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Using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions

by Eduardo Dávila
Abstract

This paper studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting. I show that, in a large class of economies, knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal, or should be increased or decreased. These variables are: the sensitivity to the exemption level of the interest rate schedule offered by lenders to borrowers, the borrowers’ leverage, the borrowers’ bankruptcy probability, and the change in bankrupt borrowers’ consumption. An application of the framework to US data suggests that the optimal bankruptcy exemption is higher than the current average bankruptcy exemption, but of the same order of magnitude.

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1 Introduction

Should bankruptcy procedures be harsher or more lenient with borrowers who decide not to repay their debts? What is the socially optimal level of bankruptcy exemptions? These questions are perennial topics of debate that gain relevance after economic downturns, in which default rates spike, such as in the Great Recession.\(^1\) Although it is widely believed that some form of credit relief may be at times desirable, there are no clear guidelines to determine whether the exemption level in an economy is appropriate. In fact, looking at comparable modern economies, the level of bankruptcy exemptions across similar countries or regions differs substantially. The variation in exemption levels across US states is an example of this phenomenon.

Using a canonical equilibrium model of unsecured credit, I show that, in a large class of economies, a few observable variables are sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal, or should be increased or decreased. This paper’s main contribution is to provide a theory of measurement in the context of optimal bankruptcy design.

I initially illustrate the main results of the paper in a two-period version of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Subsequently, I show that the insights from the baseline model apply to more general and realistic environments. Throughout the paper, the bankruptcy exemption \(m\) is defined as the dollar amount that a borrower who declares bankruptcy is allowed to keep.

The results are most easily understood when we directly describe the determinants of the optimal exemption \(m^*\) in the simplest benchmark case. The optimal exemption \(m^*\), measured in dollars, must satisfy the following equation:

\[
m^* = \frac{\beta \pi \Lambda}{\epsilon_{r,m}},
\]

(1)

where \(\beta\) is the borrowers’ rate of time preference, \(\pi\) is the probability of default in equilibrium, \(\Lambda\) is a measure of borrowers’ leverage, and \(\epsilon_{r,m}\) is the sensitivity with respect to the level of the bankruptcy exemption of the interest rate schedule offered by lenders to borrowers.

Equation (1) captures the tradeoff behind the determination of the optimal bankruptcy exemption. On the one hand, if borrowing rates rise quickly with the level of the bankruptcy exemption (high \(\epsilon_{r,m}\)), it is optimal to set a low exemption level, especially when borrowers’ leverage is high (high \(\Lambda\)). A low exemption facilitates the access to credit ex-ante in that case. On the other hand, if default is very frequent in equilibrium (high \(\pi\)), especially when borrowers are eager to postpone consumption (high \(\beta\)), it is optimal to set a high exemption level. A high

\(^1\)The number of personal bankruptcies more than doubled between 2007 and 2011 — see Dobbie and Goldsmith-Pinkham (2014) for a detailed account of the effect of debtor protections in the Great Recession. See White (2011) and Claessens and Klapper (2005) for recent detailed discussions of actual institutional features of bankruptcy procedures in the US and around the world, and Sichel (2001) for a historical account of the evolution of the US bankruptcy system.
exemption allows borrowers to consume more when bankrupt. Equation (1) trades off these forces optimally.

Importantly, all elements of Equation (1) have direct empirical counterparts. However, Equation (1) must be used cautiously, because all its right hand side variables are endogenous to the exemption level. Equation (1) should be interpreted as follows: for a given set of sufficient statistics measured at a given exemption level $m$, it is optimal to increase the exemption level if $m < m^*$, while it is optimal to decrease the exemption level if $m > m^*$, where $m^*$ is calculated from Equation (1). At the optimal exemption, $m = m^*$.

The formula for $m^*$ does not directly incorporate the behavioral responses of households regarding how much to borrow and when to default. It only does so through the sufficient statistics. This occurs because borrowers borrow and default optimally. The same logic applies to other optimally chosen variables, as described in the extensions. This insight, which has so far been neglected in the context analyzed here, is the reason underlying the generality of the results.

This paper adopts the tradition of general equilibrium with incomplete markets, imposing no restrictions on the shape of contracts used while taking the number and shape of the contracts available as part of the environment. When the first-best allocation, which implies perfect insurance for the risk averse borrowers, can be achieved, there is no rationale for bankruptcy. However, when the first-best allocation cannot be reached with a given set of contracts, an optimally chosen bankruptcy exemption can improve welfare. A judiciously chosen exemption alleviates the incomplete market friction.

After introducing the main results of the paper in a stylized environment, I systematically study multiple extensions that show the robustness of the main result. The takeaway of this paper is not that a simple expression like Equation (1) applies to the baseline model, but that it is valid more generally. I sequentially introduce elastic labor supply and unobservable effort choices, general utility specifications (emphasizing state-dependent preferences, which capture non-pecuniary default losses, and Epstein-Zin preferences), and multiple traded contracts with arbitrary payoffs, which allows agents to be borrowers and lenders concurrently. I also allow for observable and unobservable ex-ante heterogeneity among borrowers, which generates pooling among borrowers and financial exclusion. The optimal exemption formula easily accommodates all these more general assumptions. Finally, I make the model dynamic and show that the optimal exemption of the static model can be interpreted as an optimal steady-state exemption. The specifics of the dynamics of borrowers’ income processes, involving permanent and transitory shocks, health or family shocks, as well as life cycle considerations, which have been shown to be important to determine borrowers’ behavior, are all captured by the identified sufficient statistics.\(^2\)

\(^2\)The online appendix also allows for a) price-taking borrowers, b) exemptions contingent on aggregate shocks, and c) non-zero output gaps and aggregate demand effects.
Three robust insights emerge from the generalizations. First, the precise determination of the region(s) in which borrowers decide to default does not change the optimal exemption formula, because borrowers default optimally. Hence, evaluating the welfare implications of changing exemptions does not require us to model explicitly the multiple factors that may influence default decisions, often seen as a daunting task.\(^3\)

Second, only measures of bankrupt borrowers’ consumption are required to assess the welfare benefits of varying exemptions. Preference parameters, like risk aversion, determine how to translate measures of consumption into welfare. However, the responses of labor supply and other endogenous choice variables are irrelevant once borrowers’ consumption is known, as long as borrowers’ utility of consumption is separable.

Third, the response of interest rate schedules to changes in exemption levels contains crucial information to assess the desirability of varying the exemption level. This is particularly important in complex environments in which unobservable heterogeneity leads to the exclusion and pooling of some borrowers.

Lastly, I apply the theoretical results to US household bankruptcy data. Using a Kaldor/Hicks welfare criterion to account for household heterogeneity, under the preferred set of parameters, the approach developed in this paper suggests that the optimal bankruptcy exemption should be higher than the average exemption across US states. This exercise is not meant to settle the debate on optimal exemption levels, but rather to provide a disciplined framework to guide measurement efforts. Only further work on the measurement of the key variables identified in this paper will help us refine the optimal prescription for the exemption level. Specifically, this paper concludes that precise measures of interest rate schedules and borrowers’ consumption will be needed.

**Related Literature**

This paper presents an application of the sufficient statistic approach to the problem of bankruptcy and security design. In the spirit of Chetty (2009), this paper derives formulas for the welfare consequences of policies that are functions of high-level observables rather than deep primitives. The optimal policies characterized under this approach are robust to a broad range of environments. Some recent applications of this approach are Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) — hence the title analogy — on income taxation, Shimer and Werning (2007) and Chetty (2008) on unemployment insurance, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) on the welfare gains

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\(^3\)In general, forward looking borrowers internalize the option value of waiting for uncertainty to be realized before defaulting, which crucially depends on whether shocks are temporary or permanent. Both these considerations, which prevent a simple characterization of default regions, only affect the determination of the optimal exemption through the sufficient statistics.
from trade liberalizations, Mahoney and Weyl (2014) on the effects of market power in selection markets, and Alvarez, Le Bihan and Lippi (2016) on the effects of monetary shocks under sticky prices. In the context of financial markets, most closely related is the work of Matvos (2013), who exploits a sufficient statistic approach to estimate the benefits of contractual completeness. In the same spirit, Alvarez and Jermann (2004) show how to use specific consumption claims to carry out welfare assessments. Methodologically, this paper adopts a price-theoretic approach, as described in Weyl (2015), to tackle the problem of optimal bankruptcy design.

This paper contributes to the literature on applications of general equilibrium with incomplete markets, which has studied the possibility of default in very general environments. Zame (1993) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) are the first to theoretically analyze the core tradeoff present in this paper. They show that allowing for default may be welfare improving in a model with incomplete markets since it creates insurance opportunities by introducing new contingencies into contracts. These papers take default penalties as exogenous and do not characterize optimal penalties, which is the approach I adopt in this paper. Interestingly, despite acknowledging in Section 7 of their paper that the optimal penalty associated with default is neither zero nor infinite, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) do not pursue its optimal determination.

It is well known that default is only beneficial when markets are initially incomplete. Allowing for default when agents can write fully state contingent contracts, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez and Jermann (2000) or Chien and Lustig (2010), only restricts the contracting space, reducing welfare unequivocally. By adopting a classic general equilibrium approach, this paper circumvents the frictions studied in the literature on optimal contracting that focuses on borrower-lender relationships. Limited commitment or enforcement, moral hazard, imperfect monitoring, and secret cash-flow manipulation are examples of these frictions, which span a large number of theoretical contributions.

This paper complements the well-developed quantitative literature on bankruptcy with unsecured credit. On the one hand, the work by Gropp, Schulz and White (1997), Gross and Souleles (2002), Fay, Hurst and White (2002), Mahoney (2015), Iverson (2013), Dobbie and Song (2015), Severino, Brown and Coates (2013), and Albanesi and Nosal (2015), among others, uses microeconometric methodology to understand the implications of actual bankruptcy policies. See White (2007, 2011) for recent surveys of this body of work. On the other hand, the papers by Chatterjee et al. (2007) or Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007), among several others, provide a careful quantitative structural analysis of unsecured credit and default from a macroeconomic perspective. Due to their rich general equilibrium features, these papers have relied on numerical

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4 A closely related literature studies the role of collateralized credit in general equilibrium environments. See, for instance, Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010) and Hostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2012, 2014). As described in Section 4.4, it is straightforward to allow for collateralized contracts in this paper.
methods to evaluate the welfare implications of varying exemption levels. This paper takes
a different but complementary approach, which allows us to gain analytical insights into this
question and to shift our attention to a small set of variables of interest.

Finally, a version of the environment used in this paper has become the workhorse model to
understand sovereign default. If the ex-post penalties imposed on sovereigns that default were
enforceable, the results of this paper would also apply to the international context with minor
modifications. See Aguiar and Amador (2013) for a recent survey.

Outline Section 2 lays out the baseline model and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3
presents the main results in the baseline model. Section 4 analyzes multiple extensions and Section
5 applies the theoretical results to US data. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and derivations are
in the appendix.

2 Baseline model

For clarity, I introduce the main results of the paper in a stylized environment: a two-period
version of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), which is an unrealistic model in many dimensions. In
Section 4, I enrich the environment and show that the insights of the baseline model are robust
and apply generally.

2.1 Environment

Time is discrete, there are two dates, denoted by \( t = 0, 1 \), and there is a unit measure of borrowers
and a unit measure of lenders. Because borrowers are risk averse, the results of this paper are
more applicable to household borrowing, rather than to corporate borrowing.\(^5\)

Borrowers Borrowers are risk averse and maximize expected utility of consumption with a
rate of time preference \( \beta > 0 \). Their flow utility \( U(C) \) satisfies standard regularity conditions:
\( U''(\cdot) > 0 \), \( U'''(\cdot) < 0 \) and \( \lim_{C \to 0} U'(C) = \infty \).

There is a single consumption good (dollar) in this economy, which serves as numeraire. Every
borrower is endowed with \( y_0 \) units of the consumption good at \( t = 0 \). At \( t = 1 \), every borrower
receives a stochastic endowment of \( y_1 \) units of the consumption good, whose distribution follows
a cdf \( F(\cdot) \) with support in \([y_1, \overline{y_1}]\), where \( y_1 \geq 0 \) and \( \overline{y_1} \) could be infinite. \( y_1 \) corresponds to net
resources available to borrowers after accounting for any form of public social insurance. The
realizations of \( y_1 \) are iid among borrowers. Therefore, under a law of large numbers, there is no
aggregate risk in this economy. The environment and the realization of \( y_1 \) are common knowledge.

\(^5\)There is scope to adapt the results of this paper to the corporate context, in which risk neutral firms engage
in risk management with imperfect instruments and become endogenously risk averse.
In the baseline model, \( y_1 \) should be interpreted as the level of assets, not income. This distinction becomes clear in Section 4.4.

Hence, borrowers maximize:

\[
\max_{C_0, \{C_1, B_0, \xi\}_{1}, Y_1, B_0} U(C_0) + \beta E[V(C_1)],
\]

where \( V(C_1) = \max_{\xi \in \{0, 1\}} \{\xi U(C_P^D) + (1 - \xi) U(C_N^N)\} \) and \( \xi \) is an indicator for default for every realization \( y_1 \). If a borrower decides to repay, \( \xi = 0 \), while if he decides to default, \( \xi = 1 \). \( C_P^D \) denotes consumption for a borrower who defaults and \( C_N^N \) denotes consumption for a borrower who repays, both defined below.

Borrowers use a single noncontingent contract, i.e., a debt contract. That is, borrowers issue debt with face value \( B_0 \), due at \( t=1 \), and receive from lenders \( q_0(B_0, m)B_0 \) units of the consumption good at \( t=0 \). Hence, the gross interest rate faced by borrowers can be defined as \( 1 + r \equiv \frac{1}{q_0} \). When needed, I denote by \( \tilde{r} \) the logarithmic interest rate, i.e., \( \tilde{r} \equiv \log(1 + r) \).

In the baseline model, borrowers take into account that the interest rate at which they are able to borrow depends on the amount of debt they take. Hence, the budget constraint at \( t=0 \) for borrowers is:

\[
C_0 = y_0 + q_0(B_0, m)B_0,
\]

where the unit price of debt taken \( q_0(B_0, m) \) is a function of \( B_0 \) and \( m \), as described below.

