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**Research Report**

## Increasing the visibility and effectiveness of development cooperation: how to reconcile two competing objectives?

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## Studies

### Increasing the Visibility and Effectiveness of Development Cooperation

How to reconcile two competing objectives?

*Frank Vollmer*

Increasing the visibility and effectiveness  
of development cooperation

## German Development Institute (DIE)

The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) is a multidisciplinary research, consultancy and training institute for Germany's bilateral and for multilateral development cooperation. On the basis of independent research, it acts as consultant to public institutions in Germany and abroad on current issues of cooperation between developed and developing countries. Through its 9-months training course, the German Development Institute prepares German and European university graduates for a career in the field of development policy.

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## Increasing the visibility and effectiveness of development cooperation

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*Frank Vollmer*

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## Preface

This study on the “visibility” of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is part of a broader research project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) on “Development Policy: Questions for the Future”.

Among other things, the project entails the analysis of concrete options for improving the implementation of the international aid effectiveness agenda. Specifically, the study undertakes a desk review aimed at hermeneutically scrutinising the role played by “visibility” in the implementation of the agenda, the only such attempt to formalise and pin down “good practices” politically in the delivery of ODA. Though normative, the agenda gains its political strength from the many signatories/endorsements of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: since 2005 more than 150 countries and international organisations have signed the Paris Declaration and therefore committed themselves to its implementation, despite the acknowledged and reiterated political challenges that will entail. While not legally binding, it is nevertheless the internationally recognised frame of reference for the effective delivery of aid against which the concept of “visibility” is rightly gauged and from which recommendations for policy actions are derived.

This study is based on interviews with representatives of the BMZ, the KfW banking group, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and Welthungerhilfe, and on numerous conversations and exchanges with colleagues at the German Development Institute (DIE). I am grateful to all participants for their thought-provoking contributions. The usual caveat applies.

Frank Vollmer

Bonn, July 2012





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## Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development / Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
BS	Budget Support
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DIE	German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
DoL	Division of Labour
DP	Development Partner (aka donor)
EC	European Commission
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (provided by OCHA)
G20	Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
GiZ	German Agency for International Cooperation / Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HLF	High Level Forum
IC-DoL	In-country division of labour
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP	Principal-agent problem

PBA	Programme-based approaches
PD	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
PD/AAA	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness / Accra Agenda for Action
Q-squared	Qualitative and Quantitative
SSC	South-South Cooperation
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WP-EFF	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (of the OECD-DAC)

## Executive Summary

Official development assistance (ODA) is constantly under pressure to justify its *raison d'être*. Hence, calls for greater visibility – to prove to parliaments and the public how ODA is used appropriately – are frequently to be heard at the headquarters level of aid agencies, particularly in ministries responsible for promoting development and in the implementing bi- and multilateral development institutions. At the same time, reports that such calls for greater visibility can undermine efforts to achieve aid effectiveness continue to appear, particularly among aid practitioners at field level in partner countries. With these different views in mind, it is time to give more thought to visibility and its implications for the aid effectiveness agenda. First, a conceptual discussion should be launched. A better understanding of the relationship between the call for “greater visibility” and that for “greater effectiveness” will then be necessary. Can ODA become more visible and remain effective at the same time? Or does achieving one goal mean sacrificing the other?

### *Aid effectiveness*

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) is internationally acknowledged as marking a critical moment in the history of development assistance and cooperation. The 56 commitments grouped under the five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability – deepened in the 2008 follow-up, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), and given even greater emphasis in the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – attempt to deconstruct old perceptions of competing development partners (DPs) delivering ODA to (grateful) supplicants. Such competitive and uncoordinated donor-driven aid supply did not live up to ODA's potential to reduce poverty in partner countries. On the contrary, uncoordinated aid supply can have severe adverse effects and unintended consequences in the partner country – such as higher transaction costs, a major duplication of effort and increased aid management overheads – that impact negatively on the partner government's ability to address poverty effectively.

In response, the aid effectiveness agenda attempts to nurture awareness of the need for development actors to meet as partners and peers who rely on one another and subordinate individual interests where possible in order to make progress towards the achievement of their shared objective of making aid more effective so that

- a. poverty may be fought more efficiently and effectively;
- b. the return on the ODA provided is improved.

The rationale behind the agenda is basic: on paper, coordinated action is more likely to increase value for money, since it should have a greater impact for the beneficiaries than eventually achieved by merely combining the individual and uncoordinated efforts of the DPs. Increasing the return on the initial investment should be in the best interests of the principals of ODA, such as the taxpayers in the DP country.

Thus, while aid effectiveness is a concept that benefits from this basic form of common understanding (among aid experts at least), visibility has yet to be addressed conceptually.

*Conceptualising visibility in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda*

“Visibility” is a term frequently used in discussions surrounding the international aid effectiveness agenda. It is mentioned, for instance, at various points in the final reports of the first and second phases of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration (published in 2008 and 2011, respectively, to inform the third and fourth High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana, and Busan, South Korea). Yet, while the term “aid effectiveness” has been the subject of a conceptual discussion, the use of “visibility” – despite its prominence in the evaluations – tends to be based on an everyday understanding of the term. It lacks a conceptual discussion: what is visibility, and how is it achieved? Why is it sought, what are its benefits, and what threats does it pose to the implementation of the agenda? This should benefit the identification of parameters of a form of development cooperation that is as visible as possible without concentrated efforts to achieve aid effectiveness in the partner country being undermined. The present study attempts to achieve this conceptualisation.



*What is visibility?*

“*Visibility*” is a transient term, but has two basic meanings: the “*state of being able to see or be seen*” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2011), and the “*capability of being readily noticed*” (Merriam-Webster 2011). In the context of the aid effectiveness debate, it can therefore be placed roughly between transparency – the open exchange of information among development agents and with their respective principals – and the public relations of agents who want to be noticed.

*How is visibility achieved?*

Visibility can be achieved through the use of any combination of signs, symbols, phrases and words (descriptors) through which it is possible to be noticed. As visibility is merely the capability of being noticed, the options for establishing a notion are numerous. For example, the “Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions”, published by the European Commission (EC), identifies banners, photographs, display panels, leaflets, press releases, press conferences, press visits, brochures and newsletters, websites, commemorative plaques, vehicles, supplies and equipment, promotional items, audiovisual productions, public events and visits and information campaigns as the main elements (or channels) for its communication and visibility plan (EC 2010, 17).

The channels chosen for achieving visibility depend on a number of mutually influencing factors, ranging from

1. the reason / motivation for being visible and
2. the target group, including its attention span, to
3. the phase in which the desire for visibility arises.

If, for instance, visibility becomes an objective of development actors in the course of a humanitarian crisis (phase), aid pledges and commitments will be announced immediately to the public (target group), even though specific projects and programmes may still be in the identification and inception phase. However, most importantly, the choice of channels for achieving visibility depends on the reasons/motivations of agents seeking visibility.

*Why is visibility sought?*

Visibility is sought to inform, to present and to give an impression of how a development agent puts funds entrusted to him to meaningful use. Instrumentalising visibility is certainly justifiable, but caution is required. Particularly if instrumentalised for political reasons – such as securing a continuation of financial endowments, boosting the career of the presenter or setting an agenda – it can become ambiguous, because it may conflict with its transparency mandate. If the aim is to create or increase “brand awareness”, information may be tailored, withheld or manipulated with a view to conveying a favourable impression or preventing a negative impression from being conveyed. In addition, evidence-based recommendations for making aid effective at partner-country level – such as channelling bilateral ODA through the partner country’s public financial management (PFM) systems if conditions allow – may be ignored by the DP simply because the DP may feel that its own performance is not visible enough in the recommendation for its own “brand” to be “sold” to the principals in their respective home constituencies. Ideally, perception matches evidence that an agent’s work and agenda are useful, relevant, effective and efficient (as defined in the aid effectiveness agenda). Yet judging whether this is true remains one of the greatest challenges for analysts of development cooperation. They must scrutinise visibility (and communication) plans for content. Assuming the role of “watchdog”, the analyst must differentiate between high-quality work (high-quality implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda) and lip-service (where references to the PD/AAA are made, but implementation is actually poor).

*Arguments for visibility to make aid more effective*

Four good arguments support the claim that visibility could be a valuable asset in promoting the aid effectiveness agenda:

1. First, the implementation of the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) – confirmed in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation – implicitly calls for greater visibility of the agenda as such in the political and pub-

lic domains. In particular, the PD requires “*continued high-level political support, peer pressure and coordinated actions*” (paragraph 8). Greater visibility of the agenda is therefore necessary to ensure its continued relevance.

2. Second, visibility in the form of an exchange of information is a precondition if development actors are to coordinate their activities.
3. Third, agents must be visible at some stage of the aid delivery chain to account for their activities to their respective principals.
4. Fourth, partner governments should use visibility as a lever: if they lack much of the bargaining power they need to be considered and noticed as development partners and not mere ODA applicants, visibility is one of the few levers at their disposal for demanding a right of ownership. As development assistance ought to be demand- rather than supply-driven, a highly visible and outspoken rejection of funds that do not meet identified needs may demonstrate how seriously a partner country is tackling the development challenges it faces. Partner governments should therefore take advantage of the current momentum and attempt to increase their “democratic” visibility as much as possible, in order to weaken DPs’ reluctance to act in a principled manner. As democratic leaders, they should be opportunistic and embrace their responsibility for determining and gaining broad-based support for their democratic development paths. They should perceive visibility as one of their leadership requirements, behind which DPs can align themselves and harmonise their activities.

*Critical reflections on the negative effects of visibility on the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda*

Effective development cooperation cannot function without some form of visibility. However, it cannot cope with every form of visibility. In fact, if the call for visibility is undifferentiated, it can pose threats to the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Visibility can have adverse effects if the desire for it at agency level outweighs approach-

ing aid delivery, as the PD sees it. Such “declaration-style” aid is defined as being “*clearly aligned to country priorities and systems, coordinated by the country and/or provided through harmonised or multi-donor arrangements, untied, predictable and transparent*” (Wood et al. 2011, xi). Actions should be geared to the achievement of substantial and sustainable development results (which should be negotiated by DPs and the partner country). “Declaration-style” aid is undermined if the desire for visibility creates incentives for going solo – that is, the implementation of projects/programmes uncoordinated with other DPs and parallel to the partner government – that are stronger than the incentives to work in a coordinated manner. Such a course of action makes it more likely that the agents’ visibility is established and attribution to them is proven; yet the price is that this course of action undermines partner-country ownership, and, among other things, causes ODA fragmentation. At worst, it leads to a “free-for-all” situation, a relapse into the turmoil of “*competitive, uncoordinated and donor-driven activities*” (ibid., xv) that the PD set out to overcome by demanding joint action between partner countries and DPs, and among DPs.

More precisely, implementing the aid effectiveness agenda is threatened if the desire for visibility sets the incentive for the individualism/egoism of agents, who then predominantly

- a. “cherry-pick” projects, sectors, modalities or countries. This can give rise to fragmentation and duplication of effort. It can also create aid orphans, because it impedes a division of labour (DoL): cherry-pickers rarely focus on compensating for the actions of others;
- b. pursue “quick gains” which are neither sustainable nor substantial, but are immediately presentable and attributable. The evaluative focus remains on individual inputs (the financial, human and material resources used for the development intervention), activities (action taken or work performed, such as the number of schools financed) and outputs (the products, capital goods, services resulting from a development intervention, such as the number of schoolchildren enrolled) rather than joint outcomes (the likely or actual short-term and medium-term effects of or

changes brought about by the outputs of an intervention, such as a reduction of the illiteracy rate) or impacts (the long-term consequences of the programme, such as improved primary education). This almost guarantees positive publicity (our inputs – financial or technical assistance – have been greater than those of donor X, and so more children have been enrolled), although it creates a risk-averse culture that undermines collaboration in addressing fundamental problems requiring long-term and coordinated action (e.g. how is it possible to improve the quality of primary education? Who takes responsibility for the curriculum, the supply and maintenance of the school equipment, the training facilities for teachers and their salaries to prevent a brain drain, and how can we together prevent political patronage from influencing teacher placement in schools?);

- c. claim the credit for results achieved, rather than modestly regarding their own efforts as a contribution to outcomes jointly achieved. Claiming the credit is not only dishonest, but may also create a climate in which the partners feel relieved of the responsibility to help to deliver results in the future.

Put differently, the pressure to attribute – and to remain in control of the formation of perceptions by promoting (and protecting) one’s “brand” – may threaten the aid effectiveness agenda. This can happen if visibility-induced egoism has the (unintended) effect of encouraging PD/AAA non-compliance in the form of questionable aid practices, such as earmarking or the creation of parallel project implementation units. At worst, visibility joins with such other factors as the geo-strategic and commercial interests of DPs and sets in motion a downward spiral in which assistance remains (or relapses into) a one-way, donor-suppliant route, with DPs competing with each other and refusing to delegate power and leadership to partner countries. DPs do so (a) to remain in control of the assistance provided, (b) to ensure that outputs are as forthcoming as anticipated and (c) to guarantee that their work is attributable and distinctive in order (d) to present positive work to their domestic principal. This accords with the intention (e) of being perceived as a capable development actor. While managing visibility in

this way may suit the agent's political intentions with regard to the domestic electorate, it may cause ODA to become ineffective.

While the second phase of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration clearly shows that – owing to the agenda – a “free-for-all” situation has been largely overcome, a relapse cannot be ruled out. In other words, while development agencies are more willing to collaborate today than they were some 20 years ago, they do not collaborate as far as they committed themselves to doing by 2010 when signing the PD in 2005. After all, the process of meeting the targets of the Monitoring Survey – a set of thirteen indicators for observing quantitative progress in implementing the agenda – has been disappointing: only one of the thirteen targets for 2010 was met (Indicator 4, strengthening capacity by co-ordinated technical co-operation. See Appendix 4). Despite some promising progress in the case of partner-country ownership, both the survey and the evaluation clearly show, in particular, that the process of alignment, harmonisation and managing for results was slowed down, among other things, by DPs' fears of losing individual visibility in the wake of such action. In certain cases – such as Nepal – meaningful and evidence-based recommendations for increasing aid effectiveness at partner-country level were rejected by DPs on the ground that their individual visibility would be lost as a consequence of such action (OECD 2011b; Wood et al., 2011). In such cases, effectiveness is demoted to a second concern among equals.

#### *Assessment of the relationship between visibility and effectiveness*

This analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of visibility for the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda raises the question: is it possible to have both greater visibility and greater effectiveness in development cooperation? Three scenarios are conceivable.

##### *1. A win-win situation?*

Is it a clear-cut “win-win situation”? No. Development actors tend to think in terms of the visibility of the individual “agency” – which they want to see increased – and the effectiveness of the “group”, which calls for joint action and therefore agents willing to share the spotlight.

An undifferentiated call for “greater visibility” is therefore very likely to result in the second scenario.

### 2. *A win-lose situation?*

Is it a clear-cut “win-lose situation” (or a case of “impossible geometrics”)? Yes, *if* agents *insist* on the visibility of their input and activities, particularly during the project/programme implementation phase in the partner country. If agents insist on hoisting their own flag to mark the *output* achieved – such as a school built with bilateral ODA – then aid effectiveness is in jeopardy. This is the kind of visibility that

- a. is the most serious obstacle to collaboration, which calls for mutual trust, shared risks and the acceptance of responsibility,
- b. creates incentives to cherry-pick projects/programmes small enough for a single financier to implement.

The key word of the aid effectiveness agenda is “mutual”, which gives a fairly clear indication that *control* over the development process must be shared, as must the spotlight – the responsibility and credentials – in this process. Yet this differentiated view opens up a third scenario.

### 3. *A third way?*

Is there a “third way”? Yes, in the form of “new” visibility. The two competing objectives of increasing the visibility and the effectiveness of development cooperation can be reconciled if the agent and the principal start to think outside the box. A third way can emerge if DPs in particular overcome their great desire for performance visibility in the partner country and

- a. present their efforts modestly as contributions to jointly achieved development outcomes and impacts (results visibility) and
- b. are willing to enhance visibility with strong communication strategies that convincingly and creatively explain possible losses of individual visibility for the sake of functioning joint efforts at partner-country level. If given a clear explanation, the principal is likely to understand – and one should choose to be

positive about this prospect – that the sacrifice of the visibility of individual input and activities – the loss of *performance visibility* (not of performance as such) – during the project/programme implementation phase in the partner country has been worthwhile, if the impact of joint action on the beneficiaries in the partner country has been greater than would possibly have been achieved by the sum of the individual performances of the development actors. In theory, joint action increases the effectiveness of aid and therefore gives better “value for money”. Effective aid is therefore in the best interests of

- the beneficiaries in the partner country and
- the domestic principals in the DP country, since they see an increased return on the individual investment (in the form, it is to be hoped, of greater poverty reduction or a similar positive impact on the lives of the beneficiaries).

