

de Chaisemartin, Clément

Article

Tolerating defiance? Local average treatment effects without monotonicity

Quantitative Economics

Provided in Cooperation with:

The Econometric Society

Suggested Citation: de Chaisemartin, Clément (2017) : Tolerating defiance? Local average treatment effects without monotonicity, Quantitative Economics, ISSN 1759-7331, The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, pp. 367-396, <https://doi.org/10.3982/QE601>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195543>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

Tolerating defiance? Local average treatment effects without monotonicity

CLÉMENT DE CHAISEMARTIN

Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Barbara

Instrumental variables (IVs) are commonly used to estimate the effects of some treatments. A valid IV should be as good as randomly assigned, it should not have a direct effect on the outcome, and it should not induce any unit to forgo treatment. This last condition, the so-called monotonicity condition, is often implausible. This paper starts by showing that actually, IVs are still valid under a weaker condition than monotonicity. It then derives conditions that are sufficient for this weaker condition to hold and whose plausibility can easily be assessed in applications. It finally reviews several applications where this weaker condition is applicable while monotonicity is not. Overall, this paper extends the applicability of the IV estimation method.

KEYWORDS. Monotonicity, defiers, instrumental variable, average treatment effect, partial identification.

JEL CLASSIFICATION. C21, C26.

1. INTRODUCTION

Applied economists study difficult causal questions, such as the effect of juvenile incarceration on educational attainment or the effect of family size on mothers' labor supply. For that purpose, they often use instruments that affect entry into the treatment being studied and then estimate a two stage least squares regression (2SLS). As is well known, a valid instrument should be as good as randomly assigned and should not have a direct effect on the outcome. But even with an instrument satisfying these two conditions, the resulting 2SLS estimate might not capture any causal effect.

People's treatment participation can be positively affected, unaffected, or negatively affected by the instrument. Those in the first group are called compliers, those in the second are called noncompliers, and those in the third are called defiers. Noncompliers reduce the instrument's statistical power as well as the external validity of the effect it estimates. But they do not threaten its internal validity. Indeed, [Imbens and Angrist \(1994\)](#) show that if the population only contains compliers and noncompliers, 2SLS estimates

Clément de Chaisemartin: clementdechaisemartin@ucsb.edu

I am very grateful to Josh Angrist, Sascha Becker, Stéphane Bonhomme, Federico Bugni, Laurent Davезies, Xavier D'Haultfœuille, Sara Geneletti, Walker Hanlon, Toru Kitagawa, Andrew Oswald, Azeem Shaikh, Roland Rathelot, Ed Vytlačil, Fabian Waldinger, Chris Woodruff, the co-editor, three anonymous referees, and participants at various conferences and seminars for their helpful comments.

the average effect of the treatment among compliers, the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE). Defiers are a much more serious concern. If there are defiers in the population, we only know that 2SLS estimates a weighted difference between the effect of the treatment among compliers and defiers (see Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)). This difference could be a very misleading measure of the treatment effect: it could be negative, even when the effect of the treatment is positive in both groups. Defiers could be present in a large number of applications, and I will now give four examples which illustrate this situation.

First, a number of papers have used randomly assigned judges with different sentencing rates as an instrument for incarceration (see Aizer and Doyle (2015) and Kling (2006)) or receipt of disability insurance (see Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), French and Song (2014), and Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad (2014)). Imbens and Angrist (1994) argue that the “no-defiers” condition is likely to be violated in these types of studies. In this context, ruling out the presence of defiers would require that a judge with a high average of strictness always hands down a more severe sentence than that of a judge who is on average more lenient. Assume judge A only takes into account the severity of the offense in her decisions, while judge B is more lenient toward poor defendants and more severe with well-off defendants. If the pool of defendants bears more poor than rich individuals, B will be on average more lenient than A, but she will be more severe with rich defendants.

Second, defiers could be present in studies relying upon sibling-sex composition as an instrument for family size, because some parents are sex-biased. In the United States, parents are more likely to have a third child when their first two children are of the same sex. Angrist and Evans (1998) use this as an instrument to measure the effect of family size on mothers’ labor supply. However, some parents are biased toward one or the other sex. Dahl and Moretti (2008) show that in the United States, fathers have a preference for boys. Because of sex bias, some parents might want two sons, while others might want two daughters; such parents would be defiers.

Third, defiers could be present in randomized controlled trials relying on an encouragement design. Duflo and Saez (2003) measure the effect of attending an information meeting on the take-up of a retirement plan. To encourage the treatment group to attend, subjects were given a financial incentive upon attendance. Deci (1971) and Frey and Jegen (2001) provide evidence showing that financial incentives sometimes backfire because they crowd-out intrinsic motivation. Sometimes, the crowding-out effect even seems to dominate: Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that fining parents who pick up their children late at daycare centers actually increased the number of late-coming parents. Accordingly, paying subjects to get treated in encouragement designs could lead some of them to forgo treatment.

In this paper, I show that 2SLS still estimates a LATE if the no-defiers condition is replaced by a weaker “compliers–defiers” condition. If a subgroup of compliers accounts for the same percentage of the population as defiers and has the same LATE, 2SLS estimates the LATE of the remaining part of compliers. Compliers–defiers is the weakest condition on compliance types under which 2SLS estimates a LATE: if it is violated, 2SLS does not estimate a causal effect.

The compliers–defiers (CD) condition is somewhat abstract, so I derive more interpretable sufficient conditions. I start by showing that CD holds if in each stratum of the population with the same value of their treatment effect there are more compliers than defiers. If that is the case, within each stratum one can form a subgroup of compliers with as many units as defiers. Pooling these subgroups across strata yields a subgroup of compliers accounting for the same percentage of the population as defiers and with the same LATE. I further show that with binary outcomes, CD holds if defiers' LATE and the 2SLS coefficient are both of the same sign, or if defiers' and compliers' LATE are both of the same sign and the ratio of these two LATEs is lower than the ratio of the shares of compliers and defiers in the population, or if the difference between compliers' and defiers' LATEs is not larger than some upper bound that can be estimated from the data.

These results have practical applicability. [Maestas, Mullen, and Strand \(2013\)](#) study the effect of disability insurance on labor market participation. Their 2SLS coefficient is negative. In standard labor supply models, disability insurance can only reduce labor market participation because it increases nonlabor income. It is therefore plausible that defiers' LATE is negative and has the same sign as their 2SLS coefficient, thus implying that CD should hold in this study. Therefore, even though their coefficient might not estimate the LATE of compliers, it follows from my results that it still estimates the LATE of a subgroup of compliers. Later in the paper, I argue that this restriction on the sign of defiers' LATE is also plausible in [French and Song \(2014\)](#), [Aizer and Doyle \(2015\)](#), and [Duflo and Saez \(2003\)](#). [Angrist and Evans \(1998\)](#) study the effect of having a third child on mothers' labor market participation. I estimate the upper bound mentioned in the previous paragraph in their data, and find that it is large. On the other hand, there is no reason to suspect that defiers and compliers have utterly different LATEs: selection into one or the other population is driven by parents' preferences for one or the other sex, not by gains from treatment. Therefore, CD should also hold in this application.

Overall, the 2SLS method is applicable in studies in which defiers could be present, provided one can reasonably assume that defiers' LATE has the same sign as the 2SLS coefficient or that compliers' and defiers' LATE do not differ too much. As I explain in more details later, my CD condition is also more likely to hold when the instrument has a large first stage.

2SLS is not the only statistical method requiring that there be no defiers. An important example is bounds for the average treatment effect (ATE) derived under the assumption that treatment effects have the same sign for all units in the population (see [Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlacil \(2008\)](#), [Chesher \(2010\)](#), [Chiburis \(2010\)](#), [Shaikh and Vytlacil \(2011\)](#), and [Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes \(2012\)](#)).¹ All of these bounds rely on the assumption that there are no defiers in the population. Actually, I show that these bounds are still valid under my CD condition.

Other papers have studied relaxations of the no-defiers condition. [Klein \(2010\)](#) considers a model in which a disturbance uncorrelated with treatment effects leads some subjects to defy. By contrast, under my CD condition the factors leading some subjects

¹ Actually, [Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes \(2012\)](#) only require that the LATEs of compliers, never-takers, always-takers, and defiers all have the same sign.

to defy can be correlated with treatment effects. [Small and Tan \(2007\)](#) show that if in each stratum of the population with the same value of their two potential outcomes there are more compliers than defiers, a condition they refer to as *stochastic monotonicity*, then 2SLS estimates a weighted average treatment effect. Nevertheless, some of their weights are greater than 1, so their parameter does not capture the effect of the treatment for a well defined subgroup, making it hard to interpret. Moreover, stochastic monotonicity is a stronger condition than CD. [DiNardo and Lee \(2011\)](#) derive a result similar to [Small and Tan \(2007\)](#). [Huber and Mellace \(2012\)](#) consider a local monotonicity assumption that requires that there be only compliers or defiers conditional on each value of the outcome. The CD condition allows for both compliers and defiers conditional on the outcome. Finally, [Fiorini, Stevens, Taylor, and Edwards \(2013\)](#) provide practitioners with recommendations as to how they should investigate the plausibility of the no-defiers condition in their applications.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 concerns identification, Section 3 concerns inference, Section 4 concerns results of a simulation study, Section 5 concerns empirical applications, and Section 6 concludes. Most proofs are deferred to the [Appendix](#). For the sake of brevity, I consider some extensions in the Supplemental Material, available in a supplementary file on the journal website, <http://qeconomics.org/supp/601/supplement.pdf>, where I show that one can estimate quantile treatment effects among a subpopulation of compliers even if there are defiers, that one can test the CD condition, and that my results extend to multivariate treatment and instrument.

2. IDENTIFICATION

2.1 Identification of a LATE with defiers

In this section, I show that with a binary instrument at hand, one can identify the LATE of a binary treatment on some outcome under a weaker assumption than no-defiers. The results presented in this section extend to more general settings with multivariate instrument and treatment. These extensions are deferred to the Supplemental Material.

