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European Union and diaspora engagement policy within changing realities

Violina MARDARI*

Abstract

The article presents an analysis of the European Union and diaspora engagement policy within changing realities. The author focuses on the main research question concerning how the new, uncontrolled migration flows may influence the approach on diaspora engagement policy within member states. This process could have positive as well as negative implications for the Community space even if the EU attempts to develop a new legal framework on migration. The interdisciplinary approach and methods as empirical analysis, comparison and observation on some good practices and new issues gave the possibility to estimate the results of how changing diaspora role perception reduces the gap between different migrants in the EU and improves the diaspora engagement dialogue on institutional and civil society level.

Keywords: diaspora engagement, good practices, migration, changing realities

Introduction

Diaspora engages in different fields of interest and in manifold ways. Governments employ a variety of methods to engage with their diasporas and use different institutional forms at different governmental levels. Following the new trends in diaspora policies world-wide, we could expect that the EU Member States should have taken a deeper look at the outflows of human capital and that they might focus on engaging emigrants in development strategies.

More recently, in June 2016, the Commission presented an action plan which includes a policy framework and concrete measures to help member states to integrate on about 25 million nationals of third countries being legally residents within the European Union. A deeper understanding of mainstreamed policy innovations for diaspora is important to Europe's immigrant integration efforts, since intended beneficiaries of traditional integration policy are no longer a discrete and easily identifiable population—and in some localities, they are not even minorities. At a time when public budgets are tightening, governments are articulating new strategies to ensure that the needs of all vulnerable groups are met more effectively through mainstream policy change.

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In that order, the research goal is analysing the problems and good practices of stakeholders, inter-ministerial, inter-agency coordination for establishing an efficient, comprehensive, sustainable and future-oriented EU diaspora engagement policy within changing realities.

This study will focus on the following hypothesis: The traditional emigration countries of the European Union have different approaches to diaspora engagement. The focus is on catering for the cultural needs of the communities of the same cultural background abroad, such as language schools, national curricula schools or active cultural programs for diaspora. A separate category of catering for diaspora needs are policies focusing on vulnerable emigrants. Over a million persons have arrived in Europe since January 2015, many of them fleeing conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and their integration into host societies may pose difficulties due to the scale of the phenomenon.

The research questions are: What does supporting states in developing tailored diaspora engagement policies and approaches mean?; How to empower the diaspora and create spaces for government-diaspora interaction?; What are the changing realities with impact on diaspora role within the EU migration policy? These one may increase or reduce its role?

The methodological approach of this research consists, firstly by using the comparative method to identify the similarities and differences in forming the policy towards diaspora in the European space, also, empirical analysis of some qualitative and quantitative data presented in tables. Author will contextualize diaspora and diaspora engagement in migration and development policy, followed by a brief discussion on different concepts and approaches. There will be discussed some European good practices: traditional diaspora engagement building policies, government strategies, programs focusing on emigrants through the EU member states. It will be analysed the support given to states in developing tailored diaspora engagement policies and approaches.

1. ‘Diaspora engagement policy’ concept into the migration-development nexus

A brief analysis of the term ‘diaspora’ emphasizes that it has different meanings to different scholars (Spagnul, 2010). Recent years and different studies made this one to become a universal concept changing over time (Faist, 2010). Diaspora can be very generally defined “as people who have migrated, and their descendants, who maintain a connection to their homeland” (Plaza *et al.* 2011, p. 3). It “always refers to a community or group” (Faist, 2010, p. 13). The most representative example is Jewish or Armenian diaspora. At the beginning the concept underlined trading diasporas (Brubaker, 2005), and later, social and political engagement of migrant alliances. So, there are identified “three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora”

(Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). The first one is any kind of dispersion in space. The second criterion is the orientation to a so-called homeland. “The third constitutive element is boundary-maintenance, which means that diasporas are held together through solidarity and social relationships beyond nation states” (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 23-24).

An extensive transnationalist definition relates to the third constitutive element from above and introduces the term ‘diaspora networks’ as “populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries” (Van Hear *et al.*, 2004, p. 3). As a result, diaspora supports developing interests and experiences among its members.

