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## A Proposal for the Attribution of Market Leakage to CDM Projects

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# A Proposal for the Attribution of Market Leakage to CDM Projects

## ABSTRACT

Economic models suggest that in many cases, market leakage rates of greenhouse gas abatement reach the two-digit percentage range. Consequently, the Marrakesh Accords require Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to account for leakage. Despite this, most project proponents neglect market leakage for their project, because the influence of an individual project on market prices seems to be negligible. Insufficient leakage accounting is facilitated by a lack of theories and applicable proposals regarding the quantification and attribution of leakage effects. The aim of this paper is to develop a proposal for the attribution of market leakage effects to CDM projects. To this purpose, we identify the transmission mechanisms for CDM project leakage, investigate the current practice of leakage accounting, and analyse alternative attribution methods for leakage effects that are transmitted through price changes. We find that project-specific approaches must fail to take account of such leakage effects. Consequently, we propose to estimate aggregate market leakage effects and attribute them proportionally to individual projects. Our proposal is based on commodity-specific leakage factors which can be applied by project developers to any emission reductions that are associated with a project's leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. The proposal is conservative, equitable, incentive compatible and applicable at manageable costs.

**JEL-Classification:** D62, F18, Q25, Q41

**Keywords:** Climate policy, Clean Development Mechanism, market leakage, leakage accounting, sharing rules.

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## 1. Introduction

The effective greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement of a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)<sup>1</sup> project equals the emission reductions realised within the project boundary<sup>2</sup>, less any leakage that may occur. Leakage refers to changes (usually an increase) in GHG emissions outside the project boundary that are induced by the project.<sup>3</sup> If leakage to countries that do not have an emissions target is not accounted for in the quantification of the project's Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), the Kyoto targets are undermined, because the project's effective abatement does not compensate for the additional emission rights given to the industrialised countries which acquire the CERs.

Top-down studies (*cf.* Metz *et al.*, 2001) show that leakage rates of GHG abatement policies to non-Annex I countries can be high: most estimates are between 5% and 20%. This excludes leakage to countries that have announced not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, such as the USA and Australia. The importance of leakage is acknowledged in the Marrakesh Accords as they require the project design document to contain, among other things, the “description of formulae used to calculate and to project leakage”, provided that the latter is “measurable and attributable to” the project (UNFCCC, 2001, 45).

Measuring leakage is challenging, because changes that occur outside the project boundary are not a conventional part of project monitoring. Even if such changes are detected, it is not self-evident that they are attributable to a project, as there can be manifold reasons for these changes, such as other CDM projects, changes in macroeconomic conditions or weather conditions. Thus, attribution of leakage requires a theory that establishes a link between a project and the changes in GHG emissions outside the project boundary. Especially leakage effects that are transmitted through price changes, which are called “market leakage” (Schwarze *et al.*, 2002) have been considered unmeasurable or insignificant for individual projects (and thus not attributable to them). Accordingly, market leakage is neglected in the current practice

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<sup>1</sup> The CDM is a project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. It has the goals to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development and industrialised countries in meeting their GHG reduction commitments cost-effectively. Via the CDM, an investor from an industrialised country invests in a GHG reduction project in a developing country and receives Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for it, which the industrialised country can use to comply with its reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Marrakesh Accords, the project boundary is defined in the following way (UNFCCC, 2001, 37): “The project boundary shall encompass all anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases under the control of the project participants that are significant and reasonably attributable to the CDM project activity.” The emission reduction within the project boundary is given by the difference between baseline emissions and project emissions.

<sup>3</sup> For example, there are almost no project emissions when photovoltaic facilities replace a diesel generator for electricity generation. However, the production of solar cells requires more energy than the production of diesel generators. This energy is in part produced by the combustion of fossil fuels, and thus there is an increase in GHG emissions outside the project boundary.

of CDM leakage accounting. As we show in section 4, most project developers claim in the project design document that leakage effects are insignificant.

Insufficient leakage accounting is mainly due to a lack of applicable methods for CDM leakage accounting. So far, proposals that have been put forward are mainly of qualitative nature (see *e.g.* Geres and Michaelowa, 2002). Qualitative work on CDM leakage has been done on forestry projects (Aukland *et al.*, 2003; Schwarze *et al.*, 2002; Chomitz, 2002). Forestry activities are also the focus of a quantitative study of project-related leakage carried out by Murray *et al.* (2002). To the best of our knowledge, no generally applicable, conservative<sup>4</sup>, equitable, incentive compatible, cost-effective methods for leakage calculation are available.