[Imbens and Angrist \(1994\)](#) study the causal interpretation of the coefficients of a 2SLS regression with binary instrument and treatment. Let Z be a binary instrument. Let $D_z \in \{0; 1\}$ denote a subject's potential treatment when $Z = z$. Let Y_{dz} denote her potential outcomes as functions of the treatment and of the instrument. Only Z , $D \equiv D_Z$, and $Y \equiv Y_{DZ}$ are observed. Following [Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin \(1996\)](#), let never-takers (NT) be subjects such that $D_0 = 0$ and $D_1 = 0$, let always-takers (AT) be such that $D_0 = 1$ and $D_1 = 1$, let compliers (C) be such that $D_0 = 0$ and $D_1 = 1$, and let defiers (F)² be such that $D_0 = 1$ and $D_1 = 0$. Let $FS = P(D = 1|Z = 1) - P(D = 1|Z = 0)$ denote the probability limit of the coefficient of the first stage (FS) regression of D on Z . Let $RF = E(Y|Z = 1) - E(Y|Z = 0)$ denote the probability limit of the coefficient of the reduced form (RF) regression of Y on Z . Finally, let $W = \frac{RF}{FS}$ denote the probability limit of the coefficient of the second stage regression of Y on D .

²In most of the treatment effect literature, treatment is denoted by D . To avoid confusion, defiers are denoted by the letter F throughout the paper.

Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) make a number of assumptions. First, they assume that $FS \neq 0$. I will further assume throughout the paper that $FS > 0$. This is a mere normalization: if it appears from the data that $FS < 0$, one can switch the words “defiers” and “compliers” in what follows. Under Assumption 1 (see below), this normalization implies that more subjects are compliers than defiers: $P(C) > P(F)$.

Second, they assume that the instrument is independent of potential treatments and outcomes.

ASSUMPTION 1 (Instrument Independence). *We have*

$$(Y_{00}, Y_{01}, Y_{10}, Y_{11}, D_0, D_1) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z.$$

Third, they assume that the instrument has no direct effect on the outcome.

ASSUMPTION 2 (Exclusion Restriction). *For all $d \in \{0, 1\}$,*

$$Y_{d0} = Y_{d1} = Y_d.$$

Last, they assume that there are no defiers in the population or that defiers and compliers have the same average treatment effect.

ASSUMPTION 3 (No-Defiers (ND)). *We have*

$$P(F) = 0.$$

ASSUMPTION 4 (Equal LATEs for Defiers and Compliers (ELATEs)). *We have*

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) = E(Y_1 - Y_0|F).$$

The following proposition summarizes the three main results in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).

LATE THEOREMS (Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)).

(i) *Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then*

$$FS = P(C) - P(F), \tag{1}$$

$$W = \frac{P(C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - P(F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}{P(C) - P(F)}. \tag{2}$$

(ii) *Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then*

$$FS = P(C), \tag{3}$$

$$W = E(Y_1 - Y_0|C). \tag{4}$$

(iii) *Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold. Then*

$$W = E(Y_1 - Y_0|C). \tag{5}$$

Under random instrument and exclusion restriction alone, W cannot receive a causal interpretation, as it is equal to a weighted difference of the LATEs of compliers and defiers. If there are no defiers, (1) and (2), respectively, simplify into (3) and (4). Then W is equal to the LATE of compliers, while FS is equal to the percentage of the population compliers account for. Finally, when ND does not sound credible, W can still capture the LATE of compliers provided one is ready to assume that defiers and compliers have the same LATE, as shown in (5).

In this paper, I substitute the following condition to Assumption 3 or 4.

ASSUMPTION 5 (Compliers–Defiers (CD)). *There is a subpopulation of compliers C_F that satisfies*

$$P(C_F) = P(F), \quad (6)$$

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) = E(Y_1 - Y_0|F). \quad (7)$$

CD is satisfied if a subgroup of compliers accounts for the same percentage of the population as defiers and has the same LATE. I call this subgroup *compliers–defiers*. CD is weaker than Assumptions 3 and 4. If there are no defiers, one can find a zero probability subset of compliers with the same LATE as defiers. Similarly, if compliers and defiers have the same LATE, one can randomly choose $\frac{P(F)}{P(C)}\%$ of compliers and call them compliers-defiers: this will yield a subgroup accounting for the same percentage of the population and with the same LATE as defiers.

I can now state the main result of this paper.

THEOREM 2.1. *Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If a subpopulation of compliers C_F satisfies (6) and (7), then $C_V = C \setminus C_F$ satisfies*

$$P(C_V) = \text{FS}, \quad (8)$$

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) = W. \quad (9)$$

Conversely, if a subpopulation of compliers C_V satisfies (8) and (9), then $C_F = C \setminus C_V$ satisfies (6) and (7).

PROOF. (\Rightarrow) We have

$$\text{FS} = P(C) - P(F) = P(C_V) + P(C_F) - P(F) = P(C_V).$$

The first equality follows from (1); the last follows from (6). This proves that C_V satisfies (8).

Then

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) &= P(C_V|C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) + P(C_F|C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) \\ &= \frac{P(C) - P(F)}{P(C)}E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) + \frac{P(F)}{P(C)}E(Y_1 - Y_0|F), \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from (6) and (7). Plugging this into (2) yields

$$W = E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V).$$

This proves that C_V satisfies (9).

(\Leftarrow) We have

$$P(C_F) = P(C) - P(C_V) = P(C) - FS = P(C) - (P(C) - P(F)) = P(F).$$

The second step follows from (8); the third step follows from (1). This proves that C_F satisfies (6).

Then

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) &= P(C_V|C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) + P(C_F|C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) \\ &= \frac{FS}{P(C)}W + \frac{P(F)}{P(C)}E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F), \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from (8), (9), and (6). Plugging this equation into (2) yields

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F).$$

This proves that C_F satisfies (7). □

This result is derived from (1) and (2), after using the law of iterated expectations and invoking Assumption 5. The intuition underlying it is as follows. Under CD, compliers–defiers and defiers cancel one another out, and the 2SLS coefficient is equal to the effect of the treatment for the remaining part of compliers. I hereafter refer to the C_V subpopulation as *surviving-compliers*, as they are compliers who “out-survive” defiers.

The LATE in Theorem 2.1 is harder to grasp than the LATE identified under the no-defiers assumption. It does not apply to all compliers, but only to a subset of them, the surviving-compliers subpopulation. Note that under the no-defiers assumption, compliers account for the same percentage of the population as surviving-compliers under the CD assumption. Therefore, the LATE in Theorem 2.1 does not apply to a smaller population than the LATE identified under the no-defiers assumption. Moreover, as I show in the next subsection, one can estimate the mean of any covariate (age, sex, ...) among surviving-compliers under a mild strengthening of the CD assumption. Thus, the analyst can assess whether surviving-compliers strongly differ from the entire population. Still, surviving-compliers differ from compliers in that they are not fully characterized by their potential treatments. Knowing D_0 and D_1 is not sufficient to distinguish surviving-compliers (comvivors) from compliers–defiers (comfiers). Actually, in most instances even knowing $Y_1 - Y_0$ is not sufficient to tell the two populations apart. If a comvivor and a comfier have the same value of $Y_1 - Y_0$, switching the comvivor to the comfier population, and the comfier to the comvivor population will not change the LATE and the size of the new comvivor and comfier populations. Thus, as soon as the supports of $Y_1 - Y_0$ in the two populations overlap, they are not uniquely defined.

This raises the question of whether this LATE is an interesting parameter. Some authors consider that treatment effect parameters are worth considering if they can inform treatment choice (see [Manski \(2005\)](#)). From that perspective, LATEs are not necessarily interesting: to decide whether she should give some treatment to her population, a utilitarian social planner needs to know the average treatment effect (ATE), not the LATE (see, e.g., [Heckman and Urzúa \(2010\)](#)). However, other authors have argued that researchers should still report an estimate of the LATE of compliers, along with the bounds on the ATE (see [Imbens \(2010\)](#)). Their arguments can be summarized as follows: reporting only the bounds might leave out relevant information; the LATE of compliers can give researchers an idea of the magnitude of the treatment effect; under some assumptions this LATE can be extrapolated to other populations (see [Angrist and Fernandez-Val \(2013\)](#)). In a world with defiers, these arguments no longer apply. In such a world, the LATE of compliers is not even identified. Only the LATE of surviving-compliers can be identified. Accordingly, it is this parameter that should be reported along with bounds on the ATE.³

A great appeal of the ND condition is that it is simple to interpret. On the contrary, CD is an abstract condition. I try to clarify its meaning by deriving more interpretable conditions under which it is satisfied.

A sufficient condition for CD to hold I start by considering a condition that is sufficient for CD to hold irrespective of the nature of the outcome. Let $R(P(F)) = 1 + \frac{FS}{P(F)}$. Notice that (1) implies that $R(P(F)) = \frac{P(C)}{P(F)}$. Therefore, $R(P(F))$ is merely the ratio of the shares of compliers and defiers in the population.

ASSUMPTION 6 (More Compliers Than Defiers (MC)). For every δ in the support of $Y_1 - Y_0$,

$$\frac{f_{Y_1 - Y_0|F}(\delta)}{f_{Y_1 - Y_0|C}(\delta)} \leq R(P(F)). \quad (10)$$

I call this condition the *more compliers than defiers* condition. Indeed, as $R(P(F)) = \frac{P(C)}{P(F)}$, (10) is equivalent to

$$P(F|Y_1 - Y_0) \leq P(C|Y_1 - Y_0). \quad (11)$$

Equation (11) requires that each subgroup of the population with the same value of $Y_1 - Y_0$ comprise more compliers than defiers. This condition is weaker but closely related to the stochastic monotonicity assumption in [Small and Tan \(2007\)](#). For instance, their condition is satisfied if $P(F|Y_0, Y_1) \leq P(C|Y_0, Y_1)$, that is, if in each stratum of the population with the same value of their two potential outcomes there are more compliers than defiers.

