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Modeling Firm Dynamics to Identify the Cost of Financing Constraints in Ghanaian Manufacturing*

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Preliminary

Abstract

Economic development requires the growth of productive firms. However, financing constraints may limit firms' investment abilities. This paper estimates the cost of financing constraints to firms, for example in terms of idle investment opportunities, and their aggregate implications. To this end, I develop and estimate a dynamic model of firm-level investment. The model allows me to deal with the main identification problem faced by work that studies financing constraints, namely to identify the investment opportunities and the constraints of a firm separately. The model also allows for other potential explanations of the observed phenomenon, in particular adjustment costs and uncertainty. I solve the model using dynamic programming methods and estimate it via simulation methods, using firm level data from Ghana. Counterfactual analyses are then carried out to quantify the importance of financing constraints. These counterfactuals indicate that removing the constraints would imply economically significant increases in investment that are associated with higher levels of consumption.

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1 Introduction

Economic development requires the growth of productive firms. Theoretical considerations and existing empirical evidence however point to the existence of financing constraints that limit firms' investment abilities. Despite the potentially large welfare implications, very little is known about the cost of financing constraints to individual firms or about their aggregate implications. This motivates the research questions that are at the core of this paper: what is the cost of financing constraints to firms, and what are the aggregate implications? I define as financially constrained a firm for which external funding is not a perfect substitute for internal finance.¹ The paper quantifies the effect that removing all constraints would have for individual firms. Thus, the paper quantifies the upper bound of the effect of potential policies that attempt to close the wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. Since growth is a main goal of economic policy, the results of this work have immediate policy relevance. Further, given the multitude of activities and the amount of money spent on support for enterprise development in developing economies - especially to enhance firms' ability to borrow in order to finance investment - the question is particularly relevant for, but not confined to, developing economies.

I study the behavior of manufacturing firms in Ghana. In a related paper (Schündeln 2004) I present an apparent puzzle: Using firm level panel data I demonstrate that, on average, the marginal returns to capital in Ghanaian manufacturing are high during the period 1991-1999. However, investment rates are low, and there is only little evidence for a correlation between investment rates and returns to capital, especially for the group of firms with the largest returns. One of the main hypotheses put forward in the literature to explain low investment despite high returns to capital are financing constraints (e.g. Bigsten et al. 2000 for other African economies; Tybout 2000; at the macro level, Lucas, 1990, discusses capital market imperfections). In Schündeln (2004) I give evidence for the existence of these constraints in Ghanaian manufacturing. I show direct evidence from the survey for the existence of financing constraints, as well as econometric evidence

¹This wedge between internal and external funding is caused by capital market imperfections, as for example informational asymmetries. This definition follows the definition of financing constraints in Fazzari et al. (1988, e.g. p. 142). Note that, according to this definition, it is likely that all firms are constrained, for example if transaction costs matter (Kaplan and Zingales 1997). In that case the question is therefore not: which firm is constrained? but: to what extent is a firm constrained?

that uses a version of a standard test for financing constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988).

While several other papers have shown that financing constraints matter for manufacturing firms both in developed and developing economies, the effects of these constraints for firm dynamics have, to the best of my knowledge, not been estimated. The central goal of this paper is therefore to quantify the effects of financing constraints along several dimensions, in order to help better understand the importance of financing constraints. To this end I develop and estimate in the main part of the paper a structural dynamic model that allows me to study firms' investment, growth, volatility, and exit in the presence of financing constraints. I explicitly model the firms' real activities, i.e. the production process and investment decisions, together with the financial side, i.e. the decisions of how to use profits (keep them to build up internal funds vs. dividend payments) and how to finance investment (internal vs. external funds). I further model the latent interest rate that the firms of different types face, where heterogeneity across types is both observed and unobserved. The model also allows for other potential explanations of the observed phenomena, in particular adjustment costs and uncertainty. Finally, the model incorporates the possibility of exit of firms.

By modeling and estimating the dynamic optimization problem of the firm that simultaneously includes both the real side and the financial side of the firms' activities, I can deal with the main identification problem faced by tests for and quantifications of financing constraints, namely to identify the investment opportunities and the constraints of a firm separately (e.g. Hubbard 1998). The identification of the production function and unobserved productivity relies on the assumption that capital is predetermined and labor is chosen as the solution to a static optimization problem. Evidence from the survey is presented to support this assumption. Given an estimate of the production function, the investment opportunities can be determined as the solution to a dynamic optimization problem. These can be used to identify the constraints that a firm faces. Intuitively, the separate identification of constraints that are common to all firms, e.g. adjustment costs, vs. financing constraints, that only apply to firms with low levels of internal funds, is achieved by the fact that some firms are able to invest optimally out of internal funds, while others are not.

The model is solved using dynamic programming methods and is estimated via simulation meth-

ods using the firm level panel data from Ghana. The estimation results indicate that the per-unit cost of credit decreases in the capital stock of a firm and increases in the amount that a firm borrows. These results are consistent with conventional models of imperfect credit markets. Counterfactual analyses are then carried out to answer the main research question, i.e. to quantify the importance of financing constraints. These counterfactuals indicate that removing the constraints would imply economically significant increases in investment that are associated with higher levels of consumption.

The results of the estimation are of interest for several reasons. The different potential explanations for low investment have important implications for individual firm dynamics, industry structure, as well as for policy at the macro level. Distinguishing between them and quantifying the relative importance of them is therefore important. For policy reasons, it is important to understand the determinants of financing constraints and quantify their extent and potential effects more fully. Policy implications are very different depending on the determinants of access to credit that turn out to be important. For example, if current size matters, firm growth and in particular entry will be difficult. Further, if productivity is at least partly observable and matters in the credit allocation process, then capital will be allocated more efficiently than it would be, if for example current cash flow matters most in the allocation process. In the latter case, permanent effects of transitory shocks can be expected (Banerjee and Duflo 2002). In an extreme case, when the constraint is proportional to some measure of net worth, Banerjee (2001) shows that there can be a poverty trap. For example, it is possible that small firms never reach their efficient size. This translates into industry structure and dynamics, e.g. firm size distribution, average productivity levels and growth.

Finally, support for small and medium sized enterprises is one of the primary focuses of development agencies. For example, lending to micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by the World Bank Group was approximately \$2.8 billion in 2001 (IFC, 2002).² Among the questions then are: how is this money best spent, what is the potential impact of improving credit availability to firms, and which types of firms should be targeted? At the macro level, the effects of tax and interest

²And lending to SMEs is increasing: it increased by 65% since 1997, when total lending was \$1.7 billion (IFC, 2002).

rate policies, which may be smaller than is generally thought if adjustment costs or uncertainty are the main causes of low investment, could be explored with the estimates of the model.

The following section relates this paper to earlier work. The third section presents some background on the Ghanaian economy and the data. In the fourth section a dynamic model of firm-level investment is developed. In the fifth section the solution, identification, and estimation of the model are discussed. Estimation results as well as the implied costs of financing constraints and other implications of these constraints are presented in the sixth section. The seventh section concludes.

2 Related work

Understanding investment and the role played by financing constraints is a central problem in economics and an area of active research with contributions coming from various subfields including industrial organization, macroeconomics, financial economics, and development economics. This paper is therefore related to several strands of the economics literature. To begin, there is now a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, about the existence of financing constraints in both developing and developed countries. The main problems leading to constraints that are identified in the theoretical literature can be split up into two groups: asymmetric information and enforcement problems. However, since I do not test one particular model of why firms might be financially constrained in the first place, I do not attempt to summarize the large literature about the informational problems that give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard that are often the basis of theoretical models of financing constraints (for a recent survey see for example Banerjee 2001). In development economics most of the empirical work is concerned with credit for households' consumption smoothing desire and for farm households' production processes (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). In particular, little is known about the importance of financing constraints and the role different sources of credit play for enterprises other than in the agricultural sector at the household level.³

The classic work in the empirical literature that tests for financing constraints at the firm level

³For a survey on credit for household consumption smoothing see for example Besley (1995). Household enterprises are surveyed for example by Vijverberg and Mead (2000). Liedholm and Mead (1999) survey the literature on the dynamics of micro and small enterprises without focussing on credit constraints. Townsend and Paulson (2001) are primarily concerned with the role of financing constraints in the start-up of a firm.

is the work by Fazzari et al. (1988). A second standard approach to test for financial constraints is based on estimating Euler equations (Bond and Meghir 1994). This body of empirical work proceeds by estimating a standard investment equation or accelerator models (for other examples see Schiantarelli 1996, Gelos and Werner 2002). The question in this literature is: does adding cash flow (as a proxy for the change in internal net worth) to standard investment equations, that include Q as a measure of investment opportunities, help explain capital expenditure for certain types of firms? With perfect credit markets, the financial structure of a firm is irrelevant to its real decisions (Modigliani and Miller 1958). However, if for example informational asymmetries or contract enforcement problems matter, then external funds will be more costly than internal funds and cash flow appears significantly in the regressions. One difficulty is that cash flow may be correlated with investment for other reasons, for example it may predict future profitability (e.g. Schiantarelli 1996). To deal with that possibility, Fazzari et al. (1988) propose to split the sample into firms that are likely to be more constrained and firms that are likely to be less constrained. Note also that it may be difficult to obtain measures of average Q, in particular in the context of developing countries, since the market value is not observed. Also, average Q might be a poor proxy for marginal Q, which is usually unobserved.⁴ For detailed surveys see for example Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli (1996). An alternative to the above approach is to estimate Euler equations, e.g. Bond and Meghir (1994). The question is again whether investment is sensitive to cash flow. However, the properties of Euler equations make them difficult to use in the present context.⁵ The findings using the above methodologies usually suggest that most types of firms face significant financial constraints (see Schiantarelli, 1996, for a more detailed overview).⁶

⁴See also the debate about whether the Fazzari et al. (1988) method is valid in Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari et al. (2000). Cooper and Ejarque (2001) demonstrate that in standard "Q-regressions" the coefficient on cash flow can be positive, although there are no capital market imperfections, if firms have market power as sellers.

⁵First, estimates of Euler equations have poor quality with small samples and/or short panels as those that are available for African countries. Second, the parameters are not identified if the constraints are approximately constant over time (Zeldes 1989), which is especially likely for short panels. Third, when the firm is at a debt ceiling, the Euler equation is misspecified. Both approaches also rely on sample splits, which poses the problem of potentially endogenous split-criteria. Most important in the context of African manufacturing may be that both models are misspecified when there are fixed cost of adjustment or irreversibility of investment (Schiantarelli 1996).

⁶There is also a body of work that uses firm level and industry level data and makes use of cross-country differences in the development of financial markets which also finds evidence for financing constraints, e.g. Bond et al. (1997), Love (2001), Fisman and Love (2003).