At \( t=1 \), once \( y_1 \) is realized, borrowers can repay the amount owed \( B_0 \) or default. If they default, they consume \( C_P^D = \min \{y_1, m\} \), that is, they keep the bankruptcy exemption of \( m \) units of the consumption good unless \( m \) is larger than \( y_1 \), in which case they only keep \( y_1 \) units. Any positive remainder \( y_1 - m \) is seized from borrowers and transferred to lenders, although lenders only receive a fraction \( \delta \in [0, 1) \) of the transferred resources. This loss captures the resource costs associated with the bankruptcy procedure. There is no ex-post renegotiation of the terms of the contract.

The exemption \( m \) takes a value in the interval \([m_l, m_u]\). Because the bankruptcy procedure cannot rely on external funds, \( m_l \leq m \). To simplify the exposition, I further restrict \( m \) to be greater than the lowest realization of \( y_1 \), that is, \( m > y_1 \). Therefore, for a given realization of \( y_1 \), the budget constraints at \( t=1 \) when a borrower chooses to repay and when it chooses to default

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\[6\] Bankruptcy and default are synonyms in this paper. See White (2011) and Herkenhoff (2012) for how borrowers may default on their obligations without entering in bankruptcy. Allowing borrowers not to repay without declaring bankruptcy does not change the optimal exemption formula, as long as they behave optimally. See the discussion in Section 4.7.

\[7\] The results extend naturally to the case in which \( m < y_1 \), but the analysis becomes more tedious, since multiple cases have to be analyzed then. These results are available under request.
are, respectively:

\[
C^N_1 = y_1 - B_0 \\
C^P_1 = \min\{y_1, m\}
\]

Borrowers’ rate of time preference $\beta$, initial endowment $y_0$ and distribution of future endowments $F(\cdot)$ are such that borrowers borrow in equilibrium, that is, $B_0 > 0$. The appendix provides an exact sufficient condition.

**Lenders**  Given the exemption level and default behavior of borrowers, lenders supply credit by offering a pricing schedule $q_0(B_0, m)$, which depends on the face value of the debt $B_0$ and the exemption level $m$. I focus on the case in which lenders are risk neutral, perfectly competitive and require a given rate of return $1 + r^*$, which can differ from the borrowers’ rate of time preference $\beta$.

Under these assumptions, $q_0(B_0, m)$ takes the form:

\[
q_0(B_0, m) = \frac{\delta \int_{\mathcal{D}} \max\{y_1 - m, 0\} dF(y_1) + \int_{\mathcal{N}} dF(y_1)}{1 + r^*},
\]

where $\mathcal{D}$ represents the default region and $\mathcal{N}$ the no default region, which are determined in equilibrium. $\delta$ denotes the proportional deadweight loss associated with transferring resources in bankruptcy. As long as lenders make zero profit and $q_0(B_0, m)$ is well-behaved, the insights of this paper are independent of the particular assumptions made regarding the behavior of lenders. For instance, the online appendix shows how to introduce risk averse competitive lenders.

**Equilibrium definition and regularity conditions**  An equilibrium, for a given exemption level $m$, is defined as a set of consumption allocations $C_0, \{C_1\}_{y_1}$, default decisions $\{\xi\}_{y_1}$, amount of debt issued $B_0$, and price $q_0$ such that borrowers default and borrow optimally internalizing that their choices affect the price of the debt and lenders offer a pricing schedule $q_0(B_0, m)$ while making zero profit.

As usual in problems with continuous distributions of shocks, the convexity of the problem is in general not guaranteed. I work under the assumption that the borrowers’ problem is well-behaved, so first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimum, and borrowers’ indirect utility $W(m)$, defined in Equation (7) below, is well-behaved in $m$. This is a common approach in normative analysis. I discuss sufficient conditions for convexity in the appendix and show that the model is well-behaved numerically for standard primitives in the online appendix.

I would like to make a final observation before characterizing the equilibrium. Because the first-best outcome in the baseline model involves risk neutral lenders providing a flat consumption

\[\text{8}\]

There is scope to model a richer lending side, potentially including financial intermediaries with funding frictions.
profile (full insurance) to risk averse borrowers at \( t = 1 \), an exemption level that does not depend on \( y_1 \) is optimal in the baseline model, even when a nonlinear bankruptcy scheme that depends on \( y_1 \) is feasible. A constant exemption level is not necessarily optimal in some of the extensions: I’ll point that out whenever that is the case. In those situations, this paper solves a second best problem with imperfect instruments. In those cases, the choice of a constant exemption is justified by the fact that it is the one used in practice. Although allowing for additional instruments could further improve welfare, that does not change the characterization of the optimal exemption developed in this paper.

2.2 Equilibrium characterization

First, I characterize the optimal ex-post default decision by borrowers. Then, I characterize the equilibrium pricing schedules offered by competitive lenders. Finally, I solve for the optimal ex-ante choice of \( B_0 \).

**Borrowers’ default decision** At \( t = 1 \), given his ex-ante choice of \( B_0 \), a borrower solves the problem:

\[
\max_{\xi \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ \xi U \left( C^D_1 \right) + (1 - \xi) U \left( C^N_1 \right) \right\}
\]

Because flow utility is strictly monotonic, this problem is equivalent to \( \max_{\xi} \left\{ C^D_1, C^N_1 \right\} \). The optimal default decision is given by a threshold on the realization of \( y_1 \). When \( y_1 \) is high, it is optimal not to default, but when \( y_1 \) is sufficiently low, it is preferable to default than to repay the loan. Figure 1 shows graphically the default problem at \( t = 1 \). The upper envelope of the default and repayment options determines the optimal consumption choice given \( B_0 \). The 45 degree line is shown for reference.

Formally, the optimal default decision is:

\[
\xi = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } y_1 < m + B_0 \quad \text{Default} \\
0, & \text{if } y_1 \geq m + B_0 \quad \text{No Default}
\end{cases}
\]

The default threshold is determined by the indifference condition between the amount to be repaid \( B_0 \) and the amount transferred to lenders \( y_1 - m \). I assume that indifferent borrowers decide not to default. Given the default decision, the fraction of borrowers that defaults in equilibrium is deterministic and given by \( F(m + B_0) \).

This model incorporates forced default, which occurs when a borrower does not have enough resources to pay back its debt fully (it occurs when \( B_0 > y_1 \)), and strategic default, which happens when borrowers have enough resources to repay fully but they decide not to do it (it occurs when \( m + B_0 > y_1 > B_0 \)). This distinction, which often plays a prominent role in discussions about bankruptcy exemptions, is not relevant for the results of this paper.
Forced Default
Strategic Default

Figure 1: Optimal default decision given $B_0$

**Lenders’ pricing/interest rate schedule** When lenders are risk neutral and perfectly competitive, given borrowers’ default decision, they offer the following pricing schedule for given levels of $B_0$ and $m$:

$$q_0(B_0, m) = \delta \left( \frac{m + B_0}{m} \right) F'(y_1) + \frac{\int_{m + B_0}^{\min\{y_1, m\}} dF(y_1)}{1 + r^*}$$

(2)

Figure 2 graphically shows the repayment to lenders. The upper envelope between $\max\{y_1 - m, 0\}$ and $B_0$ represents the effective repayment to lenders. The credit spread is positive, that is $r - r^* > 0$, to account for the possibility of default, and approximately equal to the expected unit loss for lenders, because of risk neutrality.

Two properties of the pricing schedule are important for the analysis. First, the pricing schedule decreases (interest rates increase) with the level of debt $B_0$. Second, the pricing schedule decreases (interest rates increase) with the level of the bankruptcy exemption. Formally (the exact expressions are in the appendix):

$$\frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial B_0} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial m} < 0$$

(3)

For a given level of $m$, the required interest rate spread increases with the amount of credit issued. This occurs for two reasons. First, the per unit fraction of liabilities recovered by lenders in default states decreases with the total amount of credit. Second, because the default region widens, more resources are lost as bankruptcy costs. Also, for a given level of $B_0$, the required interest rate spread increases with the level of the bankruptcy exemption. There are again two reasons for this. First, the recovery rate for lenders in default states decreases with the level
Repayment

\[ \max \{y_1 - m, 0\} \]

Figure 2: Repayment to lenders given \( B_0 \)

of the exemption, since borrowers get to keep a higher exemption. Second, because the default region widens, more resources are lost as bankruptcy costs.

**Borrowers’ optimal choice of \( B_0 \)** Given the optimal ex-post default decision and taking into account the debt pricing schedule offered by lenders, borrowers optimally choose how much to borrow. The problem solved by borrowers at \( t = 0 \), for a given exemption \( m \), is:

\[
\max_{B_0} \left[ U(y_0 + q_0(B_0, m)B_0) + \beta \int_m^{m + B_0} U(y_1 - B_0) \, dF(y_1) \right]
\]

Under the assumed regularity conditions, the following first-order condition fully characterizes the solution to (4):

\[
U'(C_0) \left[ q_0(B_0, m) + \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] = \beta \int_{m + B_0}^{y_1} U'(y_1 - B_0) \, dF(y_1)
\]

The left hand side of (5) represents the marginal benefit at \( t = 0 \) of increasing the face value of the debt by a dollar. This marginal benefit is given by \( q_0 \), the amount raised at \( t = 0 \) per dollar promised at \( t = 1 \), corrected by how the induced interest rate increase affects the total amount borrowed \( B_0 \). Borrowers value this change at their marginal utility \( U'(C_0) \). The right hand side of (5) represents the marginal cost of repaying the debt, given by the marginal utility when the payment is due. This cost is only paid in states in which borrowers do not default; debt imposes no effective costs on borrowers in those states in which it does not have to be repaid.

Equation (5) allows us to characterize analytically how the total amount of credit changes in equilibrium with the level of the bankruptcy exemption \( m \). Unsurprisingly, the sign of \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \) is
ambiguous. Formally, \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \) has the following sign:

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \right) = \text{sign} \left( U''(C_0) \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} B_0 + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial B_0} \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} B_0 + U'(C_0) \left[ \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial B_0 \partial m} B_0 \right] + \beta U'(m) f(m + B_0) \right)
\]

Three distinct effects determine the sign of \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \). First, all else equal, an increase in \( m \) reduces \( q_0 \), which reduces borrowers’ consumption \( C_0 \) and increases \( t = 0 \) marginal utility \( U'(C_0) \); this income effect induces borrowers to increase \( B_0 \). Second, all else equal, an increase in \( m \) varies the unit amount that can be raised at \( t = 0 \), given by the direct price effect \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \) and the change in the derivative of the pricing schedule \( \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} B_0 \); this substitution effect is in general ambiguous, although the direct price effect induces borrowers to decrease \( B_0 \). Third, all else equal, an increase in \( m \) reduces the marginal cost of borrowing because the default region widens, which reduces the likelihood of having to pay back the debt. This direct effect induces borrowers to increase \( B_0 \). Through this direct effect, borrowers decide to borrow more ex-ante anticipating not having to pay back their debts: this effect is often described as moral hazard.

Numerical solutions of the model with standard parametrizations find that \( B_0 \) tends to increase with the exemption level when the exemption level is low: the direct effect dominates in those cases. However, \( B_0 \) tends to decrease with the exemption level when the exemption level is large. In that case, borrowers face very high interest rates, and the substitution effect dominates. I show that it is not necessary to have precise knowledge on whether borrowers borrow more or less when exemptions change to understand the effects on welfare of varying bankruptcy exemptions, as long as borrowers optimally choose how much to borrow.

Finally, we can formally express the equilibrium changes in interest rates induced by changing the bankruptcy exemption in the following way:

\[
\frac{dq_0(B_0, m)}{dm} = \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial B_0} \frac{dB_0}{dm} + \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial m} \tag{6}
\]

The last term in Equation (6) is negative, but depending on the sign of \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \), \( \frac{dq_0(B_0, m)}{dm} \) can take any sign. As long as borrowing increases with \( m \), that is, \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} > 0 \), observed interest rates increase in equilibrium, that is, \( \frac{dq_0(B_0, m)}{dm} < 0 \).

3 Welfare and optimal bankruptcy exemptions

After characterizing the equilibrium for a given exemption \( m \), I now study how welfare varies with the level of \( m \) and how to determine the welfare maximizing exemption. Because lenders
make zero profit in equilibrium, maximizing borrowers’ indirect utility is equivalent to maximizing social welfare in this economy. I denote the indirect utility of borrowers, as a function of \( m \), by \( W(m) \):

\[
W(m) = U\left(y_0 + q_0(B_0(m), m)B_0(m)\right) + \beta \int_m^{m+B_0(m)} U(y) dF(y) + \int_{m+B_0(m)}^\infty U(y) dF(y)
\]

where \( B_0(m) \) is given by the solution to Equation (5) and \( q_0(B_0(m), m) \) is given by:

\[
q_0(B_0(m), m) = \delta \int_m^{m+B_0(m)} \frac{y - mB_0(B_0(m))}{B_0(m)} dF(y) + \beta \int_{m+B_0(m)}^\infty \frac{y - mB_0(B_0(m))}{B_0(m)} dF(y)
\]

Propositions 1 and 2 present the main results of this paper.

Proposition 1. (A directional test for \( m \))

a) The change in welfare induced by a marginal change in the bankruptcy exemption \( m \) is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = U'(C_0) \frac{\partial q_0(B_0(m), m)B_0(m)}{\partial m} + \int_m^{m+B_0(m)} \beta U'(C_0) dF(y)
\]

b) The change in welfare induced by a marginal change in the bankruptcy exemption \( m \), expressed as a fraction of \( t = 0 \) consumption, is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{U'(C_0) C_0} = -\Lambda \varepsilon, m + \frac{1}{m} \frac{\Pi_m}{C_0}
\]

where \( \Lambda \equiv \frac{q_0 B_0}{m+B_0(m)} \) is a measure of borrowers’ leverage, \( \varepsilon, m \equiv \frac{\partial \log(1+r)}{\partial m} = -\frac{\partial q_0(B_0(m), m)B_0(m)}{q_0 B_0(B_0(m), m)B_0(m)} \) denotes the semi-elasticity of the interest rate schedule offered by lenders with respect to the level of the exemption, and \( \frac{\Pi_m}{C_0} \equiv \int_m^{m+B_0(m)} \frac{\beta U'(C_0) dF(y)}{C_0} \) is the price-consumption ratio from the borrowers’ perspective of a claim that pays the marginal value of increasing the bankruptcy exemption by one unit.

Proposition 1 characterizes the effect on social welfare of a marginal change in the bankruptcy exemption. The derivation of Equation (8) crucially exploits the fact that borrowers borrow and decide when to default optimally. When \( \frac{dW}{dm} \) is positive (negative), it is optimal to increase (decrease) the current exemption level \( m \).