#### *Parameters of the “new” visibility*

This “new” visibility uses a “form-follows-function” *leitmotiv*: that is, effectiveness is the primary concern and point of departure in any discussion on ODA, whereas visualising the path towards effectiveness – and one’s individual role in it – takes second place. Where the “new” visibility obtains, agents need to understand that their call for visibility should be differentiated:

- a. The call for input, activity and output visibility – the agent’s performance – should be, in fact, a call for greater transparency for information-sharing purposes. The information concerned is best published in keeping with the International Aid Transparency Initiative standard or through publicly accessible web-libraries at partner-country level. An agent’s performance does need to be visible to be effective. In fact, non-visibility – in the sense that the performance does not receive much attention, or occurs largely unnoticed – is not an indication that there has been no performance. Financing the maintenance of an existing school may be less visible and noticeable than financing the building of a new school. Yet, in performance terms, ensuring a



school is maintained (so that the premises are available for an improved quality of education, the desired outcome of the aid intervention) may be more effective than the one-off focus on a very visible output (the building of a new school without any indication of who will cover the maintenance costs once the programme has ended). On the other hand, although performance does not need to be visible to be effective, it must be transparent to increase the likelihood of its contributing to the effective use of ODA. In other words, performance indicators and information should be made visible at a central, easily accessible location where they can be seen by everybody, giving an insight into who is engaged where, with what contribution and in what constellation. Without this necessary information gathered in a common format to enable actions to be coordinated, a DoL is unnecessarily hampered, making a duplication of effort more likely.

- b. The call for greater visibility during the implementation phase in the partner country may, in fact, be counterproductive from an effectiveness point of view. Put differently, less *branding* in the partner country (visibility of input and activities) may promise greater effectiveness, if the preconditions in the partner country are right, that is, if the partner government shows strong *ownership*, which is indicated, first and foremost, by
  - the establishment of democratic operational development plans, which, among other things, clearly reveal what form a DoL between the partner country and the DP may take, and
  - the existence of reliable public financial and procurement systems.
- c. The call for visibility must be aligned with the definition of effectiveness. To prevent the domestic principal from misunderstanding such “modesty” – or “silent” performance – in the implementation phase at partner-country level as inactivity or passiveness on the part of the DP – or simply as “poor” performance – development agents should therefore use targeted communication strategies. Communication strategies seek to foster a certain image of the development agency, one that shows

it to be effective. To align the image of an effective development actor with the actual understanding of effectiveness, such strategies should contain “principled” information that is related to the agreed definition of effectiveness in the aid effectiveness agenda. In other words, communication strategies should contain visuals (*inter alia* images, comics, data visualisations) and interesting narratives of the agent’s own contribution to the joint development results achieved with aid given declaration-style.

#### *Preconditions for the “new” visibility*

If this “new” visibility is to function, the following preconditions must be satisfied:

1. A capable partner government, one that meets the right preconditions – such as operational development plans – to allow and pressure DPs to act in a principled manner. Ownership is the linchpin of the aid effectiveness agenda. Without ownership, joint efforts to increase the impact of ODA will not function, and the “new” visibility is therefore bound to fail.
2. Close collaboration between the evaluation and communication departments of development agencies: those who provide the evidence of effective development cooperation – the information and data on development outcomes and impacts – need to inform the communication experts who have been assigned the task of communicating the complexity of development in understandable terms to the target groups. This necessitates the extensive commissioning of M&Es of declaration-style aid so that it may actually be proved and demonstrated that positive development results can be achieved through the “principled” application of ODA.
3. Creativity: aid effectiveness is established at partner-country level with an individual mix of aid modalities, team composition and task-sharing. Inevitably, this will entail strategic choices containing some elements inferior to others in visualisation potential:

- Budget support (and contributions to other pool arrangements) is inferior to project aid in terms of visual presentation;
- Multilateral aid is as inferior to bilateral aid as unearmarked funding is to earmarked funding if attribution is what is wanted;
- Proactive decision-making is inferior to reactive decision-making in terms of noticeability, since public attention is usually lacking;
- Capturing interest with maintenance activities is inferior to setting up more and more new projects;
- Social-sector targeting is more inclined to positive visualisation than is support for the productive sectors.

Yet this should be seen as a challenge rather than an existential disadvantage. In practical terms, this lack of potential for visibility – this “non-visibility” of budget support, multilateral aid, etc. – should not be perceived as a valid reason for objecting to these strategic decisions if they are considered necessary for an effective DoL and poverty alleviation. With imagination and creativity, a lack of potential to achieve visibility can be turned into actual visibility, without effectiveness being undermined. In other words, if something is not visible, make it visible. How? By using information and data visualisation, graphics, comics, illustrations and interesting narratives that explain plausibly

- why certain strategies were chosen,
- why actor X has been assigned task Y.

A lack of visibility can be compensated for with some good communication. This calls for....

4. An “enlightened principal” (parliament, taxpayers and the audit office), one that is familiar with – and, to a certain degree, also recognises and accepts – the basic rationale behind the aid effectiveness agenda and acknowledges that

- the *raison d'être* of development cooperation is no longer explained by merely highlighting the performance of the individual development agents, but by the results achieved;
- “value for money” is highest where structural problems are addressed to achieve impacts (which by definition requires dedicated and predictable forward-planning budgets and action over at least 2–5 years), not where there is a rise in the number of projects/programmes financed which are too time-bound for any real impact to be achieved (programmes that are tied to the DP’s annual budget cycle, for instance);
- *performance* does not necessarily have to be visible, if it helps to achieve substantial change (which should, on the other hand, be made highly visible);
- targeting for results may entail a quantitative “attribution gap”, which may be unbridgeable and an inevitable consequence of the course of joint action chosen to make ODA more effective. Qualitative testimonies – interviews with beneficiaries, participatory studies, expert opinions, etc. – particularly in such areas as governance, must be accepted at times as sufficient to assess whether results have been achieved (imperfect and unsatisfying though this may be);
- ODA is a risk-investment that is often used in regions or sectors where no private capital investor would accept the risk of seeing no return on his investment. ODA should attempt to manage such risks, rather than avoid them. Taking risks involves collaborating with other actors in the partner country over a longer time horizon, in order to achieve the desired impacts that are both substantial and sustainable. Impacts are by definition influenced by many factors. They require a greater number of actors, who must collaborate; anticipated impacts may not materialise because exogenic factors – such as natural disasters or unfavourable worldwide economic conditions – offset the possible success of the coordinated programmes once they

have been completed. Managing for results is more risky than focusing solely on the outputs of a project or programme financed by a single DP. Hence results management entails relinquishing some of the *control* that DPs naturally want to exercise over their inputs – which may mean channelling funds to multilateral agencies or into pooled funds – and the principal should a) encourage the agency to do so if it is deemed conducive to achieving results and b) reckon with possible setbacks;

- the interests of the beneficiaries in the partner country should always come first. Consequently, enlightened principals should not accept that “non-visibility” is used – in their name – by their aid agents as an excuse for objecting to strategically useful recommendations which – by consensus and particularly in the eyes of a “capable” partner government – would be deemed appropriate for an effective fight against poverty in the partner country. In other words, the “new” visibility needs an audience that rewards with attention and approval development strategies drafted on the basis of rational evidence that they will make a real impact on the lives of the poor, rather than being an aesthetic presentation designed to show them, as principals, how ODA has been used in practice, with the sole aim of creating the impression that – and this is the main paradox of the need for visibility in development cooperation – appropriate action is being taken to fight poverty effectively in the partner country.

### *Conclusion*

Visibility may not be the most important factor to be discussed in the context of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Commercial and geo-strategic interests of the DP that determine ODA disbursements, for instance, have a much greater impact on the question whether or not DPs and partner countries can move beyond mere lip-service and seriously attempt to implement development strategies that have the interests of the beneficiaries in the partner country at heart.

But neither should visibility be underestimated as a factor that *does* have an impact on the agenda and the effectiveness of aid.

Development cooperation that defines effectiveness as a joint venture needs to consider the demands this new paradigm makes on the visibility of the implementing aid agencies. It necessitates a new kind of visibility, one that is adjusted to the changing demands on ODA. Reducing performance visibility in the partner country is just a small price to be paid to increase the impact of ODA on the lives of the beneficiaries in the partner country. The loss of performance visibility can even be offset by offers to parliaments, audit offices and the public of results visibility and an increase in communication.

A clear starting-point for launching the notion of “new” visibility is to make the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the agreement on the Busan Partnership – and its underlying rationale – more visible outside the small group of aid specialists. For example, OECD/DAC DPs should use money categorised as “development awareness” in the DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) – money that counts as ODA – for a targeted campaign to increase awareness of the aid effectiveness agenda in their respective home constituencies, a campaign that explains, in a language people can follow and understand, why performance visibility can seriously hinder the achievement of joint results.

An enlightened audience is more likely to accept a possible loss of individual performance visibility at partner-country level for the sake of aid effectiveness. Performance does not have to be visible to be effective. It need only be transparent. Results, on the other hand, should be visible and transparent. It should be with results that agents attempt to make an impression, to mould the political perception of the principals that – as agents – they have been “good” development actors.

## Introduction

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) is internationally acknowledged as marking a critical moment in the history of development assistance and cooperation. Deepened in its 2008 follow-up, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), it took stock of evaluation and research findings that highlighted the limitations and actual negative effects of the “*institutional economics of foreign aid*” (Svensson 2006).<sup>1</sup>

Characterised by an effort to deconstruct old role perceptions of competing development partners (DPs) delivering Official Development Assistance (ODA) to grateful applicants, the PD/AAA attempts to nurture the awareness that development actors must meet as partners and peers who rely on one another, subordinating individual interests so that progress may be made towards the achievement of the common goal, the reduction of poverty at country level.<sup>2</sup>

In due course, the “international aid effectiveness agenda” was monitored and evaluated not least to inform the formulation of the PD/AAA’s successor, discussed by 3,000 delegates at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF 4) held in Busan, South Korea, in late 2011 (with the main aim of framing a new, even more inclusive Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation that overcame the historic North-South structure that had characterised the aid effectiveness debate).<sup>3</sup> The message

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1 See also Birdsall (2004), Easterly (2006), Martens et al. (2002) for further analysis and particularly a critique of international development cooperation, which partly informed the formulation of the PD.


2 A process referred to by Glennie (2011) as the “*horizontalisation*” of international cooperation.

3 Since its inception the agenda has undergone lengthy analyses, debates and evaluations to scrutinise its key premises and to monitor the deliverables. Studies have been commissioned to monitor and evaluate PD/AAA principles and commitments and country-specific implementation (Monitoring Surveys 2006, 2008, 2011; Phases I and II of the Evaluation of the Paris Declaration). Secondary literature has looked into the premises and assumptions of the declaration and its implementing actors, the results of the M&E exercises and proposed amendments for incorporation into its successor to be formulated at the HLF 4 in Busan (see, for example, Booth 2011; De Renzio et al 2008; Droop et al. 2008; Faust / Neubert, 2010; Klasen 2009; Odén / Wohlgemuth 2011; Steer / Wathne 2009; Vatterodt 2008).

was clear: while progress in the implementation of the PD/AAA was not as rapid as anticipated, the declaration's key principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability proved relevant *"to improving the quality of aid and of the partnerships needed to make it work"*, according to the authors of the Phase II evaluation of the PD (Wood et al. 2011: xv). This key finding led to a reiteration and confirmation of the principles in the Busan Partnership Agreement for those DPs and partner countries who had endorsed the PD and the AAA, which is a reassurance of their relevance.<sup>4,5</sup>

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- 4 The study reflects the level of information available in May 2012. The analysis is mainly influenced by the synthesis report of the second evaluation of the Paris Declaration (published in May 2011) and the 2011 Monitoring Survey (published in October 2011). The study is also informed by the "Busan Partnership For Effective Development Co-Operation" of December 2011, which announces that by June 2012 signatories are to agree *"on a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets through which we will monitor progress on a rolling basis"* (OECD 2011a, 12).
- 5 The change of terminology from aid to development effectiveness in the Busan Partnership Agreement is conspicuous and reflects the recognition that *"aid – and its effectiveness – are only one element of a broader landscape of development finance, and that findings relating to joint efforts to make aid more effective can and should inform a broader development effectiveness agenda going forward"* (OECD 2011d, 6). Yet the term "development effectiveness" – in contrast to "aid effectiveness" – still lacks a more refined definition, as Kindornay shows: while *"a common understanding of 'development effectiveness' does not exist [a thematic study on the Paris Declaration defined aid effectiveness as the] arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient, reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes, including poverty reduction"* (Stern et al., 2008: vii in Kindornay 2011, 10). This means in practice that *"some actors make little distinction between aid and development effectiveness"* (Kindornay 2011, 10). Certainly, some commentators share an understanding of development effectiveness as a reference point for development outcomes that *"result from national and international forces, including aid interventions by various actors, the availability of domestic resources, global commodity prices, regional stability and many other determinants"* (Kindornay / Morton, 2009: 4). For the purposes of the present study – which seeks to assess the role of visibility in development cooperation in general and the implementation of the international aid effectiveness agenda in particular – the now classical, yet still valid definition of aid effectiveness is used as the analytical benchmark.





The second phase of the evaluation of the PD analysed in depth where most progress had been made towards implementation and attempted to find reasons for any lack of progress. It concludes that “*country ownership has advanced farthest, with alignment and harmonisation progressing more unevenly, and managing for development results and mutual accountability advancing least*” (ibid.). It further concludes that partner countries have gone further in implementing their commitments than DPs (Wood et al. 2011, xiii).

Reasons for DP non-compliance appeared at both macro and agency level. Wood and his team emphasised that

*“development aid and aid reform have to compete for political and public attention with an even wider range of domestic and international issues in donor countries, making it harder to muster the necessary political, bureaucratic and public attention and support”* (ibid.).

At agency level, the evaluators referred, for example, to “*a focus on compliance and a risk-averse culture; [and] disconnects between corporate strategies and the aid effectiveness agenda and weak organisational incentives*” (ibid.). Later in the evaluation they pinpoint the need and desire to be visible with *attributable* work as a further reason for the lack of progress in the implementation particularly of PD/AAA commitments that require joint efforts among DPs, and a transfer of power and control from DP to partner country. Specifically, the lack of progress on harmonisation since 2005 is partly explained by “*donor headquarter insistence on their distinctive channels for reasons of visibility*” (Wood et al. 2011, 27). Furthermore, a key finding of the country evaluation of Nepal was that “*the need to demonstrate attribution*” inhibited some bilateral development partners from alignment and the adoption of government systems, which caused a “*continued fragmentation with many stand-alone projects, vertical fundings, and direct implementation*” (Wood et al. 2011, 117).<sup>6,7</sup>

In other words, the need and desire for *attributable visibility and noticeability* – particularly emphasised in ministries responsible for promoting development (in DP countries) and at headquarters level of the implementing bi- and multilateral development institutions – may prevent the demise

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- 6 Other authors writing on this subject-matter also refer to the striving for individual visibility as one of the reasons for a lack of progress in implementing the normative principles of the Paris Declaration, particularly in relation to the second PD principle (alignment) and the third (harmonisation). See, for example, Barder (2009), Booth (2008) and Mwega (2010).
- 7 These are the two, seemingly opposite, poles from which references to visibility usually appear in the literature:
1. analysts who claim that the individual striving for visibility is an obstacle to the implementation of the PD/AAA principles and commitments also claimed ...
  2. that a lack of visibility of development aid and aid reform in DP and partner countries as such has been a cause of slow implementation by DPs of their respective commitments.

In other words, critics who claim that the agency striving for visibility undermines attempts to foster team awareness among DPs and between DPs and partner countries may be the first to call for an increase in the visibility of development cooperation per se in the public domain in order to leverage change at the political macro level (for instance, to urge DPs of the G20 publicly and visibly to live up to their 2005 Gleneagles commitment to raise ODA from its 2004 level of about US\$80 billion to nearly US\$130 billion, at 2004 prices and exchange rates, by 2010).

of old role perceptions that the PD/AAA set out to redefine. But is this so surprising?

Development agents are constantly asked and under pressure to *legitimise* their *raison d'être*. Frequent calls to increase “brand awareness” with a view to gaining necessary political support and financial and technical endowments are a common feature in development cooperation. It is a policy field in which – leaving aside the rhetorical calls for joint action – incentive structures favour individualism and niche-thinking, and every organisation held accountable by its stakeholders must be seen to be earning its keep. Evidence-based policy-making pushes actors to prove and to highlight (or make visible) their individual inputs, activities and outputs and, best of all, outcomes achieved and impacts caused.

Seen in this light, the need for visibility, knowing who has done what, the need to make development cooperation noticeable and transparent, is a political reality and democratic necessity without which development cooperation cannot function, or does not function, depending on the viewpoint.<sup>8</sup> What would happen if development cooperation and the agents involved were invisible, unnoticeable, untraceable, unmonitorable?

