

A Service of

ZBW

Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

McKinnish, Terra

Working Paper Overwork in Spouse's Degree Field and the Labor Market Outcomes of Skilled Women

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12149

Provided in Cooperation with: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: McKinnish, Terra (2019) : Overwork in Spouse's Degree Field and the Labor Market Outcomes of Skilled Women, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12149, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196647

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



WWW.ECONSTOR.EU



Initiated by Deutsche Post Foundation

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12149

Overwork in Spouse's Degree Field and the Labor Market Outcomes of Skilled Women

Terra G. McKinnish

FEBRUARY 2019



Initiated by Deutsche Post Foundation

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12149

Overwork in Spouse's Degree Field and the Labor Market Outcomes of Skilled Women

Terra G. McKinnish University of Colorado and IZA

FEBRUARY 2019

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.

The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

ISSN: 2365-9793

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9	Phone: +49-228-3894-0	
53113 Bonn, Germany	Email: publications@iza.org	www.iza.org

ABSTRACT

Overwork in Spouse's Degree Field and the Labor Market Outcomes of Skilled Women

This paper estimates the effect of overwork and underwork in husband's undergraduate degree field on the labor market outcomes of skilled married women using 2009-2015 ACS data. Overwork and underwork by degree field, respectively, are measured as the fraction of prime-aged men reporting 50 or more and 34 or fewer usual hours of work per week. Analysis is conducted using the sample of college-educated men and women ages 25-44 married to college-educated spouses. Results indicate that for married women with children, overwork in spouse's degree field negatively affects total earnings, hourly wages, employment and hours of work relative to married men with children or married women without children. There is little evidence that underwork in spouse's degree field differentially affects married women with children.

JEL Classification:	J16, J22
Keywords:	marriage, labor market, spouse hours of work, degree field

Corresponding author: Terra G. McKinnish Department of Economics University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309-0256 USA E-mail: mckinnis@colorado.edu

Introduction

Prior literature has documented the lower labor force participation and lower earnings of college-educated women relative to college-educated men, and that these gender gaps tend to particularly emerge and widen after childbirth (Noonan, Corcoran and Courant, 2005; Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010). One potential mechanism is that women may select into lower paying occupations and into lower paying jobs within occupation in search of more flexible, familyfriendly work conditions (Fabbi and Moro, 2012; Lim 2015; Wiswal and Zafar, 2016; Pertold-Gebicka, Pertold and Gupta, 2016). Indeed, the demand for long hours in skilled jobs does appear to be an import feature driving gender gaps in labor market outcomes. Goldin (2014) calculates the gender wage gap and the return to long hours of work by occupation using 2009-2011 American Community Survey (ACS) data. She finds that the gender gap is largest in occupations with the highest returns to long hours of work. Cha and Weeden (2014) evaluate the contribution of overwork to the gender wage gap using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1979 and 2007. They find that increasing returns to overwork, combined with higher rates of overwork for male compared to female workers, acted to reduce gender wage convergence over this time period.

Cortes and Pan (2016) find that college-educated women, particularly those with children, avoid occupations that demand long hours and are more likely to drop out of the labor market if they trained in fields that demand long hours. Using 215 occupations and four decades of Decennial Census and ACS data, they find that the share of men in an occupation who report working 50 or more hours per week is negatively associated with the participation of college-educated married women with children in that occupation. In individual-level cross-sectional analysis using 2009-2014 ACS data, they find that college-educated married mothers who

majored in undergraduate degree fields associated with longer hours of work are less likely to be currently employed.

While these previous papers analyze the effect of overwork in a woman's own job or potential job, this paper considers the role of spouse's overwork. Prior research documents that women remain responsible for the larger share of household responsibilities, even among dualearner couples (Bianchi et al., 2000; Stone 2007). Married women, especially those with children, may find work-family conflict exacerbated and their own labor market effort particularly costly when their husband works in a profession that demands long hours. This may cause women may shift to jobs that are lower-paying, lower-effort and more flexible.

Cha (2010) analyzes the effect of spousal overwork in a sample of dual-earner couples in the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). She finds that having a husband who works 50 or more hours a week increases the probability a married woman with children quits her job, but wife's overwork does not affect the probability a husband quits his job. Cha can't rule out the possibility that men choose to longer work hours in anticipation of their wife's lower labor market attachment.

This paper evaluates instead the effects of rates of overwork and underwork in husband's undergraduate degree field as the measure of interest, rather than husband's own hours of work. While husband's usual hours of work per week and husband's occupation both may respond to wife's characteristics, undergraduate degree field is time-constant and in most cases determined prior to spouse characteristics.

ACS data from 2009-2015 are used to calculate a degree-field-specific measure of overwork, specifically the fraction of prime-age male workers who report working 50 or more usual hours of work per week, and a degree field specific measure of underwork, specifically the

fraction of prime-age male workers reporting 34 or fewer hours of work per week. An analysis sample of college-educated women ages 25-44 married to college-educated men is then used to estimate the effects of overwork and underwork in husband's degree field on wife's labor market outcomes. To control for wife's potential earnings, specifications include fixed-effects for wife's detailed undergraduate degree fields (interacted with advanced degree status) and wife's detailed occupation.

Overwork-prone degree fields tend to be higher paying and, conversely, underwork-prone degree fields tend to be lower paying. Degree-field-specific measures of average hourly wage, wage variance, average wages for workers working 50 or more hours, and average wages for workers working 34 or fewer hours are therefore included as controls, along with husband's own earnings, in order to separate out the effects of overwork and underwork in husband's degree field from pay in husband's degree field. It should be noted, however, that the overwork measures and underwork measures are certainly correlated with other job characteristics beyond hours of work. For example, jobs that demand longer hours may also tend to be more stressful or require that the worker be accessible by phone or email most hours of the day, which could also affect spouse labor market outcomes. The effects estimated in this paper can therefore better be thought of as the effects of a bundle of job characteristics associated with overwork or underwork (conditional on pay).

Positive assortative matching is well-documented in the marriage market. It is therefore expected that men from overwork-prone degree fields (which tend to be higher-skilled and higher-paying) will tend to marry women who themselves are higher-skilled and higher-wage. Similarly, men from underwork-prone degree fields (which tend to be lower-skilled and lowerpaying) will tend to marry women who themselves are lower-skilled and lower-wage. Positive

assortative matching will therefore positively bias estimates of the effect of overwork in husband's degree field on wife's labor market outcomes and negatively bias estimates of the effect of underwork in husband's degree field on these same outcomes.

Bias due to assortative matching will affect both estimates of the effect of husband's degree field characteristics on wife's labor market outcomes and estimates of the effect of wife's degree field characteristics on husband's labor market outcomes. Evidence of bias due to assortative matching can therefore be obtained by generating a comparison set of estimates of the effects of overwork and underwork in wife's degree field on husband's outcomes. If, for example, there is little or no direct negative effect of overwork in wife's degree field on husband's outcomes, we should expect the positive bias due to assortative matching to result in positive estimates of the effect of overwork in wife's degree field on husband's outcomes.