On the one hand, a marginal increase in the exemption \( m \) makes borrowing more expensive through a reduction in the price of the debt issued \( \frac{B_0}{m+B_0(m)} \), which affects the total amount of debt in Section 4.4. The problem solved here can be interpreted as that of a jurisdiction setting exemptions to maximize social welfare or, alternatively, as that of borrowers optimally choosing exemption levels under commitment.

This logic is analogous to assuming that the production sector faces constant returns to scale in optimal taxation problems.

10This logic is analogous to assuming that the production sector faces constant returns to scale in optimal taxation problems.
outstanding $B_0$. This change is valued by borrowers according to their $t = 0$ marginal utility $U'(C_0)$. This increase in borrowing costs is the marginal cost of a more lenient bankruptcy procedure.

On the other hand, a marginal increase in the exemption $m$ increases the resources that borrowers can keep when they default while claiming the full exemption. Averaging over the pertinent realizations of $y_1$ and weighting this gain by the marginal utility $\beta U'(C_0)$ in those states, the marginal welfare gain of a more lenient bankruptcy procedure becomes

$$\beta \int_{m}^{m+\delta m} U'(C_1^m) \, dF(y_1).$$

Equation (9) expresses the change in welfare as a money-metric — dividing by $U'(C_0)$ — before normalizing by initial consumption $C_0$. It provides a simple test, expressed as a function of potentially observable variables, for whether it is optimal to increase or decrease the bankruptcy exemption, starting from a given level. The term $\Lambda$ measures borrowers’ leverage.

The optimal bankruptcy exemption $m^*$ can be found as:

$$m^* = \arg \max_m W(m)$$

The optimal bankruptcy exemption must be a solution to the equation $\frac{dW}{dm} = 0$.

Proposition 2. (Optimal bankruptcy exemption) The optimal exemption $m^*$ — expressed in units of the consumption good, i.e., dollars — is characterized by:

$$m^* = \frac{\Pi_m \{ C_1 \}}{\Pi_m \{ C_0 \}} \Lambda \, \varepsilon_{r,m}, \tag{10}$$

where $\Lambda \equiv \frac{q_0 B_0 y_0}{1 + q_0 B_0 y_0}$ is a measure of borrowers’ leverage, $\varepsilon_{r,m} \equiv \frac{\partial \log(1 + r)}{\partial m}$ denotes the semi-elasticity of the interest rate schedule offered by lenders with respect to the level of

Debt-to-equity ratios, that is, $L \equiv \frac{B_0}{y_0}$, are the most frequently used measures of leverage. The variable $\Lambda$ is a monotonic transformation of $L$: $\Lambda = \frac{L}{1 + L}$. 

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14
the exemption, and \( \Pi_m \{C_D} \equiv \int_{m}^{m+R_0} \frac{C_D}{C_b} \left( \frac{C_D}{C_b} \right)^{1-\gamma} dF(y_1) \) is the price-consumption ratio from the borrowers’ perspective of a claim that pays the marginal value of increasing the exemption by a unit.

The expression for \( m^* \) optimally trades off the marginal benefit of increasing consumption in default states (numerator) against the marginal cost of restricting access to credit (denominator). Importantly, it does so using potentially observable variables. A low value for \( m^* \) is optimal when \( \Lambda \) and \( \tilde{\epsilon}_{r,m} \) are large. Intuitively, if interest rates schedules are very sensitive to increasing the bankruptcy exemption, making default more attractive by increasing \( m^* \) is very costly in terms of restricted access to credit; this effect is amplified when the amount borrowed \( \Lambda \) is high. A high value for \( m^* \) is optimal when \( \Pi_m \{C_D \} \), the normalized welfare gain of a marginally higher exemption is large.

Although Equation (10) must hold at the optimum, it does not provide a characterization of \( m^* \) as a function of primitives, because all right hand side variables are endogenous to the exemption level. Hence, Equation (10) should also be interpreted in the form of a test as follows: for a given set of sufficient statistics measured at a given exemption level \( m \), it is optimal to increase the exemption level if \( m < m^* \), while it is optimal to decrease the exemption level if \( m > m^* \), where \( m^* \) is calculated from Equation (10). At the optimal exemption, \( m = m^* \).

CRRA utility  
To build further intuition, assume that borrowers have constant relative risk aversion utility (CRRA) preferences, that is, \( U(C) = \frac{C^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \), where \( \gamma \equiv -C U''(C) / U'(C) \). Assuming a particular utility specification only affects directly the price-consumption ratio \( \Pi_m \{C_D \} \). The marginal cost of increased leniency \( \Delta \tilde{\epsilon}_{r,m} \) does not depend directly on the utility function, only through the effects on \( B_0 \) and \( q_0 \). We can thus write:

\[
\frac{\Pi_m \{C_D \}}{C_b} = \beta \int_{m}^{m+R_0} \left( \frac{C_D}{C_b} \right)^{1-\gamma} dF(y_1)
\]

Therefore, an increase in leniency \( m \) increases \( C_D \) and has both discount rate and cash flow effects. When the CRRA coefficient \( \gamma \) is greater than one, the discount rate effect \( \left( \frac{C_D}{C_b} \right)^{1-\gamma} \) dominates — this is the standard parametrization, see Campbell (2003) — but, if \( \gamma \) is less than one the consumption growth term \( \frac{C_D}{C_b} \) dominates. With logarithmic utility \( (\gamma = 1) \) both effects exactly cancel out. We expect \( t = 0 \) consumption to be higher than the exemption level, that is, \( \frac{C_D}{C_b} < 1 \), so the marginal loss generated by a higher exemption is increasing in the risk aversion parameter \( \gamma \) — see the appendix for a formal argument.

The forces that determine the price-consumption ratio are the same that determine the price-dividend (consumption-wealth) ratio in standard consumption based asset pricing models — see

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12Similarly, classic optimal Ramsey commodity taxation results depend on demand elasticities, which in general are endogenous to the level of taxes.
Campbell (2003) for a review. In the classic Lucas (1978) model, price-dividend ratios are constant and equal to the rate of time preference $\beta$ for investors with logarithmic utility. That same result applies here with one modification: instead of $\beta$, the relevant price-consumption ratio becomes $\beta \pi_m$, because we are interested in the price-dividend ratio of a security that only pays in default states with positive recovery by lenders.

Logarithmic utility is an often used benchmark specification for preferences, the price-consumption ratio can be written as:

$$\Pi_m \left\{ \frac{C_D}{C_0} \right\} = \beta \pi_m,$$

where $\pi_m \equiv \int_{m-B_0}^{m} dF(y_1)$ is the unconditional probability that a borrower consumes the bankruptcy exemption. It can alternatively be written as: $\pi_m = \pi_D \cdot \pi_m|D$, the unconditional probability of default $\pi_D$ times the conditional probability that a borrower claims the full exemption $\pi_m|D$. Hence, when borrowers have log utility and lenders always claim the full exemption, only the probability of default is needed to assess the marginal benefit of increasing the bankruptcy exemption. When borrowers’ risk aversion is larger than unity and $m < C_0$, the logarithmic utility formula provides a lower bound for the optimal exemption that does not require to measure consumption.

Hence, when borrowers have logarithmic utility, the optimal bankruptcy exemption $m^*$ can be written as in Equation (1):

$$m^* = \frac{\beta \pi_m}{\Lambda \varepsilon,m},$$

**Behind the sufficient statistics** In this baseline model with risk neutral lenders, we can further rewrite the equation that characterizes the optimal exemption as:

$$m^* = \left( \frac{\beta (1 + r^*)}{\Omega + \delta (1 - \Omega)} \right)^\frac{1}{\gamma} C_0, \quad (11)$$

where $\Omega = \frac{f(m^* + B_0) - f(m^*)}{f(m^* + B_0) - f(m^*)}$ is a measure of curvature of the distribution $F(\cdot)$ that can take values in $[0, \infty]$. When $F(\cdot)$ is a uniform, $\Omega = 1$. Intuitively, the optimal exemption seeks to equalize consumption at $t = 1$ in default states with consumption at $t = 0$, although with a correction that depends on the term $\frac{\beta (1 + r^*)}{\Omega + \delta (1 - \Omega)}$. All else constant, when $\beta (1 + r^*) > 1$, it is optimal to consume more at period 1, which calls for lower exemptions. Similarly, when $\delta + (1 - \delta) \Omega$, which measures $\frac{\partial \log(1 + r)}{\partial m}$, is low, high exemptions are optimal. All else constant, there is no clear comparative static on the bankruptcy cost parameter $\delta$. Two effects compete. On the one hand, a high $\delta$ (low bankruptcy costs) amplifies the sensitivity of interest rate schedules to exemption changes because more resources flow from borrowers to lenders in bankruptcy. On the other hand, a high $\delta$ dampens the sensitivity of interest rate schedules to exemption changes, because there is no loss associated to defaulting in more states. All these effects are modulated by borrowers’ risk
aversion: high risk aversion $\gamma$ pushes towards $\frac{m^*}{C_0} \to 1$. It should not be surprising that a complete closed-form solution cannot be found, even in this simple (but highly nonlinear) model.

Although Equation (11) can be easily solved numerically and it is helpful to provide intuition behind the sufficient statistics, it is only valid in this stylized model. Even in this very simple model, there are multiple competing effects that determine $m^*$, suggesting that it may hard to find a clear mapping between primitives and optimal exemptions.

Instead, I focus throughout this paper on equations like (9) and (10), which apply to more complex and realistic environments, as shown in Section 4.

I conclude this section with four remarks.

Remark 1. (Sufficient statistics) Three observable variables: borrowers’ leverage, the sensitivity of interest rate schedules with respect to the exemption level, and the price-consumption ratio, suffice to determine the optimal exemption, independently of the rest of the structure of the model. For standard preferences, the price-consumption ratio depends on the probability of default and the consumption of borrowers. For instance, the distribution of endowment shocks or the level of interest rates only affect $m^*$ through these sufficient statistics. The logic behind these sufficient statistics is similar to the one behind the CAPM, in which the beta of an asset becomes sufficient to determine expected returns, or the consumption CAPM, in which the consumption process, independently of how it is generated, is sufficient to determine asset prices and expected returns.

Remark 2. (Applicability of $dW$ versus $m^*$) Although I emphasize the characterization of $m^*$ in the introduction, because it is a more salient result, the robust practical insight of this paper comes from the local test involving $\frac{dW}{dm}$. This test, which only uses local information, can be carried out either by finding the value of $\frac{dW}{dm}$ or by comparing a given $m$ with $m^*$. By repeatedly applying such test, under appropriate regularity conditions, one would eventually find the optimal bankruptcy exemption level in a given economy.

Remark 3. (Endogenous contract choice) This paper solves the problem that maximizes the ex-ante welfare of borrowers under commitment, given a set of contracts, which are taken as observable. One interpretation of the results is that agents do not choose the shape of contracts, perhaps because of hysteresis in contract choice. Alternatively, Allen and Gale (1994) show that, if there are fixed costs associated with trading contracts, only a finite number of contracts will be used in equilibrium. Moreover, I show in detail in the appendix and further discuss in Section 4.4 that the main characterization of this paper remains valid even if contracts are endogenously chosen, as long as the shape the contracts chosen does not vary with the level of $m$. In practice, the fact that we observe the same set of contracts (e.g., debt contracts) being traded in economies with high and low exemption levels suggests that this sufficient condition applies to modern economies.

Remark 4. (Security design interpretation) The key tradeoff in this paper can be interpreted as a security design problem. Assume that borrowers can choose between two fairly priced securities.
They can issue either a noncontingent bond or a bundle of a noncontingent bond with a put option (whose strike is determined by the optimal default decision). Given their endowment process, borrowers will prefer one of these two securities; the choice of $m$ adjusts parametrically between both contracts and $m^*$ selects the optimal traded security. This approach is related to the work in security design motivated by risk sharing, as in Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995). This literature starts by allowing for some form of market incompleteness and then asks the question of which securities should be introduced in the market to improve risk sharing and welfare. The optimal bankruptcy exemption in this paper solves a specific optimal security design problem.

4 Extensions

The baseline model omits many relevant features of credit markets. This section shows that the results derived in the baseline model are robust to many generalizations. I exhaustively address the most natural extensions and relegate several others to the online appendix. To ease the exposition and for brevity, I analyze every extension separately and omit equilibrium definitions and regularity conditions.

A reader more interested in the practical applicability of the results can jump directly to Section 5, keeping in mind that many claims made there follow formally from the many insights drawn from the extensions studied here.

4.1 Endogenous income: elastic labor supply and effort choice in frictionless markets

In the baseline model, borrowers’ income is exogenously determined. However, it is often argued that creditor friendly bankruptcy procedures reduce borrowers’ welfare by distorting labor supply decisions: seizing borrowers’ labor income can have a negative effect on labor supply. Similarly, large exemptions may distort ex-ante effort choices by borrowers. However, the optimal exemption formula does not change when effort and labor supply are affected by changes in exemptions, as long as those decisions are made optimally.

To capture these concerns, I modify the baseline model in two dimensions. First, I allow borrowers to choose labor supply in both periods. Second, I assume that the distribution of income $F(Y_t,a)$ is a differentiable function of a noncontractible effort choice $a$, made by borrowers at $t = 0$. This effort choice creates another form of moral hazard. Borrowers can work at given wages $w_0$ and $w_1$ — in the background, perfectly competitive/constant returns to scale firms provide labor demand curves. Borrowers’ flow utility is now given by a well-behaved function.
$U(C,N,a)$, where $N$ denotes hours worked and $a$ is the quantity of effort exerted. For now, I make no assumptions on the separability between consumption, leisure and effort. For simplicity, I abstract from limits on wage garnishments and assume that all labor income is transferred from borrowers to lenders in bankruptcy.

Borrowers now solve:

$$\max_{C_0,(C_1)_t,a_t} U(C_0, N_0; a) + \beta \mathbb{E}_a [V(C_1, N_1)]$$

s.t. $C_0 = y_0 + w_0 N_0 + q_0 B_0; \quad C_1 = y_1 + w_1 N_1 - B_0; \quad C_t = \min \{ y_t, m \}$,

where $V(C_1, N_1) = \max_{C_t \in \mathbb{R}^+} \{ \xi \max_{C_T,N_T} U(C_T, N_T) + (1 - \xi) \max_{C_T,N_T} U(C_T, N_T) \}$. As in the baseline model, there are three regions depending on the realization of $y_1$. First, the no default region, denoted by $N$. Second, the default region in which borrowers keep the full exemption, denoted by $D_m$. Third, the default region in which borrowers do not exhaust the full exemption, denoted by $D_y$. Borrowers decide not to work at all when bankrupt, because all their labor income can be garnished — a cap to wage garnishments would only reduce their labor supply partially, but the conclusions would remain unchanged.