A second group of this literature looks at direct evidence for constraints. Bigsten et al. (2000) estimate the determinants of demand for external formal funds (i.e. bank loans) explicitly using a selection model. They use direct survey questions regarding the reasons why firms do not apply for credit. They find that for their sample of African manufacturing firms small firms and unproductive firms are the most likely to be constrained. This approach however relies on strong assumptions about what kind of reason for not applying for a loan is a sign of credit demand. For example it is not obvious whether a firm that does not apply for a bank loan because the "interest rate is too high" is constrained or simply unproductive relative to the prevailing market interest rate. A further drawback is that informal credit is very important in the Ghanaian data used in this paper, but is not an alternative in the test by Bigsten et al. (2000).

Another direct approach is taken by Banerjee and Duflo (2002). They investigate the 'nature of credit constraints' by looking at the credit allocation rules of a particular (state owned) Indian bank. They exploit a change in government policy to investigate whether firms would like to obtain more credit at the going interest rate than they can actually obtain. They find that an increase in working capital leads to a more than proportional increase in profits and conclude that firms are credit constrained and that as a consequence there are significant productivity losses.

Standard models of firm dynamics are due to Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). In Jovanovic (1982), heterogeneous firms learn over time about their productivity and either expand or exit. In Hopenhayn (1992) firms experience persistent shocks to technology. He studies the properties of the stationary equilibrium, and the effect of changes in sunk entry costs or fixed costs per period on size distribution and turnover rates. Ericson and Pakes (1995) study investments in new processes with uncertainty in the outcome. Very recently there have been two theoretical papers that combine aspects of the above mentioned dynamic investment literature with the literature on financing constraints. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) introduce financial frictions in a model of firm behavior to explain why growth, job creation/destruction, and exit are negatively related to size (age) of firms, conditional on age (size). Financial frictions are introduced via a cost per unit of new equity through shares and borrowing that is costly (above the risk-free interest rate) due to the cost of default. Gomes (2001) introduces financial frictions into a general equilibrium

model to show that results from standard investment regressions are questionable, due in part to the measurement error in marginal Q when it is approximated by average Q . In his paper financial frictions are modelled as a fixed cost of borrowing plus a per unit cost of new equity. Both papers study theoretical models that are calibrated to US data.

Summarizing, there exists now a considerable amount of empirical evidence for financing constraints. However, to identify financing constraints separately from other constraints is challenging (e.g. Hubbard 1998, Banerjee and Duffo 2002) and the cost of financing constraints to firms have, to the best of my knowledge, not yet been estimated from a representative survey. Therefore, this paper goes beyond the question whether financing constraints exist. Instead, I study how much of the observed dynamic firm behavior is explained by financing constraints. My objective is to quantify the cost of these constraints. Further, I provide estimates for the relative importance of firm characteristics, e.g. the capital stock, that determine these constraints.

3 Background on Ghanaian manufacturing and the financial sector and data

3.1 Background

Ghana, located in West Africa, has a population of about 18 million, with about two thirds of the population living in rural areas. The period under consideration was a period of moderate growth rates for Ghana. Real GDP growth in Ghana oscillated between 5.3% (1991) and 3.3% (1994), averaging 4.3% over the period 1991-1997 (IFS).⁷ Manufacturing during this period grew faster than total GDP, with total manufacturing growth of 7.2% on average (UN, statistical yearbook). The share of the manufacturing sector (in % of total value added) is about 10.1% on average over the years 1991-1997. Thus, manufacturing is the second largest sector (UN, statistical yearbook). The largest sector is agriculture/hunting/forestry/fishing with 42.5% over that time period.

Following the classification in Steel and Andah (2003), the financial sector in Ghana can be split into three categories: First, formal financial institutions, which are incorporated and licenced by the Bank of Ghana under a Banking Law of 1989. Second, semi-formal institutions, which are

⁷Some of the macro data is not yet available consistently for all years.

formally registered, but not licensed by the Bank of Ghana. Non-Governmental Organizations and Credit Unions fall in this category. While formal financial institutions target mostly urban middle income and high net worth clients, the focus of semi-formal institutions is on smaller sized loans. Finally, the informal financial system, which includes moneylenders, as well as savings collectors, rotating savings and credit associations, and other savings collection activities known as “susu”. Informal finance can also take the form of trade credit or loans from relatives or friends.

Financial sector liberalization was pursued since 1983 in Ghana as part of Ghana’s Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP was launched in 1983 assisted by the IMF and the World Bank, with the objective of carrying out a structural reform of the economy. The financial sector adjustment program (FINSAP), since 1988, aimed initially at the restructuring of financially distressed banks, with the government taking over bad loans, and the reduction of state shareholdings in Ghanaian banks. FINSAP further addressed policies of direct controls over interest rates, which were phased out gradually, and the allocation of credit (Aryeetey et al. 1994). Competition in the financial sector increased after liberalization, since several new commercial banks entered, and by 1994 thirteen commercial, savings, development and merchant banks existed. At the same time 124 unit rural banks served mainly demand for financing at a smaller scale. The Ghana Stock Exchange commenced operations in 1990 with eleven listed companies. The stock exchange still operates on a relatively small level and by the end of the sample period, in 1997, only 21 companies were listed.

Despite the liberalization of the financial sector, a comprehensive study of both the supply and the demand side for small and medium enterprise (SME) credit concludes that liberalization and a specific SME credit program have “not been sufficient to generate substantially more lending to SMEs” (Aryeetey et al. 1994, p. 35).⁸

⁸For further in-depth surveys of issues affecting the Ghanaian economy and more detailed information, see for example Baah-Nuakoh (2003) and ISSER (2003). Aryeetey (1996) contains a nice set of papers that provide comprehensive information about the availability of credit to small and medium enterprises in West Africa, with the majority of papers covering Ghana, and papers that study potential ways to enhance the availability of formal and informal finance.

3.2 Data

One reason for the focus on household enterprises in most of the development economics literature certainly is that good data about non-farm, non-household enterprises in developing countries was rare until recently. Panel surveys of manufacturing firms are now available for a small set of African countries. They have been collected within the framework of the Regional Program on Enterprise Development in Africa (RPED) by the World Bank in cooperation with other institutions like the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, which is carrying out the data collection for Ghana, over the last decade. These surveys with a panel component and detailed data on production processes as well as the financial situation of the firms will help to shed some more light on the importance of financing constraints for enterprises.

I use panel data from the Ghanaian Manufacturing Enterprise Surveys that cover the years 1991 - 1997. Each survey round covers roughly 200 representative firms. The data constitutes an unbalanced panel, and firms exiting the survey were replaced. The survey covers manufacturing firms of all sizes (i.e. including self-employed without employees) and covers four sectors: (1) food processing, (2) textiles and garments, (3) wood products and furniture, and (4) metal products and machinery. The survey covers the following four urban centers: Accra and Tema, Kumasi, Takoradi, and Cape Coast, with more than 50% of firms being located in Accra and Tema. For details on the surveys see Teal (2002).

The capital measure is the replacement value of the stock of plant and equipment. Throughout this paper the value of land and buildings is not included in the capital measures. The capital stock measure is imputed, as described in Teal (2002), with a procedure that has similarities to the commonly used perpetual inventory method (e.g. Bond et al. 2003) which starts from an initial capital stock and obtains subsequent values of capital using accounts data on investment and disposals.⁹

⁹Differing from the perpetual inventory method, Teal (2002) assumes that the most recent capital data is the most reliable data. The procedure therefore involves working backwards from the most recent capital data using the annual information about investment in plant and equipment, where investment is assumed to be productive with a one period lag, i.e. investment today enters next period's capital stock. Teal assumes for this purpose without further discussion a depreciation rate of 2% (Teal 2002, Appendix A, p. 22). I complement this procedure and introduce a depreciation rate of 10%, which is roughly between two different estimates of depreciation that I obtain from the raw data. For further details on how I estimate depreciation see Schündeln (2005).

I focus on small and medium sized firms. More specifically, I use only data from firms that fell in the category of firms with less than 30 employees in the first survey round in which they were interviewed. I also exclude state owned firms and firms with foreign ownership. This is done for two reasons: First, and foremost, in the empirical work below, I cannot capture all relevant correlates of financing constraints. State owned firms and firms with foreign ownership presumably have potentially different sources of financing than purely privately and locally owned firms. Harrison and McMillan (2003), for example, provide evidence that domestic firms in Côte d'Ivoire are more credit constrained than foreign firms. Further, the production process will most likely vary with the firm size and other firm characteristics above the extent that I can capture with my model. Therefore, it is imperative to focus on a relatively homogeneous group of firms, which is why I only study micro and small firms.¹⁰ Finally, the sample is stratified by firm size and, judging from information presented in the manufacturing census 1987 (Republic of Ghana, Statistical Service 1989), large firms appear to be oversampled and 30 employees is a cutoff used for stratification. In addition to the reduction in the sample size due to these restrictions, the sample size is further reduced since I require (one period) lagged values. The final sample consists of 507 firm-year observations.

All the data has been deflated to 1991 Ghanaian Cedis, using firm-level deflators.¹¹ Finally, it should be noted in particular that the data only contain information about levels of debt, not about positive financial assets. In this chapter debt is measured as total debt including informal borrowing and overdraft, but excluding trade credit. Trade credit is excluded since there is evidence in the survey that trade credit is not an important source of financing for fixed investment (see table 11 in the appendix). See table 1 for summary statistics of the variables used in this chapter to estimate the dynamic model of firm-level investment.

¹⁰Alternatively, one could account for heterogeneity by letting key parameters vary by firm size (or type of ownership), instead of estimating separate models for different firm sizes (or types of ownership).

¹¹Deflators are provided by the survey team (for details see Teal 2002). Inflation during the period 1991-1997 was 30% per year on average. While all data has been deflated, this raises the possibility that some measurement error in variables cannot be avoided. Further, it may be difficult for firms to forecast inflation, which would introduce an additional layer of uncertainty on the decisions of the firms. However, although inflation fluctuates considerably and does not show a clear trend, it does not go below 10% and above 59%, and from direct survey responses (in which inflation does not appear to be a main problem - for more on this see Schündeln 2004) and informal observations inflation appears to be something that Ghanaian entrepreneurs have learned to adjust to.

Summary statistics					
	mean	std.dev.	min	max	N
employment	13.87	11.38	1	88	507
capital	25.23	75.37	0.013	638.1	507
output	24.32	52.35	0.098	827.8	507
value added	9.07	23.26	0.003	371.2	507
investment	0.72	4.45	0	57.3	507
age	14.0	10.6	1	66	507
debt	3.08	18.26	0	210.0	507
debt (conditional on debt>0)	9.82	31.64	0.001	210.0	159

Notes: all monetary values are in million Ghanaian Cedis, deflated to 1991 values; 1 million Cedis (1991) approximately equals 2500 USD

Table 1: Summary statistics

Exit is an important characteristic of the data. Out of 248 firms that are at one point or another in the sample that I use in the first chapter of the paper, 53, i.e. 21.4%, exit the market at some point during the 7 years (note that these numbers do not include attrition for other reasons, e.g. non-response). Out of the 120 firms that constitute the sample for this chapter, i.e. firms with less than 30 employees in the first year in which they are surveyed, 27 (22.5%) exit. A comparison with a study of exit-rates in manufacturing in the US (Dunne et al. 1988) might be useful to put these numbers in perspective. To be able to compare with the US, which provides data in 5 year intervals, note that for the 5 years period starting in 1991, 43 out of 178 (24.2%) Ghanaian firms that were in the sample in 1991 exit in one of the 5 subsequent years. For comparison, Dunne et al. (1988) find that in their full sample of US manufacturing firms, i.e. including the smallest firms, between 41.4% and 51.8% of firms exit over five-year intervals.¹² Not considering the smallest firms, they still find that between 30.7% and 42.7% of firms exit.

