Sweden, are funding the “Big Results Now in Education” programme as the first PforR pilot programme in the education sector. The programme duration is four years (2014–2018) and the overall budget is US$ 416 million, with contributions from the World Bank (US$ 122 million), the United Kingdom (US$ 100 million), Sweden (US$ 30 million) and the government of Tanzania (US$ 164 million). The programme is closely aligned with the BRN initiative and uses the same indicators as BRN. Its overall objective is to improve the quality of basic education service delivery, thereby producing tangible improvements in learning outcomes and – over the longer term – to lay the foundation for an “outcome-based performance culture in the education sector in Tanzania” (World Bank, 2014).

The programme design follows the rationale of an RBA programme, since disbursements are linked to the achievement of pre-agreed results. However, most of the results indicators are defined on the process level and not on the level of impacts. Also, there is only a semi-independent verification of results, as donors also engage in verification. Hence, the programmes represent a mix of results-orientation and traditional process-focused financing. Finally, the design features a parallel financing package from DFID of US$ 7 million.

The RBA programme

Compared to the DFID-financed water programme, the education programme places less emphasis on results at the outcome level. The programme targets multiple points along the results chain, but most indicators reward activities such as formulating budget frameworks, producing reports or setting up other processes. The only outcome indicator rewards improvements in reading, writing and arithmetic assessments, but the funding attached to this indicator only represents about 13 per cent of the programme funds (Holzapfel & Janus, 2015). The education sector is an example of donors directly funding the BRN initiative through an RBA programme, as the BRN indicators and indicators used for making RBA disbursements strongly overlap.
### Table 3: Big Results Now in Education programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Improve the quality of basic education service delivery, thereby producing tangible improvement in learning outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Sector** | **Donors** | **World Bank (US$ 122 Million)**  
DFID (US$ 100 Million)  
Sweden (US$ 30 million)  
(government of Tanzania co-finances US$ 164 million) |
| **Total budget** | US$ 416 million | **Period** | 2014–2018 |

**Results and capacity-building components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results component</th>
<th>Capacity-building component</th>
<th>Donors use disbursement-linked indicators for triggering payments</th>
<th>Parallel financing technical assistance package (US$ 7 million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of intervention</strong></td>
<td><strong>Level of intervention</strong></td>
<td>Central-level ministries and local governments</td>
<td>Central-level ministries and local governments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration

The programme targets three ministries: the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, the PMO-RALG and the Ministry of Finance. In total, 16 disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) are used but only five directly address the actions of the LGAs responsible for providing schools with funds and teachers. Overall, the financial incentives set by the PforR programme could be quite strong. By targeting different ministries and levels within the public service, the programme aims to align incentives for improved performance along the education service delivery chain.

The verification of the 16 DLIs is semi-independent. Five DLIs are based on the independent verification of a private actor that will be identified through an open tendering process. The remaining DLIs will be assessed by the development partners (World Bank, DFID and Sweden) at the central government level because these indicators mostly focus on the direct actions of the counterparts of development partners in planning and releasing funds, for instance. The independent verification, in contrast, will mostly focus on local-level activities concerning the performance of local governments, individual schools, teachers and students. This set-up provides some incentives for improved performance at the local level, but a verification process conducted by development partners poses the potential risk of skewing the power balance between development partners and the government of Tanzania more than a completely independent verification process would.

**Capacity development**

The World Bank anticipates that the PforR programme will have important capacity development effects through the use of DLIs, the government’s involvement in the preparation of the programme as well as through direct capacity development activities. In addition, the World Bank notes that DFID is providing an additional technical assistance programme with a budget of US$ 7 million through parallel financing. This TA package
focusses on three areas, namely (i) implementation readiness; (ii) longer-term implementation support; and (iii) results monitoring and support to student assessment systems (World Bank, 2014, p. 23). While also seeking to support efforts on issues that transcend the programme, such as the sub-national disbursement of funds, the bulk of support is meant to directly support programme implementation, including efforts to raise awareness of the programme and the DLIs. As detailed in the programme appraisal document, the different items listed are highly ambitious and would mean a strong break from the past, for example the sourcing of direct feedback from education beneficiaries through modern technologies.

