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New Interfaces between Security and Development

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New interfaces between security and development
Changing concepts and approaches

Stephan Klingebiel (Editor)

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Preface

For some years the nexus of development and security has been a key conceptual and also political issue. The associated debates are wide-ranging, extending from the basic question of the relationship between development and security to the concrete interaction of military and civil actors in a given post-conflict situation. The present volume seeks to contribute to this debate by considering various dimensions of the subject.

I should like to express my sincere thanks to the authors of the essays included in this volume for their involvement and very close cooperation in the preparation of the manuscripts. I am similarly very grateful to those of my colleagues at the German Development Institute – and especially Gisela Kuhlmann and Renate Bugdoll – who participated in the compilation of this publication. I should particularly like to mention the editorial assistance provided by Nina Kielwein.

Bonn, January 2006

Stephan Klingebiel

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Abbreviations

AA	<i>Auswärtiges Amt</i> (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
APF	African Peace Facility
APRODEV	Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe
AU	African Union
BMVg	<i>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung</i> (Federal Ministry of Defence)
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCPDC	Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts
CFC	Ceasefire Commission (AU)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGD	Centre for Global Development
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDSE	International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIPM	Centre for International Peace Missions (<i>Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze</i> , ZIF)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCEC	Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation
DCECI	Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)

DIE	<i>Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik</i> (German Development Institute)
DIT	Department for International Trade (Canada)
DOD	Department of Defense (USA)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG	Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (UN)
EADI	European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
EC	European Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Development Fund
EED	<i>Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst</i> (Church Development Service)
EMOND	Ethiopian Ministry of National Defense
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Canada
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
FIFC	Feinstein International Famine Centre
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i>
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator (UN)
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HSC	Human Security Center
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDC	International Development Committee
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IPA	International Peace Academy
ISC	Interministerial Steering Committee (Germany, <i>Ressortkreis</i>)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LICUS	Low-Income Countries Under Stress
MCC	Millennium Challenge Account
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office of Coordination in Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAI	Pre-accession Instrument
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PDNS	Presidential Directives on National Security (USA)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSA	Public Sector Agreement
PSTC	Peace Support Training Centre (Nairobi)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCHR	Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response
SGESC	Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities
SI	Stability Instrument
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Missions in Sierra Leone

UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VENRO	<i>Verband Entwicklungspolitischer Organisationen</i> (Association of German development non-governmental organisations)
WCC	World Council of Churches
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

New Interfaces between Security and Development

Stephan Klingebiel

Introduction

New foundations

The relationship between development and security is not a fundamentally new conceptual issue. Much the same can be said of the practical interfaces between various outward-oriented policies – and above all development, foreign and security policies. In the past, too, an aspect which has at least implicitly played an essential role has been, for example, the stable and peaceful environment that has to exist if development is to be possible. Earlier debates, however, saw this relationship primarily as abstract interdependence.¹ In contrast, the current debates, which began in the early 2000s, focus far more directly on convergence in conceptual and practical policy terms.

The differences from previous debates extend well beyond practical relevance. The enormous process of change in the concept of security is particularly important in this context. The idea of security centred on the state has, in many respects, given way to an entirely new concept. Security has fundamentally evolved in the international debate from a concept which focused on the stability of the state to a protective approach related to the individual. In this context, basic changes of course have been brought about particularly by the debates in the United Nations (e.g. The Responsibility to Protect, high-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the UN Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom*²). Although the conclusions for actual policy have not always been drawn to the same degree, there is certainly evidence of initial attempts in this direction. A

1 However, the practical and other aspects of the civil-military relationship in the area of humanitarian aid have long been under discussion. This is true of the military side in two respects: it sometimes takes on logistical tasks (transport of aid supplies, etc.), and it is involved in the security situation in areas receiving aid. The two tasks have resulted in there being a long debate on the relationship between humanitarian aid and military actors (see, for example, Weiss 2005, 7 ff.).

2 See: ICISS (2001); UN Secretary-General (2004); UN Secretary-General (2005).

clear example of this is the transformation of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), which has explicitly abandoned the principle of non-interference (see Klingebiel 2005). The United Nations' decision in December 2005 to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which will above all seek improved coordination among the various actors and integrated strategies in post-conflict situations, may also serve as a guide for the future.

It is still hard to appreciate many of the implications of the change in thinking and of the new concepts of development and security. This is true, for example, of dealings with states which continue to be insufficiently capable of establishing their (at best, legitimate) monopoly of power. This increasingly leads to confrontation with old patterns of thought: in what circumstances should, or even must, there be interaction or cooperation with groups which, though having instruments of power at their disposal, are not legitimized as governments? How can there be dealings with government representatives who may be able to ensure a monopoly of power for their government, but lack legitimacy? Many debates³ directly and sometimes indirectly linked to the development-security nexus have begun in this sphere.

"Human security" and "integrated missions": new approaches

For the conceptual debates "human security" has become a key term.⁴ A constituent element of the concept of human security is the protection of people or individuals. The concept thus differs fundamentally from the term "national security", where the focus is on the security of the state.

Protagonists of a narrow understanding of human security place the emphasis on threats of violence (civil wars, etc.). Protagonists of a broad understanding of human security include in their understanding of the term other threats and risks facing people, such as natural disasters and famine. No matter whether a narrow or broad view is taken, however, the concept of human security may encourage an integrative approach at a general goal

3 To name but a few of the issues currently being debated: states within states, non-state armed groups, dealing with traditional authorities, transformation of authoritarian/totalitarian systems. A brief overview of some of these debates can be found in Debiel et al. (2005).

4 For this debate see, for example, Human Security Centre (2005) and Krause (2005).

level since the understanding of goals is always geared to the protection of individuals.

Development, security and foreign policies have similarly undergone rapid change at practical level within the space of a few years. For development policy security issues have moved into the direct field of vision; seen as a whole, aspects of foreign policy have therefore gained in importance for development policy. Conversely, security policy has increasingly to do with developing and transition countries and their stability or fragility. Challenges to security policy posed by the defence of countries at their own frontiers are now deemed far less relevant by a number of members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Instead, new dangers and threats⁵ very largely characterized by their global relevance and their disregard for frontiers are being identified.⁶ This is due, among other things, to the threats posed by international terrorism, which can hardly be eliminated with traditional defence policy models.

Against this background a convergence of development and security policies is taking place, even in the case of individual measures and conflict situations. Comprehensive mandates for peace missions in particular have given rise to numerous points of contact between civil and military tasks. Peace missions today are expected to perform many difficult tasks in the development and stabilization of government structures (Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc.). Development policy often and increasingly plays an important role in this context. "Integrated missions" occupy an important place (Eide et al. 2005). Development policy therefore has to do with a growing number of situations in which interfaces with military actors need to be established.

Simultaneity of military and civil tasks in peace missions without adequate links between them is unsatisfactory. Simply merging development-policy

5 The High-level Panel (UN Secretary-General 2004) identifies six clusters of threats: (1) economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation, (2) inter-state conflict, (3) internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities, (4) nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, (5) terrorism and (6) transnational organized crime. These threats challenge the protection of civilians and call for prevention. The European Security Strategy of 2003 refers to the following key threats: (i) terrorism, (ii) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (iii) regional conflicts, (iv) state failure and (v) organized crime.

6 For this debate see Kaldor (1999) and Münkler (2003).

and military approaches and activities, on the other hand, is neither meaningful nor desirable. What is vital, however, is the identification of situations and spheres where more closely coordinated and sometimes even joint planning, action and monitoring are appropriate and more effective (e.g. security sector reforms).

Although there is now a general consensus on the need for coherent approaches by the various policies if security challenges and complex peace missions are to be dealt with constructively, differences among the various actors by no means pale into insignificance. Rather, the specific objectives (Are, for example, protective measures intended primarily for the troops involved or for the local people?), operations and time horizons (In what time dimensions is the "success" of a mission appraised? When should or can an external actor leave an area? and so on) differ widely.

Formally speaking, the official definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA) also attempts to take account in some respects of the new range of tasks to be performed by development policy. In March 2005 the High-level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies of the OECD's Development Assistance Committees (DAC) decided to adapt the then applicable ODA criteria. Now, for example, the management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure is eligible for ODA.

Risk: securitization

The expansion of the development policy agenda to include aspects relevant to security creates new room for manoeuvre. This room for manoeuvre with respect to the security policy dimension consists, for example, in the exercise of influence on the main obstacles to development in the shape of instability, physical uncertainty and violent conflicts. The possible approaches and potential benefits are, moreover, to be extended and improved through influence on other policies and possible interaction and, if appropriate, cooperation with the actors concerned. As Kofi Annan has commented in his report "In Larger Freedom": *"Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other."* (UN Secretary-General 2005, 5).

It may indeed be legitimately asked in this context what implications this may have for development policy. Critical analyses emphasize the potential danger of development policy being subordinated to a security policy agenda dominated by military interests. The central issue for the critical debates from a development policy angle is therefore securitization.⁷

Conflicts of objectives and the risk of development policy being subordinated to objectives and strategies with a military bias are plausible in many areas and verifiable in a number of examples. These conflicts of objectives and risks need not, however, form a basic argument against the wisdom of a new conceptual understanding of security and development and of a change in the interaction between development and security policy.⁸

Examples of the securitization risk:

- The role of the USA's development policy in connection with its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan or its policy in Iraq is proof of the dangers arising when development actors are subordinated to a military approach.⁹
- A choice of countries in development policy geared solely or primarily to security or geostrategic thinking would lead to withdrawal from countries and areas of activity (poverty reduction and the like) which did not have any (immediately) obvious relevance to security.

The new relationship between development and security policy is not bound to result in the subordination and securitization of development policy. The international debates on a new understanding of security are particularly helping to generate increased geopolitical responsibility for ensuring that protection can be demanded and afforded to endangered population groups. The UN Secretary-General's report "In Larger Freedom" is clear evidence of this.

The specific shape taken by political strategies and operational action by the actors involved is a decisive factor. Overcoming the present distance between development and security policy is often a major prerequisite for

7 See *inter alia* the contributions by Brock (2004) and Maihold (2005) to the debate in Germany, for example.

8 See, for example, the debate in connection with the European Security Strategy in Faust / Messner (2005).

9 See, for example, Klingebiel / Roehder (2004).

more effective long- and short-term action to prevent crises, for constructive conflict management and for coping effectively with post-conflict situations. It is therefore crucial for appropriate management of the interfaces between the relevant actors to be defined.

About this volume

The aim of this volume is to provide an insight into the debate on the conceptual understanding of "development and security" and on the relationship between development and security policy and to contribute to the further development of this debate. It seeks to reflect the breadth of views in the debate and to reveal its complexity in terms of the levels addressed (concepts, practical country policies, individual measures, etc.) and of the various actors (international organizations, national actors, non-governmental organizations, etc.).

The present volume comprises six chapters in addition to the introduction (Chapter 1). **Mark Duffield**, professor at the University of Bristol, has been one of the leading authorities on the theoretical debate on "development and security" since the 1990s. In his essay (Chapter 2) he takes critical stock of the link between development and security. His view is that in the age of terrorism this debate is resulting in development cooperation being geared to *"those sub-populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland security."*

Neclâ Tschirgi, former Vice-President of the International Peace Academy (New York) and director of its research programme "The Security-Development Nexus", argues in Chapter 3 that the debate on the security-development nexus has become an unsatisfactory mantra. She sees the conceptual debate as still being too vague in many respects: it should be made clearer where the conceptual links between development and security actually lie. She also calls for far more field-based research efforts to improve the empirical foundations of the debate.

Clive Robinson's study for the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) on the convergence and divergence of the European Union's security and development policies forms the basis of Chapter 4. In his essay he summarizes the European debate, closely examining the understanding of security in the

European context and considering what this understanding means for the principles underlying and the instruments of EU action.

Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), concentrates on post-conflict challenges with an eye to new interfaces between security and development (Chapter 5). He develops a phase model, in which the weighting of the security and development dimensions varies as a function of stability and instability.

Ann M. Fitz-Gerald of the Centre for Managing Security in Transitional Societies (Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy) (Chapter 6) considers specific concepts of political management for coping with the development-security nexus, referring inter alia to experience of "joined-up government" in the UK and Canada.

Finally, **Stephan Klingebiel**, division head at the German Development Institute (Bonn), considers the debate particularly from a German perspective (Chapter 7). He reveals a number of interfaces between development and security policy, especially in the approach to Africa. It becomes clear in this context that the contribution sought politically in support of the African peace and security architecture is essentially accompanied by closer dovetailing of the policies.

Future agenda

The various essays cannot, of course, paint a complete picture of the conceptual and politico-strategic issues, but they do provide an insight into the many dimensions of the subject. They demonstrate that (i) the debate on the relationship between security and development must be advanced in theoretical terms and (ii) also developed further with a view to establishing political strategies and (iii) practical joined-up approaches.

- In theoretical terms the causal links between security and development have yet to be adequately explained. The debate on human security has, however, produced greater clarity in the terminology and, above all, the various premises (individual vs state security). However, the precise interrelationship and the specific chains of causal links have yet to be fully analysed. This is also evident from the de-

bates that call for "security" to be given priority over "development" in certain phases, the motto being "security first".¹⁰

- As regards models of joined-up strategies and approaches, little experience has so far been gained and appraised. Many of the studies hitherto conducted have been primarily descriptive. The extent to which integrative policy approaches have actually generated added value is more a matter of conjecture than proof.
- Much the same is true of practical measures and operations. Development-oriented peace missions and other approaches geared to integration still form a comparatively new experimental field. The implications that differences between military and civil organizational cultures have for interaction have, for example, an extremely important bearing on operational action.¹¹ The available studies on these approaches and their effects and added value compared to earlier approaches are correspondingly deficient.

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Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2006): Culture of Cooperation? Civil-Military Relations in Danish Homeland Security, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies

10 See, for example, the papers in Junne / Verkoren (eds.) (2005). In many debates on this aspect the importance of subjective perspectives for civil life (jobs, access to basic social services, etc.) for the immediate security situation is not adequately considered. This does not mean, on the other hand, that original security concerns are not relevant, but indicates yet again the heavy interdependence of security and development.

11 See, for example, some of the thinking underlying the approach taken by Danish policy (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006).

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Human security: linking development and security in an age of terror

Mark Duffield

Summary

Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states. Instead of examining human security as a measurable or specific condition, however, the focus here is how human security as a technology of governance facilitates the way that populations living within the territories of ineffective states are understood, differentiated and acted upon by aid institutions emanating from effective ones. In order to do this, development is first defined biopolitically, that is, as a security technology related to promoting the life of populations that, compared to the inhabitants of developed societies, are essentially "non-insured". Of special interest in this paper is how human security as a relation of governance has continued to evolve in relation to the war on terrorism. At the close of the 1990s, human security encapsulated a vision of integrating existing aid networks into a coordinated, international system of intervention able to complement the efforts of ineffective states in securing their citizens and economies. Compared to this more universalistic notion of human security, in which development and security were regarded as "different but equal", the war on terrorism has deepened the interconnection between development and security. In particular, it is refocusing aid resources on those sub-populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland security. While some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are concerned over growing threats to independence, for others new possibilities and opportunities for state/non-state interaction have emerged.

1 Introduction

The concept of human security is emblematic of the changed relations and governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain.¹ While definitions vary, it addresses a world in which the threat of catastrophic nuclear war between leading states has been replaced by a concern for the well-being of people living within ineffective ones. Their ability to enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives – their human security – has moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda. Failure to achieve human security risks disillusionment and civil conflict among groups, communities and peoples; it threatens states from inside as it were and hence global order itself. Human security embodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional concerns with military capacity and the defence of borders. Human security approaches usually treat an expanded range of social and developmental variables as being able to constitute an international security threat. Poverty, population displacement, HIV/AIDS, environmental breakdown and social exclusion, for example, all bear directly on human and hence global security. The concept of human security has achieved striking prominence in the post-Cold War period. The term has gained widespread currency and, over the past few years in particular, has attracted a growing institutional interest. There has been a proliferation of government, practitioner and academic networks,² university centres, courses and research initiatives³, publications⁴, official reports⁵ and international commissions that draw

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- 1 The research for this article was made possible by an Economic and Social Research Council, UK (ESRC) grant (RES-22-25-0035) within its New Security Challenges Programme.
 - 2 Noteworthy examples include "The Human Security Network" launched in 1999 at a foreign ministerial level and involving the governments of Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and, as an observer status, South Africa (<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>). Also, the UNESCO Forum on Human Security (<http://www.unesco.org/securipax/>) and the Human Security News Association bringing together freelance journalists and web-builders (<http://www.humansecurity.org.uk>). The Development Studies Association also has a Conflict and Human Security study group (<http://www.devstud.org.uk/studygroups/conflict.htm>).
 - 3 The universities of Harvard, Oxford and Tufts, for example, have established major institutes, centres or programs dedicated to human security.
 - 4 For an extensive bibliography see Paris (2001).

directly on ideas around human security. Established in 2001, for example, was the independent International Commission on Human Security co-chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata.⁶ In the same year, a separate International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sponsored by the Canadian government suggested that human security is,

"increasingly providing a conceptual framework for international action [...] there is growing recognition world-wide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions" (ICISS 2001, 6).

The rise of human security is usually portrayed as resulting from a growing humanism within the international system that draws on increasingly accepted norms and conventions associated with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the founding of the International Criminal Court, and so on (ibid). In the words of Astri Suhrke, human security *"evokes 'progressive values'"* (quoted by Mack 2002, 3). Rather than examining human security from a humanistic perspective, this essay regards human security as a principle of formation. That is, as producing the "humans" requiring securing and, at the same time, calling forth the state/non-state networks of aid, subjectivity and political practice necessary for that undertaking. Rather than rehearse the conceptual disputes surrounding the definition of human security (see Paris 2001; King / Murray 2001), the concern here is with human security as a relation of governance. Rather than focussing on human security as a specific condition or measurable state of existence, the emphasis is on human security as a technology that empowers international institutions and actors to individuate, group and act upon Southern populations.

In exploring the human security as a technology of international governance, the paper is concerned with the interrelationship between the war on terrorism and human security. This takes note of the disquiet felt within

5 Key official reports include Boutros-Ghali (1992); UNDP (1994); OECD (1998); ICISS (2001); Collier et al. (2003); CHS (2003). The Canadian based Centre for Human Security (<http://www.ligi.uba.ca>) is in the process of producing an annual Human Security Report, modelled on UNDP's Human Development Report. The first report was due for publication in Autumn 2004.

6 See <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org>.

many aid agencies over the purported negative effects of the war on terrorism on humanitarian and development assistance (BOND 2003; CHS 2003; Oxfam 2003; Christian Aid 2004). It can be argued that the 1990s relation of governance encapsulated by human security has undergone a number of important changes. While human security represents the fusion of development and security, the critics argue that the balance has tipped against development and in favour of a "harder" version of security which prioritises homeland livelihood systems and infrastructures. This incarnation of security threatens to absorb development with, among other things, pressures to reprioritise development criteria in relation to supporting intervention, reconstructing crisis states and, in order to stem terrorist recruitment, protecting livelihoods and promoting opportunity within strategically important areas of instability. For its critics, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress made during the 1990s in promoting a universalistic human rights agenda and refocusing aid on poverty reduction. However, before rushing to declare a "*new Cold War*" (ibid), the paper will explore the governmental components of human security beginning with a brief examination of biopolitics.

2 Biopolitics and human security

Foucault's conception of biopolitics is, at first glance, not wholly applicable to the typical site of human security, that is, populations defined by "underdevelopment" (Foucault 2003, 239–264; Foucault 1998, 135–159; Foucault 1991b). What is being discussed in Foucault's work is a biopolitics of metropolitan or "developed" society. While it is possible to usefully extend his insights to development practice, the seminal difference between developed and underdeveloped populations in biopolitical terms must be first explored.⁷ This was graphically illustrated in the great Asian tsunami disaster at the end of 2004. Although the human cost and physical

7 Foucault did not directly consider biopolitics in relation to colonial and developmental regimes. Moreover, a number of influential writers have invoked him in this context without using the concept, for example, Said (1995), Escobar (1995), and Crush (1995). For an analysis of biopolitics in relation to colonialism see Stoler (1995), and for development see Brigg (2002). Dillon and Reid (2000) and Dillon (2004) are extremely useful in laying out the biopolitical problematic and drawing out its global implications. This essay, however, specifically explores development as a biopolitics associated with a self-reproducing species-life.

destruction was of an entirely different order, within 24 hours the world's leading reinsurance companies had estimated that their losses would be half the 14 billion £ incurred during the hurricanes that hit Florida in summer of the same year. The reason being, *"fewer people in the area's affected by the huge sea surges are insured"* (Harding / Wray 2004). This distinction between an "insured" and a "non-insured" population broadly understood is suggestive of how development and underdevelopment can be distinguished biopolitically. Populations defined by "development" exist in relation to massified and pluralistic welfare regimes that, in addition private insurance cover, include comprehensive state-based or regulated safety-nets covering health care, education, employment protection and pensions. In contrast, those classed as "underdeveloped" are distinguished by the absence of such massified life-support mechanisms; they are, essentially, non-insured.

This absence however, has historically been compensated by a counter-vailing presence. Since the eighteenth century a recurrent feature of the defining encounter between the agents of "modernity" and the incumbents of "tradition" has been for the former to regard the latter as essentially self-reproducing in terms of their basic welfare, economic and social requirements. The savage or natural man of the Enlightenment, for example, is an epitome of self-reliance. Self-reproduction, and the natural resilience that this imparts, has long been axiomatic for people understood through the register of tradition, simplicity, backwardness and race.⁸ This pervasive assumption is illustrated, for example, in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) futurology of global welfare regimes. In the former Soviet Union, where modernisation has already atomised households, extended welfare safety-nets are required. In less developed countries, however, the extended family and community *"operates relatively well as an informal social security scheme obviating the need for the urgent introduction of large-scale public pensions"* (quoted by Deacon et al. 1997, 64). From this perspective, development is a set of compensatory and ameliorative technologies concerned with maintaining equilibrium among populations understood as self-reproducing.

According to Foucault, the emergence of biopolitics marks the passage from the classical to the modern age. Its appearance is located in the dif-

8 For the nineteenth century see Cowen / Shenton (1995).

ference between the ancient right of the sovereign to take life or let live and a new power "*to foster life or disallow it to the point of death*" (Foucault 1998, 138). Beginning in the seventeenth century, this new power over life evolved in two basic forms. The first was a disciplinary and individualising power, focusing on the *human-as-machine* and associated with the emergence of the great institutions of medicine, education, punishment, the military, and so on (Foucault 1991a). From the middle of the eighteenth century, however, a different but complementary power over life emerges. This newer form is not associated with the human-as-machine, it is an aggregating or massifying power concerned with the *human-as-species*. Rather than individualising, it is a regulatory power that operates at the collective level of population (Foucault 2003, 243). Regulatory biopolitics functions differently from institutionally-based disciplinary power. The multiple social, economic and political factors that aggregate to characterise a population appear at the level of the individual as chance, unpredictable and contingent events. Rather than acting on the individual *per se*, a regulatory biopolitics seeks to intervene at the level of the collective where apparently random events reveal themselves as population trends, constants and probabilities. Biopolitics utilises forecasts, statistical estimates and overall measures "*to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined*" (ibid). Based upon centrally directed hygienic campaigns and educational programmes, the emergence of public health from curative medicine is an early example of a regulatory biopower.