In view of the facts above, we can mention that ‘diaspora engagement policies’ concept is determined by the increasing role of diaspora and the establishment of various networks between its members. Diaspora is more powerful than ever. These homogeneous groups at a first look, are very complex inside (Spagnul, 2010). In many cases, diaspora may be a launching ramp for other migrants from the origin country (Tölölyan, 1996). ‘Diaspora engagement policies’ are a primary channel through which migrant source states are interacting with their diasporas. Such policies became development strategies of the governments engaging also different non-state actors. Diaspora engagement policies emphasize social status, political or religious beliefs, and the status and conditions in the country of destination.

Diaspora engagement policies, of course, provide emigrants and diaspora members with a set of rights and obligations through citizenship policies, such as voting rights, giving them tools for better socio-economic integration in the country of origin or destination (such as taxation schemes, portability of rights and recognition of qualifications) (Weinar, 2014, p. 6).

The term diaspora engagement is widely used in the policy and scientific context, but there can be an objection that this one does not take the required partnership needed for cooperation between governmental or non-governmental development and diaspora organizations.

Diaspora engagement cuts across government policies and institutions both in countries of origin and destination, going far beyond the migration-development nexus. Contextualizing diaspora engagement in the migration-development nexus, scholars recognize migrants and diaspora as one of the focus areas in the still evolving migration and development policy field.

“It became a general policy trend to promote diaspora engagement” (Frankenhaeuser and Noack, 2015, p. 5).

Scholars have studied the linkages between various policy initiatives in various perspectives. (Gamlen, 2006) distinguishes two diaspora engagement mechanisms: the first for diaspora building (the policies would include extraterritorial citizenship, dual citizenship and extended cultural rights for emigrants and their descendents) and the second preoccupied with binding emigrants to the home country with the net of rights and obligations (emigrants are offered a wide range of socio-economic rights but also obligations (e.g. special tax laws, property laws, voting rights etc.).

This way, diaspora engagement is based on different initiatives and programs on the cooperation level. The practitioners Keusch, M., and Schuster, N. (Keusch and Schuster, 2012) divide many types of activities which could better define the concept: Awareness raising; Diaspora entrepreneurship; Transfer of knowledge; Capacity building; Funding of migration and development initiatives; Hometown association initiatives. These actions are implemented by different stakeholders: international organizations, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and diaspora organizations. They deal migration related issues, facilitating business investment start-ups and small-scale businesses in the country of origin (diaspora entrepreneurship), promoting knowledge transfer, offering capacity building and financial support. “Also, there are activities of so-called hometown associations, which collaborate with established governmental or non-governmental developmental actors and, in general, projects following different goals” (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 23).

The link between diaspora engagement and migration-development nexus has become a topical issue for highly developed and developing countries. The first one usually deal with the large flow of immigrants and refugees to integrate into their societies. The second one are interested in implementing migrant return programs and the issue of remittances. Diaspora engagement and migrant investment are seen as a new and emerging field, able to develop the origin and residence countries. This includes knowledge and skills, superior technology, improved business practices and financial capital of the emerging markets.

In recent years, governments and civil society organizations have been coalescing towards this positive impact, reflected in civil society’s call Action Plan for better models and frameworks that facilitate the engagement of diaspora and migrant associations as entrepreneurs, social

investors, policy advocates and partners in setting and achieving priorities for the full range of human development in countries of origin, heritage and destination (MADE, 2016, p. 13).

Stephan Castles (2008, p. 3), underlines that “development policies cannot reduce international migration, because a higher level of development brings more mobility, not less – at least for a considerable period”. So, it is important to recognise a significant fact: today, nearly all scientists and experts agree that economic and human development does not lead directly to decreased migration. We know that the push factors of migration are various: conflict, political repression, persecution, economic constraints, unemployment and precarious and unsafe working conditions (CONCORD, 2011). However, considering the interdependency of migration and development, it is inadmissible that policymakers still consider development in origin countries being able to change migration from the less developed countries to more developed one.

In this context, diaspora engagement policies can be defined as governmental or non-governmental actions focused on emigrants and their descendants capturing and channelling measures aimed to control remittances, develop migrants return programs, launch symbolic and rhetorical appeals toward diaspora, in order to maintain the emigrants loyalty and linkage with the origin country, harmonizing and overseeing the many ways in which states impact on, and are impacted by diasporas. These policies are not only changing the political landscape and institutional architecture of many states, but also reshaping their basic terms of citizenship and sovereignty.

