Bloom, David E.; Canning, David; Kotschy, Rainer; Prettner, Klaus; Schünemann, Johannes

Working Paper
Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 11940

Provided in Cooperation with:
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: Bloom, David E.; Canning, David; Kotschy, Rainer; Prettner, Klaus; Schünemann, Johannes (2018) : Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 11940, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193234

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
IZA DP No. 11940

Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence

David E. Bloom
David Canning
Rainer Kotschy
Klaus Prettner
Johannes Schünemann

NOVEMBER 2018
Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence

IZA DP No. 11940

David E. Bloom  
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and IZA

David Canning  
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health

Rainer Kotschy  
LMU Munich

Klaus Prettner  
University of Hohenheim

Johannes Schünemann  
University of Göttingen

NOVEMBER 2018
Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence

Micro-based and macro-based approaches have been used to assess the effects of health on economic growth. Micro-based approaches aggregate the return on individual health from Mincerian wage regressions to derive the macroeconomic effects of population health. Macro-based approaches estimate a generalized aggregate production function that decomposes output into its components. The micro-based approach tends to find smaller effects than the macro-based approach, thus presenting a micromacro puzzle regarding the economic return on health. We reconcile these two strands of literature by showing that the point estimate of the macroeconomic effect of health is quantitatively close to that found by aggregating the microeconomic effects, controlling for potential spillovers of population health at the aggregate level. Our results justify using the micro-based approach to estimate the direct economic benefits of health interventions.

JEL Classification: I15, I25, J11, O11, O15

Keywords: productivity, population health, human capital, economic development, return on health

Corresponding author:
David E. Bloom
Harvard University
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health
665 Huntington Avenue
Boston
Massachusetts 02115
E-mail: dbloom@hsph.harvard.edu

The authors would like to thank participants of the ViS Annual Congress 2018, the European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018, and Ana Abeliansky, Michael Burda, Alexander Khoury, Holger Strulik, and Uwe Sunde for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction

Health is an essential component of human capital, supporting worker productivity by enhancing physical capacity and mental capabilities. Health improvements influence the pace of income growth through many pathways: Better health directly increases labor market participation and worker productivity (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Bloom and Canning, 2000; Schultz, 2002; Bloom et al., 2003a); increasing life expectancy creates incentives to invest in education, innovation, and physical capital (Bloom et al., 2003b, 2007, 2014b; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Prettner, 2013); and better health, particularly that of women, reduces fertility and spurs an economic transition from a state of stagnating incomes toward sustained income growth (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011; Cervellati and Sunde, 2005, 2011; Bloom et al., 2015). Hence, health and development correlate positively at the macroeconomic level, as the unconditional correlation between the survival probability from age 15 to 60 and (log) gross domestic product (GDP) per worker illustrates in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Unconditional Correlation: Health and Development](image)


In general, two prominent methods are used to assess the effect of health on economic growth. The first aggregates the results of Mincerian wage regressions of the return on individual health to derive the macroeconomic effects of population health. The second relies on the estimation of a generalized aggregate production function that decomposes human capital into its components, including population health. While the overwhelming majority of studies based on both methods indicate a positive effect of health on economic growth, the size of the effect remains subject to intense debate. The micro-based approach tends to find smaller effects than the macro-based approach, thus presenting a micro-macro puzzle of the economic return on health.
This paper aims to reconcile both approaches by showing that the estimates based on microeconomic results are compatible with the effects derived from a well-specified macroeconomic analysis. To this end, we develop a production function model of economic growth, keeping our specification as close as possible to a generalized Mincerian wage equation as in Weil (2007). This permits us to compare our macro-level estimates and Weil’s micro-level calibration directly. We account for reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and measurement errors in the explanatory variables using a large cross-country panel and exploiting the demographic structure for an instrumental variables approach (see Kotschy and Sunde, 2018, who use this procedure to examine the implications of population aging and educational investment for macroeconomic performance). Our results show that the micro-based and macro-based estimates of the effects of health on economic development are consistent with each other. Thus, we provide a macro-based justification for using the micro-based approach to estimate the direct economic benefits of specific health interventions.

According to Weil (2007), a 10-percentage-point increase in adult survival rates translates into a 6.7-percent increase in labor productivity. Consequently, health differentials account for about 9.9 percent of the variation in output per worker across countries. Our macro-based analysis shows that a 10-percentage-point increase in adult survival rates is associated with a 9.1-percent increase in labor productivity. Weil’s (2007) estimate falls well within the 95-percent confidence interval of our estimate, suggesting that the two models’ results are compatible with each other. Because we include physical capital and education in our empirical framework, the resulting estimate is a measure of the direct productivity benefits of health as in Weil (2007). Thus, the estimated effect excludes the role of better health in increasing the incentives for investment, saving, and education, and its role in reducing fertility and spurring a takeoff toward sustained growth. As such, the productivity benefits of health presented in this paper should be considered a conservative estimate of the overall economic benefits of health, including spillover effects.

Overall, our results and their consistency with the micro-based approach of estimating the return on health substantiate the claim that public health measures are an important lever for fostering economic development. These types of health investments could include vaccination programs, antibiotic distribution programs, and micronutrient supplementation schemes, which lead to large improvements in health outcomes for relatively low expenditures (World Bank, 1993; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Field et al., 2009; Luca et al., 2014).

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews various approaches to measure the effect of health on economic performance. In Section 3, we derive the theoretical effect of health on output per worker from a human capital–augmented aggregate production function. In Section 4, we use these results to derive an empirical specification for estimating the influence of changes in the health stock of the population on output growth. Section 5 describes the data, while Section 6 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Literature Review

A common early empirical approach to examining the effect of health on economic growth involves regressing income per capita growth against initial level of health for a cross-sectional sample of countries, controlling for initial income and other factors believed to influence steady-state income (see, for example,
Barro, 1991, 1997; Durlauf et al., 2005). Nearly all studies investigating economic growth that use this approach find a positive, significant, and sizable influence of initial population health—usually measured by life expectancy—on the subsequent pace of economic growth (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Sachs et al., 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Bhargava et al., 2001; Bloom et al., 2004). While the results for most other explanatory variables are not robust with respect to different specifications, Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Doppelhofer et al. (2004) find that initial population health is positively associated with subsequent growth in almost all permutations of explanatory variables they analyze. Hence, initial population health is one of the most robust predictors of subsequent economic growth.

More recent work analyzes the effects of health on economic growth via dynamic panel data regressions in the vein of Islam (1995), using the lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors to control for the convergence process. These studies typically employ an exogenous instrument for health to isolate the causal channel running from better health to income growth (see, for example, Lorentzen et al., 2008; Aghion et al., 2011; Cervellati and Sunde, 2011; Bloom et al., 2014a). Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) is one of the few studies finding no evidence for a causal positive effect of health improvements on economic growth. The authors argue that increasing life expectancy raises population growth, which, in turn, increases capital dilution in the neoclassical growth model and therefore reduces income growth during the convergence process. They support this theory empirically using the global epidemiological revolution as an instrument for life expectancy. However, Aghion et al. (2011) and Bloom et al. (2014a) show that this result fails to hold when initial life expectancy is included in the regression. In addition, Cervellati and Sunde (2011) argue that Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2007) results only hold for less-developed countries that have not yet undergone the demographic transition. In these countries, increasing life expectancy does indeed raise population growth and reduce income growth. For post–demographic transition countries, however, fertility declines with mortality. As a result, health improvements do not lead to an increase in population growth and capital dilution does not intensify. Splitting the sample into pre– and post–demographic transition countries, Cervellati and Sunde (2011) find that the effect of life expectancy on growth is positive for post–demographic transition countries and negative but insignificant for pre–demographic transition countries (see, for example, Hansen and Lønstrup, 2015, for a recent discussion).