The aim of this paper is to develop a proposal for the attribution of market leakage to individual CDM projects. To this purpose, we identify the transmission mechanisms for CDM project leakage, investigate the current practice of leakage accounting, and analyse the attribution issue for leakage effects that are transmitted through price changes. Special attention is given to complications that arise due to uncertainties regarding the scale of the CDM and its impact on the magnitude of leakage effects. Drawing from these insights, and bearing in mind the requirements of conservatism, equity, incentive compatibility, and applicability at reasonable cost, we outline a general proposal for accounting for market leakage effects.

The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a categorisation of CDM leakage types. Section 3 presents the basic economics of market leakage including a short overview of quantification methods. Section 4 is a short survey of the practice of CDM leakage accounting in current project design documents. In section 5, we analyse the attribution issue in detail. In section 6, we present our proposal for the attribution of market leakage. The main results are summarised in the concluding section 7.

## **2. Leakage types**

Adequate leakage accounting requires a consistent and systematic approach to the explanation and categorisation of leakage. We need a classification that yields homogeneous categories with regard to the methods used for quantification. In addition, the categories should have some intuitive appeal, making it possible to recognise all relevant single leakage effects when applying the categories to a project. Classifications of leakage effects have been presented by other authors – mainly in the

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<sup>4</sup> Conservative in the context of the certification of emission reductions means that emission reductions should be estimated such that the risk of an overcertification of emission reductions is small.

context of LULUCF<sup>5</sup> projects – e.g. by Schwarze *et al.* (2002). Based on these classifications and the requirements stated above, we propose the following approach.

We use the leakage definition of the Marrakesh Accords as a starting point, according to which leakage is “the net change of anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases which occurs outside the CDM boundary, and that is measurable and attributable to the CDM project activity” (UNFCCC, 2001, 37). Something that happens outside the project boundary can only be attributable to a project if something has crossed the project boundary to influence events outside the project. Thus, any existing transmission mechanism for leakage can theoretically be found by identifying all items that cross the project boundary (both in the baseline and in the project case) and by searching for any GHG emission relevant effects that are connected to these items.

Table 1 shows the major categories of leakage that we distinguish according to different items that cross the project boundary.

**Table 1: Classification of leakage effects according to the transmission medium**

<b>leakage type</b>	<b>items crossing the project boundary</b>
economic leakage (market leakage and direct economic leakage)	production factors and intermediate deliveries demanded by the project, goods and services supplied by the project
ecological leakage	waste, emissions, organic matter, soil, water, wind, fire etc.
knowledge leakage	information

The first category, economic leakage, is transmitted via a project’s demand and supply changes relative to the baseline. The demand changes concern intermediate deliveries or changes in the use of production factors such as labour, land or capital. Supply changes usually apply to the good produced by the project. They can also refer to replaced machinery and alike. Within the broad category of economic leakage, we distinguish “market leakage” and “direct economic leakage”. Market leakage takes effect via price changes. For example, changes in a project’s demand, let us say for Diesel fuel, may induce relative price changes which alter GHG emission relevant decisions of other economic agents, such as the decision to buy a Diesel generator or a solar panel. Direct economic leakage occurs even if market prices are not affected, e.g. if the GHG emission intensity of the bundle of goods demanded by the project increases relative to the baseline. Such changes in the GHG emission intensity of

<sup>5</sup> The acronym LULUCF refers to land use, land use change and forestry.



intermediate deliveries are often referred to as “life-cycle leakage” (see, for instance, Schwarze *et al.* 2002). Life-cycle leakage also comprises any changes in GHG emissions associated with the use of the product if the output is changed or if the product is modified. Another form of direct economic leakage is caused by the shifting of production factors. For example, land use change and forestry activities can lead to the displacement of peasants and agricultural labourers who may shift to other sectors or continue their activities in other areas. The latter case is often referred to as “activity shifting”.