Biopolitics is a security mechanism that works through regulatory interventions that seek to establish equilibrium, maintain an average or compensate for variations at the level of population. Security in this context relates to improving the collective resilience of a given population against the contingent and uncertain nature of its existence.⁹ Moreover, achieving such outcomes required complex systems of state-based coordination and centralisation less important for the functioning of a more localised, institution-based disciplinary power. Such a disciplinary power, however,

9 In *Society Must be Defended* (Foucault 2003, 253–261), Foucault expands this biopolitical analysis of security to include the emergence of state racism during the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of Nazism. The later being a paroxysmal expression of biopolitics involving extreme forms of both disciplinary and regulatory power.

especially its ability to regiment a populace, was an essential prerequisite of the industrial revolution and the spread of the factory system. A regulatory biopolitics appears in the context of a related mass phenomenon of capitalism: the emergence of an industrial species-life that, through dispossession and dependence on wage-labour, had lost the resilience of an earlier agrarian self-sufficiency.¹⁰ By end of the nineteenth century, compensating insurance-based technologies began to emerge with state-encouraged individual savings schemes for housing, sickness and pensions (Foucault 2003, 251). During the twentieth century, state-based insurance schemes began to expand. It was following World War II, however, that social-democratic states introduced comprehensive and massified welfare regimes that used national insurance and tax receipts to support a "cradle to grave" system of health care, educational provision, unemployment benefit and pensions.

The "non-insured", that is, self-reliant nature of an "underdeveloped" population does not mean that a regulatory biopolitics is absent. To the contrary, such a biopolitics emerges, grows alongside and complements that of mass society. Those various disciplinary and regulatory interventions that constitute the linked technologies of humanitarian relief and development – or, to be more specific, protection and betterment – constitute an historic biopolitics of self-reliant species-life. Relief and development (here jointly referred to as "development") function to maintain the dynamic equilibrium of a self-reproducing or underdeveloped population. Since the nineteenth century the recurrent security task of development has been to reconcile the disruptive effects of progress on indigenous peoples, such as, commercial exploitation, impoverishment and unchecked urbanisation, with the need for societal order (Cowen / Shenton 1995). From this perspective, the interconnection between development and security can be seen as a recurrent and episodic strategisation of power in which securing self-reliant species-life and maintaining its cohesion is essential for the defence of mass society and international order (Duffield 2005).

This brief overview of biopolitics provides a base from which to approach human security as a international security technology operating at the level of non-insured or self-reliant population. To appreciate the specific biopolitical character of human security it is necessary to examine in more

10 For a related discussion see Arendt (1998).

depth its institutional origins. If, as is commonly argued, human security represents the merging of development and security (King / Murray 2001), it remains to explore each of these component parts in turn.

3 Developing humans

Within the various assumptions and practices that constitute "development" it is possible to recognise a biopolitics of life operating at the international level. That is, those varied economic, educational, health and political interventions aimed at improving the resilience and well-being of people whose existence is defined by the contingencies of "underdevelopment". While development programmes contain individualising disciplinary elements, typically in the form of projects, they also seek to strengthen the resilience of collectivities and populations. Towards this end, development draws widely on regulatory mechanisms, risk management techniques and compensatory programmes that act at the aggregate level of economic and social life. In particular, development is a biopolitical security mechanism associated with populations understood as essentially self-reproducing in relation to their basic social and welfare needs.

The type of development that constitutes the present foundation of human security is more accurately defined as "sustainable development". A popular definition is that of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development: sustainable development is a *"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs"* (quoted by Adams 1993, 208). In bringing together the domains of development and the environment, the idea of sustainable development grew to become the developmental leitmotif of the 1980s. Despite being widely criticised for its lack of conceptual rigour, the phrase quickly entered the rhetoric of politicians, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Under the banner of sustainable development, formal development practice embraced a human, people-centred focus that not only prioritised the development of people ahead of states, it also decoupled human development from any direct or mechanical connection with economic growth. The move towards sustainable development was a move away from an earlier dominance of state-led modernisation strategies based on the primacy of economic growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world

would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the developed. Rather than economic growth *per se*, a broader approach to development emerged based on aggregate improvements in health, education, employment and social inclusion as an essential precursor for the realisation of market opportunity. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, launched its annual *Human Development Report* in 1990, dedicating it to "*ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone*" (UNDP 1996, iii). The introduction of the Human Development Index, in particular, with its composite measure of population welfare that includes per capita income, life expectancy and educational attainment, was seen as part of the "*paradigm shift*" towards the emerging consensus that "*development progress – both nationally and internationally – must be people-centred, equitably distributed and environmentally and socially sustainable*" (ibid).

Sustainable development defines the type of "development" that is securitised in human security. In promoting diversity and choice, sustainable development is a biopolitics of life. It is concerned with relations and institutions able to act in a regulatory manner on populations as a whole to maintain their equilibrium. This includes, for example, educational measures aimed at enabling the non-insured to understand the contingencies of their existence and to manage better, and compensate for, the risks involved. In bringing together previously unconnected environmental and developmental actors, as a biopolitical assemblage, sustainable development created the possibility for new forms of coordination and centralisation. As an assemblage it brought in non-state actors and multilateral agencies and saw mandates change as well as new ways of interacting emerge. In short, sustainable development forged new means of coordination and centralisation that have the human being rather than the state as the referent object of development.

4 Discovering internal war

How conflict has been understood in the post-Cold War period is central to understanding the concept of "security" within human security. It defines the nature of the threat that a developmental biopolitics defends populations against. Reflecting the move from states to people already rehearsed in sustainable development, conflict similarly moves its locus from wars

between states to conflicts within them. As with sustainable development, population is also the terrain on which such conflicts are fought. This is both in terms of livelihood systems and social networks being the object of attack and attrition as well as providing sites of resistance and counter-attack. Both development and security within human security take life as the referent object.

A new international consensus on the changed nature of war emerged in the early 1990s. Not only had hopes of a new era of post-Cold War peace been confounded by the persistence of conflict in many developing countries, the very nature of conflict was said to have altered. It became accepted that today's wars, unlike the past, were increasingly "*within States rather than between States*". These wars were "*often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty*" largely directed against civilians (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 7). Emerging at the same time as the idea of human security, this "changing nature of conflict" refrain has since become an established truth recycled *ad nauseam* in policy documents, academic works and the media. It holds that these new wars, unlike the past, are largely civil conflicts in which warring parties not only show no restraint regarding human life and cultural institutions but also deliberately target essential infrastructures and livelihood systems for criminal gain (International Alert 1999; Collier 2000; DFID et al. 2003). While the accuracy of this "changing nature of conflict" motif is questionable,¹¹ it is essential for establishing the problematic of human security. The changing nature of conflict theme sees organised violence as "*development in reverse*" (Collier 2000, ix). Conflict destroys development because, as argued above, development is portrayed as a biopolitical condition of socio-economic homeostasis. By wrecking infrastructures and livelihood systems, tipping them into disequilibrium and increasing the risk of enduring cycles of violence and displacement, conflict becomes redefined as a terminal threat to sustainable development, that is, a self-reliant species-life.

11 Several independent datasets, for example, suggest that, rather than being unusual, internal or civil wars have formed the majority of all post-World War II conflicts (Mack 2002, 15–20). Also see, Monty Marshall, <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgn/globcon2.htm>.

However, by strengthening coping mechanisms and subsistence strategies, sustainable development is also seen as a bulwark against the dangerous enticements and alternative rewards that illegitimate indigenous leaders can present to impoverished and alienated peoples (Carnegie Commission 1997, ix). It is not just poverty, however, that draws people towards aggressive leaders but, crucially, a sense of resentment derived from exclusion. It is the belief *"among millions of people within society that they have 'no stake in the system'"; indeed, the more acute the sense of grievance [...] the more likely it is that a large number of people will be susceptible to the siren voices of extremists, and believe they have more to gain from war than peace"* (Saferworld 1999, 69). It is a sense of alienation and the legitimate desire for change among the non-insured that the technologies of sustainable development seek to harness and empower in order to improve the self-management of contingency and risk.

During the 1990s, the proposition that poor countries have a higher risk of falling into conflict than rich ones (because the resulting social exclusion can be exploited by violent and criminal leaders) coalesced into a policy consensus (see Collier 2000). If sustainable development brought the issue of collective self-reproduction centre-stage, the rediscovery of internal war during the 1990s problematised the nature of the state in the developing world. Weak and failing states existing in zones of crisis can be captured by unsuitable rulers. The perception of these rulers as the illegitimate enemies of development, together with concerns that disaffected people are liable to be drawn to them, establishes an interventionist dynamic. A range of conflict resolution and social reconstruction strategies emerge from this dynamic that are geared for the sovereign separation of such leaders from the led while acting governmentally on collectivities and populations to strengthen their resilience and civility (OECD/DAC 1997). The distinct institutional dimensions attaching to the development and security inflections of human security will now be examined.

5 An emerging technology of international biopolitical order

As an organising concept, human security emerged in the mid 1990s and began to develop considerable institutional depth. Two early documents of enduring influence to human security are UN Secretary General Boutros-

Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 42–43), and the UNDP's *Human Development Report* (UNDP 1994). With respect to the security dimension of human security, the *Agenda for Peace* was one of the first systematic elaborations of the idea that the post-Cold War period was defined by threats to people's well-being rather than inter-state conflict. In what is now a well-established human security approach, the *Agenda* argues that the referent object of security is the individual rather than the underdeveloped state and that this broadens the definition of security to include wider environmental, health, demographic, economic and political issues (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 42–43). Boutros-Ghali calls for these new disruptive potentialities to be addressed through an extensive international division of labour that includes not only developed states but also UN agencies, NGOs and civil society groups working within "*an integrated approach to human security*" (ibid, 44).

If the *Agenda* has shaped the security dimension of human security, the UNDP's *Human Development Report* has had equivalent influence with regard to the development dimension. The UNDP presents human security as being constituted by "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear". That is, safety from chronic threats such as hunger and disease, together with protection from damaging disruptions "*in the patterns of daily life*" (UNDP 1994, 23). The UNDP divides life's contingencies into seven interconnected areas of security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political. While critics have argued that this list is descriptive and lacks an explanation for how these areas are related, the UNDP's initiative has, nonetheless, been influential. King and Murray, for example, have described the project as a "*unifying event*" in terms of launching human security as an assemblage that fused security and development (King / Murray 2001, 589). The UNDP has stimulated others to suggest more rigorous ways of measuring human security through new and cross-cutting datasets (ibid; Mack 2002) as well as encouraging more inclusive definitions (Thomas 2001).

More recently, two events have defined how human security as a biopolitical assemblage has taken shape. The first was the publication at the end of 2001 of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report *The Responsibility to Protect*. The second event was the 2003 release of the Commission of Human Security's *Human Security Now*. These two reports reflect, in a practical sense, how, until recently,

the governance networks of human security were being constructed in two complementary but different ways. *The Responsibility to Protect* sees human security at the heart of a redefinition of the nature of sovereignty in respect of the state and the international community. It moves the earlier juridically-based idea of "humanitarian intervention" as requiring authorisation under the UN charter, onto the terrain of moral duty (Warner 2003).

Evident in *The Responsibility to Protect* is the fact that, while implying an universal ethic, human security (like human rights) has been re-inscribed within the juridico-political architecture of the nation-state. The proposition that human security prioritises people rather than states is more accurately understood in terms of effective states prioritising populations living within ineffective ones.¹² This distinction between effective and ineffective states on the terrain of population is central to *The Responsibility to Protect*. In an interconnected and globalised world "*in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities*" the existence of failed states who either harbour those that are dangerous to others, or are only able to maintain order "*by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere*". Indeed, there is no longer such a thing "*as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring 'in a faraway country of which we know little'*" (ICISS 2001, 5). When a state is unable or unwilling to ensure the human security of its citizens, the Commission argues "*the principle of non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect*" (ibid, ix). It is striking that while the security of people rather than the state is prioritised, in practical terms, the Commission remains wedded to reinstating the state:

"a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states confident in their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities" (ibid, 8).

Human Security Now, unlike *The Responsibility to Protect*, largely takes the moral case for intervention for granted. The report relates to development and is more concerned with the "consolidation" of global popula-

12 A wide range of labels exists to distinguish between effective and ineffective states. "Failing", "weak" or "crisis" states are usually described in terms of weak institutions and infrastructure, absent or inadequate public services, non-recognition of human rights and predilections to conflict (Maass / Mephram 2004).

tions. In this respect, *Human Security Now* is more in keeping with the UNDP, not least in holding a similar holistic and interdependent view of human security. Its division of the contingencies of population, however, is more dynamic and integrated with conflict and its effects (also see Mack 2002). It signals for special consideration, for example, human security in relation to conflict and post-conflict recovery; the protection of people on the move; economic insecurity; basic health needs; and non-inflammatory education.

The Commission defines human security as the protection of the vital core of human life through "*protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life*" (CHS 2003, 3). Rather than presenting a particularly new definition, or set of innovative ideas for the measurement of human security the emphasis within *Human Security Now* is to encourage the complex and extensive forms of coordination and centralisation necessary for the biopolitical regulation of non-insured populations. Important here is ensuring protection through the building of a comprehensive international infrastructure that shields self-reliance from menacing threats. This requires working institutions at every level of society, including police systems, the environment, health care, education, social safety nets, diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems (ibid, 132). In achieving this ambitious aim, it is noted that there already exist numerous loose networks of actors including UN agencies, NGOs, civil society groups, and private companies that are currently operating such agendas independently of each other. Rather than inventing something new, the main task is to bring these numerous separate initiatives into a coherent global strategy:

"To overcome persistent inequality and insecurities, the efforts, practices and successes of all these groups should be linking in national, regional and global alliances. The goal of these alliances could be to create a kind of horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that complements that of traditional vertical and compartmentalised structures of institutions and states" (ibid, 142).

Human Security Now argues for a biopolitics of self-reliant species-life based upon international forms of coordination and centralisation largely formed from the integration of existing aid networks, programmes and datasets. It sees such regulatory networks as collectively having the ability and legitimacy to strengthen the capacity of ineffective states and promote

non-insured species-life. This is an ambitious and expansive view of human security as a centralising biopolitics of international security, based within effective states, and aiming to promote self-reliance among non-insured populations.¹³

Taken together, *The Responsibility to Protect* and *Human Security Now* present two interconnected trajectories to human security's institutional framework. The security component of human security is largely concerned with a responsibility to protect, based on the distinction between effective and ineffective states (Wheeler 2000). Primacy is given to the dangers of the uncontrolled circulatory effects of crisis territories, for example, the ability of humanitarian disaster, instability and poverty to create displacement and migration, promote illicit transborder economies and provide support for terrorist networks, have revealed that all countries and regions are radically interdependent and interconnected. Regarding aid dispensation, this is a "vertical" formula linking domestic and the foreign agendas. In contrast, while accepting the risks of global circulation, human security's development inflection is more concerned with local consolidation: improving the resilience of non-insured populations through better aid coordination and improved public/private and state/non-state cooperation (Chen et al 2003). As a practical formula for sharing the world with others, this is a "horizontal" model linking developed and underdeveloped worlds. Development and security interconnect, interrogate and complement each other. During the 1990s, however, policy discourse portrayed the relationship between development and security as one of "different but equal". For example, as in the UN's Strategic Framework for Afghanistan when under Taliban authority (UN 1998). Post 9/11 developments, however, have problematised this conception of international biopolitical order. In consolidating the trend of the 1990s, effective states are rephrasing developmental concerns in terms of the risks of disruptive international circulation. Where necessary and possible, this includes a new emphasis on engaging with crisis states including regime change and/or the recon-

13 Similarly ambitious visions of human security have recently been echoed in the European context: *"An effective human security approach requires coordination between intelligence, foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and security policy initiatives of the [European] member states, of the [European] Commission and the [European] Council, and of other multilateral actors, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and regional institutions"* (SGESC 2004, 17).

struction of the *"sovereign frontier"* (Harrison 2004) through strengthening their capacity to secure the economies and people that come with territory. This changing discourse has had important ramifications for NGOs. Agencies have adapted to the altered political landscape with varying entrepreneurial success. While the issue of neutrality has been a concern for some, for others new opportunities have appeared.

6 The new global danger

"Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (President Bush, 18 September 2001).

The war on terrorism has had an acute impact upon human security as a centralising technology of international biopolitical order. The predominance of homeland security concerns means that issues of illicit and uncontrolled circulation – of people, weapons, commodities, money, ideologies, and so on – emanating from, and flowing through, the world's crisis zones, now influence the consolidating biopolitical function of development. Security considerations are increasingly evident in arguments to increase the proportion of development resources directed to measures, regions and sub-populations deemed critical in relation to the dangers of radical international interdependence.

While greater interconnection is often celebrated, during the 1990s it was increasingly argued that "globalisation" can cut both ways. An interdependent world also has more uncertainties and hence increased risk (Beck 1992), including the ability of inequalities visited on the South to "boomerang" on the North (George 1992). While globalisation and "network society" have generated undreamt flows of wealth, they have also widened old disparities and encouraged new forms of exclusion, all of which can foment illicit, criminal and destabilising forms of global flows and movement (Castells 1998). As President Bush's *National Security Strategy* sees it, the fruits of liberal-democracy are under threat from a new global danger. In today's radically interconnected world, in which borders are increasingly porous, enemies are no longer the massed armies of opposing state encampments but their opposite: transnational global terrorist networks *"organised to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us"* (Bush 2002, v). Securing freedom neces-

sitates stopping the spread of terrorist networks through closing home bases, preventing new sanctuaries from forming, and stemming the proliferation of weapons, funds and recruits.

In achieving security, securing failed and fragile states has been identified as pivotal. Whereas ineffective states were treated with relative neglect during the 1990s (Newburg 1999) they are now the subject to renewed policy interest. While crisis states are still regarded in terms of the criminality, breakdown and chaos associated with a sovereign void, that void is now regarded as vulnerable to colonisation by political extremism able to propagate on the fragmentation, poverty and alienation among the non-insured populations encountered. A recent speech by Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for International Development, suggested that *"one of the main reasons why it is proving so hard to achieve Millennium Development Goals is the concentration of the poorest in crisis states"* (Benn 2004, 2). The Department for International Development (DFID) is working with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit to improve Britain's ability to respond by devising an integrated approach that *"combines development programmes with diplomatic engagement and security interventions. The common goal is reducing the risk of state crises"* (ibid, 3). With respect to the UN, 2005 is the year that it will respond to Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on how to address state failure under the UN Charter and thus discourage the unilateralism of recent years. According to Benn, this is a chance for the UN to identify state crises and work with the World Bank and other agencies in order to act *"decisively when human security is at risk"* (ibid, 4).

The newfound concern over failed states indicates that the war on terror is not simply a military campaign. It is a multidimensional conflict that also engages with questions of poverty, development and internal conflict. The *National Security Strategy*, together with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC 2003) and the European Union (EU) (Solana 2003), all highlight development assistance as a strategic tool in the war against terrorism. The Development Assistance Committee's *Lens on Terrorism* report, for example, illustrates that while the regional containment of the effects of poverty and conflict remains important, current policy has broadened to address issues of leakage and interpenetration. Insurgent populations, shadow economies and violent

networks are the new global danger in a world *"of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked"* (ibid, 5). In an echo of the 1990s "the poor are attracted to violent leaders" argument, the *Lens on Terrorism* sees terrorist insurgency as stemming from a sense of anger arising from exclusion, injustice and helplessness. In this situation, terrorist leaders, who may themselves be motivated by grievances and resentment, *"feed on these factors and exploit them, gathering support for their organisations"* (OECD/DAC 2003, 11). The package of developmental measures designed for offsetting alienation and promoting self-reliance involves a complex set of biopolitical interventions with the ultimate goal of building *"the capacity of communities to resist extreme religious and political ideologies based on violence"* (ibid, 8). Education and job opportunities become key, reflecting the concern that the new global danger no longer necessarily lies with the abject poor, who are fixed in their misery: instead, it pulses from those mobile sub-populations capable of bridging and circulating between the dichotomies of North/South; modern/traditional; and national/international.

7 Aid agencies and the rephrasing of development

Some advocates of human security are keen to assert the complementarity and even indivisibility of homeland and borderland security. The authors of *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, for example, suggest that Europe's military forces *"need to be able to address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in order to make the world a safer place for Europeans"* (SGESC 2004, 7). The *"whole point of a human security approach"*, the authors argue, *"is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity"* (ibid, 10). Similarly, to assert the inextricable link between security and development has become something of a cliché: no development without security and no security without development. Many NGOs and aid agencies however, stress that there are also tensions in trying to harness development as a tool of homeland security. Arguments based on "enlightened self-interest" often gloss over real tensions between domestically-oriented security priorities and Southern-oriented development priorities. The worry is that "their" security and development are becoming important only insofar as they are a means towards "ours". Areas where the causal links are less apparent are liable to fall by the wayside. As the Commission for Human

Security argues, current approaches to conflict *"focus on coercive, short-term strategies aimed at stopping attacks by cutting off financial, political or military support and apprehending possible perpetrators"*, rather than *"addressing the underlying causes related to inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, and aggression by states as well as people"* (CHS 2003, 23–24). The focus on circulation as opposed to consolidation, with its threats to institutional independence arising from politically directed aid, is of concern to many UN agencies, NGOs and aid organisations.

For a number of critics, the politicisation of development has invited comparisons with the Cold War. The reappearance has been noted, for example, of the use of overseas aid, including arms sales and trade concessions, as a reward political allegiance (Christian Aid 2004; also see Cosgrave 2004; BOND 2003; CHS 2003). What Christian Aid has dubbed "the new Cold War" it sees *"terrorism replacing communism as the bogey"* (Cosgrave 2004, 15). However, while having a rhetorical force, the analogy is misleading. During the Cold War, erstwhile Third World states were part of competing superpower geopolitical alliances. While cooperative borderland states, especially strategically located ones, are currently being reappraised in assistance terms, the alliance is essentially biopolitical. Instead of being ranged outwards militarily, as it were, towards other states and political blocs, it is directed inwards towards securing territory and, importantly, policing the flows and contingencies of economy and population. While the war on terrorism has renewed international interest in promoting effective states, these transitional entities are being reconstructed around the control of core biopolitical functions in the interests of global security.

Poverty reduction remains axiomatic to development assistance. The threat of global terrorism, however, has highlighted the importance of transitional populations living in volatile and strategic regions. Their frustration and alienation, although not causing terrorism, proves a fertile breeding ground for recruitment. While reducing absolute income poverty remains important, *"approaches to inequality and exclusion should be given increased priority"* (OECD/DAC 2003, 8). This is not the universalistic poverty focus that has gained ground since the 1980s in the shape of sustainable development. Poverty reduction here is concerned with delineating the poorest members of society and bettering their position. As the NGO members of the Global Security and Development Network have

argued in a joint statement to DAC, despite flagging the importance of poverty reduction, the *Lens on Terrorism* can be interpreted as "*the redirection of aid away from poverty reduction and towards a counter-terrorism and security agenda*" (BOND 2003, 1; also see Christian Aid 2004; Woods 2004).