2. European Union diaspora engagement policy: context, evolution and good practices

This chapter starts with a few questions. Is there a diaspora engagement policy in the EU? How efficient is it? What is the diaspora engagement policy focusing on? (e.g. focusing on return migration, on circular return migration, on keeping economic links). What are the prevailing discourses on diaspora engagement? Is it an issue on political agenda? In general, EU diaspora engagement policy is realizing for two main channels: migration fluxes towards EU and migration fluxes of EU citizens. These one are reflected below.

2.1. EU diaspora engagement policy and migration fluxes towards EU

The European Union’s first comprehensive approach to migration and development manifested in a European Commission Communication published in 2005 titled ‘Migration and Development:

Some concrete orientations’. In this communication, diasporas were recognized as being agents of development in their home countries and concrete measures were proposed (EC, 2005): Facilitating remittances and boosting their contribution to countries of origin’s development; Mitigating the adverse effects of brain drain; Benefiting from circular migration and brain circulation; Recognizing diasporas as agents of development in their home countries. It is considered a step forward and appreciated the inclusion of the broader developmental role of diaspora engagement (Hein de Haas, 2006). In this context, it was approved the Policy Plan on Legal Migration and was followed by the adoption of the “Blue Card (Highly Skilled Workers Directive) in June have called for it to be revised” (Godzimirski *et al.*, 2015, p. 11).

CONCORD, the European NGO federation for relief and development, stated in its report on EU Policy Coherence for Development (CONCORD, 2011, p. 57) that “the current restrictive approach to EU migration policy poses additional obstacles, because of its lack of consideration for development implications and human rights requirements”. Another EU Strategy is the Europe 2020 Strategy. One of its key Strategic goals is to reach 75% employment in the EU, something that can only be achieved by “capitalizing on highly skilled labor” (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 17). The external dimension of the migration and asylum policy for 2007 – 2013 is financed through geographical instruments and a thematic program for the cooperation with third countries in the field of migration and asylum. “The main objective is to support non-EU Member States to better manage migratory flows” (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 19).

Concerning the developmental role of diasporas, the EC has funded studies on the potentials of diaspora organizations as partners in development cooperation. Because of the increasing appreciation of contributions by diaspora organizations, the EC is expected to open the budget from non-state actors and local authorities to include diaspora organizations (EC, 2011b). This would be a great step forward. However, in general, diaspora organizations are often excluded from funding. This may be related to the fact that the EU requires a very strict and sophisticated administrative and financial system. Two main obstacles for diaspora organizations are their lack of capacity and the fact that they often do not have the required legal status (Desiderio and Weinar, 2014).

However, the positive aspect is that the EC has apparently recognized that the funding requirements need to be adjusted to the capacities of diaspora organizations. A successful migrants integration into the society of their new country – in terms of non-discrimination, gainful employment, decent living conditions and participation in all spheres of society – is a great advantage to their developmental efforts.

In practical terms, the EU has not yet taken any steps regarding the engagement of diasporas in the elaboration and adaptation of development policies. In the future, however, the European Parliament will review how these policies will be implemented and reflected in cooperation practices, and NGOs engaged in the field will advocate it (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 18).

A more reliable policy, for instance, would be the acceptance of dual citizenship. This is seen as a possible key for migrants to realize their full potential in areas of development, and to use all aspects of transnationality. “Restrictive residency and citizenship laws in countries of destination may limit diaspora participation in programs if prolonged absence means loss of residency rights” (Laczko, 2008, p. 73). EU Member States predominantly allow dual citizenship. “When they do not, the policy has been conceived with regard to naturalized immigrants rather than country-born emigrants and their descendants, as in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands” (Weinar, 2014, p. 15). “A paradigm shift towards a development-focused, migrant-centered and rights-based approach to migration is critical” (Keusch and Schuster, 2012, p. 20-21). “However, we increasingly see that some states from EU and OECD choose yet another form of policy: support for integration in the receiving country, where citizens emigrate to countries of similar economic standing” (Weinar, 2014, p. 5).