More specifically, this paper estimates effects of overwork and underwork in spouse's degree field for a sample of married women with children and compares these estimates to those for two comparison groups: married men with children and married women without children. The expectation is that while estimates for all three groups will be subject to bias due to assortative matching, married women with children will experience a disproportionate direct effect of overwork and underwork in spouse's degree field.

Earnings and wages results for the two comparison groups are consistent with assortative matching. Estimates of the effect of overwork in spouse's degree field on earnings and wages are positive for both married men with children and married women without children, consistent with positive selection into marriage to spouses from overwork-prone degree fields. Likewise, estimates of the effect of underwork in spouse's degree field on earnings and wages are negative

for both comparison groups, consistent with negative selection into marriage to spouses from underwork-prone degree fields.

In contrast, estimates of the effect of overwork in spouse's degree field on earnings and wages for married women with children are negative, and differences in overwork estimates between married women with children and the two comparison groups are negative and statistically significant in all cases. These results are consistent with a disproportionate negative effect of overwork in spouse's degree field on earnings and wages of married women with children. Results from analysis of labor supply outcomes similarly indicate a disproportionate negative effect of overwork in spouse's degree field on employment and hours of married women with children.

Differences in underwork estimates between married women with children and the two comparison groups, however, are largely statistically insignificant for all outcomes. There is, therefore, little evidence that having a husband from an underwork-prone degree field differentially benefits the labor market outcomes of married women with children.

Labor market effects of overwork and underwork in husband's degree field are estimated conditional on detailed fixed-effects for wife's current occupation, which may mask effects on occupational choice. Additional analysis estimates the effects of overwork and underwork in husband's degree field on whether the wife works in a high-earning occupation. Differences in overwork estimates between married women with children and the two comparison groups are all negative, and differences in underwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups are all positive, but most of the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

The results in this paper overall provide evidence that there is an effect of work demands in spouse's degree field on the labor market outcomes of married women with children that is not experienced by married women without children or by married men. These findings take on an even larger relevance when viewed in the context of the way high-skilled women sort into marriage. Because high-skilled women trained for high-earning, demanding careers are particularly likely to be married to men who are also trained for demanding careers, the very women who make-up the "pipeline" for high-level positions in skilled careers are most likely to be married to husbands whose work demands may negatively affect their wives' persistence and advancement in their careers.

Methods

The empirical analysis makes use of two samples from 2009-2015 ACS data. First, the sample of college-educated male workers ages 25-55 is used to calculate degree-field level characteristics. Regressions are then estimated an analysis sample of college-educated women and men ages 25-44 who are married to college-educated spouses.

A. Degree Field Characteristics

Starting in 2009, the ACS data report field of undergraduate degree for college-educated individuals using 181 detailed codes. While the data report completion of an advanced degree, the field of advanced degree is not reported. Following the literature on overwork in occupations, the proportion of prime-aged (ages 25-55) college-educated male workers in a degree field who report 50 or more usual hours of work per week is used as the measure of overwork by degree field. Using the same sample, the proportion of male workers in a degree field who report 34 or fewer usual hours of work a week is used as the measure of underwork by degree field. Whether estimating the effect of husband's degree field characteristics on wife's

outcomes or the effect of wife's degree field characteristics on husband's outcomes, measures of overwork and underwork are calculated using prime-aged men.

The overwork and underwork measures are calculated separately by advanced degree status within degree field. Using the 181 detailed degree field codes, this allows for 362 degree field by advanced degree status cells. Additional degree field by advanced degree characteristics, also calculated using the same sample of college-educated prime-aged men, include the average hourly wage and wage variance.¹ Because McKinnish (2008) documents that the earnings of married women are negatively affected by high migration rates in husband's occupation, the one-year cross-state migration rate is also calculated using the same sample. For simplicity, the text will refer to these degree field by advanced degree status characteristics as degree field characteristics. Degree field cells that contain fewer than 100 observations for calculating these characteristics are dropped from the analysis. This sample restriction eliminates 29 degree field x advanced degree status cells (leaving 333), but only eliminates 0.10% of the analysis sample.

The top panel of Table 1 reports distributional characteristics of degree field characteristics for women in the analysis sample and their husbands. The first two rows of Table 1 report distributional characteristics of the overwork measure for wife's degree field and husband's degree field. The second two rows report the distribution characteristics of the underwork work measure for wife's degree field and husband's degree field. The median

¹ To calculate wage characteristics, the hourly wage is first calculated for each worker by dividing annual earnings by annual hours. Annual hours are calculated by multiplying weeks worked last year times usual hours per week. Because post-2008 ACS reports weeks of work in intervals, weeks of work are taken as the midpoint of the reported interval. Specifically, weeks values of 7, 20, 33, 43.5, 48.5 and 51, are used, respectively, for the reported intervals 1-13, 14-26, 27-39, 40-47, 48-49, and 50-52.

woman in the analysis sample specialized in a degree field for which 33.5% of male workers report overwork and for which 6.97 % of male workers report underwork. The median woman in the analysis sample has a husband who specialized in a degree field for which 34.5% of male workers report overwork and for which 4.86% of male workers report underwork. The final two rows of the top panel in Table 1 report distributional characteristics of average male earnings in degree field for the same samples.

The bottom panel in Table 1 reports distributional characteristics of overwork, underwork and average male earnings calculated by detailed occupation rather than degree field. Comparing the top and bottom panels, it is noteworthy that the gender gaps in overwork, underwork, and average male earnings are much larger for occupation than degree field. While women do specialize in degree fields that typically have less overwork, more underwork and lower male earnings than those chosen by men, the gender gap in these degree field characteristics is much smaller than the gender gap in the same occupation characteristics. These descriptive statistics suggest that women do not particularly select out of degree fields associated with overwork, but do select out of occupations associated with overwork.

The comparison of the top and bottom panels of Table 1 highlights the benefits of using degree field level measures of overwork and underwork as opposed to measures based on occupation. There is evidence of sorting by women away from higher paying occupations and away from occupations with more overwork. This sorting is likely affected by husband's characteristics. Therefore, when regressing husband's labor market outcomes on overwork in wife's occupation, a negative relationship could indicate that women are less likely to sort away from demanding high-paying occupations if they have a lower-earning husband rather than a direct causal effect of wife's occupation on husband's outcomes. Similarly, a negative effectof

overwork in husband's occupation on wife's labor market outcomes, could reflect men shifting into more demand careers in respect to a wife who is lower earning or less attached to the labor market. While current occupation is likely endogenous to spouse's characteristics, field of degree is time-constant and, in most cases, determined prior to spouse's characteristics. *B. Positive Assortative Matching and Degree Field Characteristics*

Table 2 provides evidence that degree fields associated with greater demand for long hours also tend to be higher-skilled and higher-wage. The top panel of Table 2 separates out from the analysis sample those in degree fields for which the overwork measure is less than or equal to 0.28 and those in degree fields for which the overwork measure is 0.38 or greater (approximately the 25th and 75th percentiles reported in Table 1). The table then reports, for each group, the means of the average male wage in degree field and the proportion of male workers in degree field with an advanced degree. Both average male wages in degree field and proportion with advanced degrees are notably higher for the degree fields with greater overwork. The bottom panel instead separates the sample based on the underwork measure. The reported means indicate that degree fields with less underwork tend to be higher-wage and higher-skill. Overall, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that individuals from degree fields with more overwork and less underwork will tend to be positively selected relative to individuals from degree fields with less overwork and more underwork.