Interviewees were cognisant of the longstanding capacity development challenges in the sector, with two ministries sharing responsibility for a poor track record on earlier capacity development interventions. In relation to the capacity development effect of the RBA itself and the DLIs, it was noted that the water programme had the advantage of a clear and visible overall result (i.e. functioning water points), whereas for education the results strived for are longer-term and difficult to measure. In view of these challenges, there were concerns over the government’s “absorptive capacity” of the additional US$ 7 million of TA and to what extent it would be available to take part in the tendering process for it. Moreover, the coordination of the TA package – with PEMANDU’s support through the BRN President’s Delivery Bureau – was also seen as being a challenge and bringing a potential risk of duplication.

Lessons learnt and challenges

Unintended consequences will have to be carefully monitored, but not enough evidence is available to draw conclusions yet. The semi-independent verification process might present one potential unintended consequence related to disbursement pressures on the side of the donors. If results for donor-verified DLIs are not achieved, then the donor group might still feel tempted to disburse funds, and technically they would be free to make this decision. Interviewees moreover expressed the expectation that, on the government’s side, no senior officials or ministers would be fired if the results were not achieved.

Another potential unintended consequence is related to the separate TA package (US$ 7 million over four years). On top of the PforR programme, DFID funds several technical advisors and capacity development support that ensures the smooth operation of the PforR programme. However, such a construct also bears the risk of “instrumentalising” technical assistance to make disbursements under the PforR programme, without addressing genuine capacity needs. This would be a form of distortion, if technical assistance is mainly geared towards enabling donor disbursement. Given the donor disbursement pressure, the strong TA investments may further muddy the waters, with donors paying for results that they themselves are responsible for achieving (Keijzer & Janus, 2014).

9 One of DFID’s tender notices in fact only identified two objectives: “It is envisaged that this technical assistance to the key government authorities involved with BRN in the education sector will support them to (i) implement the Programme For Results (P4R) programme approach with embedded Disbursement Linked Indicators that triggers donor fund releases, and (ii) undertake monitoring, verification, capacity building and systems strengthening activities, aiming to improve the overall quality of basic education service delivery.” Source: https://www.devex.com/projects/tenders/service-provider-to-provide-technical-assistance-for-big-result-now-brn-in-education-tanzania/151224 (accessed 8 April 2015).
The government plans to mitigate potential gaming risks around student assessments (for instance, artificial improvement of pass rates by disallowing weaker students from taking the exams), but it is still identifying methods to minimise the chances of gaming the exam results (World Bank, 2014). One option is to adopt a variety of verification processes that will test the validity and reliability of the results (World Bank, 2014).

3.3 Local governments and decentralisation

The decentralisation process in Tanzania is one of multiple reform programmes that the government is pursuing simultaneously. As a cross-sectoral reform process, decentralisation affects all development interventions inevitably, as local governments are at the forefront of implementing most donor- and government-funded initiatives. Therefore, a new RBA pilot programme by the World Bank that finances urban local governments in a results-based manner is of critical relevance to the analysis of results-based approaches and capacity development support in Tanzania. Although there is no direct link to the national BRN reform agenda, the 18 urban local governments funded by the World Bank of course are important actors, also for achieving BRN results on a national level.