Table 1. Overview of existing institutions, laws and strategies addressing emigration in the EU

Existing mechanisms	Countries
New dedicated Law or a Strategy	BG, DE, ES, HR, LT, PL, RO, SI, SK
Emigration in their Migration Policy Strategies	BG, EE, FI, HR, PL, SI
Return migration policies	BG, HR, CZ, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IR, IT, LT, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK
Focus explicitly on the issue of return or the retention of youth	LT, MT, SI, SK

Source: Weinar (2014), p. 11

The short overview of the table above (see Table 1) provides several interesting insights. Nine out of 28 MS have introduced a new dedicated Law (recent or recently amended) or a Strategy (BG, DE, ES, HR, LT, PL, RO, SI, SK) on the topic. Six out of 28 include emigration in their Migration Policy Strategies (BG, EE, FI, HR, PL, SI), linking effects of emigration to possible attenuation through immigration. Eighteen out of 28 propose return migration policies (both of ethnic emigrants and of ethnic minorities) seen as a response to demographic crisis and as an economic asset. Only

four out of 28 Member States focus explicitly on the issue of return or the retention of youth (LT, MT, SI, SK). The mapping of EU responses to emigration on national level reveals three main categories of actions: traditional diaspora building policies; diaspora engagement policies; and active emigration policies (Agunias and Newland, 2012).

The table below (see Table 2) identifies three diaspora support models employed by European development agencies to support development contributions by diaspora organizations: general co-funding schemes for development NGOs, special diaspora initiatives, and support to networks. The three models often co-exist and their activities may overlap. As the table shows, capacity building activities and matching fund schemes are the two most common ways of supporting diaspora organizations.

Table 2. Development aid agencies' support to diaspora organizations (DOs)

Principle	Characteristics	Examples
Mainstreaming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to matching fund schemes on equal terms with other development NGOs - Capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil Society in Development (Danida), 1996- - Oxfam Novib Linkis (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 2004-2011
Special diaspora initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to matching fund schemes for DOs only - Capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Diaspora Programme (Danida), 2010-2015 - Pilot Project Pakistan (NORAD), 2008- 2010
Networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish DO networks and platforms - Facilitate collaboration between DOs - Facilitate collaboration between DOs and other development NGOs - Capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EADPD5 (European Commission (EC) with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Dutch MFA, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)), 2010-2013; (SDC), 2014-2016

Source: Kleist (2014), p. 59

2.2. EU diaspora engagement policy and migration fluxes of EU citizens

There are basically four categories of emigrants from the EU (permanent and temporary) captured in the current statistics of the Member States. The first category are Member State nationals with no immigrant background with a high return rate (especially for the UK, France and Denmark). The second category are EU nationals with an immigrant background, extremely difficult to capture in administrative statistics both at origin and destination (e.g. highly-skilled French-Algerians to Canada). The third group of emigrants is non-EU nationals. They constitute a very high percentage among emigrants from EU. In the case of Austria it is around 70% of the outflow; Denmark, Germany – 80%; Spain, France, and the Netherlands – ca. 65%. The fourth group is EU nationals of national

minorities. This is a very special case of emigrants originating mainly from the EU, those who are actively encouraged to emigrate and those members of minorities, who emigrate for better economic opportunities abroad (Weinar, 2014, p. 9).

The practice analyse shows that traditional diaspora engagement building policies focus on catering for the cultural needs of the communities of the same cultural background abroad, such as language schools, national curricula schools or active cultural programs for diaspora. Only Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg have no government strategy, nor program focusing on emigrants and the cultural/linguistic support for them. There is a difference in approach. Central European Member States maintain embassy schools, as well as curricula for national minorities abroad, e.g. Lithuanian school programs in Poland (Newland and Tanaka, 2011).

The Northern Member States tend to mix cultural diplomacy with diaspora outreach: the prime example is the network of French or British schools abroad offering full curricula. Germany is the most active state in this field, offering over 870 language and cultural programs in local schools abroad. A separate category of catering for diaspora needs are policies focusing on vulnerable emigrants. Such policies had been the centre of Spanish and Portuguese diaspora policies up until the crisis. They addressed the needs of pensioners and emigrants in extreme poverty. Italy also runs a program for its retired diaspora abroad that boils down to giving information on possibilities of getting the Italian pension rights and of a return to Italy for old age (Weinar, 2014).