Or is this, in fact, the current reality and state of the art in development cooperation? After all, according to the 2011 Pilot Aid Transparency Index of Publish What You Fund,

*“the vast majority of aid information is not currently published”. Most worryingly, “an astonishing 23 organisations [surveyed] do not systematically publish any country information – country strategies, forward budgets, evaluations and results – which is over a third of the 58 organisations surveyed and includes major donors such as Canada, Germany, Norway, USAID and U.S. Treasury”* (Global Campaign for Aid Transparency 2011).

Does, then, this astonishing finding warrant a call for more oversight, more monitoring, more exchanges of information, in short, *greater* visibility of actions and actors?

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8 Wood et al. may have recognised that the desire for visibility inhibits progress on the PD principles of alignment and harmonisation. On the other hand, transparency advocates may indeed emphasise that a lack of visibility, that is, a lack of knowledge-sharing, inhibits the better and more effective use of ODA (see, for example, the briefing paper *“Greater aid transparency: crucial for aid effectiveness”* published by the Overseas Development Institute, the International Budget Partnership, and Publish What You Fund [Moon / Williamson 2010]).

Visibility is therefore neither all good nor all bad for development cooperation and the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Like every political reality, honest reflection on the subject will identify justifiable grounds for its existence. But every action has effects and consequences, which must be openly discussed. Hence the goals of this study:

1. To identify the *raison d'être* of visibility in development cooperation: what causes and motivates it, what benefits does it have?
2. To analyse its incentive-setting potential and to trace the unintended effects of the desire for visibility on development cooperation and the implementation of the PD/AAA principles and commitments. In other words, the study attempts to conceptualise visibility in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda.
3. To suggest options for minimising these adverse effects, to assess and to appease the relationship between the two calls – one for “more visibility”, the other for “more effectiveness” – in the wake of such conceptualisation.

Placing visibility at the centre of the analysis is intended to help to give a better overview of the value, merit and dangers of visibility for the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. The analysis will be conducted in the following manner: Chapter 1 will offer a working definition of the visibility of development cooperation that permits reflection on the benefits of and risks associated with visibility for development cooperation in general and for DPs and partner countries in particular (Chapters 2 and 3). It will recall why the visibility of development cooperation is important as both a precondition for and a facilitator of effective aid delivery, but it will also highlight the threat that an overt desire for visibility may pose to the principles and commitments of the international aid effectiveness agenda. Chapter 4 reflects on options for conceptualising visibility with a view to minimising its adverse effects on the PD/AAA (in other words, it sheds light on the parameters of the “new” visibility, which is conducive to the principles and commitments of the aid effectiveness agenda), while Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the findings.

The study should be regarded as a platform for subsequent discussion. It follows on from a line of argument similar to that published by the German Development Institute in two briefing papers (Vollmer 2012a; 2012b). Given the impalpable and elusive nature of the working term “visibility” –

it is unquantifiable and has been largely ignored academically – the analysis offered should be understood as a contribution to the very limited amount of literature on visibility and its effects on the effective delivery of ODA. The conceptualisation of visibility in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda – including a pro and contra analysis of its usefulness – may therefore enable an apparent conflict of objectives between the call for “greater visibility” and that for “greater effectiveness” to be resolved.



## 1 Visibility of development cooperation

Development cooperation is known as a discipline characterised by “buzz words”, many of which have no clear definition. Yet few words are used as frequently in development cooperation as visibility, though it lacks any kind of conceptualisation. In fact, the term is deployed loosely in various situations. With regard to the aid effectiveness agenda, visibility is most commonly used to justify actions and agendas: *“By continuing to apply the principles of the Paris Declaration, we can [... bring] ever-greater visibility to development that works”* (Eckhard Deutscher, former chair of the Development Assistance Committee). Visibility is also used as an excuse: *“The few substantive explanations offered (...) for limited progress [on harmonisation] emphasise donor headquarter insistence on their distinctive channels for reasons of visibility (...)”* (Wood et al. 2011, 27). But visibility is often hidden in the subtext, probably its most common usage: *“The need to demonstrate attribution [caused] some bilateral [development partners to adopt] direct modalities and some remain reluctant to adopt government systems fully”* (ibid., 117).

It is therefore time for a conceptual discussion: what is visibility, and how is it achieved? Why is it sought, and what challenges does its analysis pose?

### 1.1 What is visibility?

“Visibility” is a transient term, but has two basic meanings: the *“state of being able to see or be seen”* (Oxford Dictionaries 2011) and the *“capability of being readily noticed”* (Merriam-Webster 2011). In the context of the aid effectiveness debate, the term “visibility” can therefore be placed roughly between transparency – the open exchange of information among development agents and with their respective principals – and the public relations of agents who want to be noticed.

### 1.2 How is visibility achieved?

Visibility can be achieved through the use of any combination of signs, symbols, phrases and words (descriptors) through which it is possible to be noticed. As visibility is merely the capability of being noticed, the options for establishing a notion are numerous. For example, the “Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions”, published by

the European Commission (EC), identifies banners, photographs, display panels, leaflets, press releases, press conferences, press visits, brochures and newsletters, web sites, commemorative plaques, vehicles, supplies and equipment, promotional items, audiovisual productions, public events and visits, and information campaigns as the main elements (or channels) for its communication and visibility plan (EC 2010, 17).<sup>9</sup>

Visibility of development cooperation works considerably better when quality information and data are generated from both the supply side (the DP) and the demand side (the partner country). Once this information is generated, readily accessible and, best of all, distributed, it can be analysed and evaluated independently to identify effective and ineffective cooperation.

The channels chosen for achieving visibility depend on a number of mutually influencing factors, ranging from (a) the reason/motivation for being visible and (b) the target group, including its attention span, to (c) the phase in which the desire for visibility emerges. For instance, if visibility becomes an objective of development actors during a humanitarian crisis (phase), then aid pledges and commitments will be announced immediately to the public (target group), even though specific projects and programmes may still be in the identification and inception phase. However, most importantly, the choice of channels for achieving visibility depends on the reasons/motivations of agents who seek it.

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9 It should be noted with regard to the European Commission's humanitarian aid that the word "visibility" is used loosely "to cover the whole spectrum of 'visibility-information-communication': (...). In European Commission humanitarian aid, 'information' implies the assembly of data through various tools and products that inform about humanitarian situations and actions, the partnership between the Commission and implementing agencies and the role of the EU as an aid donor. 'Communication' relates to the pro-active dissemination of data and messages to identified target audiences. In general terms, partners are obliged to highlight their humanitarian partnership with the European Commission. This must be done through basic visibility. (...). Basic visibility is a contractual obligation applying to all types of humanitarian project. It entails:

- the display of the European Commission's humanitarian visual identity,
- the written and verbal recognition of the European Commission's role in global humanitarian aid, in partnership with the agency implementing the action, in all relevant situations" (EC 2009).



### 1.3 Why is visibility sought?

Visibility is sought for three main reasons/motivations:

#### 1.3.1 For information-sharing purposes


The basic reason for seeking visibility is to share information and data, in order to track what is done and how it is done. Transparency remains a key challenge in development cooperation. According to the aforementioned 2011 Pilot Aid Transparency Index of the Global Campaign for Aid Transparency, the vast majority of aid information is currently not published and therefore not visible. Transparency makes for a completely open and realistic account of an agency's work and of the policy field as a whole. Visibility in the sense of transparency must be increased the length of the aid delivery chain to reveal all the information needed to analyse the reasons for or the lack of good performance.

#### 1.3.2 For presentation purposes

The second reason for seeking visibility is to present an agency's work. Visibility for presentation purposes is necessary because DPs and partner countries have fiduciary obligations they must fulfil. Though necessary, presentations in development cooperation are analytically delicate, because information is selected by each agent as he seeks to present his work in the best light. The information asymmetry that characterises development cooperation also makes it extremely complicated to conduct some much needed fact-checking. Fact-checking is important, however, because visibility is also sought – and at times actively used – to form political perceptions.

#### 1.3.3 For perception- and opinion-building

The third reason for seeking visibility is to shape perceptions and opinions. Development cooperation is subject to the political views of, say, the ministry responsible and opposition parties that carefully scrutinise its work. As any development agent must gain legitimacy, fighting for hearts and minds *en masse* is a political reality. Consequently, agents for whom visibility is a fiduciary requirement, such as politicians and publicly financed ministries, are constantly faced with the following set of questions, which influence their visibility strategy:



Using visibility to shape perceptions is justifiable, but caution is required. Instrumentalising visibility for political motivations – such as securing the continuation of financial endowments, boosting the career of the presenter or setting an agenda – can be ambiguous, because it conflicts with the transparency element of visibility. For the sake of “managing visibility” information may be tailored, withheld or even manipulated with the aim of achieving a favourable perception or avoiding a negative one. Moreover, evidence-based recommendations for achieving aid effectiveness – such as channelling bilateral ODA through the partner country’s public financial management (PFM) systems – may be ignored, simply because the actors may feel that their own performance may not be visible enough in the proposal to promote their own “brand”.

Ideally, perception matches evidence that an agent’s work and agenda are useful, relevant, effective and efficient (as defined in the aid effectiveness agenda). Yet judging whether this is the case continues to be one of the greatest challenges for analysts of development cooperation. The analyst – *inter alia* the press, opposition parties, academic institutions – must scruti-

nise visibility (and communication) plans for content. Assuming the role of the “watchdog”, he must differentiate between high-quality work (the quality of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda) and lip-service (where references to the PD/AAA are made, but implementation is actually poor). In other words, the analyst must help to achieve transparency in those cases where visibility has not been used by its creator so that it may perform its other main task: providing honest information on who is doing what, how and why, who has made an honest attempt to implement the aid effectiveness agenda, and who is merely paying lip-service (this point will be discussed further in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5, following the risk analysis of “visibility” in the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in section 3.1).

This analysis is, however, challenged by two key features of development policy.

#### 1.4 What are the analytical challenges if visibility is sought to form a perception?

Visibility sought for presentation and opinion-building purposes requires a careful examination of the content and timing of the information which agents choose to publicise. This analysis is necessary and is challenged by two problems in international development cooperation and policy: the principal-agent problem (PAP) and the dangers inherent in the manipulation of the mass mind.

<b>Box 1: Analytical challenges associated with visibility used to form a perception</b>	
Principal-agent problem (PAP)	The principal, such as the taxpayer in the DP country, often has no direct knowledge or experience of the programmes financed or implemented by the (aid) agency in the partner country, the agent (Svensson 2006, 119). This asymmetric information creates a power imbalance in which <i>“the agent uses this information advantage to further his own interest”</i> (Aerni 2006, 28).
Perception-building en masse	In his 1895 analysis “The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind”, French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon (2007, 33; 120) postulated that <i>“a crowd thinks in images”</i> and that mass perceptions are best formed and affirmed <i>“by repetition”</i> , by fixing a certain thought <i>“in the mind in such a way that it is accepted at the end as a demonstrated truth”</i> , which works even if the affirmed idea is <i>“kept free of all reasoning and all proof”</i> .
Source: Author’s own compilation	

Both phenomena are analytical challenges. The danger inherent in the mass mind being manipulated and deceived by agents fighting for political support by pursuing a visibility and communication strategy that is aesthetically attractive, but not rich in information, actually worsens the information asymmetry that is characteristic of the classical PAP. Much can be shown and said without any insight being provided. This danger is further intensified in cases where the electorate or important stakeholders merely “judge the book by its cover”, as when an agent’s work is assessed on the basis of its presentation rather than its substance.

Of course, if perception-building is in fact combined with evidence-based performance, using visibility for presentation purposes in order to convey the image of an effective and efficient agent is justifiable, and explicitly required. In this situation, visibility is of great benefit to development cooperation as such, for DPs and partner countries alike (a point that will be considered further in Chapter 2).

On the other hand, if information is tailored and only a brief glimpse of the truth is seen, or worse, if visibility is used to convey the image of a good and competent development agent when in fact he has been neither good nor competent, visibility becomes a threat to development cooperation (a point that will be discussed further in Chapter 3). It is for the political analyst, or “watchdog”, to check whether visibility used for presentation and perception-building is backed by evidence.

In other words, creating the perception of a “principled” actor when in fact no more than lip-service is being paid should be avoided and disclosed by the political analyst if detected.

To summarise Chapter 1, using visibility has various motivations and justifications. Visibility for

1. information-sharing is a *process* of establishing transparency as to the actors and their actions in development cooperation;
2. visibility used to form an opinion is a *tool* employed politically to promote specific interests.

If sought primarily for political purposes, visibility can undermine its other virtue, that of making development processes transparent. In cases where agents utilise visibility to form a perception by withholding or manipulating crucial information and data, by deliberately presenting only a partial


picture, by taking things out of context, in short by deliberately implying or inadvertently giving the impression that an agent is acting in a “principled” manner when this is not in fact the case, it is a duty – and a challenge – for the political analyst to correct the picture. This in turn necessitates – and, to a certain degree, presupposes – the willingness of the electorate or important stakeholders to resist the temptation merely to judge the book by its cover and to demand quality information as the basis for their opinions and judgments.

In the next chapter the *raison d'être* of visibility in development cooperation will be analysed.

## 2 What is the *raison d'être* of visibility in development cooperation?

Following the definition of visibility in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will attempt to analyse the usefulness of visibility for development cooperation in general and for DPs and partner countries in particular.


### 2.1 For development cooperation



Visibility of development cooperation is important. Above all, visibility is a *precondition* and *facilitator* for the aid effectiveness agenda to work, simply because the need for it constitutes what might be labelled a “political reality”. As the implementation of the Paris Declaration requires “*continued high-level political support, peer pressure and coordinated actions*” (paragraph 8), visibility is justified for various reasons:

1. Visibility can help to ensure that the principles and commitments of the aid effectiveness agenda remain *relevant* by guaranteeing that it ranks high on the international political agenda and by making its usefulness known outside the small group of aid and development specialists.
2. Emerging signs of “*aid reform fatigue*” have been identified by the authors of the second phase of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration (Wood et al. 2011, xv; 59). This can be countered with a wide-ranging discourse on the merits of the Declaration for all actors involved. “Out of sight, out of mind” is a constant threat that may befall any normative political endeavour. Any serious attempt to overcome old path dependencies is bound to fail unless convincing ways of creating more effective work situations are widely disseminated.
3. Visibility is a precondition for joint action and coordination. Unless it is known who is doing what, agency proliferation and duplication of effort will cease to be addressed.
4. A lack of visibility of the aid and development effectiveness agenda hampers knowledge-sharing, which is a prerequisite for effective accounting. The lack of public attention paid to the fourth HLF is an example: even though over 3,000 delegates, including seven heads of state, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, discussed the future of development cooperation, the forum did not attract enough attention for widespread media coverage, in Germany at least. Journalists and other watchdogs are urged to scrutinise development cooperation by comparing it with recent research on what is considered “effective” assistance and to disseminate their findings widely. A lack of visibility of the aid and development effectiveness *discourse* and *rationale* makes it difficult for “watchdogs” to ask the right questions and, more importantly, for the electorate *to assess* whether the right questions have been asked.

## 2.2 For development partners



At agency level, visibility is again a *precondition* and *facilitator* that is meant to assist in the implementation of the PD/AAA principles and commitments:

1. DPs are required to make their work visible in order to justify and legitimise their actions to the domestic principals (visibility to meet the DP's and partner countries' fiduciary requirements).
2. By revealing good and bad practice, visibility can maintain peer pressure and, therefore, performance and motivation. This is particularly true of "like-minded" DPs, such as those of the OECD/DAC who – despite not being a homogeneous group – have at least endorsed the same working definition of "effective" aid delivery, to which they can be held.
3. DPs should understand visibility as part of their leadership requirement in cases where they have been assigned leading coordination status (in an in-country division of labour (DoL) for instance).
4. Visibility is a useful tool for attracting attention to the reason for using ODA as a catalyst for development (i.e. that the fight against poverty is


useful and worthwhile, eighteen countries having crossed the threshold from low- to middle-income status in the past 20 years alone).

In other words, visibility (particularly for information-sharing purposes) helps to ensure that justifiable demands for transparency and domestic and mutual accountability are met. Gaining and sustaining public support for aid expenditure is, without some form of “visibility”, an impossible venture. Demands for learning through knowledge-sharing can be partly met by presenting lessons learnt outside the small group of aid specialists to a wider public. Disseminating good and bad practice is intended to help to ensure that the right conclusions are drawn: that there is a need to plan for the future and to sustain the motivation of those engaged in this line of (often frustrating) work. In this regard, visibility for presentation purposes and opinion-building is also beneficial, *if* presentation matches evidence-based performance, or is based on honesty about what worked or what did not work (in other words if visibility is sought for information-sharing purposes; those who deserve it should receive public recognition and appreciation).