Positive assortative matching is already well-documented in the marriage market. To the extent that there is positive matching on degree field characteristics, this implies that individuals married to spouses from overwork-prone degree fields will themselves tend to be positively selected and that individuals married to spouses underwork-prone degree fields will tend to be negatively selected. Table 3 provides evidence on matching on degree field characteristics by

regressing husband's degree field characteristics on wife's. The first column reports results from simple bivariate regressions, while the second adds controls for advanced degree status, age, race/ethnicity, immigration/citizenship, age of marriage, state x urban fixed-effects and year fixed-effects.

The results for the full sample in the top panel of Table 3 confirm that wives from higher paying degree fields tend to have husbands from higher paying degree fields, wives from degree fields with more overwork tend to have husbands from degree fields with more overwork, and wives from degree fields with more underwork tend to have husbands from degree fields with more effective fields with more underwork. The bottom panel of Table 3 confirms that these associations persist even after eliminating from the sample couples in which both spouses specialized in the same degree field.

The analysis in Tables 2 and 3 taken together suggest that regressions of labor market outcomes on spouse's degree field characteristics will be biased due to positive assortative matching. Men from overwork-prone degree fields will tend to be married to higher-skilled higher-wage women, which will positively bias estimates of the effect of overwork in husband's degree field on wife's labor market outcomes. Similarly, men from underwork-prone degree fields will tend to be married to lower-skilled lower-wage women, which will negatively bias estimates of the effect of underwork in husband's degree field on wife's labor market outcomes.

Of course, bias from assortative matching will affect both the estimates of the effect of husband's degree field characteristics on wife's outcomes and estimates of the effects of wife's degree field characteristics on husband's outcomes. It is therefore instructive to generate and compare estimates for both samples. If, for example, estimates indicate that men with married to women from overwork-prone degree fields tend to have better labor market outcomes, this is much more reasonably interpreted as a positive bias due to assortative matching rather than an

actual causal positive effect of wife's overwork on husband's labor market performance. And furthermore, this implies that estimates of the effect of overwork in husband's degree field on wife's labor market outcomes are also subject to positive bias due to assortative matching. If, then, estimates indicate that women married to men from overwork-prone degree fields tend to have worse labor market outcomes, this is consistent with a negative direct effect of husband's overwork that is sufficiently strong to outweigh positive bias due to assortative matching.

We therefore compare estimates for wives (which reflect the combination of the direct effect of spousal overwork on wives and the assortative matching effect for wives) to estimates for husbands (which reflect the combination of the direct effect of spousal overwork on husbands and the assortative matching effect for husbands). More specifically, in this paper, estimates for married women with children, who are most likely to be directly affected by overwork and underwork in husband's degree field, are compared to estimates for married men with children as well as to estimates for married women without children.

If the estimates for married women with children are typically more negative than the estimates for the two comparison groups, this is consistent with married women with children experiencing a disproportionate negative effect of husband's overwork. However, it is important to be clear this comparison of estimates does not necessarily difference out the assortative matching effect and leave an unbiased estimate of the difference in direct effects. This would only be true if the assortative matching effects were identical across subgroups. It is therefore more appropriate to think of this empirical approach as checking for evidence consistent with a differential direct effect of spouse overwork on wife's labor market outcomes, rather than producing an unbiased estimate of the direct effect.

C. Regression Specification

The baseline regression specification for analyzing wife's labor market outcomes is:

$$Wife_Outcome_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Husb_DegFieldHrsGt50_j + \beta_2 Husb_DegFieldHrsLt34_j +Husb_DegFieldControls_j\beta_3 + \beta_4 Husb_Earn_j + X_{ij}\beta_5 (1) + \sum_k \delta_k *Wife_DegField_{ki} + \sum_k \phi_k *Wife_DegField_{ki} *Wife_Adv_i + \sum_l \theta_l *Wife_Occ_{li} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where for wife *i* married to husband *j*, *Wife_Outcome* is an individual labor market outcome: earnings, hourly wage, employment status, or usual hours of work per week. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for these outcome variables separately for married women with children, married men with children, and married women without children.

The explanatory variables of interest are the proportion of prime-aged college-educated male workers in husband's degree field reporting 50 or more hours of work per week and the proportion of prime-aged college-educated male workers in husband's degree field reporting 34 or fewer hours of work per week. The degree field-level controls for husband's degree field are: average male wage, male wage variance, average wage for male workers working 50 or hours a week, average male wage for workers working 34 or few hours a week, and out-of-state migration rate in past year. Standard errors are clustered on spouse's degree field.

It is important to include measures for overwork and underwork together in the same regression. The reason is that excluding one exacerbates the bias due to assortative matching on the remaining variable. The overwork and underwork measures are negatively correlated, and assortative matching induces a negative correlation between the underwork measure and spouse labor market outcomes (individuals from underwork-prone degree fields tend to be negatively-selected and their spouses, therefore, tend to be negatively selected). If the underwork measure is not included as a control, this exacerbates the positive bias due to assortative matching on the overwork measure (and vice versa).

X is a vector of controls that includes, for both husband and wife: indicator for advanced degree, age and age squared (also interacted with advanced degree), race/ethnicity indicators (white, black, Hispanic), immigration and citizenship status. X also includes couple level controls: number of children, number of children under 5, wife's age of marriage (quadratic), state x urban indicator fixed-effects, and year fixed-effects.

The specification also includes fixed-effects for wife's detailed degree field (interacted with advanced degree indicator) and wife's detailed occupation.² These fixed-effects help control for heterogeneity in wife's human capital and potential earnings.

The specification also includes a control for husband's own earnings. This control is included to address the fact that husbands from overwork-prone degree fields tend to be higher earners, and a higher earning husband tends to reduce wife's labor market effort. Husband's earnings are therefore included as a control to help isolate the effect of the time demands in husband's degree field separate from husband's earnings. Because of the concern that husband's earnings is endogenous to spouse's labor market outcomes, Appendix A reports sensitivity of the baseline results in Tables 5 and 7 with husband's earnings excluded as a control variable. The results are highly robust to the exclusion of this variable.

Equation (1) is estimated separately for married women with children and married women with children. Equation (1) is also estimated for married men with children, where husband's labor market outcomes are the dependent variables, overwork and underwork in wife's degree field are the key explanatory variables, and fixed-effects for husband's degree field and occupation replace fixed-effects for wife's degree field and occupation.

² There are 333 detailed occupation codes. Occupation is reported for most recent job in past 5 years, so fixedeffects will reflect reported occupation even for women who are not currently working, as long as they have worked in the past 5 years.