As shown in [Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin \(1996\)](#), 2SLS estimates a LATE if there are no defiers or if defiers and compliers have the same distribution of $Y_1 - Y_0$. These assumptions are “polar cases” of MC. MC holds when defiers and compliers have the same

³The extrapolation strategy proposed in [Angrist and Fernandez-Val \(2013\)](#) under the no-defiers assumption can also be used under the compliers–defiers assumption introduced in this paper.

$Y(1)-Y(0)$	Defiers	Compliers
-1	f1 f2	c1 c2 c3
0	f3 f4 f5	c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
1	f6 f7	c9 c10 c11 c12 c13

FIGURE 1. A population where the “more compliers than defiers” condition is satisfied.

distribution of $Y_1 - Y_0$, as the left-hand side of (10) is then equal to 1, while its right-hand side is greater than 1.⁴ Additionally, MC also holds when there are no defiers, as the right-hand side of (10) is then equal to $+\infty$.

THEOREM 2.2. *Assumption 6* \Rightarrow *Assumption 5*.

To convey the intuition of this theorem, I consider the example displayed in Figure 1. Y_0 and Y_1 are binary. The population bears 20 subjects. 13 of them are compliers, while 7 are defiers. Those 20 subjects are scattered over the three $Y_1 - Y_0$ cells as shown in Figure 1. MC holds as there are more compliers than defiers in each cell. To construct C_F , one can merely pick up as many compliers as defiers in each of the three $Y_1 - Y_0$ strata. The resulting C_F and C_V populations are displayed in Figure 2. Compliers–defiers account for the same percentage of the population as defiers and also have the same LATE. Given that $R(P(F))$ is increasing in FS and decreasing in $P(F)$, Assumption 6 is more plausible in applications with a large first stage and in applications where defiers are unlikely to account for a very large share of the population. Because $P(F)$ is not identified, neither is $R(P(F))$. To get a sense of the plausibility of Assumption 6, one can estimate $R(P(F))$ for plausible values of $P(F)$. If one does not want to make any assumption on $P(F)$, one can also derive a worst-case lower bound for $R(P(F))$. Indeed,

$$P(F) \leq \min(P(D = 1|Z = 0), P(D = 0|Z = 1)) \equiv \bar{P}(F). \quad (12)$$

The share of defiers must be lower than the percentage of treated observations among those who do not receive the instrument, as this group includes always-takers and defiers. It must also be lower than the percentage of untreated observations among those who receive the instrument, as this group includes never-takers and defiers. Thus $P(F) \leq \bar{P}(F)$ implies the following worst-case lower bound for $R(P(F))$:

$$1 + \frac{FS}{\bar{P}(F)} \leq R(P(F)). \quad (13)$$

$Y(1)-Y(0)$	Defiers	Compliers-defiers	Surviving-compliers
-1	f1 f2	c1 c2	c3
0	f3 f4 f5	c4 c5 c6	c7 c8
1	f6 f7	c9 c10	c11 c12 c13

FIGURE 2. In the population in Figure 1, the compliers–defiers condition is also satisfied.

⁴I have assumed, as a mere normalization, that $FS > 0$.

More sufficient conditions with a binary outcome While Assumption 6 is intuitive, there might be applications where it is hard to gauge its plausibility. I now derive conditions that are sufficient for CD to hold when the outcome is binary, and whose plausibility should be easy to assess in most applications.

Let $\text{sgn}[\cdot]$ denote the sign function: for any real number x , $\text{sgn}[x] = 1\{x > 0\} - 1\{x < 0\}$. Let also $\Delta(P(F)) = \frac{|\text{RF}|}{\text{FS} + P(F)} = |W| \frac{\text{FS}}{\text{FS} + P(F)}$. Notice that (1) implies that $\frac{\text{FS}}{\text{FS} + P(F)} = \frac{P(C_V)}{P(C)}$. Therefore, $\Delta(P(F))$ is equal to the absolute value of the Wald ratio, weighted by the ratio of the shares of surviving-compliers and compliers in the population.

The three following conditions are sufficient for CD to hold when the outcome is binary.

ASSUMPTION 7 (Restriction on the Sign of the LATE of Defiers). *We have $\text{sgn}[E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)] = \text{sgn}[W]$, or either $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ or W is equal to 0.*

ASSUMPTION 8 (Equal Signs and Bounded Ratio of the LATE of Defiers and Compliers). *Either $\text{sgn}[E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)] = \text{sgn}[E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)] \neq 0$ and $\frac{E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}{E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)} \leq R(P(F))$, or $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = 0$.*

ASSUMPTION 9 (Restriction on the Difference Between Compliers' and Defiers' LATE). *We have*

$$|E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)| \leq \Delta(P(F)).$$

THEOREM 2.3. *If Y_0 and Y_1 are binary and $|W| \leq 1$,⁵ Assumption 9 \Rightarrow Assumption 8 \Leftrightarrow Assumption 7 \Rightarrow Assumption 5.*

The first implication and the equivalence follow after some algebra. The second implication states that if the LATE of defiers has the same sign as the 2SLS coefficient (or if either of those two quantities is equal to 0), CD is satisfied. The intuition for this result is as follows. With binary potential outcomes, it follows from (2) that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RF} &= P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, C) \\ &\quad - (P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, F) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, F)). \end{aligned}$$

To fix ideas, suppose that Assumption 7 is satisfied with $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ and W greater than 0; $W \geq 0$ implies $\text{RF} \geq 0$; $\text{RF} \geq 0$ combined with the previous equation implies that

$$P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C) \geq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, F) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, F).$$

Then there are sufficiently many compliers with a strictly positive treatment effect to extract from them a subgroup that will compensate defiers' positive LATE.

⁵Assuming that $|W| \leq 1$ is without loss of generality. If $|W| > 1$, Assumption 5 cannot be true anyway as with a binary outcome there cannot be a subgroup of compliers with a LATE strictly greater than 1 or strictly lower than -1 . In the Supplemental Material, I discuss testable implications of Assumption 5.

Assumption 7 requires that defiers' LATE have the same sign as W . The sign of W is not known, but it can be inferred from the data using \widehat{W} and an estimator of its standard deviation. When $W < 0$ is rejected and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \geq 0$ is a plausible restriction in the application under consideration, one can invoke Theorem 2.3 to claim that \widehat{W} consistently estimates the LATE of surviving-compliers. When $W > 0$ is rejected and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \leq 0$ is a plausible restriction, one can also invoke Theorem 2.3. On the other hand, when one fails to reject $W > 0$ or $W < 0$, one cannot assess whether Assumption 7 is plausible because the data do not give sufficient guidance on the sign of W .

Assumption 8 requires that defiers' and compliers' LATEs have the same sign and that their ratio be lower than $R(P(F))$. Notice that $R(P(F))$ is greater than 1. Therefore, when it is plausible to assume that the two LATEs have the same sign and that defiers react less to the treatment, thus implying that their LATE is closer to 0, one can invoke Theorem 2.3 to claim that \widehat{W} consistently estimates the LATE of surviving-compliers.

Finally, Assumption 9 requires that the difference between defiers' and compliers' LATEs be smaller in absolute value than $\Delta(P(F))$. The difference $\Delta(P(F))$ is increasing in $|W|$ and FS, and decreasing in $P(F)$. Therefore, Assumption 9 is more likely to be satisfied when the instrument has large first and second stages, and when defiers are unlikely to account for a large fraction of the population. Here as well, one can estimate $\Delta(P(F))$ for plausible values of $P(F)$. One can also estimate a worst-case lower bound for $\Delta(P(F))$. Indeed, $P(F) \leq \overline{P}(F)$ implies the following worst-case lower bound for $\Delta(P(F))$:

$$|W| \frac{\text{FS}}{\text{FS} + \overline{P}(F)} \leq \Delta(P(F)). \quad (14)$$

2.2 Incorporating covariates into the analysis

Instruments are sometimes valid only after conditioning for some covariates. Theorem 2.4 below shows that identifying the LATE of surviving-compliers in such instances does not require a strengthening of the CD condition.

Let X denote a vector of covariates. Assume that instead of Assumption 1, the following assumption is satisfied.

ASSUMPTION 10 (Instrument Conditional Independence). *We have*

$$(Y_{00}, Y_{01}, Y_{10}, Y_{11}, D_0, D_1) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z|X.$$

I prove the following result.

THEOREM 2.4. *Suppose Assumptions 10, 2, and 5 hold. Then $C_V = C \setminus C_F$ satisfies*

$$P(C_V) = E(E(D|Z = 1, X) - E(D|Z = 0, X)),$$

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) = \frac{E(E(Y|Z = 1, X) - E(Y|Z = 0, X))}{E(E(D|Z = 1, X) - E(D|Z = 0, X))}.$$

The estimand identifying the LATE in Theorem 2.4 is not the same as that in Theorem 2.1, but it is the same as the one considered in Frölich (2007). Frölich (2007) proposes an estimator and derives its asymptotic distribution.

Under the no-defiers condition, one can recover the mean of any covariate among compliers (this follows from Abadie (2003), for instance). This is a desirable property, as LATEs apply to subpopulations. Therefore, applied researchers often want to describe these subpopulations, so as to assess whether their LATEs are likely to extend to other populations. When the instrument is unconditionally independent of potential treatments and outcomes, and when it is also independent of X , one can recover the mean of X among surviving-compliers under a mild strengthening of Assumption 5.⁶

ASSUMPTION 11 (Conditional Compliers–Defiers). *There is a subpopulation of compliers C_F that satisfies (6) and (7), and*

$$E(X|C_F) = E(X|F). \quad (15)$$

$$\text{Let } W_{XD} = \frac{E(XD|Z=1) - E(XD|Z=0)}{P(D=1|Z=1) - P(D=1|Z=0)}.$$

THEOREM 2.5. *Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 11 hold, and $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp X$. Then $C_V = C \setminus C_F$ satisfies (8), (9), and*

$$E[X|C_V] = W_{XD}. \quad (16)$$

2.3 Partial identification of the ATE with defiers

Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) consider a model with binary treatment and outcome, where the treatment and the outcome are both determined by threshold-crossing single-index equations. The sharp bounds for the ATE under their assumptions are tighter than those obtained under Assumptions 1 and 2 and studied in Manski (1990), Balke and Pearl (1997), or Kitagawa (2009). In particular, the sign of the ATE is identified under their assumptions. Their single-index model for treatment implies that there cannot be defiers in the population. Similarly, their single-index model for the outcome implies that the sign of the treatment effect is the same for all units in the population. The next theorem shows that their result holds even if there are defiers in the population.