How do firms that exit differ from those firms that stay in the market? I present a comparison based on firm-year observations (as opposed to a comparison based on firms), i.e. I calculate medians and means of some firm characteristics for firm-year observations if a firm stays in the market for one more year, and for those that exit the next year. Table 2 shows that these firm-year

¹²The group of smallest firms is the group of firms from the bottom of the distribution that together produces 1% of the industry's output.

observations differ with respect to important characteristics. Focusing on the median comparison, we notice that the measures of profitability (VAD/capital and a measure of the marginal returns to capital as calculated in Schündeln (2004)¹³) are larger for firms that do not exit. Further, average investment and the size of the labor force are larger for firms that do not exit, although the capital stock, at least at the median, for exiting firms is larger than for not-exiting firms. Importantly for considerations of potential default, debt is larger for firms that do not exit, both looking at absolute levels as well as the debt/capital ratio.

	firms that do not exit		firms that exit at the end of period	
	mean	median	mean	median
capital	25.68	0.87	17.04	1.05
employees	13.91	11	13.26	7
investment	0.74	0	0.34	0
debt	3.23	0	0.41	0
debt/capital	0.11	0	0.08	0
VAD/capital	5.83	1.80	7.60	1.19
returns to capital	1.34	0.49	1.73	0.32
age	14.0	12	13.3	10
firm-year observations	480		27	

Note: all monetary values in million Ghanaian Cedis

Table 2: Firm characteristics of exiting vs. non-exiting firms

¹³This particular measure of the returns to capital is based on production function estimates using the technique suggested in two papers by Akerberg and Caves (2003) and Frazer (2004).

4 A dynamic model of firm investment in the presence of financing constraints and uncertainty

4.1 Production process and the objective of the firm

The preceding sections suggest that financing constraints are important in preventing productive firms from investing. To be able to quantify the cost of financing constraints I develop in this section a dynamic model of firm-level investment. The model starts from the description of individual firm dynamics as in Hopenhayn (1992). The output of a firm is determined by the production function

$$Y_{t,i} = f(K_{t,i}, L_{t,i}, \omega_{t,i}) \quad (1)$$

where $K_{t,i}$ and $L_{t,i}$ are capital and labor inputs respectively, and $\omega_{t,i}$ is a firm specific productivity shock which the firm observes at the time it makes decisions about labor inputs. Specifically, I employ the Cobb-Douglas specification

$$Y_t = \mu_s L_t^{\alpha_L} K_t^{\alpha_K} e^{\omega_t} \quad (2)$$

where the subscript s in μ_s indicates that the average productivity varies by sector s , with $s \in \{\text{food/bakery; garment/textiles; furniture/wood; metal/machines}\}$. Here and in what follows I suppress subscripts i for clarity.

The firm is uncertain about future productivity levels. As in Hopenhayn (1992), ω is assumed to follow a Markov process. I assume that ω follows an AR(1) process:

$$\omega_{t+1} = \rho\omega_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}, \quad \text{with } \varepsilon_{t+1} \sim iid N(0, \sigma_\omega^2). \quad (3)$$

The empirical work will focus on the behavior of smaller firms. Therefore, I model the firm not as a profit maximizer, but a utility maximizer with a utility function that is a function of dividends d_t and that exhibits constant relative risk aversion γ , i.e. $u(d_t) = \frac{d_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$. This modeling approach is followed to introduce a consumption smoothing motive, which is particularly important if I consider the smallest of the firms in my sample.¹⁴ The firm derives utility from dividends d that are paid out

¹⁴Without the consumption smoothing motive, firms would be able to go through a year with zero dividends. However, given that for a self-employed firm owner in this model the dividend is equal to his consumption, zero dividend years would imply zero consumption, which this self-employed firm owner will avoid at all cost. Therefore I choose to model utility in a way that assigns infinitely small utility to zero consumption.

every period, and the firm's objective is to maximize the discounted sum of future utilities that is derived from the stream of dividends over an infinite time horizon. Denote the one period discount factor as β , with $0 < \beta < 1$, then the objective is

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(d_t)$$

A distinguishing feature of the model versus standard models is the explicit modeling of the firm's ability to accumulate financial assets A_t . This is essential once there is a wedge between the internal and the external cost of raising funds (for investment and/or consumption), to which I will return later. Firms make a decision about (financial) asset accumulation via their decision about the use of profits. The profit in each period can either be paid out as a dividend (and be consumed) or can be used to accumulate financial assets, which can be used for investment in the current or future periods. A positive level of financial assets $A_{t,i}$ earns interest at the rate equal to the risk free interest rate \underline{r} . Dividends in future periods may be paid out of the accumulated financial assets.

4.2 Exit

At the end of each period, the firm decides whether it exits the market or stays in the market for the next period. While in Hopenhayn (1992) the firm has to pay a fixed cost per period, which is necessary to have exit in the model, I assume the equivalent, namely that the firm owner has an outside option which she foregoes while she operates the firm. The total outside option depends on the capital stock of the firm, and the stock of financial assets the firm owns. In particular, I assume that the outside option increases in the current capital owned by the firm owner (which can be resold) and decreases in the debt of the firm, since the firm is assumed not to be able to simply default on all the loans without consequences for outside activities.

More specifically, the assumptions about exit are as follows: (a) Firms can only exit if the outstanding debt is smaller than the capital stock (i.e. $K_t + A_t > 0$); this reflects the strong requirements about collateral that are reported for example by Aryeetey et al. (1994) who report that small and medium enterprise credit collateral requirements range from 60-150 percent of the loan amount. Further, Aryeetey et al. (1994) state that default rates for informal sources, as

moneylenders and savings (*susu*) collectors, are under 10 percent. Strong collateral requirements are also observed in the actual data: Only for 2.7% of all firm-year observations the assumption $K_t + A_t > 0$ is violated, i.e. for these firms the capital stock is smaller than the debt outstanding. There is only one firm in the data which violates this assumption in the year before it exits. Finally, strong collateral requirements were also confirmed during the interviews during the field work. (b) The firm gets to keep $(K_t + A_t)$ for future consumption purposes; (c) in addition, the firm receives an outside option value which is constant over time; this can be thought of as a wage that the entrepreneur can earn in the labor market. Since I assume risk aversion, the firm will smooth consumption. Once it exits, the firm has a constant stream of income from the outside option which means that it will not borrow, hence the relevant interest rate is the risk free interest rate, \underline{r} . Together with the assumption that $\beta = 1/(1 + \underline{r})$, i.e. β is the inverse of the rate at which the firm can deposit positive assets, this implies that the entrepreneur, once exited, will consume in every period a constant fraction c^* of his wealth $(K_{t^E} + A_{t^E})$, where t^E is the period of exit plus the outside option. The constant amount of the wealth consumed, c^* , satisfies: $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c^* = K_{t^E} + A_{t^E} \Leftrightarrow \frac{c^*}{1-\beta} = K_{t^E} + A_{t^E} \Leftrightarrow c^* = (1 - \beta)(K_{t^E} + A_{t^E})$. Therefore the amount of total consumption of the entrepreneur, which will be consumed every period, is

$$c_t^{outside} = c^{outside} = (1 - \beta) \cdot (K_{t^E} + A_{t^E}) + \textit{outside option} \quad (4)$$

and the value of consuming this $c^{outside}$ infinitely can be calculated as: $\textit{total outside option} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c^{outside}) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} u(c^{outside})$.

4.3 Investment

If the firm stays in the market, it has to decide on the amount it invests this period. Investment has a one period lag, i.e. investment decisions of this period will translate into capital next period, while the investment must be financed immediately. Financing may come from various sources: (a) current profits, (b) accumulated financial assets, which are retained profits of past periods, (c) loans; or a combination of (a),(b), and (c).

Investment is costly, due to the direct cost of capital inputs plus an additional quadratic ad-

justment cost (AC) which is modeled as follows (Hayashi 1982):

$$AC(K_{t+1}, K_t) = \frac{\nu}{2} \left(\frac{K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t}{K_t} \right)^2 K_t \quad (5)$$

Hence, the total cost of investment (TCI) is:

$$TCI(K_{t+1}, K_t) = K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t + AC(K_{t+1}, K_t) \quad (6)$$

Note that this formulation symmetrically also includes disinvestment. While I do not want to focus on irreversibilities (see for example Pindyck 1991 or Hubbard 1994), this formulation acknowledges that disinvestment is costly. While disinvestment in the data is rare, only 64% of all investment in equipment is made using new equipment. This suggests that there is a market for used equipment and not all investment is necessarily irreversible.

The capital stock depreciates at an exogenous rate δ . The law of motion for the capital stock is therefore:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \quad (7)$$

4.4 Credit

Of key interest is the cost of credit. Debt in the model occurs when $A < 0$. For an easier interpretation of the following discussion I define $debt = -A$ if $A < 0$, and 0 otherwise). The following specification of the per unit cost of credit assumes that the per unit cost of outside financing cannot be below that of internal financing. The per unit cost of credit is therefore modeled as a function of the risk free interest rate, \underline{r} , and firm characteristics. I choose the following specification with a logarithmic functional form (introducing the firm index i again to stress the firm level fixed effect η_i):

$$\ln(r_{t,i} - \underline{r}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot K_{t,i} + \beta_2 \cdot (debt_{t+1,i}/K_{t,i}) + \beta_3 \cdot debt_{t+1,i} + \eta_i \quad (8)$$

This specification deserves some explanation. Economic theory does not suggest one particular specification. Different models of information asymmetries that give rise to borrowing constraints have different implications for the form of the per unit cost of capital. Since the purpose of this chapter is not to test one specific model, I can be somewhat agnostic about the structural form

that explains the wedge in the cost between internal and external funding. The specification of $r_{t,i}$ chosen here tries to nest the following special cases of financing constraints: (a) all investment is out of own profits/wealth (which would imply $r_{t,i} = \infty$, i.e. a large β_0), (b) the availability of collateral decreases the cost of credit ($r_{t,i}$ decreasing in $K_{t,i}$); (c) there is an upper limit to borrowing ($r_{t,i}$ increasing in $debt_{t+1,i}$). Note that, although not one particular model of credit markets is tested, the estimates of the parameters of the cost of credit function can provide insight into the character of credit markets.

I allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity with respect to the ability to obtain a credit by introducing a firm fixed effect η_i . It is assumed that $\eta_i \sim iid N(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$. Note that the approach to the estimation taken below does allow me to introduce other variables that potentially influence the cost of credit, as for example age, sector, or location of the firm, without any conceptual difficulties. Potentially, I could also include unobserved firm characteristics that are not data but are the results of the simulation approach taken, e.g. the productivity of a firm. This is currently not done for computational reasons but will be done in future extensions of this work.

The above model so far implies the following intertemporal budget constraint if the firm stays in the market (recall that $debt = -A$):

$$A_{t+1,i} = (1 + r_{t,i}) \cdot (Y_{t,i} - wL_{t,i} + A_{t,i} - TCI(K_{t+1,i}, K_{t,i}) - d_{t,i}) \quad (9)$$

with

$$r_{t,i} = \begin{cases} \underline{r} & \text{if } A_{t+1,i} \geq 0 \\ \underline{r} + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 K_{t,i} + \beta_2 (debt_{t+1,i}/K_{t,i}) + \beta_3 debt_{t+1,i} + \eta_i) & \text{if } A_{t+1,i} < 0 \end{cases}$$

Finally, note the simplifications and underlying assumptions of the model. Single firm dynamics are studied, but there are no general equilibrium effects. Ideally, one would also like to introduce aggregate shocks (for example to demand), but this appears not yet to be feasible with firm level data until longer panels are available. Since there are no time effects in the model as it stands now, large aggregate shocks will move the estimates of the average productivity, μ_s , up (positive aggregate shocks) or down. I also assume competitive markets/price taking of firms. This may be problematic for larger firms, but should be a good first approximation for the smaller firms that I focus on. Further, there is no price uncertainty, and prices are constant.

Summarizing, the timing is as sketched in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The timing of events

5 Solving the model and estimation

5.1 The solution

Due to its complexity the model is solved numerically, using dynamic programming techniques. The solution to the dynamic problem is described by the value function V , which is a mapping from the state space X into \mathbf{R} , and which satisfies the Bellman equation

$$V(x) = \max_{\text{exit, stay}} \left\{ \text{total outside option}(x), \sup_{c \in C(x)} E \{ u(x, c) + \beta V(x' | x, c) \} \right\} \quad (10)$$

where x is an element of the state space X , $x' \in X$ is next period's state, and $C(x)$ is the space of all possible choices given that the state is x . For a given set of parameters the solution of the model will imply a set of decision rules that map the state variables into choice variables. The elements of the state space in this model are the capital stock K_t , the stock of financial assets A_t , the productivity shock ω_t , and $I_{\{stay\},t}$, where $I_{\{stay\},t}$ is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is in the market at time t , and it is 0 if the firm has exited the market. The choice variables of the firm are A_{t+1} , K_{t+1} , $I_{\{stay\},t+1}$, L_t , and d_t . The dividend d_t does not add any complexity, however, since it is determined as a residual. Further, note that L_t is chosen optimally within the period, given K_t and ω_t , but it does not enter the dynamic problem of the firm. Since this feature of the model is very useful for identification of the parameter estimates, as will be explained below, I will present and discuss supportive evidence for the validity of this assumption in detail below. Finally, separate solutions have to be computed for the different sectors, and one additional dimension is added through the credit-fixed-effects.

The fact that I have to solve the model using numerical methods adds the following additional (computational) constraints: $K_t \in [\underline{K}, \overline{K}]$, $A_t \in [\underline{A}, \overline{A}]$, $\omega_t \in [\underline{\omega}, \overline{\omega}]$, and $\eta_t \in [\underline{\eta}, \overline{\eta}]$. The bounds are chosen as follows: for K_t and A_t the upper bounds \overline{K} and \overline{A} are 2.5 times the observed maximum capital in the data, while the lower bound is $\underline{K} = 0$ and $\underline{A} = -\overline{A}$. For productivity ω_t , bounds are chosen as ± 2 standard errors of the residual of a production function using the Cobb-Douglas, random effects specification, that includes a set of industry dummies.

I solve the dynamic programming problem using value function iteration and a logarithmically spaced grid for K_t and A_t , and a linearly spaced grid for ω_t and η_i . In the simulations (see section 5.2) I interpolate the decision rules, using linear interpolation, to diminish the importance of the discretization and to get more accurate simulations. I do not use equidistant grid points for K_t and A_t since the distributions of capital and assets are very skewed. The autoregressive process ω_{t+1} is discretized using the method suggested by Tauchen (1986).

For the final estimation procedure that is used to estimate the structural parameters reported below, the discretization is as follows: K_t is discretized into 27 grid points, A_t is discretized into 29 grid points, ω_t is discretized into 15 grid points, the firm-credit fixed effect η_i is discretized into 10 grid points, further, four different value functions are calculated, one for each sector s , with $s \in \{\text{food/bakery; garment/textiles; furniture/wood; metal/machines}\}$. The state space for each of the four sectors, and each of the 10 firm-credit types thus consists of 11,745 grid points, i.e. in total there are 469,800 grid points, which presents an enormous computational challenge since the estimation requires that the solution is found repeatedly for different parameter values.¹⁵

5.2 Estimation of the structural parameters

The estimation procedure for the structural parameters is of a nested fixed point algorithm type (Rust 1987). An outer algorithm calculates the criterion function and searches for its minimum, while the inner algorithm solves the dynamic problem of the firm for the currently given parameter vector, starting from an initial guess for the vector of parameters, which is updated in the outer

¹⁵In practice, the innermost loop to find the value function is a loop around the firm fixed effect η and the time required to finding the solution for firm fixed effect type $\eta(\tau)$, $\tau = 2, \dots, 10$, where 10 is the number of discrete firm-credit fixed effects, is reduced dramatically by using the value function for firm fixed effect type $\eta(\tau - 1)$ as the starting value for the value function iteration.

algorithm.

The model is estimated using the firm level data from Ghana. As mentioned in the data section, since there is reason to believe that the underlying models might be different for large and for small firms, I restrict the sample to firms that have less than 30 employees in the first year that they are in the survey. The cutoff point is chosen since it was also a cutoff that is underlying the sample selection of the survey team (see Teal 2002). I also exclude state owned firms and firms with foreign ownership.

Given the richness of the stochastic model and the additional difficulty that arises because of the partial observability of an endogenous variable (as noted earlier, the data only contains information about levels of debt, not about positive financial assets) it does not exhibit closed form solutions for the criterion function in a Maximum Likelihood Estimation or GMM framework. Econometric methods based on simulations can be used to overcome this difficulty. A natural estimation method for this kind of model, where the solution often is presented via simulations, is the Method of Simulated Moments (McFadden 1989, Pakes and Pollard 1989, Ingram and Lee 1991). One advantage of the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) over Simulated Maximum Likelihood is that MSM does not require that the number of simulations goes to infinity to achieve consistency (e.g. Adda and Cooper 2003), a property which is particularly useful if the simulations are computationally intensive as in the present case.

The Method of Simulated Moments estimator is defined as follows¹⁶:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\theta}_{SN}(W) = \arg \min_{\theta} & \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \left[M'(x_i) - \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S m'(x_i, u_{si}, \theta) \right] \right\} \times W \times \\ & \times \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \left[M(x_i) - \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S m(x_i, u_{si}, \theta) \right] \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

where n is the number of observations, S is the number of simulations, W is a weight matrix, u is a random variable and $u_{si}, s = 1, \dots, S, i = 1, \dots, N$, are draws from the distribution of u (which are held fixed throughout estimation), $M(x_i)$ is a vector of functions of the observed data x_i , $m(x_i, u, \theta)$ is an unbiased simulator of the conditional vector of moments such that:

$$E_u [m(x_i, u, \theta)] = E [M(x_i) | x_i].$$

¹⁶The presentation of the estimator follows Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996) and Adda and Cooper (2003).

The specific vector of moments, $M(x_i)$, that is used is discussed in the section on identification below, while the u_{si} represent draws of the idiosyncratic productivity shock ε_t which is distributed *iid* $N(0, \sigma_\omega^2)$ as described above, and from the distribution of initial productivity shocks as well as from the joint distribution of initial capital and asset stocks (see below). It is important to keep the draws u_{si} constant during the whole estimation procedure so that changes in the simulated data can clearly be attributed to changes in parameter values. The asymptotic properties of the estimator are stated in the appendix.

Firm behavior is simulated from age zero to the oldest age at which I actually observe a given firm. This approach explicitly takes all the effects of the unobserved cost-of-credit type on cost of credit today, and hence on investment today and capital tomorrow, into account and thus solves the potential endogeneity problems that would arise in a reduced form analysis, e.g. the fact that capital appears in the cost-of-credit function, but is endogenous to the cost of credit for a given firm. Simulating firm behavior up to the age at which a firm is observed also deals in a natural way with the initial conditions problem. It turns out to be easier to determine initial conditions at age zero than those at the age at which firms are observed. This deserves some more discussion. A major difficulty with the data is that I do not know the asset position of the firm if the firm has positive financial assets. In accordance with the theoretical model, I assume that firms use up their internal funds first and hence that if I observe a firm with debt outstanding, that I in fact observe their financial asset position, i.e. there are no positive assets to balance the debt. However, I do not observe the amount of non-negative assets of a firm with no outstanding debt. Instead of assuming a certain distribution of the level of these assets at the point in time at which I start to observe the firm, I make the assumption that firms invest all their available financial assets at the time that they enter the market, hence financial assets at age zero are either zero or negative. For the simulations I can then use as initial conditions of financial assets and initial capital for a firm at age zero draws from the empirical joint distribution of (non-positive) assets and capital stocks of those firms in the survey which are up to 3 years old at the time of the first interview.¹⁷

¹⁷Strictly speaking, I would have to consider only firms that are up to one year old. However, to increase the number of observations that can be used to construct the initial conditions, I use firms that are in business for 1, 2 or 3 years at the time when they are first interviewed.

Simulating the firms' behavior starting at age zero then allows me to track in the simulations the financial assets position of a firm and provides a natural way to find the initial conditions for firms that I observe only at an age larger than one.

Regarding initial productivity for a firm in sector s , I assume that it is distributed *iid* $N(\mu_s, \sigma_{initial\ \omega}^2)$, with the sector specific mean of the initial distribution equal to μ_s , which is the parameter that also governs the productivity process in later periods. While μ_s is sector-specific, I assume that the variance of the initial distribution of productivity $\sigma_{initial\ \omega}^2$, which is one of the parameters to be estimated, is the same across sectors. I further assume that initial productivity is independent of the initial capital stock and financial asset level. I assume that the initial productivity *initial* ω is bounded similar to the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the production function, ω_t , hence *initial* $\omega \in [\mu_s - \underline{\omega}, \mu_s + \bar{\omega}]$.

Given that exit is an option to firms, a firm in the simulations may exit before the age at which I observe it in the data. Consistent with the way the survey data is collected, exiting firms in the simulations are replaced by another simulated firm. The number of simulations used in the estimation below is $S = 100$.