Equations (1) includes fixed-effects for wife's current detailed occupation as a control for heterogeneity in wife's human capital and potential earnings. A consequence of adding these controls, however, is that any effects of husband's overwork on wife's current occupation will be missed. For example, it may be the case that women are more likely to switch to lower paying occupations, particularly after they have children, if their husband tend to work long hours. It is therefore important to also consider the effect of spousal overwork and underwork on whether the wife works in a high-earning occupation. Equation (2) uses as the outcome an indicator variable, *Wife_HighEarnOcc*, for whether average male earnings in wife's occupation are above median among college-educated women. Specifically, the indicator equals one if average male earnings in wife's occupation are at least \$76,350 (the median reported in Table 1).³

$$Wife _HighEarnOcc_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Husb _DegHrsGt50_j + \beta_2 Husb _DegHrsLt34_j +Husb _DegControls_j\beta_3 + \beta_3 Husb _Earn_4 + X_{ij}\beta_5 +\sum_k \delta_k *Wife _DegField_{ki} + \sum_k \phi_k *Wife _DegField_{ki} *Wife _Adv_i +\varepsilon_{ij}$$

Because the dependent variable only varies with wife's occupation, fixed-effects for wife's detailed occupation cannot be included in equation (2).

Results

Table 5 reports estimates from equation (1) using earnings and wages as outcomes. Standard errors are clustered on spouse's degree field. The top panel reports estimates for logged earnings, specifically log(earnings+1), while the bottom panels restrict the sample to current

³ When comparison estimates are generated using the husbands sample, the outcome indicator Husb_HighEarnOcc equals one if average male earnings in husband's occupation are at least \$86,310 (median reported in Table 1).

workers and report estimates for logged earnings and logged wages.⁴ The first three columns report estimates using the subsamples of married women with children, married men with children and married women without children, respectively.

It is instructive to first look at columns 2 and 3, which report estimates for the comparison groups of married men with children and married women without children. Across all three panels, the estimates in these columns are consistent with positive assortative matching. All coefficient estimates for overwork in spouse's degree field are positive and all coefficient estimates for underwork in spouse's degree field are negative, though with varying degrees of significance. This is consistent with assortative matching in which individuals from overwork-prone degree fields tend to be positively-selected and therefore tend to be married to positively-selected higher-earning spouses. Individuals from underwork-prone degree fields tend to be negatively-selected and therefore tend to be married to negatively-selected lower-earning spouses. Even the magnitudes are quite similar when comparing overwork and underwork coefficient estimates across the two comparison groups: married men with children and married women without children.

The column 1 uses the sample of married women with children, and coefficient estimates for overwork in spouse's degree field differ substantially from those for the two comparison groups. Overwork estimates for married women with children are negative in all three panels and statistically significant in the top two panels. The negative effects of overwork in spouse's degree field on married women with children are therefore highly suggestive of a negative direct effect of husband's overwork on wife's labor market outcomes for married women with children.

⁴ When analysis is restricted to current workers in panels B and C, the sample is further restricted to only workers for whom calculated hourly wage is between \$1 and \$200.

The only conditions under which this interpretation would be incorrect is if the assortative matching effort for married women with children were substantially weaker than it is for the two comparison groups. There is no reason to believe that married women with children are subject to any less of a positive assortative matching effect on the overwork estimates than those reflected in the comparison group estimates in columns 2 and 3 (particularly given that the estimates for the two comparison groups are so similar to each other).

Column 4 directly tests the difference in estimates between married women with children and married men with children using a fully-interacted model. Column 5 similarly tests the difference in estimates between married women with children and married women without children. Across all three panels in both columns, the differences in overwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison group are negative and statistically significant.

Unlike the overwork measure, the estimates for underwork in spouse's degree field are the same sign for married women with children as the two comparison groups, and none of the differences in estimates tested in columns 4 and 5 are statistically significant. It does not appear that underwork in spouse's degree field is differentially consequential for the earnings and wages of married women with children.

A comparison of the earnings results using the full sample in Panel A and those using the sample of workers in Panel B indicates that the more negative effects of underwork for married women with children in the first panel are due to non-working women. This suggests that married women with children whose husbands are in underwork-prone degree fields are disproportionately likely to be non-workers. This will be tested more directly below.

Table 6 reports sensitivity of estimates in Table 5 to changes in the definitions of the overwork and underwork measures. To reduce the total volume of reported estimates, which

will facilitate comparisons across the table, Table 6 only reports differences in estimates between married women with children and the two comparison groups, like those reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5. The top panel of Table 6 repeats the baseline estimates from columns 4 and 5 of Table 5. Panel B changes the underwork measure to the fraction of prime-aged college-educated men who report 36 or fewer hours of work a week. Panel C uses 32 hours per week as the cutoff for the underwork measure. Panel D uses 55 hours a week as the overwork measure cutoff.⁵

There are a few noticeable patterns in Table 6. First, the differences in estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups for the overwork measures are all negative, and, in the majority of specifications, statistically significant. Second, the differences in estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups for the underwork measures are positive in most cases, but only occasionally statistically significant.

Additionally, the magnitude of the estimates in Table 6 are sensitive to the hours of work cutoffs used to define the overwork and underwork measures. The overwork estimates are sensitive to the definition of underwork and vice versa. This is because, as discussed above, the overwork and underwork measures are (negatively) correlated and the coefficient estimates for each are affected by bias due to assortative matching. A change in definition in one will therefore affect the other. It is therefore problematic to interpret the magnitude of any one estimate as an unbiased estimate of the differential direct effect of spouse overwork or underwork. Rather, it is more appropriate to simply consider whether the estimates are consistent with a differential effect of spouse overwork or underwork on married women with children. Overall there is stronger evidence of a negative effect of husband's overwork on the labor market outcomes of

⁵ Degree field wage controls are adjusted as appropriate.

married women with children than for a positive effect of husband's underwork on the same outcomes.

Table 7 reports estimates from equation (1) using labor supply outcomes: employment and weekly hours. The structure of Table 7 is identical to Table 5. The results for overwork mirror those in Table 5. The overwork estimates for the comparison groups are largely positive, while the overwork estimates for married women with children are all negative. The differences in overwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups are all negative and statistically significant.

Also similar to the Table 5 results, there are no statistically significant differences in underwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups. In contrast to Table 5, however, most of the underwork estimates in column 1 are negative, suggesting that if there is any positive effect of husband's overwork on the labor market outcomes of married women with children, this effect is small relative to the negative bias due negative selection into marriage with husbands from underwork-prone degree fields.

Unlike Table 5, however, the differences in underwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups are mostly negative, though statistically insignificant. The fact that the underwork estimates are even more negative for married women with children than the comparison groups suggests that the negative selection into marriage to spouses from underwork-prone degree fields is more consequential for the labor supply of married women with children than the two comparison groups. This is very plausible, as married women with children have lower employment and average hours than both comparison groups, and negatively selected mothers likely respond to childbearing with larger reductions in labor supply than positively selected mothers. Notice, however, that the reverse of this argument, that

positively-selectively women are disproportionately less likely to reduce labor supply when they have children, works against the Table 7 finding of negative effects of spouse overwork on married women with children.

Table 8 replicates the Table 7 analysis, but varying the hours of work cutoffs used to definite the overwork and underwork measures, similar to Table 6. Consistent with previous findings, the overwork estimates are consistently negative and mostly statistically significant. Also similar to previous findings, the underwork measures are statistically insignificant with a mixture of positive and negative coefficient estimates.