The logic used to characterize the default region is identical to the baseline model. First, I define the $t = 1$ indirect utility of borrowers after choosing optimally consumption and labor supply as $V(y_1; B_0, w_1)$, that is:

$$\tilde{V}(y_1; B_0, w_1) \equiv \max U(C_1, N_1) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad C_1 = y_1 + w_1 N_1 - B_0$$

Given $y_1$, a static consumption-leisure choice characterizes borrowers' labor supply, that is:

$$w_1 \frac{\partial U}{\partial C}(C_1, N_1) = - \frac{\partial U}{\partial N}(C_1, N_1)$$

Second, the default region is characterized by a threshold $\tilde{y}_1$ such that:

$$U(m) = \tilde{V}(\tilde{y}_1; B_0, w_1)$$

When $y_1 \geq \tilde{y}_1$, it is optimal for a borrower to repay, but when $y_1 < \tilde{y}_1$, it is optimal to default — see Figure A.4 in the appendix for a graphical representation. In this case, lenders pricing schedules also depend directly on borrowers effort choice $a$, that is, we have $q_0(B_0, m, a)$. Given the optimal default decision, borrowers’ behavior is characterized by three additional optimality conditions. First, an Euler equation for borrowing:

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial C}(C_0, N_0; a) \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m, a)}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] = \beta \int \frac{\partial U}{\partial C}(C_t, N_t) dF(y_t; a)$$

Second, an optimal effort choice:

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial a}(C_0, N_0; a) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial C}(C_0, N_0; a) \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m, a)}{\partial a} B_0 + \beta \int V(C_1, N_1) \frac{\partial f(y_t; a)}{\partial a} dy_t = 0$$

19
Third, an optimal consumption-leisure choice at \( t = 0 \):

\[ w_0 \frac{\partial U}{\partial C} (C_0, N_0; a) = - \frac{\partial U}{\partial N} (C_0, N_0; a) \]

From the optimality conditions, it is easy to show that changes in the exemption \( m \) modify both borrower’s consumption, labor supply, and effort choices. In particular, when \( m \) increases, borrowers’ labor supply is lower because the default region, in which no labor is supplied, grows.

**Proposition 3. (Endogenous income: frictionless markets)**

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption \( m \) when labor supply is endogenous and borrowers have an effort choice is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial C_0} (C_0, N_0; a) \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} B_0 \frac{\partial U}{\partial C_1} (C_{D1}, 0) dF (y_1; a) \]

b) The optimal exemption \( m^* \) when labor supply is endogenous and borrowers have an effort choice is given by:

\[
m^* = \frac{\Lambda \{ C_{D1} \} C_0}{\Lambda e_m} \]

where \( \Lambda \equiv \frac{w_0 B_0}{\lambda y_0} \), \( e_m \equiv - \frac{\partial q_0 (B_0, m; a)}{\partial m}, \) and \( \Lambda \equiv \beta \int \frac{\partial U}{\partial C_1} (C_{D1}, 0) dF (y_1; a) dF (y_1). \)

The intuition behind Proposition (13) is elementary and powerful: as long as borrowers optimally choose their labor supply and effort, changes in these variables do not modify the optimal exemption formula — the same argument applies to any other static endogenous variable. If the utility of consumption is separable from the disutility of working and providing effort, Equations (12) and (13) are identical to their counterparts in the baseline model. In general, the marginal benefit of the bankruptcy exemption depends on the values of \( N \) and \( a \) through its effect on the marginal utility of consumption. Although there are is a rich literature studying the separability properties of the utility function, e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1989) or Aguiar and Hurst (2007), separable utility of consumption is often seen as a reasonable benchmark.

This is an important takeaway of this paper: we only need to measure consumption to determine the welfare consequences of bankruptcy policies. Labor supply responses to changes in exemptions are irrelevant once the consumption response has been accounted for.\(^{13}\)

### 4.2 Non-pecuniary utility loss

In the baseline model, borrowers ruthlessly default whenever the pecuniary benefits of doing so are greater than the pecuniary cost. Perhaps because of stigma, social pressure or to avoid being

\(^{13}\)Similar insights are widely used in the consumption based asset pricing literature. Marginal utility of consumption is the only information needed to price any asset when utility is separable.
hounded by lenders, it is often argued that borrowers may experience a non-pecuniary loss if they do not pay back their liabilities. In particular, White (1998) and Fay, Hurst and White (2002), among others, calculate that the fraction of households that would benefit from bankruptcy, based on pecuniary considerations, far exceeds the fraction of households who actually file for bankruptcy. I now capture that possibility by allowing borrowers to have state dependent utility. In particular, I assume that the utility of a borrower who consumes $C$ units of the consumption good in bankruptcy is given by $U(\phi C)$, where $\phi \in [0, 1)$. As in the baseline mode, renegotiation remains unfeasible.

Borrowers now solve:

$$\max_{C_0, \{C_1\}_i, B_0, \{\xi\}_i} U(C_0) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V(C_1)],$$

where $V(C_1) = \max_{\xi \in \{0, 1\}} \{\xi U(\phi C_1^D) + (1 - \xi) U(C_1^N)\}$. The logic used to characterize the default region is identical to the baseline model. The optimal default decision is given by:

$$\begin{cases} \xi = 1, & \text{if } y_1 < \phi m + B_0 \quad \text{Default} \\ \xi = 0, & \text{if } y_1 \geq \phi m + B_0 \quad \text{No Default} \end{cases}$$

With the exception of the change in the default region, the expression that characterizes $B_0$ is analogous to the one in the baseline model, that is:

$$U'(C_0) \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial m} B_0 \right] = \beta \int_{\gamma m + B_0}^{\infty} U'(y_1 - B_0) dF(y_1)$$

Proposition 4. (Non-pecuniary utility loss)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption $m$ when bankrupt borrowers experience a non-pecuniary utility loss is given by:

$$\frac{dW}{dm} = U'(C_0) \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial m} B_0 + \beta \int_{\gamma m + B_0}^{\infty} \phi U'(C_1^D) dF(y_1)$$

b) The optimal exemption $m^*$ when bankrupt borrowers experience a non-pecuniary utility loss is given by:

$$m^* = \frac{n_0(C_1^D)}{\Lambda},$$

where $\Lambda \equiv \frac{n_0(C_1^D)}{\gamma + \phi m + B_0}$, $\varepsilon_{m, \phi} \equiv -\frac{n_0(C_1^D)}{\partial m}$, and $n_0(C_1^D) \equiv \beta \int_{\gamma m + B_0}^{\infty} \frac{\phi U'(C_1^D)}{C_1^D} dF(y_1)$.

As expected, for the standard case of $\gamma > 1$, low values of $\phi$ push towards higher optimal exemptions because, all else constant, borrowers’ marginal utility is higher when bankrupt. The presence of non-pecuniary costs of default modifies the default region and the expression for the price-consumption ratio, but the formula for the optimal bankruptcy exemption remains unchanged. This conclusion extends to any form of state dependent utility. State dependent utility only modifies $m^*$ through the sufficient statistics identified in this paper.
4.3 Epstein-Zin utility

The results of the baseline model remain valid when borrowers do not have expected utility. I analyze here the Epstein-Zin case to disentangle the effects of risk aversion versus intertemporal substitution. While risk aversion plays an important role in pricing the marginal benefit of a bankruptcy exemption increase, intertemporal substitution plays an important role shaping the sensitivity of credit demand to interest rates. All results can be easily extended to more general Kreps-Porteus preferences or other types of well-behaved nonexpected utility preferences.

Borrowers’ utility is now given by:

\[
V_0 = \left(1 - \hat{\beta}\right) C_0^{1 - \hat{\beta}} + \hat{\beta} \left( E \left[ C_1^{1 - \gamma}\right]\right)\frac{1 - \hat{\beta}}{1 - \gamma},
\]

where the parameter \(\gamma\) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and \(\psi\) represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for a given nonstochastic consumption path. Given \(B_0\), borrowers default decision is identical to the baseline model. Taking that into account, borrowers now solve:

\[
\max_{B_0} \left[ (1 - \hat{\beta}) (y_0 + q_0 B_0)^{1 - \hat{\beta}} + \hat{\beta} \left( \int_m^m (y_1)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1) + \int_{m+B_0}^{m+B_0} (m)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1) + \int_{m+B_0}^{m+B_0} (y_1 - B_0)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1) \right)^{\frac{1 - \hat{\beta}}{1 - \gamma}} \right]
\]

Borrowers choose how much to borrow as in the baseline model. Their choice of \(B_0\) is given by:

\[
(C_0)^{-\frac{1}{\hat{\beta}}} \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0(B_0,m)}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] = \beta Q^{-\frac{1}{1 - \hat{\beta}}} \int_{m+B_0}^{m+B_0} (y_1 - B_0)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1),
\]

where \(Q\) denotes the certainty equivalent of consumption at \(t = 1\) (the appendix contains the exact expression) and \(\hat{\beta} \equiv \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}\). It is easy to show that the sensitivity of credit demand to interest rates crucially depends on \(\psi\) (see the derivation in the appendix).

Proposition 5. (Epstein-Zin utility)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption \(m\) when borrowers have Epstein-Zin preferences is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = V_0^{\frac{1}{\hat{\beta}}} \left[ (1 - \hat{\beta}) \left( C_0 \right)^{\frac{1}{\hat{\beta}}} \frac{\partial q_0(B_0,m)}{\partial m} B_0 + \hat{\beta} Q^{-\frac{1}{1 - \hat{\beta}}} \int_{m+B_0}^{m+B_0} (C_1^\gamma)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1) \right]
\]

b) The optimal exemption \(m^\ast\) when borrowers have Epstein-Zin preferences is given by:

\[
m^\ast = \frac{\frac{\partial q_0(B_0,m)}{\partial m} B_0}{\Lambda \varepsilon_{\ast,m}}
\]

where \(\Lambda \equiv \frac{\partial q_0(B_0,m)}{\partial m} B_0\), \(\varepsilon_{\ast,m} \equiv -\frac{\partial q_0(B_0,m)}{\partial m}\), and \(\frac{\partial q_0(C_0^\gamma)}{\partial m} \equiv \left( \frac{Q}{C_0^\gamma} \right)^{\gamma - \frac{1}{\hat{\beta}}} \beta \int_{m+B_0}^{m+B_0} \left( C_1^\gamma \right)^{-\gamma} dF(y_1)\).
Using a more general form of preferences only modifies the expression for the price-consumption ratio $\Pi_m\{C_D\}$, which is now given by the product of two terms. The first term $\beta \int_0^{m+B_0} \left( \frac{C_D}{C_0} \right)^{1-\gamma} dF(y_1)$ is the same as in the CRRA case studied above. The second term $\left( \frac{Q}{C_0} \right)^{\gamma-1}$ can be interpreted as a correction to the rate of time preference that captures a preference for early versus late resolution of uncertainty. Although $Q$ is a complex object, Equation (16) provides intuition on the optimal exemption. For instance, when $Q < C_0$, a situation in which borrowers face large consumption risks, high values of $\gamma = \frac{1}{\psi}$, which represent a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, make consumption at $t = 0$ more valuable, which calls for lower exemptions all else constant. Intuitively, borrowers enjoy more early consumption, so they value more cheaper access to credit ex-ante. As expected, when $\gamma = \frac{1}{\psi}$, the second term of the price-consumption ratio cancels out, recovering the CRRA formulas.

Intuitively, it is fair to say that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is important to determine the demand for credit — because $\psi$ controls directly the sensitivity of the demand for credit to interest rates — but risk aversion, through the classic CRRA term, and the preference for early versus later resolution of uncertainty, play an important role when assessing the welfare effects of varying bankruptcy exemptions. More generally, changes in preferences only modify $m^*$ through the sufficient statistics identified in this paper.

4.4 Multiple contracts

In the baseline model, borrowers only have access to a single noncontingent contract. Now borrowers have access to an arbitrary number of contracts with arbitrarily general payoffs. Every contract $j = 1, \ldots, J$ has an arbitrary payoff scheme $z_j(y_1)$, which can take positive or negative values depending on the realization of $y_1$, which now exclusively represents borrowers’ income. In this more general model, it becomes explicit that the bankruptcy exemption applies to the level of assets held by borrowers. Borrowers optimally choose both positive and negative values of $B_0$. Given these new assumptions, the distinction between borrowers and lenders is now blurred, although I continue to use the same nomenclature. As shown in the appendix, as long as the shapes of the contracts used, independently of whether such shapes are optimally chosen or not, do not vary with the exemption level, there is no loss of generality on taking the set of contracts as a primitive for the purpose of understanding the welfare implications of varying exemption levels. This logic motivates the choice of the debt contract for the baseline model, since debt contracts are pervasively used in economies with high and low levels of exemptions.

I make two simplifying assumptions about the behavior of lenders. First, if needed, lenders...

---

14These results relate to the findings of Tallarini (2000), who shows that the EIS determines quantity dynamics but risk aversion is the relevant parameter for asset valuations.
can fully commit to pay borrowers at \( t = 1 \). Second, lenders are able to observe borrowers’ portfolio choices at \( t = 0 \), allowing the pricing schedule offered for contract \( j \) to depend on the whole portfolio of a borrower, that is:

\[ q_0 (B_{01}, \ldots, B_{0J}, m) \]

Borrowers’ budget constraints now read as:

\[
C_0 = y_0 + \sum_{j=1}^J q_{0j} (B_{01}, \ldots, B_{0J}, m) B_{0j} \\
C^N_1 = y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{-z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\} - \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\} \\
C^P_1 = \min \left\{ y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{-z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\}, m \right\} 
\]

(17)

Some features of this general environment deserve to be emphasized. First, the baseline model is a special case of this one when \( J = 1 \) and \( z_1 (y_1) = 1 \). Second, if the set of securities spans all realizations of \( y_1 \), this formulation also nests the complete markets benchmark.\(^{15}\) Third, because bankruptcy exemptions are often linked to house ownership (homestead exemptions), we can interpret one of these assets as positive equity in a house. To interpret \( m \) exactly as a homestead exemption, Equation (17) must be written as

\[
C^P_1 = \min \left\{ y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{-z_h (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\}, m \right\},
\]

where the asset \( h \) represents home equity. Finally, it is easy to see how allowing for fully or partially secured contracts in this environment, as well as having assets with different liquidity properties, as in for instance Kaplan and Violante (2014), leaves the insights of the paper unchanged.