Most importantly, however, visibility can help to maintain peer pressure and so prevent a relapse into a “free-for-all” situation, where agents act competitively with only their own interests in mind (by exposing their unprincipled behaviour publicly, for instance (“naming and shaming”)). Most interestingly, acting solo for reasons of individual visibility, with a view to achieving strong “brand awareness”, for example, is one of the risks associated with visibility; this will be addressed in Chapter 3. This is evidence that “visibility” is a complex working term. Whether it benefits the aid effectiveness agenda certainly depends on why and when it is used. Prior to the risk analysis, the benefits of visibility for partner countries will be outlined.



## 2.3 For partner countries



The benefits of visibility for partner countries are similar to the benefits of visibility for DPs:

1. Making one's cause visible is a useful way of drawing attention to one's cause. In the absence of much other bargaining power with which to ensure that they are considered and noticed as development partners and not mere ODA applicants, visibility is one of the few tools partners have to claim an ownership right. As development assistance ought to be demand- rather than supply-driven, a highly visible and outspoken rejection of funds that do not match identified needs may help to make it clear that the partner country is serious about tackling its own development challenges.
2. Visibility may also help to justify and legitimise work efforts to the partner country's domestic principals and to the DP agency. Yet visibility for information-sharing and transparency purposes remains one of the great challenges for partner countries to date.<sup>10</sup>

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10 As mentioned in the introduction, a lack of transparency is a challenge for DPs, too (Global Campaign for Aid Transparency 2011).

More importantly, however, rather than thinking in terms of benefits, partners should perceive visibility in the context of opportunities and challenges:

3. Partner *governments*, in particular, should take advantage of the current momentum and make their work as visible as possible in order to ease DPs' reluctance to act in a principled manner. In their role as potential leaders, they should be opportunistic and take responsibility for determining and gaining broad-based support for their democratic development paths. They should perceive visibility as one of their leadership requirements, behind which DPs can align themselves and harmonise their activities. A key finding of the Phase II evaluation of the PD is that good leadership in fact weakens DPs' reluctance to align themselves and improves harmonisation efforts among DPs (see Wood et al. 2011, 115).
4. As far as they are able, recipients are therefore urged to embrace and justify power and control entrusted to them by drawing up rigorous and democratic operational development plans with clearly delineated role perceptions and to set up reliable public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems.<sup>11</sup> In other words, for partners visibility means being clear and open about who should do what and where. Visibility should be sought as a means of sharing information and coordinating actions.

In addition, achieving the visibility *of* the partner country should be perceived as an opportunity. One of the core weaknesses of pre-PD/AAA aid delivery was DPs' cultural insensitivity to the local context, partly caused by a simple lack of knowledge (Pomerantz 2004). Consequently, partner countries are explicitly urged to increase their visibility as they perform their function as leaders and reliable development partners. They need to help DPs to *understand* local cultures, histories and economic, political and social structures, this being a key prerequisite for achieving aid *effectiveness* in context, by shaping an agenda that meets the particular needs of the partner country.

To conclude Chapter 2, visibility benefits development cooperation in general and DPs and partner countries in particular. Whether used to share information, to present one's work or, politically, to shape opinions, its core


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11 Recommendation 6 of the PD Evaluation Phase II calls on all stakeholders in partner countries "to take on full leadership and responsibility for further improvement in aid effectiveness in their own country", which includes greater involvement of "legislatures, civil society and the private sector" (Wood et al. 2011, xvii).

goal should be to shed honest light on who is doing what, where and how, and on what has worked and what has not. As this is not always the case, the next chapter will deal with the other side of the visibility coin: its potential for threatening the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda.

### 3 What risks are associated with visibility?

Effective development cooperation cannot function without some form of visibility. However, effective development cooperation cannot cope with *every* form of visibility. In fact, unless the call for visibility is differentiated, the result may threaten the PD/AAA principles.



Generally speaking, the desire for visibility poses a threat to the aid effectiveness agenda when

1. it is used politically to foster perceptions and opinions with information that is so tailored, fabricated and misleading that it disguises true merit and, by doing so, manipulates the mass mind (this undermines the transparency mandate, visibility's other mandate of fostering learning and providing much needed oversight of actors and actions);

2. the desire for visibility overtakes reasonable arguments for delivering “declaration-style” aid, that is, aid “*that is clearly aligned to country priorities and systems, coordinated by the country and/or provided through harmonised or multi-donor arrangements, untied, predictable and transparent*” (Wood et al. 2011, xi), geared to the achievement of substantial and sustainable development outcomes and results (which should be negotiated between DPs and the partner country)<sup>12</sup> (OECD 2011a). This happens if the desire for visibility creates incentives for going solo that are stronger than the incentives to work in a coordinated manner. In practical terms, visibility undermines “declaration-style aid” when agents insist on the *visibility of their performance*, thus if
- the desire for visibility nurtures the individualism and egoism of agents who ignore, in particular, the PD principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation (or cling to old role perceptions of competing DPs delivering supply-driven ODA to supplicants);
  - the desire for visibility encourages the uncoordinated “cherry-picking” of *attractive* projects, programmes, modalities, procedures or countries. This causes duplication of effort and proliferation in the DP landscape and is an administrative burden on partner-country management that increases transaction costs;
  - the desire for *value for money* is misunderstood and results in the emphasis being placed on “quick gains” which, though immediately presentable and attributable, are neither sustainable nor substantial. The evaluative focus remains on individual inputs (the financial, human and material resources used for the development intervention), activities (action taken or work performed, e.g. the number of schools financed) and outputs (the products, capital goods and services that result from a development intervention, e.g. the number of schoolchildren enrolled) rather than joint outcomes (the likely or actual short-term and medium-term effects of or changes to the outputs of an intervention, e.g. a reduction in the illiteracy rate) or its

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12 See Appendix 1 for the intervention typology of inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts commonly used in evaluation and results-based management. Inputs, activities and outputs are commonly referred to as performance, whereas outcomes and impacts are considered to be results (which are usually thought of as non-substantial and non-sustainable unless joint action has been taken).

impacts (the long-term consequences of the programme, e.g. improved primary education). This almost guarantees positive publicity (our inputs – financial or technical assistance – have been greater than those of donor X, which is why Y more children were enrolled), although it creates a risk-averse culture that undermines collaboration in addressing fundamental problems that require long-term and coordinated action (e.g. how is it possible to improve the quality of primary education? Who takes responsibility for the curriculum, the supply and maintenance of the school equipment, the training facilities for teachers and their salaries with a view to avoiding a brain drain, and how can we together address the question of political patronage influencing teacher placement in schools?);<sup>13</sup>

- actors claim the credit for joint results, rather than modestly admitting that their own efforts have contributed to outcomes achieved jointly. This is not only dishonest, but can also create a climate where the partners feel relieved of the responsibility to help to deliver results in the future;
- the desire for visibility puts a strain on the mental openness (or *imagination*) that is required to select the mix of aid procedures and instruments with which development ought to be “catalysed”, tailored to the partner country’s needs, priorities and capacities (an openness that is, however, required, according to the second phase of the evaluation of the PD)<sup>14</sup>.

Put differently, the pressure to attribute – and to remain in control of the formation of perceptions by promoting (and protecting) one’s “brand” – may threaten the aid effectiveness agenda. This can happen if visibility-induced

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13 As correctly observed by Breanda Killen, Liz Ditchburn and Marcus Manuel at an ODI event on “Aid effectiveness and value for money aid: complementary or divergent agendas as we head towards HLF-4” on 4 March 4 2011, while both value for money and aid effectiveness “*should be complementary*” (Manuel) and aim for the same thing (“*more impact from our money for poor people*” (Ditchburn)), in practice value for money is best demonstrated “*through a series of simple, single focus, single donor projects*” (Manuel) (ODI 2011).

14 “*In general the current evaluations reconfirm and extend the conclusions of 2006 that ‘one size fits all’ aid modalities are inappropriate. Each country and its partners need to find and select the suitable mix for the country’s particular needs, priorities and capacities*” (Wood et al. 2011, 51).

egoism has the (unintended) effect of encouraging PD/AAA non-compliance in the form of questionable aid practices, including

- a) strict earmarking (which is particularly harmful as it creates aid orphans and DP darlings),
- b) the creation of parallel project implementation units (the delivery of ODA off the partner country's budget, thus bypassing local financial and procurement systems, a procedure which undermines the opportunity of having parliamentary oversight of the financial and technical assistance entering the country) and
- c) the unpredictable delivery of ODA, that is ODA with a small core-funding component but tied to the DP government's annual budget cycles/fiscal year. This assistance is particularly problematical, since it gives rise to the highest transaction costs, the most duplication and the highest overheads and is as remote from the normative PD/AAA demand to deliver ODA in a principled manner as it could be.

At worst, visibility joins with other factors – such as geo-strategic and commercial interests – and sets in motion a downward spiral in which assistance remains (or relapses into) a one-way, donor-suppliant route, with DPs competing with each other and refusing to delegate power and leadership to partner countries. DPs act in this way (a) to remain in control of the assistance provided, (b) to ensure that outputs are as forthcoming as anticipated and (c) to guarantee that their work is attributable and distinctive in order (d) to present positive work to the domestic principal. This accords with the intention (e) of being perceived as a capable development actor. While managing visibility in this way may suit the agent's political intentions with regard to the domestic electorate, it may cause ODA to become ineffective since it undermines joint action.<sup>15</sup>

While the second phase of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration clearly shows that – thanks to the agenda – a “free-for-all” situation has been

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15 This observation appears to be confirmed when it is compared with the results of the Phase I evaluation of the PD for the case study on Denmark: “... *there is a perception at field level that HQ wants visibility especially on cross-cutting issues, because it facilitates accountability to the interest groups at home. This, however, pushes towards project-type aid modalities, where visibility is higher as results can be more easily attributed to a specific well-targeted intervention; hence a potential conflict with the harmonization agenda*” (Wood et al. 2008, 20).

largely overcome, a possible relapse cannot be ruled out. In other words, while development agencies are more willing to cooperate and collaborate today than they were some 20 years ago, they do not cooperate and collaborate as closely as they pledged to do by 2010 when signing the PD in 2005. After all, the progress made in meeting the targets specified in the Monitoring Survey – a set of thirteen indicators to be used in observing the quantitative progress made in implementing the agenda – has been disappointing: only one of the thirteen targets for 2010 was met (see Appendix 4).<sup>16</sup> Despite some promising progress in respect of partner-country ownership, both the survey and the evaluation clearly show that progress particularly with regard to alignment, harmonisation and managing for results has slowed, partly because DPs fear a loss of individual visibility in the wake of such action. In certain cases – such as Nepal – meaningful and evidence-based recommendations for increasing aid effectiveness at partner-country level have been rejected by DPs on the grounds that their individual visibility would be forfeited as a result (OECD 2011b; Wood et al. 2011). In such cases, effectiveness is demoted to a second concern among equals.

In the following section this identification of risks will be analysed in greater depth. The role played by visibility in causing malpractice particularly by *DPs*, and here especially by DPs of the OECD/DAC group, will be discussed. This is followed in section 3.2 by an “educated guess” as to why the identified risks arise.

### 3.1 What role does the desire for visibility play in the occurrence of DP malpractice?

Visibility is one factor *among others* that causes DP malpractice in both the development and humanitarian sector. This may happen in various ways. For instance, when agents are driven by an overt desire for visibility (to achieve “brand awareness” or ensure attribution, for example), or if their actions are driven by visibility factors, such as always responding to crises with a high level of visibility (e.g. sudden-onset disasters, which usually guarantee great media coverage and footage of the humanitarian response), visibility certainly contributes to the occurrence of DP malpractice

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16 Indicator 4, strengthening capacity by co-ordinated technical co-operation (a measure of the extent to which donors co-ordinate their efforts to support countries’ capacity development objectives).

(e.g. an uncoordinated DP landscape duplicating interventions with supply-driven assistance).

The following **table 1 (s. page 43)** presents the role of visibility in the occurrence of inefficient or DP malpractice, as partly identified in the literature on effective aid (including findings of the Monitoring Survey 2011 and the evaluation of PD Phases I and II). The table

1. begins by outlining the observation (row coloured in dark blue),
2. then presents anecdotal evidence to back up and prove the observation (row coloured in light blue) and
3. finally sheds light on the role of visibility in the occurrence of the malpractice (row coloured in grey).

To preclude any misunderstanding: the problems identified are not caused solely by visibility, noticeability and/or attribution. Yet increasing “brand awareness”, or being driven by the desire for visibility, is one factor among such others as DPs’ political, geo-strategic and commercial interests, which do indeed contribute to the subsequent inefficient and debatable aid practices (which, incidentally, feed on each other). Furthermore, owing to the absence of a counterfactual, the analysis focuses on “plausible linkages” forged and “possible contributions” made by visibility to PD/AAA non-compliance, rather than attempting any form of clear attribution (Wood et al. 2011, 113 apply the same line of argument in their evaluation of the implementation of the PD in Mozambique).

## 3.2 Why do risks emerge?

The role played by visibility in exposing the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda to risks by bearing its share of the blame for DP malpractices has been explained. But why is it partly to blame? The following sections make six “educated guesses”.

### 3.2.1 Incentives: agency identity of DPs

The first reason is that DPs still see themselves first as an entity, rather than as part of a larger team. Political and financial incentives cause them to perceive themselves and to work as a separate entity, specialising in a certain area of expertise and struggling with other ministries and agencies for



<p><b>Table 1: The role of visibility in the occurrence of DP malpractice</b></p>	
<p><b>2. Targeting for quick gains rather than addressing systemic disadvantages that require long-term and substantial devotion (evaluative focus on inputs, activities and outputs, not on outcomes and impacts, the normative demand of the PD/AAA)</b></p>	<p>The OECD classified one third of average aid relations between DPs and partner countries in 2009 as “non-significant” in financial terms (OECD 2011b, 69).</p> <p>One of the key findings of the Monitoring Survey was that “Some donors tend to focus on funding and activities (inputs/outputs) rather than outcomes and results on the ground” (OECD 2011b, 69–70). This is reiterated by Aerni, who argues that project evaluations are usually conducted during the funding period rather than ex post, meaning that the time-frame for the “help for self-help” motto adopted by most DPs is too narrow (2006, 29).</p> <p>Quick gains are more likely to tell a positive story, which is, in turn, more likely to be remembered by the recipients of the message. Research by Henson et al. on UK public perceptions of aid indicates that people recounting positive stories seen or heard in the media “focus on the success of small-scale projects at the local/micro level [whereas] instances of failure were mostly related to large-scale interventions at the</p>
<p><b>1. Causing a proliferation of the DP landscape that leads to duplication of effort</b></p>	<p>In 2005 an average partner country received aid from 7.4 DPs, rising to 9.6 in 2009. In the same year an average DP sent aid to 68 partner countries (OECD 2011b, 68–69).</p> <p>DPs “cherry-pick” their cases and attempt to achieve “quick gains” which can be presented as positive work to the domestic principal, assuring the DP of some form of positive visibility. Targeting for quick gains with a view to presenting tangible positive results is problematical since the efforts are not, as a rule, substantial enough for the types of changes the PD/AAA set out to achieve. Rather, they reiterate the</p>

<p><b>Table 1: continued</b></p>	
<p>“micro-macro paradox”, which holds “that project results and country results diverge” (Picciotto 2009, 187). Despite often satisfying results at project or micro level, progress at macro level is at best minimal or even non-existent (or often disputed).</p> <p>This classical problem with development assistance led DPs to conclude that their work has a greater impact if individual efforts are aligned and harmonised. Yet the problem of DPs preferring to aim for immediate outputs (or quick gains) persists, partly for reasons of visibility.</p>	<p>macro level”. Their main finding was that “people can picture aid ‘failure’, but not aid ‘success’” (2010, 54; 2009), which makes DPs risk-averse (to be discussed further in the context of point 6 in this table).</p> <p>Outcomes (and even impacts) are harder to prove or to measure and therefore to <i>present</i>, especially in such socio-political “soft sectors” as governance or gender, in which social relations and networks, human and social capital, rules and meaning systems, power imbalances and issues of culture and identity are crucial, but complicated evaluative elements. The scale-up of the intervention level<sup>1</sup> that comes with the PD/AAA means that outcomes are often unobservable or unattributable to inputs or simply exceed the attention span of the actors directly and indirectly involved. This is because their attention has yet to shift from the inputting means to the resulting ends, the inputs provided coming from various sources, which makes individual attribution difficult, the anticipated outcomes often being no more than vaguely defined and open to influence by external factors beyond the control of DPs and partner countries responsible for implementation. Anticipated outcomes materialise, if at all, in the long run, often some time after a programme has ended.</p>
	<p>Note: <sup>1</sup> Scaling up the level of intervention has been defined by Leiderer as a move towards the establishment of systemic changes at a higher political and institutional level in partner countries (2010, 233).</p>