Another way to assess the size of the macroeconomic effect is by aggregating the microeconomic effects of health to infer the implications for aggregate income. For example, Fogel (1994, 1997) argues that much of British economic growth during 1780–1980 (about 0.33 percent per year) was due to increases in effective labor inputs that resulted from workers’ better nutrition and improved health. More recently, the seminal works of Shastry and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007) employ an aggregate production function, in which the effects of health on productivity are calibrated from microeconomic wage regressions. In the microeconomic regressions, these studies explain income by means of various health measures such as anemia, height, age at menarche, and the adult survival rate. The results of Shastry and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007) suggest that health is an important form of human capital, but that its effect on growth is smaller than that derived from macroeconomic cross-country regressions.

---

2 By construction, the fixed effects in such regressions correlate with the error term. Thus, generalized method of moments techniques are usually employed for estimation (see, for example, Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Judson and Owen, 1999).


3 Theoretical Framework

Assume that time $t = 1, 2, \ldots$ evolves discretely, and consider an aggregate production function of the form

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha H_t^{1-\alpha},$$

(1)

where $Y_t$ denotes aggregate output, $A_t$ represents total factor productivity (TFP), $K_t$ is the physical capital stock, $H_t$ describes the aggregate human capital stock, and $\alpha$ constitutes the elasticity of final output with respect to physical capital. The sum of individual levels of human capital $v_{j,t}$ of workers $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, J\}$ in the economy, that is, $H_t = \sum_j v_{j,t}$ can describe the aggregate stock of human capital. Expressing output in per worker units yields

$$y_t = A_t k_t^\alpha v_t^{1-\alpha}$$

(2)

with $y_t = Y_t/L_t$, $k_t = K_t/L_t$, and $v_t = H_t/L_t$. Alternatively, output can be expressed in per capita units as

$$\tilde{y}_t = \frac{y_t}{N_t} = \frac{k_t}{N_t} A_t k_t^\alpha v_t^{1-\alpha},$$

(3)

where $N_t$ refers to the total population size.

In a competitive labor market, one unit of composite labor $v_t$ earns the wage $w_t$, which equals its marginal product:

$$w_t = \frac{\partial y_t}{\partial v_t} = (1 - \alpha) \frac{y_t}{v_t}.$$

Furthermore, individual human capital follows a generalized Mincerian wage equation along the lines of Hall and Jones (1999), Bils and Klenow (2000), and Weil (2007). Hence, individual human capital $v_{j,t}$ follows an exponential function:

$$v_{j,t} = \exp\left(\phi_h h_{j,t} + \phi_s s_{j,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{j,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{j,t}^2 \right),$$

(4)

where $h_{j,t}$ denotes the state of health, $s_{j,t}$ refers to educational attainment, $a_{j,t}$ describes experience of the worker, $\phi_h$ is the semi-elasticity of human capital with respect to health, $\phi_s$ is the semi-elasticity of human capital with respect to educational attainment, and $\phi_{a,1}$ and $\phi_{a,2}$ refer to the semi-elasticities of experience and experience squared. We include the latter to capture the diminishing marginal contribution of experience to productivity. Accordingly, a worker $j$ with $v_j$ units of human capital earns a wage of

---

3 This holds under the assumption that a marginal change of individual human capital does not change the distribution of wages such that the marginal product of individual human capital and that of average human capital coincide.

4 Conceptually, $h_{j,t}$, $s_{j,t}$, and $a_{j,t}$ need not represent all aspects of health, educational attainment, and experience, only those that are relevant for the production of final output.
\[ w_{j,t} = w_t \cdot v_{j,t} = w_t \cdot \exp(\phi_h h_{j,t} + \phi_s s_{j,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{j,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{j,t}^2). \] (6)

This notation normalizes the effective labor input of a hypothetical worker without any health capital, education, and experience to unity. Meanwhile, workers with better health, higher education, or more experience are equivalent in productivity terms to a larger number of such baseline workers. Logarithmic wages at the individual level thus take the well-known Mincerian form:

\[ \ln(w_{j,t}) = \ln(w_t) + \ln(v_{j,t}) = \ln(w_t) + \phi_h h_{j,t} + \phi_s s_{j,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{j,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{j,t}^2. \] (7)

Hence, the aggregate production function in (1) with our measure for human capital in (4) is consistent with wage equations used in the microeconomic literature.

The Mincerian wage form implies that the aggregate human capital stock in the economy is given by

\[ H_t = \sum_j v_{j,t} = \sum_j \exp(\phi_h h_{j,t} + \phi_s s_{j,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{j,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{j,t}^2). \] (8)

Accordingly, aggregating human capital requires raising individuals’ health, educational attainment, and experience to the exponential power. This complication in the aggregation process vanishes if human capital and thus wages follow a log-normal distribution. In this case, the log of the average wage corresponds to the average of log wages plus one-half of the variance of log wages \( \sigma_t^2 \). Therefore, the log of human capital per worker simplifies to

\[
\ln \left( \frac{H_t}{L_t} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{\sum_j v_{j,t}}{L_t} \right) = \left[ \frac{\sum_j \ln (v_{j,t})}{L_t} \right] + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{2} = \frac{\sum_j \phi_h h_{j,t} + \phi_s s_{j,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{j,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{j,t}^2}{L_t} + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{2} = \phi_h h_t + \phi_s s_t + \phi_{a,1} a_t + \phi_{a,2} a_t^2 + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{2}.
\] (9)

Intuitively, a marginally better health status (for example, an increase in the adult survival rate by 1 percentage point) raises a worker’s productivity and wages by \( 100 \cdot \phi_h \) percent. Analogously, additional marginal investment in education (for example, one year of schooling) raises a worker’s productivity and wages by \( 100 \cdot \phi_s \) percent. This effect’s absolute size is larger for highly educated high-wage earners than it is for poorly educated low-wage workers. Moreover, an extra year of education for a highly educated worker also represents a greater investment, because the worker must forgo a higher wage for the extra schooling.

4 Empirical Framework
Suppose the production function in (2) applies to \( i = 1, \ldots, I \) countries. Taking the logarithm of the production function and using the result from Equation (9), the log of production per worker is given by

\[
\ln(y_{i,t}) = \ln(A_{i,t}) + \alpha \ln(k_{i,t}) + (1 - \alpha) \left( \phi_h h_{i,t} + \phi_s s_{i,t} + \phi_{a,1} a_{i,t} + \phi_{a,2} a_{i,t}^2 + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{2} \right).
\]

(10)

Using rates of return to calibrate the coefficient on education, \( \phi_s \), suggests a parameter value of 0.09 to 0.15 (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, 2018). Regarding the elasticity of output with respect to capital, \( \alpha \), economists generally agree on values of around one-third (see, for example, Hall and Jones, 1999).

Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) take a similar approach, deriving a formula that estimates the macroeconomic effects of schooling using an aggregated version of a Mincerian wage equation. The major difference between these formulations is that education level’s effect on output in their formulation is expressed as \( \phi_s \), whereas in our approach the effect of schooling is \( (1 - \alpha) \phi_s \). This difference arises because they assume the cross-country differences and changes in the intercepts in (7) are random and assign them to the error term in the regression. With our production function, increases in schooling increase the aggregate level of human capital and labor equivalent inputs in the economy and depress the wage paid per equivalent worker.