The logic used to characterize the default region is identical to the baseline model. Borrowers default for those realizations of \( y_1 \) in which \( C^P_1 > C^N_1 \). A set of equalities given by

\[
\min \left\{ y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{-z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\}, m \right\} = y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{-z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\} - \sum_{j=1}^J \max \{z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0\}
\]

define thresholds for three regions that depend on the realization of \( y_1 \). First, the no default region, denoted by \( N \). Second, the default region in which borrowers keep the full exemption, denoted by \( D_\infty \). Third, the default region in which borrowers do not exhaust the full exemption, denoted by \( D_m \). Figure 3, which is the counterpart of Figure 1 in the baseline model, shows a possible scenario. This figure illustrates how the optimal exemption formula is invariant to whether borrowers default for high or low realizations of \( y_1 \). Both forced and strategic default also occur in this more general case too.

\(^{15}\)The complete markets extension is more natural when \( F(\cdot) \) has finite support. Starting from the complete markets benchmark, when all Arrow-Debreu contracts are available, it is easy to show that allowing for bankruptcy is welfare reducing. Intuitively, the contingent contracts for states in which borrowers default cease to be traded, because lenders would require an arbitrarily large interest rate, so \( \frac{\partial \log(1+r)}{\partial m} \approx \infty \) and \( m^* \to 0 \).
Figure 3: Optimal default decision with multiple contracts with arbitrary payoffs

Assuming that all claimants split borrowers’ payments proportionally in bankruptcy, the pricing schedules offered by risk neutral lenders are:

\[ q_0(B_0, \ldots, B_J, m) = \eta \left( \frac{B_0}{B_j} \right) \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, \ldots, B_J, m)}{\partial B_j} B_j \]

where \( \eta \equiv \frac{\gamma_j(y_1) B_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \gamma_j(y_1) B_j} \) is the recovery rate in bankruptcy. Different assumptions about \( \eta \) do not affect the main insights.

Borrowers’ behavior can be characterized by a set of \( J \) optimality conditions:

\[ U'(C_0) \left[ q_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, \ldots, B_J, m)}{\partial B_j} B_j \right] = \beta \left( \int_{\mathbb{R}} z_j(y_1) U'(C^P) dF(y_1) + \int_{\mathbb{R}} z_j(y_1) U'(C^N) dF(y_1) \right) \]

A marginal change in \( B_0 \) affects the interest rate charged to all other contracts.

**Proposition 6. (Multiple contracts with arbitrary payoffs)**

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption \( m \) when borrowers can use \( J \) contracts with arbitrary payoffs is given by:

\[ \frac{dW}{dm} = U'(C_0) \sum_{j=1}^{J} \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, \ldots, B_J, m)}{\partial B_j} B_j + \beta \int_{\mathbb{R}} U'(C^P) dF(y_1) \]  \( (18) \)

b) The optimal exemption \( m^* \) when borrowers can use \( J \) contracts with arbitrary payoffs is given by:

\[ m^* = \frac{n_j(C^P)}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} n_j(C_j)} \]  \( (19) \)
where \( \Lambda_j \equiv \frac{q_0 B_0}{\sum_{j=1} J q_0 B_0} \), \( \varepsilon_{j,m} \equiv -\frac{v_{0}(y_{11},...,y_{1J,m})}{\delta y_{1m}} \), and \( \mu_{c^P} \equiv \beta \int_{D_m} c^P v(c^P) dF(y_1) \).

Proposition 6 shows that the cost of increasing the exemption level is in general given by a weighted average of the interest rate sensitivities with respect to the bankruptcy exemption for all contracts traded. The weight given to a contract \( j \) is increasing in how much borrowers rely on that contract to raise funds. Intuitively, the welfare costs associated with higher rates are larger for contracts which account for a larger fraction of borrowers’ portfolios. Allowing for multiple contracts with arbitrary payoffs only changes directly the benefits of varying exemptions through changes in the default region.

4.5 Heterogeneous borrowers: observable heterogeneity with an extensive margin choice

In the baseline model, borrowers are ex-ante symmetric. However, borrowers could be ex-ante heterogeneous on observable or unobservable characteristics. I first analyze the case of observable heterogeneity to show that my results are robust to extensive margin choices on whether to borrow or not to borrow at all. I study unobservable heterogeneity next.

Borrowers are now ex-ante heterogeneous regarding preferences, endowments, distribution of shocks, etc. I index the different types of ex-ante borrowers by \( i \) and assume that they are distributed in the population according to a well-behaved distribution with cdf \( G(i) \). For now, borrowers’ heterogeneity is observable, so lenders are able to price each (group of) borrower(s) \( i \) separately. In the baseline model, for clarity, I imposed a regularity condition guaranteeing that borrowers would always borrow a strictly positive amount for any level of \( m \). I now relax that assumption, so it is sometimes optimal for borrowers to choose \( B_0 = 0 \).

Importantly, I restrict the analysis to a single bankruptcy exemption. Conditioning the exemption level on observable characteristics or allowing for nonlinear exemptions is optimal in this environment, although these policies are not used in practice. I calculate welfare using a social welfare function that maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities with arbitrary welfare weights \( \lambda(i) \). Hence, social welfare \( W(m) \) is now given by:

\[
W(m) = \int \lambda(i) W(i) dG(i)
\]

I denote by \( q_0(B_0, m) \) the pricing schedule offered by lenders to a borrower of type \( i \). When \( B_0 > 0 \), \( q_0(B_0, m) \) is identical to the schedule in Equation (2), although the particular distribution for a borrower of type \( i \), \( F_i(y_{1i}) \). In general, the pricing schedule offered to borrowers
when they can save is discontinuous at $B_0 = 0$. Formally:

$$q_0 (B_0, m) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1 + r^*} & B_0 \leq 0 \\ \frac{\int_0^{m + B_0} \frac{m - y}{(1 + r^*)^2} dF_y(y) + \int_{m + B_0}^{\infty} dF_y(y)}{1 + r^*} & B_0 > 0 \end{cases}$$

Figure 4 represents the new (discontinuous) pricing schedule as well as the objective function of a given borrower, which is continuous but non-differentiable at $B_0 = 0$. Depending on their characteristics and the level of $m$, it is optimal for some types of borrowers to choose $B_0 = 0$. Formally, I denote the set of active borrowers for a given level of $m$ by $I_A (m)$ and the set of excluded borrowers by $I_N (m)$, that is:

$$I_A (m) = \{ i | B_0 (m) > 0 \} , \text{ Active borrowers}$$

$$I_N (m) = \{ i | B_0 (m) = 0 \} , \text{ Inactive borrowers}$$

It is easy to show — see the appendix — that the measure of excluded borrowers, under the assumed regularity conditions, increases with the exemption level. Therefore, varying $m$ causes borrowers to adjust their decisions both on the intensive and the extensive margin.

Proposition 7. (Heterogeneous borrowers: observable heterogeneity)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption $m$ when borrowers are ex-ante observably heterogeneous is given by:

$$\frac{dW}{dm} = \int_{I_A (m)} \lambda (i) \left[ U_i' (C_0) \frac{\partial q_0 (B_0, m)}{\partial m} B_0 + \beta \int_0^{m + B_0} U_i' (C_1) dF_y(y) \right] dG (i)$$

b) The optimal exemption $m^*$ when borrowers are ex-ante observably heterogeneous is given by:

$$m^* = \frac{\int_{I_A (m^*)} h_i \frac{\partial q_0 (B_0, m^*)}{\partial m} dG (i)}{\int_{I_A (m^*)} h_i \Lambda \epsilon_{i,m} dG (i)}$$
where $I_A(m)$ denotes the set of active borrowers, $h_i \equiv \lambda(i)U'_i(C_{ih})C_{ih}$, $\Lambda_i \equiv \frac{\nu_iB_i}{\nu_i + \nu_i B_i}$,

$$
\varepsilon_{r,m} \equiv -\frac{\partial q_0(B_{0,m})}{\partial m} \text{ and } \frac{\partial q_0(C_{0})}{\partial m} \equiv \int_{m}^{m_0} \frac{B_{0,m}U'(C_{0})}{\text{Cert}(m)} dF_i(y_i).
$$

The optimal exemption now contains a weighted average of marginal costs and benefits in the cross-section of borrowers. The weights $h_i$ are a combination of the social welfare weight and the marginal value of consumption, given by the product of borrowers marginal utility and their date 0 consumption level. When $h_i = 1$ for all borrowers, social welfare is simply the sum of certainty equivalents. $h_i = 1$ emerges endogenously for a utilitarian planner that sets constant welfare weights $\lambda_i = \lambda$, for all $i$, when ex-transfers across borrowers are available and it corresponds to adopting a Kaldor/Hicks welfare criterion.\(^{16}\) This is an often used benchmark in welfare analysis. In that case, the optimal $m^*$ can written as:

$$
m^* = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{G,A}\left[\frac{\nu_i(C_{0})}{\nu_i}\right]}{\mathbb{E}_{G,A}\left[\varepsilon_{r,m}\right]},
$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{G,A}[\cdot]$ denotes cross-sectional averages for active borrowers. Importantly, because changing $m$ does not affect excluded borrowers’ welfare and because it is optimal for borrowers who move at the margin from being active to excluded to do so, all averages are taken using the set of active borrowers. This is an important takeaway of this paper: only information about the set of active borrowers is needed to assess welfare changes induced by varying the level of the bankruptcy exemption.\(^ {17}\)

### 4.6 Heterogeneous borrowers: unobservable heterogeneity

I now study the same environment as in the previous extension, but make borrowers’ heterogeneity unobservable: lenders do not know the characteristics of individual borrowers, but they do know the distribution of the characteristics of the population of borrowers. Once asymmetric information is introduced, many phenomena can arise. Analyzing all of them is outside of the scope of this paper. I focus on an environment in which lenders compete using a single pricing schedule and commit to it — once the price schedule is posted, lenders must lend the amount demanded at the posted rate. This is a natural choice to understand how changes in the level of the exemptions affect the welfare of pooled and excluded borrowers.

\(^{16}\)An alternative assumption that facilitates aggregation is to impose a unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution, so that, $h_i = \lambda_i V_0$, where $V_0$ is defined in Equation (14). In that case, Equation (20) remains valid when both welfare weights and borrowers’ lifetime expected utility are constant, even when the planner does not have access to ex-ante transfers.

\(^{17}\)When $\text{Cov}_{G,A}[\varepsilon_{r,m}] \approx 0$, Equation (20) justifies using the product of cross-sectional averages $\mathbb{E}_{G,A}[\Lambda_i] \mathbb{E}_{G,A}[\varepsilon_{r,m}]$ as denominator.
As above, we expect some borrowers to borrow in equilibrium, those in $I_A(m)$, while others decide not to, those in $I_N(m)$. Hence, it is optimal for lenders to condition the pricing schedule they offer on the set of active borrowers in the economy. Therefore, the pricing schedule faced by any borrower is given by:

$$ q_m(B_0, m) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1+r}, & B_0 \leq 0 \\ \int_{I_A(m)} q_m(B_0, m) dF(i), & B_0 > 0, \end{cases} $$

where $\hat{q}_m(B_0, m) = \frac{\delta \int_{m_0}^{m+\delta} \Pi_i \epsilon_i \lambda \left[U_i^r(C_{0i})^{-1} \partial q_m(B_0, m) \right] dF(i)}{\lambda \left[U_i^r(C_{0i})^{-1} \partial q_m(B_0, m) \right] dF(i)}$ and $I_A(m)$ denotes the set of active borrowers, defined as in the previous extension. In this equilibrium, lenders offer a pricing schedule that corresponds to the weighted average of borrowers, taking into account that the level of $m$ and how their choice of schedules changes the composition of borrowers in the economy. Given this price schedule, borrowers choose whether to borrow or not. Under regularity conditions, an equilibrium exists in which the pricing schedules offered by lenders are consistent with set of active borrowers in the economy — I solve a specific example with heterogeneity in discount factors in the appendix. Given the price schedule that they face, borrowers decide how much to borrow, as in the baseline model, and whether to borrow at all, as in the previous extension. Because the composition of borrowers in the economy $G(\cdot)$ determines which borrowers have access to credit in this economy, we can argue that the equilibrium features a form of credit rationing/redlining — see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) for a classic discussion of these effects.

Proposition 8. (Heterogeneous borrowers: unobservable heterogeneity)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption $m$ when borrowers are ex-ante unobservably heterogeneous is given by:

$$ \frac{dW}{dm} = \int_{I_A(m)} \lambda(i) \left[U_i^r(C_{0i}) \frac{\partial q_m(B_0, m)}{\partial m} B_0 \right] dF(i) + \beta \int_{m_0}^{m+\delta} \left[U_i^r(C_{0i})^{-1} \partial q_m(B_0, m) \right] dF(i) $$

b) The optimal exemption $m^*$ when borrowers are ex-ante unobservably heterogeneous is given by:

$$ m^* = \frac{\int_{I_A(m^*)} h_i \frac{n_i}{C_{0i}} U_i^r(C_{0i}) dF(i)}{\int_{I_A(m^*)} h_i \lambda_i \epsilon_{i,m} dF(i)} $$

where $I_A(m)$ denotes the set of active borrowers, $h_i \equiv \lambda(i) U_i^r(C_{0i}) C_{0i}$, $\Lambda_i \equiv \frac{n_i B_0}{y_{0i} + w_0 B_0}$, $\epsilon_{i,m} \equiv -\frac{n_i B_0}{\Lambda_i}$, and $\frac{n_i}{C_{0i}} U_i^r(C_{0i}) \equiv \int_{m_0}^{m+\delta} \frac{U_i^r(C_{0i})}{\Lambda_i} dF(i) (y_{0i})$.