Because the regressions specifications in Tables 5-8 include occupation fixed-effects, estimates in these tables measure the effect of overwork in husband's degree field on wife's hourly wage and earnings *conditional* on her current detailed occupation. If some women switch to lower paying occupations in response to husband's work demands, the estimates in Tables 5-8 understate the total effect of overwork in husband's degree field on wife's outcomes. Table 9 reports estimates from equation (2), in which the dependent variable is an indicator for high-earning occupation (defined as an occupation with above median average male earnings, as reported in Table 1).

In Panels A and C of Table 9, the outcome is an indicator that equals one for individuals whose occupation has average male earnings above or equal to the median (\$66,466 for women and \$85,880 for men, as reported in Table 1). Because occupation is reported for most recent job held in the past five years, not all who report a high-earning occupation are currently working. Panels B and D of Table 5, therefore, use instead an indicator for currently working in a highearning occupation. Panels A and B of Table 5 use the full analysis samples. Panels C and D only include individuals who specialized in high-earning degree fields (above the median of

\$76,3500 for women and \$86,310 for men, as reported in Table 1), as they are more likely to work in high-earning occupations.

The differences in overwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 9 are all negative, but in most cases are statistically insignificant. The differences in underwork estimates between married women with children and the comparison groups reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 9 are all positive, but almost always statistically insignificant. The signs of the estimates are therefore consistent with the occupation choices of married women with children being affected by overwork and underwork in husband's degree field, so that mothers married to men from overwork-prone degree fields are less likely to report high-earning occupations and mothers married to men from underwork-prone degree fields are more likely to report high-earning occupations, but the estimates are imprecise and in most cases not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Conclusions

The results in this paper suggest that the earnings, wages and labor supply of married women with children are differentially negatively affected by spouse's overwork, but that there is little evidence of a differential effect of spouse's underwork. Caution must, however, be exercised when interpreting the magnitude of the estimates. First, magnitudes are sensitive to the exact definitions of overwork and underwork used in the analysis. Second, estimates for the comparison groups suggest that there is substantial bias due to assortative matching. Because it is not possible to claim that this bias is identical across married women with children and the two comparison groups, the differences in estimates do not necessarily difference out the assortative matching bias.

There are reasons, however, to be optimistic that the differenced estimates in this paper are informative about the direct effects of spousal overwork on married women with children, even if they are less informative about the direct effects of spousal underwork. First, for the earnings and wages analysis in Table 5, the coefficient estimates for the comparison groups are all consistent in sign with bias due to assortative matching (positive for overwork and negative for underwork), and similar in magnitude to each other. A reasonable interpretation of these results is that the comparison group estimates are a fair approximation of the bias due to assortative matching operating on the estimates for married women with children. In this case the differenced estimates should be interpretable as direct effects of spousal overwork on married women with children.

Second, the comparison group estimates of overwork effects exhibit the same similarity for the hours of work in Table 7. While the comparison group estimates of overwork effects on employment are not similar to each other, the results are consistent with a smaller direct negative effect of spousal overwork on the employment of married women without children.

Finally, while the underwork estimates in both Tables 5 and 7 are in general noisy and less informative, the pattern of results suggests that that negative selection into marriage to underwork-prone spouses is more consequential for the labor supply of married women with children than the two comparison groups. This suggests that the positive selection into marriage to overwork-prone spouses may have even more a positive effect of the labor supply of married women with children than the two comparison groups, suggesting that the differenced overwork estimates for labor supply are in fact conservative.

These findings also provide important context when considering labor market outcomes of high-skilled women who have trained in demanding, high-earning careers. There has been

considerable focus on the fact that the long hours and inflexibility in many careers are not family friendly and may impede the labor market success of women with children. Less attention has been given to the fact that, due to assortative matching, these high-skilled women are often also married to men who have trained for similarly demanding careers. Therefore, married women in these fields, particularly those with children, may face the double-disadvantage of both the demands of their own job as well as the demands of their husband's job.

References

- Bertrand, Marianne, Emir Kamenica and Jessica Pan. 2015. "Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130(2):571-614.
- Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2010. "Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 2 (3): 228–55.
- Bianchi, Suzanne M., Melissa A. Milkie, Liana C. Sayer, and John P. Robinson. 2000. Is anyone doing the housework? Trends in the gender division of house- hold labor." Social Forces. Vol. 79:191-228.
- Cha, Youngjoo. 2010. "Reinforcing Separate Spheres: The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men's and Women'sEmployment in Dual-Earner Households" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 75 (2): 303-329
- Cha, Youngjoo and Kim A. Weeden. 2014. .Overwork and the Slow Convergence in the Gender Gap in Wages". *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 79(3): 457-484
- Cortes, Patricia and Jessica Pan. 2017. "Prevalence of Long Hours and Women's Occupational Choices" IZA DP No. 10225
- Flabbi, Luca and Andrea Moro. 2012. .The E¤ect of Job Flexibility on Female Labor Market Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model." *Journal of Econometrics*. Vol. 168(1): 81-95.
- Goldin, Claudia. 2014. A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter." American Economic Review. Vol.104(4): 1091-1119.
- Lim, Katherine. 2015. .Self-Employment, Workplace Flexibility, and Maternal Labor Supply, A Life-Cycle Model." Working Paper.
- McKinnish, Terra. 2008. "Spousal Mobility and Earnings." Demography 45(4): 829-49.
- Noonan, Mary C., Mary E. Corcoran, and Paul N. Courant. 2005. "Pay Differences among the Highly Trained: Cohort Differences in the Sex Gap in Lawyer's Earnings." *Social Forces* 84 (2): 853–72.
- Pertold-Gebicka, Barbara, Filip Pertold, and Nabanita Datta Gupta. 2016. .Employment Adjustments around Childbirth." IZA Discussion Paper No. 9685.
- Stone, Pamela. 2007. Opting out?: Why women really quit careers and head home. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wiswall, Matthew and Basit Zafar. 2016. Preference for the Workplace, Investment in Human Capital, and Gender. Working Paper.

Appendix- Exclusion of spouse income and child control variables

Table A1 reports estimates obtained replicating regressions in Table 5, excluding the spouse earnings control variable. Table A2 reports estimates obtained replicating Table 7, also excluding the spouse earnings control variable.

Table A1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Married	Married Men	Married	Diff	Diff
	Women with	with	Women w/o	(1) and (2)	(1) and (3)
	children	Children	Children		
A. Log(Earnings)					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.856+	0.464^{*}	0.231	-1.321*	-1.087*
Deg Field	(0.514)	(0.199)	(0.301)	(0.552)	(0.482)
-					
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-1.148	-0.365	-1.125*	-0.783	-0.0235
Deg Field	(1.322)	(0.448)	(0.490)	(1.487)	(1.144)
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
B.Log(Earnings), Wo	orkers Only				
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.275+	0.205^{*}	0.161	-0.480**	-0.436***
Deg Field	(0.148)	(0.0921)	(0.0987)	(0.155)	(0.127)
C		. ,	х <i>У</i>		. ,
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.239	-0.338*	-0.599**	0.0993	0.360
Deg Field	(0.386)	(0.154)	(0.215)	(0.397)	(0.295)
-					
Ν	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237
C. Log(Wage), Work	ers Only				
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.115+	0.0971	0.0943	-0.212*	-0.210**
Deg Field	(0.0681)	(0.0667)	(0.0640)	(0.0817)	(0.0707)
-	. ,	× ,	· · ·		· · · ·
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.170	-0.326**	-0.314+	0.156	0.144
Deg Field	(0.148)	(0.119)	(0.173)	(0.182)	(0.171)
-	. ,				· · ·
Ν	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237