ASSUMPTION 12 (Sign Restrictions on the LATEs of All Subpopulations). *For every $(T_1, T_2) \in \{\text{AT}, \text{NT}, C, F\}^2$, $\text{sgn}[E(Y_1 - Y_0|T_1)] \times \text{sgn}[E(Y_1 - Y_0|T_2)] \geq 0$.*

THEOREM 2.6. *Assume that Y_0 and Y_1 are binary, and that Assumptions 1, 2, 8, and 12 are satisfied.*

(i) *If $\text{RF} > 0$,*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RF} &\leq E(Y_1 - Y_0) \\ &\leq P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = 1) - P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 0) + P(D = 0|Z = 1). \end{aligned}$$

⁶When the instrument is not independent of X , the mean of X among surviving-compliers is still identified if one is ready to assume that (6) and (7) hold conditional on X .

(ii) If $RF < 0$,

$$P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = 1) - P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 0) - P(D = 1|Z = 0) \leq E(Y_1 - Y_0) \leq RF.$$

These bounds are sharp if for every $(y, d) \in \{0, 1\}^2$, $P(Y = y, D = d|Z = d) \geq P(Y = y, D = d|Z = 1 - d)$.⁷

Assumption 12 requires that the LATEs of always-takers, never-takers, compliers, and defiers all have the same sign. This restriction is plausible in applications where selection into one or the other population is not directly based on gains from treatment, making it unlikely that LATEs switch sign across subpopulations. If one is further ready to assume that defiers are less affected by the treatment than compliers, thus implying that their LATE is closer to 0, one can use Theorem 2.6 to sign and bound the ATE, even if there are defiers in the population.

The bounds presented in this theorem are not new. They coincide with those in Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlačil (2008), Chiburis (2010), and Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2012), and with those in Chesher (2010) and Shaikh and Vytlačil (2011) with no covariates and a binary instrument. Assumption 12 has already been considered in Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2012). The novelty is that here I show that these bounds are valid even if there are defiers in the population provided Assumption 8 is satisfied. The intuition for the lower bound is as follows. Assume that $RF > 0$. If $\frac{E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}{E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)} \leq \frac{P(C)}{P(F)}$, and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$ and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ have the same sign, it is easy to see from (2) that $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$ and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ must have the same sign as RF . Therefore, $E(Y_1 - Y_0|AT)$, $E(Y_1 - Y_0|NT)$, $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$, and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ must be positive. Moreover, it follows from Theorem 2.3 that CD is satisfied under the assumptions of Theorem 2.6. Therefore, there is a subgroup of units accounting for $FS\%$ of the population with a LATE equal to W . This combined with the fact that the remaining units must have a positive LATE yields $RF \leq E(Y_1 - Y_0)$.

These bounds are sharp when the standard LATE assumptions are not rejected. As noted in Balke and Pearl (1997) and Heckman and Vytlačil (2005), Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 have testable implications. Equation (1.1) in Kitagawa (2015) summarizes these testable implications. In many applications, Equation (1.1) is not rejected, so deriving sharp bounds under this restriction is without great loss of generality. Still, as I discuss in the Supplemental Material, Assumptions 1 and 2, and the CD condition might hold while Kitagawa's (1.1) is violated. Deriving sharp bounds without this restriction is left for future work.

As can be seen in points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2.6, the expression of the bounds depends on the sign of RF . This quantity is unknown but can be estimated. When $RF = 0$ is rejected and $\widehat{RF} \geq 0$, one can use the sample counterpart of RF and $P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = 1) - P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 0) + P(D = 0|Z = 1)$ as lower and upper bounds of the ATE. When $RF = 0$ is rejected and $\widehat{RF} \leq 0$, one can use the sample counterpart of

⁷This condition is equivalent to the testable implication of the LATE assumptions studied by Kitagawa (2015) ((1.1) in his paper).

$P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = 1) - P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 0) - P(D = 1|Z = 0)$ and RF as lower and upper bounds of the ATE. On the other hand, when RF = 0 is not rejected, the data do not give sufficient guidance on the sign of this quantity, so the ATE cannot be bounded and signed.

Finally, to draw inference on the ATE I refer the reader to [Shaikh and Vytlacil \(2005\)](#). In their Theorem 7.1, they develop a method to derive a confidence interval for the ATE based on the bounds obtained in Theorem 2.6.

3. INFERENCE

I briefly sketch how one can use results from [Andrews and Soares \(2010\)](#) to draw inference on $P(F)$ using the worst-case upper bound derived in (12). Following similar steps, one can also use their results to draw inference on $R(P(F))$ and $\Delta(P(F))$ using the worst-case upper bounds derived in (13) and (14).

It follows from (12) that

$$P(F) \leq \min(P(D = 1|Z = 0), P(D = 0|Z = 1)).$$

This rewrites as

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &\leq E(D(1 - Z) - (1 - Z)P(F)), \\ 0 &\leq E((1 - D)Z - ZP(F)). \end{aligned}$$

This defines a moment inequality model. Because D and Z are binary, this model satisfies all the conditions necessary for Theorem 1 in [Andrews and Soares \(2010\)](#) to apply. One can therefore use their method to derive a uniformly valid confidence upper bound for $P(F)$.⁸

4. A SIMULATION STUDY

In this section, I assess the validity of the CD condition in a trivariate normal selection model inspired by [Heckman \(1979\)](#). For that purpose, I consider a model in which potential treatments are determined through the following threshold-crossing selection equations: for every $z \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$D_z = 1\{V_z \geq v_z\}. \quad (17)$$

The terms V_0 and V_1 are two random variables respectively representing one's taste for treatment without and with the instrument; v_0 and v_1 are two real numbers. Without

⁸The moment inequality model in the previous display also falls into the framework studied by [Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf \(2014\)](#). Therefore, one could use their results to draw inference on $P(F)$. One advantage of their procedure relative to that of [Andrews and Soares \(2010\)](#) is that it does not rely on the choice of a tuning parameter. However, their procedure cannot accommodate preliminary estimated parameters in the moment inequalities, contrary to that of [Andrews and Soares \(2010\)](#). The moment inequality models involving $R(P(F))$ and $\Delta(P(F))$ both have preliminary estimated parameters. Therefore, results from [Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf \(2014\)](#) cannot be used to draw inference on $R(P(F))$ and $\Delta(P(F))$.

loss of generality, one can assume that V_0 and V_1 have the same marginal distributions, and that $v_1 \leq v_0$ to account for the fact that $P(D_1 = 1) \geq P(D_0 = 1)$. Compliers satisfy $\{V_0 < v_0, V_1 \geq v_1\}$. Defiers satisfy $\{V_0 \geq v_0, V_1 < v_1\}$: the instrument substantially diminishes their taste for treatment, which induces them not to get treated when they receive it.

Vytlacil (2002) shows that ND is equivalent to imposing $V_0 = V_1$. I will not make this assumption here to allow for defiers. On the other hand, I will assume that $(V_0, V_1, Y_1 - Y_0)$ is jointly normal:

$$\begin{pmatrix} V_0 \\ V_1 \\ Y_1 - Y_0 \end{pmatrix} \hookrightarrow \mathcal{N} \left(\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \mu \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho_{V_0, V_1} & \sigma_{\Delta} \rho_{V_0, \Delta} \\ \rho_{V_0, V_1} & 1 & \sigma_{\Delta} \rho_{V_1, \Delta} \\ \sigma_{\Delta} \rho_{V_0, \Delta} & \sigma_{\Delta} \rho_{V_1, \Delta} & \sigma_{\Delta}^2 \end{pmatrix} \right).$$

Let Σ denote the variance of this vector, and let V_0 and V_1 be normalized to have mean 0 and variance 1. I further assume that $\sigma_{Y_0}^2 = 1$ and $\sigma_{Y_1}^2 = \sigma_{Y_0}^2$. The first assumption is a mere normalization, which corresponds to the common practice of standardizing the outcome by its standard deviation in empirical work. The second assumption is a homoscedasticity condition. Together, they imply that $\sigma_{\Delta}^2 \leq 4$. The data also impose a number of restrictions on the parameters of this model, revealing v_0 and v_1 : $v_z = \Phi^{-1}(P(D = 0|Z = z))$, where $\Phi(\cdot)$ denotes the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of a standard normal variable. It also imposes that $\rho_{V_1, \Delta}$ be written as a function of μ , σ_{Δ} , and $\rho_{V_0, \Delta}$,

$$\rho_{V_1, \Delta} = \frac{\text{RF} - \mu \text{FS}}{\sigma_{\Delta} \phi(v_1)} + \rho_{V_0, \Delta} \frac{\phi(v_0)}{\phi(v_1)},$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of a standard normal. Combining the last equation with $0 \leq \sigma_{\Delta} \leq \sqrt{4}$, $-1 \leq \rho_{V_0, \Delta} \leq 1$, and $-1 \leq \rho_{V_1, \Delta} \leq 1$, one can show that the data also bound μ :

$$\underline{\mu} = \frac{\text{RF} - 2(\phi(v_0) + \phi(v_1))}{\text{FS}} \leq \mu \leq \bar{\mu} = \frac{\text{RF} + 2(\phi(v_0) + \phi(v_1))}{\text{FS}}.$$

Overall, the parameters of the model are partially identified, and the identified set is defined by the constraints

$$\begin{aligned} \theta = (\mu, \sigma_{\Delta}^2, \rho_{V_0, V_1}, \rho_{V_0, \Delta}) &\in \Theta = [\underline{\mu}, \bar{\mu}] \times [0, 4] \times [-1, 1] \times [-1, 1], \\ \rho_{V_1, \Delta}(\theta) &= \frac{\text{RF} - \mu \text{FS}}{\sigma_{\Delta} \phi(v_1)} + \rho_{V_0, \Delta} \frac{\phi(v_0)}{\phi(v_1)} \in [-1, 1], \end{aligned}$$

Σ is positive definite.