Following the new trends in diaspora policies world-wide for countries with a strong global entrepreneurial outreach, like the UK and the Netherlands, the issue of emigration of human capital has risen higher on the political agenda in the last ten years. The UK is the top EU sending country to non-EU destinations and the Netherlands is also among the top ten sending EU states. This has to do with the economic engagement of British and Dutch companies in many countries around the world, but is also a question of specific categories of migrants: Dutch agrarian entrepreneurs tend to emigrate to places where they can invest in agricultural production, hence a growing Dutch community in Australia. In 2006, the UK authorities launched a research program “The Global Brit” (Finch *et al.*, 2010) in order to analyse the phenomenon of British emigration flows, focusing on the potential of emigration for strengthening British economic clout abroad. The two views reflected the actual ideology around emigration: as the result of the imperial experience, the British traditionally see emigration as part and parcel of building global economic and political power (Van Hear, 2004).

France is an interesting case of a country which does not acknowledge emigration. The links between France and its citizens abroad is stable and the distance only temporary. France is a very good example of active diaspora engagement policy entrepreneur. French institutions actively link

with French entrepreneurs abroad and French communities are well organized around a dense network of French schools and Institutes of Culture. As the French do not emigrate but are merely mobile, State policies provide this category of people with special social security services and special bank services. The France-Quebec Memorandum of Understanding on Recognition of Professional Qualifications of 2008 covers almost 100 professions, trades and functions and makes it almost automatically possible for France-educated workers to practice their occupational skills in Quebec (Keusch and Schuster, 2012).

The traditional emigration countries of the European Union have different approaches to diaspora engagement: countries that experienced increased emigration flows following the EU accession, like Poland and the Baltic States, and countries that experienced more intense emigration after the euro-zone crisis, like Portugal and Ireland. In Poland, the strategy towards emigration was based on renegotiating tax and portability of social rights agreements with the main countries of destination. There is no active return policy, because of legal constraints: the Polish Constitution does not allow a different set of socio-economic or political rights to citizens regardless of their place of residence. (Godzimirski *et al.*, 2015)

The Baltic States, on the contrary, presented ambitious strategies that focus on diaspora engagement. Ireland has been to the date the only one that has actually tried to engage the diaspora. Already between 2000 and 2002, Ireland ran the “Jobs Ireland Program”, informing Irish emigrants and their descendants of the employment opportunities in Ireland. This led to the establishment of the Global Irish Economic Forum in 2009. One of the proposals that came from the Forum was the establishment of a ‘Global Irish Network’, which today comprises over 350 of the most senior Irish and Irish connected business people based in almost 40 countries and the creation of the “Gathering”, by attracting people from the Irish diaspora to visit the country during 2013 (Weinar, 2014).

3. Challenges for the European diaspora engagement policy in the context of changing realities

The academic Milton J. Esman (Esman, 2009) listed nine diaspora related issues that may cause tensions in relations between the sending and receiving countries, as follow: Maintenance of transnational existence by some members of diaspora groups; Diasporas’ attempts to influence policies in their countries of origin; Diasporas’ attempts to influence their new host countries’ policies, or policies of international organizations to act in favour or in opposition to the interests of the current government of their home countries; Home governments’ attempts to use their diasporas to support their strategic or economic goals; Diasporas may seek protection from their home

governments; A host government may call on a resident diaspora to support its strategic or economic goals; Diasporas may contribute to the development of their former homeland; The home government may request the host government to restrain hostile actions by members of the diaspora; Diasporas may be involved in various transnational illegal activities, such as terrorism or organized crime.

A recently published study on the “global race for talent” (Münz, 2014) discussed challenges related to European policy on labour migration, concluding that the EU has to implement policies that will help to organise political majorities in support of more proactive migration policy that will make Europe more attractive for mobile people with talent and skills, and help the Union to move away from unilateral migration policies and towards negotiated win-win solutions. The ongoing debate on migration, fuelled by the crisis in the south and the need to address intra-EU tensions, resulted in various proposals on how the new European Commission should address the issue of migration and diaspora engagement.

An important issue discussed was the question of border management and the EU’s ability to cope with growing numbers of legal and illegal migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the question of intra-EU burden sharing. (Collett, 2015) The EU should take some practical steps for solving controversial issues, such as welfare tourism and access to those social benefits granted on a non-discriminatory basis to citizens of the Member State and to long-term residents, and not to short-term visitors even if they come from within the EU. The Commission and Member States should also adopt a more flexible approach to labour migrants from third countries in order to fill the existing and future gaps on their labour markets.