The estimation is done in two steps. In the first step the identity matrix is used as the weight matrix, i.e. $W_0 = I$. Using W_0 the estimation procedure results in consistent estimates $\hat{\theta}_{Sn}(W_0)$. With these estimates at hand, the optimal choice for the weight matrix can be calculated (see for example Adda and Cooper 2003, p. 96) which is then used for the second (and final) estimation step. For the computation of the standard errors (see the appendix) derivatives are computed via numerical methods, using the one-sided finite difference method (Judd 1998).

The minimum of the criterion function is found using a combination of a randomized algorithm (finite descent accelerated random search, Appel et al. 2003) and a simplex algorithm.¹⁸ The strength of the random search algorithm is that it is able to escape local minima and to find the global minimum even for criterion functions that are very difficult to minimize. However, the randomized algorithm requires a very large number of iteration steps to find the minimum.

¹⁸I have also experimented with another randomized search algorithm, simulated annealing (see Goffe 1996, Goffe et al. 1994) for which it turned out to be more difficult to calibrate the required input parameters, in this case reduction of the step size and temperature.

Therefore, I switch to the simplex algorithm, using the parameter values that give the current minimum of the objective function from the random search algorithm as starting values, once the accelerated random search algorithm has converged sufficiently.¹⁹

5.3 Identification

The simultaneous estimation of the production side and the investment side of the model allows me to address the main identification problem, namely to identify the investment opportunities and the constraints of a firm separately.²⁰ In this section I first give an intuitive discussion of what identifies the parameters of the model. That is followed by a more explicit description of the moments that are used to implement this identification strategy. To identify the production side, the main identifying assumption is that capital is predetermined at the beginning of the period and decisions about labor inputs are static and do not enter the dynamic problem of the firm. Using this assumption, for which supporting evidence will be given below, identification of the production process can be achieved in a way which is similar in spirit to Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003): Controlling for predetermined capital, and given input and output prices, labor inputs L_t are a strictly monotonically increasing function of productivity ω_t . Intuitively, knowing the productivity of a firm from this step, I can predict the optimal investment that this firm should make in the absence of any constraints as the solution to the dynamic firm optimization problem. The actually observed investment of firms that have enough financial assets at hand to make this investment identifies the constraints associated with investment, e.g. adjustment costs. On the other hand, the actually observed investment and credit take up of firms that are already in debt, and hence do not have enough cash at hand to make the optimal (in the absence of constraints) investment, identifies the cost of credit (see also figure 2). The exogenous variation that brings firms in different positions with respect to their internal financing abilities, i.e. their asset stock, is due to the succession of (exogenous) productivity shocks that the firms experienced, which determine

¹⁹All the computations in this chapter are done using a Matlab program as the frame program (i.e. for reading in the data, and calling the minimization routine), while the computationally intensive subroutines are programmed in C.

²⁰Roughly speaking, the challenge is to distinguish from a sample of observations on firms and investment decisions firms that do not invest because they are constrained in their financing from those that simply lack profitable projects and investment opportunities.

the ability to retain profits for future investment purposes. To a lesser extent, some exogenous variation in asset levels is due to the initial endowments of firms.




Figure 2: The intuition for identification

To estimate the determinants of the cost of credit I face a selection issue, since only realized loan contracts are observed. In addition, even for most realized loan contracts, the interest rate is not recorded in the data. However, modeling the production process and the investment decisions explicitly has the further advantage that it also deals with this selection issue, since I can infer from the production side the firms that have a demand for external funds.

The choice of moments To actually implement the above described identification strategy, informative moments that capture the essence of the identification strategy have to be chosen. Econometric theory does not tell the researcher which moments to choose, nor will I be able to prove identification, i.e. the existence of a unique global minimum of the criterion function (11) - a problem commonly encountered with complex structural models. In this section some of the moments which are currently employed are described. A complete list of moments used is given in the appendix. Given that there is little formal guidance for the choice of moments, I also present some graphs that demonstrate that changes in different parameter values affect different moments, which is essentially the foundation of identification, and that this translates into a global minimum of the criterion function (when other parameters are fixed).

For the identification of the production function I have to rely on moments related to the variables L, K , and Y ; for example, the means of these variables as well as their ratios (as for example L/K). Further, to identify the level and variance of productivity, i.e. the parameters μ (average productivity) and ω (idiosyncratic part of productivity), I can employ proxies for the productivity that come out of the data. Most importantly, given the assumption on labor inputs being a static decision, the output to capital ratio, Y/K , is strictly increasing in the productivity ω . It might appear especially difficult to separately identify α_K and α_L just from observations on L, K , and Y given that an increase in both parameters results in increases in all three outcome variables. Thus, it could be that a specific outcome can be the result of high α_K , and low α_L , or vice versa. However, while Figure (5) in the appendix demonstrates that this intuition is generally right, that figure also demonstrates that the moments chosen appear to result in a criterion function with a unique minimum²¹. To identify the differences in the production function parameters across sectors, I use the ratio of output to capital (Y/K) interacted with the sector. For the identification of the Markov process for productivity I can use covariances of the observed choice variables and outcomes over time, i.e. for example the covariances of output to capital over time: $cov(Y_t/K_t; Y_{t-1}/K_{t-1})$.

The next task is to identify the real constraints that the firm faces. In the current model this means identifying the adjustment cost parameter. As argued above, the key here is to identify firms that have profitable investment opportunities when only the productivity is considered, i.e. ignoring constraints on the firms' ability to pursue those opportunities, and then relate their actual investment behavior, and their firm characteristics, to these investment opportunities. To proxy investment opportunities, note that Y/K is strictly increasing in the productivity ω and that since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, marginal returns to capital are $\alpha_K Y/K$ and hence there is a one-to-one relation between Y/K and marginal returns to capital. Moments that relate the proxy for returns, Y/K , to investment are therefore useful moments to identify adjustment costs. I choose, for example, the covariance between Y/K and I , as well as the mean of the output rate divided by the investment rate (Y/K divided by I/K). Further, the fraction of zero investment observations can help identify the adjustment costs.

²¹For this graph, all other parameters are fixed and only the two parameters α_K and α_L are varied. Note that the other parameters are not fixed at the values of the final estimates.

Finally, to identify the financial constraints, i.e. the cost of credit function, the general idea for implementation of the above identification strategy is to use interactions of the investment and productivity related moments with the asset level and other firm characteristics. As discussed above, the investment rate is determined on the one hand by measures of investment possibilities, such as the output to capital ratio, and on the other hand by the financial constraints faced by the firm. This suggests interacting the available measures of investment possibilities with the information about the firm's financial position. To identify the extent to which firm characteristics drive the cost of credit, the covariances of actual investment data relative to the available proxies for investment opportunities with firm characteristics are employed as moments. As an example, I use the covariance between K and $I/(Y/K)$ and the covariance between A/K and $I/(Y/K)$ for firms with $A < 0$. To support the choice of moments, consider figures (7) and (8) in the appendix. They demonstrate that the effects of changes in the parameters of the cost of credit function associated with K and $debt/K$ on the two moments $\text{cov}(I\{A < 0\} \cdot (K, I/(Y/K)))$ and $\text{cov}(I\{A < 0\} \cdot (A/K, I/(Y/K)))$ are very different.

To give some support for the assertion that adjustment costs and cost of credit can be separately identified by the chosen moments, consider figure (6) in the appendix. While generally increases in adjustment cost and cost of credit have similar effects (increases in both parameters result in decreases in investment), this figure suggests that there is a unique minimum of the criterion function when only these two parameters are varied, and hence the set of moments chosen appear to be able to identify them separately.

5.4 The assumption on labor

Are labor inputs really not entering the dynamic problem of the firm? Given the importance of the modeling assumption (for identification of the productivity) that labor can be adjusted freely in response to the productivity shock, I will now present some evidence for this. For details refer to the respective table in the appendix.

First, consider hiring. The average unemployment rate over the years 1991-1995 was 35.6% in Ghana. This suggests that hiring of labor in general should not be a problem. It might still be that qualified labor is harder to find, though. The survey asks respondents directly various questions

regarding hiring (most of the questions were just asked in one survey wave). From this information we know that for 83% of firms (in waves 1 and 3) shortage of skilled labor was not an obstacle to capacity utilization at all, while it was a severe obstacle for 5.1% of the firms (Table 16). Further, only 9.3% of firms (in wave I) say that they are subject to hiring restrictions. Among the micro and small firms only 4.4% say they are subject to hiring restrictions. And of those firms that are subject to hiring restrictions, 70% (12 out of 17) are not at all negatively affected by those restrictions. Asked whether labor regulations are an obstacle to firm expansion, 92% of firms answer "not at all".

Now consider firing (refer to table 17). One good indicator whether firing might be a problem is whether workers are unionized. Unionization is particularly prevalent in medium and large firms, i.e. with 30 or more employees. Overall, in 49.9% of firms, there is no worker unionized, and in 88.6% of small firms, there is no worker unionized. Only in 0.9 % of micro and small firms are more than 75% of workers unionized. However, in 28.8% of medium and large firms, more than 75% of workers are unionized. Closely related to these numbers are probably the fact that 47.1% of medium and large firms are subject to some layoff restrictions, and 54.3% of firms in this group have layoff benefit requirements, while less than 10% of micro and small firms are, respectively, subject to some layoff restrictions or have layoff benefit requirements. Finally, one could object that training requirements prevent firm owners from hiring and firing in response to shocks. However, only 28% of workers received training within their current firm and only 20% of firm managers say that training is required for new equipment. And, conditional on training required, the median time of training necessary is only 4 weeks (Table 18).

Summarizing, there is evidence from macro data and direct evidence in the survey data that hiring labor in response to a positive productivity shock is not a problem for firms and existing regulations are not an obstacle to firm growth. This is particularly true for the small and medium firms that the following empirical work will focus on. Further, with respect to firing, less than 10% of firms in this group are subject to layoff restrictions. About 50% of medium and large firms are subject to layoff restrictions and layoff benefit requirements. But although 12% of firms with those requirements say that these layoff requirements are a severe problem, more than 50% of firms with

existing layoff restrictions say that these do not have a negative effect at all.

6 Results

6.1 Estimation results

I restrict the attention to the main parameters of interest. Therefore, I derive information about the following parameters from the data and other outside sources:

Candidate values for wages w are calculated as follows: First, I calculate the mean of the per capita annual wage paid by firms in the sample of firms with less than 30 employees in the first year that they are observed (restricting the sample to firms that report a positive wage bill), which is rounded to 0.15 million Ghanaian Cedis (1991). Alternatively, I also calculate the mean per capita wage paid by firms using the full sample, which is approximately 0.25 million Ghanaian Cedis, while the median per capita wage paid by firms using the full sample is approximately 0.17 million Ghanaian Cedis. Wages, however, are difficult to measure from this survey. For 76 firm-year observations, that is 6.8% of firm-year observations, the reported total wage bill is zero, which needs to be interpreted as missing. Further, it is not clear whether self-employed have included a wage for themselves in the total reported wage bill. Therefore, a comparison to an alternative source of wage data is useful, namely to the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS). Using the 1991/2 Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), Teal (2000, Table 2) reports that the average monthly earning of workers in the manufacturing sector is 22,900 Ghanaian Cedis, i.e. annually 0.2748 million Ghanaian Cedis. Thus the mean wages from the manufacturing survey seem to match the wages reported in the GLSS fairly well. To be able to evaluate the importance of the necessary assumption on wages, I estimate the model twice, first assuming $w = 0.15$, then $w = 0.25$ (both in million Ghanaian Cedis 1991). The value of the (annual) *outside option*, i.e. the annual earning for the firm owner in case of exit, is set equal to the wage w as well.²² The interest rate on positive financial assets, \underline{r} , is set equal to 0.06, which is the average real discount rate over the time period under consideration (IFS).