For many aid agencies, the war on terrorism has reversed the progress made during the 1990s in affirming human rights. In particular, the threat of terrorism has given states the opportunity to derogate from existing human rights treaties on the grounds of security (Cosgrave 2004). Not only has the practice of detention without trial reappeared in countries such as the USA and Great Britain, many members of the global "coalition of the willing" have used existing legislation or passed new national security laws which, critics argue, have used terrorism as pretext for repressing legitimate internal opposition. Human rights organisations have raised such concerns, for example, in relation to India, China, Thailand, Pakistan, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (ibid, 27–35). This repressive climate has had a widespread negative impact on those aid agencies working in relation to civil society and its empowering to express legitimate concerns and frustrations. As reflected in the proscribing of organisations in the 2000 Terrorism Act (Fekete 2001), many groups struggling for self-determination and against the use of arbitrary power have been outlawed.

The reversal of human rights is also matched by the curtailment of what aid agencies call "humanitarian space" (FIFC 2004). During the 1990s, the military doctrine among leading states was to support civilian humanitarian agencies and to only become directly involved in humanitarian activities as a last resort. Since Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan, this situation has changed (Donini et al. 2004). Humanitarian assistance, especially in relation to crisis states, has increasingly been coloured by political considerations. In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, humanitarian assistance, development and social reconstruction have been redrafted as a legitimating support for transitional state entities and their transformation into showcase examples of regional stability. This places tremendous responsibilities upon cooperating aid agencies and draws them directly into an exposed political process. At the same time, due to widespread insecurity and insurgency violence, the military has moved beyond protection and become directly involved in activities it labels as "humanitarian". This

includes repairing essential infrastructure and delivering supplies. As some NGOs argue, however, such undertakings *"are more properly described as military intervention in pursuit of a political goal"* (Christian Aid 2004, 23).

At the operational level, the most obvious casualty has been the neutrality of aid organisations. In many respects, the war on terrorism is weakening what, in the past, has been an important strength of NGOs: a non-governmental legitimacy and authority derived from the liminal space between national supporters and constituencies, and the communities and civil society actors with who they work. Non-governmental organisations are aware that, from the perspective of many local populations, they have become indistinguishable from occupying forces or the allies of intrusive governments (Vaux 2004). Whether or not the perceived proximity between NGOs and an expansive Western sovereignty is real or imagined, the perception itself is damaging and destabilising. The bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in August 2003 are graphic illustrations of the new situation that aid agencies find themselves in. Many have begun to ask whether the benefits that aid workers bring is *"now outweighed by the price that they are being asked to pay"* (Foley 2004). Through the ambushing of convoys, rocketing of premises and the booby-trapping of vehicles, over 40 aid workers have been murdered in Afghanistan in the past year alone. Currently, whole swathes of Afghanistan and Iraq are no-go areas for NGOs. Many, especially European agencies have already left Iraq because, as the murder of the head of Care International, Margaret Hassan, has shown, the level of insecurity is now unacceptable.

8 Conclusion: the changing security terrain

As reflected in the sense of crisis among many non-governmental aid agencies, the war on terrorism has brought to a head a longer-term shift. That is, from being outside the state during the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs have progressively become adjuncts and implementing partners of policies and interventionary strategies emanating from effective states, especially within crisis zones. Once the champions of "grass-roots" solidarity as against "top down" official development, some agencies fear they have become uncritical accomplices of Western foreign policy. Coming to

terms with the new security environment including reappraising relations with donor governments, transitional authorities and the armed forces, has acquired significant urgency. A difficulty here however, is that although an interconnection between NGOs and western states contradict the NGO ethos of independence, many organisations were either supportive or complicit with the initial deepening of state/non-state linkages during the 1990s. NGOs that now endorse the "new Cold War" position, for example, themselves encouraged moves for greater coherence between aid and politics in the past (IDC 1999). The issue then was not that aid and politics were incompatible; it was that in many crisis states, including Rwanda in 1994, there was a lack of political interest and involvement by donor governments (Macrae / Leader 2000). NGOs, for example, were an active part of the 1998 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. This was an exploratory UN programme based on the explicit attempt to integrate aid and politics (Duffield et al. 2002). At this stage, the coherence agenda promised to better channel development resources towards poverty alleviation among non-insured population. Today, however, as states have become more actively involved, it is feared that this shared agenda is likely to see development subsumed under foreign policy objectives (Woods 2004). While many NGOs were driven by the growing acceptance of a responsibility to protect during the 1990s, as that responsibility has matured into the war on terrorism, some are having second thoughts.

As a centralising technology of international governance, the vision of human security that began to hit its stride towards the end of the 1990s involved the biopolitical securing of non-insured populations through bringing together the existing practices, institutions and networks of sustainable development. It envisaged a horizontal and coordinated system of cross-border interventions, indeed – a new, multileveled planetary infrastructure – able to complement, or temporarily replace, the efforts of ineffective states. The war on terrorism has problematised this particular governmental formula of human security. Rather than prioritising the security of people living within the territories of ineffective states (which human security does) the security of "homeland" populations and infrastructures has moved to the fore. In a radically interdependent world, defending metropolitan livelihood systems and essential infrastructures, in short, its way of life, is premised upon securing the "borderland" of crisis and ineffective states. Compared to earlier more universalistic notions of human security, a sharper focus on sub-populations and strategic territories distin-

guished by their potential to circulate and interconnect has gained ground in policy discourse. This narrowing in order to then broaden through the reform and reprioritisation of development administration, together with the implicit loyalty test this manoeuvre embodies, has caused a sense of unease among many historically independent NGOs. At the same time, however, the new security terrain has also created fresh opportunities for others.

In stressing the fragility of international borders and the growing interconnectedness of livelihood systems and economic dependencies across homeland and borderland populations (Blair 2001), the war on terrorism has deepened the interconnection between development and security and, in the interests of better policing global circulation, created new possibilities for coordination and centralisation. OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), for example, has suggested that the new players in the war on terrorism include *"financial analysts, bankers, arms control and bio-chemical experts, educators, communications specialists, development planners and religious leaders"* (OECD/DAC 2003, 10). The collapse within political imagination of the national/international dichotomy also makes it possible to envisage a further deepening of coherence between aid and politics. For example, between the domestic or "home" functions of sovereign government and its international or "foreign" departments. New datasets, the merging of existing ones, together with hybrid means of surveillance and bridging institutional forms, conjures the possibility of being able to interconnect and act on populations on a planetary scale (I-CAMS 2005). That is, as local to local informational connections between insured homeland and non-insured borderland populations, infrastructures and economies. Competing with the aid-based vision of cross-border alliances of existing support networks, as envisioned in *Human Security Now*, new possibilities for centralisation are emerging. For example, in relation to better integrating the policing of international migration with the search for domestic social cohesion, especially among ethnically divided communities, and new intrusive technologies to reconstruct and manage fragile states (see Strategy Unit 2005). However, does this prospect of being able to act upon homeland and borderland populations as a complex, interconnected whole herald a new vision of human security, or does it signal a global biopolitical tyranny?

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Security and development policies: untangling the relationship

Neclâ Tschirgi

Summary

Only some 15 years ago it was unusual for policy makers to talk of development and security policies in the same breath. Today the reverse is true: national policy makers talk of the 3-Ds (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense), the 4-Ds (including Democratization), and "joined-up government approaches" as if they are inseparable. Similarly, the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union, among others, all profess the necessity for integrated security and development policies. Yet, behind the current security-development nexus proposition, there are multiple layers of confusion, contradictions and policy dilemmas. Based on ongoing research undertaken by the *Security-Development Nexus Program* at the International Peace Academy (IPA), this paper seeks to bring greater clarity to current debates on the linkages between security and development policies in an increasingly interdependent but fractured global system.

The paper starts by identifying the multiple levels at which the policy debate takes place: local, national, regional and global. It argues that moving indiscriminately between these levels has created tremendous conceptual as well as policy confusion. Similarly, because both development and security are extremely broad and elusive concepts, the call for integrating them often leads to a policy enigma: What should be integrated with what? Furthermore, it is readily assumed that the security-development linkage applies equally to various conflict contexts and to different conflict phases – albeit in somewhat different configurations. Finally, there is a tendency to make policy recommendations as if the policy community were an apolitical monolith – rather than the diverse mix of national, regional, governmental and non-governmental actors with their own interests and agenda.

Recent research examining the linkages between distinct issue areas such as poverty, demography, globalization, human rights and environment has begun to provide important clues about how these factors combine to exacerbate or reduce risks of violent conflicts as well as political and crimi-

nal violence. Similarly, comparative country-level research demonstrates the specificity of each conflict context while assessing the appropriateness of current approaches to linking security and development in essentially distinct policy and political environments. It is anticipated that these research results will contribute to a new generation of policies and programs that go beyond the rhetorical call for integrating security and development policies.

"We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing." (UN 2005a).

*"In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom – by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. **There will be no development without security and no security without development.** And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law." (UN 2005b) [emphasis added]*

"The Goals [Millennium Development Goals, MDGs] not only reflect global justice and human rights—they are also vital to international and national security and stability, as emphasized by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should therefore be placed centrally in international efforts to end violent conflict, instability and terrorism." (Sachs 2005, 6).

"Conflict and deprivation are interconnected. Deprivation has many causal links to violence, although these have to be carefully examined. Conversely, wars kill people, destroy trust among them, increase poverty and crime, and slow down the economy. Addressing such insecurities effectively demands an integrated approach." (CHS 2003)

1 Introduction

The necessity of linking security and development has become a policy mantra. From the United Nations to the African Union, from the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 to Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement, from academic institutions to operational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), there are vigorous calls for integrating security and development perspectives and policies. On one level, this is a welcome development – especially after the deliberate bifurcation of development and security policies during the Cold War. On another level, the ready consensus among policymakers and advocates alike about the

interdependence between security and development has served to obscure the difficulties involved in aligning security and development policies.

There are four major impediments to designing security and development policies that are compatible, mutually reinforcing and beneficial. The first is conceptual. The current policy debate is taking place at multiple levels: local, national, regional and global. For example, throughout the 1990s, many who advocated for integrated security and development policies focused their attention primarily at the human level. Moving away from macro or aggregate conceptions of security and development, they focused on the micro level – calling for an integrated approach to human security, human development and human rights (Commission on Human Security 2003; UNDP 1994).

Others had a narrower, more functional approach. Carving out particular policy areas such as peacemaking, peacekeeping or post-conflict peacebuilding, various UN documents of the 1990s, for example, sought to identify how the UN's security and development roles and responsibilities could be better aligned (UN 1992; UN 1994; UN 2000). Similarly, individual donor governments or multilateral institutions such as the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) began to call for coordinated and coherent donor approaches to promote conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state building in conflict-affected countries (OECD 2001).

Still others adopted a global/systemic view of the linkages between security and development concerns. This approach gained greater currency after 9/11 – especially among Western governments. Several recent UN reports have elevated the debate to the highest international level, arguing that there can be no international peace or security without development, and no development without security (UN 2004; Sachs 2005; UN 2005a; UN 2005b).

While these initiatives agree that security and development are interlinked and should be promoted simultaneously, their starting points are quite different and thus lead to divergent policy recommendations. The appropriation of the same terminology for distinct goals at very different levels of policy intervention has led to considerable confusion. Human security is a worthwhile policy goal, but it does not necessarily lead to national development or international security. Nor is the reverse true. Nonetheless,

they are equally desirable and *potentially* mutually reinforcing goals. The security-development nexus does not apply automatically across policy arenas (prevention, statebuilding, peacebuilding) or across levels of policy implementation (e.g. global, national, human). The current policy debates on security and development move indiscriminately from the local to the global, from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, from humanitarian action to terrorism – creating tremendous conceptual as well as policy confusion.

Compounding the confusion resulting from the conflation of human, national and international concerns, there are other impediments to more effective integration of security and development policies. A second obstacle to multi-dimensional and interlinked approaches to security and development derives from the fact that both development and security are extremely broad and elusive concepts. Currently, development encompasses many dimensions from human rights to environmental sustainability, from economic growth to governance. Similarly, security has been expanded to go beyond state-centric conceptions of security to human security and includes a range of military as well as non-military threats that recognize no borders. This naturally leads to a policy enigma: What should be integrated with what? At what level? To what purpose?

Third, it is readily assumed that the security-development linkage applies equally to various contexts and to different phases of conflict – albeit in somewhat different configurations. As a result, the policy prescriptions are more process-oriented rather than content-driven. Following the relevant exhortation for integrated approaches to security and development, the policy guidelines often revert back to generic imperatives for "coherence", "coordination", "harmonization", "alignment", "participation", "ownership", and "sustainability". However, these are hardly sufficient to formulate overlapping or linked-up policies across a vast policy arena. To move beyond such vacuous prescriptions, security and development conditions in a given context have to be accurately diagnosed in order to identify the appropriate package of policy responses.

Finally, and greatly fueling the conceptual confusion identified above, there is a tendency to make policy recommendations as if the policy community were an apolitical monolith rather than the diverse mix of national, regional, governmental and non-governmental actors with different interests and agendas. Linking security and development is a profoundly politi-

cal project – differentially affecting the vital interests of external policy actors as well as their intended beneficiaries. In the 1990s when the "security-development nexus" proposition came to the fore, there was growing commitment to multilateral approaches to reducing violent conflicts and promoting peacebuilding in conflict-torn, conflict-prone and post-conflict countries. The integrated policies promoted by the United Nations or the "linked-up" policies adopted by key donor countries applied primarily to conflicts that did not affect the vital interests of powerful external actors. In politically difficult cases like Kashmir, North Korea or Chechnya, there was little insistence on integrated policies; in other cases like Bosnia, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the sequencing of security and development approaches decidedly reflected the vital interests of key players. After 9/11, and the series of terrorist incidents in Bali, Madrid, Istanbul, London and other venues that followed, it is virtually impossible to consider security concerns in any part of the world without the shadow of global terrorism. Thus, in advocating for effective and integrated security and development policies, it is necessary to ask: Whose security is at stake? Whose development is affected? Whose agenda has precedence?

Despite the above shortcomings, policy discourse and policy development proceeded steadily throughout the 1990s albeit without clear prescriptions on how to link security and development in real time and real places. With the strong re-affirmation of the security-development linkage at the 2005 World Summit, the time is ripe to take a critical look at the body of evolving knowledge on the security-development nexus which is essential to start identifying the ingredients for more effective policies at multiple levels (UN 2005b). This paper provides a brief overview of the evolution of international policies at the nexus of security and development before turning to a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness and relevance of those policies based on emerging research findings.

2 Taking stock: evolution of security-development policies

Like most social phenomena, the security-development nexus is not entirely new. That socio-economic well being and physical security are interdependent is almost a tautology.

At a human level, where the interdependence between physical and socio-economic well being is experienced most directly, the security-development nexus is self-evident. However, the term "human security" gained currency only in the early 1990s with the publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* of 1994. The Report offered a dual definition of human security: *"It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities"* (UNDP 1994). The report identified seven elements that comprise human security: (1) economic security; (2) food security; (3) health security; (4) environmental security; (5) personal security; (6) community security; and (7) political security (UNDP 1994, 23). In line with the new human security agenda, several governmental and non-governmental actors began to champion a range of issues that were neither part of traditional development nor conventional security.¹ The campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, to regulate small arms and light weapons, and to establish an international criminal court were part of the emerging international consensus around major issues that threatened human security and militated against human development (Tschirgi 2004).

The World Bank's consultations with 60,000 people in 60 countries at the turn of the Millennium provided a poignant view from the field. The study, titled *Voices of the Poor*, concluded that the poor view well-being holistically and consider security – alongside physical and material well-being, social relations and freedom of choice and action – as essential to their lives. Yet, the consultations also demonstrated that their lives were often marred by insecurity, with both domestic and societal violence continually threatening their well-being (World Bank 2005b).

Despite these stark realities, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were unanimously adopted by world leaders to address poverty and human development, made no reference to conflict or human security. More recently, the connections between the MDGs and conflict have

1 There is extensive academic and policy literature on the concept of human security. For more information, see the extensive work of the Commission on Human Security under <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/>.

gained increasing attention.² This was greatly facilitated by the impressive work of the Commission on Human Security, which noted:

"People's security around the world is interlinked – as today's global flows of goods, services, finance, people and images highlight. Political liberalization and democratization opens new opportunities but also new fault lines, such as political and economic instabilities and conflicts within states. More than 800,000 people a year lose their lives to violence. About 2.8 billion suffer from poverty, ill health, illiteracy and other maladies. Conflict and deprivation are interconnected. Deprivation has many causal links to violence, although these have to be carefully examined. Conversely, wars kill people, destroy trust among them, increase poverty and crime, and slow down the economy. Addressing such insecurities effectively demands an integrated approach." (CHS 2003)

The Commission advocated a two-track approach to promoting human security: protection and empowerment. It urged the following actions: a) protecting people in violent conflict; b) protecting people from the proliferation of arms; c) supporting the security of people on the move; d) establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations; e) encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor; f) working to provide minimum living standards everywhere; g) according higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care; h) developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights; i) empowering all people with universal basic education; j) clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations (CHS 2003).

Although a growing number of studies forcefully confirmed the interdependence of security and development at the human level, appropriate policies to address them through international action have been extremely slow in coming mainly because human security and human development have traditionally been considered as exclusive responsibilities of sovereign states. The concept "responsibility to protect" which was adopted at the 2005 World Summit is a new and radical development whose application by the international community remains to be tested (UN 2005a).

2 See for example IPA (2005), Stewart (2003), World Bank (2005a).

Moving to a macro level, the interdependence between security and development is equally clear. The collapse of empires after World War I and its profound repercussions throughout the world, the Great Depression, the rise of totalitarian states, World War II and post war de-colonization are compelling evidence of the linkages between socio-economic crises, political instability and wars at the global level. The United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions were explicitly created in order to address the twin problems of peace and security, on the one hand, and socio-economic development on the other. However, even before these institutions became fully operational, the Cold War erupted and quickly distorted international priorities. Bypassing the United Nations, the two power blocs created their own separate security institutions to manage the East-West conflict. As the number of states proliferated following de-colonization, each power bloc began to provide security assistance to countries in its own sphere of influence.

Meanwhile, a parallel bilateral and multilateral system of development assistance was established to promote socio-economic development in the developing and newly emerging countries. International development strategies, policies and instruments quickly became handmaidens of the security policies of dominant powers. Foreign aid, including Official Development Assistance (ODA), was designed to support friendly regimes, to prevent others from defecting to the competing Cold War bloc, and to serve as a global mechanism to maintain international order while promoting economic growth in developing and the newly-emerging countries.³

Initially focused narrowly on economic growth, international development assistance gradually expanded to embrace other issue areas including the environment, gender, human rights, and governance. Yet, the international aid industry carefully avoided peace, security and conflict issues. Development actors worked *in* conflict and *around* conflict but they carefully avoided working *on* conflict (Goodhand / Atkinson 2001). Indeed, throughout the Cold War, conflict referred primarily to the East-West power struggle and inter-state wars which fell within the domain of secu-

3 The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were precursors of official development assistance, and had extremely strategic goals. It was not coincidental that the subtitle of W.W. Rostow's seminal book on development, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, was *A Non-Communist Manifesto*.

rity actors and institutions. At the international level, there was a fairly clear divide between development policies (covering primarily domestic socio-economic issues) and security policies (dealing with inter-state political and military affairs).

With the end of the Cold War, the artificial divide between these realms gradually disappeared under the weight of globalization, new information and communication technologies, the spill-over of domestic problems such as refugees, pandemics, environmental pressures to the regional and the global arena. Many domestic problems could not be confined within a single country. Regional and global pressures were no longer a one-way street. Thus, the borders between states, issue areas and policy realms began to be blurred.

At the United Nations, the release of *An Agenda for Peace* (UN 1992) and *An Agenda for Development* (1994), set the stage for a more holistic look at the violent conflicts in the developing countries (UN 1992; UN 1994). The OECD Development Assistance Committee followed suit by issuing *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (OECD 1997 and 2001). In 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan released his report on *Prevention of Armed Conflict* (UN 2001). These documents represented an effort to return to the original vision of the UN's founders by calling for integrated approaches to socio-economic, human rights, humanitarian, security and developmental strategies and approaches which had been derailed by the Cold War. The normative developments throughout the 1990s were quite impressive.⁴ The United Nations became the arena to create international norms, to establish new priorities and to set collective agendas. These were reflected in the various international summits that took place in the 1990s; they also influenced the agenda of the Security Council. Human rights abuses, protection of civilians in war, small arms, gender and peace, children and armed conflict, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) became legitimate issues for the Council's consideration (Malone 2004).

Meanwhile, on the ground, humanitarian workers, peacemakers, peacekeepers and development agencies responded to civil wars, ethnic conflicts and failed states with the various tools and instruments at their disposal.

4 For a review of these developments see Tschirgi (2003).

The number of United Nations peacekeeping missions increased rapidly throughout the 1990s.⁵ The new UN peace operations were different from traditional peacekeeping missions in that they were often deployed in contexts where there was little peace to keep; they also involved a combination of military and civilian tasks including civilian policing, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protection of refugees and internally-displaced people. Significantly, the UN undertook direct administration of Kosovo and East Timor in the absence of a sovereign government in these territories and assumed wide ranging responsibilities for security as well as development.⁶

As normative and operational pressures tore down traditional boundaries, there were concerted efforts to overcome the compartmentalization of the security and development institutions of the Cold War era. In the 1990s, there were several waves of bureaucratic reforms in the United Nations which included the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Although the new departments had separate mandates and functioned in isolation from the UN's development agencies, various mechanisms were established to encourage inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation (Griffin 2003). There was a corresponding revision of institutional structures within individual governments and inter-governmental organizations. New units were created to deal with conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace-building. New inter-governmental and non-governmental networks were founded. Various countries began to develop "joined up" government approaches, aligning their foreign, security and development policies and programs in order to respond more effectively to intra-state conflicts.⁷

Coming in the wake of the Cold War, the primary motivation for these policy innovations was recognition of the perverse consequences of that

5 For more information on the UN's peacekeeping operations and other peace and political missions in the 1990s, see the UN's website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/index.asp>.

6 For a fuller understanding of the UN's role in transitional administrations see Chesterman (2004).

7 For a quick review of selected innovations in this area see Fitz-Gerald (2004) or Fitz-Gerald in the present volume.

era for many newly-emerging and developing countries. It could no longer be ignored that these countries had not only failed to benefit significantly from the intricate web of international development assistance over the last fifty years; they were also extremely vulnerable to human insecurity, political instability and violent conflict. Thus, policy integration was seen as an imperative to respond to the needs of a wide range of target countries. The OECD/DAC, the European Union, the United Nations, donor governments and even the World Bank committed themselves to better harmonization of their policies *towards target countries* – whether these were transitional states, conflict-affected countries, or politically fragile states facing humanitarian crises or grave developmental challenges. In each case, the policy prescription was the same: integrated, multi-dimensional policies across the traditional security-development spectrum. With the appropriate injunction to "do no harm," external actors saw their role primarily as humanitarian in nature. The human or national vulnerabilities afflicting the aid recipients were not considered as serious threats to the security of the aid donors or the global system as a whole. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the preferred vehicle for international policy interventions was multilateral – often under the umbrella of the United Nations.