On 23 April 2015 the European Council asked Member States to take action to save lives and to step up EU activity in the field of migration. On 13 May 2015, the European Commission presented its European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015) which sets out a comprehensive policy that will improve the management of migration and diaspora engagement. It was published a set of documents by the European Commission on 13 May 2015. These one represent an immediate response to the situation developing in the South.

In this context European Agenda on Migration emphasized the measures to be taken in the short term, and the good steps for EU to better manage migration and diaspora engagement policy. As response, the EU had to focus on saving lives responding to high volumes of arrivals through a policy of relocation within the EU, targeting criminal networks, adopting a common approach to protection for misplaced persons. The close cooperation with third countries became necessary to tackle migration flow, and finally using various EU tools in order to help frontline Member States—such as Italy and Hungary—to deal with this migratory challenge.

If those immediate actions are to help the EU cope with the current situation, the adoption of four new pillars of migration policy may have greater impact on the future of migration to the EU. Those four pillars were to reduce the incentives for irregular migration, to improve border management in order to save lives and secure borders, to work towards a strong common asylum policy through a full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System, and to develop a new policy on legal migration that would help the EU deal with its demographic decline and labour shortages while “maximizing the benefits of migration policy to individuals and countries of origin, including the facilitation of cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers” (Godzimirski, *et. al.*, 2015, p. 13-14).

The current focus on European ‘foreign fighters’ who have joined the so-called Islamic State in Syria has spotlighted the malaise and disaffection felt by many young Europeans of foreign descent. Government and business recruitment policies are being gradually changed to increase the employment of migrants. For their part, migrant groups are becoming significantly more active in demanding equal rights as fully fledged citizens, organizing themselves into pressure groups and emerging as influential politicians, entrepreneurs and cultural icons. Developing a new ‘European immigration story’ requires the joint efforts of politicians and policymakers, scholars as well as thought and religious leaders, civil society organizations, business representatives and the media (Pasikowska-Schnass, 2017).

Europeans are not ready to accept more international migrants. As result, appeared restrictive political agendas mostly driven by the fact that the current debate on migration in Europe seems to be completely dominated by the discussion on how to confront with great numbers of forced migrants who try to reach Europe from various conflict zones, and with an even greater number of economic migrants who are attracted by the promise of a better life and choose to risk their lives and challenge the existing EU migration regime to reach their destinations. Because of many migrants that use various legal and not so legal channels to reach Europe, the situation in the Mediterranean is a good example of how those flows suggests the need for a common EU migration policy and challenge the EU’s cohesion, solidarity and even its security policy.

Some Member States, such as France, Sweden, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, have to cope with existing social and migratory tensions caused by the huge inflow of migrants in previous decades, and by apparent problems with the integration of some migrant communities showing signs of radicalization. Other Member States, especially those receiving great numbers of both external migrants and mobile EU citizens, suggest that the whole policy field has to be reformed by the EU and want, like the UK, to change the agreed rules of the intra and extra-EU migratory game. Other

Member States face challenges caused by the outflow of migrants moving to other parts of Europe, and have to devise and implement migration policies that will help them address their specific problems, such as the question of return migration or the need to fill the demographic gap caused by migration and deal with negative demographic trends, which is, for instance, the case of Poland.

The ongoing debate and tensions between Member States and the EU, caused by plans for the resettlement of Syrian refugees and the relocation of refugees reaching southern part of Europe, is a very good illustration of how various EU Member States deal with the issue and oppose the “EU as a whole” approach to solving acute migration-related problems. The tensions growing between Member States, sending tens of thousands of mobile EU citizens, and those receiving them, illustrates how the questions of mobility and intra-EU free movement have become contentious issues, putting the need to reform the whole field high on the political agenda (Godzimirski, *et. al.*, 2015, p. 12).

Most countries’ diaspora policies are concerned not only with the negative effects of emigration, but focus on opportunities and relations between the diaspora and economic development. An example is Poland and its need to improve cooperation with the Polish diaspora in Ukraine and the East, and with new and old Polish diasporas in the West. Since 2012, cooperation with Poland has been administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Annual funding is given to projects on cooperation with Poland and mobile Poles, and funding has been allocated according to thematic priorities set by the Polish authorities in dialogue with representatives of various diaspora groups. The main task identified in the strategy is to help new migrants maintain strong ties with Poland and to make their return more likely if Poland undertakes positive economic and social changes, or exploits the worsening economic and social situation in countries hosting new Polish diasporas (Mayer, 2015).