I set the coefficient of risk aversion γ equal to 0.5²³, and the discount rate β equal to $1/(1+0.06)$

²²Recall that the *total outside option* values ($K_t + A_t$) in addition to the annual *outside option*.

²³This value is chosen as a compromise between several available estimates and parameter values used in the

= 0.9434. I set the depreciation parameter δ equal to 0.10, which is the rate of depreciation that I estimate from the raw data in Schündeln (2005). As noted there, this value is also comparable in size to standard values used in other work.

The results are presented in table 3 for both assumptions on the wage w . For comparison, in table 4 I also present the production function estimates from simple OLS pooled regressions, a random effects and fixed effects specification as well as estimates using the Levinsohn/Petrin (L/P) and the Akerberg/Caves/Frazer (ACF) estimator that I estimate in Schündeln (2004).

The production function estimates from the dynamic model are comparable in size to the OLS estimates. The decrease in the estimate of α_L in moving from OLS estimates to the estimates of the dynamic model is to be expected due to the upward bias if labor is freely adjustable and unobserved productivity is not controlled for. All the parameters in the cost-of-credit function have the expected sign. In particular, the cost of one unit of credit decreases in the firm's existing capital stock, and increases with the amount of debt that a firm wishes to incur. Further, a larger debt/capital ratio increases the cost of a unit of credit. These results are consistent with conventional models of imperfect credit markets.

literature. In an early classic paper, Binswanger (1981) estimates only moderate risk aversion of around 0.3 for households in rural India. Recent estimates from auctions range from 0.44 - 0.67 (summarized in Holt and Laury 2002). For US-households Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate a risk aversion of 0.51. Arrow (1971) suggests a risk aversion of 1, while Browning and Crossley (2001) use a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2, and finally, Mehra and Prescott (1985) let the coefficient of relative risk aversion vary between 0 and 10.

estimates from the dynamic model		
	assuming $w=0.15$	assuming $w=0.25$
Production function estimates		
α_L	0.388 (0.030)	0.568 (0.003)
α_K	0.391 (0.019)	0.300 (0.016)
constant $\mu_{food/bakery}$	1.159 (0.080)	0.893 (0.049)
constant $\mu_{garment/textiles}$	0.838 (0.054)	0.673 (0.039)
constant $\mu_{furniture/wood}$	0.707 (0.100)	0.728 (0.031)
constant $\mu_{metal/machines}$	1.038 (0.031)	0.857 (0.048)
σ_ω	0.167 (0.093)	0.156 (0.010)
ρ	0.621 (0.094)	0.659 (0.327)
$\sigma_{initial \omega}$ (initial productivity)	0.747 (0.013)	0.435 (0.614)
cost-of-credit function parameters:		
$r_{t,i} = \underline{r} + exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 K_{t,i} + \beta_2 (debt_{t+1,i}/K_{t,i}) + \beta_3 debt_{t+1,i} + \eta_i)$		
β_0	-0.480 (0.985)	0.556 (1.202)
β_1	-0.343 (0.245)	-0.422 (0.970)
β_2	0.916 (0.639)	0.716 (1.786)
β_3	0.237 (0.158)	0.274 (0.132)
σ_η (fixed credit effect)	2.042 (0.394)	2.813 (1.171)
v (adjustment cost parameter)	0.917 (0.160)	0.552 (0.060)

Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses; (2) $debt = -A > 0$

Table 3: Estimation results

Comparison of production function estimates					
	pooled OLS	Random Eff.	Fixed Eff.	L/P	ACF
α_L	0.539 (0.085)	0.526 (0.101)	0.473 (0.137)	0.369 (0.090)	0.839 (0.222)
α_K	0.303 (0.030)	0.307 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.243)	0.277 (0.337)	0.234 (0.079)
observations	507	507	507	503	501

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; the standard errors for Levinsohn/Petrin (L/P) and Akerberg, Caves, Frazer (ACF) estimates are bootstrapped (100 repetitions)

Table 4: Comparison of production function estimates

The production function estimates from the dynamic model using the assumption $w = 0.25$ are comparable in size to the estimates presented in table 4. On the other hand, using $w = 0.15$ the results are markedly different, with a much smaller labor coefficient and a larger capital coefficient. For the results that assume $w = 0.15$ the mean productivity levels are estimated to be larger than for the results with $w = 0.25$. It is interesting to note that both sets of estimates indicate a relatively low degree of serial correlation of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, with ρ estimated to be equal to 0.621 and 0.659, respectively. Together with the estimate for σ_ω this confirms the important role of uncertainty in firms' decision making (see for example Pattillo 1998).

All the parameters in the cost-of-credit function have the expected sign. In particular, the cost of a unit of credit decreases in the firm's existing capital stock, and increases with the amount of debt that a firm wishes to incur. Further, a larger debt/capital ratio increases the cost of a unit of credit. These results are consistent with conventional models of imperfect credit markets. The effects of firm characteristics, i.e. capital and debt levels, are roughly similar in both sets of estimates. The main difference between both sets of results is a much larger estimate of β_0 under the assumption $w = 0.25$ (0.56 vs. -0.48). The estimated variance of the fixed credit effect, σ_η^2 , is fairly large in both sets of results. This is in line with the expected firm heterogeneity due to effects that are beyond what can be captured by the model.

To illustrate the importance of adjustment costs consider a firm that has one unit of capital and

wants to double its capital stock. The estimated adjustment cost parameter then implies that the additional adjustment cost, on top of the one unit capital stock investment, is 0.459 (for $w = 0.15$) or 0.276 (for $w = 0.25$). For a less extreme expansion of the firm, say from one to 1.3 units of capital, the adjustment cost would be 0.041 and 0.025, respectively, i.e. in this case approximately 14% and 8% of the cost of the newly invested capital have to be paid in addition as adjustment cost.

Note that a few of the estimates are relatively imprecisely estimated. It is believed that this is partly due to the current computational constraints, in particular the way the capital and asset state spaces have to be discretized and the fact that the number of simulations is finite. Comparing the present results to earlier preliminary results indicates that indeed a finer discretization, i.e. more grid points, and increasing the number of simulations results in a change in the precision of the estimates and it is believed that advances in computational possibilities will allow researchers to obtain more precise estimates in the future.

One way to assess how well the model performs is to compare actual and simulated data. Ideally, one has enough meaningful moments to pick from for estimation so that some can be compared that were not part of the moments chosen for the estimation. However, in the present case all the easier interpretable ones (as for example means and variances of observables) are part of the moments that are chosen for estimation, which should be kept in mind when looking at table 5. In that table, I compare the first and second moments of the observable variables in the data and in the simulations using the final parameter estimates. The table demonstrates that the magnitudes of the capital, value added and debt variables as expressed by their means are matched fairly well, while the mean labor input and mean investment are 3 to 5 times larger in the simulations than in the actual data.²⁴ On the other hand, looking at the variances, it seems that in particular the variance of the observed debt and the variance of the labor inputs cannot be matched by the model: the variance in the actual data is 6 to 7 times larger for debt and 17 times larger for labor inputs than what is observed in the simulations. The variance of capital is smaller in the simulations than in the actual data, while the variances of investment and value added are captured fairly well by

²⁴One potential explanation for this could be that there are no fixed costs of investment/adjustment in the model.

the model.

Means and variances of the observables				
		data	simulated ($w=0.15$)	simulated ($w=0.25$)
means				
	capital	25.225	22.952	22.464
	labor	13.872	34.267	35.824
	investment	0.720	3.554	3.447
	value added	9.073	13.264	15.779
	debt	3.079	3.175	3.370
variances				
	capital	5681.2	872.818	911.727
	labor	129.606	2268.3	2576.6
	investment	19.762	45.343	44.325
	value added	539.885	339.889	499.860
	debt	333.463	45.211	53.699

Note: simulated means and variances are based on simulation of 100*507 firm-year observations

Table 5: Comparison of first and second moments of observable variables

The interest rate schedule that is the result of the estimated parameters can best be illustrated by a graph (see figure 3 for the assumption $w = 0.15$ and figure 4 for $w = 0.25$). The range of capital shown is up to approximately the 85th percentile of sample firms' actual capital stocks; the interest rate is truncated above at 100%. Clearly, these graphs show that financing constraints exist, i.e. there is a substantial wedge between the internal and the external cost of finance. To take an example, the results of the estimates with $w = 0.25$ imply that a firm with little capital, e.g. 0.5 million Cedis (which is approximately the 30th percentile of the capital stock distribution), would face an interest rate of about 147% for the first Cedi it wishes to borrow. This result is in line with informal observations during field work in Ghana. Some owners of micro firms mentioned as their only potential source of credit money lenders that would charge, according to one entrepreneur, a (nominal) interest rate of up to 20% per month. The estimated interest rate increases fast as desired debt increases, quickly going to infinity, which implies that small firms will not be able to borrow at all beyond a small amount. The interest rate decreases with existing capital, and firms

with about 15 million Cedis of capital are the ones that are able to borrow at rates that are close to the risk free interest rate. Considering that 80% of firms in this sample have a capital stock of less than 15 million Cedis, this implies that most of the firms cannot borrow a Cedi at the risk free interest rate at all. However, once a firm with 15 million Cedis of capital wishes to borrow more than about 10 million Cedis, interest rates start to increase again rapidly. The estimates imply that the interest rate rises steeply after that, effectively ruling out any further borrowing once the debt level reaches 20 million Cedis.




Figure 3: The interest rate schedule (truncated above at 1) for estimates with $w=0.15$




Figure 4: The interest rate schedule (truncated above at 1) for estimates with $w=0.25$

The described interest rate schedule is consistent with collateral requirements: Firms can borrow relatively easy as long as their own capital stock is large relative to the amount they want to borrow. However, as the debt approaches the size of the firm's capital stock, interest rates are prohibitively high. The estimates suggest that this effect is larger for small firms, while larger firms have ways to borrow closer to the size of their own capital stock. Note that collateral requirements for borrowing are not imposed on the model, but the effects shown are purely coming out of the estimates. The result that current size matters will have strong effects on growth, and furthermore, entry into a market will be difficult. Some of these implications are explored in the following section.

6.2 Implications: Quantifying the impacts of the constraints

The parameter estimates of the dynamic model now put me in a position to answer the main question of the paper: what is the cost of financing constraints to firms? In this section, I use the estimates to do some counterfactual analyses. I look in particular at the effect of changes in the cost of credit.