Equation (10) describes aggregate production as an identity that could be estimated directly, if all right-hand-side variables were available. In practice, however, the level of total factor productivity in country \( i \) at time \( t, \ln(A_{i,t}) \), is not observed. Several approaches can address this problem. We follow Bloom et al. (2004) and model total factor productivity as a diffusion process across countries, which allows for the possibility of long-run differences in TFP even after the diffusion is complete. Specifically, let the change in TFP be given by

\[
\Delta \ln(A_{i,t}) = \lambda \left[ \ln(A_{i,t}^*) - \ln(A_{i,t-1}) \right] + \varepsilon_{i,t},
\]

(11)

where \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) constitutes an idiosyncratic shock. Each country has a period-specific upper bound, given by \( \ln(A_{i,t}^*) \). A country’s total factor productivity adjusts toward this bound at rate \( \lambda \). We assume this upper bound depends on country characteristics \( x_{i,t} \) and on the worldwide technology frontier \( \mu_t \). Moreover, schooling in previous periods may facilitate the diffusion and adoption of existing technologies (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) or spur novel innovation (Romer, 1990; Strulik et al., 2013). Hence, lagged schooling, \( s_{i,t-1} \), constitutes another determinant of potential TFP (see also Cuaresma et al., 2014). Neglecting one of these channels might bias the empirical estimates, as Sunde and Vischer’s (2015) results indicate. Because technological gaps are not directly observed, we follow Baumol (1986) and use lagged output per worker as a proxy (see also Fagerberg, 1994; Dowrick and Rogers, 2002). Hence, growth of total factor productivity reads

\[
\Delta \ln(A_{i,t}) = \lambda \left[ \mu_t + x_{i,t} \Theta + \rho s_{i,t-1} - \ln(y_{i,t-1}) \right] + \varepsilon_{i,t}.
\]

(12)

Alternatively, a richer model derives the log of lagged total factor productivity \( \ln(A_{i,t-1}) \) directly from the production function such that
\[
\Delta \ln(A_{i,t}) = \lambda \left[ \mu_t + x_{i,t}' \Theta + \rho s_{i,t-1} - \ln(y_{i,t-1}) + \alpha \ln(k_{i,t-1}) \right] \\
+ \lambda (1 - \alpha) \left( \phi_h h_{i,t-1} + \phi_s s_{i,t-1} + \phi_{a1} a_{i,t-1} + \phi_{a2} a_{i,t-1}^2 + \frac{\sigma_{i,t-1}^2}{2} \right) + \epsilon_{i,t}.
\]

(13)

This slightly more comprehensive modeling approach, however, suffers from the disadvantage that including additional highly correlated explanatory variables inflates the estimated standard errors without providing additional insights into the parameters of interest. As such, we provide estimates for both models and show that they are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.

Related research suggests several variables \( x_{i,t} \) that may affect the TFP level in the long run. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that institutions and "social infrastructure" affect productivity, while Gallup et al. (1999) emphasize the role of geography. Our empirical work experiments with several potential variables to control for these influences.

First-differencing (10) and inserting (12) provides the empirical estimation equation:

\[
\Delta \ln(y_{i,t}) = \lambda \left[ \mu_t + x_{i,t}' \Theta + \rho s_{i,t-1} - \ln(y_{i,t-1}) \right] + \alpha \Delta \ln(k_{i,t}) \\
+ (1 - \alpha) \left( \phi_h \Delta h_{i,t} + \phi_s \Delta s_{i,t} + \phi_{a1} \Delta a_{i,t} + \phi_{a2} \Delta a_{i,t}^2 + \frac{\Delta \sigma_{i,t}^2}{2} \right) + \epsilon_{i,t}.
\]

(14)

De la Fuente and Domenech (2001) and Bloom et al. (2004) use this approach to model TFP diffusion in cross-country production function studies. It is formally equivalent to the autoregressive TFP model that Griliches and Mairesse (1998) and Blundell and Bond (2000) use in their studies of the production function based on firm-level data.

According to the specification in (14), output growth can be decomposed into three components. The first is growth of the input factors capital, health, schooling, and experience. The second is a catch-up term capturing the reduction of the technological gap to the leading countries in each time period, such that the country converges to its TFP upper bound at the rate \( \lambda \). The third component is an idiosyncratic shock to the country’s total factor productivity \( \epsilon_{i,t} \).

Equation (14) represents a model of conditional convergence in which the speed of convergence \( \lambda \) describes the rate at which gaps in total factor productivity close. Therefore, this approach stands in contrast to models that take TFP differentials across countries to be fixed, such as those of Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). The speed of convergence in these models depends on the time that capital stocks take to reach their steady-state levels given fixed investment rates. By including the growth rates of factor inputs directly in Equation (14), we can identify the catch-up term—that is, the effect of the gap between actual and steady-state output, given current input levels—as the impact of a TFP gap.

In the special case of no technological diffusion (\( \lambda = 0 \)), the lagged level terms in (14) disappear.

\textsuperscript{5} We could allow the shock to grow over time to have a common component across countries, such as a worldwide oil or interest rate shock. Such a shock, however, would be collinear to changes in the worldwide productivity frontier captured by the time effects and would thus not affect any of our results.
Hence, our approach encompasses the estimation of a production function in first differences, as Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Pritchett (2001) advocate. Moreover, we can test if this restriction holds. Taking first differences nets out any fixed effects on TFP. Therefore, testing whether \( \lambda = 0 \) examines the plausibility that TFP differentials remain constant or, alternatively, narrow over time because of technological diffusion. Our model also encompasses the special case in which technological diffusion occurs, but the steady-state level of TFP is the same in every country. We can test this by examining whether the country-specific variables \( x_{it} \) have zero coefficients.

When estimating Equation (14), we face the possibility that contemporaneous growth rates of factor inputs are endogenous and responsive to the current TFP shock \( \varepsilon_{it} \). For health and education inputs, which are the objects of interest, we overcome this problem by exploiting the demographic structure to obtain plausibly exogenous instrumental variables (see Kotschy and Sunde, 2018). Specifically, inflows from young-age cohorts at the lower end and outflows from old-age cohorts at the upper end of the working-age population determine changes in overall health status and educational attainment of the working-age population. Hence, one can use the lagged levels of health and educational attainment for the age cohorts that will enter or leave the working-age population in the next period as an instrumental variable for the contemporaneous growth rate of the corresponding factor input. This instrument is plausibly exogenous given the approximation of TFP growth rates, which controls for productivity gains that are due to past changes in input factors, past technology shocks, and convergence to the technological frontier. This approach is compatible with lagged TFP levels and expected TFP growth—the catch-up term in Equation (14)—affecting previous input decisions (for example, Bils and Klenow, 2000, suggest that schooling decisions depend on expected economic growth). The argument that lagged input levels are uncorrelated with future shocks to TFP is the rationale for estimating Equation (14) instead of the level relationship in Equation (10).

Finally, including fixed effects in a comprehensive specification also allows for the possibility of country-specific growth trends driven by unobserved heterogeneity with a persistent effect on TFP. We additionally use dynamic panel estimators based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) to eliminate potential spurious correlations that arise mechanically through a link between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. We take the view that over the five-year intervals almost all inputs potentially correlate with contemporaneous productivity shocks. Therefore, we have to instrument many of our regressors by lagged values, as opposed to firm-level studies, in which current inputs are treated as exogenous. Both of these factors imply a loss of precision in the estimates and make drawing inferences based on a fixed-effects approach difficult. We nonetheless report these results as another specification test.

5 Data

We construct an unbalanced panel of 116 countries observed every five years from 1960 to 2010. Data on real output and physical capital, both in per worker units, are obtained from the Penn World Tables by Feenstra et al. (2015).

Health inputs are proxied using adult survival rates derived from United Nations (2017), which measure the probability of surviving from age 15 to 60. Conceptually, this measure may relate more closely to adult health and worker productivity than life expectancy—a measure that is sensitive to infant
mortality rates. Adult survival rates, however, act only as a proxy for the health of the workforce, because they measure mortality rates rather than morbidity. Our main reason for using adult survival rates is that it allows us to compare our results directly with those of Shastry and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007).