The national decentralisation reform “Decentralization by Devolution” began in 2000 and aims to reduce poverty and improve service delivery by decentralising resources and responsibilities to the local level, in particular LGAs. The main instrument for implementing Decentralization by Devolution is the Local Government Reform Programme, which has been running in a second phase (“LGRP II”) since 2009. Tanzania has 169 LGAs, of which 26 are urban LGAs in mainland Tanzania. Since 2009 Tanzania has introduced several intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems, which, to a large extent, have been financed by donor contributions. The main mechanism is the local government development grant (LGDG), which includes core funding and additional non-core sector-specific grants (e.g. agriculture, health and water). The LGDG is a performance-based grant system that disburses funds to all local governments in a formula-based, transparent and predictable manner. In order to access these grants, local governments have to undergo annual assessments that determine whether each local government has met minimum access conditions and performance indicators.

Donor support to good financial governance, including fiscal decentralisation, has changed in recent years. Except for public financial management reform support, most donors have phased out their programme-based support to the governance sector. The budget for the LGDG is tied to the national budget (2 per cent); of the annual programme budget of around EUR 100 million, half used to be funded by Tanzania and half by Finland, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Ireland, Japan and previously also the World Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Donor funding was phased out in 2013 and the LGDG is being redesigned (Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government, 2014). There are multiple reasons for the phasing out of donors, including dissatisfaction with overall progress of reforms, changing donor priorities and communication problems between donors and the government of Tanzania (Janus, 2014).

The World Bank is the biggest donor in the decentralisation sector in Tanzania. In 2013 the World Bank introduced the new Urban Local Government Strengthening Program, which is one of the first pilot programmes of the World Bank’s Program for Results. The results-
based component is called the Urban Performance Grant, which has been introduced into the current LGDG system to support urban service delivery and infrastructure in 18\textsuperscript{10} urban LGAs. The 18 cities targeted have combined populations of 2.6 million, which equals 25 percent of the country’s urban population (World Bank, 2012). The Urban Performance Grant determines allocations to each city using a population-based formula and disburses funds on the basis of an enhanced performance assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Urban Local Government Strengthening Program</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sector</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period</strong></td>
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</table>

**Results and capacity-building components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results component</th>
<th>Donors use disbursement-linked indicators for triggering payments</th>
<th>Capacity-building component</th>
<th>Up to US$ 44 million for centrally coordinated measures coordinated by PMO-RALG, and up to 5% of disbursed funds spent by urban local government on capacity-building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of intervention</strong></td>
<td>PMO-RALG 18 urban local governments</td>
<td><strong>Level of intervention</strong></td>
<td>PMO-RALG 18 urban local governments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration

*The RBA programme*

The World Bank programme targets the local level of administration via support to the 18 cities as well as the central level by engaging with the PMO-RALG, which is responsible for decentralisation and local government affairs in mainland Tanzania. The programme was declared effective in February 2013, and first assessments of the urban LGAs have been made.

Tanzanian officials commented that the level of potential funding mobilised through the urban performance grant was appropriate to generate performance improvements and cover the investment needs of the targeted cities. The potential annual disbursements are calculated based on an estimate that programme cities would need, on average, US$ 18 per capita per year to finance their service delivery and infrastructure investments. Under the current fiscal transfer system, discretionary transfers from the central government to local governments amount to only US$ 2 per capita on average. Under the new programme, cities can receive US$ 3 per capita for meeting minimum conditions and up to US$ 18 per capita.

\textsuperscript{10} Babati, Bariadi, Bukoba, Geita, Iringa, Kibaha, Korogwe, Lindi, Morogoro, Moshi, Mpanda, Musoma, Nyombe, Shinyanga, Singida, Songea, Sumbawanga, Tabora.
for meeting the performance targets. The funds will be primarily used by cities to cover their infrastructure needs according to an investment list that includes road surfacing / improvement, abattoirs, markets, drains, etc. Regarding the results-orientation, interviewees stressed that programme requirements would not be seen as an administrative burden, but rather as being aligned with their own self-interests and as a positive incentive to improve performance.