	<p>In the absence of a clearly delineated causal chain that enables commonly achieved outcomes to be traced to individual actions (“attribution”), explaining and clearly communicating results to a detail-fixed domestic audience, including opposition parties and overly critical watchdogs, is a complicated endeavour. In sum, monitoring outcomes at a higher intervention level is more comprehensive and therefore more complex than classical project evaluations, cost-benefit analyses, expenditure tracking surveys (ETSS) or narrowly designed logframe evaluations with their focus on inputs and outputs, and is therefore a less common undertaking. Because of this shortcoming, a key recommendation of this study is that the monitoring of outcomes should be improved and broadly applied and that the impacts of aid given declaration-style should be evaluated (see section 4.4).</p>
<p><b>3. Using “project-type interventions” rather than programme-based approaches</b></p> <p>“Project-type interventions”, a type of aid newly introduced into OECD.Stat in 2009, show signs of growing importance, having risen from US\$ 5.4 billion (6.5% of bilateral ODA) in 2009 to US\$ 45.6 billion (50.2% of bilateral ODA) in 2010. This compares with US\$ 4 billion (3.4% of total sectoral ODA) for General Programme Assistance in 2010, of which General Budget Support (GBS) accounted for US\$ 2.4 billion (OECD 2011c; Appendices 2 and 3).</p>	<p><b>4. Targeting the social rather than the productive sectors</b></p> <p>Of total net ODA provided by members of the DAC Group in 2010 (approx. US\$ 128.5 billion), aid to the social sectors amounted to about US\$ 44.3 billion (37.7% of total sectoral ODA), as opposed to approx. US\$ 20.2 billion to the economy (17.2%) and US\$ 9 billion to the productive sectors (7.7%) (OECD 2011c; Appendices 2 and 3).</p>

**Table 1: continued**

<p>PD/AAA signatory DPs are committed to channel 66% of their aid into programme-based approaches (PBAs) as their main aid modality. Aid delivered under PBAs “<i>involves a single budget framework for all sources of revenue whereas project based approaches refer to aid for stand-alone projects</i>” (Handley, 2009 in Domingo et al., 2009, 14).</p> <p>It is a commitment born out of the realisation that traditional project aid has been unable, for various reasons, to create systemic effects necessary to bridge the repeatedly emerging micro-macro paradox in many aid-receiving countries, as stated above. Project aid prevents attention from being paid to improving country policy or systems; it takes the best staff from the partner government; it causes the sector to be accountable to multiple DPs rather than to the government, and it weakens the government’s ability to perform core functions (Williamson / Kizilbash Agha in Booth [2008, 5]).</p> <p>Yet, despite these consequences, project aid continues to be chosen as the main aid instrument because it ensures DPs</p>	<p>Although sector allocations and funding trends are dependent on many factors, including current views and discourses on “best practice” development policy,<sup>2</sup> it is nevertheless a fair assumption that, from a visibility point of view, social-sector targeting bears several similarities to and shares some of the common advantages of aid delivered in response to emergencies in the humanitarian sector (visibility in the humanitarian sector will be dealt with in points 9 and 10): the topics dealt with are of a highly <i>emotive</i> content. The reasons for targeting social sectors, particularly education and health, differ from the reasons for targeting the economic and productive sectors, which are generally unambiguous: being healthy and educated ought to be universal human rights.</p> <p>Actions taken to this end can be regarded as largely altruistic, because at first sight the link between these actions and the DP’s self-interest is not apparent. This helps the DP to be presented in an honest and trustworthy light, ensuring positive publicity.</p>
<p>Note: <sup>2</sup> The preference currently given to the social sector is due to the “human development” and “good governance” discourse, although a shifting trend among leading bilateral DPs (such as Japan and the USA) towards an “<i>expanded emphasis on productive sectors and private sector development as a stimulus for economic growth, which is often linked to increased support for promoting greater agricultural productivity</i>” can be observed (particularly in Africa) (Lundsgaarde 2010, 3). See Severino and Ray for an overview of the main funding trends in ODA flows since the 1960s, which is always subject to the current development discourses (2009).</p>	

<p>oversight over the assistance given (the desire for oversight also explains that, of the total net ODA provided by members of the DAC Group in 2010 (approx. US\$ 128.5 billion), some 70.6% (US\$ 90.7 billion) was delivered bilaterally (OECD 2011c; Appendix 2). Bilateral project aid gives DPs attribution, which provides them with greater opportunities to achieve some form of positive visibility, since “gains” achieved with small attributable projects at local level promise to be more memorable than large-scale interventions designed for the long haul (a phenomenon highlighted under point 2).</p>	<p>Yet the neglect of investment in the local economy and the productive sectors, particularly agriculture, has led to the criticism that, without such investment in the partner country’s value chain, true development cannot be catalysed (see Hanlon and Smart, who criticised the DP strategy adopted in Mozambique’s case for precisely this reason [2008]).</p>
<p><b>5. Setting up new and exciting projects versus investing in less attractive maintenance activities, thus threatening sustainability</b></p> <p>One of the reasons for the lack of ODA effectiveness has been identified by Mwega: to achieve visible attribution, DPs tend to invest in the construction of education and health facilities without paying sufficient attention to covering operating and maintenance costs (Mwega 2010, 115–116).</p>	<p><b>6. Rendering DPs risk-averse</b></p> <p>In the course of their second evaluation of the PD, Wood and his team identified a risk-averse culture among DPs as one of the main reasons for the generally poor performance in implementing the PD/AAA principles and commitments (2011, xiii).</p> <p>Risk aversion manifests itself in many practices, including the tying of aid to annual budget cycles to remain flexible and responsive to current aid trends and discourses (at the expense of increasing the predictability of aid flows).</p>

**Table 1: continued**

<p>In keeping with the motto, “new is always better”, DPs develop new ideas for projects without paying sufficient attention to the running of the project until it is self-sustaining. From a visibility point of view investments in ongoing projects to sustain and improve them are less attractive, since all that is involved is a description of ongoing operations and maintenance activities.</p> <p>New projects, on the other hand, such as the building of a medical station or a school, attract greater attention and are therefore more visible, owing to their “innovative” (and “pilot”) nature. These outputs are often not self-sustaining once the funding period is over: <i>“This is a reason why so many medical stations in Africa lack trained doctors and medicine, and schools lack trained teachers and books”</i>, as Aerni correctly observes (2006, 29).</p> <p>This DP malpractice is linked directly to the second, third and fourth malpractices identified: the evaluative focus remains on inputs, activities and outputs during the funding period of projects preferably implemented in the social sector (all of which can be partly ascribed to an overt desire for visibility, attribution and greater brand awareness at agency level).</p>	<p>Risk aversion is caused by two factors from a visibility point of view:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The individual desire of agents to play “the safest card” when seeking to be perceived positively (“positive visibility” or “favourable publicity” with quick gains).</li> <li>2) The media’s tendency to pursue “mediated scandals” that threaten an organization’s credibility, reputation and trustworthiness (a constant threat of being exposed to “negative visibility” or “unfavourable publicity”, which, according to Cottle and Nolan, has intensified in the global age [2007]).</li> </ol> <p>The aim of raising “brand awareness” and “protecting the brand” through professional communications and visibility strategies is to remain in <i>control</i> of the formation of perceptions, at the expense of causing path dependencies where agents shy away from new ideas, often against their better judgment (see also Cottle and Nolan for an analysis of how the changing aid media field affects global humanitarianism (2007)). Aerni also highlights DPs’ aversion to long-term funding for fear that they may be “<i>exposed to negative long-term results (e.g. when a project crumbles after the end of funding)</i>” (2006, 29).</p> <p>This risk aversion also leads to DP reluctance to make greater progress in the alignment and harmonisation of their assistance, which will be discussed below in point 7.</p>
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<p><b>7. Making DPs reluctant to take the passenger seat (PD principle 2: alignment) and to share the spotlight (PD principle 3: harmonisation)</b></p>	<p>In only about 48% of the cases where reliable public financial management systems have been created in partner countries have DPs used them, according to Indicator 5a of the Monitoring Survey 2011 (Appendix 4). Only 41% of aid for the government sector was reported in the partner's government budget, which is 44% below the target of 85% (Indicator 3). The use of parallel project implementation units decreased from 1696 in 2005 to 1158 in 2010, but not rapidly enough to meet the 2010 target of 565, and actually increased to 2254 in 2010 if all countries for which data were available are considered. The “use of common arrangements or procedures” (or PBAs, Indicator 9) stagnated at 45% in 2011 (the same as in 2008, and 21% below the target of 66%), and DPs’ performance in conducting joint missions and country analytical work (Indicators 10a and b) was poor (OECD 2011b, 19, 55; OECD 2011d, 8; see also Wood et al. 2011, xv).</p>
<p><b>8. Manifesting supply- rather than demand-driven aid allocations</b></p>	<p>Even if DPs met the 2010 quantitative target of strengthening capacity by means of co-ordinated technical cooperation (Indicator 4 of the Monitoring Survey), qualitative findings suggest that “<i>efforts often remain supply-driven rather than responding to genuine needs</i>” (OECD 2011b, 19–20).</p> <p>That aid allocations remain driven by factors other than need and merit has also been highlighted by Hoeffler and Outram: when analysing DAC bilateral data, they found that roughly half of the predicted value of aid is determined by DP-specific factors, roughly one-third by recipient needs, a sixth by DP self-interest and only 2% by the recipient’s merit or performance in terms of growth, democracy and human rights (2008, 2; see also Rogerson / Steensen 2009).</p> <p>Visibility is one of those DP self-interests that certainly encourage supply-driven allocation trends. To meet their fiduciary requirements, DPs attempt to show, in the case of supply-driven ODA allocations, what has happened to the tax money provided. Owing to the disbursement pressures faced by DPs, (bilateral DPs work with amounts budgeted</p>

**Table 1: continued**

Yet, where individual DPs perform well, but the programme does not deliver as a whole and/or as anticipated, they can suffer as a result of that lack of success. They have nothing to show for their efforts; their successful input has not borne fruit. This lack of success exposes DPs to the risk of negative visibility or unfavourable publicity, which they then perceive as unjustified (a fear which grows if opposition parties and the media fail to differentiate their potential criticism and actually pursue “mediated scandals” [as highlighted in point 6]).

In other words an overly critical and undifferentiated watchdog can cause DP path dependency. The existential threat from negative visibility or unfavourable publicity can make DPs risk-averse and reluctant to work with other DPs and partner countries, to share the responsibility for putting funds entrusted to them to appropriate use.

annually by their legislatures), they “*fear that their inability to spend down authorized amounts will be judged as their own ineffectiveness or poor planning*” (Birdsall 2004, 5).

This prevents DPs from reacting to identified needs, but pressures them to invest proactively in a supply-driven manner. Projects, programmes or country cases are cherry-picked with a view to achieving positive results, which can then be presented to the legislature with a request to renew the budget for the next year.

Even more worrying, this practice “*precludes attention to the fundamental institutional problems, such as political patronage influencing teacher placement in the case of education programs, or vested interests preventing banking sector or judicial sector reforms*” (ibid.). In other words, supply-driven aid in the DP’s own interests, including visibility, is an incentive to make, yet again, quick gains in tackling symptoms of distress to the detriment of addressing identified needs that lie at the root of the problem (an observation that is linked directly to DP malpractices 1 and 2, and, as will be seen, to DP malpractice 10).



<p><b>9. Causing DP darlings and aid orphans (or forgotten emergencies)</b></p> <p>The Financial Tracking Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA's FTS) reports on the funding status of recent humanitarian appeals, including the Top 5 <i>underfunded</i> appeals (aid orphans) and the Top 5 recipient countries (aid darlings) each year (the term "darling" implies better funding in relative terms only, since the country or appeal may remain under-aided in absolute terms) (UNOCHA 2011).</p> <p>The degree to which a humanitarian crisis triggers a response is closely related to its visibility: "<i>Victims of natural disasters are viewed as innocent bystanders caught out by nature, whereas (...) long-running humanitarian crises such as complex civil conflicts were often difficult to package as fresh-sounding stories</i>" (Reuters 2005).</p> <p>Part of the problem with complex and protracted humanitarian crises is that they can become "forgotten", as was seen during the crises in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, because these types of crisis usually struggle with predicaments that are low-key from a journalistic point of view, such as droughts, lasting conflicts and hunger, "<i>the silent killer</i>" (Global Hand 2011). They are low-key because they do not appear on the public agenda</p>	<p><b>10. Preferring reactive measures (tackling symptoms) to preventive measures (addressing the causes of distress)</b></p> <p>Of the total net ODA provided by members of the DAC Group in 2010 (approx. US\$ 128.5 billion), humanitarian aid amounted to approx. US\$ 10.4 billion (8.8% of total sectoral ODA). The allocation of the funds indicates a clear preference for the emergency response: approx. US\$ 9.4 billion (90.4%), as opposed to approx US\$ 0.8 billion (7.7%) for reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation and approx. US\$ 0.3 billion US\$ (2.9%) for disaster prevention and preparedness (OECD 2011c; Appendix 3).</p> <p>DPs' immediate emergency response is more visible than their reconstruction relief or even disaster prevention, which does not, as a rule, give them any public attention that is politically desired. This has dire consequences for the humanitarian sector, as the famine in the Horn of Africa in 2011 clearly revealed.</p> <p>Even though USAID's Famine Early Warning System had warned since November 2010 that a famine in the Horn of Africa was likely to occur unless preventive action was taken immediately, proactive measures were not taken, because the humanitarian system reacts to the wrong signals, including visibility. It reacts to malnutrition caused by a lack of food, whereas action should start at the time of the earliest predictions that a shortage of food is inevitable. A small cash grant</p>
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**Table 1: continued**

with a “big bang”, like tsunamis or earthquakes, but occur with deceptive silence and persist for long periods. Although extremely serious, these problems struggle to appear on the journalist’s agenda, which is news-driven and essentially guided by the question: “*Why write about this today?*” (Large 2005).

In addition, crises of this kind usually take longer to resolve and require socio-political rather than technical solutions. When asked why humanitarian emergencies can be “forgotten”, Lindsay Hills, international editor of Britain’s Channel 4 TV News, says “*The story is always the same (...). It induces despair. It’s expensive and dangerous, and one feels that there are no solutions and no end to it all*” (AlertNet 2005a). DPs tend to avoid such invisible crises that do not guarantee them favourable publicity. They prefer to focus their humanitarian assistance on the immediate emergency response, which is the last identified DP malpractice.

to pastoralists in November 2010 could have helped to keep herds alive; investments in livestock to enable herds to build up resistance to the lean time ahead and helping pastoralists to sell them before they were too thin could have prevented the situation from spiralling out of control (Levine 2011). It is well known that every US\$1 spent on prevention saves US\$5 to 10 in emergency spending, according to UN calculations.

Yet no attention was paid to the warning signals. It therefore seems safe to say that visibility encourages the DP malpractice of giving preference to investment in reactive symptom mitigation and life-saving measures (water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), nutrition and emergency shelter)<sup>3</sup> over proactive measures to address root causes of distress, such as supporting small local food producers, investments in livestock and infrastructure to improve market access and building up capacities and planning for recurrent droughts and other predictable emergencies (see also Reimann 2011).

Note: <sup>3</sup> The evaluation of the Cluster Approach for the time period September 2005 – September 2007, the central component of the humanitarian reform process initiated in 2005 for greater sectoral coordination, found that the cluster sectors nutrition, emergency shelter and WASH had a funding coverage of 45% to 100%, whereas agriculture, education, and health had coverage of a mere 6%, 27% and 44%, respectively (Stoddard et al. 2007, vii).

funding or the most attractive lines of work. Even within agencies a feeling of group visibility can be undermined by incentives to further careers by presenting projects as *“the work of an individual or small team”* (Williamson / Kizilbash Agha in Booth 2008, 6).

This is exacerbated by the simultaneous absence of group accountability. As Williamson and Kizilbash Agha have shown, DP agencies benefit from attributed projects because they *“assist in defending the aid budget to their own parliamentary committees and audit authorities, and in defending the departmental budget within the agencies”* (ibid.).

Identification as a separate entity is further strengthened if *jealousy* enters the picture. In analysing the role of visibility in causing bilateral earmarking in the humanitarian sector, a cherry-picking technique of DPs that has long been criticised, Randel identified visibility as the elephant that makes DPs uncomfortable:

*“In principle, and in policy documents, donors and multilateral organisations say that visibility is a secondary concern. There is often a sense that the ‘best’ donor would not want visibility. But when the same organisations see others getting recognition – whether it is an NGO that they have funded, or another donor who is doing no more than they are – they express frustration and resentment at the lack of acknowledgement”* (Randel 2007, 10).