Following the Mincerian approach, educational input is proxied by years of schooling in the working-age population. To this end, we exploit measures on secondary and total schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) for the population above age 15. We combine age-specific years of schooling with population shares to construct average years of schooling for the working-age population, which we define from age 15 to 60 to match our measure of aggregate health.

We construct aggregate experience as the median age of the population obtained from United Nations (2017), net of an intercept of six years corresponding to early childhood. Moreover, we deduct compulsory schooling years, taken from UNESCO (1997) and UNESCO (2017), to account for differences in the age of workforce entry across countries. This correction is necessary, because countries with higher life expectancy and older populations tend to have later workforce entry due to longer schooling. As experience enters the regression framework in differences, this measure takes up variation from changes in median age and compulsory schooling following educational reforms.6

To control for the effect of wage inequality, we use the disposable income Gini coefficient after taxation and transfers by Solt (2016b). These data provide standardized Gini coefficients that are comparable across countries and over time.

Finally, we include some country-specific variables that may affect long-run TFP levels. These include an indicator for the quality of economic institutions from Gwartney et al. (2017), a measure for the value added by the agricultural sector from World Bank (2017) to control for structural change, the percentage of land area in the tropics by Gallup et al. (1999) to control for geographical factors that may affect productivity and trading opportunities, and a set of regional dummies.7

6 Results

6.1 Baseline Results

Table 1 presents the main estimation results. We proxy education by average years of secondary schooling, which provides the most precise estimates for the return on education. Column (1) reports coefficient estimates of a parsimonious specification of our empirical model in Equation (14), including lagged educational attainment but omitting any additional controls. The point estimates show the sign expected from theory. Lagged per capita GDP is negative, implying conditional convergence as predicted by the neoclassical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Diamond, 1965) and as established empirically.8

---

6 For certain countries, the statistical yearbooks report values for specific regions. Moreover, some countries’ educational systems allow for different categorizations such that alternative figures are conceivable. We correct for these fluctuations and code flatter, that is, less varying, values in the case of doubt. This procedure tends to render the measure for experience less informative and thus increases the corresponding standard errors. Table A3 in the Appendix contains a complete list of coding decisions. Because we use only changes in experience over time, measurement error in compulsory schooling levels poses no threat to our identification.

7 We also experimented with further indicators for landlocked countries (Gallup et al., 1999) and controls for ethnic fractionalization and polarization by Alesina et al. (2003) and Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005). Given the set of other controls, however, these variables did not explain much of the remaining variation.

8 See, for example, Barro (1991, 1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Doppelhofer et al. (2004) in cross-section regressions, and Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), and Brückner (2013) in panel data settings. For interesting surveys and critical remarks on the literature, see Durlauf et al. (2005) and
Capital accumulation positively relates to economic growth, which again conforms to the growth literature’s results. Changes in the aggregate human capital stock positively affect productivity per worker: The coefficients for changes in average health and mean years of schooling both show a positive sign and differ significantly from zero at the 1-percent level. Hence, health and education both constitute important dimensions of human capital. The opposing signs for $\hat{\phi}_{a,1}$ and $\hat{\phi}_{a,2}$ suggest a hump-shaped effect of average experience on growth of output per worker, which is consistent with the standard Mincerian framework; though only the coefficient of squared experience is (marginally) significant in this specification. Because experience varies strongly across individuals but very little across countries, however, obtaining a precise estimate of the effect of worker experience in macroeconomic models is difficult (Bloom et al., 2004).

The specification used in Column (2) includes controls for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural sector (as a proxy for structural change), the percentage of land area in the tropics, and the set of regional dummies. Adding these controls increases the model’s explanatory power as reflected by an increase in $R^2$ and slightly improves the precision of the point estimates. Quantitatively, the computed parameters reduce in magnitude compared with the parsimonious specification, but the qualitative results remain unchanged. In particular, the estimates still indicate a positive and significant effect of changes in average health and education on output per worker. Interestingly, the reduction in magnitude of the return on health is almost entirely due to the inclusion of institutional quality. This confirms recent evidence by Weil (2014, 2017), who finds that institutional differences account for a considerable portion of the cross-country correlation between income and health. Nevertheless, our results also show that even after controlling for institutional differences, significant scope exists for a positive causal effect of health on output per worker.

In Column (3), we include country-fixed effects to allow for country-specific growth trends. Again, the qualitative effects remain unchanged. Quantitatively, the estimated return on health does not change considerably, while the return on education increases slightly. Our result of a positive and significant return on health is, therefore, not driven by country-fixed unobservables. This specification substantially restricts the potential of omitted variables to bias our main outcome of interest and thus serves as a specification test for the model without fixed effects. In Column (4), we augment the specification in Column (2) by adding the Gini coefficient to approximate the variance of log wages. For reasons of data availability, the estimation sample shrinks to 461 observations. The qualitative results again remain unchanged, while the estimated parameters do not change considerably in magnitude. The computed parameter for the disposable income Gini coefficient is negative and insignificant. Finally, Column (5) presents the results for the comprehensive model with lagged controls, which derives lagged TFP directly from the production function according to Equation (13). The results conform quantitatively and qualitatively to those in Columns (2) to (4).

---

Eberhardt and Teal (2011).

9 To increase data availability, Solt (2016b) uses imputation procedures to reduce the number of missing values in the data set. Because this procedure may understate the uncertainty in the data and thus lead to downward-biased standard errors, we conduct a standard error adjustment as suggested by Solt (2016a). In particular, we estimate the specification in Column (4) for 100 potential realizations of the Gini coefficient and compute the final estimates as the average over all individual results. For details, see Solt (2016a).
Table 1: Return of Health and Education to Productivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares</th>
<th>Two-Stage Least Squares</th>
<th>Panel GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Controls (1)</td>
<td>Adding Controls (2)</td>
<td>Fixed Effects (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y₁,1−1)</td>
<td>-0.045*** (0.0097)</td>
<td>-0.157*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.34*** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ ln(k₁,1)</td>
<td>0.52*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.35*** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.23*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(h₁,ε)</td>
<td>1.12*** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.59** (0.29)</td>
<td>0.64** (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(s₁,ε)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.075*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.091** (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(o₁,ε)</td>
<td>0.0107 (0.0085)</td>
<td>0.0075 (0.0088)</td>
<td>-0.0100 (0.0095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(s₁,ε)²</td>
<td>-0.000069 (0.00036)</td>
<td>-0.000057 (0.00036)</td>
<td>0.000024 (0.00036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(s₁,ε)²</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(σ₁,ε)²</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.38 | — | 0.41 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.37 | — | — |
First-stage F | — | — | — | — | — | 26.7 | 30.2 | 17.8 | — | — |
AR(2) p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.30 | 0.21 |
Hansen p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.01 | 0.04 |
Diff.-in-Hansen p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.77 |
Instruments | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 77 | 89 |
Observations | 613 | 613 | 613 | 461 | 613 | 613 | 613 | 613 | 497 | 613 |
Controls | — | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of output per worker Δln(γ₁,1). All specifications include lagged (secondary) years of schooling s₁,ε−1 and a full set of time effects. Columns (2) to (10) add further controls s₁,ε for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural sector, the percentage of land area in the tropics, and a full set of regional dummies. The specification in Column (5) further controls for the first lag of log physical capital per worker, population health, experience, and experience squared. The panel GMM specifications instrument lagged log output per worker ln(y₁,1−1), the growth rate of physical capital per worker Δln(κ₁,1), the change in population health Δ(h₁,ε), and the change in average years of (secondary) schooling Δ(s₁,ε), whereas the changes in experience Δ(o₁,ε) and experience squared Δ(s₁,ε)² are treated as exogenous variables. The difference GMM specification uses up to two lags of the endogenous variables, whereas the system GMM specification uses the first lag of the endogenous variables in the differences equation and the first difference of the endogenous variables in the levels equation—see Section 6.3. Country-fixed effects are removed using forward orthogonal deviations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Standard errors in GMM are computed with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). We adjust standard errors in Column (4) to account for multiple imputation of the Gini series—see Footnote 9. The standard errors in all specifications are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 2 compares the results of the baseline specification in Column (2) with those of the literature. According to Weil (2007), an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1—or 10 percentage points—raises labor productivity by 6.7 percent. In comparison, our estimates indicate that an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1 translates into a 9.1-percent increase in labor productivity. The slightly larger point estimate from the macro-based approach might be due to spillover effects that the micro-based approach omits by design. The 95-percent confidence interval of our estimate ranges from 0.47 to 17.7 percent and hence includes Weil’s (2007) estimate. Consequently, our macro results are consistent with the micro results, reconciling the micro-based and macro-based approaches to estimating the effect of health on income growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Point Estimate</th>
<th>Confidence Interval</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>$&lt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$&lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>(0.23–0.47)</td>
<td>0.3–0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_h$</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>(0.47%–17.72%)</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_s$</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>(2.6%–20.26%)</td>
<td>9%–15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{a,1}$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{a,2}$</td>
<td>$&lt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$&lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our coefficient estimate for changes in physical capital $\alpha$ is 0.35. This is in line with empirical estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital, which fall around 0.3 to 0.4 (Hall and Jones, 1999). By dividing our estimate of education by $(1 - \alpha)$, we obtain a return on secondary schooling $\phi_s$ of 11.4 percent. This effect is consistent with the estimates of the studies reviewed in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018). The average return on secondary schooling over all studies and all countries in their supplementary file pins down to 10.5 percent. Moreover, our point estimate of 11.4 percent lies within the range of 9 to 15 percent that captures the most plausible estimates (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, 2018). Finally, the signs of our coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variable $\gamma$ and our experience measures $\phi_{a,1}$ and $\phi_{a,2}$ accord with previous findings on conditional convergence and positive but diminishing returns to experience.