With the re-emergence of threats to the security of Western countries after 9/11, the security-development equation has gained a different dimension. Today, "fragile states", "pandemics", "civil wars", "terrorism" and "poverty" are seen as direct threats to the well-being and security of Western countries – and by extension to international peace and security. This shift quickly became evident in the post 9/11 domestic and foreign policies of many Western governments as well as the policies of the collective military, political, economic and security institutions in which they participate. Instead of acting as arms-length policy makers in a multilateral arena, they have become primary stakeholders (and "stickholders")⁸ in the security-development calculus. Inevitably, the threat perceptions of powerful members of the international community have come to affect the global security environment. Indeed, the UN Secretary General commissioned the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change precisely because of the growing chasm in the international community about divergent threat perceptions, and the international consequences of member countries pur-

8 I am grateful to Martin Khor of the Third World Forum for this powerful metaphor.

suing narrowly-cast national interests at the expense of collective security (UN 2004). The intense debates and negotiations leading up to the 2005 World Summit at the UN in September often came down to a basic clash between competing priorities for security versus development pursued by various groupings of member states – demonstrating the huge gap between the need for integrated global policies and state-centered politics.

3 Emerging research findings and policy implications

The outcome of the 2005 World Summit has temporarily patched up the difficulties and deep-rooted cleavages that have come to characterize the post 9/11 era. Meanwhile, the dragging reform process at the UN provides a useful context within which to review the important, albeit tenuous, policy innovations that were undertaken in the last 10–15 years. During this same period, an impressive body of academic and policy literature has accumulated which focuses on the interdependence between security and development. This paper draws upon that body of literature as well as emerging findings from a multi-disciplinary research program undertaken by the International Peace Academy (IPA) in New York entitled *the Security-Development Nexus*.⁹ IPA's research program has begun to yield empirically grounded insights about how security and development interplay across issue areas and within individual countries. Ongoing research examining the linkages between distinct issue areas such as poverty, demography, globalization, human rights and environment provide important clues about how these factors combine to exacerbate or reduce risks of violent conflicts as well as political and criminal violence. Similarly, comparative country-level studies demonstrate the specificity of each conflict context while testing the appropriateness of current approaches to linking security and development in essentially distinct policy and political environments.¹⁰

9 For more information on the program, please see under Research Programs at the IPA: <http://www.ipacademy.org>.

10 This paper was prepared before the research program has been completed and the results from the various research tracks have been consolidated and synthesized in order to extract concrete policy lessons. Several forthcoming edited volumes (cited below) will contain final research results and policy recommendations.

To overcome the shortcomings raised in the introduction, this paper takes a narrow approach to the security-development nexus. First, its analysis is primarily at the *country-level* since both human and international concerns come together at the national level. Second, it basically focuses on *policies at the international level* since this is where much of the policy innovations have taken place. Lastly, the paper is particularly interested in the linkages between security and development from a conflict prevention perspective. In contemporary civil conflicts, there is no unilinear continuum from peace to war to peace; thus, there is no sequential approach to linking security and development. Nonetheless, there is a wide range of interventions across the security-development spectrum that are more appropriate for distinct phases of the conflict cycle. In the last decade, there has been growing understanding of the interplay between security and development conditions and policies in post-conflict peacebuilding.¹¹ Linking security and development policies for conflict prevention, however, still remains a largely unexplored terrain.

4 Setting the scene: challenges on the ground and policy interventions

The period since the end of the Cold War brought opportunities as well as new threats for developing countries. Globalization, market liberalization, democratization, and more recently, the global war on terror have greatly impacted domestic conditions in developing countries – alternately creating added pressures or providing potential safety valves. Similarly, the spill-over effects of regional developments, including the cross-border movement of trade, people and financial transactions have had far-reaching but mixed impacts. These have played out in very different ways in various countries and regions. Almost one third of all developing countries are considered to be at risk of violent conflict or in a state of chronic instability.¹² In other words, the correlation between lack of security and underdevelopment is well-established. While researchers can not readily identify the direction of causality, the complex web of risk factors and patterns of

11 For a review of the state of the art in post-conflict peacebuilding see Tschirgi (2004).

12 Datasets on wars, violent conflicts and violent conflict differ greatly based on their primary focus and methodology. See for example Marshall / Gurr (2005) and the recently-released Human Security Report (HSC 2005).

vulnerability is sufficiently clear. A wide range of externally generated pressures, low levels of economic growth, low human development indicators, chronic political instability, ineffective or illegitimate political institutions, highly conflictual modes of political mobilization, and high incidence of sporadic or regionalized violent conflict mix in different measure to create insecurity and retard development (World Bank 2004; CIPP; CGD 2004; Marshall / Gurr 2005).

The end of the Cold War did not only expose the vulnerability of many developing countries to interlocking socio-economic crises, political instability, physical insecurity and violent conflict. It also led to the waning of the injunction against external intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. From poverty alleviation to human rights protection, from security sector reform to democracy promotion, external actors began to play important roles across a range of policy areas.¹³ The sheer number and range of foreign actors engaged in the development and security problems of developing countries have grown exponentially. There are private sector subcontractors implementing police reform in Jamaica; international non-governmental organizations involved in prison reform in Malawi; a joint national/international special criminal court in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers providing basic services in Liberia, and the United Nations administering the entire territory of Kosovo. What do these activities add up to and what are their impacts in terms of addressing the combined security and development concerns of various developing countries?

Emerging findings from ongoing research can be grouped into five different categories: insights related to the actual mix of sectoral policies and their relevance for different types of conflict contexts; institutional challenges; operational issues; funding issues and donor roles; and the political dimensions of policy coherence across the security-development spectrum.

13 As Donini argues: *"In many ways, it is the intervention itself that should be seen as the new defining element in the post-bipolar world, rather than conflict, which of course existed throughout the previous era whether in the form of wars by proxy or in resistance to superpower hegemony. Thus, recent years have witnessed a kind of double lifting of inhibitions that had been largely suppressed by the Cold War's rules of the game: the inhibition to wage war and the inhibition to intervene"* (Duffield 2001, 31).

Policy Mix

Research on discrete issue areas such as poverty, globalization, demography, environment, human rights amply demonstrates the cross-cutting nature of the pressures faced by developing countries.¹⁴ The vicissitudes of the global market place, slow or negative economic growth in marginalized regions of the world, high levels of unemployment, urbanization, the youth bulge, poverty and pandemics, the easy transport of drugs, arms and finances across borders, poor governance, and weak institutions of rule of law tend to reinforce each other and provide a fertile ground for conflict. What is evident from these thematic studies is that the patterns of vulnerability (or "risk factors") are not country specific; instead, they are the outcome of broader social-economic-political forces beyond the control of governments and states that are particularly at risk.

Yet, at the macro policy level, each of these problems is still dealt with in a compartmentalized and fragmented way. On the big policy issues (trade, debt, migration, employment, international financial flows, global social justice, direct foreign investment, energy, global warming, or disarmament) there is little evidence of a radical transformation of the security-development linkages or a corresponding re-allocation of resources or policy priorities. Even in the most prominent area of policy intervention – poverty alleviation – the current focus on the MDGs basically rests upon implementing earlier commitments (Sachs 2005). Thus, the security-development linkage seems to operate safely within the established parameters of the current international system. The incremental, but ultimately limited, policy adjustments in official development assistance, humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, debt relief, disease control, sanctions and peacekeeping fall far short of addressing structural risk factors that lie at the source of physical insecurity, societal vulnerability and violent conflicts in the developing countries. In short, there is continued disconnect between the policy rhetoric for integrated security-development approaches at the international level and policy realities at the sectoral level. The major exception to this trend is international policies toward terrorism –

14 These insights are based on a series of commissioned studies on demography, environment, human rights, poverty, globalization and physical insecurity. They will be part of a forthcoming IPA edited volume tentatively entitled *Security and Development: Critical Connections* (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.).

which in turn have begun to penetrate other policy areas. As noted previously, the impact of 9/11 on the evolution of international security and development policies merits special attention which is only beginning to be understood.¹⁵

Turning to policy integration at the country-level: Notwithstanding claims of enhanced policy coherence across issue areas, comparative research from the field demonstrates that international policy interventions also fall short of integrated approaches to addressing the range of security and development problems in concrete contexts.¹⁶ This is equally true for national policies. Instead, research from country case studies consistently reveals serious tensions and inconsistencies resulting from the pursuit of multiple agendas. These are rarely acknowledged or effectively managed by national governments or their external supporters (*ibid*). For example, at the country level, achieving the MDGs, promoting economic development, enhancing social cohesion, executing an anti-terrorism campaign and ensuring regime stability are often identified as policy priorities although these are not necessarily mutually compatible goals. Meanwhile, socio-economic policies dealing with discrete issue areas remain segregated and fragmented, with unemployment, population growth, health, internal or external migration, diaspora remittances, food security, criminality and economic development proceeding on basically separate tracks – and these are regularly supported by external agencies through sector-specific assistance programs (*ibid*).

If development policies at the country level are far from integrated, their integration with security policies appears to be even more problematic. The evidence from country-case studies suggests that national security institutions focus narrowly on traditional threats to state security rather than the wider range of threats covered under human security. Despite claims to the contrary, there are few examples of proactive or preventive strategies to deal with structural or proximate sources of conflict through linked-up socio-economic or environmental policies (*ibid*). It is only recently that selected governments and key development donors have started

15 For a discussion of the impact of 9/11 see Tschirgi (2003).

16 These insights are drawn from country case studies on Yemen, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Guinea-Bissau, Bolivia, Somalia, Tajikistan which will be included in the above-mentioned IPA volume, alongside the thematic studies (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.).

to view standard tools like the MDGs or national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) from a security perspective (World Bank 2005a). Similarly, notwithstanding growing external pressure to include human rights and democratization criteria into aid packages, their implementation on the ground is shaped by national security interests of the donor and the recipient governments. In this context, 9/11 offers an important benchmark for assessing the relative significance of security vs. development policies for both internal and external actors. Research from several geo-strategically vital countries like Yemen, Somalia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan reveals significant policy reversals in pre and post 9/11 environments.¹⁷

Evidence from both sectoral and country case studies suggests that policy coherence is still at a high level of abstraction. Moreover, it often occurs primarily at the rhetorical level at donor capitals or the headquarters of regional or international organizations rather than in the national policies of the developing countries themselves or the country-specific programming of donor countries. As development assistance has come to play an expanded role in conflict contexts, there are growing calls for conflict-sensitive approaches to development. However, it is difficult to demonstrate that conflict sensitivity has been mainstreamed into development assistance. More often than not, development actors tend to focus either on acute problem areas – such as child soldiers, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the return of displaced populations – or on new programming areas such as security sector reform or rule of law which are not part of traditional development or security assistance programs, and are often implemented as stand-alone programs.¹⁸

The gaps, contradictions and dilemmas that exist across policy areas at the national level are replicated even within a single policy area. For example, research on rule of law programs reveals that there are distinct tensions between law enforcement and human rights agendas. Similarly, there are dilemmas between rule of law approaches supporting market liberalization

17 See the country case studies in the forthcoming IPA edited volume (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.).

18 For references on conflict-sensitive development see Tschirgi (2004).

vs. equitable development.¹⁹ Yet, few mechanisms exist through which such tensions can be resolved at the country level. More often than not, policies are translated into discrete projects and programs with their own objectives – quite divorced from a broader security or development strategy.

Paradoxically, despite the heightened pressure on donor agencies to apply well-established ODA criteria for aid effectiveness in "good performers", donors are increasingly supporting conflict countries through a range of aid instruments. The current euphemisms for such engagement include "Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS)," "difficult partnerships," and "fragile states."²⁰ On one level, these labels represent a serious effort to group countries into categories for more appropriate policy interventions. On the other hand, these categories themselves tend to create their own policy blinders. For example, "state-building" in fragile states has now become a mini policy industry with various donors designing and implementing programs on constitution making, support to multi-party politics, transparency and anti-corruption programs as well as anti-crime and anti-terrorism measures. A closer look at selected programs, however, reveals that they are quite narrowly conceived and are often shaped by donor capacities rather than recipient country needs.²¹

In short, the overwhelming evidence emerging from thematic, program level and country case studies is the absence of strategic, integrated national or international policies to address complex and interlocking socio-economic, environmental, political and security problems. Instead, international actors are now providing a multitude of discrete programs, projects

19 Research commissioned under the Rule of Law project at IPA's Security-Nexus Program promises to yield a better understanding of the impact of rule of law programming in conflict prevention, peace operations and post-conflict peacebuilding. These studies will be published in a volume tentatively called *Rule of Law and Conflict Management: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights*, (Hurwitz / Huang s.a.).

20 For further discussion of this point see Picciotto (2005).

21 Donor approaches to security sector reform are the subject of a parallel IPA research project; its findings of will be collected in an edited volume titled *Arresting Insecurity*. Also see the paper by Peake / Studdard (2005). On Rule of Law programming see the forthcoming IPA edited volume tentatively called *Rule of Law and Conflict Management: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights* (Hurwitz / Huang s.a.). There is a wealth of evaluation studies on other programming areas which confirm the overall conclusion.

and aid packages across the vast security-development spectrum but without any coherent policy framework. In the last few years, this conclusion was amply demonstrated in post-conflict contexts.²² With the growing policy interest in conflict prevention, emerging research findings from countries at risk of conflict confirm the magnitude of the gap between policy rhetoric and reality.

Institutional Challenges

One of the most persistent findings from policy research is the absence of effective institutional interface between external and domestic actors across a range of policy areas. Traditionally, external actors dealt directly with national governments and authorities in their own sectoral areas. As the range of sectors and issue areas for collaboration have expanded and new external actors, including international NGOs have become involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the multiplicity of national and international actors has led to fragmentation and dissipation of effort. This has created two contradictory problems. On the one hand, national governments generally lack the capacity or the appropriate systems to deal effectively with a growing range of external actors, each with its own mandate and requirements. On the other hand, there is understandable resistance to being confronted with a donor community which comes in with a unified agenda. As an observer from a conflict-torn country has noted, the prospect of a "donor cartel" poses a serious concern to national governments (de Leon 2004).

Another consistent finding from thematic as well as country research is the continued disconnect between various international agencies with different mandates. Although the linkages between health, environment, poverty, population, environment, housing and crime are increasingly better understood at both the policy and operational levels, international institutions dealing with these problems are highly fragmented and often operate in isolation from each other. There have been some efforts by "vanguard professionals" in each sector to reach out to other sectoral areas. For ex-

22 The "strategy deficit" in post-conflict peacebuilding is well-established in the literature. It was empirically confirmed by the multi-country peacebuilding evaluations undertaken by the Utstein-4 countries, UK, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands. For a summary report see Smith (2003).

ample, UN agencies working on property, land and housing now find their issues of growing interest to agencies working on rule of law.²³ Similarly, demographers and security experts are beginning to work together on demographic and security trends while civilian policing is now linked to peacekeeping; however, the institutional linkages across issue areas is at best informal. A decade after Alvaro de Soto and del Castillo's incisive critique of the disconnect between the operations of the UN and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in El Salvador, macro level mechanisms for better coordination among external actors, such as the multi-donor trust funds and consultative mechanisms at the country level, are still far from commonly utilized – especially for conflict prevention (de Soto 1994).

Operational and Implementation Issues

Compounding the shortcomings at the policy and institutional levels, research at the nexus of security and development consistently draws attention to failures of policy implementation. Almost invariably, there exists a huge gap between policy makers and policy implementers, between headquarters and field operations. This is particularly evident in programming areas like security sector reform. The carefully-defined and packaged policies and programs rarely translate into effective programs on the ground.²⁴

Sectoral and country-based research confirms that there is extremely weak knowledge management within organizations, inadequate mechanisms to incorporate lessons learned, and little institutional memory in terms of the range of new programs and projects that are implemented in various countries. As donors have become involved in hands-on programming (sometimes through private sector consulting firms) on such sensitive issue areas as the security sector, human rights, democratization, civil society promotion, the absence of consistent and rigorous planning methodology and management capacity is increasingly becoming more apparent (ibid).

23 Please see the IPA Policy Report entitled "Land, Property, Housing and Conflict Management: Identifying Policy Options for Rule of Law Programming" (Hurwitz / Studdard / Williams 2005).

24 The aforementioned IPA edited volumes on Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law will address implementation issues in greater detail.

At the country or field level, cooperation frameworks between program implementers, national authorities and donors are far from effective.²⁵ As a result, there are numerous unconnected programs and projects in such different sectors as gender equity, human rights training, police reform, election monitoring and poverty alleviation. Multi-disciplinary task forces across projects or programs (e.g. with expertise in conflict, legal affairs, management, financing, budgeting and human resources) or a common understanding of the linkages among program areas (e.g. justice, security sector, public finance) are simply not part of the design of externally-supported initiatives. The complicated relationship between project implementers, their external funders, national governments and beneficiaries has exacerbated the perennial challenges of transparency and accountability between donors and recipients.

Donor Roles and Funding

External actors regularly pay lip service to the importance of "local ownership" although the policy instruments for more effective alignment of donor and recipient strategies, instruments, frameworks, programs lag far behind. Research indicates that many policy and planning instruments promoted by external actors such as the PRSPs, the MDGs, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and Common Country Assessments (UNDAF / CCAs) are not only sectoral in nature; they are rarely the primary policy tools employed by national governments.²⁶

There are strong policy exhortations for more effective collaboration among donors, more efficient use of international resources and greater accountability. However, it is extremely difficult to trace donor funding within countries, across various sectors, and especially across governments and other international actors. Researchers examining external engagement in individual countries discover a multitude of actors, programs, projects which rarely add up to a comprehensive sectoral or country program.

Currently, there is no national or international repository of funding by donors, sectors or recipient countries. Researchers find it difficult to gain a composite picture of who is doing what in which countries with what level

25 For an insightful examination of this problem see Rose (2005).

26 See the forthcoming IPA volume tentatively titled *Security and Development: Critical Connections* (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.); also see Rose (2005).

of financial support. For example, a concerted search for donor investments in security sector reform over the last 10 years has yielded only fragmented information. This is only partly due to the fact that various security sector reform activities undertaken by donors do not qualify under ODA criteria and are thus not tracked by OECD/DAC. Even those activities that fall under the DAC criteria are listed under so many different categories that it is not easy to gain an accurate picture.²⁷

The Political Context

Perhaps the single most important conclusion that emerges from thematic as well as country-based research on the links between security and development policies is the centrality of politics – both for problem identification and policy response. Neither sectoral policies, nor national and international responses can be understood without an accurate understanding of the political dynamics at the country and international levels.

Despite the existence of historical and structural legacies which greatly affect a country's security and development conditions, policy options as well as policy outcomes are not pre-determined. The key variable between structural problems and policy outcomes in countries at risk of conflict seems to be the nature of the country's political processes, dynamic and institutions. The political "ecology" of security and development is highly context-specific and defies universal prescriptions. Shying away from overt involvement in politics, donors have increasingly sought to influence national politics through "good governance" programming. More recently, under the impact of 9/11, the focus has shifted to statebuilding. Yet, country-based findings question both the effectiveness of governance programming and the more recent interest in state building. There is accumulating evidence from countries like Somalia and Guinea-Bissau that the donor focus on strengthening formal institutions of the state at the central level (constitutions, elections, courts, military, police, parliaments, ministries) might be at the expense of national processes of political accommodation, dialogue and priority setting.²⁸ As the scope of official development assistance expands to highly sensitive political issue areas (including security sector reform, rule of law, democratization, human rights) the

27 See, for example, Mancini (2005).

28 See the country case studies in the forthcoming IPA volume (Tschirgi / Mancini s.a.).

perennial question of sovereignty emerges as a key challenge. The fact that domestic conflicts are increasingly "internationalized" as a result of the active involvement of donors has far reaching implications for a society's ability to address its problems through locally-sustainable political processes.

Ultimately, there is no escaping the fact that external engagement in conflict prone, conflict torn and post conflict countries is inevitably political in nature. The absence of a grand international strategy linking the multiple goals pursued in such contexts does not diminish the political role of external bilateral and multilateral actors. Rather, it confirms the limitations of current approaches to conflict prevention, state building and peacebuilding by external actors. Not only are security and development policies beset by serious problems of coherence, coordination and consistency. In reality, it is difficult to speak of the existence of "international policies" that are equal or appropriate to the multi-faceted security and developmental threats facing many developing countries in the early years of the 21st century. Instead, the current policy declarations on the security-development nexus serve to reveal the great chasm between global vulnerabilities that cut across human, national and international levels and the structural shortcomings of an international system that is shaped by the national interests of its member states.

5 Conclusion

The emerging research findings summarized above provide evidence-based support to the growing dissatisfaction with the policy mantra for integrated security and development strategies for conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding. They also point to three current gaps which need to be addressed: the gap between knowledge and policy; between policy and practice; and between policies and politics. In each of these areas there is considerable room for further work.

Under the research-policy gap, the priority should be for more rigorous, field-based research that tracks the interrelated security and development challenges confronting countries at risk of conflict. Such research needs to be informed by an overall understanding of structural risk factors while closely tracing the political context in which national and international policies are made. The dynamic interaction between security and devel-

opment conditions in different contexts cannot be overemphasized. For example, the impact of the global war on terror on the development and security priorities of individual countries and regions requires urgent attention since it has created a new political environment for policy interventions.

Under the policy-practice gap, there is need for a large body of independent, systematic, longitudinal and cumulative evaluation studies to begin documenting and assessing the implementation of security and development policies on the ground. Agency-based "best practices units", lessons learned exercises, and evaluation studies fall short of providing a sound basis upon which to assess international policies. Instead, based on ongoing research in various institutions, a consortium of policy research think tanks would be well-placed to undertake evaluation studies across various countries, sectors and issue areas.

Finally, under the policy-politics gap, the current reactive approaches to violent conflicts cannot be sustained. For developing countries, structural vulnerabilities are not destiny; there are multiple policy options at local, national, regional and international levels that are not explored or pursued by governments and international institutions because of overriding political considerations based on narrowly-cast self interest. Preventive strategies at the nexus of security and development are imperative to avert structural vulnerabilities from becoming violent conflicts that know no borders. The post Cold War, post 9/11 era offers the opportunity for enlightened national interest and collective security to converge in important ways to address development and security challenges in radically new ways. After 60 years of certain enmities and alliances, we are currently witnessing an interregnum in the international system. It remains to be seen whether the state-centric politics of the 20th century can be sufficiently transformed to respond to the multi-faceted threats of the 21st century.

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Whose security? Integration and integrity in EU policies for security and development¹

Clive Robinson

Summary

The end of the Cold War refocused the European Union's (EU) attention both on its "near neighbourhood" and on the needs of the world's poorest people. In view of the growing trend towards inclusion of "first-world" security criteria in development policies, a discussion paper *Whose security?*, summarised here, was commissioned by Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) to identify priority issues for advocacy on EU policies towards development and security.

There are signs that donors want to change the conditions of aid to respond to the threat of global terrorism, but poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity and development policy needs to be clear about whose security is the priority. The absence of global justice is a fundamental challenge. The paper explores the relationship between human development, human security and human rights as well as the need for improved women's participation in peacebuilding and security.

The European Security Strategy, seen as a response to the unilateralist character of US strategy, takes a comprehensive, multilateralist approach, recognising that threats cannot be tackled by purely military means. Development assistance is seen as one of the instruments at the EU's disposal. This approach is supported by a "human security doctrine for Europe", under which "human security response forces", paid from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, would operate. The EU's development policy statement of 2000 is being revised with a view to including the complementarity of security and development. APRODEV believes that development and human rights should be seen as end goals

1 An assessment prepared for the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) by Clive Robinson, revised August 2005.

and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU external relations policy.