Finally, note that if $\rho_{V_0, \Delta} = \rho_{V_1, \Delta}$, CD is satisfied. Indeed, we then have $(V_0, V_1)|Y_1 - Y_0 \sim (V_1, V_0)|Y_1 - Y_0$, so $C_F = \{V_1 \geq v_0, V_0 < v_1\}$ satisfies (6) and (7):

$$\begin{aligned} P(C_F) &= P(V_1 \geq v_0, V_0 < v_1) = P(V_0 \geq v_0, V_1 < v_1) = P(F), \\ E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|V_1 \geq v_0, V_0 < v_1) \\ &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|V_0 \geq v_0, V_1 < v_1) = E(Y_1 - Y_0|F). \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

In my simulations, I consider a first numerical example in which $P(D = 1|Z = 1) = 0.4$, $P(D = 1|Z = 0) = 0.1$, and $W = 0.2$. This could, for instance, correspond to a randomized experiment with a first stage of 30% and with a 2SLS coefficient equal to 20% of the standard deviation of the outcome. I also consider a second numerical example in which $P(D = 1|Z = 1) = 0.2$, $P(D = 1|Z = 0) = 0.1$, and $W = 0.2$. This could, for instance, correspond to a randomized experiment with a weaker first stage of 10% and the same 2SLS coefficient. For each numerical example, I draw a sample of 4,000 vectors of parameters representative of the population of parameters compatible with the data. To do so, I draw values for θ from the uniform distribution on Θ , and keep only those such that $\rho_{V_1, \Delta}(\theta) \in [-1, 1]$ and Σ is positive definite. For each vector of parameters, I draw 100,000 realizations from the corresponding distribution of $(V_0, V_1, Y_1 - Y_0)$. This also gives me 100,000 realizations of $(D_0, D_1, Y_1 - Y_0)$. For each of these 4,000 empirical distributions of $(D_0, D_1, Y_1 - Y_0)$, I assess whether it satisfies the CD assumption using an algorithm presented in the [Appendix](#).

The main results from this exercise are as follows. First, the larger the instrument's first stage, the more CD is likely to hold. While in the first numerical example CD is satisfied for 67% of the 4,000 data generating points (DGPs) considered, in the second example it is only satisfied for 43% of them. Second, CD is more likely to hold when the LATE of defiers has the same sign as the 2SLS coefficient. Most DGPs for which $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \geq 0$ satisfy CD. However, some DGPs for which $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ is very large violate it. For instance, across the 4,000 DGPs in the first numerical example, the DGP with the lowest positive value of $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ for which CD is violated has $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = 0.86\sigma_{Y_0}$, a very large treatment effect. Third, the difference between $\rho_{V_1, \Delta}$ and $\rho_{V_0, \Delta}$ seems to be the main determinant of whether CD is satisfied or not in this model. A regression of a dummy for whether CD is satisfied on $|\rho_{V_1, \Delta} - \rho_{V_0, \Delta}|$ has an R^2 of 0.66. Adding $(\mu, \sigma_{\Delta}^2, \rho_{V_0, V_1}, \rho_{V_0, \Delta}, \rho_{V_1, \Delta})$ to this regression hardly adds any explanatory power.

These results might help applied researchers to assess whether CD is likely to hold when their outcome of interest is continuous. When their 2SLS coefficient is, say, positive, they can assess whether defiers are likely to have a negative or a very large positive treatment effect. If that sounds unlikely, CD is likely to hold. Similarly, when their first stage is large, they can be more confident that their results are robust to defiers than when it is weak.

To conclude this section, it is worth noting that results presented in this paper generalize to the local IV approach introduced in [Heckman and Vytlacil \(1999\)](#) and [Heckman and Vytlacil \(2005\)](#). These authors show that with a continuous instrument Z satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, if (17) is satisfied with (i) $V_z = V$ for every z in the support of Z and (ii) v_z decreasing in z , then under some regularity conditions $\frac{\partial E(Y|P(D=1|Z=z)=p)}{\partial p}$ is equal to the average treatment effect of units at the $1 - p$ th quantile of the distribution of V . This result can be extended to selection equations where V_z is allowed to vary across values of z , under a generalization of the CD condition. For instance, if for every z_1 in the support of Z there is a $z_0 < z_1$ such that for every $z \in [z_0, z_1]$ there is a subset of the $\{V_{z_1} \geq v_{z_1}, V_z < v_z\}$ subpopulation accounting for the same percentage of the total population and with the same average treatment effect as the $\{V_{z_1} < v_{z_1}, V_z \geq v_z\}$

subpopulation, then $\frac{\partial E(Y|P(D=1|Z)=p)}{\partial p}$ is equal to the average treatment effect of units at the $1 - p$ th quantile of the distribution of V_{z^p} , where z^p is the unique solution of $P(D = 1|Z = z) = p$.

5. APPLICATIONS

In this section, I show how one can use the previous results in various applications where it is likely that defiers are present.

Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) and French and Song (2014)

Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) study the effect of receiving disability insurance (DI) on labor market participation. They use average allowance rates of randomly assigned examiners as an instrument for receipt of DI. In this context, $Y_1 \leq Y_0$ is a plausible restriction.⁹ It is, for instance, satisfied in a static labor supply model under standard restrictions on agents' utility functions. Assume agents' utilities depend on consumption C and leisure L . To simplify, assume agents can only work fulltime or not work at all, which is denoted by a dummy Y . To choose Y , agents maximize $U(C, L)$ subject to $C = YW + I$ and $L = T - HY$, where W , I , H , and T , respectively, denote agents' wages, their nonlabor income, the amount of time spent on a fulltime job, and the total amount of time available. Let U_{CC} , U_{LL} , and U_{CL} , respectively, denote the second order and cross derivatives of U , and assume that $U_{CC} \leq 0$, $U_{LL} \leq 0$, and $U_{CL} \geq 0$, a property satisfied by most standard utility functions. Let $I_0 < I_1$ denote agents' nonlabor income without and with disability insurance, and let Y_0 and Y_1 denote their corresponding labor market participation decisions. As is well known, $U_{CC} \leq 0$, $U_{LL} \leq 0$, and $U_{CL} \geq 0$ imply that $U(W + I, T - HY) - U(I, T)$ is increasing in I , which in turn implies that $Y_1 \leq Y_0$.

The 2SLS coefficient in this study is significantly negative. Following the discussion in the previous paragraph, Assumption 7 is plausible in this context: it will hold if $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ is not strictly greater than 0, something which will be automatically satisfied if $Y_1 \leq Y_0$.¹⁰ Therefore, one can invoke Theorems 2.3 and 2.1 to claim that this coefficient consistently estimates the LATE of surviving-compliers, even though it might not be consistent for the LATE of compliers because of defiers. Moreover, $Y_1 \leq Y_0$ also implies that Assumption 12 is satisfied. One could then use Theorem 2.6 to estimate bounds for the ATE in this application.¹¹

⁹Ex ante restrictions on the sign of the treatment effect are usually called monotone treatment response assumptions and were first introduced by Manski (1997).

¹⁰The instrument used in Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) is multivariate. Theorem 2.3 can easily be extended to this type of setting, assuming that Assumption 7 holds within the sample of cases dealt with by each pair of judges. In the Supplemental Material, I cover in more details the case of multivariate instruments.

¹¹The Disability Operational Data Store (DIODS) data archives used in this paper contain personally identifiable information. It is only possible to access them at a secure location, after having signed an agreement with the U.S. Social Security Administration.

Finally, French and Song (2014) also study the effect of disability insurance on labor supply and find a strictly negative 2SLS coefficient. Following the same line of argument as in the previous paragraph, the CD condition should also hold in this study.

Aizer and Doyle (2015)

Aizer and Doyle (2015) study the effect of juvenile incarceration on high school completion. They use average sentencing rates of randomly assigned judges as an instrument for incarceration. Here as well $Y_1 \leq Y_0$ sounds like a plausible restriction. Being incarcerated disrupts schooling and increases the chances the youth form relationships with nonacademically oriented peers. This should increase the chances of dropout. Their 2SLS coefficient is significantly negative, so Assumption 7 is also plausible in this context. Therefore, one can invoke Theorems 2.3 and 2.1 to claim that this coefficient consistently estimates the LATE of surviving-compliers.

Angrist and Evans (1998)

Angrist and Evans (1998) study the effect of having a third child on mothers' labor supply. In their study, $\hat{P}(F) = 37.2\%$, and the 95% confidence upper bound for $P(F)$ constructed using Theorem 1 in Andrews and Soares (2010) is 37.4%. The left axis of Figure 3 shows the sample counterpart of $\Delta(P(F))$ for all values of $P(F)$ included between 0 and 37.4%. The right axis shows the same quantity normalized by the standard deviation of the outcome. Assumption 9 is satisfied for values of $P(F)$ and $|E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)|$ below the black solid line. For instance, $\hat{\Delta}(0.05) = 0.072$.¹² Therefore, Assumption 9 holds if there are less than 5% of defiers and the LATEs of compliers and defiers differ by less than 7.2 percentage points, or 14.5% of a standard deviation of the outcome. The limited evidence available suggests that 5% is a conservative upper bound for the share of defiers in this application. In the 2012 Peruvian wave of the Demographic and Health




FIGURE 3. For all values of $P(F)$ and $|E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)|$ below the green line, the compliers–defiers condition is satisfied in Angrist and Evans (1998).

¹²The 95% confidence interval of $\Delta(0.05)$ is $[0.044, 0.100]$. It can be estimated using standard Stata commands. A code is available upon request.