### 6.2 Instrumental Variables Approach

To address concerns about the endogeneity of health and education in our empirical model, we present instrumental variable regressions for the two human capital variables health and education in Columns (6) to (8) of Table 1. To this end, changes in health and education are explained by in- and outflows of young- and old-age cohorts at the lower and upper ends of the working-age population (see Kotschy and Sunde, 2018). Hence, we can use lagged levels for the youngest and oldest age cohorts to predict
contemporaneous changes in aggregate health and education of the working-age population. Given the strong persistence in demographic patterns, these in- and outflows are plausibly exogenous in an empirical specification that controls for past levels of per capita output and time-fixed effects. Moreover, migration is less of a concern for these age groups in contrast to prime-age workers. In Column (6), we apply this identification strategy to instrument changes in health. In particular, contemporaneous changes in health are instrumented by the health status of the cohort aged 10–14 years in the previous period, measured in terms of infant mortality at time of birth. Optimally, we would also like to capture the outflow of aggregate health by using lagged health of the cohort aged 55–59 years; however, a lack of data on child mortality rates from before the world wars prohibits us from doing so. In Column (7), contemporaneous changes in education are instrumented by average years of secondary schooling of the cohort aged 55–59 years in the previous period. We refrain from using the inflow of schooling for young-age cohorts, because individuals might anticipate future economic growth and thus increase educational attainment. Finally, Column (8) reports results for a specification in which both health and education are instrumented. While the sign of each coefficient remains stable compared with the other regressions, the instrumented variables become insignificant. However, this loss of significance is of less concern because the size of the estimated coefficients does not change considerably. Weak instruments are no concern, as sufficiently high values of the first-stage F-statistic indicate.

6.3 Panel GMM Results

As a further specification test, we use panel GMM estimators to address potential spurious correlations that arise mechanically through a link between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. The difference GMM estimator identifies the parameters of interest by instrumenting changes in the explanatory variables by their lagged values (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The system GMM estimator extends this model by a level equation, which exploits changes over time as additional instruments, to achieve more efficient estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In our specifications, we instrument not only the lagged dependent variable but also some of the other regressors by lagged values, because these inputs potentially correlate with productivity shocks over five-year intervals. Hence, this approach is more cautious than a parsimonious GMM specification that only instruments the lagged dependent variable. Specifically, we instrument lagged output per worker $ln(y_{i,t-1})$, the growth rate of physical capital per worker $\Delta ln(k_{i,t})$, the change in population health $\Delta(h_{i,t})$, and the change in average years of secondary schooling $\Delta(s_{i,t})$. By contrast, we treat changes in experience $\Delta(a_{i,t})$ and experience squared $\Delta(a_{i,t}^2)$ as exogenous variables. This assumption is appropriate, because, on the one hand, the demographic structure is strongly predetermined and thus insensitive to contemporaneous shocks and, on the other hand, compulsory schooling laws require sufficient time to alter the schooling composition of a country.

An important aspect of both difference and system GMM is the choice of the instrument sets: While the estimators’ efficiency increases with the number of instruments, the risk of using weak instruments also increases. A rule of thumb due to Roodman (2009) is not to use more instruments than there are cross-sectional units in the sample—here countries. Therefore, we restrict the instrument count by using only the two most recent lags of the endogenous variables in the difference GMM specification.

---

11 See also Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bover (1995) for further details.
For system GMM, which has a higher instrument count through the inclusion of the levels equation, we use only the most recent lag of the endogenous variables in the difference equation and the first difference of the endogenous variables in the level equation.

Columns (9) and (10) report the corresponding results for difference and system GMM. Both estimators eliminate fixed effects using forward orthogonal deviations and thus also account for country-specific growth trends. Overall, the estimates accord with the results obtained in Columns (2) to (8). The reduced-form estimate of population health is significant at the 5-percent level and takes a value of roughly 0.8. This value lies in the range of the ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares specifications. Due to the higher number of instruments, the GMM estimate is more precise than the two-stage least squares estimate. The other parameter estimates also conform qualitatively and quantitatively to the preceding specifications. We view this as further evidence that our macro-based estimates roughly lie in the same domain as the micro-based results by Weil (2007). The Hansen J-test, however, indicates that the instrument set is not perfectly exogenous such that these estimates should not be interpreted as causal effects. Because the estimated coefficient of population health takes roughly similar values for different specifications of the instrument set, we nonetheless interpret these results as evidence for the robustness of our main findings.

6.4 Robustness

As a first robustness check, Table A1 in the Appendix contains the estimation results of an empirical model that proxies education by average years of total schooling instead of average years of secondary schooling. Again, we observe that the expected signs of the coefficients remain stable throughout all specifications. In particular, the estimated effect of health on output per worker is quantitatively almost identical compared with the baseline results. Therefore, we confirm our main result that micro-based and macro-based estimates of the return to health are consistent with each other.

The estimated return on average years of schooling loses its significance; however, the variation in this regressor may be less informative than the variation in average years of secondary education, because primary education does not change appreciably over the time period examined in most countries. In any case, this discrepancy is not a major concern because the return on health, which is the main parameter of interest, remains relatively stable throughout the specifications.