The European Commission aims to rationalise the profusion of aid budgets, reducing them from 90 to just six new instruments. The parameters of some of these instruments would make it more difficult to monitor EU spending on poverty reduction. In the draft Financial Perspectives for 2007–2013, the largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union's contribution to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is set to take a falling share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments. The share allocated to the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument (DCECI) should increase at least *proportionately* with the overall increase in external relations funding. The EU needs an instrument dedicated to the pursuit of poverty eradication in developing countries.

The proposed Stability instrument, smaller in size than DCECI, was planned to support post-conflict reconstruction, including peacekeeping operations of third countries. APRODEV agencies feel that short-term military stabilisation may be necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU), but that it should be financed by the CFSP, separately from development expenditure. A ring-fenced Stability instrument might produce greater clarity in protecting development expenditure through the DCECI. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recently classified six new areas of quasi-military aid as official development assistance (ODA). APRODEV members may want to ensure that there is "no further erosion" and explore the "roll-back" of eligibility in the case of some existing items.

While subscribing to policy coherence, APRODEV agencies believe in a division of labour and mandates. Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a value that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU's work for poverty reduction. EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the Union is spending on poor people and the MDGs. The distinct contribution of development assistance is to improve the livelihoods of poor people with the ultimate objective of eradicating poverty.

1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War signalled three trends which were to affect the evolution of the European Union's development assistance policy. The delinking of aid from strategic Cold War considerations allowed donors during the 1990s to refocus attention on the needs of the world's poorest people, culminating in the adoption in 2000 of the MDGs. The second trend, specific to the Union, was the refocus of its aid on its "near neighbourhood" of countries. As a result, between 1990 and 2000 European Community (EC) aid to low-income countries fell from 76 % to less than 40 %. The third trend, common like the first to all OECD donors, is the growing inclusion of "first-world" security criteria in development policies and instruments.

To begin an assessment of these trends at EU level, the three Brussels-based networks of faith-based development and humanitarian aid organisations, APRODEV, CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité) and Caritas Europa, organised a workshop in November 2004 (see APRODEV / CIDSE / Caritas Europa 2004). APRODEV commissioned the discussion paper summarised here in order to take forward the outputs from the workshop and to identify priority issues for its advocacy positions on EU policies towards development and security. A ten-day consultancy was commissioned in April 2005, based on desk research and semi-structured interviews with a small number of staff in selected APRODEV and related agencies.

2 Security and development: where we are now

Poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity. Casualties from international terrorism between 1998 and 2004 were nearly 28,000 in Africa and Asia, compared with 5,000 in North America and Western Europe (DFID 2005). Yet terrorism accounts for only a tiny share of violence-related deaths. War and interpersonal violence account for much more. The international community needs to be clear about "whose insecurity?" is the priority. There are signs that the donor community wants to change the shape and conditions of aid in order to respond to the threat of "global terrorism".

APRODEV agencies detect a similar trend among politicians to link security and development in ways that make it hard to distinguish the logics and activities of the two sectors. There has been an inflationary use of the term "humanitarian" to describe military interventions, with the language, the aid and the budgets of development appropriated for political purposes. The Directors of the three German church-based development agencies, in a 2003 statement, considered,

"the justification that threats must be averted as problematic, politically as well as ethically. The absence of global justice is a fundamental challenge to us, because it has for a long time been violating the lives of billions of people day-by-day, and not because it has for a short time also been linked to the horrifying terrorist use of force. It is not fear that makes us act, but the conviction that another world is necessary and possible" (Misereor / Brot für die Welt / EED 2003).

The record of "humanitarian" interventions has been to stop extreme violence in some cases, produce new conflicts in others but not to resolve substantially the underlying causes. One basis for intervention, much discussed since events in Rwanda and the Balkans, is the norm of a collective responsibility to protect: sovereign states have a duty to protect their own citizens. When they fail to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states, ultimately through enforcement action. This is a classic response to symptoms rather than causes. Moreover, the protection of citizens of other countries through such a doctrine is different from an extended right of self-defence of one's own citizens, as claimed by the US security strategy.

A stronger mandate for peace enforcement actions sanctioned by the UN Security Council in situations like Darfur and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has some support among APRODEV agencies, provided that it is not misleadingly described as "humanitarian". Their view is that military interventions can never bring lasting peace; they can at best make the guns fall silent. By virtue of its Charter and the experience of its Security Council, the UN has held peacemaking and development in creative tension since its inception. Many UN peace missions involve humanitarian, political and military elements. There is a *"need to ensure that the long-term perspectives of transition and development are embedded from the outset of a mission"* (Eide et al. 2005).

This has not always been the case. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has been interpreted as civil support measures to military operations, to gain acceptance, support and intelligence from the local population. However, the experience of the UN and humanitarian aid of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has led to the development of codes and guidelines governing the independence of humanitarian action.² The Red Cross insists that, "*Measures are humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Aid measures that do not are not humanitarian, regardless of any well-meaning intentions and their effectiveness.*" These principles are important for the security of beneficiaries as well as that of aid workers. Humanitarian aid must also be subject to civil coordination.


3 Human security, human development and human rights

The extended concept known as human security emerged when United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its *Human Development Report* on this theme in 1994. This advocated a greater emphasis on people's security than on territorial security. A Commission on Human Security appointed by the UN, which reported in 2003, defined human security as, "*to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment*" (CHS 2003).

How does the concept of human security relate to human development and human rights? The report *Human security now* (2003) draws on the experience of its co-editor Amartya Sen to explain. Human development shifted the focus of development attention away from economic growth to the quality and richness of human lives. Human development has a buoyant quality, as it is concerned with progress and augmentation: "*Human security supplements the expansionist perspective of human development by paying attention to 'downside risks'.*"

2 Humanitarian aid NGOs regard themselves as bound by the Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994) that can be found on <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct> and/or by SCHR (2002, revised 2004).

Human rights begin as ethical claims on behalf of every human being. Even where they are not legalised, the affirmation of human rights (and related activities of advocacy and monitoring of abuse) can be effective through the politicisation of ethical commitments. As human security likewise demands ethical force and political recognition, it can be seen as an important class of human rights. It may help to show the complementarity between the three concepts diagrammatically.



The human security perspective keeps the full range of human deprivation in view. It is larger than state security: the primacy of human rights distinguishes human security from traditional state-based approaches. The faith-based agencies see something beyond human security. The preferential option for the poor and powerless combined with the hope for a more just

and peaceful world are the cornerstone of their approach. Church-based development cooperation cannot be subsumed to an idea of security focused on preserving and protecting the way of life of people in the north. Peace cannot be restored "from above". Achieving a fair balance of interests is political and must be done principally by the society affected. For peace to be sustainable, it must grow "from below".

4 Gender, childhood and security

Any concept of security (even the human security approach) is insufficient unless it differentiates between the type and scale of insecurity affecting men and women, young and old. Whose security is at stake, when and where? World Health Organization's (WHO) 2002 report *World report on violence and health* estimated that in 2000 1,659,000 people died as a result of violence: 49.1 % from suicide, 31.3 % from homicide and 18.6 % from war-related violence. The different forms of violence affect men and women, young and old, differently. The great majority of deaths from violence (91.1 %) occurred in low- to middle-income countries. Almost half the women who die owing to homicide are killed by their current or former partner, making the home the most dangerous place for women worldwide. The WHO report also notes that one third of girls experience their first sexual encounter in a forced or coercive way. Issues of bodily integrity that women identify as crucial to their intimate security (reproductive rights and violence in the family) lead to fear which limits women's access to resources and basic activities (WHO 2002).

The existing climate of impunity for violence in the family feeds the culture of impunity towards violence more generally. It reinforces the belief that violence wins, that domination succeeds, whether at home or in wars. In warfare women are seen as a symbol of the nation, which has to be defended. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have become a weapon of war. The increased incidence of sexual and gender-based violence needs to be made a key international issue, as called for in 2000 in UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UNSC 2004). Even the deployment of UN and other peacekeepers, usually large numbers of unattached men with money to spare, may create new security concerns for women and children and increase the potential for exploitation, abuse, prostitution and trafficking. There is a need to

integrate gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations, increasing the numbers of women peacekeepers, and to implement adequate and gender-sensitive training and a clear sexual code of conduct for deployed personnel.³

Children suffer disproportionately from lack of security. Poverty, displacement, separation from family and lack of rights put children at risk of exploitation and abuse. The harm suffered by child soldiers is severe. There is the risk of being maimed or killed in combat, the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) for girls forced into sexual slavery, but also the long-term emotional and social impact of witnessing and being involved in acts of violence from an early age.

Strategies adopted by external actors in crisis or post-war regions must take account of culture-specific factors affecting the social status of men, women and children:

- Violence against women, whether perpetrated at home or in public, must be addressed through legislative and policy reforms supported by public education.
- Male domination of the security sector ("militarised masculinity") and male responsibility for condoning and extending violence against women must be acknowledged and actions put in place to address and overcome its root causes.
- Women's equal participation with men should include putting women in positions of authority in peace talks, addressing gender perspectives in peace agreements, recruiting and promoting women in security institutions (including peacekeeping forces), consulting women's peace movements, and addressing violations of the human rights of women and children in conflict. Donors should ensure that in these activities they meet the standards of UNSC resolution 1325 and develop new and more adequate instruments.
- The use of children as soldiers must be addressed through legislative reform.

3 A "Gender resource package for peacekeeping operations" can be found at the website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations; online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>.

- The Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 3.2) entrusted the European Community with the task of promoting equality between men and women and seeking to eliminate inequality in all its actions. This principle should be extended to all activities implemented under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

5 European security strategy

In parallel with the changes in the nature of global security over the past fifteen years, the European Union has enlarged and deepened its cooperation. Under the treaty establishing the new constitution, the external policies of the Union would include three "Community" areas (trade, development and economic cooperation, humanitarian aid) and two "intergovernmental" areas: the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).⁴

In a recent dynamic evolution of EU external relations policy, the European Defence Agency, the European Security Strategy (ESS), a new relationship with NATO, a European planning headquarters and the first CSDP missions all emerged during 2003 and 2004. Some in the EU welcome the ESS, agreed in December 2003, as an holistic and comprehensive understanding of security and as a response to what is seen as the unilateralism of the US security strategy. *"No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own,"* it maintains. *"None of these threats are purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments"* (European Council 2003). To some in APRODEV, the Strategy is based on the prerogative of northern/EU politics to define security threats and fails to recognise the need for fundamental policy change by the EU.

Within three months of the adoption of the ESS, Western Europe sustained its worst terrorist attack, the Madrid bombings. This led to tougher language, the acceleration of measures already under way for improved coordination of domestic security and a Council declaration on combating terrorism (European Council 2004). This contains further references to the

4 In the intergovernmental areas, it is the member states, acting in the Council normally by unanimity, who have authority, not the Commission and Parliament.

use of policy dialogue and aid instruments with third countries in pursuit of terror.

Policy development is supported by the evolution of the EU's defence capabilities. Europe has 1.8 million persons under arms and spends 180 billion euros per year on defence. The European Defence Agency (EDA), set up in 2004, is tasked with, "*strengthening Europe's industrial potential [in] strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities,*" and promoting, "*an internationally competitive European defence equipment market.*"⁵ These objectives seem hard to reconcile with the pledge in a recent Commission communication on coherence that, "*The EU will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries*" (European Commission 2005c). The General Affairs Council should commission independent studies of the extent to which European arms exports and EC funding of armaments research contribute to fuelling of conflict outside the Union.

6 A human security doctrine for Europe

The human security concept outlined in paragraph 3 has been modified to justify EU security interventions through the report of the Barcelona study group on Europe's security capabilities (European Union 2004). The convener of the study group, Professor Mary Kaldor, has argued that whether EU security policy is good or bad for development depends on the type of policy the EU adopts: a US-style defensive build-up or a contribution to global security (Kaldor / Glasius s.a.). She claims that there are "two EUs": a tension between 'Europe as a peace project' and 'Europe as a super-power in the making'. The study group's policy proposals centre on a "human security response force" of 15,000 personnel (one third to be civilian) as a standing contribution to UN operations.

Kaldor and Glasius conclude that, "*The development community's best option is to embrace coherence, and try to influence the security agenda in*

5 See report of the General Affairs and External Relations (GAER) Council meeting of 17 November 2003; online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gac/date/171103.htm.

the direction of human security." They add that spending on the civilian component should be increased and paid for out of the CFSP budget and that in the long run member states should allocate part of their defence budgets to the CFSP. If the civilian component is paid for by the CFSP, this has implications for command and control. Perhaps it is logical to place police, legal and some administrative and civil protection staff under CFSP command but this should not extend to aid workers, who should be under civilian management, as recognised by the Red Cross and the UN.

While many in APRODEV are comfortable with the broader human security concept preached by the UN, reaction to the "doctrine for Europe" proposals has been more critical, seeing them as reinforcing the EU's short-term interests and narrowing the scope for reforms to promote human security in diverse policy areas, such as trade, agriculture and external relations.⁶ This is the kind of EU policy coherence long advocated by APRODEV (Madeley 1999). Interviewees were interested in the security of a global citizenship, not simply the security of EU citizens. Similarities and differences between the various security "doctrines" (US national security strategy, ESS, a human security doctrine for Europe and a faith-based approach to human security) are shown, albeit simplified, in chart 2.

7 Development policy statement

One other part of the policy framework under review this year is the development policy statement. In November 2000 the Council and the Commission adopted a joint statement on EU development policy whose central principle is, *"Community development policy is grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development [...] The main objective of Community development policy must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty."* The Commission has launched a review of the policy statement, publishing a consultation paper in January 2005 and a new draft statement in July. The consultation paper warned that,

6 See Geraldine McDonald in APRODEV / CIDSE / Caritas Europa (2004).

Chart 2: Four security doctrines				
	US National security strategy	EU security strategy	Human security doctrine for Europe	Faith-based approach to human security
Focus	Our nation	European defence	Global defence of the individual	Poor people
Inspiration	9/11	Fall of Berlin wall, 9/11, 3/11	EU as a peace project	The Gospel
Aim	National security	Political influence	Global security	Global justice and reconciliation
Role in the world	Spreading freedom	A superpower in the making	EU as an international norms promoter	Preferential option for the poor
Security where?	Defending the US, the American people and our interest at home and abroad	Need to be a "global actor", but especially in the neighbourhood	Global	Both south and north, and with the north needing to make concessions for justice
Scope of action	Unilateral, if necessary	Effective multilateralism, rule-based	Multilateral, support for UN	Multilateral
Approach to crisis	Pre-emptive, crisis precipitation	Preventive engagement, crisis anticipation	Crisis prevention and management	Emphasis on non-crisis insecurity, crisis avoidance based on structural change in global economy
Targets	Terrorism, threats to sovereignty	Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)	Insecurity, lack of development	Poverty, lack of global justice

Instrument	Coalition of the willing, led by US	Deployable and inter-operable EU forces, battle groups	Human security response force, civil and military	Development and humanitarian aid
Approach to arms	Contain WMD proliferation	Contain WMD. EDA: harmonise procurement	Reduce European nuclear capabilities	Curtail international arms trade
Approach to development policy	Most favoured nations get aid	Security is the first condition for development	Development can gain from being embedded in a human security doctrine	Other policies should be made coherent with development

"The increase in political conditionality and the diversion of development resources for other, legitimate, security type concerns need to be avoided," and the draft statement adds, "Development is crucial for collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other" (European Commission 2005d).

APRODEV has taken the position that development can contribute to security through addressing the root causes of conflict, including poverty and inequality, but only if the specific objectives of development policy are respected. Development and human rights should be seen as end goals and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU external relations policy.

8 Conditionality in EU aid agreements

The Madrid Declaration linked aid and trade agreements with third countries to their willingness to cooperate on security. This policy was put to the test in February 2005 during the five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement with the 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (AKP) countries. The fight against proliferation of WMD will become an essential element

of the Agreement; the EU undertook to provide ACP states with additional resources apart from the European Development Fund to carry this out. For the fight against terrorism a new article on cooperation has been added. This new insistence on "security conditionality" has the potential to open the door to the use of development funds for security purposes and increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent. If the question were posed another way ("Should aid to poor people be denied if their governments don't agree on counter-terrorism?"), APRODEV agencies would say no. In a possible example of "acceptable conditionality", one member state government has recently separated security considerations from the use of development budgets for poverty reduction: *"Aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals"* (DFID 2005). Interruption of aid should be a consequence only of financial mismanagement, human rights violation or departure from poverty reduction objectives.

9 Financial perspectives 2007–2013

With negotiations taking place around the Union's spending plans for the next seven-year period (the Financial Perspectives), the Commission has taken the opportunity to rationalise the profusion of aid budgets, proposing to reduce them from 90 to just six new legal instruments. These are the Pre-accession instrument (PAI), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI), the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument (DCECI), the Stability instrument, humanitarian aid and macro-finance. After the two accessions planned for 2007, the PAI will be available to two candidate and four potential candidate countries. The ENPI will be available to 17 countries to the east and south of the Union which are not expected to accede but with which the Union seeks neighbourly relations. The Commission's proposed distribution among instruments is shown in chart 3.

The largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union's contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, is set to take a lower share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments, in the years up to 2013. Although all figures are projected to increase from year to year, the increases for pre-accession and neighbourhood (largely middle-income) countries and for stability are greater and are at the expense of the share of

aid allocated to Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation (DCEC), the budget which includes aid to most low-income countries. DCEC would suffer a drop in share from 56 % to 49 % over the seven years. The parameters of the instruments are not designed to follow the criteria set by the Development Assistance Committee of OECD for official development assistance (ODA), making it impossible to track what share of external relations spending is allocated to poverty reduction. If the EU is serious in its commitment to long-term development and the attainment of the MDGs, the share allocated to DCEC should increase at least *proportionately* with the overall increase in the external relations envelope instead of the decreasing share envisaged by the Commission.

10 Development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument

The conception of the DCEC instrument reveals some intrinsic problems (European Commission 2004a). It includes a mixture of objectives, geographic scope and themes in the same instrument. It is based on two articles of the Treaty covering development cooperation (179) and economic cooperation (181a). It embraces a number of large regions where EC aid is delivered but is also applicable to OECD countries, including economic cooperation without poverty criteria. Its coverage has a negative or "default" definition: all countries not eligible for assistance under the PAI or the ENPI. There is no clear dividing line between activities eligible for funding from the DCECI and the Stability instrument.

In budgetary terms, there is no protected space for the fight against poverty. What is needed is a dedicated instrument for poverty eradication in developing countries based on Article 179 only and with the eradication of poverty as its single over-arching objective. The DCECI proposal does not include an overall objective. Although the institutions have insisted that the MDGs must be at the core of Community development policy, the DCECI proposal does not count them as an objective and mentions them only once, in a non-legally binding recital.

Chart 3: EC proposed distribution of funds within Heading 4 "Europe as a Global Partner" in mio. €											
Instrument	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total	% in 2007	% in 2013	% Increase 2013–2007
PAI	1400	1570	1636	1828	2080	2170	2235	12919	15	17	60
ENPI	1350	1450	1700	1850	2021	2255	2513	13139	15	19	86
DCECI	5170	5553	5820	6124	6273	6376	6490	41806	56	49	26
<i>of which EDF</i>		2988	3245	3528	3619	3635	3653	20668		27	
Stability	325	425	475	591	647	702	750	3915	3	6	131
<i>of which EDF</i>		100	100	100	100	100	100	600		1	
Human aid	825	890	900	910	920	930	940	6315	9	7	14
<i>of which EDF</i>		55	55	55	55	55	55	330		2	
Macrofinance	110	140	156	170	182	190	193	1141	1	1	75
CFSP	75	105	125	140	155	165	174	939	1	1	132
Total	9255	10133	10812	11613	12278	12788	13295	80174			44
Notes:	1. The figures for the DCECI and SI assume that the European Development Fund (EDF), a separate five-year fund resourced by direct contributions from member states, will be added to the EC budget from 2008. Such integration looks increasingly unlikely.										
	2. EDF portion of the SI includes an allocation for the African Peace Facility.										
Source:	Self-compiled from European Commission 2005b										

11 Stability instrument (SI)

Despite the exponential growth planned for its budget, the new Stability instrument (European Commission 2004b) would still be much smaller in size than the DCECI. It has been devised to "*build on the approach pioneered under the Cotonou Agreement*" and the existing EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The EU approval in 2004 of a 250 million € grant to the African Peace Facility responded to an African Union request for help in strengthening its regional peacekeeping capability. However, it was also controversial because member states funded it by shaving 1.5 % off the development allocation of each African country in the European Development Fund.

The Stability instrument was originally planned to combine ODA-eligible and ODA-ineligible funding. Its aims are to respond to crises in order to re-establish the conditions for regular aid (from DCECI, ENPI or PAI), and to cooperate in confronting global and regional trans-border challenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. It was envisaged to include the "*development of peacekeeping and peace support capacity in partnership with international, regional and sub-regional organisations*"; there are now signs that the DAC-ineligible items (peacekeeping, nuclear safety and non-proliferation) may be removed.

In order to ground this enquiry in practical challenges, APRODEV interviewees were asked what should be done to end the suffering in Darfur and the DRC. The consensus was that short-term military stabilisation was necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate from the UN or the AU, and that the EU was right to play its part, but that its support should be completely separate from development expenditure. Otherwise, "*we confuse aid with European security interests. It blurs the lines.*" Defence budgets should pay. This is easier to implement at national level than at EU level. To say that the CFSP should pay fails to recognise that the EU does not control its own defence forces and that the CFSP has only a small administrative budget. If member states were to design a European stabilisation fund to share the costs of actions involving troops or police from member states, this would be the most appropriate source for the financing of third party peacekeeping operations.

The Commission's real justification for a Stability instrument is where such actions need to be delivered in "*response to crisis situations*" (ibid).

It is not the nature of the activity but its delivery in a context of crisis that underpins the instrument. It might be easier to protect poverty eradication spending from repeated raids for crisis purposes if a DAC-eligible and ring-fenced Stability instrument is adopted. A ring-fenced "crisis" instrument could produce more clarity from a development perspective. At the same time, the SI needs to be governed by the development policy statement and should explicitly mention the objective of poverty eradication.

12 What counts as ODA: the DAC criteria

In March 2005 the DAC reported the outcome of the latest round of discussions about whether new areas of aid could be classed as ODA (OECD/DAC 2005). There was agreement to extend eligibility to the six items in the box below. The DAC already excludes from ODA the supply or financing of military equipment or services and use of military personnel to control civil disobedience. In March the DAC discussed two other items – training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities. These were not considered appropriate for ODA (unlike the six new items, they currently involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets) but the DAC agreed to revisit them in 2007.

Box 1: Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: what counts as ODA?
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure. 2 Enhancing civil society's role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. 3 Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control. 4 Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers. 5 Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 6 Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
Source: OECD/DAC 2005

Reactions to these inclusions vary. Number 6 is uncontroversial. 4 and 5, as examples of DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration), could be seen as classic cases of "turning swords into ploughshares". With the first three, it could be argued that the security services should be democratically controlled in the first place, without the need for ODA support: why is management more acceptable as ODA than security force activity on the ground? "No further erosion" might be a guiding principle but there may also be a case to explore the "roll-back" of eligibility for quasi-military expenditures already allowed. One answer to the problem of how to ensure that EU development funds are not diverted to non-development purposes might be to require that a minimum percentage of EU external assistance be accounted for by ODA.