Capacity development

Apart from financial constraints, capacity gaps in the decentralisation process exist at two levels. At the central level the PMO-RALG – the lead institution in decentralisation – has insufficient capacity for performing its role (Tilley, 2013). At the local level, Tanzanian officials also have frequently raised capacity constraints as being a major obstacle to improved service delivery (Janus, 2014; Tobias & Omondi, 2014). Therefore, the programme includes a specific capacity-building grant-scheme that combines supply- and demand-driven dimensions of capacity-building support to ensure that the programme functions effectively and achieves intended results. Interviewees, however, identified capacity-building as being a possible “Achilles heel” of the PforR programme, in the sense that the government has so far overcommitted and underdelivered in the area, whereas donors in the design phase – convinced of the innovative nature of the RBA – largely took this ambition as given.

At the local level, governments are allowed to spend up to 5 per cent of funds received on capacity-building. This ceiling was introduced based on past concerns over the misuse of funds, as well as strong investments in centralised capacity development activities. With the local-level funds, governments will, for instance, use formal, classroom-style training from local institutions in line with their local needs on the basis of annual capacity-building plans. At the central level, about US$ 44 million of the overall programme budget over five years can be spent by the PMO-RALG on capacity-building measures. These measures will be provided through a number of centrally procured and managed, issue-specific activities. Capacity-building advisors attached to the PMO-RALG will provide assistance in the formulation of these plans. These centrally administered funds will particularly be used to support local governments that do not meet the minimum requirements for triggering disbursements, for instance. In addition, one performance indicator for the PMO-RALG requires that all local governments are adequately staffed, meaning that key positions have to be filled in every local government administration.

Lessons learnt and challenges

The World Bank programme is a good example for an aid modality that combines features of traditional development funding and more innovative results-based components. The results-based component is tailored towards the needs of urban local governments and the policy environment of decentralisation in Tanzania. The disbursements are largely based on achievable, yet ambitious, indicators at the level of local government performance in financial management. The capacity-building components represent the traditional means of working in decentralisation and have been integrated alongside the results-based components in this programme. So far, the results-based elements of the programme have worked well as urban local governments – as well as the central-level ministry – show improved efforts in delivering results. The capacity-building parts, however, underperform.
Local-level training efforts (up to 5 per cent of disbursements per local government) are not sufficient, also because required trainings are often held abroad at higher costs and require civil servants to travel. The central-level efforts coordinated by PMO-RALG have been ambitious but could not be met in the first year, as there were delays in planning and implementing capacity-building activities across all 18 local governments.

Capacity-building in the context of the World Bank programme will therefore be a long-term undertaking that requires continuous monitoring and adjustment going forward. Reform options could include, for instance, a focus on specific “catalytic skills” that are necessary in every local urban government, and then offer training for these skills in a more targeted manner. One example would be to focus on putting in place long-term systems, such as tax collection mechanisms, that will continue to be used once the World Bank programme has ended. In those cases where the perspectives on long-term improvements are well-aligned between the results-based and the capacity-building components, there is a potential for synergies.

4 Discussion of the three interventions

It is clear that the Big Results Now! initiative and the three RBA programmes represent relatively new and innovative approaches in development cooperation. Yet, the findings presented above show that the conceptualisation and implementation of the three programmes is strongly shaped through the development cooperation relations in Tanzania that have developed over several decades. Those conducting research and policy discussions on RBA therefore are advised to not assume that RBA interventions can be designed and implemented on a “blank sheet” basis but will instead partly be shaped and influenced by existing approaches to managing development cooperation.

In recent years Tanzania’s economic development has increased and aid dependence has correspondingly decreased, while donors have moved away from the provision of general budget support. The decreasing interest of donors in using budget support was influenced by domestic concerns in donor countries as well as by corruption scandals in Tanzania. Evaluations of general budget support in Tanzania, however, showed evidence of strong results in terms of improved development outcomes. At the same time, the evaluation confirmed donors’ disappointment over the low performance results of policy dialogue (Lawson et al., 2013). Against this background, the analysis of documents as well as perceptions from interviewees indicated a need to “manage expectations” regarding the extent to which aid programmes would be successful in incentivising government behaviour and promoting results. In fact, some interviewees suggested that, while appearing as relatively different instruments on paper, the RBA interventions would allow donors to provide financial support akin to general and sector budget support in a way that is more likely to receive adequate levels of public support at home.