Over the last five years, diaspora-related questions have topped the Norwegian policy agenda. The terrorist attack on 22 July 2011 was driven mostly by hatred of migrants and of the migration policy conducted by the previous government and the Labor Party, whose young elite was targeted. The so-called Norwegian Syria warriors, young people going to Syria to join the Islamic State, have put the role of ethnic and religious diasporas in Norway on the country’s security agenda, as witnessed by the newly-released risk assessments presented by Police Security Service (PST). This document defines the growth of religious fundamentalism in diaspora groups in Norway and elsewhere as one of the key security challenges. The ongoing discussion on the wisdom of allowing 8,000 Syrian refugees to settle in Norway over the next three years is related to the diaspora question, as their potential arrival is presented as posing not only an economic challenge, but also a security and societal one (Godzimirski, *et. al.*, 2015).

In the multi-faceted challenge of integrating new arrivals, cultural aspects are also part of the solution. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), over a million persons have arrived in Europe since January 2015, many of them fleeing conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Their integration into host societies may pose difficulties due to the scale of the phenomenon. It depends also on the level of preparedness of local communities for the process. According to Article 79(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), integration policy is primarily a national competence. Recommended actions in this area, are shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue and education about immigrant cultures, which enhance interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens and promote mutual understanding. (Pasikowska-Schnass, 2017).

The Europe for Citizens program also offers funding for cultural integration projects involving both migrant and host populations, such as the City Ghettos of Today project for countering the stigmatization of migrants. The Creative Europe program has allocated €2.5 million for 12 projects on refugee cultural integration starting in September 2016. Theatre, music and storytelling productions running for a maximum 24 months will allow refugees to express themselves, EU citizens and refugees to get to know their respective cultures, and co-create. Available EU, national or private funding is listed on the European Commission's website.

Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund provides support for Member States' action: over the 2014-2020 period, €385 million of its €3.1 billion budget is assigned to funding grants and other direct actions. The fund will provide €9.5 million in 2017 for integration of third-country nationals projects, including for their participation in cultural life. (Pasikowska-Schnass, 2017, p.2).

The Manual of artistic tools for migrants 'Art of adaptation', published in 2012, (Kondoylanni, 2012) resulted from the Ariadne project, supported by the EU's Lifelong Learning program researched the role of art in the adaptation process, analysed positive impacts of art and creative activities on the ability to adapt, to change, and as a therapeutic tool to address trauma in one's personal development. This approach mirrors the needs of refugees who flee war zones and whose cultural identity has been undermined. In June 2016, the Commission held a structured dialogue with organizations working at local level in the area of culture, on the role of culture in promoting the inclusion of refugees and migrants.

The report underlines establishing a new EU funding program in rural and remote areas, especially for local authorities, and to create 'spaces of welcome' for refugees. Such safe spaces

projects engage local and refugee communities, promoting identity issues and inclusion. The EU will help build bridges between people and strengthen democracy by supporting art and culture projects involving the whole community of citizens and migrants. It stresses the need for a more developed cultural strategy to an open and equal dialogue between arrivals and their host countries, so that both communities share the goal of cultural and social integration.

4. Discussions on the main hypotheses and findings

Changing realities became one of the main challenges facing national and international actors and leads to a reassessment of concepts and action plans. Rethinking diaspora concept revealed the importance of diaspora engagement policy which may take various institutional forms being managed at different governmental levels. The study emphasized that some new trends in diaspora policies world-wide are attributed to the vulnerable groups of emigrants' emergence. This fact should determine EU member states to focus more on outflows of human capital and on engaging them in development strategies. So, separate categories of catering for diaspora needs are policies focusing on vulnerable emigrants. Their integration into host societies may pose difficulties due to the scale of the phenomenon. Such policies address to the needs of pensioners and emigrants in extreme poverty.

In the same time, the traditional emigration countries of the European Union have different approaches to diaspora engagement, determined by two mechanisms: diaspora building and binding emigrants to the home country with the net of rights and obligations. Following the new trends in diaspora policies world-wide, diaspora engagement policy entrepreneur is practiced into the high developed countries through some professional agreements. Also, it is determined by their big companies engagement for investments, building an economic and political power. Some member states tend to mix cultural diplomacy with diaspora outreach, language and cultural programs in local schools abroad. For others it is based on renegotiating tax and portability of social rights agreements with the main countries of destination. Here there is no active return policy, because of legal constraints. An important instrument is informing emigrants and their descendants of the employment opportunities, establishing networks, in order to attract people from the diaspora to visit the country.