Table	A2
-------	----

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Married	Married Men	Married	Diff	Diff
	Women with	with	Women w/o	(1) and (2)	(1) and (3)
	children	Children	Children		
A. Employed					
\geq 50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0999*	0.0353^{*}	-0.00963	-0.135**	-0.0902^{+}
Deg Field	(0.0458)	(0.0144)	(0.0362)	(0.0488)	(0.0486)
	0.0207	0.000770	0.000	0.0200	0.0000
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0397	-0.000772	-0.0606	-0.0389	0.0209
Deg Field	(0.112)	(0.0299)	(0.0604)	(0.116)	(0.101)
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
B. Weekly Hours					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-1.838	5.616***	4.289^{**}	-7.455**	-6.127**
Deg Field	(2.285)	(1.156)	(1.533)	(2.424)	(1.927)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-1.971	2.990	-2.971	-4.961	1.000
Deg Field	(6.782)	(1.888)	(3.011)	(6.632)	(5.174)
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
C. Weekly Hours, We					
\geq 50 Hrs in Spouse's	0.0229	4.119***	3.144**	-4.096*	-3.121*
Deg Field	(1.537)	(1.139)	(1.120)	(1.835)	(1.315)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.938	1.867	-3.493	-2.805	2.555
Deg Field	(4.465)	(1.823)	(2.376)	(4.346)	(3.662)
Ν	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237

	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90
A. Degree Field Characteri	stics				
Fraction Male Workers with	≥50 Work Hrs	in:			
Wife's Degree Field	0.239	0.275	0.335	0.377	0.446
Husband's Degree Field	0.253	0.285	0.345	0.388	0.461
Fraction Male Workers with	≤34 Work Hrs	in:			
Wife's Degree Field	0.0369	0.0473	0.0697	0.0863	0.105
Husband's Degree Field	0.0331	0.0399	0.0486	0.0728	0.0970
Avg Annual Earnings for Ma	ale Workers in:				
Wife's Degree Field	53,089	63,834	76,350	95,327	120,680
Husband's Degree Field	59,886	68,751	86,310	104,399	125,237
B. Occupation Characteris	tics				
Fraction Male Workers with	≥50 Work Hrs	in:			
Wife's Occupation	0.125	0.185	0.274	0.366	0.491
Husband's Occupation	0.179	0.232	0.340	0.445	0.560
Fraction Male Workers with	≤34 Work Hrs	in:			
Wife's Occupation	0.0163	0.0273	0.0528	0.0930	0.170
Husband's Occupation	0.0125	0.0184	0.0288	0.0609	0.142
Avg Annual Earnings for Ma	ale Workers in:				
Wife's Occupation	41,923	51,898	66,466	93,506	120,239
Husband's Occupation	45,794	61,935	85,759	107,594	144,197

Table 1: Characteristics of Wife's and Husband's Degree Field and Occupation

Notes: Sample of college-educated women in 2009-2015 ACS data ages 25-44 married to college-educated men (N=347,116). Characteristics calculated for each occupation and degree field using the sample of college-educated male workers ages 25-55.

	$(\geq 50$ Hrs in Deg Field)	(≥50 Hrs in Deg Field)
	≤0.28	≥0.38
Average Male Wage	33.43	49.65
in Degree Field	(7.00)	(10.32)
Proportion Male Workers	0.077	0.795
with Adv Degree in Deg	(0.267)	(0.404)
Field		
	(≤34 Hrs in Deg Field)	(≤34 Hrs in Deg Field)
	≤0.04	≥ 0.08
Average Male Wage	45.57	32.48
in Degree Field	(8.77)	(5.41)
Duenentien Mele Wei	0.502	0.102
Proportion Male Workers	0.593	0.192
with Advanced Degree	(0.491)	(0.394)

Table 2: Characteristics of Degree Fields with High and Low Overwork and Underwork

Notes: Sample of college-educated men and women in 2009-2015 ACS data ages 25-44 married to college-educated spouses. Table reports average degree field characteristics for designated subcategories.

	No Controls	with Controls
A. Full Sample (n=346,987	():	
Log(Average Male Wage in Degree Field)	0.268 (0.012)***	0.178 (0.011)***
≥50 Hrs in Degree Field	0.173 (0.019)***	0.137 (0.018)***
≤34 Hrs in Degree Field	0.225 (0.017)***	0.217 (0.016)***
B. Exclude Same-Degree F Couples (n=311,055):	ïeld	
Log(Average Male Wage in Degree Field)	0.202 (0.010)***	0.095 (0.009)***
≥50 Hrs in Degree Field	0.100 (0.017)***	0.044 (0.014)**
≤34 Hrs in Degree Field	0.132 (0.014)***	0.116 (0.012)***

Table 3: Relationship between Wife's and Husband's Degree Field Characteristics

Notes: Sample as described in Table 1. Column 1 reports coefficient from simple bivariate regression of husband's degree field characteristic on wife's. Column 2 adds controls for both husband and wife: advanced degree indicator, age and age squared (interacted with advanced degree), race/ethnicity indicators, immigration and citizenship status as well as wife's age of marriage (quadratic), state fixed-effects, state x urban indicator fixed-effects and survey year fixed-effects.

	Married Women	Married Men	Married Women
	with Children	with Children	w/o Children
Faminas	46.042	97 005	40 116
Earnings	46,042 (52,763)	87,905 (78,382)	49,116 (42,862)
	(52,705)	(78,382)	(42,002)
Weekly Hours	31.58	44.92	39.83
-	(16.86)	(11.06)	(13.03)
Employed	0.813	0.967	0.911
N	237345	208781	109552
Workers Only: Earnings	52,632	85,646	51,595
Lamings	(44,141)	(61,721)	(37261.4)
	(11,111)	(01,721)	(3/2011)
Wage	29.58	37.24	25.24
-	(19.49)	(23.16)	(15.48)
Weekly Hours	36.53	45.60	41.68
·	(12.47)	(9.531)	(10.14)
Ν	196,439	194,931	101,798
		0	
\geq 50 Hrs in	0.327	.345	0.330
Degree Field	(0.0776)	(0.0747)	(0.0774)
≤34 Hrs in	0.0689	0.0588	0.0735
Degree Field	(0.0285)	(0.0274)	(0.0318)
Ν	237345	208781	109552