All these factors encourage agencies to pursue an individual rather than a joint strategic plan, which is a serious obstacle to harmonisation efforts. It should be remembered that for DPs, particularly traditional bilateral DPs of the OECD/DAC, visibility is a “two-edged sword”: they must be visible if the aid effectiveness agenda is to work, but without undermining the PD/AAA collaborative spirit. As providers of financial and technical assistance, they possess “hard power” and face incentives to go solo and to “cherry-pick”, but ought to become “silent partners” (but not “free riders”) in cases where recipients show ownership or where the DPs are not assigned the leading role in a DoL at sector or country level.

This is a challenging task! It means shifting from a realistic to an idealistic perspective of providing assistance. It requires team spirit and entails “holding one’s tongue” at times when others get the credit. It also means resisting the many domestic incentives that stand in the way of following the idealistic route.

However, incentive structures within DP agencies are not the only reason for the lack of progress towards the more effective implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda.

### 3.2.2 Partner-country incentives to remain path-dependent

It is also possible to identify incentives within partner countries that inhibit progress particularly in the promotion of partner-country ownership. The point is that certain partner countries are not very eager to change their ways, since they benefit from the traditional manner in which ODA has been transferred, as Williamson / Kizilbash Agha in Booth (2008) explain:

*“Within recipient governments, project modalities with parallel funding and management mechanisms generate multiple material and non-material benefits for the ministers and civil servants in whose sectors they are located, including salary top-ups, allowances, vehicles, training and travel opportunities, and prestige. Ministers, parliamentarians and local authorities are interested in the political credit they get for attracting a stand-alone project to a specific sector or area. The resource flows from a free-standing project are visible, reliable and relatively simple to control. The government officials at the sector or local-government prefer to avoid the unpredictability, rigidities and reporting requirements associated with funding through the national budget [...]. In addition, dealing with a single donor is simpler than dealing with several through a pooled-funding or budget-support arrangement, where donors tend to ‘gang up’ on the ministry in way that reduce its discretion”.*

Incentives for adhering to PD/AAA principles have further diminished in recent years with the emergence of new or “*non-DAC providers of assistance*”, such as the BRICS<sup>17</sup> (Davies 2011, 74). Officially acknowledged for the first time in the Busan Partnership Agreement, these DPs are transforming international development cooperation “*by contributing new ideas and modalities, as well as increasing the options available for partner countries*” (Davies 2011, 76).

In contrast to the PD/AAA principles, South-South cooperation (SSC) attaches less or no importance to good governance, respect for human rights or other conditions attached to traditional assistance. On the contrary, the SSC agenda embraces sovereignty, non-interference, solidarity, mutual

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17 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

respect and, explicitly, mutual economic benefit (which does not necessarily have to be pro-poor).

While the agenda has the advantage that the DP and its partners (seemingly) meet on closer terms with regard to their respective development stages, it faces the criticism of lacking transparency, being unaccountable (since it does not feature impact evaluations) and undermining democratisation processes, since decisions are often taken behind closed doors, without civil society being consulted. To further their own interests, some partners misguidedly prefer the SSC agenda for these reasons.

To sum up, the reluctance of *some* partners (certainly not all: partner-country ownership is the principle on which, as the Phase II evaluation of the PD points out, most progress has been made, with 37% of the countries participating in the Monitoring Survey having drawn up operational development plans by 2010) to assume their leadership role since they benefit from a lack of ownership causes DP malpractices, especially if it forces DPs to keep bypassing the partners' budgets and to work parallel to rather than through the government.

### 3.2.3 Visibility used to create a favourable perception unsupported by evidence

Visibility causes DP malpractice when it is used politically as a *tool* to create a favourable perception of a competent agent despite the lack of evidence to back it up (see sections 1.3 and 1.4). For instance, for DPs to focus predominantly on quick gains so that they can present successes in a timely fashion with a view to being perceived as competent and capable of taking action may contradict the aid effectiveness agenda, when, for example, the action taken has no lasting impact, but merely intensifies the micro-macro paradox.

Visibility for transparency purposes, to reveal what has worked and what has not, is not usually to be criticised. Yet the classical PAP is constantly present. Information can be selected to further one's own strategy. The PAP also befalls the aid effectiveness agenda as such, since the PD/AAA commitments are usually known to just a small group of aid specialists. Agents tend to refer selectively to the agenda in their visibility and communication plans when it suits their own interests and strategic choices, but omit to mention the Declaration when their actions do not comply with the PD/AAA commitments (as that would show them in a bad light). In such

cases, the political use of visibility contradicts its transparency mandate, which constitutes risky behaviour.

Certainly, if presentation matches the evidence of performance or lack of performance, in other words, if visibility is used for an *honest* presentation, whether an actor contributes to “effective” aid delivery or not, then visibility for presentation- and perception-building purposes is not to be criticised.

### 3.2.4 Institutional isomorphism

Great minds think alike, act alike. Agents look at other agents to see what works (for them) and what does not. In a sense, this is useful. It proves that evaluation is being taken seriously, and good work is being duplicated. Yet this has a *mass effect*, known in sociology as “institutional isomorphism” (a term coined by DiMaggio / Powell [1983]). Isomorphism is the drive toward similarity, a “*constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions*” (ibid., 149). The two central mechanisms of institutional isomorphism are mimetic processes and normative pressures. The former occurs when organisations imitate other organisations when faced with uncertainty; the latter results from professionalization (ibid., 150).

Specifically, what is of value and merit in terms of visibility at individual *agency level* may have unintended detrimental consequences that inhibit progress at *macro level*, that is, progress towards the implementation of the PD/AAA principles and commitments. Communication experts commissioned with the task of increasing “brand awareness” and noticeability may recommend the use of a mix of instruments and procedures having the greatest *potential* to cause visibility, such as bilateral project aid that ensures attribution. They may also recommend using humanitarian aid earmarked for a “sudden-onset disaster” reactively to respond in the public media to a very “visible” crisis. By itself, there is nothing to criticise. Somebody should indeed respond to the crisis, and the response or development strategy may address identified needs, given the circumstances in which the response or strategy has to operate.

Yet, if duplicated, homogenised and conducted *en masse* by development agents, this causes a setback and reveals inefficient practice, against which analytical background the PD and, for the humanitarian sector, the 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles were formulated. If everybody

focuses on visible crises, aid orphans emerge and the DP landscape fragments in the crisis identified. If all agents set up exciting projects for great presentation, nobody will be willing to invest in maintenance activities, which are less interesting. As correctly observed by Rogerson / Steensen (2009, 1), “*accountability to taxpayers or boards is seldom focused on correcting [or supplementing] the actions of others*”.

This is the contradiction in the analysis of visibility and its implications for the effective delivery of ODA. While too much niche-thinking for reasons of visibility and brand awareness is unfavourable to the aid effectiveness agenda, since it hampers harmonisation and alignment, too much conformity for reasons of visibility leads to one-sided, uneven assistance strategies. It may result in excessive emphasis on what is currently the “flavour of the month”, such as social-sector targeting, and on what promises to make the agent most noticeable, such as earmarked humanitarian assistance.

A middle path should be sought, with harmonised actors ensuring a balanced assistance strategy based on needs identified by the partner countries and across countries. It should ensure that crucial work areas are not overlooked or bypassed. The temptation to duplicate only those elements of assistance strategies that have proved capable of assuring agents of positive results which can be presented to the domestic audience in order to create positive perceptions is a threat to the aid effectiveness agenda, a point that should be borne in mind.<sup>18</sup>

This observation leads to the next explanation of why identified risks emerge: channels vary in their potential for creating noticeability.

### 3.2.5 Differing potential of channels for creating “noticeability”

Not every descriptor (sign, symbol, phrase, channel, etc.) has the same strength or potential for creating widespread noticeability and, by extension, shaping (mass) perception. Certain channels used to deliver messages are more attractive to certain actors because they are more direct, have an extensive range and target emotions, which is why agents like them, but also why they are highly contentious:

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18 Seen from this angle, the Busan Partnership Agreement must be complimented for its intention to “*accelerate efforts to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance*” and so address the problem of aid orphans (OECD 2011a, 7).

*“the visibility that most donors and agencies rate most highly (the coverage on international TV or prestigious national TV or influential international press) is competitive. Not everyone can have the slot on CNN and the area of visibility which is most contentious – the flagging of humanitarian interventions – is considered to give a competitive edge in gaining that publicity”* (Randel 2007, 10).

As mentioned in section 1.4, Gustave Le Bon (2007 33, 120) was already postulating in 1895 that *“a crowd thinks in images”* and that mass perceptions are best formed and affirmed *“by repetition”*, by fixing a certain thought *“in the mind in such a way that it is accepted at the end as a demonstrated truth”*, which works even if the idea affirmed is *“kept free of all reasoning and all proof”*.

Hence, a five-minute slot on the evening news, with a field report about a high-ranking official visiting refugee camps supported by attributable aid transfers, such as bilateral ODA, at the peak of the hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011 may have been the most desired form of visibility for creating the widespread perception that funds are given in the most useful way to those in greatest need. It is the type of message that is sent when the public are paying attention, one that is potentially the least ambiguous (a DP presented as an altruistic Samaritan), targets emotions and can be easily repeated in one crisis after another.<sup>19</sup> Whether this kind of approach is effective fades into the background or becomes completely out of focus.<sup>20</sup>

Other ways of channelling messages are less attractive since they are more limited in their range, more demanding in terms of time and cognitive effort for the recipient to fathom the message and unsuited to repetition. Text- or

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19 In a study by the Institute of Development Studies of UK public perceptions of aid 185 selected members of the UK public were interviewed. One recalled the repetition of messages that remain focused on superficial aspects, addressing symptoms rather than causes of the crisis: *“I’ve seen so many reports on famines in Africa that all looked so identical that it could be the same reports being shown over and over. We never learn what caused the crisis or what happened after the press got bored with it and moved on. What we never seem to get is a clear, simply presented documentary that gives us the whole picture in an un-sensationalist style. I don’t need to see dying babies, I want to know why they are dying (G4304)”* (Henson et al. 2010, 58).

20 As already shown in section 3.1, it can be argued that the more noticeable relief efforts obscured the fact that many DPs and regional actors had previously ignored warning signals that a famine in the Horn of Africa was likely unless early action was taken, which would, of course, have been a less noticeable/visible course of action.



data-rich reports or documentaries are examples of this, their potential for creating noticeability and a perception being further diminished if the subject-matter can be regarded as of no interest to the general public, examples being electoral or judicial reform, public finance reform (including taxation) and wealth generation through public-private partnerships, or if their content is simply not “new”, as in the case of reports about maintenance activities.

This observation is also of importance to the media, which, aside from the primary actors involved in development assistance, are the prime means of creating visibility in the public domain. In an honest self-assessment of their role in causing DP malpractice, the media should reflect critically on the incentives they give for DP action through their reporting trends:

- Do the media revisit emergencies with the aim of helping to assess and document reconstruction efforts and reporting on actual outcomes and impacts of past emergency relief?
- Do multilateral institutions receive as much attention proportionally as given to domestic bilateral agencies?
- How often have the media enquired about proven attribution of individual efforts at agency level, rather than asking about the outcomes and impacts of aid delivered under harmonised or multi-DP arrangements?
- Is general budget support for the governance sector given the same attention as project aid to the education and health sectors?
- Do proactive measures in productive sectors receive the same level of media attention as reactive humanitarian aid for sudden-onset disasters?
- Do the media check whether a partner country has established operational development plans, analysed the roles assigned and assessed agents on the basis of that information? In other words, have assessments of assistance strategies been fair in that they judge them by reference to the latest research on “effective” assistance? On this basis is the unfavourable publicity or negative visibility certain actors and actions receive actually deserved?

In short, the media should assess themselves to see whether they have a reporting bias in that they give certain actors, procedures, modalities and work patterns favourable publicity, while neglecting or even criticising others. And they should consider how far they attempt, or unintentionally help, to set the agenda with their reporting trends and incentive structures.

### 3.2.6 Function follows form

The final identifiable reason for the risks associated with visibility is that the desire for it puts a strain on the *imagination* that is required if aid is to be effective in the given context. Certain country strategies will contain elements (modalities, procedures, teams) which are inferior to others in terms of their potential for visual presentation and communication, as the previous section has shown. For instance,

- in terms of visual presentation, GBS is inferior to project aid;
- multilateral aid is as inferior to bilateral aid as unearmarked funding is to earmarked funding if attribution is what is wanted;
- proactive decision-making is inferior to reactive decision-making if the goal is noticeability, since public interest is usually lacking;
- maintenance activities are of less interest than the establishment of new projects.

This may undermine the imagination of actors. Useful strategic proposals may be rejected on the grounds that agents do not see any potential for “selling” them to their stakeholders at home, that the strategy cannot be presented as interesting, that individual contributions cannot be attributed or that certain team members are assigned tasks which have greater potential for positive presentation, which intensifies jealousies within the group.

Visibility thus threatens the aid effectiveness agenda when it drives rather than follows (reports on) the agenda, when, for reasons of visibility, useful measures are not taken. In other words, when the function of ODA – to be delivered most efficiently and effectively so that it may have a lasting impact on the partner country’s poverty incidence (the evidence-based utilisation of ODA) – follows, in the ranking order, the form of its presentation, visibility threatens the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda.<sup>21</sup>

Given this realisation, what should be done?

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21 To put it differently, visibility threatens the aid effectiveness agenda when the DP ignores rational and evidence-based recommendations for achieving aid effectiveness in the partner country by such means as channelling bilateral ODA through the partner country’s public financial management (PFM) systems if circumstances allow, simply because the DP feels that the visibility of its own performance in the recommendation is not strong enough to show off its own “brand” to the principals in their respective domestic constituencies.

## 4 Parameters of the “new” visibility

Departing from the risk identification and risk analysis in Chapter 3, the study proposes the following attitude towards visibility in development cooperation.

### 4.1 Restore the ranking order of events: form follows function

Visibility should be addressed in a two-step thought process:

1. Agents should decide in the given context on a strategy (modalities, procedures and work assignments) for ODA to be so used that it unleashes its greatest “catalytic” potential for development (e.g. through joint programming at country level). At this stage, agents *free their minds* from any concerns as to whether the strategy has the potential to be made visible.
2. Once the strategy has been decided, communication experts should use their *imagination* and work with whatever is available.

In other words, the study proposes the restoration of the ranking order of actions and emphasises the need and desire for visibility to be oriented towards the necessary strategic choices to be taken to achieve aid effectiveness in the given context, not the other way round. Form follows function, not *vice versa*. The second step is to give creativity a chance.

### 4.2 Give creativity a chance

As stated in section 3.2.6, certain strategic choices will contain elements which are inferior to others in terms of their potential for visual communication/visualisation. This should, however, be perceived as a challenge rather than an existential disadvantage. With imagination and creativity, a lack of potential for achieving visibility can be turned into visibility, without effectiveness being undermined. In other words, if something is not visible, make it visible:

- Randel (2007), for instance, proposes that the challenge of attribution should be overcome by reporting “*on unrestricted money as a trail, not as a snapshot*”, meaning the inclusion of individual contributions to unarmarked, pooled and multilateral funds in financial reports on expenditure, such as OECD.Stat or OCHA’s FTS.

- Hiergens (2010) proposes that communication should change “*from project reporting to policy debates and results oriented working*” with regard to multilateral ODA. The general message could be that multilateral cooperation is an added value and “*closer to home than you think it is*”. What it takes is a good explanation of *why* this type of cooperation has been chosen and what the expected benefits are, with an outline of the results likely to be achieved. This necessitates investing in sound M&E of multilateral work to make room for reports on results, both good and bad, and some interesting story-telling fed by selected projects and elements of the collaboration appropriate to the story. Multilateral organisations, on the other hand, need to make an effort to meet the communication needs of bilateral DPs by presenting, for instance, the work of national representatives in the organisations. In practical terms, DP visibility could be generated through joint outreach activities, press events, annual reports, flagship publications, annual meetings and emphasis on *contributions* to results.
- Data and information visualisation experts rightly claim that, with detailed information on aid “*that is open, timely, findable and usable, you could soon find yourself able to use information visualisation to communicate insights about the world of international development that just weren’t possible before*”. Yet poor visualisation weakens the utility of the data generated (AidInfo 2011). Using data and information visualisation and interaction tools<sup>22</sup> is therefore essential in any attempt to highlight those elements of international cooperation, such as budget support and pool arrangements, which are inferior in terms of their potential for visualisation.
- Finally, a lack of visibility can be offset with some good explanations and interesting stories as to why certain strategies were chosen. A lack of aesthetics can be offset by some good communication.

To this end, evaluation departments should team up with communication experts specialising in transforming complex and abstract themes into “infotainment”. Those who lay the foundations for evidence-based

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22 See the following organisations, providers and institutions, who work successfully on or with data and information visualisation: AidData (2011), Gapminder (2011), the World Bank (2011), Gephi (2011), Google Fusion (2011) and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (2011).

decision-making should collaborate closely with those required to communicate these actions to the outside world with creativity and inspiration.<sup>23</sup> However, it should be apparent that substance rather than the potential for positive presentation drives decisions on aid strategies.