Surveys, women were asked their ideal sex sibship composition. Among women whose first two offspring are a boy and a girl, 1.8% had three children or more and retrospectively declare that their ideal sex sibship composition would have been two boys and no girl, or no boy and two girls. These women seem to have been induced to having a third child because their first two children were a boy and a girl. To my knowledge, similar questions have never been asked in a survey in the United States: 1.8% could under- or overestimate the share of defiers in the U.S. population. But this figure is, as of now, the best piece of evidence available to assess the percentage of defiers in Angrist and Evans (1998). Therefore, 5% sounds like a reasonably conservative upper bound.

15% of a standard deviation is also a reasonably conservative upper bound for $|E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)|$ in this application. Compliers are couples with a preference for diversity, while defiers are sex-biased couples. Preference for diversity and sex bias are probably correlated with some of the variables entering into mothers' decisions to work (mothers' potential wages, preferences for leisure, ...), but they are unlikely to enter directly into that decision. As a result, 15% of a standard deviation is arguably a conservative upper bound for $|E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)|$, because selection into being a complier or a defier is not directly based on gains from treatment.

Duflo and Saez (2003)

Duflo and Saez (2003) conduct a randomized experiment with an encouragement design to study the effect of an information meeting on take-up of a retirement plan. To encourage the treatment group to attend, subjects were given a financial incentive upon attendance. Unless it is poorly designed, the meeting should not reduce take-up. In this context, $Y_1 \geq Y_0$ sounds like a plausible restriction. The authors' 2SLS coefficient is significantly positive, so Assumption 7 is also plausible in this context. Therefore, one can invoke Theorems 2.3 and 2.1 to claim that this coefficient consistently estimates the LATE of surviving-compliers.

6. CONCLUSION

Applied economists often use instruments affecting the take-up of a treatment to estimate its effect. When doing so, the methods they use rely on a monotonicity assumption. In many instances, this assumption is not applicable. In this paper, I show that these methods are still valid under a weaker condition than monotonicity. Doing so, I extend the applicability of these methods. Specifically, I show that researchers can confidently use them in applications where one can reasonably assume that defiers' LATE has the same sign as the reduced form effect of the instrument on the outcome, or that compliers' and defiers' LATEs do not differ too much. My weaker condition is also more likely to hold when the instrument has a strong first stage. I put forward examples where my weaker condition is likely to hold, while monotonicity is likely to fail.

APPENDIX A: THE CD ALGORITHM

In this section, I present the CD algorithm used in Section 4 to assess whether a joint distribution of $(D_0, D_1, Y_1 - Y_0)$ satisfies Assumption 5.

THEOREM A.1. Assume that $Y_1 - Y_0|C$ is dominated by the Lebesgue measure on \mathbb{R} , and that its density relative to this measure is strictly positive on the support of $Y_1 - Y_0|C$.¹³

If $RF \geq 0$, one can use the following algorithm to assess whether Assumption 5 is satisfied:

- (i) If $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\}) < RF$, Assumption 5 is violated.
- (ii) Else, let $\delta_0 \geq 0$ solve $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta\}1\{C\}) = RF$. If $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) > FS$, Assumption 5 is violated.
- (iii) Else, if $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_0\}1\{C\}) \leq 0$, let δ_1 solve $E((Y_1 - Y_0) \times 1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta, \delta_0]\}1\{C\}) = 0$.
 - 1. If $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1, C) \geq FS$, Assumption 5 is satisfied.
 - 2. Else, Assumption 5 is violated.
- (iv) Else, if $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_0\}1\{C\}) > 0$, let δ_2 solve $E((Y_1 - Y_0) \times 1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta\}1\{C\}) = RF$.
 - 1. If $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_2, C) \geq FS$, Assumption 5 is satisfied.
 - 2. Else, Assumption 5 is violated.

If $RF < 0$, one can substitute $-(Y_1 - Y_0)$ to $Y_1 - Y_0$ in the previous algorithm.

The intuition for this theorem is as follows. Assume $RF \geq 0$. If CD holds, there must be a subpopulation of compliers such that $P(C_V) = FS$ and $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) = RF$. If $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\}) < RF$, CD must be violated, because for any subpopulation of compliers, $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) \leq E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\})$. Even summing the treatment effects for all compliers who gain from treatment is not enough to reach the numerator of the 2SLS coefficient. Similarly, if $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) > FS$, CD must be violated: even the smallest subpopulation of compliers such that $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) = RF$ is already too large. The following steps of the algorithm follow from similar arguments.

APPENDIX B: PROOFS

In the proofs, I assume the probability distributions of $Y_1 - Y_0$, $Y_1 - Y_0|C$, and $Y_1 - Y_0|F$ are all dominated by the same measure λ . Let $f_{Y_1 - Y_0}$, $f_{Y_1 - Y_0|C}$, and $f_{Y_1 - Y_0|F}$ denote the corresponding densities. I also adopt the convention that $\frac{0}{0} \times 0 = 0$.

LEMMA B.1.

(i) A subpopulation of compliers C_F satisfies (6) and (7) if and only if there is a real-valued function g defined on $\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)$ such that

$$0 \leq g(\delta) \leq f_{Y_1 - Y_0|C}(\delta)P(C) \quad \text{for } \lambda\text{-almost every } \delta \in \mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0), \quad (19)$$

¹³This ensures that the numbers δ_0 , δ_1 , and δ_2 introduced hereafter are uniquely defined.

$$\int_{\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)} g(\delta) d\lambda(\delta) = P(F), \quad (20)$$

$$\int_{\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)} \delta \frac{g(\delta)}{P(F)} d\lambda(\delta) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | F). \quad (21)$$

(ii) *A subpopulation of compliers C_V satisfies (8) and (9) if and only if there is a real-valued function h defined on $\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)$ such that*

$$0 \leq h(\delta) \leq f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(\delta) P(C) \quad \text{for } \lambda\text{-almost every } \delta \in \mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0), \quad (22)$$

$$\int_{\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)} h(\delta) d\lambda(\delta) = FS, \quad (23)$$

$$\int_{\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)} \delta \frac{h(\delta)}{FS} d\lambda(\delta) = W. \quad (24)$$

PROOF. In view of Theorem 2.1, the proof will be complete if I can show the if part of the first statement, the only if part of the second statement, and finally that if a function h satisfies (22), (23), and (24), then a function g satisfies (19), (20), and (21).

I start by proving the if part of the first statement. Assume a function g satisfies (19), (20), and (21). Densities being uniquely defined up to 0 probability sets, I can assume without loss of generality that those three equations hold everywhere. Let

$$p(\delta) = \frac{g(\delta)}{f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(\delta) P(C)} 1\{f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(\delta) > 0\}.$$

It follows from (19) that $p(\delta)$ is always included between 0 and 1. Then let B be a Bernoulli random variable such that $P(B = 1 | C, Y_1 - Y_0 = \delta) = p(\delta)$. Finally, let $C_F = \{C, B = 1\}$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} P(C_F) &= E(P(C_F | Y_1 - Y_0)) \\ &= E(P(C | Y_1 - Y_0) P(B = 1 | C, Y_1 - Y_0)) \\ &= E\left(P(C | Y_1 - Y_0) \frac{g(Y_1 - Y_0)}{f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(Y_1 - Y_0) P(C)} 1\{f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(Y_1 - Y_0) > 0\}\right) \\ &= E\left(\frac{g(Y_1 - Y_0)}{f_{Y_1 - Y_0}(Y_1 - Y_0)}\right) \\ &= \int_{\mathcal{S}(Y_1 - Y_0)} g(\delta) d\lambda(\delta) \\ &= P(F). \end{aligned}$$

The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second from the definition of C_F and Bayes, the third from the definition of B , the fourth from the fact that under (19), $f_{Y_1 - Y_0 | C}(\delta) P(C) = 0 \Rightarrow g(\delta) = 0$, and the last from (20). This proves that C_F satisfies (6).

Then

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) &= \frac{E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_F\})}{P(C_F)} \\
 &= \frac{E((Y_1 - Y_0)P(C_F|Y_1 - Y_0))}{P(C_F)} \\
 &= \frac{E\left((Y_1 - Y_0)\frac{g(Y_1 - Y_0)}{f_{Y_1 - Y_0}(Y_1 - Y_0)}\right)}{P(C_F)} \\
 &= \int_{S(Y_1 - Y_0)} \delta \frac{g(\delta)}{P(F)} d\lambda(\delta) \\
 &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|F).
 \end{aligned}$$

The fourth equality follows from (6) and the fifth follows from (21). This proves that C_F satisfies (7).

I now prove the only if part of the second statement. Assume a subset of C denoted C_V satisfies (8) and (9). Then $h = f_{Y_1 - Y_0|C_V}P(C_V)$ must satisfy (22); otherwise we would not have $C_V \subseteq C$. It must also satisfy (23) and (24); otherwise C_V would not satisfy (8) and (9).

I finally show the last point. Assume h satisfies (22), (23), and (24). Then it follows from (1) and (2) that $g = f_{Y_1 - Y_0|C}P(C) - h$ satisfies (19), (20), and (21). \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 2.2. Under Assumption 6, $g_1 = f_{Y_1 - Y_0|F}P(F)$ satisfies (19), (20), and (21). \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 2.3. I only prove the result when $RF > 0$. The proof follows from a symmetric reasoning when $RF < 0$. When $RF = 0$, proving the equivalence and the first implication becomes trivial. To prove the second implication, if $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \geq 0$, one can use the same reasoning as that used for $RF > 0$, while if $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \leq 0$, one can use the same reasoning as that used for $RF < 0$.

I first prove that Assumption 9 \Rightarrow Assumption 7. As I have assumed $0 < RF$, Assumption 7 implies that $0 \leq E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$. Rearranging (2) yields

$$E(Y_1 - Y_0|C) - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = \frac{FS}{FS + P(F)}(W - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)).$$

Assumption 9 is therefore equivalent to

$$|W - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)| \leq W,$$

which implies that $0 \leq E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$. This proves the result.