The focus is on catering for the cultural needs of the communities of the same cultural background abroad, such as language schools, national curricula schools or active cultural programs for diaspora. The aim is to held a structured dialogue with organizations working at local level in the area of culture, on the role of culture in promoting the inclusion of refugees and migrants. Safe spaces projects may engage local and refugee communities, promoting identity issues and inclusion. a more

developed cultural strategy to an open and equal dialogue between arrivals and their host countries in order to share the goal of cultural and social integration. Also the cooperation with third countries in the field of migration and asylum may reveal the main EU objective to support its non-member states to better manage migratory flows.

The challenges imposed by changing realities are: establishing a new EU funding program in rural and remote areas, especially for local authorities; maintaining the legal status of diaspora organisations; the acceptance of dual citizenship; refugees' integration into the member-states societies; the EU has to implement policies that will help to organise political majorities in support of more proactive migration policy that will make Europe more attractive for mobile people with talent and skills, and help the Union to move away from unilateral migration policies and towards negotiated win-win solutions; saving lives responding to high volumes of arrivals through a policy of relocation within the EU, targeting criminal networks, adopting a common approach to protection for misplaced persons; the close cooperation with third countries.

Development cooperation equally involving diasporas, governmental and non-governmental development organizations have the potential to address the global social inequality made visible through migration flows. As a result, migrants and the communities they come from should be actively involved in defining the development of their countries of origin (Castles, 2008). This implies that it is crucial to adopt a broad concept of development in which the wellbeing of a populace is critical. In addition, experiences made by organizations that have existed over several decades are invaluable resources for the development of new initiatives and activities and should be taken into account.

Conclusions

“The message of a new dialogue on diaspora engagement into changing realities should be clear: integration is a two-way street, requiring adjustment efforts by migrants and host societies” (Mayer *et al.*, 2015, p. 6). Migration governance should thus work in a continuum of various forms of mobility and should be redefined. The individual EU Member States have very well-grounded strategies and policies towards emigration. From the almost anti-emigration stance of Denmark and the Netherlands, to active and nurturing policies of Ireland, France and Germany. Following division between diaspora policies (focusing on relating ties and supporting performance of individuals and communities) and emigration policies (regulating mobility), we can see that basically all Member

States are active in these areas. “However, there is no EU community of practice that has emerged around the emigration issue (as opposed to the immigration issue)” (Weinar, 2014, p. 16).

The first step for a fruitful cooperation is the recognition and appreciation of the developmental activities of diaspora organizations. Therefore, it is essential to realize the current existing initiatives of migrants and diaspora. Established governmental and non-governmental development organizations should adapt their approaches and structures in order to meet the needs and capacities of diaspora organizations. They should be mobilized to engage with diaspora in development cooperation and to learn from field experiences. Projects and programs should be offered by linking into existing diaspora-led initiatives. Also, diaspora organizations should be encouraged to initiate cooperation with development organizations and governmental actors.

The treatment of diaspora organisations as non-professional development players has led to mistrust among diaspora organisations and consequently to a lack of interest in cooperating with established governmental or non-governmental development actors. Patronising diaspora organisations does not foster cooperation (de Haas, 2006). Furthermore, migrants should not be made responsible for the development of their countries of origin. In other words, the engagement of diasporas should never be a substitute for public intervention nor become a matter of course.

We could expect that the EU Member States should have taken a deeper look at the outflows of human capital and that they might focus on engaging emigrants in development strategies. Diasporas engage in different fields of interest and in manifold ways. These range from philanthropy, development and humanitarian assistance, political debates and civil society engagement, know-how transfer, trade and tourism, remittances, investments and business creation. Consequently, the various ways of promoting these contributions span many different policy areas.

At last, there are four areas which are important for any kind of project or activity on diaspora engagement for development. The first and second areas getting to know the diaspora and supporting states in developing tailored diaspora engagement policies and approaches form the foundation for successful diaspora engagement policies by creating the evidence-base, and the political and institutional framework. In the third and fourth areas, empowering the diaspora and creating spaces for government-diaspora interaction, we share our experiences of working directly with the main stakeholder, the diaspora.

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