### 4.3 Move from performance visibility to results visibility

Visibility utilisation for presentation and perception-building purposes is a threat to the aid effectiveness agenda when it is not backed by evidence.<sup>24</sup> Agents should therefore align the presentation of their own efforts with jointly achieved development outcomes. Any further information (on inputs, activities and outputs – the agents' performance) is important with regard to the other function of visibility: overseeing actors and actions (published, for instance, through the International Aid Transparency Initiative or publicly accessible web-libraries at partner-country level).

In this connection it is important to note that an agent's performance does not necessarily have to be visible to be effective. In fact, non-visibility – in the sense that the performance does not receive much attention or occurs largely unnoticed – is not an indication of the absence of performance! Financing school maintenance activities may be less visible and noticeable than financing the building of a new school. Yet, in performance terms, it may be more effective to ensure that a school is maintained (so that premises are available for improving the quality of education, the desired outcome of the aid intervention) than to focus on a very visible, but unique output (the building of a new school, with no mention of who will cover the maintenance costs once the programme has ended). On the other hand, while performance does not necessarily have to be visible to be effective, it must be transparent to increase the likelihood of its contributing to the effective use of ODA. In other words, performance indicators and information should be made visible at a centralised location for all to see and to

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23 Possible role models is the “*Mathematikum*” (2011) in Giessen, Germany, the “*world's first mathematical science center*”, which, since 2002, has successfully presented the flipside of abstract mathematics, its practical, sensual and playful “hands-on” applicability. Communicating on development may be an abstract endeavour, but that is even truer of mathematics.

24 The danger of the PAP is omnipresent, and Gustav Le Bon's analysis of the possibilities of perception formation and manipulation with content-free and even bogus visuals is as valid in 2012 as it was in 1895.

access easily to gain an insight into who is engaged where, with how much and in what constellation. Without this necessary information gathered in a common format to enable activities to be coordinated, in-country DoL is unnecessarily hampered and duplication of effort is more likely.

However, in order to judge an agent's visibility management to form perceptions (visibility for what purpose?), such management should be assessed on the basis of the answer given to the evaluative question presented in Box 2:

<b>Box 2: Evaluation of communication strategies</b>
To what extent does the agent present his contribution to outcomes (visibility at what phase?) achieved with aid given declaration-style at country level (visibility with what information, and at what level)?
Source: Author's own compilation

The messages that development actors want to send can be tailored to different target groups (visibility for whom?) and their particular needs and attention spans. Yet, however noticeability is sought, information should be linked to the PD meaning of effectiveness.

It should be borne in mind that by reiterating that visibility is a political reality and necessity makes it essential to reflect on the value system which directs visual communication for presentation purposes. If aid effectiveness is the primary goal ("This is the result of our fight against poverty"), not aid's classical *raison d'être* as such ("Why we fight poverty and this is how we do it"), then the communication and visibility strategy needs to adjust and focus on medium-to long-term solutions achieved with the help of ODA. In an ideal world, of course, a communicative act would indeed illuminate the delivery chain from input to impact. Yet what little attention span there is should be used most efficiently and devoted not to excessive discussion of reactions (inputs and outputs) to problems (such as poverty), but to finding and presenting solutions.

Results should therefore be both visible and transparent. If the results are not visible as such (which can easily be the case in such areas as gender or fostering social cohesion, which are, by definition, not as visible as, say, the funding of a new building or street), they should be made visible, through

creative attempts at visualising data and information and improved communication. In other words, agents should use results in an attempt to make an impression and mould political perceptions that they have been “good” development actors. This requires improvements on the following fronts.

#### 4.4 Eight steps forward

To unite presentation and perception-building with evidence it is essential – particularly for DPs – to make progress on eight fronts:

1. *Improve outcome-monitoring and Q-squared impact evaluation techniques for aid given declaration-style (and its Busan follow-up), and commission their use on a broad scale*

The better and richer the understanding of outcomes and impacts of declaration-style aid – its results – the easier it will be to communicate and visualise them. Without the necessary evidence base, it will not be possible to align presentation with content.<sup>25</sup> Interestingly, according to the Pilot Aid Transparency Index, information relating to monitoring results and impact is collected, but rarely published. For the authors of the index there

*“is no defensible reason for why there is not a presumption towards the publication of this information – particularly given donor commitments relating to monitoring for results, mutual accountability and conditionality”* (Global Campaign for Aid Transparency 2011).

2. *Develop a sense of group identity for visibility*

Communication strategists of the various agents working on a country case should begin to collaborate and develop a joint/harmonised visibility and communications plan.

3. *Develop the political will to “walk the talk” of the aid effectiveness reform*

The idea of horizontalising development cooperation is, to some extent, still “idealistic”, because power imbalances continue to exist. Implementing the PD/AAA commitments requires agents willing to develop that idealistic

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25 By analysing the findings of the Phase II evaluation of the PD, Ashoff (2011) highlights that the need to prove positive development results requires more serious results-oriented management and necessitates the commissioning of more evaluations.

attitude. The evaluation of the implementation of the PD in Mozambique described the problem as follows:

*“The main finding is that the PD ignored completely political and power aspects of the aid relationship. Implementation of the PD implies a mentality shift on both sides, but it is naïve to expect that a recipient country and a donor will come to see each other as truly equal partners, when the ability to “punish” is so one-sided. Government officials often raised their frustration that when push comes to shove, donors are able to force government by threatening to reduce or withdraw aid”* (Wood et al. 2011, 115).

Phase I of the evaluation of the PD actually emphasised that DP agencies in particular have to “let go” and reduce “*past degrees of strategic donor control and leadership*” in order to implement the agenda. In practical terms, this implied “*reducing demands for the visibility and attribution of their individual contributions*” and therefore a reduction in the visibility of their individual inputs and activities (or performance visibility) (Wood et al. 2008, 9). This is a recommendation that is important to keep in mind, since, even though development cooperation has overcome the “free-for-all” situation that characterised pre-PD development cooperation through the implementation of the agenda, Phase II of the evaluation of the PD and, in particular, the results of the Monitoring Survey 2011 have shown very clearly that in many instances donor-driven activities remain the rule rather than the exception (see Chapter 3 for an in-depth analysis).

#### *4. Be humble and modest*

Collaboration can work only if agents develop greater humility and modesty about their own role in that collaboration and in development cooperation as a whole. Development cooperation is a complex and ambitious field, where progress is often slow to come. This needs to be realised. The author of this study therefore considers *any* presentation of efficient and effective collaboration more valuable than the *perfect* presentation of mediocre performance. It increases an organisation’s credibility, since it shows that it is taking its M&E obligations seriously. It also shows that an agent has himself made a realistic assessment of both the options and the limits at his level of influence in helping to solve the complex socio-political and economic problem that is poverty. If honesty and humility are applied, the temptation for “watchdogs” to undertake overly critical and often lurid investigations (key words: “mediated scandals”) will be overcome. This aspect is linked directly to the next area in which progress needs to be made.



### *5. Work with the media*

The “fourth estate” in particular should be (made) aware of its agenda-setting potential through its reporting trends, which are often inconsistent with the PD/AAA principles and commitments. It is therefore essential to survey these reporting trends, to assess whether they play their part in encouraging primary agents to work in a “principled” manner (to assess the degree to which joint results are sought and reported, rather than reporting solely on the performance of the individual actors in development cooperation). Enlightened media might make it easier to enlighten the public.

### *6. Enlighten the public*

Once he has been given a good explanation, it is to be hoped that the principal will understand that sacrificing the visibility of individual input and activities during the project/programme implementation phase in the partner country – performance visibility – has been worthwhile, so long as the impact of joint action for the beneficiaries in the partner country has been greater than might possibly have been achieved by the sum of the individual efforts of development actors. In theory, this leads to greater ODA effectiveness, which increases “value for money”. Hence, such a course of action would be in the principal’s own best interest. The rationale behind the aid effectiveness agenda must therefore be made more visible outside the small group of aid specialists. If the recipient of the message rewards the sender for his honesty and priority-setting (form follows function), the idea that “non-visibility” is a strong reason for objecting to useful strategic proposals may be eliminated in the future.

Promoting “development awareness” is in fact an activity that traditional OECD/DAC DPs can count as official ODA (in 2010 it accounted for approx. US\$ 0.4 billion of bilateral development assistance, more than was spent on disaster prevention and preparedness). Those resources should be used more efficiently to guarantee that international knowledge regarding the parameters of effective development assistance is spread more widely, rather than confined to a small group of aid specialists. If the agenda is better known and more widely accepted, it will become easier to make progress on the next step, step seven.

### *7. Be noticeable for your principled behaviour*

Alignment and harmonisation naturally lead to reduced input and process visibility, but that does not mean that agents are not noticed: in 2010, for

example, Sweden used the public financial management systems of partner countries to deliver 71 percent of its bilateral aid for the government sector (against an average of 48 percent) and undertook 42 percent of its missions in the field jointly with other donors (average: 19 percent) (OECD 2011b). Arguably, by sacrificing individual input visibility, the Swedish government, government departments/Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation increased their noticeability, not least among their peers, for their commitment to alignment and harmonisation.

#### 8. *Partner countries need to show ownership*

The eighth step concerns partner country governments in particular. Ownership is the linchpin of the aid effectiveness agenda. Without ownership, joint efforts to increase the impact of ODA will be in vain, and the “new” visibility is bound to fail. Partner governments are therefore urged to take full advantage of their ownership mandate, thus enabling DPs to act in a principled manner.

These steps are not quick fixes (for a problem that is admittedly complex). On the contrary, their aim is to change the norms – in much the same way as the aid effectiveness agenda itself – underlying the manner in which development agents, their principals, the media and partner countries interact with each other. The experience of implementing the PD clearly shows that seeking to change behaviour in a system characterised by a plethora of actors, differing interests and individual incentive systems is a very complex endeavour. It will take time and effort to nurture the preconditions for a “new” form of visibility that is conducive to the aid effectiveness agenda. But it is not impossible for these steps to be taken in a timely manner to achieve tentative results and to go on from there. A positive tangible outcome of these steps would be that DPs in particular would begin

1. to “think twice”<sup>26</sup> before calling for more visibility and to weigh up the consequences – intended and unintended – which that call might have for efforts to make ODA more effective,

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26 The Final Report “*Progress and Challenges in Aid Effectiveness: What can we learn from the Health Sector*” published by the OECD makes the same recommendation. It calls on actors to “think twice” before setting up additional global funds and programmes in order to curb fragmentation (OECD 2011e, 11).

2. to become aware of the fact that calling for more visibility while much ODA information continues to lack transparency – as is still the case, given the abundance of unpublished ODA information, particularly on outcomes and impacts – is somewhat contradictory. Raising awareness through greater visibility is justifiable if
  - a. results are presented, and
  - b. third parties are given the information needed to conduct some essential fact-checking so that they can distinguish the “seemingly” effective DPs from the “really” effective DPs.<sup>27</sup>

## 5 Conclusions

This study set out to address two objectives:

1. firstly, to conceptualise visibility in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda;
2. secondly, to assess and to appease, in the wake of such conceptualisation, the relationship between the two calls – one for “greater visibility” and one for “greater effectiveness”.

The study has found that, depending on motivations, timing and context, the visibility of ODA is a precondition for, facilitator of and threat to the aid effectiveness agenda. Departing from a working definition which, in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda, places visibility in the interplay between transparency and public relations, the study shows that visibility is used for information-sharing and presentation purposes and to shape the mass perception that an agent is a competent development actor. This constitutes the “politicisation” of visibility, which poses the analytical challenge of critically scrutinising the information with which agents choose to form an opinion.

The study reaffirms not only that the need for visibility constitutes a “political reality” if a deepening of early signs of aid reform fatigue is to be avoided, but also that the desire for and exposure to visibility are prerequisites for effective development cooperation: without visibility agents cannot justify or

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27 In other words, transparency plays an important role in overcoming the PAP and enabling the principal to decide for himself whether the DP is really as good an actor as he claims – or wants to persuade the principal to believe himself to be – in its visibility and communication strategy.

legitimise their work, leverage support for increases in ODA or distinguish good from bad practice. As a motivational and performance tool, visibility is indispensable as a means of ensuring that peer pressure is maintained so that individual agents may be deterred from “going solo”.

Yet visibility is a threat to the aid effectiveness agenda when the individual – that is, the agency striving for visibility and noticeability particularly at the behest of ministries responsible for promoting development in DP countries and of the implementing bi- and multilateral development institutions – undermines any serious attempt at joint action. It has been shown that certain aid procedures, modalities, work constellations, etc. simply have more potential for presenting activities and forming a positive perception, and that this can put a strain on the mental openness (*or imagination*) that is required for a decision in a given context on the mix of aid procedures and instruments to be used to catalyse development tailored to the needs, priorities and capacities of the partner country. In other words, visibility-induced individualism and egoism can undermine the required horizontalisation of international cooperation, for which sharing the spotlight (PD 3 harmonisation) and willingness to take the passenger seat (PD 2 alignment) are essential. This unintentionally helps to reveal aid malpractices that the aid effectiveness agenda was initially compiled to address (i.e. the proliferation of the DP landscape with insubstantial/fragmented assistance given, or the unharmonised (re-)bilateralisation of development and, by extension, humanitarian assistance).

At the same time, the pendulum may swing too far in the other direction. This happens when visibility causes a crowding-in of actors in tempting work areas that promise positive presentation and widespread noticeability. This is detrimental to the aid effectiveness agenda, because it can cause the mass effect that the PD/AAA also sought to prevent, namely duplication of effort, the creation of DP darlings and aid orphans and the lack of balance in the attention given to the social and productive sectors.

On the basis of this analysis, the study proposes the restoration of the ranking order of actions and argues that the need and desire for visibility should be oriented towards the necessary strategic choices to be made to achieve aid effectiveness in the given context, not the other way round. When the *form of visibility follows the function of effective development cooperation*, visibility fulfils its facilitating potential for the aid effectiveness agenda, since it aligns perception-building with evidence-based decision-making. Communication specialists are called on to work with whatever cooperation strategy has been

decided on the basis of what is best for addressing needs case by case (e.g. through joint programming at country level) and meeting the challenge of visualising and communicating its content with creativity and imagination. Furthermore, agents should develop a form of group identity in cases where there has been collaboration and attempt to coordinate their visibility and communication strategies accordingly.

The most important argument put forward in this study is that, if visibility is sought (or actively used) for presentation and opinion-forming purposes, it should be achieved with honest and evidence-based information. Wilful deception of the mass mind with bogus, manipulated, overly polished or selective information conveying only part of the picture, taking things out of context or deliberately implying, or inadvertently giving the impression, that measures have been taken to comply with the PD/AAA (and, by extension, the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles) – such “lip-service” should be detected by political analysts and publicly exposed, so that transparency, visibility’s other mandate, is (re-)established and information is fully and honestly shared. This should ensure that public perceptions and opinions are formed on the basis of realistic accounts of an agent’s work and merit.

Consequently, while information and data on inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts should be published through the International Aid Transparency Initiative or publicly accessible web-libraries – with a view to launching some much-needed exchange of information – visibility and communication strategies specially designed to present an agency’s work – and, by extension, to give an impression – should be assessed on the basis of the quality of answers given to the evaluative question:

To what extent does the agent publicise his contribution to outcomes (visibility at what phase?) which were achieved with aid provided declaration-style at country level (visibility with what information and at what level)?<sup>28</sup>

If these questions are to be answered properly, the M&E of assistance delivered declaration-style will need to be improved so that

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28 Performance does not necessarily have to be visible to be effective; it should “only” be transparent. Results, on the other hand, should be visible and transparent. The visibility of results should be of the kind with which development agents attempt to form political perceptions (that of a good/effective development agent).

1. firstly, communication experts can develop visibility plans for external presentation and opinion-building based on evidence, and
2. secondly, surveillance and oversight of primary agents by *responsible* third-party watchdogs may be increased.

Responsible watchdogs are actors who take their accountability function seriously by basing their judgments on the findings of the latest research into what actually constitutes effective development assistance. This presupposes the willingness of the electorate and important stakeholders to use quality information rather than an aesthetic presentation on which to base their political perceptions and opinions. The study therefore ends with

1. the call to make the principles and commitments of the PD/AAA (and the Busan follow-up) and their underlying rationale more *visible* outside the small group of aid specialists;
2. the basic, but often ignored, reminder *never to judge a book by its cover*;
3. the call always to look for a third way when two justifiable objectives seem to be irreconcilable. If agents can agree that outcome/result visibility is somehow the least unsatisfactory solution to a complex problem and if they are willing to be creative and to accept a meaningful combination of visibility and communication strategies that eventually explains that a loss of visibility of input and activities during project/ programme implementation at partner-country level was conducive to joint efforts to make ODA more effective (always supposing that the right conditions prevail in the partner country), abandoning this type of visibility – performance visibility – may be but a small price to pay for aid effectiveness.