13 Conflict prevention⁷

Throughout this enquiry, there were frequent references to the efforts of EU institutions and NGOs to promote crisis prevention. In 2001 the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts was adopted in Gothenburg. *Country Strategy Papers* (CSP) were identified as key tools for improving crisis prevention. (The SI, on the other hand, is not about prevention but about post-conflict reconstruction.) A list of crisis and conflict indicators (check-list of root causes of conflict) was drawn up, to be systematically used in the drafting of CSP and performing early warning and monitoring functions.

APRODEV agencies familiar with Darfur underlined the need for political efforts. Constructive engagement with the parties, addressing wealth-sharing, technical help to find solutions, time and space were needed to allow Darfurians to address the problems through their own mechanisms; such was the lesson of the eventual resolution of the conflict in southern Sudan. This political track, and non-violent economic alternatives, needed to be followed as well as military intervention to stop the violence, which had received more attention. More "Darfurs" could be avoided with cost-efficient preventive actions, but non-military forms of involvement had disappeared from public discourse. This approach was "down-to-earth"

7 "Crisis prevention" is preferred to "conflict prevention" by German NGOs because conflict can be managed positively to avoid violence (VENRO 2003).

and related to local initiatives, a far cry from the EU aspiration to be a "global actor".

Women can be key change agents in crisis prevention through social networks across conflict lines. Their unique experience in peacebuilding brings added value; it is not simply a question of women's vulnerability. The churches have a special vocation to work for reconciliation and diminish Muslim/Christian tensions. The churches have not yet systematically brought together all the experiences they have had of grassroots crisis prevention.⁸ And, in the ten years since the Rwandan genocide, the ecumenical movement has not had a forum or process to discuss the dynamics underlying violence: what do our spiritual foundations tell us, where do just war and just peace approaches stand in an age of non-statal conflict?⁹

14 Conclusions

This study has shown a number of practical steps the EU can take while adopting its new financial instruments and agreeing its Financial Perspectives for 2007–2013. The EU needs a financing instrument clearly dedicated to the support of its poverty eradication and development cooperation objective, and not diluted by overlap with its stability fund or by economic cooperation with richer countries. This should replace the current DCECI proposal. A ring-fenced Stability instrument might produce greater clarity in protecting development expenditure through the DCECI. To maintain the EU's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, the share of external relations funds allocated to DAC-eligible development cooperation should increase at least *proportionately* with the overall increase in the external relations envelope. EU conflict prevention and crisis management activities should begin not with military options but with intensified political efforts towards constructive engagement with the parties, offering mediation and technical assistance, especially at local level.

8 The VENRO report includes a case study from EED on promoting democracy through non-government actors in Kenya (VENRO 2003). Other case studies appear in APRODEV (2001).

9 For a start on this, see Anna T. Höglund: "Gender and war – a theological and ethical approach", in: APRODEV (2001).

A development-oriented approach to security can also be enshrined in the policies of the wider donor community including the EU. While it is reasonable to put declaratory counter-terror clauses in international agreements, aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals. There should be "no further erosion" of the civilian character of official development assistance through inclusion of quasi-military expenditures. The DAC should review whether some existing items of this nature should be excluded from eligibility. Donors need to avoid the distorting effect on social cohesion of financing the strengthening of third country armed forces as such. Only specific peacemaking objectives should be considered for support. In peacebuilding and reconstruction, care should be taken that civil society actors, especially women, are consulted from the first planning exercises onwards. There is a need to consult with women who have experienced rape in conflict to ask them what further steps policy-makers should take to address the use of rape as a weapon.

The churches for their part could do more to fulfil their vocation for constructive peacemaking. They could make a systematic effort to bring together (for use with policy-makers) the experiences of ecumenical agencies in grassroots conflict prevention. APRODEV and the World Council of Churches (WCC) are well placed to promote reflections on the objectives and values of civil development and the relationship of development agencies to beneficiaries, civil society, governments and security institutions. The ecumenical movement could explore the spiritual and theological sources for human security and convene a forum or process to discuss the dynamics underlying violence in an age of non-statal conflict. There is a need for all the world's religions to consult and issue prophetic guidance on the changing types of conflict which mainly target civilians.

Discussions with APRODEV member agencies show that they are comfortable with:

- dialogue between the development and security communities. We have to relate to the military but this does not necessarily imply sharing their goals and so would not normally be described as civil-military cooperation.
- the principle that the EU should support (for example) African Union peacekeeping forces as a last resort and when authorised by the UN. This should be financed from the CFSP or defence budgets. The an-

swer is not to take resources from development. Global resources for development are around 60 billion US \$ a year while global defence budgets amount to 900 billion US \$.

- policy coherence, which APRODEV has long advocated. But this does not mean that development policy should concede resources to non-developmental policies or instruments. The figures quoted on page 84 unfortunately suggest that this is what the Commission intends.

While subscribing to coherence, APRODEV agencies believe that there should be a division of labour and mandates. Integration and synthesis are important, but a lesson we can learn from gender analysis is that disaggregation and analysis are also important.¹⁰ Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a value that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU's work for poverty reduction.¹¹ EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the Union is spending on poor people and the MDGs. The distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality.

10 The recent UN report on integrated missions observes, *"Only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated, and 'asymmetric' models of integration may provide for deeper integration of some sectors than others"* (Eide et al. 2005).

11 Integrity is a value recognised in the draft constitution's external action provisions: *"a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity."* (Article III-292 para 2) (European Union 2004b).

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New interfaces between security and development

Jakkie Cilliers

Summary

Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately aimed at addressing the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase; however, they should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. Post-conflict reconstruction systems have five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. These five dimensions need to be programmed simultaneously, collectively and cumulatively to develop momentum to sustainable peace.

While there are processes, phases and issues that can be said to be common to most countries emerging from conflict, one should recognise the uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms of its own particular socio-economic and political history, the root causes and immediate consequences of the conflict and the specific configuration of the actors that populate the system. Further, as most intra-state conflicts in Africa are interlinked within regional conflict systems, country specific post-conflict reconstruction systems need to seek synergy with neighbouring systems to ensure coherence across regional conflict systems.

The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. While the need and benefits of improved coherence is widely accepted, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken.

1 Introduction

During 2004 and 2005 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) supported the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Governance, Peace and Security Programme in the development of what is now known as the *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*.¹ Although not yet fully integrated into the African Union, that framework sets out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction and an effort to ensure that peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction systems in Africa are directed towards a common objective. This presentation is entirely based on the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework of NEPAD.

Obviously, each country's transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its own particular circumstances. Each specific post-conflict reconstruction system emerges in response to that conflict system's specific set of circumstances and it will thus be unique in its composition, prioritisation, timing and sequencing. At that same time, there are recurrent phases, dimensions and processes that are common to most, if not all, post-conflict reconstruction systems.

For the purposes of the following remarks, post-conflict reconstruction can be understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace.

Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of inter-related programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establishes the foundations for social-justice and sustainable peace and development. In the short term post-conflict reconstruction is

1 See: <http://www.iss.org.za> (June 2005).

designed to assist in stabilising the peace process and prevent a relapse into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace.

2 Post-conflict reconstruction phases

There seems to be a general agreement that most post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase. These phases should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. Some countries that form part of a regional conflict system may be in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, different geographic, ethnic, language or religious regions or groups within a country emerging from conflict are likely to be in different phases. Any phased approach should also allow for considerable overlap in the periods of transition between phases. Planning or analysis based on these phases should thus take into account that these phases are not based on causal or chronological progression, but are determined by a wide-range of complex feedback and reinforcement mechanisms.

The **emergency phase** is the period that follows immediately after the end of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and secure environment and an emergency response to the immediate consequences of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes. The emergency phase is characterised by the influx of external actors usually in the form of a military intervention to ensure basic security, and by humanitarian actors responding to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

If there is still a high degree of instability, the military intervention may take the form of a stability operation. Such stability operations are likely to be undertaken by one of the sub-regional brigades of the African Standby Force or a coalition of the willing. Once the situation has been sufficiently stabilised, or if it was relatively secure from the onset of the cease-fire, the military force could form part of a multi-dimensional peace operation deployed by the African Union (AU) or the UN.

The humanitarian actors will typically include various elements of the UN System, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a wide

range of humanitarian donor agencies and NGOs. The emergency response will be coordinated by UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). If a UN peace operation is deployed the HC is likely to be one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).

Preparations will be underway for medium-term rehabilitation and recovery and longer-term development actions and it is likely that some form of needs assessment process will be undertaken during the emergency phase, often culminating in an international donor conference. Internal actors are typically pre-occupied with basic survival and the re-organisation of their social and political systems. As a result external actors often play a prominent role during the emergency phase but they should nevertheless seek every opportunity to involve and consult with internal actors. Depending on the situation the emergency phase typically ranges from 90 days to a year.

The **transition phase** derives its name from the transition from an appointed interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to (s)elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the provisions of the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.

The transitional phase focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable internal capacity. The focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Programmes include efforts aimed at rehabilitation of basic social services like health and education, rebuilding the economic infrastructure, short-term job creation through labour intensive public works, and establishing mechanisms for governance and participation. The security sector is likely to be engaged in transforming the existing police, defence and other security agencies so that they can become representative of the communities they serve and so that they are re-orientated to their appropriate roles in the post-conflict environment.

The relationship between the internal and external players should reflect a growing partnership and a gradual hand-over of ever-increasing responsibility to the internal actors. There should be specific programmes aimed at

building the capacity of the internal actors. The transitional phase typically ranges from one to three years.

The **development phase** is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and the civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and supporting ongoing development programmes across the five dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction highlighted in the next section.

The peace operation, and especially the military and police components, is likely to draw down and withdraw during the early stages of this phase. In the case of a UN peace operation there will be a transition of responsibilities to the UN Country Team and internal actors. The roles and responsibilities of the external actors will change from a post-conflict reconstruction posture back to a more traditional development posture in the latter stages of the sustainable development phase, in other words, the internal actors develop the capacity to take full responsibility for their own planning and coordination, and the external actors provide technical assistance and support.

The post-conflict sustainable development phase typically ranges from four to ten years, but the country is likely to continue to address conflict related consequences in its development programming for decades thereafter.

The transition from one phase to the next is usually determined by the degree to which various conditions within each phase are met and the level of engagement required by the various actors at each level. However, these transitions are not linear and therefore programmes undertaken in one phase are likely to continue for a period into another phase.

3 The dimensions of a post-conflict reconstruction system

Each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction of the specific internal and external actors present, the history of the conflict and the processes that resulted in some form of peace agreement. Although the specific configuration of the post-conflict reconstruction system will be unique, it is possible to identify a broad framework of dimensions, phases and issues that appear to be common to most post-

conflict reconstruction systems. There seems to be general agreement that post-conflict reconstruction systems contain the following five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. A broad range of programme areas within each dimension is provided in chart 1.

The **security** dimension is responsible for ensuring a safe and secure environment that will enable the civilian humanitarian actors to undertake emergency relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration operations which will prepare the ground for full-fledged reconstruction programmes. In the transitional phase the emphasis gradually shifts to security sector reform aimed at the development of appropriate, credible and professional internal security services. Programmes include security sector review, reform and transformation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); small arms reduction strategies, and enhancing regional security arrangements.

The **political transition, governance and participation** dimension involves the development of legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions, ensuring participatory processes, and supporting political transition. Aside from facilitating elections, programmes include strengthening public sector management and administration; establishing a representative constituting process; reviving local governance; strengthening the legislature; broadening the participation of civil society in decision-making process, and building the capacity of political parties and civil society for effective governance while giving former rebel groups a chance to turn themselves into viable political parties if they so wish. There is typically a focus on engendering a culture of rule of law based on existing or newly formulated constitutions, by supporting justice sector reform and related institutions. The transition phase should focus on the need to ensure plurality and inclusiveness, dialogue and the participation of all constituencies and stakeholders. During the development phase it is important to encourage and develop broad-based leadership at all levels; to build a shared purpose for the nation; to develop national capacity in terms of skills, mobilisation of resources and reviving national infrastructure; to promote good political and economic governance; develop checks and balances to measure progress; and finally, to institute a culture of long-

term assessment of the impact of post-conflict reconstruction activities and programmes.

The **socio-economic development** dimension covers the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations displaced during the conflict including refugees and IDPs. This dimension needs to focus on an approach that ensures effective dynamic linkages between activities related to the provision of emergency humanitarian needs and longer-term measures for economic recovery, sustained growth and poverty reduction. It is also crucial that balance is struck on the relationship between social capital and social cohesion at all stages of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Programmes to be implemented in this dimension include emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social services such as education, health, and social welfare; and enhancing economic growth and development through employment generation, trade and investment, and legal and regulatory reform.

The **human rights, justice, and reconciliation** dimension is concerned with ensuring accountable judicial systems, promoting reconciliation and nation building, and enshrining human rights. Programmes include justice sector reform and establishing the rule of law; promoting national dialogue and reconciliation processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and monitoring human rights. A point often raised is the need to make definitions of human rights, justice and reconciliation accessible to all through the use of local languages and include these concepts in school curricula. A system, which accommodates both restorative and retributive justice, is recommended for Africa, which focuses on African values and includes African traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes within this dimension should also ensure creating an environment conducive to peace, justice and reconciliation; increasing the involvement of women at all levels; reparations, and providing participatory processes which include vulnerable groups. There is the need to rebuild trust and cross cutting social relationships which span across religious, ethnic, class, geographic and generational cleavages in war-torn societies. This is an investment in social capital which underlies the ability of a society to mediate everyday

conflicts before they become violent conflicts, and through building state-people relationships it advances social cohesion.

Coordination, management and resource mobilisation are cross-cutting functions that are critical for the successful implementation of all the dimensions and the coherence of the post-conflict reconstruction system as a whole. All these dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. No single dimension can achieve the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction system – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. The success of each individual programme in the system is a factor of the contribution that this programme makes to the achievement of the overall post-conflict reconstruction objective. It is only when the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources. Coordination is concerned with synchronizing the mandates, roles and activities of the various stakeholders and actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system and achieves this through joint efforts aimed at prioritisation, sequencing and harmonisation of programmes to meet common objectives.

4 Conclusion

The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context.


Although approximately twenty countries have experienced some form of post-conflict reconstruction intervention over the last decade, no generic coordination model has yet emerged that can be further developed and refined for future intervention. One reason why coherence has proven so elusive is the lack of a shared understanding of the role of coordination.

Some external actors see coordination as a vehicle to bring order among the many different agencies whilst others resist coordination because they associate it with losing control over their own independence. The common refrain is that everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated. Whilst it is recognised, on the one hand, that coordination is crucial if we want to achieve coherence in the complex multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction environment, on the other, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken.

The lack of coherence between programmes in the humanitarian relief and development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres have been highlighted by various recent evaluation reports and best practice studies. For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a "strategic deficit", as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The *Utstein* study found that more than 55 % of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

Thus, one of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction system is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy is the strategic direction of the operation, taken as a whole, as produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the programmes and agencies in the system. There is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronised and coordinated. Such an overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a monitoring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors and programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experienced elsewhere in the system.

Chart 1: Goals within each element during the three phases of post-conflict reconstruction			
	<i>Emergency Phase</i>	<i>Transition Phase</i>	<i>Development Phase</i>
Security	Establish a safe and secure environment	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate local capacity
Political Transition, Governance, and Participation	Determine the governance structures, foundations for participation, and processes for political transition	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Socio-economic Development	Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development	Institutionalise long-term developmental programme
Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights	Establish a functional legal system based on accepted international norms
Coordination and Management	Develop consultative and coordination mechanism for internal and external actors	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development	Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination
Source: Self-compiled from AUSA / CSIS 2002			



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Addressing the security-development nexus: implications for joined-up government¹

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Summary

The coming together of security and development forces has introduced new approaches supporting both the analysis and implementation of these programmes. Empirical evidence supported by the World Bank-commissioned study "Voices of the Poor" confirms that the two disciplines are both mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing. Broader conclusions have suggested that bilateral and multilateral institutions are responding to this research agenda by undergoing reforms that create a better enabling environment supporting the "security-development" nexus.

So too, has the greater donor community been encouraged to adopt policy, tools and a range of other outputs produced from this debate. Such activities have helped encourage more widespread thinking on these issues and have allowed for an international consensus amongst key implementing agents. Policy tools supporting "joined-up thinking" on security and development include security sector reform (SSR), small arms and light weapons (SALW) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), are also undergoing parallel development. This article applauds such initiatives, but cautions the reader on the extent to which incomplete "joined-upness" may actually impair the implementation of these policies and strategies.

The article reflects on the recent experiences of the Dutch, Canadian, UK and US Governments. It unpacks areas for concern which are common to all donors, including the degree to which individual countries remain committed to Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines; the careful balance that must be struck between the more enhanced participation of international development agencies in defence and security-related fora, with the necessity to, at times, distance themselves and retreat to a

1 This is an up-dated and condensed version of an article published in: *Policy Matters* 5 (5), July 2004, 2–24.

position of independent status; the degree to which development constituencies are permitted to develop as a cabinet level function in donor countries and decisions required to disperse funds from a "joined-up" pool of resources.

1 Introduction

The provision of donor assistance to most post-conflict transitional countries repeatedly encounters problems due to conflicting approaches between external and internal actors. Recent interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone and other African countries have exposed gaps between the approaches used by western donor countries and multi-lateral donor organisations, and the expectation, willingness and ability of the recipient countries to implement donor programmes in a way which contributes to a sustainable peace. While criticism is often pointed towards uninformed donor approaches that do not fully appreciate local conditions, and policy instruments that do not reflect local realities, a degree of blame must also be accepted by certain internal stakeholder groups that pose difficulties to the process. It is at this second level that the greatest challenge remains, as widescale intervention strategies which respond to a country's security and development issues require local ownership across all sectors. Subscribing to this level of ownership, particularly in transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic governance, can involve a complete transformation in cultural mindset and indigenous norms. Closing this gap requires a more focused commitment towards tailoring external donor instruments to local realities and identifying only the feasible entry strategies which, when achieved, could help encourage compliance and support for others.

Pursuing this more realistic piecemeal approach to overseas assistance is in no way meant to encourage a bottom-up, as opposed to a top-down, strategy. Selected entry points must always be strategically planned against a more holistic national vision and endstate for the recipient country, even if initial support for all aspects of the strategy cannot be obtained. To this end, a number of other western donor countries have moved forward in establishing more holistic policy instruments that reflect the need for security and development issues to be united in post-conflict peace-building strategies.

"Joined-up" government processes, however, are not without their problems. Moreover, the success of their joint intervention policies requires not only coalition and partner countries, but also recipient countries, to have the appropriate policy tools, approaches and mindsets to receive and work harmoniously with joined-up solutions.

This paper will look at the centrality and the mutual inclusivity of the relationship between security and development in post-conflict interventions. The notion of security sector reform will be explained as the new policy area that unites security and development in post-conflict states. The discussion will then review how this nexus impacts on the wider governance agenda and describes how these ideas became the thrust behind the joined-up government concept. Several cases of joined-up government experiences will be explained to highlight the existing disparities between these joined-up approaches, as well as how these strategies have been received in-country. Lastly, the paper will identify challenges for these more unified donor approaches to be implemented coherently on the ground. Similarly, it will discuss potential strategies that could be used to garner more cooperation at the local level, which, if unobtainable, can render even the best joined-up strategy, useless.

2 The security-development nexus

The conceptual debate on the extent to which the international community requires comprehensive solutions to its intervention strategies has advanced at an astonishing rate. The post-Cold war era saw the rise of "new wars" and "second dimensional peacekeeping", both of which involved smaller-scale conflicts which required "softer" approaches to military monitoring in order to sustain secure and stable environments. The debate then intensified in the "complex humanitarian emergency" era, during which the link between disaster, defence and development was loosely articulated. The argument was that, in this era of new wars and internal conflicts, any conventional man-made or natural disaster could immediately become "complex" if it occurred in a collapsed or failing state whose frail infrastructure could not remedy the damage or cope with the impact. The disaster could then become "humanitarian" in nature if it displaced a significant percentage of the population and rendered them homeless; indeed, the situation would become exacerbated if the displaced groups

migrated across borders or wandered into unstable areas inhabited by lawless gunmen, or warlords.

Whilst the concept created a new understanding of "civil-military cooperation" (CIMIC), and could be applied during a fairly tranquil environment, it fell short of addressing pre-conflict vulnerabilities. The debate on conflict prevention came to dominate overseas development agendas. The World Bank-commissioned study "Voices of the Poor", empirically proved to the western world that the number one priority for people living in impoverished areas was security, and ranked just as high, and in many cases higher, than access to both food and shelter (World Bank 1999/2000).

Thus, security was required for development and development was required for security. The discourse was coined a "circular argument" out of which many countries could not escape.² However, upon further examination, two levels of analysis gave this argument more clarity. At the state level, the provision of state security was necessary for human development and at the individual level, local "grass-roots" security provisions were essential to promote confidence in the state structures. Without the latter, the former would fail to be comprehensive in its quest for human and national development. In some countries, this disproportionate distribution of security has led to regional collapse within the peripheral rural areas that eventually permeates the urban centres. This phenomenon has been observed recently in both Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where rebel groups situated far from government capitals eventually make their way to these centres in a final attempt to overthrow, or be heard by, the central authorities (Anonymous 2004a).

In many developing countries and failing states, security provisions are extended only to elitist groups, and the gap that widens between the elite and the masses often triggers a spiral of heightened security measures that favour the governing regime, its extended families and commercial interests. A completely segregated society results in pockets of dissatisfaction that generate demand for alternative sources of security. Having established power in their regions, the agenda of these alternative security forces then becomes highly politicized. Support is sought to govern larger

2 Based on discussions with members of Senior Officers from the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence (EMOND), 13 February 2004, Addis Ababa.

regions and overthrow political regimes. Such was the case in Sierra Leone and Haiti, and previously in Burma and Argentina. The other conventional outcome is the creation of internal divisions within the state that informally demarcate borders dividing two or more ruling systems. Charles Taylor's former rule over "Taylorland", or the northern part of Liberia, which contained all sources of national wealth, serves as a good example.

There was no dispute over the linkages and inter-dependencies between security and development. Its acknowledgement encouraged official development assistance programmes to address these two concepts in a more comprehensive way. Policy that shaped the way in which official development funds would be disbursed began to formally recognize the need for a wider approach to addressing a development and security nexus in order to yield more effective and longer-lasting solutions on which these funds were spent.

Over the past three years, the linkages between conflict, poverty, security and development became widely accepted by donors and civil society groups. The United Kingdom, and soon after other bilateral and multilateral donor organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and the Dutch Government, took the lead in expressing these inter-relationships in a more user-friendly way that gave rise to a new sound-bite called *Security Sector Reform*. Other donor countries, such as Canada, and the Scandinavian countries, interpreted the union between security and development as a step closer to understanding the wider human security debate, which served as a more expanded concept of security sector reform. Security within the human security context was that which impacted elements such as a country's economic security and social security and beyond measures that merely allowed people to go about their daily lives in a safe and secure way.

3 Security sector reform: where security and development meet

Security sector reform (SRR) recognized that, particularly during post-conflict transitions, states suffered from a lack of democratic and professional security forces that required re-building, transforming or reforming

immediately following the end of a conflict. These extended security forces not only included the military, but also the police and the law enforcement agencies, the intelligence forces, the judicial system, the legislative functions and oversight mechanisms. "Professionalism" became the key word, which acknowledged the dual thinking that one could not have a well-trained, operationally effective armed forces if it did not have control of them and, conversely, that a well-monitored, financially efficient defence institution was futile without a combat-capable armed force that could serve as a key instrument of foreign policy.