For the counterfactual analyses I perform simulations. Although I model exit explicitly, I do not

model entry, and thus cannot meaningfully study steady state behavior. Instead, I simulate an age distribution of firms which is similar to the age distribution that I observe in the data. I first simulate the model using the parameter estimates presented above. Then I remove all financing constraints and set the cost of external financing equal to the cost of internal financing and simulate new firm observations, again starting from the entry/‘birth’ of the firm.²⁵ In particular, in terms of the model, I set the parameters β_1, β_2 , and β_3 equal to zero, β_0 equal to some very small number, and the number of credit types to 1 with $\eta_1 = 0$, such that the interest rate is $r = \underline{r}$ (recall that the estimated cost of credit function is: $r_{t,i} = \underline{r} + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot K_{t,i} + \beta_2 \cdot (debt_{t+1,i}/K_{t,i}) + \beta_3 \cdot debt_{t+1,i} + \eta_i)$). Then I compare the simulated data under these two scenarios. This exercise quantifies the upper bound of the effect of potential policies that attempt to close the wedge between the cost of internal and external finance.

The results are summarized in tables 6 and 7. In the results using the assumption $w = 0.15$ the capital stock increases by 3% and the investment actually decreases slightly (-1%), which may be due to the fact that in this case due to the reduced cost of financing the capital is already closer to the desired optimal level at the time that the firms are observed in the data (which is the age to which the firm’s behavior is simulated) and thus investment activities are slowing down. Average consumption increases by 4.8%. Using the assumption $w = 0.25$ (table 7) all the changes are somewhat more pronounced. Mean capital and mean investment increase by 8.3% and 4.2%, respectively, once the constraints are removed completely. Average consumption increases by 8%. The average amount of debt of those firms who are in debt increases by 6.8%, and the number of firms holding debt increases substantially, namely from 49.4% of all simulated observations to 85.5%.

²⁵Since I start the analysis from age zero of a firm in both cases, this analysis quantifies a medium impact.

simulation results			
	with constraints	without constraints	$\frac{\text{without constraints}}{\text{with constraints}}$
mean capital	22.508	23.189	1.030
mean investment	3.518	3.474	0.988
mean value added	12.996	13.372	1.029
debt (conditional on debt>0)	5.953	6.521	1.095
firms with debt	53.4%	84.0%	1.573
mean dividend (consumption)	3.864	4.051	1.048

Notes: results from simulation of 5070 obs.; simulated age distribution and initial capital/asset distribution are the empirical distributions from the data;
all monetary units in this table are in 1 million Cedis, approx. 2500 USD (1991)

Table 6: The effect of removing the constraints, $w=0.15$

simulation results			
	with constraints	without constraints	$\frac{\text{without constraints}}{\text{with constraints}}$
mean capital	21.980	23.794	1.083
mean investment	3.398	3.542	1.042
mean value added	15.514	16.654	1.074
debt (conditional on debt>0)	7.044	7.522	1.068
firms with debt	49.4%	85.5%	1.731
mean dividend (consumption)	3.039	3.283	1.080

Notes: results from simulation of 5070 obs.; simulated age distribution and initial capital/asset distribution are the empirical distributions from the data;
all monetary units in this table are in 1 million Cedis, approx. 2500 USD (1991)

Table 7: The effect of removing the constraints, $w=0.25$

6.3 Quantifying the impacts of the constraints for the smallest firms

As is evident from the estimates above, effects of removing the constraints will differ by the existing capital stock of a firm. To investigate these effects closer, I therefore redo the above analysis for the smallest firms. As the cutoff point I choose the 20th percentile of the capital stock distribution in the data that is underlying the estimation, which corresponds to firms with a capital stock of ≤ 0.3 million Cedis. More precisely, I simulate firm behavior under financing constraints, using the same starting conditions as above, and then use only the sample of firm observations that fall into this size category (i.e. firms with a capital stock of ≤ 0.3 million Cedis) at the end of the simulation period. I calculate the average firm characteristics for those firms and then simulate the firm behavior of only those firms, again starting from birth of the firm, when they do not face the constraints.

The most striking numbers in the tables concern the fraction of firms with debt and the amount of debt. While 35% and 42% of firms, respectively, have some outstanding debt, the cost of financing is estimated to be so high for all of the firms in this category that the average amount is very small. Once constraints are removed all firms in this group start borrowing to finance investment and growth and the average amount of debt increases substantially. Further, both capital stock and investment of the firms in this group increase by more than 70% ($w = 0.15$) or more than double ($w = 0.25$). Mean consumption of entrepreneurs in these firms increases by 50% and 178% due to the availability of cheap sources of financing. Overall, these results suggest that the smallest of the firms would take particular advantage of relaxed financing constraints, and the results would be substantial increases in capital stock and investment, and economically significant increases in consumption.

	simulation results		
	with constraints	without constraints	$\frac{\text{without constraints}}{\text{with constraints}}$
mean capital	0.210	0.363	1.729
mean investment	0.103	0.179	1.738
mean value added	0.316	0.445	1.408
debt (conditional on debt>0)	0.017	0.201	11.824
firms with debt	42.6%	100%	2.347
mean dividend (consumption)	0.052	0.078	1.500

Notes: results from simulation of 5070 obs.; simulated age distribution and initial capital/asset distribution are the empirical distributions from the data;
all monetary units in this table are in 1 million Cedis, approx. 2500 USD (1991)

Table 8: The effect of removing the constraints for firms with < 0.3 million Cedis capital, $w=0.15$

	simulation results		
	with constraints	without constraints	$\frac{\text{without constraints}}{\text{with constraints}}$
mean capital	0.201	0.404	2.010
mean investment	0.112	0.227	2.027
mean value added	0.396	0.687	1.735
debt (conditional on debt>0)	0.011	0.230	20.909
firms with debt	34.88%	100%	2.867
mean dividend (consumption)	0.032	0.089	2.781

Notes: results from simulation of 5070 obs.; simulated age distribution and initial capital/asset distribution are the empirical distributions from the data;
all monetary units in this table are in 1 million Cedis, approx. 2500 USD (1991)

Table 9: The effect of removing the constraints for firms with < 0.3 million Cedis capital, $w=0.25$

6.4 Self-stated credit problems and the estimated cost of financing

Recall that the survey asks the entrepreneur to state the three biggest problems of the business over the last year. According to the survey between 34 and 53% of firms regard credit as the major problem in their operations. This information can now be used to compare the own assessment of the entrepreneur with the predicted cost of credit. To this end, I split the sample that I used for estimation of the structural model in the previous section into two groups, namely into firm-year observations in which ‘credit’ is mentioned as the biggest problem, and those in which ‘credit’ is not mentioned as the biggest problem. Table 10 presents the results together with some other information about the firms in these two groups. I find that among the firms which state credit as their biggest problem the predicted cost of credit is larger than among the other firms. The difference is particularly striking at lower percentiles of the cost of credit distribution, which cover the range of interest rates at which firms might still be able to borrow. For example, the 25th percentile of cost of credit is estimated to be 18% and 29% (depending on the assumption for the wage) for firms which regard credit as their biggest problem, while it is about 6% for the other firms, i.e. only about a third to a fifth. Further, it is interesting to note that estimated returns to capital (using results from a translog specification, for details see Schündeln (2004)) indicate that firms that regard credit as their biggest problem do have higher returns to capital on average than the other firms.

	credit not the		credit is the	
	'biggest problem'		'biggest problem'	
	w=0.15	w=0.25	w=0.15	w=0.25
mean predicted cost of credit (%)	0.445	1.035	0.541	1.205
median predicted cost of credit (%)	0.522	1.240	0.544	1.343
25th percentile of cost of credit (%)	0.065	0.064	0.180	0.287
mean returns to capital (TL-OLS)	1.502		1.673	
median returns to capital (TL-OLS)	0.314		0.554	
mean returns to capital (TL-ACF)	1.198		1.407	
median returns to capital (TL-ACF)	0.320		0.537	
other firm characteristics:				
mean capital	31.76		20.65	
mean employees	15.03		13.19	
mean debt/capital	0.10		0.12	
mean age	13.9		13.7	
observations	150		190	

Table 10: Predicted cost of credit vs. self-stated credit problems

7 Conclusion

This paper provides new evidence for the existence of financing constraints to firms and is the first to quantify the dynamic cost of these constraints. In my main contribution to the literature, I propose and estimate a dynamic model of firm-level investment that simultaneously models the real side and the financial side of the firm. This allows me to separately identify the investment opportunities of a firm, the determinants of the cost of credit, which is unobserved in the data, and alternative reasons for low investment that are common to all firms, as for example adjustment costs. The approach also deals with the selection problem that only realized debt levels but not desired debt levels are observed. Using the estimates of the structural dynamic model, I perform counterfactual analyses to provide a quantitative estimate of the cost of financing constraints to firms. It is important to keep the computational constraints in mind that limit the complexity of the model that can be empirically analyzed. Improvements in computational power will likely allow researchers to estimate more complex models of firm behavior in the near future, using the analytical framework that is proposed in this paper.

The paper has three major results. First, the paper provides new evidence for the existence of financing constraints. This evidence is obtained from a dynamic model that explicitly deals with some of the problems that reduced form tests for financing constraints face. Second, the estimates of the parameters of the cost-of-credit function of the dynamic structural model of firm-level investment imply that the per-unit cost of credit is increasing with the amount of debt a firm incurs and decreasing with the capital stock already used by a firm. This is consistent with conventional models of imperfect credit markets. Third, the estimated cost of financing constraints are economically significant. Counterfactual analyses indicate that removing the constraints would imply firm growth with economically significant increases in firm sizes that are associated with higher levels of consumption, namely between 5 and 8% more consumption on average in the full sample used, and increases in consumption between 50 and 178% if only the smallest firms are considered.

Although "governments, and other development agencies, have made the development of credit markets a focus for policy intervention" (Besley, 1995, p. 2127), remarkably little is known empirically about the cost of financing constraints due to imperfect credit markets. Those that promote credit markets development seem to accept the view that financing constraints exist. However, to understand whether the large scale interventions that are observed are justified, and to be able to carry interventions out cost-efficiently, researchers and policy makers alike must be able to quantify the effects of these constraints and to investigate the effect of different potential policies. The structural framework that I have proposed and the estimates of this model are a first step in this direction for investigations at the firm level. While the results of this work cannot identify one particular reason for the existence of financing constraints for firms, the results provide an estimate for the loss in investment and consumption that is due to the constraints. Thus, this study demonstrates empirically the economic significance of these financing constraints. For policy purposes, the results clearly support the need to address the problem of financing constraints. The results also identify firm characteristics, namely the size of the capital stock and the debt level, that are associated with higher costs of credit. Future work should focus on identifying the specific reasons why financing constraints exist to be able to evaluate particular policy interventions.