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Subsample

Notes: Column 1 uses sample of college-educated women in 2009-2015 ACS data ages 25-44 married to college-educated men and residing with a child under age 18. Column 2 uses sample of college-educated men in 2009-2015 ACS data ages 25-44 married to college-educated women and residing with a child under18. Column 3 uses sample of college-educated women in 2009-2015 ACS data ages 25-44 married to college-educated men and who do not reside with a child under 18. Table reports means with standard deviations in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Married	Married Men	Married	Diff	Diff
	Women with	with	Women w/o	(1) and (2)	(1) and (3)
	children	Children	Children		
A. Log(Earnings)					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.911+	0.430^{*}	0.293	-1.340*	-1.203*
Deg Field	(0.516)	(0.194)	(0.294)	(0.551)	(0.476)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-1.337	-0.470	-0.641	-0.866	-0.695
Deg Field	(1.323)	(0.447)	(0.474)	(1.486)	(1.119)
N	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
B.Log(Earnings), Wo	orkers Only				
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.303*	0.164^{+}	0.167+	-0.468**	-0.470***
Deg Field	(0.149)	(0.0894)	(0.0982)	(0.154)	(0.129)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.335	-0.462**	-0.541^{*}	0.127	0.206
Deg Field	(0.384)	(0.156)	(0.214)	(0.396)	(0.290)
N	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237
C. Log(Wage), Work	ers Only				
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0993	0.0584	0.0863	-0.158+	-0.186*
Deg Field	(0.0679)	(0.0673)	(0.0635)	(0.0803)	(0.0721)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.125	-0.436**	-0.260	0.311	0.135
Deg Field	(0.159)	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.197)	(0.183)
Ν	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237

Table 5: Effect of overwork and underwork in spouse's degree field on earnings and hourly wage

Notes: Samples described in notes of Table 2. Table reports, from equation (2), estimates of the coefficients on fraction of male workers in spouse's degree reporting 50 or more usual hours of work per week and fraction of male workers in spouse's degree field report 34 or fewer usual hours of work per week. Differences estimates in columns 4 and 5 are generated using fully-interacted models. Controls include all controls listed in notes of Table 4 as well as degree field fixed-effects (interacted with advanced degree indicator), detailed occupation fixed-effects, spouse's earnings, and additional characteristics of spouse's degree field: average hourly wage, average hourly wage for workers with 50 or more hours, average hourly wage for workers with 34 or fewer hours, wage variance, and cross-state migration rate.

Standard errors, clustered on spouse's degree field, in parentheses.

 $^{+}p < 0.10, \ ^{*}p < 0.05, \ ^{**}p < 0.01, \ ^{***}p < 0.001$

Wage Outcome						
	Log(Earnings)		Log(Earnings),		0.	Wage),
			Workers Only			rs Only
	Diff 1	Diff 2	Diff 1	Diff 2	Diff 1	Diff 2
A. Baseline						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-1.340*	-1.203*	-0.468**	-0.470***	-0.158+	-0.186*
Deg Field	(0.551)	(0.476)	(0.154)	(0.129)	(0.0803)	(0.0721)
\leq 34Hrs, Spouse's	-0.866	-0.695	0.127	0.206	0.311	0.135
Deg Field	(1.486)	(1.119)	(0.396)	(0.290)	(0.197)	(0.183)
Ν	446126	346897	391370	298237	391370	298237
$\frac{N}{\text{B.} \leq 36 \text{ Hours}}$						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.721	-0.884+	-0.297+	-0.317*	-0.106	-0.151*
Deg Field	(0.564)	(0.496)	(0.166)	(0.136)	(0.0802)	(0.0701)
≤ 36Hrs, Spouse's	0.629	0.275	0.382	0.458^{*}	0.267^{*}	0.202^{*}
Deg Field	(1.030)	(0.767)	(0.303)	(0.189)	(0.118)	(0.0985)
Ν	446126	346897	391370	298237	391370	298237
$\frac{N}{C. \leq 32 \text{ Hours}}$						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-1.368*	-1.215*	-0.477**	-0.472***	-0.189*	-0.215**
Deg Field	(0.544)	(0.471)	(0.153)	(0.128)	(0.0798)	(0.0698)
≤ 32Hrs, Spouse's	-1.012	-0.804	0.105	0.195	0.238	0.0946
Deg Field	(1.488)	(1.123)	(0.402)	(0.293)	(0.190)	(0.170)
Ν	446126	346897	391370	298237	391370	298237
$D. \ge 55$ Hours						
≥55 Hrs, Spouse's	-1.062	-1.024	-0.504*	-0.615**	-0.147	-0.179+
Deg Field	(0.884)	(0.793)	(0.242)	(0.208)	(0.115)	(0.106)
≤ 34Hrs, Spouse's	0.137	0.124	0.411	0.412	0.379^{*}	0.241
Deg Field	(1.527)	(1.135)	(0.407)	(0.300)	(0.173)	(0.169)
Ν	446126	346897	391370	298237	391370	298237

Table 6: Varying Weekly Hours Cutoffs for Overwork and Underwork Measures, Earnings and Wage Outcomes

Notes: Panel A replicates Columns 4 and 5 results from Table 5. Diff 1 indicates differences between married women with children and married men with children reported in column 4 of Table 5. Diff 2 indicates differences between married women with children and married women without children reported in column 5 of Table 5. Panels B-D replicate the same analysis, varying the hours cutoff used to define the underwork or overwork measure.

Standard errors, clustered on spouse's degree field, in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Married	Married Men	Married	Diff	Diff
	Women with	with	Women w/o	(1) and (2)	(1) and (3)
	children	Children	Children		
A. Employed					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.114*	0.0309^{*}	-0.00898	-0.145**	-0.105*
Deg Field	(0.0462)	(0.0140)	(0.0361)	(0.0491)	(0.0482)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0896	-0.0139	-0.0555	-0.0757	-0.0341
Deg Field	(0.112)	(0.0291)	(0.0605)	(0.116)	(0.100)
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
B. Weekly Hours					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-2.732	4.977***	4.288**	-7.709**	-7.020***
Deg Field	(2.286)	(1.123)	(1.530)	(2.414)	(1.943)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-5.072	1.044	-2.981	-6.116	-2.091
Deg Field	(6.744)	(1.872)	(2.983)	(6.571)	(5.163)
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
C. Weekly Hours, We	orkers Only				
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.538	3.613**	3.138**	-4.150*	-3.676**
Deg Field	(1.542)	(1.127)	(1.118)	(1.815)	(1.346)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-2.868	0.305	-3.547	-3.173	0.679
Deg Field	(4.452)	(1.858)	(2.371)	(4.307)	(3.659)
Ν	196439	194931	101798	391370	298237

Table 7: Effect of overwork and underwork in spouse's degree field on labor supply

Notes: Samples and analysis described in notes of Table 5. Standard errors, clustered on spouse's degree field, in parentheses. p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.01, p < 0.001