The debate on SRR forged ahead without entirely appreciating the diversity of issues it embraced and the multitude of reform agendas across different regions. The United Kingdom's thinking on this concept has advanced most rapidly, due in large part to the efforts of the former Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short (DFID 2003).

Because the SRR debate spans a range of activities and issues which involve practitioners, policymakers, and civil society – a range that now spans wider than a multi-tasked consolidated peace support operation – not surprisingly, evaluations and assessments that use these variables result in completely different findings in different countries. For example, while defence reform remains high on the agenda for many post-conflict and transitioning African countries, maritime security and policing issues supersede defence requirements in many Latin American and Caribbean regions.³ Thus, whilst different "entry points" may be identified for those providing external assistance, the more holistic frameworks wrapped around these lines of activity must also be appreciated at the earliest stage. Membership opportunities in Euro-Atlantic structures like NATO and the EU have encouraged the donor community's recent efforts to reform the defence sector in Serbia and Montenegro (Judah 2001). However, until very recent efforts to ensure a more synchronized delivery of a security sector-wide approach in Belgrade, corruption and capacity problems

3 Based on a presentation given by a member of Trinidad and Tobago's Office of the National Security Advisor at the *Latin America and Caribbean Security Networking Symposium*, held in Kingston, Jamaica, 20–23 April 2004.

within the police force, the interior ministry and the customs and border guard ran a dangerous risk of increasing exponentially.⁴

Despite these failures, and many other unsuccessful efforts to tackle security reforms in the context of a wider government agenda, lessons remain unlearned. Although a wider approach was taken in Sierra Leone, which drew on existing regional capacity to support national recovery and security for the people, funds are still desperately required, and transitions that support less emphasis on a much improved security situation and more emphasis on developmental primacy must be provided. Elements of successful experiences must also be used elsewhere in order to learn from the past. Recent efforts to tackle DDR in Liberia show very little evidence of importing lessons from neighbouring Sierra Leone – a DDR programme that, in the end, was relatively successful.

4 Approaches used by external actors

Undertaking forecasting and analysis, and defining feasible entry points for security sector reform, all refer to work carried out at the operational level. Policy makers and practitioners both contribute to this level of analysis. Beyond it, however, are the indigenous groups and local constituencies who must be prepared to lead such reform and reconstruction programmes with a view towards sustained democratisation and professionalism. Sitting above these operational tasks, are the more macro strategic-level issues that shape the entire national framework of the beneficiary country and, therefore, the policies of those countries providing foreign assistance.

Elevating the analysis to the strategic level provides more clarity with regards to the relationship between security and development, and the relationship both elements have with the overall governance agenda. Both security and development are "enablers" for a country's foreign and domestic policy agendas. These policy agendas are based on the environment in which a country exists and how the country prioritizes the way in which it responds to the given environment. Whilst strategic environments

4 Based on a UK-government commissioned scoping study carried out by the author in December 2002.

change, national interests and core values of a country tend not to, except perhaps over generations.

This observation is important and should influence the approaches of donors and other external actors seeking to provide assistance to a given country. Too often, templates that correspond to western national interests and core values underpin programmes for external assistance.

5 Merging the disciplines: the introduction of "joined-up government"

Activities that emerge where security and development forces meet undoubtedly require joint and comprehensive planning, which includes all security relevant government departments.

For the **United Kingdom**, this has primarily included the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Department for International Development (DFID), all of which have formally come together under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool following a government-wide review of conflict prevention work. This aimed to encourage different departments working in similar areas to cooperate more closely as part of the joined-up initiative. The review concluded that the UK's contribution to conflict prevention *"could be even more effective if it was coordinated across departmental boundaries"* (DFID / FCO / MOD 2003, 6).

In response to the review, the UK set up two conflict prevention "pools": the Africa Pool, which covers sub-Saharan Africa, and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which covers the rest of the world. The aim of the Pools is to integrate UK policy-making so that the three departments can develop shared strategies for dealing with conflict and make the practical programmes they fund as effective as possible (ibid.). The emphasis on joint working is reflected in the fact that the three departments now share a demanding Public Sector Agreement (PSA) target, which reads as follows:

"Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management, as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in the potential sources of conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution" (ibid., 7).

Both Pools are overseen by Cabinet committees and are managed at working level by a joint steering team made up of officials from each department who agree on priorities, budgets and management. They comprise geographical (i.e. Balkans, Middle East and North Africa, India and Pakistan), international strategies (i.e. European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UN), thematic strategies (Security Sector Reform, Small Arms and Light Weapons), as well as an additional "quick response fund" that accommodates activities that fall within the Global Pool's remit but which do not fit into existing strategies.

The joined-up approach to government has also reached Canadian shores. A commitment to the "3-D" model comprising defence, development and diplomacy has been articulated as **Canada's** three main instruments of foreign policy. Such a policy implies the cross-departmental cooperation between National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). During the recent opening of the Diplomatic Forum in Toronto, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Peter Harder described the model as a *"second priority in the current transition [of government] that places greater emphasis on horizontal thinking."*

However, many have questioned whether or not the much-needed 3-D approach stops at indeed that: "thinking". In practice, there is no joined-up pool of resources from which to manage joined-up planning. Such an incomplete strategy precludes strategic thinking at the highest of levels, which, ironically, should be the primary aim of such an exercise. Without any resources, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (now separate departments, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and Department of International Trade (DIT)) can exert minimal influence on CIDA. Similarly, while posing at the more "robust" end of the foreign policy spectrum, the lack of resources within the Department of National Defence precludes any long-term operational effectiveness. This point became only too evident in the recent commitment of Canadian troops to Haiti, which initially amounted to a duration of 90 days; an operation which has since been extended to 6 months under the auspices of a larger UN multinational effort (Anonymous 2004b). Incidentally, the initial 90-day pledge of troops was issued at the same time as reports suggesting that all branches of the Canadian military say they lack the resources for major international expeditions (Cox / Thanh Ha 2004).

Thus, as far as "3-D" goes, all this begs the question of who holds the security-development purse strings and whether or not a more centralized pool of resources is needed to support a "pooled" capability. At present, CIDA manages a multi-billion dollar discretionary fund that is restricted by two things. First of all, Canada's membership in the OECD implies a commitment to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Official Development Assistance (ODA) criteria (OECD 2001). These criteria include a remit to deliver development aid in a secure and safe environment and, arguably, are in need of serious revision that reflects the realities of failed and post-conflict states. Similarly, the strategic mantra governing CIDA speaks laudably about enhancing aid effectiveness through poverty reduction and by contributing to a more secure environment. However, Canada's involvement assumes some degree of absorptive capacity within the recipient country of the aid, and a reasonable degree of stability and security in order for it to carry out its programmes. This precludes involvement in anything but secure and stable theatres of operations, and poses frightening limitations on the use of the discretionary fund for the "Defence" and "Diplomacy" pillars of "3-D". Thus, investing in vulnerable countries seems counter to the CIDA strategic agenda which, again, is underscored by the modalities of Canada's recent decision to intervene in Haiti.

However, all is not lost within the 3-D approach. The idea itself is encouraging shared discussions and analysis which is contributing to the growing international consensus on the utility of "joined-up" thinking. This has emerged not only from a recent "joint" scoping mission by all three departments in Haiti but also from a similar approach taken towards Afghanistan where the funding of the *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (PRTs) contributes to military reconstruction projects carried out within a "hearts and minds" operation using civil-affairs teams scattered throughout the country. However, the 3-D picture is still incomplete without the joint planning, joint policy, joint implementation and joint endstate.

The **Dutch Government's** recently forged joined-up initiative has circumvented the dictatorial ODA eligibility criteria. This has involved the creation of a Stability Fund, which disposes of resources from the development budget (ODA) and the foreign policy budget (non-ODA). The aim of the Fund is to provide rapid and flexible support for activities that foster peace, security and development in countries and regions where violent

conflicts are threatening to erupt or have already erupted (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). The fund has the flexibility of being used in developed, transitioning and "richer developing" countries and can support peace processes, military peacekeeping capacity, security sector reform, small arms and light weapons and crisis management.⁵ The Dutch Government has stated specifically that the *"fund will not result in the contamination of development cooperation"* and that *"if certain activities do not meet the OECD/DAC requirements for ODA, they will simply not be attributable to ODA"* (ibid.).

On the surface, the problem bound to confront the Dutch is the inevitable interface between "support for peace missions" and the deployment of Dutch military troops in peace missions, the latter of which will not be funded by the Stability Fund – not surprising since the Ministry of Defence has been excluded from the initiative. Such exclusion could also conflict with an ethical foreign policy approach, which is prepared to militarily support bilaterally-funded development and diplomacy initiatives.

Indeed, the UK model of joined-up government is also not without its problems, many of which involve the different departmental motivations across the joined-up partnership. For example, under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool's thematic strategy of SSR, a policy brief has been published and endorsed by all ministers across departments (DFID 2003). Despite this, the UK Ministry of Defence continues to view SSR through the lens of conflict prevention vis-à-vis *defence diplomacy and defence relations*, both of which represent its strategic mantra that embraces SSR-related activities.

On the other hand, DFID evaluates everything against the backdrop of conflict prevention vis-à-vis *poverty eradication*, which serves as its overarching mandate. As a result, strategic disconnects emerge in certain areas. One recent example referred to by the former Assistant Director for Policy and Planning within the Ministry of Defence involved the military outreach programme in Central and East European countries.⁶ Because the programme enhanced interoperability with UK partners and strengthened defence relations, the Ministry of Defence quite comfortably labelled it as

5 For further information on the Stability Fund see: <http://www.minbuza.nl>.

6 "Whitehall Security Sector Reform Policy Seminar", Church House, Westminster, London, 17–18 September, 2003.

a "joined-up" SSR activity. However, due to the lack of linkage with poverty eradication, the DFID would not place it under the same description. Such classification becomes important when drawing on joined-up resources and policy guidelines.

In many other respects, the UK is farther ahead of the game strategically than its Dutch and Canadian counterparts. Its biggest challenge is overcoming the tendency for each department to evaluate joined-up activities against their own single-departmental aims and instead view them against a new strategic set of joined-up policy criteria. Arguably, the Public Sector Agreement targets take care of this, however, such transformational change, which affects the conventional culture of each of these separate departments, almost requires a separate and complementary change management strategy to underpin the joined-up process.

In the **United States**, however, the situation is somewhat bleaker. Following the 2003 publication of National Security Adviser Dr. Condoleezza Rice's 2003 National Security Strategy⁷, many Washington policymakers were encouraged by the multiple references made to "inter-agency" coordination and activity. Like the Canadian government, the conceptual synonym that underscored this idea became *Development, Defence and Diplomacy*. Strategic thinkers should have been encouraged when such an initiative became immediately reflected in one of the most strategic level policy instruments that viewed security in its broadest sense. However, these hopes were soon deflated when limited efforts to implement the inter-agency activity became apparent at the operational level.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is not a Cabinet level function, and has not been elevated to one under the new inter-agency strategy. As a result, the significantly large and capable department is still viewed as the poor "stepchild" of the State Department. Moreover, this phenomenon does not lend itself to the creation of a larger development constituency. Only a fraction of USAID's budget remains discretionary, with the large majority of its spending requiring Congressional oversight. Discussions in Washington revealed that Congress tends to take this oversight role one step too far, and engages in "pork barrel politics" in a way that undermines the development community and the whole ethos

7 See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

behind development assistance. For example, approval for development assistance funds is often contingent on the job opportunities created for different congressional members' constituencies. As a result, much of the development assistance budget comes back into the US and does not stay in the recipient country.

At the same time, the State Department has almost marginalized the role of USAID as it creates new units for development assistance purposes.⁸ This has made some bureaucrats in Washington fear that USAID's role will become scaled down to humanitarian assistance only.⁹ The good news is that, because of their close structural relationship, the State Department and USAID do come together for the creation of joint task groups that respond to crises "du jour". But even these efforts are restricted at the operational level. Archaic approaches to programme design and a lack of funds for operational expenses, precludes significant programming where local ownership is central. Once again, programme managers in Washington have no choice but to recruit US expatriates to lead these efforts in country – an exercise that proves far more expensive than using a combination of USAID people and locally engaged employees and further contributes to the "pork barrel politics".

While a degree of coordination between the State Department and USAID exists at the policy level, albeit not at the operational level, there is a significant gulf between these two departments and those responsible for Defence. Although in the wake of post-war Iraq, significant pressure has been placed on Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld to give more consideration to immediate post-conflict security vacuums and longer-term stability requirements, no formal coordination exists between the other departments which renders the Department of Defense's (DOD) activities as quite reactionary, and not visionary. The recent decision by the government to create an Office for Conflict, Reconstruction and Stabilization (an immediate post-conflict deployable team equipped with a database of

8 The US State Department recently created the Millennium Countries Corporation (MCC) to oversee the Millennium Countries Activities, the latter of which involves providing assistance to an annual selection of countries in accordance with the objectives set out for them by the MCC. Andrew Natsios, the Administrator for USAID, sits as a member on the MCC.

9 Based on discussions with numerous USAID employees (USAID main offices, Federal Triangle, Washington, 6 May 2004).

experts that can be used for immediate deployment, depending on the initial assessment) is good, but will require the cooperation of the DOD in order for the unit to develop operational viability and credibility, as well as foster coordination in the field.

The final impediment to an American joined-up government is the significant change and, in many cases, complete reversal, of priorities from one administration to the next. Prior to President Bush's inauguration, the Clinton Administration managed its national security strategy through policy instruments known as "Presidential Directives on National Security" (PDNS). Because these policy instruments only survive for the duration of the administration, unlike strategy documents or white papers that are more likely to survive successive transitions, developing longer-term joined-up solutions to international priorities becomes difficult.

For reasons outlined in earlier sections, the inability to operationalize joined-up policy also remains an issue for the Canadian Government, due to current departmental procedural and budgetary issues. But being too quick to replicate the UK Government's approach may also put Canada into an awkward position that would conflict with its traditionally passive approach to donor funding. More specifically, joined-up approaches carry the implication that a country's assistance policy abroad will seek to harmonize the defence, development and diplomatic elements of a more strategic, longer-term assistance towards a sustainable endstate. This requires a more "hands-on" and bilateral approach taken by the intervening country – an approach that Canada, during the past decade, has not been able to demonstrate.

For an effective, joined-up government approach to prevail, a country must first evaluate its foreign policy and determine what joined-up mechanisms are required to achieve foreign policy goals or elements thereof. Careful thought must then be put into what government departments would be involved, as policy imperatives stemming from defence, diplomacy and development initiatives are very different from region to region. For example, in countries like Afghanistan, agricultural issues play an important role in wider security and development concerns and thus, including an agricultural ministry in a joined-up government structure meant to address security and development, may be very acceptable and reflect national realities. For a country like Canada, border control, customs and immigration would all be priority areas affecting a joined-up policy on

national security, as would the economic dimension of trade with the United States.

Clearly, the donor community cannot be all things to all people at all times. Limited resources preclude the indiscriminate and widespread use of national military, development and diplomatic assets except in regions where national interests are clearly at stake, or where surplus capacity exists to assist allies. However, any firm effort by one bilateral donor government should be mirrored by similar efforts from its partner governments and any multilateral donor organization to which it belongs. The absence of these contingencies could render joined-up policy and practice of limited utility with potential only in single-nation interventions.

6 Working with partners

This paper has so far addressed the centrality of security, development, the wider governance agenda and how these elements should impact the policies and approaches of external actors providing overseas assistance. It then described how this conceptual union has encouraged donor governments to restructure to provide much more coherent and comprehensive approaches for operationalizing this wider agenda. Whilst these interim efforts should be applauded, the benefits of joined-up policy instruments will not be fully realized unless partner governments and recipient states also bring the same approach to the table.

As far as the recipient states are concerned, much depends on the state of their own security infrastructure, as well as the nature of the external assistance. At one end of the spectrum, the "quick fixes" in collapsed states, described in earlier sections, must be supported by joint strategic planning between the security and development communities. The 2000 intervention by the British forces in Sierra Leone serves as an example of a "quick fix" but one which was reasonably well-supported by plans for parallel programmes supporting wider governance issues. Although Iraq was not a failed state, the 2003 US-led intervention exposed no strategic planning contingencies across wider Washington offices aside from those within the Pentagon. This has huge implications for future coalition interventions if close allies, such as Canada and UK, go down the joined-up route without the US doing the same.

The other area of partner cooperation is that which is required between western donor governments and regional and sub-regional organizations in the southern hemisphere – arguably the regions into which most official development assistance is channelled. There are currently a number of regional and sub-regional organizations, which serve as the key mechanisms to support the peace and security agendas in different parts of the world. Organisations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have not, until recently, been equipped with an adequate resource base and decision-making frameworks to sanction and deploy regional peacekeeping missions. However, an organization like the Organization of American States (OAS), whose membership straddles both the northern and southern hemispheres, has proven reasonably useful for peacebuilding purposes in Haiti where it was able to draw on the riches of the north and the knowledge of the south. Had the joint UN-OAS mission in Haiti not been plagued by a dominant UN, such short-term expectations and, as a result, a less than adequate outcome, an acceptable regional solution to a regional problem may have developed.

Strategies used in Sierra Leone, and most recently in the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan, provide examples of how interventions have become "regionalized". The provision of the Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), whose troops were later absorbed under the UN Assistance Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), together with sanctions imposed on Liberia, close cooperation with the Guinea Government, and the creation of an International Contact Group on Liberia – which included West African countries like Senegal and Nigeria – all contributed to a more "regionalized" effort. Another example is provided by the recent support given to the deployment of military monitors under the AU-led Ceasefire Commission, known as the CFC, to the Darfur region of Sudan, to monitor the political violence leading to severe levels of humanitarian crises.

Thus, along with harmonizing inter-donor approaches, bolstering regional and sub-regional capacity is a critical element of any expanded "joined-up" strategy to address the global peace and security agenda and reach overseas development assistance goals. The response to the resurgence of conflict in Haiti should have provided a clear case for regional organizations like CARICOM or the OAS to be engaged as the lead agent, but with

assistance from others. Like Africa, many Latin American and Caribbean countries cannot, even collectively, fund a large-scale military deployment, much less the work of indigenous civilian agencies. However, as these groups do bring the local knowledge that garners trust, more effort must be fuelled towards developing regional and sub-regional capacity for groups of states with direct national security interests in these conflict regions. In this case, and as long as funding allowed, interest would not wane as quickly as the impetus driving an international intervention – particularly in the most remote areas in Africa, which become quickly forgotten about. Moreover, developing countries would view the idea of external assistance much more favourably if their own regional governing bodies had a voice in how it was implemented.

7 Conclusion

This paper began with the premise that international strategies for the provision of donor assistance in post-conflict and transitioning states require more coherency at the planning and implementation levels. It reviewed the linkages between security and development, and the contribution this union makes to good governance. It also emphasised that, whilst a wide spectrum of tools existed to address security-development issues, each tool must think of the wider governance issues its separate contributions seek to support. These arguments were substantiated by examples of where inadequate stove-piped approaches from external actors undermined a longer-term sustainable solution.

Lessons learned from these interventions, and the rise of the intellectual discourse on the security-development nexus, have provided the impetus for a number of bilateral donor governments to restructure their relevant departments to conform to more "joined-up" strategic objectives. The experiences of the UK, Dutch, Canadian and US governments were critically reviewed, with the conclusion that failure to overcome incomplete strategies for joined-up approaches will result not only in incoherent national interventions but also in disjointed multilateral interventions.

Improved delivery mechanisms for impact-driven international assistance require well-informed funders who can think strategically, and who are willing to draw on regional capacity in order to support a regional solution to a regional problem. These strategies will help to close the gap between

the approaches of external and internal actors, as well as provide better suited policy instruments to address wider governance issues. This will not happen overnight – and for some partner countries, policies and approaches will change only in slow time and, in some cases, perhaps not at all

In order to build an international consensus to support broader thinking and joined-up resources, bilateral actors should develop more effective strategies to influence and consult with partners whose national security interests are broadly similar in certain parts of the world. Moreover, they must do more to empower the regional and sub-regional organizations which have specific peace and security mechanisms and agendas that serve the needs of each area. Where resources remain a problem, donors should balance their contribution of overseas aid between empowering regional capacity to respond to regional problems (by developing closer links with organisations like the AU and CARICOM), and providing a more comprehensive effort where no operational capacity exists. This comprehensive effort should support institutional development and good governance, as well as training and technical assistance. Moreover, it should promote more "staying power" and focus in future multilateral engagements.

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Converging the role of development policy and security policy? New approaches in Africa¹

Stephan Klingebiel

Summary

The relationship between development policy and security policy has undergone rapid changes over a period of only a few years. In Germany, as well as other donor countries, there was in the past a clearly recognizable distance between development actors and military actors and between their respective tasks. This distance is shrinking. The new debate is important for many developing countries and regions (e.g. Afghanistan), but is especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa.

Peace and security are at the top of the agenda for Africa. While they have been recognized in the past as among the most urgent challenges facing the continent, they have not previously gained the marked profile they are now assuming as a political priority for practical policy approaches and efforts both in and outside Africa. The basic parameters involved have shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will to act. The African Union (AU), created in 2002, is most important for this new situation. However, the new peace and security architecture faces a number of challenges. Although the AU's ownership approach to peace and security is fundamentally correct, it contrasts sharply with African funding and implementation capacities. Ultimately, the AU will prove to be effective only if the relevant donors are prepared to support, and above all to fund, its policies.

Interfaces between development policy and security policy are not a phenomenon confined to Germany. The UN, for example, is increasingly interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Integrated missions with civil and military components were first undertaken in Sierra Leone. Another important example is Britain, which established

1 A similar version of the article will be published in: Ulf Engel / Robert Kappel (eds.): Germany's Africa policy revisited: Interests, images and incrementalism, 2nd print, Münster: LIT

an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. The British development, foreign and defence policies are contributing to this fund.

Germany's cross-policy approaches in Africa's case cover different categories, such as strategic planning, funding and operational activities. It is important to stress that many of these efforts are made within a broader context of international approaches of the G8 and the European Union.

An important effort as regards a German "whole-of-government" approach began with an action plan for "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building". The action plan is an interministerial exercise and was approved by the Cabinet in May 2004. Its objective is to develop the Federal Government's capabilities and to make greater use of the foreign, security and development policies in civil crisis prevention. One of its main aims is therefore coherent and coordinated action on the part of all state and non-state actors. Several parts of the plan are devoted to Africa.

The new tendencies in Germany have led not to a merging of development and security concepts, but to a new relationship between the actors concerned. This closer relationship also entails differences of view on a number of issues.

1 Background to the ongoing discussion

The context: Africa's new peace and security architecture²

The relationship between development policy and security policy has undergone rapid changes over a period of only a few years.³ In Germany, as well as in other donor countries, there was in the past a clearly recognizable distance between development actors and military actors and their tasks. This distance is shrinking. In particular, the broad mandates of peacekeeping missions have led to numerous points of contact between civil and military tasks. Nowadays, peace missions face a range of more complex tasks related to the stabilization of state structures and reconstruction. In this context, development policy frequently, and increasingly,

2 For this chapter see Klingebiel 2005a.

3 For an overview see Weiss 2005.

plays a crucial role and so finds itself in a growing number of situations where interfaces with military actors need to be developed and structured.