Turning to the specific findings on the new RBA programmes, the review of the design and initial implementation of the three programmes confirms that RBA interventions are potentially most effective in cases where indicators are straightforward to measure and do not leave substantial room for interpretation. The importance of clear and unambiguous indicators should not be understated and builds upon experiences with implementing budget support. Already in implementing general budget support, a dynamic of a permanent
negotiation had developed between the government and donors on results and the interpretation of progress towards them.\textsuperscript{11} As a result, the Tanzanian government has developed a strong capacity to manage donors and the programmes they develop with them, including more recently BRN.

From the analysis of RBA programmes in Tanzania, three main models of implementing RBA in relation with other aid modalities, such as capacity development support, have emerged (see Table 5). First, RBA programmes can be subcomponents of a larger modality mix, such as in the case of the DFID water sector RBA that is implemented together with a sector-wide approach and traditional capacity development projects. Second, an RBA programme can include features of input or process funding, such as in the example of the World Bank programme for decentralisation and the DFID education programme. The difference between these two programmes, however, lies in the ways that capacity development support and technical assistance are organised. Whereas the World Bank allows for capacity development and technical assistance to be implemented and procured by the government, DFID retains management of these activities through a project implemented in parallel to the education PforR, which might lead to potentially adverse effects. Although still possible under the present arrangement, an integration of the TA project into the PforR would have made it more straightforward and less organisationally demanding to manage this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Three ways for implementing results-based aid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Option</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main feature</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Potential advantage</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Potential disadvantage</strong></td>
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With regard to the CDS provided, several interviewees expressed concern that capacity development in all three RBAs was mainly provided as a means to achieving the results and making the programmes a success. The strongest example is the DFID education pilot

\textsuperscript{11} The term “permanent negotiation” was coined by Whitfield and Fraser (2010), based on aid management case studies conducted in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia.
programme. Interviewees thus observed a trade-off between longer-term capacity development and “just getting things done and the people in place”. This should also be related to the wider context of BRN and its imperative to “accelerate” government performance in the process parallel to the preparation of Tanzania’s general elections, scheduled for October 2015. Although a short-term increase in available financial and human resources might lead to the appearance of better development results, the situation could also quickly revert back to the initial stage before the results-initiative ends.

As one interviewee expressed it, whether the BRN culture is there to stay depended on “the head of the family”, that is, the new president. In view of the long-standing challenges in Tanzania’s public service, some interviewees offered critical views of the parallel system of Ministerial Delivery Units that were based inside ministries as “quasi project implementation units”. With the MDU officials receiving higher salaries than their colleagues in the ministry, similar effects on the morale of civil servants could be observed, as in the case of the provision of longer-term technical assistance and project implementation units. The example of the MDUs also shows that additional structure might help in the short-term, but in the long-term it might lead to duplications and unclear lines of reporting.

However, these more critical views were accompanied by others who, although cognisant of the short-time horizon of BRN, felt that the RBA interventions and the wider BRN context have helped people to become more aware as to why results were not achieved in the past. Moreover, many were optimistic that some of the aspects put in place in the context of the three programmes, such as the open data initiatives as well as improved efficiency in funding schools for instance, would support achieving longer-term capacity development results beyond the BRN initiative itself.

5 Conclusions

The analysis of different RBA programmes and the BRN initiative presented in this paper shows an encouraging picture of donors and the government welcoming innovative approaches towards responding to their shared concern of increasing public service delivery. Guided by this aim, donors and the government of Tanzania have started to use new innovative approaches that include various combinations and adaptations of existing aid modalities. A recent trend concerns the use of results-oriented approaches based on Western New Public Management ideas. None of these are introduced in a blueprint manner, as all analysed programmes have been adapted to the specific context and initiative by the government of Tanzania, both in terms of how they were designed and translated “on the ground”.