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A More about investment

	all firms	micro/small firms (1-29 employees)	medium/large firms (≥ 30 employees)
Investment in equipment			
yes	47.5 %	38.8 %	58.7 %
obs.	1085	592	475
Proportion of money coming from			
company retained earnings	69.5%	74.7%	65.3%
personal savings	7.9%	8.7%	7.5%
borrowed from friends or relatives	3.7%	7.2%	1.0%
bank loan or overdraft	9.2%	3.9%	12.9%
supplier credit	2.3%	1.4%	3.1%
borrowed from money lender	-	-	-
borrowed from parent or holding company	0.9%	0.2%	1.4%
sale of equipment	0.2%	-	0.3%
new partner	-	-	-
other	3.9%	3.0%	4.8%

Note: percentages do not add up to 100%, because they are based on self-reported percentages in the data that do not add up to 100%

Table 11: Funding sources for investment in equipment (for years 1992-1997)

	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms
new	64.3%	65.0%	63.0%
used	23.5%	26.0%	21.9%
mixed	12.2%	9.0%	15.1%
obs	499	223	270

Table 12: Form of newly purchased equipment (years 1992-1997)

Years with positive investment (% of years in survey)	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms
0	23.3%	27.8%	17.9%
0<x≤15	8.5%	11.1%	5.7%
15<x≤30	11.1%	16.7%	4.9%
30<x≤45	10.7%	13.9%	7.3%
45<x≤60	12.6%	11.1%	14.6%
60<x≤75	11.1%	9.7%	13.0%
75<x≤90	7.0%	4.2%	10.6%
100	15.6%	5.6%	26.0%
obs	270	144	123

Table 13: Percentage of years with positive investment

Years with positive investment of firms being surveyed at least 5 times (% of years in survey)	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms
0	10.7%	11.8%	8.9%
0<x≤15	15.4%	17.2%	12.5%
15<x≤30	15.4%	22.6%	3.6%
30<x≤45	16.8%	18.3%	14.3%
45<x≤60	10.7%	11.8%	8.9%
60<x≤75	12.8%	9.7%	17.9%
75<x≤90	12.8%	8.5%	23.2%
100	5.4%	2.2%	10.7%
obs	149	93	56

Table 14: Percentage of years with positive investment for firms being in survey at least 5 years

B Covariates of self-stated credit problems

The information about self-stated credit problems can be used to explore correlations of firm characteristics and self-stated credit constraints. To this end, I estimate probit models where in specification (1) the dependent variable is 1 if credit is the biggest problem, while in (2) it is 1 if credit is one of the three biggest problems.²⁶ I also use the panel dimension of the data (dependent variable in that case is 1 if credit is the biggest problem). The results (see Table 15) indicate that in particular measures of firm size are highly negatively correlated with self-stated credit problems: both capital and employment level appear significantly in at least one specification. Employment is significant throughout. The interpretation of the two measures of the level of debt, the absolute debt level and the debt ratio is particularly difficult because of their close relationship with one another and because of the obvious endogeneity concerns. Higher debt is associated with higher probability of self-stated credit problems. Overall, the results are informative about the variables that need to be included in a dynamic structural model.

²⁶For the ordered probit - specification (3) - the dependent variable is 3 if credit is mentioned as the biggest problem, it is 2, if credit is the second biggest problem, 1 if it is third biggest problem and 0 if credit was not mentioned as a problem.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	probit	probit	ordered probit	panel probit
	Credit biggest	Credit one of	Credit first, second or	Credit biggest
	problem?	three biggest	third biggest problem;	problem?
		problems?	or no problem?	
capital ($*10^{-2}$)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.042 (0.026)
employment ($*10^{-2}$)	-0.451 (0.134)**	-0.529 (0.107)**	-0.482 (0.105)**	-0.385 (0.163)**
[empl. ($*10^{-2}$)] ²	0.023 (0.009)**	0.034 (0.007)**	0.030 (0.007)**	0.018 (0.011)
firm age	-0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.017)
firm age ²	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
returns to capital	5.062 (2.917)	3.980 (3.115)	5.134 (2.745)	3.577 (3.412)
debt	0.106 (0.083)	0.013 (0.061)	0.028 (0.057)	0.127 (0.096)
debt/capital	-0.043 (0.049)	-0.037 (0.048)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.037 (0.060)
located in Accra	-0.151 (0.113)	-0.339 (0.117)**	-0.241 (0.103)*	
sector effects	yes	yes	yes	
year effects	yes	yes	yes	
constant	0.016 (0.188)	0.569 (0.196)**		0.063 (0.182)
observations	575	575	575	575

Notes: (1) standard errors in parentheses; ** (*) indicates statistical significance at 1% (5%);
(2) debt \geq 0 (and debt/capital \geq 0)

Table 15: Covariates of credit problems

C Properties of the Method of Simulated Moments estimator

The Method of Simulated Moments estimator has the following asymptotic properties:²⁷

When n goes to infinity and S is fixed, then $\hat{\theta}_{Sn}(W)$ is consistent, $\sqrt{n} [\hat{\theta}_{Sn}(W) - \theta_0]$ is asymptotically normally distributed, and the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is equal to

$$Q_S(W) = (1 + \frac{1}{S})\Sigma_1^{-1}\Sigma_2\Sigma_1^{-1} \quad (12)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma_1 &= D'WD \\ \Sigma_2 &= D'W \text{var}_0 [M(x) - E_u [m(x_i, u, \theta)]] WD \\ D &= \frac{\partial E_u [m(x_i, u, \theta)]}{\partial \theta'} \end{aligned}$$

The optimal choice for the weight matrix W is:

$$W^* = \{\text{var}_0 [M(x) - E_u [m(x_i, u, \theta)]]\}^{-1}$$

Using this optimal weight matrix, the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is:

$$Q_S(W^*) = (1 + \frac{1}{S}) \left[D' \{\text{var}_0 [M(x) - E_u [m(x_i, u, \theta)]]\}^{-1} D \right]^{-1}$$

²⁷The presentation of the estimator follows Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996) and Adda and Cooper (2003).

D Moments used for estimation

Variable definitions:

K =capital

L =labor

I =investment,

A =asset (truncated at zero)

Y =value added

Means:

$\text{mean}(K)$; $\text{mean}(L)$; $\text{mean}(I)$; $\text{mean}(A)$; $\text{mean}(Y)$

$\text{mean}(Y/K)$;

$\text{mean}(L/K)$; $\text{mean}(A/K)$; $\text{mean}(A/(Y/K))$

$\text{mean}(\mathbf{I}\{I > 0\})$;

$\text{mean}((I/K)/(Y/K))=\text{mean}(I/Y)$

Variances:

$\text{variance}(K)$; $\text{variance}(L)$; $\text{variance}(I)$; $\text{variance}(A)$; $\text{variance}(Y)$; $\text{variance}(Y/K)$

Covariances:

$\text{cov}(A, I)$; $\text{cov}(A, Y/K)$; $\text{cov}(A, I/(Y/K))$;

$\text{cov}(K_t, K_{t-1})$; $\text{cov}(I_t, I_{t-1})$; $\text{cov}((L/K)_t, (L/K)_{t-1})$; $\text{cov}((Y/K)_t, (Y/K)_{t-1})$

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A \geq 0\} \cdot (I, Y/K))$;

for observations with debt (i.e. $A < 0$):

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (I, Y/K))$

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (K, I/(Y/K)))$;

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (A, I/(Y/K)))$;

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (A/K, I/(Y/K)))$

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (K, I/Y))$;

$\text{cov}(\mathbf{I}\{A < 0\} \cdot (A, I/Y))$;

Sector specific moments:

$$\text{mean}(K \cdot I\{sector\}); \text{mean}(Y \cdot I\{sector\}); \text{mean}((Y/K) \cdot I\{sector\})$$

E Support for the assumption on labor as a static decision

	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms	year
Subject to hiring restrictions?				
yes	9.3%	4.4%	15.7%	
obs.	193	113	70	1991
Negative effects of existing hiring restrictions?				
1 (not at all)	12	3	8	
2	2	-	2	
3	2	1	1	
4	-	-	-	
5 (severe)	1	1	-	
obs.	17	5	11	1991
Limits on temporary hiring?				
yes	10.4%	1.8%	20.0%	
obs.	193	113	70	1991
Negative effects of existing limits?				
1 (not at all)	14	1	10	
2	5	1	4	
3	-	-	-	
4	-	-	-	
5 (severe)	-	-	-	
obs.	19	2	14	1991
How severe are labor regulations as obstacle to firm expansion?				
1 (not at all)	182	114	59	
2	10	3	7	
3	2	-	2	
4	1	-	-	
5 (severe)	2	-	2	
obs.	197	117	70	1991
Shortage of skilled labor as an obstacle to capacity utilization				
1 (not an obstacle)	83.0 %	86.5 %	78.2 %	
2 (moderate obstacle)	11.9 %	9.5 %	15.0 %	
3 (severe obstacle)	5.1 %	4 %	6.8 %	
obs.	352	200	147	1993-1995

Table 16: Evidence concerning hiring restrictions

	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms	year
Subject to layoff restrictions?				
yes	25.4%	9.7%	47.1%	
obs.	193	113	70	1991
Negative effects of existing layoff restrictions?				
1 (not at all)	21	5	12	
2	9	-	9	
3	9	3	6	
4	1	-	1	
5 (severe)	6	2	4	
obs.	46	10	32	1991
Layoff benefit requirements?				
yes	27.5%	8.9%	54.3%	
obs.	193	113	70	1991
Negative effects of existing layoff benefit requirements?				
1 (not at all)	27	4	19	
2	9	1	8	
3	9	3	6	
4	1	-	1	
5 (severe)	4	2	2	
obs.	50	10	36	1991
Percentage of work force that is unionized				
0%	49.9%	88.6%	19.5%	
>0% and \leq 25%	1.0%	1.8 %	0.4%	
>25% and \leq 50%	2.8%	1.4 %	4.1%	
>50% and \leq 75%	4.7%	0.9 %	7.9%	
>75% and <100%	16.6%	0.9 %	28.8%	
100%	25.1%	6.4%	39.3%	
obs.	495	220	267	1991-1997

Table 17: Evidence concerning firing restrictions

	all firms	micro/small firms	medium/large firms	year
Training required after setting up plant?				
yes	24.3%	10.9%	44.3%	
obs.	169	101	61	1991
Training required for additions to plant equipment?				
yes	20.2%	14.6%	27.5%	
obs.	13	41	40	1991
Duration of training for additions to plant equipment in weeks?				
median	4.3	4.3	4.3	
mean	11.2	11.3	11.1	
obs.	13	5	8	1991
Worker questionnaire:				
Did you receive any job training in past?				
within this firm	27.8%	37.3%	24.0%	
outside this firm	36.8%	24.5%	41.5%	
no	35.5%	38.2%	34.5%	
obs.	936	306	595	1997

Table 18: Evidence concerning on-the-job training

F Identification - some illustrations




Figure 5: Criterion function as a function of production function parameters




Figure 6: Criterion function as a function of adjustment costs and cost of credit




Figure 7: Identification of the cost of credit function parameters




Figure 8: Identification of the cost of credit function parameters (continued)