This “new” visibility obviates the need to choose between visibility and effectiveness. However, it calls for a capable partner-country government, one that takes full advantage of its ownership mandate. The “new” visibility also requires “patient” DPs and principals who do not believe that quick gains are sufficient to have any real impact on the incidence of poverty in the partner country. On the contrary, both need to have the necessary strategic vision to achieve development results.

If, however, the partner country does not accept ownership – and the responsibilities that come with it – and if DPs continue to insist on the visibility of their individual inputs and processes at partner-country level – their performance visibility – then the two calls for greater visibility and greater effectiveness will remain irreconcilable.

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# Appendices



<b>Appendix 1: Interventions-Typology used in Evaluation and Results-based management</b>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Inputs</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Technical Expertise</i> <i>Equipment Funds</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Activities</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Actions taken or work performed.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Training workshops conducted</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Outputs</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">The products, capital goods, and services that result from a development intervention.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Number of people trained</i> <i>Number of workshops conducted</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Outcomes</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects or changes of an intervention's outputs.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Increased skills</i> <i>New employment opportunities</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Impacts</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">The long-term consequences of the program, maybe positive and negative effects.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Improved standard of living</i></p>
Source: Sera / Beaudry (2007, 2)

## Appendix 2: Net ODA by OECD/DAC countries total

Dataset: ODA by Donor		Donor/DAC Countries, Total									
Amount type		Current Prices (USD millions)									
Flow type		Net Disbursements									
Aid type	Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010		
I. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (LA + LB)		69432.48	79854.46	107837.72	104814.29	104206.07	121954.33	119777.71			128492.03
I.A. Bilateral Official Development Assistance by types of aid (1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9)		49982.17	54634.52	82895.32	77268.33	73378.52	86805.19	83665.14			90747.23
2.1 Core support to NGOs, other priv. bodies, PPPs & research institutes		2006.86	2604.51	2739.67	2995.43	2937.02	3398.34	3055.7			3153.6
a) Core support to national NGOs & other private bodies		1489.58	1793.69	1783.14	2042.18	2183.18	2516.59	2130.09			1568.35
b) Core support to international NGOs		374.88	592.69	595.86	639.97	537.38	478.2	498.55			837.3
c) Core support to Public-Private Partnerships		142.4	218.13	360.67	313.28	216.46	403.55	427.06			422.85
3. Project-type interventions		..	..	..	..	..	..	..			45628.02
3.1 Investment projects of which equities		3154.83	4938.78	8811.35	6430.59	4290.35	8319.76	10568.22			10964.92
5.2 Imputed student costs		195.51	89.9	67.41	259.56	-448.52	908.5	588.71			549
6. Debt relief		1616.61	1858	2086.66	2268.2	2567.2	2293.8	2268.74			2251.62
6.1 Debt forgiveness and debt rescheduling		8437.5	5208.04	23911.73	19164.65	9022.67	8850.21	1576.4			3919.89
a) ODA claims (for loans, only capitalised interest)		9804.11	8000.17	26177.41	18890.45	9663.97	11083.55	1939.09			4165.25
b) ODF claims		3380.33	3217.84	4160.58	1767.29	1001.05	2865.52	450.19			853.73
c) Private claims		5327.14	2491.14	13349.16	10510.27	5793.91	4728.55	1080.23			1942.19
Memo: Grants for debt service reduction		1096.64	2291.2	8667.64	6612.88	2869.02	3488.49	408.67			1369.24
6.2 Other action on debt		667.93	389.76	267.37	42.98	45.24	1765.71	17.2			10.12
a) Service payments to third parties		216.47	131.55	165.41	1595.42	260.27	344.14	158.05			396.21
b) Debt conversion		7.96	0.53	0.46	33.78	6.93	50	5.3			110.77
c) Debt buybacks		27.73	79.07	139.53	35.13	111.99	197.24	65.28			81.18
d) Other		..	..	..	1435.72	3.01	..	31.05			..
6.3 Offsetting entry for debt forgiveness (principal ODA claim)		180.78	51.95	25.43	90.79	138.34	96.9	56.42			164.27
		-1583.08	-2923.68	-2431.09	-1321.22	-901.57	-2577.48	-520.74			-601.51



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Memo: Offsetting entry for forgiven interest (interest ODA claim)	-296.82	-224.98	-678.25	-176.22	-169.48	-469.02	-99.18	-65.66
7. Administrative costs not included elsewhere	3557.56	4049.59	4134.71	4275.36	4649.56	5399.23	5294.76	5976.44
8. Other in-donor expenditures	2026.96	2362.52	2326.67	2093.6	2195.86	2832.84	3495.84	3924.18
8.1. Development awareness	166.86	216.5	258.03	270.26	288.63	324.45	349.63	354.85
8.2. Refugees in donor countries	1860.1	2146.02	2068.64	1823.34	1907.23	2508.39	3146.21	3668.3
9. Recoveries on bilateral ODA grants	-112.66	-161.21	-60.67	-336.98	-248.21	-234.9	-80.51	-179.51
Memo: Free-standing technical co-operation (FTC)	18389.32	18725.44	20812.1	22358.9	15036.53	17231.04	17542.28	18970.07
Memo: ODA channelled through private entities	2437.85	2859.07	3768.3	3701.41	4389.88	4970.91	4900.98	13589.3
Memo: ODA channelled through multilateral organisations	..	..	2995.31	6301.44	9088.98	14017.18	15200.4	14291.07
Memo: Post-conflict peacebuilding operations	1004.53	414.41	205.84	186.69	384.13	362.61	429.79	501.4
Memo: Relief food aid	1908.15	1524.09	2161.9	1847.98	1573.76	2991.48	2820.31	2233.3
I.B. Multilateral Official Development Assistance (capital subscriptions are included with grants)	19450.31	25219.97	24942.4	27545.95	30827.55	35149.16	36112.56	37744.76
1. Multilateral contributions to:	19450.31	25219.97	24942.4	27545.95	30827.55	35149.16	36112.56	37747.43
1.1 UN agencies	4852.83	5151.64	5507.45	5287.41	5871.82	5870.44	6201.97	6590.43
1.2 EU institutions	6943.41	8905.58	9216.31	9877.15	11714.25	13039.46	13788.59	13153.87
1.3 IDA	3133.19	5733.74	4942.82	6784.09	5691.06	8150.3	7175.45	8059.02
1.4 Other World Bank (IBRD/IFC/MIGA)	446.16	645.11	390.08	416.33	498.44	444.72	411.04	1113.86
***Memo: World Bank, Total (1.3.1.4.)	3579.35	6378.85	5332.9	7200.42	6189.5	8595.02	7586.49	9172.88
1.5 Regional development banks	1758.01	2291.36	2211.42	2509.28	2407.71	3208.27	3105.39	3142.79
1.6 Global Environment Facility (96%)	665.64	470.97	531.38	416.05	665.62	549.11	514.27	686.23
1.7 Montreal Protocol	100.88	104.85	70.44	75.26	82.19	125.41	110.47	110.47
1.8 Other agencies	1548.83	1916.71	2072.22	2180.3	3896.49	3801.75	4790.13	4910.73
Memo: HIPC initiative	1748.25	1879	4232.1	4213.37	1407.85	1508.63	612.31	285.33
Memo: IDA Debt Reduction Facility	8.54	20.41	23.21	120.26	120.66	188.22	165.34	130.62
GNI	28462964.46	31602069.81	33198421.53	35057497.2	38227032.39	40438099.91	38482578.06	40141089.78
ODA % GNI	0.24	0.25	0.32	0.3	0.27	0.3	0.31	0.32
TOTAL FLOWS % GNI	0.45	0.52	0.83	0.89	1.14	0.68	0.87	1.23

data extracted on 13 Feb. 2012 07:59 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

## Appendix 3: ODA by Sector OECD/DAC countries total

Sector	Donor DAC Countries, Total									
	Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010		
<b>I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE &amp; SERVICES</b>										
I.1. Education	28079.36	29892.11	33620.96	37667.14	44988.33	45234	44328.63			
I.1.a. Education, Level Unspecified	6823.43	5739.55	7983.59	8431.1	9406.15	9321.45	9467.44			
I.1.b. Basic Education	831.39	1431.45	1776.88	1687.73	2126.04	2330.5	1970.75			
I.1.c. Secondary Education	2153.18	1658.73	2207.8	2166.2	2491.06	2384.56	2510.26			
I.1.d. Post-Secondary Education	487.72	477.13	611.29	675.56	777.93	948.86	1014.07			
I.2. Health	3350.13	2172.24	3387.57	3901.59	4011.18	3657.55	3972.35			
I.2.a. Health, General	3424.29	3537.69	4501.86	4445.75	5073.57	4984.31	5154.42			
I.2.b. Basic Health	1414.1	1342.14	1682.15	1304.79	1562.76	1317.23	2170.18			
I.3. Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health	1968.57	2195.59	2819.7	3140.94	3510.83	3667.08	2945.22			
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation	2348.12	3175.44	4011.65	5645.13	7245.47	7040.48	7254.76			
I.5. Government & Civil Society	3166.7	4567.41	3958.85	4412.24	5817.81	6513.57	5249.65			
I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	9355.1	9290.42	8767.26	11661.78	13175.49	13297.64	14043.43			
I.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security	5116.69	7696.97	7035.73	9174.46	10158.04	10191.53	11026.66			
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services	812.72	1593.44	1731.53	2487.33	3017.47	3106.12	3016.77			
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES	2961.64	3581.52	4397.75	3271.15	4269.77	4076.53	3197.93			
II.1. Transport & Storage	12563.04	10604.13	11235.6	12239.42	19513.77	15344.13	20215.79			
II.2. Communications	3800.4	5100.28	4315.87	4134.04	9083.42	7373.86	8512.26			
II.3. Energy	793.13	393.33	403.45	375.67	293.81	418.21	345.91			
II.4. Banking & Financial Services	5901.43	3248.63	3794.07	3915.56	5686.18	3775.18	8107.8			
II.5. Business & Other Services	870.53	1061.38	1336.22	2370.76	2818.8	2670.23	1760.88			
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS	1197.57	800.51	1385.97	1443.38	1631.55	1106.62	1488.94			
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	4657.61	5190.6	4658.8	5760.42	7648.55	6704.91	9009.08			
III.1.a. Agriculture	2546.76	3311.27	2805.96	4352.19	4978.44	4930.27	6616.73			
III.1.a. Agriculture	2087.74	2584.78	2235.05	3623.65	4058.72	4073.2	5374.25			

III.1.b. Forestry	288.05	500.56	407.78	539.57	532.38	421.19	931.93
III.1.c. Fishing	170.97	225.89	163.15	189	387.32	435.86	310.57
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction	1721.82	1387.43	827.85	829.57	1981.11	1089.74	1478.44
III.2.a. Industry	1649.79	678.57	521.66	722.09	1398.96	1012.72	1069.24
III.2.b. Mineral Resources & Mining	49.7	661.32	277	40.09	549.46	56.44	388.46
III.2.c. Construction	22.31	47.52	29.19	67.41	32.73	20.57	20.75
III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations	362.23	370.39	607.12	526.67	629.92	550.78	848.94
III.3.b. Tourism	26.84	121.52	417.85	51.94	59.09	134.13	64.97
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING	4753.98	5978.1	5746.97	6628.89	6916.9	9204.61	14939.53
IV.1. General Environment Protection	1370.44	1539.52	1444.26	2339.43	2674.29	3419.09	5378.2
IV.2. Other Multisector	3356.87	4438.58	4302.68	4289.45	4242.59	5785.47	9561.38
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE (I-III+IV)	50053.95	51664.88	52522.3	62495.85	79067.6	76487.64	88493.08
VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL PROG. ASS.	2333.59	2575.46	3049.2	4258.68	5462.66	5190.82	4008.23
VI.1. General Budget Support	583.04	1590.27	1905.97	3169.16	3731.08	3251.86	2364.82
VI.2. Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass.	1148.79	890.32	939.33	1085.84	1550.7	1510.37	1373.43
VI.3. Other Commodity Ass.	601.74	94.87	203.91	3.89	200.89	428.63	289.93
VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT	8047.08	25995.82	21843.28	9738.41	11187.22	2699.47	3769.47
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID	5351.57	8009.82	6887.05	7200.16	9009.14	9151.57	10433.93
VIII.1. Emergency Response	3728.71	6263.52	6095.21	6313.82	8074.64	8017.8	9351.08
VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	144.58	1326.53	542.91	727.21	659.65	689.26	761.91
VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & Preparedness	..	7.68	46.96	159.4	274.83	444.52	321.74
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF DONORS	3816.68	3891.45	3994.4	4915.81	5794.62	5457.79	6131.71
X. SUPPORT TO NGO'S	1710.95	1256.41	4433.02	1841.75	1279.46	1140.78	..
XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR COUNTRIES	2037.03	2004.26	1823.32	1969.68	2511.03	3087.31	3317.73
XII. UNALLOCATED/UNSPECIFIED	1508.71	1745.02	2043.76	1400.03	1822.42	1747.19	1422.59
TOTAL (V+VI+VII+VIII+IX+X+XI+XII)	74859.56	97141.12	99136.33	99820.37	116134.15	104962.57	117576.74

data extracted on 13. Feb. 2012 08:01 UTC. (GMT) from OECD.Stat

## Appendix 4: Paris Declaration Indicators and Targets 2010

Paris Declaration Indicator		2010 Actual	2010 Target <sup>d</sup>	Status
1	<b>Operational Development Strategies</b> % of countries having a national development strategy rated "A" or "B" on a five-point scale <sup>a</sup>	37% (of 76)	75%	Not met
2a	<b>Reliable public financial management (PFM) systems</b> % of countries moving up at least one measure on the PFM/CPIA scale since 2005 <sup>a</sup>	38% (of 52)	50%	Not met
2b	<b>Reliable procurement systems</b> % of countries moving up at least one measure on the four-point scale since 2005	--	No Target <sup>e</sup>	--
3	<b>Aid flows are aligned on national priorities</b> % of aid for the government sector reported on the government's budget <sup>a</sup>	41%	85%	Not met
4	<b>Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support</b> % of technical co-operation implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies <sup>a</sup>	<b>57%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>Met</b>
5a	<b>Use of country PFM systems</b> % of aid for the government sector using partner countries' PFM systems <sup>a</sup>	48%	55%	Not met
5b	<b>Use of country procurement systems</b> % of aid for the government sector using partner countries' procurement systems	44%	No Target <sup>e</sup>	--
6	<b>Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel PIUs</b> Total number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) <sup>b</sup>	1 158	565	Not met
7	<b>Aid is more predictable</b> % of aid for the government sector disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled and recorded in government accounting systems <sup>b</sup>	43%	71%	Not met
8	<b>Aid is untied</b> % of aid that is fully untied <sup>d</sup>	86%	More than 89%	Not met
9	<b>Use of common arrangements or procedures</b> % of aid provided in the context of programme-based approaches <sup>a</sup>	45%	66%	Not met
10a	<b>Joint missions</b> % of donor missions to the field undertaken jointly <sup>a</sup>	19%	40%	Not met
10b	<b>Joint country analytic work</b> % of country analytic work undertaken jointly <sup>a</sup>	43%	66%	Not met
11	<b>Results-oriented frameworks</b> % of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks <sup>a</sup>	20% (of 44)	36%	Not met
12	<b>Mutual accountability</b> % of countries with mutual assessment reviews in place <sup>a</sup>	38%	100%	Not met

## Notes:

- Assessment against 2010 target uses data for all 78 countries participating in 2011 for which data were available. Where data are available for only a subset of these countries, the sample size is indicated in brackets.
- Assessment against 2010 target uses data for the 32 countries participating in both the 2006 and 2011 Surveys, as the indicator target is formulated in relation to the 2005 baseline. Targets may differ from those published in previous years as baselines have been recalculated, omitting data from two countries (Nicaragua and Yemen) which formed part of the original panel of 34 countries participating in 2006, but which did not participate in 2011.
- No targets are presented for indicators 2b (reliable procurement systems) and 5b (use of country procurement systems) as the sample of countries for whom data on the quality of systems are available is too small to allow for meaningful analysis.
- The targets shown may differ from indicative targets published in previous years as a result of adjustments to historical data (e.g. indicator 8, where final data on tying led to adjustments to the underlying datasets after publication of reports on the previous surveys). The target for indicator 5a (use of country PFM systems) has been computed to consider the 2010 scores on the quality of PFM systems (indicator 2a), consistent with the approach agreed in the Paris Declaration and described in Chapter 3.

Source: OECD (2011b, 19)

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