Then I prove that Assumption 7 \Leftrightarrow Assumption 8. Let Assumption 7 be satisfied with $0 \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$. As I have assumed $0 < RF$, Assumption 7 implies that $0 < E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$. Then it follows from (2) that $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$ must also be strictly positive. Finally, rearranging (2) yields $\frac{E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}{E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)} \leq \frac{P(C)}{P(F)}$. This proves that Assumption 8 is satisfied. If Assumption 7 is satisfied with $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = 0$, Assumption 8 is also trivially satisfied. Conversely, if Assumption 8 is satisfied with $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \neq 0$, one has $1 \leq \frac{P(C)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)}{P(F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}$.

Using (2), this in turn implies that $0 \leq \frac{RF}{P(F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)}$, thus proving that either $RF = 0$ or $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ has the same sign as RF . This proves that Assumption 7 is satisfied. If Assumption 8 is satisfied with $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) = 0$, Assumption 7 is also trivially satisfied. This proves the result.

Finally, I prove that Assumption 7 \Rightarrow Assumption 5. To do so, I show that if Assumption 7 is satisfied, there is a function h_1 satisfying (22), (23), and (24). In view of Lemma B.1, this will prove the result.

As I have assumed $0 < RF$, Assumption 7 implies that $0 \leq E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$. With binary potential outcomes, this is equivalent to $0 \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, F) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, F)$. With binary potential outcomes, (2) simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, C) \\ = RF + P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, F) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, F). \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Once combined with (25), Assumption 7 implies

$$RF \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C). \quad (26)$$

Then notice that

$$\begin{aligned} FS - RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C) \\ = 2P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, C) - (2P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, F) + P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, F)), \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

$$\begin{aligned} FS + RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C) \\ = 2P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C) - (2P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, F) + P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, F)). \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

Now, consider the function h_1 defined on $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ and such that

$$\begin{aligned} h_1(-1) &= \max\left(0, \frac{FS - RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)}{2}\right), \\ h_1(0) &= \min(P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C), FS - RF), \\ h_1(1) &= \max\left(RF, \frac{FS + RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)}{2}\right). \end{aligned}$$

If $FS - RF \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)$, then

$$\begin{aligned} h_1(-1) &= 0, \\ h_1(0) &= FS - RF, \\ h_1(1) &= RF. \end{aligned}$$

The term $h_1(-1)$ is trivially included between 0 and $P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, C)$. The inequality $0 \leq h_1(0)$ follows from the fact that by assumption $|W| \leq 1$. By assumption, we also have $h_1(0) \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)$ and $0 \leq h_1(1)$. The inequality $h_1(1) \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C)$ follows from (26). This proves that h_1 satisfies (22). It is easy to see that it also satisfies (23) and (24).

If $FS - RF > P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)$, then

$$\begin{aligned} h_1(-1) &= \frac{FS - RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)}{2}, \\ h_1(0) &= P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C), \\ h_1(1) &= \frac{FS + RF - P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

The term $h_1(-1)$ is greater than 0 by assumption; $h_1(-1) \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = -1, C)$ follows from (27); $h_1(0)$ is trivially included between 0 and $P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 0, C)$; $h_1(1)$ is greater than 0 because it is greater than $h_1(-1)$; $h_1(1) \leq P(Y_1 - Y_0 = 1, C)$ follows from (28). This proves that h_1 satisfies (22). It is easy to see that it also satisfies (23) and (24). \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 2.4. Following the same steps as those used by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) to prove (1) and (2), one can show that under Assumptions 10 and 2, for every x in the support of X ,

$$\begin{aligned} E(D|Z = 1, X = x) - E(D|Z = 0, X = x) &= P(C|X = x) - P(F|X = x), \\ E(Y|Z = 1, X = x) - E(Y|Z = 0, X = x) &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|C, X = x)P(C|X = x) \\ &\quad - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F, X = x)P(F|X = x). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} E(E(D|Z = 1, X) - E(D|Z = 0, X)) &= P(C) - P(F), \\ E(E(Y|Z = 1, X) - E(Y|Z = 0, X)) &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)P(C) \\ &\quad - E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)P(F). \end{aligned}$$

Under Assumption 5, one can apply to the right-hand side of the previous display the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2.1. One finally obtains

$$\begin{aligned} E(E(D|Z = 1, X) - E(D|Z = 0, X)) &= P(C_V), \\ E(E(Y|Z = 1, X) - E(Y|Z = 0, X)) &= E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V)P(C_V). \end{aligned}$$

This proves the result. \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 2.5. In view of Theorem 2.1, it is sufficient to show that if a subpopulation of compliers C_F satisfies (6), (7), and (15), then $C_V = C \setminus C_F$ satisfies (16). Using the same steps as those used in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) to prove (2), one can show that

$$W_{XD} = \frac{P(C)E[X|C] - P(F)E[X|F]}{P(C) - P(F)}.$$

Then it follows from (6) and (15) that

$$E[X|C] = \frac{P(C) - P(F)}{P(C)}E[X|C_V] + \frac{P(F)}{P(C)}E[X|F].$$

Plugging this equation into the previous one yields the result. \square

PROOF OF THEOREM 2.6. I only prove the result when $RF > 0$ and for the lower bound. The proof is symmetric when $RF < 0$, and it follows from similar arguments for the upper bound.

I first prove that the lower bound is valid. If Assumption 8 is satisfied, (2) implies that $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$ must have the same sign as RF . Assumption 12 then implies that $E(Y_1 - Y_0|AT)$, $E(Y_1 - Y_0|NT)$, $E(Y_1 - Y_0|C)$, and $E(Y_1 - Y_0|F)$ must all be weakly greater than 0. Moreover, it follows from Theorem 2.3 that Assumption 5 is satisfied under the assumptions of the theorem. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 2.1 that compliers can be partitioned into subpopulations C_F and C_V respectively satisfying (6) and (7), and (8) and (9). Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(Y_1 - Y_0) &= P(C_V)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_V) + P(C_F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|C_F) \\
 &\quad + P(AT)E(Y_1 - Y_0|AT) + P(NT)E(Y_1 - Y_0|NT) \\
 &\quad + P(F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \\
 &= RF + P(AT)E(Y_1 - Y_0|AT) + P(NT)E(Y_1 - Y_0|NT) \\
 &\quad + 2P(F)E(Y_1 - Y_0|F) \\
 &\geq RF.
 \end{aligned}$$

This proves that the bound is valid.

Let

$$\begin{aligned}
 P^*(Y_0 = 0, Y_1 = 0, D_0 = 1, D_1 = 1) &= P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = 0), \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 1, Y_1 = 1, D_0 = 1, D_1 = 1) &= P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = 0), \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 0, Y_1 = 0, D_0 = 0, D_1 = 0) &= P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 1), \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 1, Y_1 = 1, D_0 = 0, D_1 = 0) &= P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = 1), \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 0, Y_1 = 1, D_0 = 0, D_1 = 1) &= RF, \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 0, Y_1 = 0, D_0 = 0, D_1 = 1) &= P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = 1) \\
 &\quad - P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = 0), \\
 P^*(Y_0 = 1, Y_1 = 1, D_0 = 0, D_1 = 1) &= P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = 0) \\
 &\quad - P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = 1),
 \end{aligned}$$

and let $P^*(Y_0 = y_0, Y_1 = y_1, D_0 = d_0, D_1 = d_1) = 0$ for all other possible values of $(y_0, y_1, d_0, d_1) \in \{0, 1\}^4$. Equation (1.1) in Kitagawa (2015) ensures that P^* is a probability measure. It is easy to see that it is compatible with the data and with the assumptions of the theorem, and that it attains the lower bound. This proves that the lower bound is sharp. \square

PROOF OF THEOREM A.1. I only prove the result when $RF \geq 0$ (the proof is symmetric when $RF < 0$).

Assume $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\}) < \text{RF}$. If CD is satisfied, it follows from (8) and (9) that there is a subpopulation of compliers C_V such that

$$\text{RF} = E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) \leq E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\}) < \text{RF},$$

a contradiction. CD must therefore be violated. This proves the first point.

Then assume $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) > \text{FS}$. Assume first that $\delta_0 > 0$. If CD is satisfied,

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \text{RF} - \text{RF} \\ &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0\}1\{C\}) - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) \\ &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0\}(1\{C\} - 1\{C_V\})) \\ &\quad - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 < \delta_0\}1\{C_V\}) \\ &\geq \delta_0(P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C_V) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 < \delta_0, C_V)) \\ &\geq \delta_0(P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) - \text{FS}) \\ &> 0, \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction. CD must therefore be violated. Now, assume $\delta_0 = 0$. If CD is satisfied, then

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &\geq E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 < 0\}1\{C_V\}) \\ &= \text{RF} - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C_V\}) \\ &\geq \text{RF} - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\}) \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $P(Y_1 - Y_0 < 0, C_V) = 0$, which in turn implies that $1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C\} = 1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq 0\}1\{C_V\}$ almost everywhere, a contradiction. This proves the second point.

Then assume $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C) \leq \text{FS}$ and $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1, C) \geq \text{FS}$. Let

$$h_2(\delta) = \begin{cases} \frac{P(C)f_{Y_1-Y_0|C}(\delta)}{\text{FS} - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C)} & \text{if } \delta \geq \delta_0, \\ \frac{P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1, C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_0, C)}{P(C)f_{Y_1-Y_0|C}(\delta)} & \text{if } \delta \in [\delta_1, \delta_0), \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The variable h_2 satisfies (22), (23), and (24). This proves point (iii)(a), following Lemma B.1.

Then assume $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1, C) < \text{FS}$. Assume first that $\delta_1 < 0$. If CD is satisfied, then

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1\}1\{C\}) - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) \\ &\geq \delta_1(P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_1, C) - \text{FS}) \\ &> 0, \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction. CD must therefore be violated. Now assume $\delta_1 = 0$. Then we must also have $\delta_0 = 0$, so we can use the same reasoning as in the proof of the second point to show that CD must be violated.