Outcomes						
	Employed		Weekly Hours		Weekly Hours, Workers Only	
	Diff 1	Diff 2	Diff 1	Diff 2	Diff 1	Diff 2
A. Baseline						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.145**	-0.105^{*}	-7.709**	-7.020***	-4.150^{*}	-3.676**
Deg Field	(0.0491)	(0.0482)	(2.414)	(1.943)	(1.815)	(1.346)
≤ 34Hrs, Spouse's	-0.0757	-0.0341	-6.116	-2.091	-3.173	0.679
Deg Field	(0.116)	(0.100)	(6.571)	(5.163)	(4.307)	(3.659)
Ν	446126	346897	446126	346897	391370	298237
$\frac{N}{\text{B.} \leq 36 \text{ Hours}}$						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.0959^{+}	-0.0788	-5.782^{*}	-5.487**	-3.370+	-2.556+
Deg Field	(0.0520)	(0.0505)	(2.619)	(2.053)	(1.905)	(1.384)
≤ 36Hrs, Spouse's	0.0478	0.0335	0.807	2.043	0.360	2.910
Deg Field	(0.0841)	(0.0722)	(4.912)	(3.591)	(3.072)	(2.434)
Ν	446126	346897	446126	346897	391370	298237
$\frac{N}{C. \leq 32 \text{ Hours}}$						
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.147**	-0.107*	-7.749**	-7.053***	-4.178^{*}	-3.696**
Deg Field	(0.0487)	(0.0481)	(2.387)	(1.923)	(1.803)	(1.341)
≤ 32Hrs, Spouse's	-0.0856	-0.0404	-6.533	-2.424	-3.358	0.538
Deg Field	(0.117)	(0.101)	(6.613)	(5.209)	(4.369)	(3.704)
Ν	446126	346897	446126	346897	391370	298237
$D. \ge 55$ Hours						
≥55 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.167*	-0.113	-6.822^{+}	-8.417*	-4.044	-6.596**
Deg Field	(0.0801)	(0.0816)	(4.070)	(3.506)	(2.818)	(2.302)
\leq 34Hrs, Spouse's	0.00130	0.0282	-0.308	1.533	-0.0244	1.543
Deg Field	(0.123)	(0.102)	(6.743)	(5.314)	(4.243)	(3.667)
Ν	446126	346897	446126	346897	391370	298237

Table 8: Varying Weekly Hours Cutoffs for Overwork and Underwork Measures, Labor Supply Outcomes

Notes: Analysis as described in Table 6 notes, except Panel A replicates Columns 4 and 5 results from Table 7. Standard errors, clustered on spouse's degree field, in parentheses. ${}^{+} p < 0.10$, ${}^{*} p < 0.05$, ${}^{**} p < 0.01$, ${}^{***} p < 0.001$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Married	Married Men	Married	Diff	Diff
	Women with	with	Women w/o	(1) and (2)	(1) and (3)
	children	Children	Children	(1) und (2)	(1) und (5)
A. High Income Occu					
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0190	0.0667	0.0496	-0.0856	-0.0686
Degree Field	(0.0408)	(0.0623)	(0.0473)	(0.0648)	(0.0511)
-					
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.111	-0.328**	-0.275**	0.217^{+}	0.164
Degree Field	(0.0877)	(0.105)	(0.0868)	(0.126)	(0.111)
λī	237345	208781	109552	446126	216907
N B. Works in High Inco			109332	440120	346897
	-		0.0505	0.1.40±	0.107*
≥50 Hrs in Spouse's	-0.0680	0.0747	0.0585	-0.143+	-0.127*
Degree Field	(0.0484)	(0.0619)	(0.0504)	(0.0741)	(0.0550)
\leq 34Hrs in Spouse's	-0.124	-0.319**	-0.277**	0.196	0.154
Degree Field	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.0978)	(0.154)	(0.124)
8	(0.2027)	(0000)	(0.07.0)	(0.12 1)	(0))
Ν	237345	208781	109552	446126	346897
C. High Income Occu	pation, High In	come Degree Fi	elds Only		
≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	-0.0451	0.00556	0.0165	-0.0506	-0.0616
Degree Field	(0.0589)	(0.0735)	(0.0597)	(0.0829)	(0.0754)
\leq 34Hrs, Spouse's					
	-0.0696	-0.396**	-0.299*	0.327^{*}	0.229
Degree Field	-0.0696 (0.103)	-0.396 ^{**} (0.133)	-0.299* (0.119)	0.327 [*] (0.162)	0.229 (0.143)
Degree Field	(0.103)	(0.133)	(0.119)	(0.162)	(0.143)
Degree Field	(0.103) 118047	(0.133) 106802	(0.119) 55755	(0.162) 224849	
Degree Field <i>N</i> D. Works in High Inc.	(0.103) <u>118047</u> ome Occupatio	(0.133) 106802 n, High Income	(0.119) 55755 Degree Fields C	(0.162) 224849 Dnly	(0.143) 173802
Degree Field <u>N</u> D. Works in High Ince ≥50 Hrs, Spouse's	(0.103) <u>118047</u> <u>ome Occupatio</u> -0.100	(0.133) <u>106802</u> n, High Income -0.00301	(0.119) 55755 Degree Fields C 0.0230	(0.162) 224849 Only -0.0971	(0.143) <u>173802</u> -0.123
Degree Field <u>N</u> D. Works in High Inc.	(0.103) <u>118047</u> ome Occupatio	(0.133) 106802 n, High Income	(0.119) 55755 Degree Fields C	(0.162) 224849 Dnly	(0.143) 173802
Degree Field <i>N</i> D. Works in High Ince ≥50 Hrs, Spouse's Deg Field	(0.103) <u>118047</u> <u>ome Occupatio</u> -0.100 (0.0690)	(0.133) <u>106802</u> n, High Income -0.00301 (0.0737)	(0.119) <u>55755</u> <u>Degree Fields C</u> 0.0230 (0.0623)	(0.162) <u>224849</u> Duly -0.0971 (0.0923)	(0.143) <u>173802</u> -0.123 (0.0828)
Degree Field N D. Works in High Inco ≥ 50 Hrs, Spouse's Deg Field ≤ 34 Hrs, Spouse's	(0.103) <u>118047</u> <u>ome Occupatio</u> -0.100 (0.0690) -0.150	(0.133) <u>106802</u> n, High Income -0.00301 (0.0737) -0.414**	(0.119) <u>55755</u> <u>Degree Fields C</u> 0.0230 (0.0623) -0.313*	(0.162) <u>224849</u> <u>0nly</u> -0.0971 (0.0923) 0.264	(0.143) <u>173802</u> -0.123 (0.0828) 0.163
Degree Field N D. Works in High Inco \geq 50 Hrs, Spouse's Deg Field	(0.103) <u>118047</u> <u>ome Occupatio</u> -0.100 (0.0690)	(0.133) <u>106802</u> n, High Income -0.00301 (0.0737)	(0.119) <u>55755</u> <u>Degree Fields C</u> 0.0230 (0.0623)	(0.162) <u>224849</u> <u>0nly</u> -0.0971 (0.0923)	(0.143) <u>173802</u> -0.123 (0.0828)

Table 9: Effect of overwork in spouse's degree field on participation in high-earning occupations

Notes: Outcome variable in Panels A and C is an indicator for high-earning occupation. Indicator equals one if occupation (for most recent job in the past 5 years) has average male earnings that exceed the median reported in Table 1 (66,466 for women and 85,759 for men). Outcome variable in Panels B and D is an indicator for currently working in high-earning occupation. High-earning degree sample used in Panels B and D includes individuals for whom average male earnings in undergraduate degree field exceed the median reported in Table 1 (76,350 for women

and 86,310 for men). Right-hand side variables are the same as in Tables 5-8, with the exclusion of occupation fixed-effects. Standard errors, clustered on spouse's degree field, in parentheses. ${}^{+}p < 0.10$, ${}^{*}p < 0.05$, ${}^{**}p < 0.01$, ${}^{***}p < 0.001$