There is no difference between observable and unobservable heterogeneity for the purpose of understanding the welfare implications of changing the level of the bankruptcy exemption. With unobservable heterogeneity, varying $m$ changes the composition of borrowers not only directly but also through endogenous changes in the pricing schedules faced by borrowers in equilibrium,
which creates feedback and modifies borrowers choices on the extensive and intensive margins. However, all the information needed to assess whether a change in \( m \) increases or decreases welfare is embedded in the sufficient statistics identified in this paper, in particular, the sensitivity of the interest rate schedule. An important takeaway of this extension is that unobserved heterogeneity complicates the equilibrium characterization of the economy, but does not change the sufficient statistics for the welfare implications of changing exemptions. As in the case with observed heterogeneity, excluded borrowers are inframarginal from a welfare perspective.

4.7 Dynamics

Finally, I extend the results to a dynamic environment. I assume that time is discrete and there is a finite horizon: \( t = 0, \ldots, T \). At every point in time, borrowers trade a single noncontingent one period contract. The income process for \( y_t \) has a Markov structure. Employment, health or family shocks, which previous literature has shown to be key drivers of bankruptcy, as well as social insurance transfers, are all captured in the stochastic process for \( y_t \). In case of default, borrowers’ debt is fully discharged but they can’t borrow in the defaulting period and recover access to credit markets stochastically, with probability \( \alpha \). Chatterjee et al. (2007) argue that these are reasonable assumptions in the context of the US unsecured credit system. I again restrict my attention to a noncontingent exemption which is not time varying. More sophisticated instruments, as choosing the fraction of debt discharged or the time of borrowers’ exclusion from financial markets, can be welfare improving in this environment. Independently of whether these features are determined optimally or not, they do not affect the optimal characterization of exemptions.\(^{18}\)

Hence, borrowers maximize:

\[
\max E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^t U(C_t) \right]
\]

Borrowers’ consumption when they do not default is given by \( C_t^N = y_t + q_t B_t - B_{t-1} \). In default states, borrowers consume \( C_t^D = \min \{ y_t, m \} \) and, when excluded from credit markets, they simply consume their income \( y_t \).

From a \( t = 0 \) perspective, we can write borrowers’ problem recursively as:

\[
V_{N,0}(B_{-1}, y_0; m) = \max_{B_0} U(y_0 + q_0 B_0) + \beta E \left[ \max \{ V_{N,1}(B_0, y_1; m), V_{D,1}(y_1; m) \} \right],
\]

where \( V_{N,1}(B_0, y_1; m) \) and \( V_{D,1}(y_1; m) \), which denote indirect utility at \( t = 1 \) for borrowers’ who repay and default, respectively, are explicitly characterized in the appendix. Indirect utility in default \( V_{D,1} \) is independent of \( B_0 \) because of the assumption that all debt is fully discharged.

\(^{18}\)Under appropriate regularity conditions, the results extend easily to infinite horizon economies.

\(^{19}\)There is scope to extend the results of this section allowing for longer maturity contracts and explicit renegotiation.
I characterize default at \( t = 1 \) and borrowing at \( t = 0 \). The results for other periods follow directly. The logic used to characterize the default region is identical to the baseline model. Borrowers default decision is determined by an indifference condition, given by:

\[
V^N_1 (B_0, \hat{y}_1; m) = V^D_1 (\hat{y}_1; m),
\]

(21)

where \( \hat{y}_1 \) denote indifference thresholds. Once again, I denote the repayment region by \( N_t \), the default region in which borrowers claim the full exemption by \( D_{y,t} \) and the default region in which borrowers do not claim the full exemption by \( D_{m,t} \). All three regions are formed in general by a union of intervals. The value functions in Equation (21) embed the forward looking nature of the default decision.

Borrowers choose \( B_0 \) according to:

\[
U'(y_0 + q_0 B_0) \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial y_0(B_0,m)}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] = \beta \int \left[ U'(y_1 + q_1 B_1 - B_0) \right] dF(y_1)
\]

The characterization of default and borrowing decisions is identical in other periods.

Proposition 9. (Dynamics)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption \( m \) in the dynamic model is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}_t} \left[ \beta^t U'(C^N_t) \frac{\partial y_t(B_t, m)}{\partial m} \right] + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}_{m,t}} \left[ \beta^t U'(C^D_t) \right]
\]

b) The optimal exemption \( m^* \) in the dynamic model is given by:

\[
m^* = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \Pi_{\mathcal{N}_t} \{ C^N_t \}}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \Pi_{\mathcal{N}_t} \{ g_t \Lambda_t \varepsilon_{t,m} \}}
\]

where \( \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}_t}[\cdot] \) denotes the \( t = 0 \) expectation of being in a no default state in which borrowers have access to credit, \( \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}_{m,t}}[\cdot] \) denotes the \( t = 0 \) expectation of defaulting in a given state, \( \Lambda_t \equiv \frac{q_t B_t}{y_t + q_t B_t - B_t - 1}, \ g_t \equiv \frac{C_t}{C_0}, \ \varepsilon_{t,m} \equiv \frac{\partial m}{\partial m}, \ \Pi_{\mathcal{N}_t} \{ \cdot \} \equiv \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}_t} \left[ \frac{C_t^D}{C_0^D} \frac{\hat{y}_t}{U(C_0)} \right], \) and \( \Pi_{\mathcal{D}_{m,t}} \{ \cdot \} \equiv \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}_{m,t}} \left[ \frac{\hat{y}_t}{U(C_0)} \right].
\]

The optimal exemption becomes a weighted average across periods/states of the marginal benefits/losses. The numerator of \( m^* \), which captures the marginal benefit of increased leniency, is the price of a claim to an asset that pays consumption in the default states in which borrowers claim the full exemption as a ratio of initial consumption. The denominator, which captures marginal losses, is the \( t = 0 \) price of a weighted average of interest rate schedule sensitivities with respect to the bankruptcy exemption — with weights given by the product of consumption growth \( g_t \) and leverage ratios \( \Lambda_t \). Intuitively, the optimal formula in the dynamic model trades
off marginal welfare gains and losses using borrowers’ stochastic discount factor. Therefore, the results of the static model can be interpreted as the steady state of a dynamic model when $g_t \approx 1$.

I would like to make four final observations. First, previous literature has shown that the magnitude of income shocks, family shocks or health shocks faced by households are important drivers of borrowing and bankruptcy decisions. For instance, Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) show that the nature of income shocks — whether they are transitory or permanent — as well as life-cycle borrowing motives play an important role. Similarly, taxation and social insurance programs affect borrowing and bankruptcy decisions. All these considerations are captured in the framework of this paper and only affect the exemption level through the characterized sufficient statistics.

Second, the precise conditions that determine the decision of declaring bankruptcy, for instance, whether borrowers’ go bankrupt after high or low income realizations, does not change the formula for the optimal exemption. The option value to waiting before defaulting complicates the characterization of the default decision, but it only affects the optimal exemption through the characterized sufficient statistics.

Third, if borrowers are allowed to save part of their exemption when bankrupt, the price-consumption ratio must be corrected by a term that depends on the propensity to consume of bankrupt borrowers — see the appendix for an exact expression. Hence, the baseline model implicitly assumes a propensity to consume close to unity for bankrupt borrowers. This entails little loss of generality since we expect bankrupt borrowers to have done poorly and have high propensities to consume.

Finally, from the derivation of Proposition 9, it is easy to see that allowing borrowers to stop repayments (default) without declaring bankruptcy does not affect the formula for the optimal exemption. That possibility will be priced by lenders and borrowers will exercise it optimally, so it will only affect exemptions through the characterized sufficient statistics, in particular the sensitivity of the interest rate schedule.

5 Application

The upshot of the approach used in this paper is that the key theoretical tradeoffs can be linked to the measurement of a few observables. I now illustrate how to apply the theoretical results to US household bankruptcy data.

I assume that borrowers have CRRA utility and adopt a utilitarian Kaldor/Hicks welfare
criterion to account for heterogeneity. In that case, the optimal exemption is given by
\[ m^* = \frac{\beta \pi_m \left( \frac{C_D}{C_0} \right)^{1-\gamma}}{\Lambda \tilde{r}_m}, \]  
(22)
where, as described in Section 4.5, it is justified to use cross-sectional averages for active borrowers.

As just shown, we can interpret Equation (22) as representing the steady state of a dynamic economy. I use additional insights from the extensions to determine the correct variables to target. If borrowers happened to trade assets that directly reveal their willingness to pay for a unit of consumption in bankrupt states, we could calculate their price-consumption ratio without the need to make assumptions about their preferences. Alvarez and Jermann (2004) use this particular approach to provide preference-free measures of the cost of business cycles. Unfortunately, that type of asset pricing data does not exist in this context.

Therefore, four observable variables and two preference parameters, the rate of time preference \( \beta \) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion \( \gamma \), need to be chosen. I adopt a yearly calibration and choose appropriate values for the US economy as a whole.

Choosing the values of \( \beta \), \( \gamma \), and \( \Lambda \) is straightforward. I use \( \beta = 0.96 \) as the annual rate of time preference: this is a standard choice. Consistent with the asset pricing literature, which is more appropriate in this case since we are considering financial decisions, I adopt \( \gamma = 5 \) as the preferred value for risk aversion, although I provide a sensitivity analysis for other levels. For \( \Lambda \), I target the same average ratio of unsecured debt to personal disposable income as Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007), which is 8.4%. This value implies that \( \Lambda = 0.0775 \).\footnote{A substantial fraction of borrowing is collateralized. I work under the assumption that collateralized borrowing is fully secured, which implies that the interest rate charged is not sensitive to \( m \). Therefore, Equation (19) implies that the denominator of the optimal exemption only has to account for the fraction of unsecured credit. Since the bulk of exemptions in the US are homestead exemptions, and the papers that identify \( \epsilon_m \) use changes in those, this assumption extrapolates from borrowers' with positive home equity.}

Finding appropriate values for \( \pi_m \), \( \frac{C_D}{C_0} \), and \( \tilde{r}_m \) requires further work. First, \( \pi_m \) can be written as the product of the unconditional probability of default \( \pi_D \) with the probability of claiming the full bankruptcy exemption conditional on defaulting \( \pi_m|D \). To determine \( \pi_D \), I use the average probability of filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, also from Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007), which is 0.8%. This choice should raise no concerns. I determine \( \pi_m|D \) by using the fact that roughly 90% of bankruptcies are filed as “no-asset” bankruptcies — see Lupica (2012). This implies that 10% of bankrupt borrowers fully claim their exemption.

Second, I use \( \frac{C_D}{C_0} = 0.9 \) for the change in consumption by bankrupt borrowers. A 10% reduction in consumption is within the range of variation documented in Filer and Fisher (2005) using PSID data on changes in food consumption for bankrupt individuals.\footnote{Allowing for Epstein-Zin preferences and assuming that the certainty equivalent of \( t = 1 \) consumption equals \( C_0 \) yields identical results.}
Finally, choosing the sensitivity of the interest rate schedule with respect to the exemption \( \varepsilon_{r,m} \) is not easy. Ideally, one would use direct access to lenders’ pricing schedules or would identify the shape of the pricing schedules offered to the same borrower using variation in the exemption level. Unfortunately, because the required pricing data is sensitive for lenders and because changes in exemptions are rare, no paper has been able to measure these elasticities using individual data. Instead, I use the average estimate from Gropp, Scholz and White (1997), who estimate the equilibrium effect on interest rates of changes in bankruptcy exemptions over time and across states. A value of \( \varepsilon_{r,m} = 1.5 \cdot 10^{-7} \) is within the range of estimates for the average response of interest rates in the population of active borrowers. I account for the uncertainty of the estimates with a sensitivity analysis. As shown in Section 4, we do not have to account directly for pooling and exclusion.

This choice of \( \varepsilon_{r,m} \) implies that increasing the bankruptcy exemption by a $100,000 increases the equilibrium interest rate by 150 basis points. Conceptually, this value corresponds to \( -\frac{dq}{q_0} \), as defined in Equation (6), and not to \( -\frac{\partial q}{q_0} \), since it does not control for the change in interest rate caused by changes in the level of borrowing \( \frac{dB}{dm} \), which is found to be positive in the data and may bias \( \varepsilon_{r,m} \) upwards. Alternatively, we can think that we are using the model in which borrowers are price takers. As shown in the online appendix, the equilibrium semielasticity is the correct one in that case.\(^{22}\)

Table 1 summarizes the choices of parameters and measured variables used in this application. We will proceed under the assumption that all the variables in Table 1 are representative of an economy with an exemption level of \( m = 70,000 \) dollars, the average value of exemptions across US states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>Rate of time preference</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>( \pi )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( c^T/c_0 )</td>
<td>Consumption change</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>( \pi_{m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Lambda )</td>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>0.0775</td>
<td>( \varepsilon_{r,m} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Measured variables and parameter choices

Table 2 presents the optimal exemption \( m^* \) for different values of the risk aversion coefficient \( \gamma \). Figure 5 provides a more detailed sensitivity analysis by jointly varying the two variables calibrated with greater uncertainty: the risk aversion coefficient \( \gamma \) and the sensitivity of the interest rate schedule \( \varepsilon_{r,m} \). For reference, I draw in red the isoecurve for \( \gamma \) and \( \varepsilon_{r,m} \) that implies that $70,000 corresponds to the optimal exemption.

\(^{22}\)It is hard to make a case for whether borrowers take interest rates as given or not for unsecured borrowing. A previous version of this paper used price taking as the baseline case.
Table 2: Value of $m^*$ (measured in dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$m^*$ (measured in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (log)</td>
<td>66,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>73,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>100,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>170,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>489,058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking at face value the choices for the sufficient statistics, this analysis concludes that the actual average bankruptcy exemption across US states, of roughly $m \approx 70,000$ dollars, is of the same order of magnitude as the one predicted by the model. The preferred parametrization with $\gamma = 5$ suggests that the optimal exemption should be higher, since $m^* > m$. In fact, any risk aversion coefficient greater than $\gamma = 2$ calls for an increase in the exemption level, as clearly shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Heatmap of $m^*$ (measured in dollars)

Final remarks on measurement

I would like to conclude with two remarks on the practical applicability of the results.

Remark. (Validity of the framework for non-local changes) Although the theoretical characterizations of $dW/dm$ and $m^*$ are everywhere exact, any application of the results of the paper that is nonlocal incurs in an approximation error when it imposes that the values assigned to the sufficient statistics for the set of active borrowers do not change with the exemption level. Ideally, if we could obtain empirical counterparts of the different sufficient statistics for all values of $m$, we could calculate the exact welfare gain or loss induced by a nonmarginal change in $m$ by
integrating \( \frac{dW}{dm} \) over the relevant range of exemptions. Formally:

\[
W(m_1) - W(m_0) = \int_{m_0}^{m_1} \frac{dW}{dm}(\tilde{m}) d\tilde{m}
\]

Similarly, we could find the fixed point that determines \( m^* \). Better measurement efforts could make this possible. Hence, the quantitative results of this paper should be interpreted with caution if used to assess nonmarginal interventions.