Then assume $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_2, C) \geq \text{FS}$. Let δ_3 solve $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta\} \times 1\{C\}) = 0$. First assume that $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_3, \delta_2), C) \leq \text{FS}$. Let

$$h_3(\delta) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \delta \geq \delta_2, \\ P(C)f_{Y_1-Y_0|C}(\delta) & \text{if } \delta \in [\delta_3, \delta_2), \\ \frac{\text{FS} - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_3, \delta_2), C)}{P(Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_2, C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_3, \delta_2), C)} \\ \quad \times P(C)f_{Y_1-Y_0|C}(\delta) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The variable h_3 satisfies (22), (23), and (24).

Now assume that $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_3, \delta_2), C) > \text{FS}$. For any $\delta \in [\delta_3, \delta_0]$, let $\eta(\delta)$ solve $E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta, \eta(\delta))\}1\{C\}) = \text{RF}$. Take $\eta(\delta_3) = \delta_2$ and $\eta(\delta_0) = \bar{y}$, the sup of the support of $Y_1 - Y_0|C$. It is easy to see that $\eta(\delta)$ is increasing in δ . I show now that $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta, \eta(\delta)), C)$ is decreasing in δ . Consider $\delta^a \leq \delta^b$ in $[\delta_3, \delta_0]$. Assume first that $\delta^b \leq \eta(\delta^a)$:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^b, \eta(\delta^b))\}1\{C\}) \\ &\quad - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^a, \eta(\delta^a))\}1\{C\}) \\ &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\eta(\delta^a), \eta(\delta^b))\}1\{C\}) \\ &\quad - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^a, \delta^b)\}1\{C\}) \\ &\geq \eta(\delta^a)P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\eta(\delta^a), \eta(\delta^b)), C) - \delta^b P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^a, \delta^b), C) \\ &\geq \delta^b (P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^b, \eta(\delta^b)), C) - P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta^a, \eta(\delta^a)), C)). \end{aligned}$$

This proves the result because $\delta^b \geq 0$. If $\delta^b > \eta(\delta^a)$, the proof follows from a similar but simpler argument. Now, as $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_3, \eta(\delta_3)), C) > \text{FS}$ and $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta_0, \eta(\delta_0)), C) \leq \text{FS}$, let δ^* solve $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \in [\delta, \eta(\delta)), C) = \text{FS}$ and let

$$h_4(\delta) = \begin{cases} P(C)f_{Y_1-Y_0|C}(\delta) & \text{if } \delta \in [\delta^*, \eta(\delta^*)), \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The variable h_4 satisfies (22), (23), and (24). This completes the proof of point (iv)(a), following Lemma B.1.

Finally, assume $P(Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_2, C) < \text{FS}$. Assume first that $\delta_2 > 0$. If CD is satisfied, then

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq \delta_2\}1\{C\}) - E((Y_1 - Y_0)1\{C_V\}) \\ &\leq \delta_2 (P(Y_1 - Y_0 \geq \delta_2, C) - \text{FS}) \\ &< 0, \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction. CD must therefore be violated. Now assume $\delta_2 = 0$. One must then have $\delta_3 = \text{RF} = 0$; $\delta_3 = 0$ implies $1\{Y_1 - Y_0 \leq 0\}1\{C\} = 0$. Combined with $\text{RF} = 0$, this implies $1\{C_V\} = 0$, so CD must be violated. This proves point (iv)(b). \square

REFERENCES

- Abadie, A. (2003), “Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 113 (2), 231–263. [378]
- Aizer, A. and J. J. Doyle (2015), “Juvenile incarceration, human capital and future crime: Evidence from randomly-assigned judges.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130 (2), 759–803. [368, 369, 384]
- Andrews, D. W. K. and G. Soares (2010), “Inference for parameters defined by moment inequalities using generalized moment selection.” *Econometrica*, 78 (1), 119–157. [380, 384]
- Angrist, J. D. and W. N. Evans (1998), “Children and their parents’ labor supply: Evidence from exogenous variation in family size.” *American Economic Review*, 88 (3), 450–477. [368, 369, 384, 385]
- Angrist, J. D. and I. Fernandez-Val (2013), “ExtrapoLATE-ing: External validity and overidentification in the LATE framework.” In *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress*, Vol. 3, 401–436, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [374]
- Angrist, J. D., G. W. Imbens, and D. B. Rubin (1996), “Identification of causal effects using instrumental variables.” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 91 (434), 444–455. [368, 370, 371, 374, 390]
- Balke, A. and J. Pearl (1997), “Bounds on treatment effects from studies with imperfect compliance.” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 92 (439), 1171–1176. [378, 379]
- Bhattacharya, J., A. M. Shaikh, and E. Vytlačil (2008), “Treatment effect bounds under monotonicity assumptions: An application to Swan–Ganz catheterization.” *American Economic Review*, 98 (2), 351–356. [369, 379]
- Chen, X., C. Flores, and A. Flores-Lagunes (2012), “Bounds on population average treatment effects with an instrumental variable.” Technical report, Department of Economics, University of Miami. [369, 379]
- Chesher, A. (2010), “Instrumental variable models for discrete outcomes.” *Econometrica*, 78 (2), 575–601. [369, 379]
- Chiburis, R. C. (2010), “Semiparametric bounds on treatment effects.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 159 (2), 267–275. [369, 379]
- Dahl, G. B., A. R. Kostøl, and M. Mogstad (2014), “Family welfare cultures.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129 (4), 1711–1752. [368]

Dahl, G. B. and E. Moretti (2008), “The demand for sons.” *Review of Economic Studies*, 75 (4), 1085–1120. [368]

Deci, E. L. (1971), “Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 18 (1), 105–115. [368]

DiNardo, J. and D. S. Lee (2011), “Program evaluation and research designs.” In *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. 4, Chapter 5, 463–536, Elsevier, New York. [370]

Duflo, E. and E. Saez (2003), “The role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions: Evidence from a randomized experiment.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118 (3), 815–842. [368, 369, 385]

Fiorini, M., K. Stevens, M. Taylor, and B. Edwards (2013), “Monotonically hopeless? Monotonicity in IV and fuzzy RD designs.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Technology Sydney, University of Sydney, and Australian Institute of Family Studies. [370]

French, E. and J. Song (2014), “The effect of disability insurance receipt on labor supply.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6 (2), 291–337. [368, 369, 383, 384]

Frey, B. S. and R. Jegen (2001), “Motivation crowding theory.” *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 15 (5), 589–611. [368]

Frölich, M. (2007), “Nonparametric IV estimation of local average treatment effects with covariates.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 139 (1), 35–75. [378]

Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000), “A fine is a price.” *Journal of Legal Studies*, 29 (1), 1–17. [368]

Heckman, J. J. (1979), “Sample selection bias as a specification error.” *Econometrica*, 47 (1), 153–161. [380]

Heckman, J. J. and S. Urzúa (2010), “Comparing IV with structural models: What simple IV can and cannot identify.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 156 (1), 27–37. [374]

Heckman, J. J. and E. Vytlacil (2005), “Structural equations, treatment effects, and econometric policy evaluation.” *Econometrica*, 73 (3), 669–738. [379, 382]

Heckman, J. J. and E. J. Vytlacil (1999), “Local instrumental variables and latent variable models for identifying and bounding treatment effects.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 96 (8), 4730–4734. [382]

Huber, M. and G. Mellace (2012), “Relaxing monotonicity in the identification of local average treatment effects.” Working paper. [370]

Imbens, G. W. (2010), “Better LATE than nothing: Some comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009).” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48, 399–423. [374]

Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist (1994), “Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects.” *Econometrica*, 62 (2), 467–475. [367, 368, 370, 371]

Kitagawa, T. (2009), “Identification region of the potential outcome distributions under instrument independence.” Working Paper CWP30/09, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [378]

- Kitagawa, T. (2015), “A test for instrument validity.” *Econometrica*, 83 (5), 2043–2063. [379, 391]
- Klein, T. J. (2010), “Heterogeneous treatment effects: Instrumental variables without monotonicity?” *Journal of Econometrics*, 155 (2), 99–116. [369]
- Kling, J. R. (2006), “Incarceration length, employment, and earnings.” *American Economic Review*, 96 (3), 863–876. [368]
- Maestas, N., K. J. Mullen, and A. Strand (2013), “Does disability insurance receipt discourage work? Using examiner assignment to estimate causal effects of SSDI receipt.” *American Economic Review*, 103 (5), 1797–1829. [368, 369, 383]
- Manski, C. F. (1990), “Nonparametric bounds on treatment effects.” *American Economic Review*, 80 (2), 319–323. [378]
- Manski, C. F. (1997), “Monotone treatment response.” *Econometrica*, 65 (6), 1311–1334. [383]
- Manski, C. F. (2005), *Social Choice With Partial Knowledge of Treatment Response*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. [374]
- Romano, J. P., A. M. Shaikh, and M. Wolf (2014), “A practical two-step method for testing moment inequalities.” *Econometrica*, 82, 1979–2002. [380]
- Shaikh, A. and E. Vytlacil (2005), “Threshold crossing models and bounds on treatment effects: A nonparametric analysis.” Technical Working Paper 0307, National Bureau of Economic Research. [380]
- Shaikh, A. M. and E. J. Vytlacil (2011), “Partial identification in triangular systems of equations with binary dependent variables.” *Econometrica*, 79 (3), 949–955. [369, 378, 379]
- Small, D. and Z. Tan (2007), “A stochastic monotonicity assumption for the instrumental variables method.” Working paper, Department of Statistics, University of Pennsylvania. [370, 374]
- Vytlacil, E. (2002), “Independence, monotonicity, and latent index models: An equivalence result.” *Econometrica*, 70 (1), 331–341. [381]

Co-editor Petra Todd handled this manuscript.

Manuscript received 10 August, 2015; final version accepted 24 September, 2016; available online 18 October, 2016.