The evidence of the three programmes confirms that current RBA practices, although innovative in many respects, also feature many known characteristics of other aid modalities. Furthermore, RBA programmes vary significantly in their design and implementation approach, depending on the donor, the specific sector and the partner country. As with any development intervention, RBA programmes are affected by the overall conditions and political economy of development cooperation that is created and reinforced by the interests of all parties involved. In the case of Tanzania, a defining factor is the country’s long-standing aid dependence, which – despite low performance results in
terms of national development – also reflects the government’s strong capacity to attract and manage contributions from a wide range of international donors.

The recent introduction of BRN testifies to that, and despite the fact that donors are no longer providing as much budget support as they used to, Tanzania continues to be in many ways a testing ground for innovations in development cooperation management. The BRN initiative moreover not only (primarily) seeks to boost government performance before upcoming elections – characterised by growing opposition and criticism towards the government – it also provides a new channel for donors to redirect funds originally provided in the form of budget support.

Despite this “meeting of minds” and shared interests, it should be emphasised that the government’s plans and donors’ support for them carry strong risks. Managing these risks requires discipline and clear prioritisation by all. Although designed as a catalysing programme, the combination of underfunding and strong expansion of the scope of BRN may increase the likelihood of overlaps and supplementation of government efforts. The initiative’s expansion can to some degree be seen as an indicator of its success, but it can also have harmful effects on the capacity of civil servants by partially substituting for its performance and responsibility. If the BRN management structures end up in part supplementing for line management tasks instead of catalysing the government’s performance, public service delivery may increase while the government’s capacity stagnates or decreases.

Whereas BRN clearly lives up to its name in the sense of prioritising short-term gains, evidence from the three programmes suggests that this is done in a way that may neglect considerations of – and measures to – longer-term sustainability. In its most recent progress report, the government recognised the challenge to reconcile institution-building and implementation (GoT, 2015, p. 9). Capacity development support provided by donors – in the context of the three programmes in particular – has mainly been provided with a view to enabling and ensuring successful implementation, and less so to mitigate the risks of the short-term drive for results and the potential inconsistency with longer-term programmes. In addition to continuing its drive to provide quality public services, the new government of Tanzania taking office later this year should therefore increase its efforts to realise its Development Vision 2025 of promoting a development mindset and strong government implementation with equal vigour, as well as endurance.
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Annex
### Annex 1: List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attfield, Ian</td>
<td>Education Adviser</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development (DFID) Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bald, Andre A.</td>
<td>Senior Urban Specialist</td>
<td>World Bank Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charnock, Annabel</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>The United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office, President’s Delivery Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couplex, Olivier</td>
<td>Head of Section, Economics and Governance</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union to Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imwolde-Krämer, Claudia</td>
<td>Counsellor / Head of Cooperation</td>
<td>Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanzler, Andreas</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>GIZ Water Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinyua, Henry</td>
<td>Director of Agricultural Markets Efficiencies</td>
<td>The United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office, President’s Delivery Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwezi, Lukas</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Adviser</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development (DFID) Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader, Nicholas</td>
<td>Governance Adviser</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development (DFID) Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lerise, Fred</td>
<td>Head of Capacity Development</td>
<td>GIZ Water Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maganga, Tumaini</td>
<td>Economist Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Presidential Delivery Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manda, Constantine</td>
<td>Senior Research Analyst</td>
<td>Twaweza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minoru, Homma</td>
<td>Senior Representative</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Tanzania Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olav, Svein</td>
<td>Country Economist</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayre, Rebecca</td>
<td>Education Consultant</td>
<td>World Bank Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schipper, Youdi</td>
<td>Research Manager</td>
<td>Twaweza</td>
</tr>
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