As a second robustness check, Table A2 in the Appendix contains the estimation results for the growth rate of per capita GDP as the dependent variable instead of the growth rate of per worker GDP. In these specifications, we additionally control for the log difference in the workforce to population ratio \( \Delta \ln \left( \frac{L_{i,t}}{N_{i,t}} \right) \), thereby following the derivation of our model in per capita terms in Equation (3). The coefficient estimates of health increase slightly in some of the specifications, which might be due to the fact that a healthier population also implies that a larger fraction of the population is working, which raises GDP per capita as compared to GDP per worker. However, the results in our baseline specification of column (2) again remain robust.
7 Conclusion

Much of the economic growth literature has been devoted to studying the impact of education on aggregate economic performance and comparing the results with the rate of return on education identified by the Mincer (1974) wage equation. We believe our study is the first to show that the macroeconomic estimates of the effect of health on output are compatible with the microeconomic estimates of the effect of health on wages. According to our estimates, an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1, or 10 percent, increases labor productivity by about 9.1 percent, which is somewhat higher than, but still consistent with, Weil’s (2007) calibrated value of around 6.7 percent. The slightly higher point estimate from the macro-based approach might be due to spillover effects that the micro-based approach omits by design. Given that we find no evidence of substantial externalities, however, our results suggest that calibration based on microeconomic data can serve as a reasonable means to estimate the macroeconomic impact of health changes. Thus, our results provide a macro-based justification for using the micro-based approach to estimate the direct economic benefits of specific health interventions.

Overall our results indicate that health plays a role in explaining cross-country differences in the level of income per worker. As far as policy implications are concerned, public health measures might be an important lever for fostering economic development. Potential policies along these lines include vaccination programs, antibiotic distribution programs, and micronutrient supplementation schemes, which lead to large improvements in health outcomes for relatively low expenditures (World Bank, 1993; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Field et al., 2009; Luca et al., 2014).
References


### Table A1: Robustness: Return of Health and Education to Productivity — Total Schooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares</th>
<th>Two-Stage Least Squares</th>
<th>Panel GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Controls (1)</td>
<td>Adding Controls (2)</td>
<td>Fixed Effects (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y&lt;sub&gt;t−1&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>-0.051*** (0.0095)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.33*** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ ln(k&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.052)</td>
<td>0.35*** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.27** (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(h&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1.22*** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.63** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.66** (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(s&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.057** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.038 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.035 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(α&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.0063 (0.0089)</td>
<td>0.0061 (0.0088)</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.0098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(α&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>-0.00052 (0.00036)</td>
<td>-0.00051 (0.00036)</td>
<td>0.00028 (0.00037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(α&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>— — — — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.29 0.38 0.38 — — 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.36 — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-stage F</td>
<td>19.6 25.3 10.0 — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(2) p-value</td>
<td>— — — — — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansen p-value</td>
<td>— — — — — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff.-in-Hansen p-value</td>
<td>— — — — — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>— — — — — — — — — — — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>613 613 613 461 613 613 613 613 613 613</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of output per worker Δln(y<sub>t</sub>). All specifications include lagged (total) years of schooling s<sub>t−1</sub> and a full set of time effects. Columns (2) to (10) add further controls x<sub>t</sub> for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural sector, the percentage of land area in the tropics, and a full set of regional dummies. The specification in Column (5) further controls for the first lag of log physical capital per worker, population health, experience, and experience squared. The panel GMM specifications instrument lagged output per worker ln(y<sub>t−1</sub>), the growth rate of physical capital per worker Δln(k<sub>t</sub>), the change in health Δ(h<sub>t</sub>), and the change in average years of (total) schooling Δ(s<sub>t</sub>), whereas the changes in experience Δ(x<sub>2</sub>) and experience squared Δ(x<sub>2</sub>) are treated as exogenous variables. The difference GMM specification uses up to two lags of the endogenous variables, whereas the system GMM specification uses the first lag of the endogenous variables in the levels equation — see Section 6.3. Country-fixed effects are removed using forward orthogonal deviations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Standard errors in GMM are computed with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). We adjust standard errors in Column (4) to account for multiple imputation of the Gini series — see Footnote 9. The standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
## Table A2: Robustness: Return of Health and Education to Productivity — Per Capita Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares</th>
<th>Two-Stage Least Squares</th>
<th>Panel GMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Controls (1)</td>
<td>Adding Controls (2)</td>
<td>Fixed Effects (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y_{it-1})</td>
<td>-0.042*** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.35*** (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ ln(k_{it})</td>
<td>0.35*** (0.062)</td>
<td>0.16* (0.079)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(h_{it})</td>
<td>1.33*** (0.31)</td>
<td>0.67** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.54* (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(s_{it})</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.074** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.10** (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(α_{it})</td>
<td>0.0020 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.0013 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.0099 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(α_{it}^2)</td>
<td>-0.00038 (0.00040)</td>
<td>-0.00034 (0.00037)</td>
<td>0.00020 (0.00037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ(σ_{it}^2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R² | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.39 | — | 0.39 | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.36 | — | — |
| First-stage F | — | — | — | — | — | 22.7 | 25.1 | 14.6 | — | — |
| AR(1) p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Hansen p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.02 | 0.07 |
| Diff.-in-Hansen p-value | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 |
| Instruments | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Countries | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 497 | 613 |
| Observations | 613 | 613 | 613 | 461 | 613 | 613 | 613 | 613 | 497 | 613 |
| Controls | — | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ |

Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of output per capita Δln(y_{it}). All specifications include the log difference in the workforce to population ratio Δln(L_{it}/N_{it}), lagged (secondary) years of schooling s_{it-1}, and a full set of time effects. Columns (2) to (10) add further controls x_{it} for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural sector, the percentage of land area in the tropics, and a full set of regional dummies. The specification in Column (5) further controls for the first lag of log physical capital per worker, population health, experience, and experience squared. The panel GMM specifications instrument lagged log output per worker ln(y_{it-1}), the growth rate of physical capital per worker Δln(k_{it}), the change in population health Δ(h_{it}), and the change in average years of (secondary) schooling Δ(s_{it}), whereas the log difference in the workforce to population ratio Δln(L_{it}/N_{it}) and the change in experience Δ(α_{it}), and the change in experience squared Δ(α_{it}^2) are treated as exogenous variables. The difference GMM specification uses up to two lags of the endogenous variables, whereas the system GMM specification uses the first lag of the endogenous variables in the differences equation and the first difference of the endogenous variables in the levels equation—Section 6.3. Country-fixed effects are removed using forward orthogonal deviations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Standard errors in GMM are computed with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). We adjust standard errors in Column (4) to account for multiple imputation of the Gini series—see Footnote 9. The standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
## Table A3: Coding Description

This table describes coding choices for countries in which compulsory schooling laws differ by schooling type or target group and countries that experienced longer spells of turbulence and civil war. This list contains all countries for which information on compulsory schooling was available and thus even those that do not enter the estimation sample.

### Albania
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) yearbooks report four plus an additional three years of compulsory schooling for 1963 and 1964. From 1965 to 1967, four plus an additional other four years of compulsory schooling are reported. We code these as seven and eight years of schooling because “four years’ schooling is compulsory for all children; a second period of three (four) years is compulsory for children in towns and villages where a seven-grade (eight-grade) school is available” (UNESCO, 1963–1968).

### Andorra
Andorra’s educational system is split into French and Spanish schools. However, because both schooling systems differ in terms of compulsory schooling, we follow UNESCO’s convention and code values as missing until 1977. Afterward, both schools require a minimum of 10 years of schooling so that we code a value of 10.

### Angola
“The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas” (UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as is the case for Portugal.

### Argentina
In 1972, compulsory schooling takes a value of eight years before while and afterward compulsory schooling is consistently reported with seven years. Because the structure of the educational system did not change in 1972, we code a value of seven years.

### Australia
For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report eight to 10 years of compulsory schooling, varying by state. We take the figure of New South Wales, the most densely populated state, and thus code nine years. From 1968 onward, the yearbooks report values between nine and 11 years, varying by state or whether kindergarten counts toward primary education. We code 10 years of compulsory schooling. This figure is consistent with more recent data published by the World Bank (2017). Moreover, the number reflects average compulsory schooling.