Remark. (Cross sectional implications) If actual exemptions happen to be chosen optimally according to the model developed in the paper, sharp cross sectional implications arise. In particular, a cross-sectional regression of (log) exemption levels on (log) values of the right hand side variables in Equation (10) using different economies as units of observation, as described here:

\[
\log m_i^* = \alpha_1 \log (\beta_i) + \alpha_2 \log (\pi_{m,i}) + \alpha_3 \log (C_1/C_0) + \alpha_4 \log (\Lambda_i) + \alpha_5 \log (\varepsilon_{r,m}) + u_i,
\]

should find that \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 1, \alpha_3 = 1 - \gamma_i \), as well as \( \alpha_4 = \alpha_5 = -1 \). Detailed information on consumption and interest rate elasticities for different regions/countries is not easily available, but there is no reason why it couldn’t be in the future. This paper implies that gathering detailed information on consumption for bankrupt borrowers and understanding the shape of interest rate schedules offered by lenders, especially how these schedules vary with possible changes in exemption levels, are necessary measurement efforts to determine optimal bankruptcy exemptions.

6 Conclusion

This paper provides a theoretical characterization of optimal bankruptcy exemptions in a wide variety of environments. Importantly, this characterization uses measurable sufficient statistics. Knowledge of borrowers’ leverage, the sensitivity of the interest rate schedule faced by borrowers with respect to the exemption level, the probability of default, and the change in the consumption of bankrupt borrowers is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal, or should be increased or decreased in a given economy. Other features of the environment need not be specified once these variables are known. An application of the approach developed in this paper to US data suggests that the optimal bankruptcy exemption should be higher than the current average exemption across US states.

The conclusions of this paper should influence further research on both structural modeling and microeconometric work on bankruptcy. Regarding structural macroeconomic modeling,

\[ \text{36 There is no presumption that actual exemption levels, which in practice are the outcome of political processes as described by Skeel (2001), are optimally chosen following the prescriptions of this paper.} \]
reporting the sufficient statistics found in this paper for different models can shed light on through which channels different assumptions on primitives affect the level of optimal exemptions. More importantly, empirical work that identifies the sensitivity of interest rate schedules with respect to changes in exemptions or that provides precise measures of consumption for bankrupt borrowers will be essential to assess which exemption level is appropriate for every economy. Understanding how different bankruptcy exemption levels affect the balance sheets of banks and other intermediaries using a richer model of the lending side of the economy is another promising avenue for further research.
Appendix

7 Numerical example

I illustrate the equilibrium of the Epstein-Zin version of the model with a numerical example, using the parameters given in Table 3. The distribution $F(\cdot)$ is a log-normal with parameters $\mu$ and $\sigma$. This is not a calibration exercise and merely an illustration of the analytical results derived in the paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences</th>
<th>$\gamma = 10$</th>
<th>$\psi = 1.5$</th>
<th>$\beta = 0.96$</th>
<th>$r^* = 4%$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endowments</td>
<td>$y_0 = 85$</td>
<td>$\mu = 4.9$</td>
<td>$\sigma = 0.095$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy</td>
<td>$\delta = 0.1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Parameters numerical example

Figure A.1 shows how the interest rate schedule $q_0(B_0, m)$ changes with $B_0$ and $m$ respectively, keeping one of the two variables constant. For the first figure, I assume that $m = 80$ and, for the second one, I assume that $B_0 = 23$. It corresponds with the maximand in Equation (2) in the text. As shown analytically is Equation (3), both functions are downward sloping.

Figure A.2 shows the function maximized by borrowers at $t = 0$ when they have to choose $B_0$ for a given level of $m$. I assume $m = 80$. It corresponds with Equation (4) in the text and (23) in the appendix.

Figure A.1: Interest rate schedule $q_0(B_0, m)$

Figure A.2: Interest rate schedule $q_0(B_0, m)$
The left plot in Figure A.3 shows the optimal choice of $B_0$ for different levels of $m$. It corresponds to Equation (5) in the text. As described in the text, $\frac{dB_0}{dm}$ can take any sign depending on the strength of the effects mentioned. I chose this particular parametrization to illustrate how $B_0(m)$ can increase or decrease on $m$ — we observe a form of “Laffer curve”. The right plot in Figure A.3 shows borrowers welfare for a different levels of $m$. It corresponds with Equation (7) in the text. The optimal exemption $m^*$ is the value that maximizes that expression.

In this example, $m^* = 78.35$, $B_0(m^*) = 32.74$, $\Lambda = 0.34$ and $\pi_D = 2.29\%$. 

Figure A.2: Borrowers objective function $J(B_0, m = 80)$

Figure A.3: Optimal borrowing choice $B_0(m)$ and indirect utility $W(m)$
8 Proofs and derivations

Proofs: Section 2

Differentiating the pricing schedule in Equation (2) yields:
\[ \frac{\partial p_0(B_0,m)}{\partial B_0} = \frac{-\delta f_{m+B_0} \frac{y - m}{1 + r^*} f(m + B_0) - (1 - \delta) f(m + B_0)}{1 + r^*} < 0 \]
\[ \frac{\partial p_0(B_0,m)}{\partial m} = \frac{-\delta f_{m+B_0} \frac{1}{1 + r^*} f(m + B_0) - (1 - \delta) f(m + B_0)}{1 + r^*} < 0 \]

Given their optimal ex-post default decision, borrowers solve \( \max_{B_0} J(B_0,m) \), where:
\[ J(B_0,m) = U(y_0 + q_0(B_0, m) B_0) + \beta \left[ \int_{m}^{\infty} U(y_1) dF(y_1) + \int_{m}^{m+B_0} U(m) dF(y_1) + \int_{m+B_0}^{\infty} U(y_1 - B_0) dF(y_1) \right] \]
(23)

A sufficient condition for borrowers to borrow in equilibrium, when combined with the SOC in Equation (25), is the following:
\[ \lim_{B_0 \to B^*_0} \frac{dJ}{dB_0} = \frac{U''(y_0)}{1 + r^*} \int_{m}^{\infty} dF(y_1) - \beta \int_{m}^{m+B_0} U''(y_1) dF(y_1) > 0, \forall m \in [m, \infty) \]

This is a condition on primitives. It holds, for instance, when the initial endowment \( y_0 \) is sufficiently low, when borrowers are very impatient, \( \beta \to 0 \), or when the level of expected future income is sufficiently large and not too stochastic (to prevent the precautionary savings effect from dominating). Figure 4 in the text illustrates the result.

The first-order condition to the borrowers’ problem is the following:\(^4\)
\[ \frac{dJ}{dB_0} = U''(C_0) \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] - \beta \int_{m}^{m+B_0} U''(y_1 - B_0) dF(y_1) = 0 \]
(24)

Exploiting lenders’ risk neutrality, this expression can be written as:
\[ U''(C_0) \left[ (\delta - 1) f(m + B_0) B_0 + \int_{m+B_0}^{\infty} dF(y_1) \right] = \beta \int_{m+B_0}^{\infty} U''(y_1 - B_0) dF(y_1) \]

Note that, when \( m + B_0 \to \infty \), \( \frac{d}{dB_0} \) < 0, which guarantees that there is an interior solution to the problem. Note also that, when bankruptcy is costless (\( \delta \to 1 \)), by choosing \( m^* \) equal to the full insurance benchmark, we can replicate the perfect insurance outcome between risk neutral lenders and risk averse borrowers.

The second order condition, which establishes convexity and I assume that is satisfied everywhere, is the following:
\[ \frac{d^2J}{dB_0^2} = U''(C_0) \left[ q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right]^2 + U''(C_0) \left[ \frac{\partial (q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial B_0} B_0)}{\partial B_0} \right] + \beta U''(m) f(m + B_0) \]
\[ \quad + \beta \int_{m+B_0}^{\infty} U''(y_1 - B_0) dF(y_1) \leq 0 \]
(25)

\(^4\) I write \( \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial B_0} \) throughout instead of \( \frac{\partial q_0(B_0, m)}{\partial B_0} \) to simplify the notation.
Note that \( \frac{\partial (y + \frac{\partial y}{\partial m})}{\partial m} = 2 \frac{\partial y}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial m^2} B_0 \), which in the case of risk neutral lenders equals \( f(m + B_0) \). Hence, a sufficient condition for the second term to be negative is that \( B_0 \frac{f'(m + B_0)}{f(m + B_0)} \geq -\frac{2 - \gamma}{1 - \gamma} \). When numerically solving the model, for usual distributions, the borrowers’ problem is convex, despite the positive third term in Equation (25). The curvature of the utility function induced by borrowers’ risk aversion prevents to find simple sufficient conditions for convexity, as the one used by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in a related environment.

By differentiating Equation (24), we can find \( \frac{dB_0}{dm} \):

\[
\frac{dB_0}{dm} = \frac{U''(C_0) \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} B_0 + U'(C_0) \left[ \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial B_0 \partial m} B_0 \right] + \beta U''(m) f(m + B_0)}{-dF \gamma^2} > 0
\]

When numerically solving the model, for usual distributions, the level of borrowing \( B_0 \) increases with \( m \). The amount raised by borrowers at \( t = 0 \) can also increase or decrease with \( m \). Formally, \( \frac{d(q_0 B_0)}{dm} = \left[ \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial B_0 \partial m} \right] B_0 + q_0 \frac{dB_0}{dm} \), which can take any sign.

To determine whether \( C_o^P > 1 \), we can rewrite the optimality condition for debt as

\[
U'(C_0) = \beta (1 + \bar{\gamma}) \pi N \mathbb{E} \left[ U'(C_0^Y) \mid \mathcal{N} \right], \quad \text{where } 1 + \bar{\gamma} = \left( q_0 + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} m B_0 \right)^{-1}.
\]

We can also express \( \mathbb{E} \left[ U'(C_0^Y) \right] \approx U'(C_0^Y) (1 + \kappa) \), where \( \kappa > 0 \) corrects for Jensen’s inequality. Combining both expressions, we can conclude that \( U'(C_0) = a U'(C_0^Y) < a U'(C_0^P) \), where \( a \equiv \beta (1 + \bar{\gamma}) \pi N (1 + \kappa) \). So a sufficient (not necessary) condition for \( C_o^P < 1 \) is that \( \alpha \leq 1 \). Borrowers impatience (low \( \beta \)) and small precautionary savings motives (low \( \kappa \)), which are the conditions needed for borrowers to borrow, guarantee that \( \alpha \leq 1 \).

**Proofs: Section 3**

**Proposition 1. (Marginal effect of varying \( m \) on welfare)**

a) Starting from Equation (7), we can write, applying repeatedly Leibniz rule and using the optimality condition for \( B_0 \) and the default decision:

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = \int_m^{m + B_0} U'(C_0) \left[ \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial B_0 \partial m} \right] B_0 \frac{dF}{dm} + U'(C_0) \left[ \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial B_0 \partial m} \right] B_0 - \beta \int_m^{m + B_0} U''(m) f(m + B_0) \left( 1 + \frac{dB_0}{dm} \right) - U(m) f(m + B_0) \left( 1 + \frac{dB_0}{dm} \right) \right],
\]

where we need to use Equation (3) in the paper. As in most normative exercises, it is hard to guarantee the convexity of the problem in general, although numerical solutions are well-behaved when \( m > y_1 \). Formally, we can write:

\[
\frac{d^2 F}{dm^2} = d \int_m^{m + B_0} U''(C_0) \frac{dF}{dm} + \beta \int_m^{m + B_0} U''(C_0) dF(y_1) + \beta U''(C_0) \left( f(m + B_0) \left( 1 + \frac{dB_0}{dm} \right) - f(m) \right),
\]
where:
\[
\frac{d(U'(C_0) \frac{dB_0}{dm})}{dm} = U''(C_0) \frac{d(q_0B_0)}{dm} + U''(C_0) \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} \frac{dB_0}{dm} + \left( \frac{\partial^2 q_0}{\partial m^2} + \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} \frac{dB_0}{dm} \right) B_0
\]

b) By rewriting Equation (8), we can find:
\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = \frac{dU''(C_0)}{dm} q_0 B_0 \equiv \epsilon_{r,m} B_0^C_0 \equiv \Lambda + m^{-\gamma} \frac{\hat{m}}{C_0 \epsilon_{r,m}} \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} \frac{dB_0}{dm} \frac{dW}{dm}
\]

where
\[
\epsilon_{r,m} \equiv \frac{\partial \log(1+r)}{\partial m} = -\frac{\partial q_0(B_0(m), m)}{q_0 B_0 C_0^D_1 C_0^U(C_0) dF(y_1)} = \beta \frac{U''(C_0)}{U'(C_0) C_0} = \frac{\hat{m}}{C_0}.
\]

Proposition 2. (Optimal bankruptcy exemption)

Setting \( \frac{dW}{dm} = 0 \) characterizes the optimal exemption. If the problem is well-behaved, \( m^* \) determines the unique optimal solution. Formally, solving for \( m^* \) in Equation (9) immediately yields (10).

In the logarithmic utility case:
\[
\Pi_m \left( \frac{C_1^D}{C_0} \right) = \beta \int \left[ m^{-\gamma} \frac{dW}{dm} \frac{dF(y_1)}{dF(y_1)^{m+B_0}} \right] = \beta \int \left[ m^{-\gamma} \frac{dW}{dm} \frac{dF(y_1)}{dF(y_1)^{m+B_0}} \right] = 0
\]

since \( U'(C) = \frac{1}{\hat{C}} \).

Note that we can write: \( \frac{\partial q_0(B_0(m), m)}{\partial m} \frac{dB_0}{dm} \frac{dW}{dm} = \frac{\pi_m}{\epsilon_{r,m}} \frac{\partial q_0(B_0(m), m)}{\partial m} \), where \( \Omega = \frac{f(m+B_0)}{\pi_m} \). Substituting into Equation (8), we can find:
\[
(1+r)^* \frac{dW}{U'(C_0) \pi_m} = -\left[ \epsilon + (1-\epsilon) \right] \frac{(m+B_0)}{\pi_m} \beta (1+r)^* \frac{m}{C_0} - \gamma = 0
\]

Solving for \( m^* \) yields Equation (11) in the paper. When the distribution \( F(\cdot) \) is a uniform, \( F(m+B_0) = f(m+B_0) \), so \( \Omega = 1 \).