Besides peace missions, development policy and military actors are achieving closer convergence and adopting a more complementary approach at several levels. This is true not only of the operational approach adopted "on site", but also of the headquarter and capital city levels, thus opening the way for joint planning (country-wide strategies, etc.) and agreement on common aims and providing a clear picture of where complementary processes are feasible and viable in the achievement of shared goals in the operative area.

The new debate is important for many developing countries and regions (e.g. Afghanistan), but is especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. There is a regional focus for several reasons. Despite some positive tendencies (a declining number of armed conflicts since the end of the 1990s, etc.), sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the world region hardest hit by violent conflict and war. In addition, development assistance is generally an important resource basis for the countries of the region. Official development assistance (ODA) accounts for 55 % of all external resource flows into the region (Klingebiel 2005b). Consequently, the potential influence of the donor community is fairly high. A weak financial resource basis for peace and security policies also leads to heavy dependence on external actors in this field. Further reasons are a change in the outside perception of Africa's significance for international politics and the new dynamics with regard to the emerging peace and security architecture in Africa. Today relatively more attention is being paid to Africa's role in international relations than in the late 1980s, following the end of the Cold War and the onset of the mono-polar world.⁴ This increased interest is only partly due to ongoing efforts to reduce poverty (e.g. Millennium Development Goals – MDGs) and to redress structural shortcomings, especially in sub-Saharan Africa: it has far more to do with new political priorities in international relations. In the context of the new international security agenda, Africa has come to be seen as a continent that is relevant in security policy terms. Political struc-

4 The 1998 bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam served, for a time, to focus world attention on this dimension. Compared to other donor countries (such as Britain and France), German policy takes little interest in Africa. The reasons are discussed by Engel (2005).

tures and dynamics, factors bound up with stability and instability, have become a key issue for both political and research approaches to the continent. Against this background, Africa must be seen as developing into a continent on which increasing international capacities and financial contributions for peace missions are concentrated. Around 75 % or almost 2.9 billion US \$ (annual budget 2004/2005) of United Nations peacekeeping mission funding is spent on Africa.

Peace and security are, moreover, at the top of the agenda for Africa. While they have been recognized in the past as among the most urgent challenges facing the continent, they did not gain the marked profile they are now assuming as a political priority for practical political approaches and efforts both in and outside Africa. The basic parameters involved have shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will to act. However, the new architecture faces a number of challenges if it is to fulfil its peace and security mandate. They include question of legitimacy, conflicting agendas and resource and capacity constraints (see Powell 2005).

The dynamics that Africa has developed on its own and the dynamics currently involved in external assistance for Africa are largely related to military capabilities. In the past there have been all too many indications that mechanisms put in place by African institutions themselves (e.g. the Organization of African Unity) or by the international community (e.g. United Nations, key states) are unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in extreme emergency situations to protect civilian populations. Furthermore, much serious doubt has been expressed about the *raison d'être* of military actions undertaken by African and external actors.

The immediate significance of the new peace and security architecture is due to a number of factors. The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 must be seen as a crucially important step in the development of a new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a set of new proactive conditions, whereas the Organization of African Unity, its predecessor, had a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security, owing to its inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of its member states. In connection with some positive developments at regional level and in conjunction with the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative, the AU is now seen as presenting a realistic "African reform programme" designed

to set new African political accents, while at the same time consciously seeking support from abroad.

The new relationship between development and security policy

The modern notion of security has helped to align the goals set in foreign, security and development policy. This convergence is reflected in such concepts as "expanded security", "human security" and "new security consensus" (see, for example, UN High-level Panel), which clearly break with the traditional and short-term image of security and stability. These new trends and the growing convergence of security and development are criticized in a number of cases. The "securitization" of development policy and the militarization of crisis prevention and conflict management strategies are seen as one of the main threats in the ongoing debate.⁵

The need for overarching strategies and measures in the areas of development, foreign and security policy has grown for two reasons. First, development policy has in recent years increasingly indicated that "development and security" are mutually dependent and that success in the development policy sector is not possible without "security" (in its multiple dimensions). Consequently, security has become a key issue in development policy. In connection with both the AU and NEPAD, there is also a new consensus on the close interrelationship between security and development. Security is generally acknowledged as being the main precondition for development (while development is a precondition for security). In some quarters the security dimension is given priority⁶ or armed conflict is expressly seen as one of the principal obstacles to the achievement of the MDGs in Africa.⁷ And the Africa strategy proposed by the Commission of the European Union (2005) has identified peace and security as the first prerequisite for achieving the MDGs (see Commission of the EU 2005). This will entail an increase in the responsibility for progress in development that Africa itself is prepared to assume.

5 See, for example, Brock (2004) and Duffield in the present volume.

6 The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Konaré, for instance, notes that "[s]ecurity is the African Union's priority"; online: <http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?articleid=3669>.

7 For example, by Tidjane Thiam, Commissioner for Peace and Security on the UK-led Commission for Africa; online: http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/africa2004/meeting_9nov/print-friendly.html.

Second, the new international security agenda – as contained, for example, in the European Security Strategy (December 2003) – is based on current threats, suggesting that they can be effectively countered only if all externally oriented policies are closely coordinated and allotting to development policy, among other measures, a central role in the establishment of viable civil structures. Viewed against the background of new threat scenarios, in the face of which the classic concepts of self-defence have lost much of their meaning, sub-Saharan Africa's crisis vulnerability is coming to play an increasingly important role here. The ESS points in particular to the interdependence of the problems involved:

"Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict." (Council of the EU 2003,3)

In Germany the debate likewise indicates a clear increase in the attention paid by overall German policy to Africa. Newly defined security parameters form one of the leitmotifs of the German debate. Germany's increased interest in Africa has also found expression – among other things – in official high-level visits to Africa (as in 2004 by German Presidents Rau and Köhler, former German Chancellor Schröder and other members of the German government), during which the issues of peace and security have been high on the agenda. Stability and security have ranked high in recent German government documents dealing with Africa.⁸ The German Foreign Office notes that both Germany and the other European nations have an immediate interest in security-related stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, military and civil conflict prevention are playing a growing role in cooperation with Africa.

"As far as security policy is concerned, while sub-Saharan Africa is free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and carrier systems, light and small arms [...] continue to be widespread in African crisis regions. Every year they are used to kill a large number of people. For international terrorism, sub-Saharan Africa is both a target area for attacks (e.g. Kenya and Tanzania), a base of operations, and, at least temporarily, a retreat area and training grounds for Islamist terrorists."

8 See, for example, the German Report on the Implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan (*Bundesregierung* 2003), the German Foreign Office's Africa Strategy (*Auswärtiges Amt* 2003) and the Africa position paper issued by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ 2004a).

There is a great risk that African raw materials, from diamonds to gold to coltan, may fall into the hands of terrorists. Europe is furthermore faced with security problems resulting from state failure. The breakdown of the state's monopoly on the use of force goes hand in hand with the exercise of criminal power and the unobstructed use of force. The resulting migration flows are mainly directed toward Europe. Germany and the other European nations therefore have an immediate interest in security-related stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Military and civil conflict prevention are assuming more and more importance in cooperation with Africa. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a joint effort of European Security and Defense policy, must be viewed in this context." (Auswärtiges Amt 2004, 199 f.)

2 Cross-policy-field and development-policy approaches to providing support for African capacities

Interfaces between development policy and security policy

Interfaces between development policy and security policy are not a phenomenon confined to Germany.⁹ The UN, for example, is increasingly interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Integrated missions with civil and military components were first conducted in Sierra Leone; others have since been carried out in Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. The principal aim of these missions has been to provide targeted mutual support for development-related approaches (reconstruction efforts, transformation of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front into a political party, etc.) and coordinated peace missions with stabilization as their aim (see UN Secretary-General 2004, 8 f.; Weiss 2005). Another important example is Britain, where an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool was established in 2001. By pooling resources of the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) are able to act more coherently, and more effective policy is envisaged. The Canadian government uses the Canada Fund for Africa (established in 2002) to support peace and security efforts in Africa (with the focus on West Africa and the African Union). At conceptual level, the OECD's

9 For an overview of G8 activities see, for example, Ramsbotham / Bah / Calder 2005.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is increasingly discussing "whole-of-government" approaches.

In general, interfaces between development policy and security policy can be placed in various categories (see Klingebiel / Roehder 2004). First, security and stability are required conditions for development policy. In most situations they are needed by development actors for their operational work. In many situations, they are dependent on military actors (e.g. peace missions). Second, strategic planning and conception is an important category for existing interfaces. It is relevant, for example, to interministerial cooperation and mechanisms. Third, development policy and security policy intersect where various funding dimensions are concerned. This category covers, for example, the funding of non-civil measures and missions and the pooling of external actors' resources. Fourth, a number of interfaces exist at operational level (e.g. interministerial projects, cooperation in training and capacity-building).

Germany's cross-policy approaches in Africa's case cover all four categories. It is important to stress that many of these efforts are made within a broader context of international approaches. This is true of efforts within the G8 and the European Union (EU). During its 2002 summit at Kananaskis, Canada, the G8 adopted its Africa Action Plan, which provides, as one of the main priorities of its partnership with Africa, for support for African capacities to prevent and resolve armed conflict in Africa. In the Action Plan, the G8 commits itself to:

"providing technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organizations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter."

At its summits in Evian, France, in 2003 and Sea Island, USA, in 2004, the G8 worked out new plans for implementing this objective. The G8 thus sees itself as a major driving force and supporter of the efforts currently being undertaken on the African continent. All in all, the G8 Africa Action Plan provides an important framework for Germany's activities in the field. "Peace and security" is one of the key chapters of the German implementation reports (*Bundesregierung* 2005) on the G8 Africa Action Plan. A number of aspects covered by the chapter feature joint development and security policy approaches.

Joint German development and security policy approaches were uncommon until the late 1990s, and this for several reasons. Historically, the two policies had overlapped conceptually in very few instances. Germany's international military role was limited until the early 1990s. The rapid changes in its international role since the end of the Cold War and its reunification have led to a growing number of German military missions overseas. The former approach of defending Germany at its borders has changed dramatically. The new international security agenda and the new threats, identified, for example, by the European Security Strategy (2003), are endorsed by German defence policy. As former German Defence Minister Peter Struck (Struck 2004, 22) has said:

"If we fail to invest today in development and stability outside NATO and the European Union, in the Near and Middle East, the Caspian region, southern Asia, and parts of Africa, it will bounce back on us as a security problem in Europe and the U.S."

At the same time, German development policy and its international context have undergone a process of rapid change. Crisis prevention and conflict management were already established as new tasks for development policy in the mid- and later 1990s. However, there was always a strict conceptual and operational divide between developmental and other (including non-civil) approaches. Development actors always saw development cooperation as having a strong civil identity at some remove from military approaches. Traditionally, the majority of civil society in Germany has considerable doubts about military approaches and strategies embracing both development and military actors.¹⁰

Generally speaking, at least four main factors have been responsible for a change in the relationship between development policy and the military since the 1990s (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004). First, the number of protracted crises characterized de facto by trusteeship rules has increased (e.g. Afghanistan, Kosovo). Nation-building tasks are a major element of these peace missions. Second, development policy, interested in gaining more constructive influence in post-conflict situations, even expects contributions from security policy in some cases and advocates or calls for military intervention (e.g. Liberia in 2003). For example, the former Parliamentary State Secretary at the BMZ (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche*

10 See, for example, the policy paper of the German NGO association VENRO (2003).

Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), Uschi Eid,¹¹ has proposed closer cooperation between security policy and development policy, calling, from the development policy angle, for a stronger German commitment to peace missions in Africa. Third, foreign and security policy are increasingly coming to expect the active involvement of development policy in post-conflict situations. Fourth, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the German military has helped to draw public attention to the whole spectrum of German policies and the areas in which they might take joint action.

Concrete new measures and approaches

These new tendencies have led not to a merging of development and security concepts, but to a new relationship between the actors concerned. This closer relationship also entails differences of view on a number of issues. For example, the BMZ was initially opposed to the EU's European Development Fund being used to finance the African Peace Facility (APF). The BMZ emphasized that no development funds should be used to finance non-civil missions, which, though important and necessary, should be the task for the foreign and security policies (see Wieczorek-Zeul 2003). In addition, the African Peace Facility (APF) is not eligible for ODA. In general, the EU's APF has a major role to play. Based on a proposal by EU Commissioner Poul Nielson, it was requested by the AU and has been available since May 2004. It is endowed with 250 million € from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF). Its purpose is to fund peacekeeping operations carried out by Africans in Africa. At the AU's request, the EU first made 12 million € available in June 2004 and then, in October 2004, provided an additional 80 million € for the AU mission in the Darfur.¹²

The support¹³ Germany is providing for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)¹⁴ is innovative in nature in that

11 Published in an article with co-author Helmut Asche (Eid / Asche 2003).

12 See EU 2004 and EU press releases EU IP/04/727 of 10 June 2004 and IP/04/1306 of 26 October 2004.

13 Other donors similarly regard the KAIPTC as an important project worthy of support.

14 See Klingebiel / Roehder 2004, 18; *Bundesregierung* 2003, 15 f.; *Bundesregierung* 2004, 46 f.

three ministries are contributing to the efforts. The KAIPTC was set up in Accra in 1998 as a regional training centre, one of the main aims being to tap Ghana's experience of peace missions and make it available to other African countries. It is one of three regional centres in the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) region. The training programme includes courses on military-police tasks as well as preparatory training for military observers. In the framework of the G8 Africa Action Plan, Germany is using various foreign, development and defence ministry instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC. The components involved include:

- (i) Development of a model course on the use of civil forces for peace-keeping, funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Centre for International Peace Missions / CIPM (*Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze* / ZIF); the implementing agency for technical cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* / GTZ) is responsible for carrying out the project.
- (ii) Funds from the Federal Foreign Office are being used to build/equip the centre; the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* / BMVg) is in charge of implementation.
- (iii) A German military instructor specializing in civil-military cooperation provides support for training operations. In Germany the BMVg and the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Auswärtiges Amt* / AA) train African training personnel.

The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi also receives support from the German government (mainly through the BMZ). The PSTC is to be developed into a centre of excellence of the East African region.

Like other donors (e.g. Canada), Germany is providing capacity-building support for the AU's Peace and Security Directorate, with the UN Development Programme playing a catalytic role (see UN Secretary-General 2004, 12). The German government has announced it is to help the AU and the African sub-regional organizations to create and develop efficient institutions and to deploy different instruments such as development and equipment aid (*Bundesregierung* 2004, 47).

The action plan and its impact on joint approaches

The most important effort as regards a German "whole-of-government" approach began with an action plan for "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building" (*Aktionsplan "Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung"*) (*Bundesregierung* 2004).¹⁵ The action plan was originally launched by the Red-Green Coalition, which held power from 1998 to 2005. However, the agreement on which the Grand Coalition (November 2005) is based argues very clearly for the action plan to be continued by the new government.

The action plan is an interministerial exercise and was approved by the Cabinet in May 2004. Its objective is to develop the Federal Government's capabilities and to make greater use of the foreign, security and development policies in civil crisis prevention. One of its main aims is therefore coherent and coordinated action on the part of all state and non-state actors. Many examples and a sub-chapter ("*Enhancing the peace-building capacities of regional and sub-regional organizations, especially Africa*") are devoted to Africa. The plan concludes that the Federal Government's activities in Africa focus on the promotion of regional cooperation in the field of security policy, civil-military cooperation, post-conflict rehabilitation and support for peace processes (*Bundesregierung* 2004, 46). Supporting African regional and sub-regional organizations is one of the key elements of the action plan:

*"Targeted assistance for the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations in establishing and developing efficient institutions for crisis prevention and conflict management. To this end, the Federal Government relies on various complementary instruments (e.g. development policy and equipment aid)."*¹⁶ (*Bundesregierung* 2004, 5)

The plan covers a large number of approaches and conclusions for German policy and includes 161 practical steps. Against the background of the action plan a new Interministerial Steering Committee (ISC) (*Ressortkreis*) was established in September 2004. Most important is the identification of four priority tasks for the first phase (see *Auswärtiges Amt* 2005). These

15 The action plan builds on the three-page "Comprehensive Concept of the Federal Government on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building" (2000).

16 Equipment aid is provided by the Federal Foreign Office.

priority tasks have a number of clear links to sub-Saharan Africa. The first concerns the establishment of a whole-of-government team for a specific country (*Ländergesprächskreis*). Nigeria was chosen as a pilot country. The aim of this effort is to develop a new format in order to improve communication among different ministries on crisis issues. The second priority task concerns security sector reforms. As the German government has no concept for failing or failed states, this project seeks closer cooperation among German ministries in this field. The third priority task is to decide on the details of a possible law (*Entsendegesetz*) aimed at providing civilians for international peace missions. The fourth priority task is to pool financial resources. Given the experience gained by Britain in particular, the ISC will consider the possibility of establishing a jointly administered crisis prevention pool funded from the budgets of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

3 Conclusions and perspectives

Conceptual cornerstones

The ongoing African efforts and measures to install a new peace and security architecture must, on the whole, be viewed positively. There is no denying, however, that many capacities have yet to be developed (e.g. in the field of transport infrastructure, as has been noted in connection with the Darfur mission). Some of the goals set are likely to prove unrealistic when it comes to practical implementation (e.g. the creation of all five projected regional standby forces). Another positive factor is that external actors have an interest in the emerging peace and security regime. In some respects, the new interest in Africa is prompted by a variety of motives (access to energy resources, influence on migration, etc.).

In this context, external donors are developing new approaches in the support they provide. Joint concepts and measures are new especially for the German government. These new interfaces are important for Germany's approaches in all developing regions and post-conflict settings (like the Balkans and Afghanistan), but particularly relevant in Africa's case.

At a strategic and conceptual level, a number of cornerstones are important for the German approach in Africa. At national level the action plan (2004) is the most important document. It is clear from the plan that joint development and security policy approaches will increase in the future and that Africa is an important region for Germany's efforts.

As in other fields, the German government is trying to integrate national efforts into international approaches. The G8 Africa Action Plan is one of the main reference points for Germany's activities in this area. It is also a sign of its growing ambition to become a global player. The European Union also plays an important role, not least because decisions on new instruments and funding mechanisms (e.g. the African Peace Facility) are giving rise to major debates within the German government. In addition, the European Security Strategy provides a framework for the role of development policy against the background of the new international security agenda. Less recognition has so far been given to the ongoing efforts of the United Nations in Africa (developmental peace missions in Africa, etc.).

Ownership vs dependence on external actors

One general question that will inevitably arise if the AU proves willing to act will have to be answered in the future: how is the funding of the African peace and security architecture, with particular reference to peace missions, to be secured? There is no doubt that a large share of the costs will have to be borne by external actors, even if the AU member states take steps to intensify their efforts in this regard. This has turned out to be the case, for example, with the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, where the lion's share of the costs has been borne by the EU, the US and other donors. Even the EU's African Peace Facility, with its endowment of 250 million €, is unlikely, in view of the funding requirements involved, to be able to provide more than intermittent solutions, and theoretically, the facility could be entirely exhausted in roughly two years by the limited mission being undertaken in Burundi alone. The question must be addressed with regard both to donor budgetary logic (should development policy really be funding military peace missions?) and to the general willingness of the international community to provide additional resources to fund these tasks on a continuous basis (are donors prepared to contribute more resources – in absolute terms – to fund AU missions?).

Although the AU's ownership approach to peace and security on the African continent is fundamentally correct, it contrasts sharply with African funding and implementation capacities. Ultimately, the AU will prove to be effective only if the relevant donors are prepared to support, and above all to fund, its policies.

Challenges and starting points for cross-policy approaches

The action principles and implementation procedures adopted by development policy actors on the one hand and military actors on the other differ in their underlying logic, which may lead to areas of friction. For this reason, the debate on the relationship between development and security cannot have the convergence of the two tasks as its aim. Rather than the effects of each policy being viewed and assessed in its own narrow terms, the goal should be to strive for common priorities and strategies for the countries or regions in question. It should be noted, however, that closer alignment and cooperation between development actors and armed forces does not automatically lead to a resolution of potential conflicts of interest in the goals set or preclude diverging perspectives. The allocation of ODA resources varies (by country and region, for example) depending on whether the assistance is targeted at the MDGs (poverty reduction, absorptive capacity, performance, etc.) or the reduction of threats to security and stability (the actions of those in power, the fragility of the state, the limited monopoly on the use of force, etc.).

It is absolutely vital to decide whose security a peacekeeping mission is intended to ensure. The credibility of peacekeeping troops or missions largely depends – irrespective of the need to protect one's own troops and civilian personnel on assignments – on whether they contribute to the security and protection of the local population.

Today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions have to perform comprehensive civil and military tasks. Since the Brahimi Report (2000), close cooperation and alignment have been recognized as core tasks, although this has not in itself resolved the issue. Without adequate interfaces, tackling military and civil tasks simultaneously in peacekeeping missions remains unsatisfactory. However, simply merging development policy and military approaches and activities is neither meaningful nor desirable. It is important, however, to identify those situations and areas where better aligned or even, to some extent, joint planning, action and monitoring are

meaningful and more effective (for example, in the area of security sector reforms).

In the context of military operations, development policy should play a role only in mandated, and therefore legitimized, missions; otherwise, its credibility will be fundamentally open to question, and there will be a serious danger of development policy being used for short-sighted military purposes. Furthermore, the question of which tasks to assign to the military components of a mission is crucial for development policy. Combat operations offer few, if any, linkage points for development policy involvement, while stabilization operations provide meaningful interfaces far sooner and far more frequently.

Peacekeeping missions necessarily incorporate both civil and military components. Even though, from the development policy perspective, the military components are frequently more important and often indispensable, development policy should not be required to fund them. In view of the goals to be achieved, watering down the civil components in peacekeeping missions may well prove counterproductive.

Peacekeeping missions are experiencing a trend towards "regionalization". Increasingly, regional mechanisms are being allotted a more significant role in resolving security and stability problems. This can be seen in the efforts of the African Union, for example, in the Darfur region of Sudan, the creation of the African Standby Forces and the current role of ECOWAS / ECOMOG (*ECOWAS Monitoring Group*) in West Africa. Over the coming years, one of the main tasks will be to create the requisite capacities for regions with fewer capabilities in the planning and implementing of peacekeeping missions. This area will be increasingly important as a field of action for external actors, and it is precisely here that it is crucial to develop action across policy sector lines.

The number and proportion of peacekeeping missions on the African continent is increasing. For this reason, too, particularly intensive efforts are being made (above all in the G8 context) to create African conflict resolution and crisis intervention capabilities (and hence the ability to conduct peacekeeping missions). In this context, it will be especially important to ensure that the civil components and capabilities of peacekeeping missions, including interfaces with the military, are also given sufficient weight.

The move to establish the African Peace Facility, financed from the European Development Fund, is to be welcomed for the concerns it addresses, since it facilitates and reinforces regional action; however, the funding structure, i.e. the redistribution of development resources (ODA), does not offer a true perspective, since it weakens the contribution made by development policy. Reliable funding and sufficient equipment are crucial factors in successful multidimensional peacekeeping missions – and this applies equally to ODA resources and the agreed provision of aid from defence budgets. What needs to be taken into account in this respect is that an adequate supply of resources is also required specifically when the goal is to achieve "soft security".

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