### Bahrain
For 1971 and 1972, eight years of compulsory schooling are reported. However, change “will be applied in 1973/1974” (UNESCO, 1971). Following the value of the preceding years, we code a value of zero. For 1987 to 1993, zero compulsory schooling is reported. This figure contrasts with the high values before and afterward. We thus code a missing rather than a zero value. Based on the age range, 12 years of compulsory schooling are reported for 1995 to 1997. However, the compulsory program only contains six years of primary schooling with a general academic curriculum combined with religious instruction, which continues to nine years. Correspondingly, we code nine instead of 12 years for 1995 to 1997.

### Barbados
There is no compulsory schooling from 1963 to 1967; however, the value for 1966 is missing. We impute this value to be zero. For the years 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report 12 years of compulsory schooling instead of 11 in preceding and subsequent periods.

### Belgium
In 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report eight and nine years of compulsory schooling. Based on the preceding years and the age range, nine years of compulsory schooling are implausible, however. Therefore, we code eight years in 1985 and 1986.

### Benin
After independence in 1960, there was a longer spell of political turbulence. In particular, several changes in power occurred at the beginning of the 1970s. According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling amounts to six years until 1970, zero years from 1971 to 1974, and seven years from 1975 onward. Due to the unstable nature of the government, the exact role of compulsory schooling and whether it was enforced is unclear. Therefore, we decided to code the years 1971 to 1974 as missing rather than a clean zero.

### Brazil
For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling values of four and five years. From 1965 onward, the level remains consistently at four years. Because Brazil follows the Portuguese educational system, we code a value of four for 1963 and 1964.

### Brunei
For the years 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling levels of 12 years. These stand in contrast to nine years of compulsory schooling before and afterward. Because neither the educational system nor the age range of compulsory schooling changed during this period, we code nine instead of 12 years.

### Cameroon
Historically, the educational system consisted of French schools in the Eastern and British schools in the Western part of Cameroon. In 1976, the British system was adopted in the entire country. We use the British system’s compulsory schooling regulations throughout all periods. UNESCO yearbooks list eight years of compulsory schooling in 1969 and 1970. Given the subsequent period without any compulsory schooling, enforcement of this regulation is unlikely. We thus code a zero value for 1969 and 1970.

### Canada
Compulsory schooling “[...] figures vary slightly from one Province to another” (UNESCO, 1963). Values range from seven to 10 years between 1963 and 1968 and eight to 10 years between 1969 and 1994. We take a slightly conservative view and code a value of eight years for 1963–1968 and nine years for 1969–1994.

### Cape Verde
“The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas” (UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as is the case for Portugal.

### Czech Republic and Slovakia
We use compulsory schooling regulations of former Czechoslovakia for both countries prior to 1994.

### Egypt
For 1989 to 1991, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory education. However, these figures are implausible given five years of primary and three years of lower secondary education. Therefore, we code eight rather than nine years. For 1995 and 1996, the yearbooks report five years of compulsory schooling. This figure does not reflect lower secondary education, which is also compulsory since the educational reforms in the early 1990s. Hence, we set the corresponding value to eight years instead of five.
From 1966 onward, zero years of schooling are reported. Because the educational system of the former protectorate for both Kiribati and Tuvalu remained unaltered during these years, this change seems implausible. Hence, we code six rather than seven years.

**Fiji:** Between 1975 and 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report zero years of compulsory schooling in contrast to eight years from 1963 to 1974. We follow the World Bank convention, which codes missing values of compulsory schooling between 1998 and 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Thus, we code six years of compulsory schooling in 1968 rather than seven years.

**Finland:** For 1967, 1971, and 1972, UNESCO yearbooks report eight instead of formerly nine years of compulsory schooling. Based on the age range of six years, we code five years of compulsory schooling to remain at eight years instead of 12.

**Germany:** Figures are based on West Germany prior to 1990. We code 12 rather than nine years of compulsory schooling in 1968–1970 and 1973–1988. This coding includes nine years of compulsory schooling plus an additional three years of “[...] part time vocational education” (UNESCO, 1973).

**Guinea:** In 1971/1972, compulsory schooling increases from eight to 12 years before it dropped again back to eight years in 1973. Throughout this period, the overall structure of the educational system remained unaltered. The only detectable change was the range of compulsory schooling from ages 7–15 to 7–22, which is implausible compared with other countries and Guinea’s legal age. Therefore, compulsory schooling is coded to remain at eight years instead of 12.

**Guinea-Bissau:** For 1981 and 1982, UNESCO yearbooks report seven years of compulsory schooling in contrast to six years in preceding and subsequent periods. Because the educational system remained unaltered during these years, this change seems implausible. Hence, we code six rather than seven years.

**Guyana:** Throughout 1963 to 1997, compulsory schooling takes a value of eight years with the exception of 1981 and 1982 (nine years), 1983 (six years), and 1995 to 1997 (10 years). However, the shifts are inconsistent with the relative stability of the educational system between 1980 and 1984 and the age range of compulsory schooling from ages six to 14 for 1995 to 1997. We thus code eight years over the entire period.

**India:** In 1971 and 1972, the UNESCO yearbooks report various levels of compulsory schooling. In the years thereafter, only a uniform level of five years is reported. This change is justified by the fact that “[...this information pertains to the majority of states” (UNESCO, 1975). Therefore, we also code a value of five years for 1971 and 1972.

**Indonesia:** In 1973 and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report zero years of compulsory schooling. These figures stand in contrast to six years of compulsory schooling before and thereafter. Moreover, the educational system remained unaltered during this period. Hence, we code a value of six instead of zero years.

**Iran:** For 1966, 1967, 1973, and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report five years of compulsory schooling in contrast to six years in preceding and intermediate periods. However, these figures remain implausible because the educational system remained unaltered during this period. Therefore, we code six rather than five years.

**Iraq:** UNESCO yearbooks consistently report six years of compulsory schooling. In 1983, however, five years are reported although the educational system remained unaltered. We code six instead of five years. Moreover, compulsory schooling is missing in 1973 and 1974. Because the educational system remained unaltered, we set the value to six years—the same as in the preceding and following years.

**Israel:** Between 1981 and 1987, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory schooling in contrast to 11 years in preceding and subsequent periods. Moreover, this figure seems implausible given the age range from five to 15. Hence, we code 11 instead of nine years for this period.

**Jordan:** According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling increased from six to nine years in 1964 based on a widening of the age range. However, this increase is not observed in 1965 where the age range is again six years. Therefore, we code six instead of nine years.

**Kiribati and Tuvalu:** Until 1976, the islands were a British protectorate under the name Gilbert and Ellice Islands. We thus use compulsory schooling of the former protectorate for both Kiribati and Tuvalu. For the years 1975 to 1980, during which the islands became independent, we code five years instead of the reported zero values. For the years 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report five years of schooling in contrast to nine years in the preceding and subsequent periods. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this time, we code nine instead of five years.

**Kuwait:** For 1982 and 1983, UNESCO yearbooks report four rather than eight years as in preceding and subsequent periods. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code eight instead of four years.

**Laos:** For the years 1990 to 1994, UNESCO yearbooks report eight rather than five years of compulsory schooling in contrast to six years in preceding and subsequent periods. Because the educational system of five years of compulsory primary schooling remained unaltered during this period, we code five instead of eight years.

**Lebanon:** Throughout 1963 to 1997, compulsory schooling is consistently zero years, except for 1971 where UNESCO yearbooks report a value of 12. Given the overall trend, this value seems implausible so that we code zero years.

**Lesotho:** The UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of eight years for the former British Crown colony Basutoland in 1964 and 1965. However, there was no compulsory schooling for the independent state of Lesotho between 1966 and 1984. Moreover, the yearbooks also report a value of zero for the colony in 1963. We thus set the value for compulsory schooling to zero for 1964 and 1965.