Extended remark: endogenous contract response

Following the general equilibrium tradition, this paper takes the shape and number of contracts as part of the environment. I now show that the crucial underlying assumption for the results to be valid is that the shape of contracts used remains invariant to the level of \( m \). Rather than specifying some ad-hoc assumption on contracting frictions, I adopt a more abstract approach. I delegage this discussion to the appendix because I will argue that the main sufficient condition that justifies the results of the paper is satisfied in modern economies.

Borrowers now solve, accounting already for the possibility of defaulting:
\[
\max_{B_0} U(C_0) + \beta \int_D U(C_1^D) dF(y_1) + \beta \int_N U(C_1^N) dF(y_1),
\]
I denote by $\Lambda$ where $B$ exemption level, borrowers choose $m$ the indifference condition between the default and no-default regions is subject to

$$C_0 = y_0 + q_0 (B_0, m, \{ \rho (y_1, m) \}) B_0$$

$$C_N = y_1 - \rho (y_1, m) B_0$$

$$C_D = \min \{ y_1, m \}$$

Borrowers repayment at date 1 is given by $\rho (y_1, m) B_0$, where the function $\rho (y_1, m)$, that allows for a full nonlinear contract shape, can be potentially negative, meaning that borrowers could receive insurance from lenders at date 1. I derive the results using a general $\rho (y_1, m)$ and discuss below how choosing $\rho$ borrowers and by varying the borrowers’ consumption in no default states. In the default regions, this creates first-order effects on welfare either by changing the interest rate schedule faced by borrowers and by varying the borrowers’ consumption in no default states. In the default regions, note that now the pricing schedule offered by lenders $q_0 (\cdot)$ depends on the shape of the contract $\rho (y_1, m)$, potentially in a complicated nonlinear way. To continue using differential techniques, I assume that the shape of repayments $\rho (y_1, m)$, now contingent on the $t = 1$ realization $y_1$ and potentially on the exemption choice, is well-behaved. The pricing schedule offered by lenders is given by

$$q_0 (B_0, m, \{ \rho (y_1, m) \}) B_0 = \delta \int_{D_0} \{ y_1 - m \} dF (y_1) + \int_N \rho (y_1, m) B_0 dF (y_1)$$

The indifference condition between the default and no-default regions is $m = y_1 - \rho (y_1, m) B_0$, I denote by $y^*_1$ the solution to this Equation. Given the shape of the contract $\rho (y_1, m)$ and the exemption level, borrowers choose $B_0$ optimally according to

$$U' (C_0) \left[ q_0 (B_0, m) + \frac{\partial q_0 (B_0, m)}{\partial B_0} B_0 \right] = \beta \int_N \rho (y_1, m) U' (y_1 - B_0) dF (y_1)$$

Proposition 10. (Endogenous contract response)

a) The marginal welfare change from varying the optimal exemption $m$ when when the shape of contracts can vary with $m$ is given by:

$$\frac{dW}{dm} = U' (C_0) \left| \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} \right| B_0 + \beta \int_{D_0} U' (C_D^*) dF (y_1) - \beta \int_N U' (C_N^*) \frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} B_0 dF (y_1)$$

where $\left| \frac{\partial q_0}{\partial m} \right|_{B_0}$ corresponds to the chance in price schedule induced by a change in $m$, holding $B_0$ constant.

b) The optimal exemption $m^*$ when borrowers are price takers is given by:

$$m^* = \frac{n_x \{ c^{\rho} \} - n_v \{ \Lambda \{ \rho (y_1, m) \} \}}{\Lambda \{ \rho (y_1, m) \}}$$

where $\Lambda \equiv \frac{n_x \{ \rho (y_1, m) B_0 \}}{c_0}, \Lambda \{ \rho (y_1, m) \} \equiv \frac{\beta \int_N \rho (y_1, m) B_0 dF (y_1)}{c_0}$.

Now a change in the exemption level endogenously changes the shape of the contract used. This creates first-order effects on welfare either by changing the interest rate schedule faced by borrowers and by varying the borrowers’ consumption in no default states. In the default regions,
the shape of the contract is irrelevant for welfare. It is clear from Equation (27) that we recover the results of the baseline model whenever \( \frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} = 0 \) for all \( y_1, m \). In that case, \( \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial m} \big|_{y_1, m} = 0 \).

Note that this result is independent of how \( \rho (y_1, m) \) is determined. If \( \rho (y_1, m) \) can be chosen optimally by borrowers without constraints, they would be able to implement the full insurance first-best outcome. This is not necessarily the case if they face constraints. For instance, we could assume that there is a well-behaved cost function with the form \( O (\{ \rho (y_1, m) \}) \) that borrowers face when choosing contracts. After \( \rho (y_1, m) \) is determined, \( m \) can be then chosen costlessly, as assumed throughout the paper. Solving different constrained contracting problems is outside the scope of this paper, but it is easy to see that \( \frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} = 0 \) is sufficient for the results of the text to hold.

**Corollary.** Independently of how the shape of the traded contract \( \rho (y_1, m) \) is determined, a sufficient condition for the results of Proposition 1 (and all others in the paper) to be valid is that the shape of the contract does not change with the level of the exemption, formally:

\[
\frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} = 0, \forall y_1, m. \tag{28}
\]

To provide more intuition, using further the structure of the two period case, we can rewrite Equation (27) as

\[
\frac{dW}{dm} = U^* (\text{C}_0) \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial m} B_0 + \beta \int_{y_0} U^* (\text{C}_y^*) dF (y_1) \\
\quad + \frac{U^* (\text{C}_y)}{1 + \rho} \left[ \delta - 1 \right] f (y_1) \rho (y_1, m) \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial m} (y_1, m) B_0 + \int_{y_0} \left( 1 - (1 + \psi)^{\beta U^* (\text{C}_y)} \right) \frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} dF (y_1).
\tag{29}
\]

For the the second line in Equation (29) to be nonzero, it is necessary that there are costs associated with bankruptcy, \( \delta < 1 \), and that the starting point does not entail full insurance, \( 1 \neq \frac{(1 + \psi)^{\beta U^* (\text{C}_y)}}{\beta U^* (\text{C}_y^*)} \). In addition to have \( \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial m} \neq 0 \). If the changes on the shape of the contract used induced by changes in the exemption level affect the probability of default or improve the insurance opportunities of borrowers, this will have a first order effect on welfare.

How likely is Equation (28) to hold? Theoretically, the literature in financial innovation and optimal security design, as in Allen and Gale (1994), studies which contracts are endogenously traded in general equilibrium. They show that, if there are fixed costs associated with trading contracts, only a finite number of contracts will be traded in equilibrium. In that framework, we expect Equation (28) to hold in general. It is also the case that many optimal contracting papers find their solution at boundaries, which also supports Equation (28). In practice, the fact that we observe the same set of contracts (e.g., debt contracts) being traded in economies with high and low exemption levels suggests that Equation (28) holds in modern economies.

Summing up, the framework developed in this paper can accommodate reactions of the shapes of contracts used in equilibrium to changes in exemption levels. There are two important takeaways of this generalization. First, a sufficient condition for all the results of this paper to be valid is that \( \frac{\partial \rho (y_1, m)}{\partial m} = 0 \), that is, the shape of the contracts used does not change with the level of exemptions, independently of how the shape of the contract is chosen. Second, if this condition does not hold, having additional information about changes in the shape of the contract in no default states and incorporating how the change in the shape of the contract affects the pricing schedule sensitivity, as in Equation (27), is sufficient to determine the optimal exemption level.
Proofs: Section 4

Proposition 3. (Endogenous income: frictionless markets)

a) Applying repeatedly Leibniz’ rule and using the optimality condition $B_0$, the default decision and first-order condition on labor supply $N_1^D$ and $N_0$ and the optimal effort choice $a$, we can write:

$$dW \over dm = \partial U \over \partial C_0 (C_0^0, N_0^0; a) \partial q_0 (B_0, m; a) \partial B_0 + \beta \int_{B_{m_1}} \partial U \over \partial C_1 (C_1^D, 0) dF (y_1; a),$$

where $\partial U \over \partial C_0 (C_0^0, N_0^0; a)$ denotes the partial derivative or flow utility with respect to consumption — equivalently with $\partial U \over \partial C_0 (C_1^D, 0)$. Note that the derivation of the optimality conditions in the text use the fact that $\partial ˜V \over \partial B_0 = -\partial U \over \partial C_0 (C_0^N, N_0^N)$.

Figure A.4 illustrates graphically how to characterize the default region when borrowers’ labor supply decision is nontrivial. Although it is impossible to solve explicitly for the default region, its characterization is conceptually identical to the baseline model.

b) Setting $dW \over dm = 0$ and solving for $m$ yields directly $m^*$.

Proposition 4. (Non-pecuniary penalties/state contingent utility)

a) The bankruptcy region is characterized a new indifference condition $\phi m = y_1 - B_0$. The derivation of $dW \over dm$ follows the same steps as the baseline model.

b) Setting $dW \over dm = 0$ and solving for $m$ yields directly $m^*$.

Proposition 5. (Epstein-Zin utility)

a) The derivation of $dW \over dm$ follows the same steps as the baseline model. I define $Q$, which denotes the certainty equivalent of consumption at $t = 1$, as:

$$Q \equiv \left( \int_{m}^{m+R_0} (y_1)^{1-\gamma} dF (y_1) + \int_{m}^{m+R_0} (m)^{1-\gamma} dF (y_1) + \int_{m+R_0}^{m+R_0} (y_1 - B_0)^{1-\gamma} dF (y_1) \right)^{1 \over \gamma}$$
Taking derivatives in Equation (15), assuming that \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial m} \equiv 0 \), yields:

\[
\frac{dB_0}{dq_0} \bigg|_{m_0=0} = \frac{(C_0)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi}{\hat{\psi}} \right]}{-\text{SOC}},
\]

where

\[
\text{SOC} = \beta \left( (q_0)^{\frac{1}{\psi}} (y_0 + q_0 B_0)^{\frac{1}{\psi} - 1} + \int_{m+B_0}^{m} \gamma (y_1 - B_0)^{\gamma - 1} dF (y_1) + (y_1 - B_0)^{-\gamma} f (m + B_0) \right) < 0.
\]

This shows that a change in interest rates (keeping interest rate schedule elasticities fixed) has an income and a substitution effect. The substitution effect, which determines the sensitivity of borrowing to interest rate changes, dominates when \( \psi > \Lambda \). Hence, \( \psi > 1 \), the standard parametrization in asset pricing models, implies that low interest rates increase borrowing and vice versa.

b) Setting \( \frac{df}{dm} = 0 \) and solving for \( m \) yields directly \( m^* \).

**Proposition 6. (Multiple contracts with arbitrary payoffs)**

a) As stated in the paper, there are three regions depending on the realization of \( y_1 \). The indifference condition between the regions \( D_m \) and \( N \) in the range \( y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ -z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} > m \) is given by \( m = y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ -z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} \). The indifference condition between the regions \( D_y \) and \( N \) in the range \( y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ -z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} \leq m \) is given by \( 0 = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} \). When \( \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} > 0 \), at \( y_1 = m \) there is a new boundary separating the \( D_m \) and \( D_y \) regions — this doesn’t occur for instance in Figure 3 in the text. This characterization decomposes the possible set of realizations in \([y_1, \infty)\) into multiple nonoverlapping intervals.

Indirect utility as a function of the exemption is written as:

\[
W (m) \equiv U \left( y_0 + \sum_{j} q_{0j} (B_{01}, \ldots, B_{0J}, m) B_{0j} \right) + \beta \left[ \int_{D_y} U \left( y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ -z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} \right) dF (y_1) + \int_{D_m} U (m) dF (y_1) \right] + \beta \left[ \int_{D_y} U \left( y_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ -z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \max \{ z_j (y_1) B_{0j}, 0 \} \right) dF (y_1) \right]
\]

The derivation of Equation (18) follows the same steps as the baseline model. It requires the use of \( J \) optimality conditions for the \( J \) different contracts traded.

b) Setting \( \frac{df}{dm} = 0 \) and solving for \( m \) yields directly \( m^* \).

**Proposition 7. (Heterogeneous borrowers: observable heterogeneity)**

a) Only for simplicity, I still assume a) that \( \lim_{r \to 0} \frac{df}{dr} > 0 \), which implies that it is never optimal to save, and b) that the problem is well-behaved in the region \( B_0 > 0 \). Formally, the price schedule becomes discontinuous at \( B_0 = 0 \), because:

\[
\lim_{r \to 0} q_{0j} (B_0, m) = \frac{\int_{y_1} dF (y_1)}{1 + r^*} \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{r \to 0} q_{0j} (B_0, m) = \frac{1}{1 + r^*}
\]
It is easy to show that $J(B_0, m)$ is continuous everywhere, but it is not differentiable at $B_0 = 0$.

Given these assumptions, we can define:

$$I_A(m) = \{ i | U'_i(y_{0i}) \frac{1}{1 + r^*} \int_m^\infty dF_i(y_{1i}) - \beta_i \int_{y_{1i}}^\infty U'(y_{1i}) dF_i(y_{1i}) > 0 \}$$

$$I_N(m) = \{ i | U'_i(y_{0i}) \frac{1}{1 + r^*} \int_m^\infty dF_i(y_{1i}) - \beta_i \int_{y_{1i}}^\infty U'(y_{1i}) dF_i(y_{1i}) \leq 0 \}$$

Therefore, for every level of $m$ we can define two regions of borrowers. Some of those will decide to borrow, but others will decide not to. Because $\int_m^\infty dF_i(y_{1i}) = 1 - F(m)$ is decreasing in $m$, the measure of active borrowers decreases with the exemption level.

The derivation of $\frac{dW}{dm}$ in this case uses the fact that, for an indifferent borrower, $U'_i(y_{0i}) \frac{1}{1 + r^*} \int_m^\infty dF_i(y_{1i}) = \beta_i \int_{y_{1i}}^\infty U'(y_{1i}) dF_i(y_{1i})$.

b) Setting $\frac{dW}{dm} = 0$ and solving for $m$ yields directly $m^*$. 

**Proposition 8. (Heterogeneous borrowers: unobservable heterogeneity)**

See online appendix.

**Proposition 9. (Dynamics)**

See online appendix.
References


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