**Malawi:** For 1963 to 1965, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling based on the English schools in the former British colony. From 1966 onward, zero years of schooling are reported. Because Malawi became independent in 1964, eight years of compulsory schooling seem implausible. Hence, we code zero rather than eight years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>From 1968 to 1984, UNESCO yearbooks report six years of compulsory schooling for some and zero or missing values for other regions. Because there is no compulsory schooling in the most populous regions, we code zero years from 1968 to 1984.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>In 1986 and 1987, UNESCO yearbooks report 12 years of compulsory schooling. Based on the stable educational system, the age range, and subsequent values, these figures seem implausible. We code 10 instead of 12 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>For 1981 to 1983, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling rather than seven years as in preceding and subsequent years. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code seven rather than eight years. Between 1987 and 1994, figures for compulsory schooling drop to zero. However, these values seem implausible because the educational system did not change in this period either. We code missing instead of zero values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>For 1973 and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report 11 years of compulsory schooling rather than 10 years as before and afterward. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code 10 rather than 11 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>&quot;The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas&quot; (UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as is the case for Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>For 1963 to 1970, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory schooling for European and 10 years for Nauruan schools. We code a value of 10 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Historically, the Nepalese educational system consisted of English and Sanskrit schools. Until 1967, there was no compulsory schooling for either of these schools. Beginning in 1968, the English school system prescribed five years of schooling while attendance at Sanskrit schools was not compulsory. Following the UNESCO's convention to document compulsory schooling based on the English system from 1973 onward (UNESCO, 1973) we code five years of compulsory schooling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>For 1994 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report 11 years of compulsory schooling. However, the educational system consists of six years of primary and four years of lower secondary schooling. For this reason, we code 10 rather than 11 years. This coding choice is consistent with preceding and subsequent periods and the stability of the educational system overall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>For 1973 to 1979, the UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of 12/13 years rather than eight years as in the preceding and subsequent periods. This substantial change is not reflected in a corresponding transformation of the educational system and only represents shifts in the age range for compulsory schooling. Therefore, this extreme increase seems implausible so that we code compulsory schooling to remain at eight years throughout 1973 to 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>From 1968 to 1970, values of seven and nine years are reported because &quot;[a] law passed in 1968 extended compulsory education from seven to nine years. This has been applied in most municipalities&quot; (UNESCO, 1968).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>In 1963 and 1964, a missing value of compulsory schooling is reported. However, we decided to code a zero value because &quot;[t]he implementation of Republic Act No. 1124, Department Order No. 1, s.1957, Article 2 states that elementary education shall ultimately be made available for all children between 7 and 13 years&quot; (UNESCO, 1963). Hence, compulsory schooling was not yet implemented in 1963 and 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Between 1963 and 1970, UNESCO yearbooks report various values of compulsory schooling. We take a conservative view and code 1963 and 1964 with a value of seven years and 1965 to 1970 with a value of eight years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>For the period 1973 and 1974, compulsory schooling dropped from an initial value of 10 to six years. From 1975 onward, compulsory schooling reverted back to a value of 10 years. Throughout this entire time, compulsory schooling age ranged from six to 16 years for boys and six to 17 years for girls. Therefore, we also code a value of 10 years for 1973 and 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report seven or eight years of compulsory schooling. In subsequent years, educational regulations prescribe eight years of compulsory schooling. Based on this stability in the educational system, we set values to eight years for 1963 and 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>For 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report 11 years of compulsory education rather than 10 years as in preceding and subsequent periods. Because the structure of the educational system with seven years of primary and three years of lower secondary schooling did not change during these years, this shift seems implausible. Hence, we code 10 rather than 11 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>&quot;The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas&quot; (UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as is the case for Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>UNESCO yearbooks report seven years of compulsory education for 1971 and 1972 and six years for 1973 and 1974. However, compulsory primary education corresponded only to six and five years. Therefore, we code six and five years rather than seven and six.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Compulsory schooling was only introduced in 2003. Hence, we code one missing value as zero before 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Between 1963 and 1984, UNESCO yearbooks report seven and nine years of compulsory schooling, varying by state and race. We code seven years of schooling as the corresponding figure for the black population, which constitutes approximately 80 percent of the total population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sri Lanka: From 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report 11 years of compulsory schooling rather than 10 years as beforehand. Based on the age limits that remained unaltered over this period, we code 10 instead of 11 years.


Suriname: UNESCO yearbooks report 11 years of compulsory schooling for the period 1995 to 1997. This figure stands in stark contrast to only six years before and afterward. Because the educational system with six years of compulsory primary schooling remained unaltered during these years, we code six instead of 11 years.

Swaziland: In the early years until 1965, the educational system consisted of European, African, and Eurafrikan schools. Because education was compulsory only at European schools, which were abolished from 1966 onward, and not for the other school types, we code a value of zero.

Switzerland: According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling varies between seven and nine years across Swiss cantons from 1963 to 1997. In some cantons, students are additionally required to take up at least two years of “complementary part-time schooling” (UNESCO, 1963). Hence, the reported figures are likely too low. Thus, we follow the convention of UNESCO reports from 1975 to 1981 and code nine years of compulsory schooling throughout the entire period.

Thailand: In 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report between four and seven years of compulsory schooling. Based on the age range and subsequent values, we code both observations as seven.

Tonga: For 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling. However, this figure seems implausible compared with six years in preceding and subsequent periods. Moreover, the educational system remained unaltered during these years. Hence, we code six rather than eight years. For 2012 to 2015, the World Bank (2017) reports eight and then 15 years of compulsory schooling. These figures are implausible because only primary education, which requires six years of schooling, is compulsory in Tonga. Therefore, we also code six years of compulsory schooling for 2012 to 2015.

Trinidad and Tobago: In 1973 and 1974, compulsory schooling is reported to possess a value of 10 years. Before 1973 and after 1974, this figure corresponds to seven years. Because only primary schooling is compulsory with a standard duration of seven years given entry ages for primary and secondary schooling, we code a value of seven for 1973 and 1974.

Turkey: Between 1965 and 1967, eight years of compulsory schooling is reported. However, only five years of primary schooling were compulsory. In line with preceding and subsequent periods, we thus code five years of compulsory schooling.

Tunisia: From 1968 to 1981, UNESCO yearbooks report six years of compulsory schooling. For 1982 and 1983, no values are reported. From 1984 onward, compulsory schooling is documented with a value of zero until 1992. The yearbooks show 11 years of compulsory schooling for 1993/1994 and nine years from 1995 onward. The educational system consists of six years of primary schooling, three years of lower secondary schooling, and a further four years of upper secondary schooling. This structure is maintained throughout 1981 to 1995. Because zero values are implausible, we code them as missing. For 1993 and 1994, we set compulsory schooling to nine instead of 11 years.

United States: For the years 1963 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks present values ranging from 10 to 12 years for the United States. Minimum compulsory schooling corresponds to 10 years, formally from age six to 16. Some states require students to remain in school until coming of age, implying two further years. However, there are also exemption regulations for religious groups and homeschooling. We take a conservative view and set the compulsory schooling thus to the minimum value of 10 years, which is fulfilled by all states.

Vanuatu: Historically, the educational system consists of English and French schools. Compulsory schooling years refer to regulations with respect to English schools.

Yemen: Figures are based on compulsory schooling of the former Arab Republic of Yemen and the Republic of Yemen.

Zambia: For 1963 to 1966, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of eight years with zero years from 1967 onward. Because “[e]ducation is compulsory in certain areas only” (UNESCO, 1963–1966), we code the years 1963 to 1966 as zero.

Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan: Prior to 1992, we code compulsory schooling according to the values of the former Soviet Union. Between 1963 and 1966, UNESCO yearbooks report eight and nine years of compulsory schooling. Because primary schooling comprises only eight grades, we code eight rather than nine years.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia: Prior to 1993, we code compulsory schooling according to values of former Yugoslavia. Figures of Serbia and Montenegro are taken from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for 1993 to 1997.