The second category, ecological leakage, is usually transmitted in a rather direct way in a physical sense: Compared to the baseline situation, more or less emissions, organic matter or elements such as water, wind or fire cross the project boundary, causing GHG relevant effects in other areas. For many LULUCF projects, ecological leakage on adjoining areas is positive<sup>6</sup>, *i.e.* carbon stocks in these areas are higher than without leakage. Another example for ecological leakage is the influence of hydro-power plants on irrigation. Environmental regulation can also play a role in transmitting ecological leakage.<sup>7</sup>

The third category, knowledge leakage, is transmitted in the form of information spillovers. Usually, information is a source of positive leakage, because know-how about clean technologies is transferred to agents other than the project partners. In case of success, pioneer projects show the feasibility of a certain project type in a country or world region, which is also a piece of information that is associated with positive leakage.

The remainder of this paper focuses on market leakage. This is for the following reasons:

- Ecological leakage is the domain of natural scientists. Economists are not trained to quantify such leakage effects.
- Measuring knowledge leakage is difficult and considered beyond the scope of this study. As knowledge leakage is usually positive, its negligence does not violate the norm of conservatism.
- Direct economic leakage effects, although often neglected, are the only leakage effects that are already being taken into account (see section 4). Their identification and quantification is relatively straight forward, such that a strong posture of the Executive Board (EB) regarding the accounting of such effects can

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<sup>6</sup> Positive leakage means that GHG concentrations are decreased, *i.e.* GHG emissions are decreased or more GHGs are absorbed from the atmosphere through sequestration.

<sup>7</sup> For example, changes in non-GHG emissions relative to the baseline may help the project partners to comply with environmental regulations that are defined at a multi-plant company level. This may make it unnecessary to improve the environmental standard of other facilities run by the project partners, which increases GHG emissions.

resolve much of the issue. A checklist with potential direct economic leakage effects could help project proponents to identify such effects. Existing quantification and attribution problems can be solved with available techniques of life-cycle analysis.<sup>8</sup>

- Market leakage effects have so far not been accounted for (see section 4), mainly because they have been perceived as unmeasurable or not attributable to projects. This is despite their great importance mainly regarding fossil fuel markets, but also timber markets and others.

### 3. The economic theory of market leakage

#### 3.1. A simple model of market leakage

This section re-interprets the notion of market leakage in terms of standard microeconomic theory. To make the discussion tractable for non-economists, we keep the exposition at a very basic conceptual and technical level.

Consider a market for some fossil fuel, say oil. Suppose, for sake of simplicity, the demand for oil  $D(p)$  is a linear function of the price of oil  $p$ :

$$(1) \quad D(p) = a \cdot (\bar{p}_c - p),$$

where parameter  $\bar{p}_c > 0$  is the “choke price” at which demand equals zero, and parameter  $a > 0$  is the slope coefficient which indicates the decrease of demand resulting from a \$1 price increase. This coefficient depends on the extent to which oil users save energy or switch to other energy sources if the price of oil increases. Suppose further that the supply of oil  $S$  is similarly a linear function of price  $p$ :

$$(2) \quad S(p) = b \cdot (p - \bar{p}_t),$$

where parameter  $\bar{p}_t > 0$  is the threshold price for any firm to enter the market, and parameter  $b > 0$  is the slope coefficient which indicates the increase in supply resulting from a \$1 price increase. This coefficient depends on the oil producers’ capacity to pump and deliver more oil as well as on the ability of the OPEC cartel to control supply.

The market is said to be in equilibrium when there is no excess demand nor over-supply at the given price, *i.e.* when demand equals supply:

$$(3) \quad D(p) = S(p).$$

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<sup>8</sup> Many of the emission reductions claimed by energy efficiency projects, for instance, are in fact

As follows by inserting (1) and (2) to (3), in a market characterised by linear demand and supply the equilibrium price  $p_0$  equals

$$(4) \quad p_0 = \frac{a \cdot \bar{p}_c + b \cdot \bar{p}_t}{a + b}, \quad \text{and}$$

$$(5) \quad q_0 = \frac{a \cdot b}{a + b} \cdot (\bar{p}_c - \bar{p}_t)$$

units of oil are supplied and demanded in the equilibrium, *i.e.*  $q_0 = S_0 = D_0$ .

Let us now investigate how CDM activities influence the oil market. Suppose that some CDM projects reduce the demand for oil relative to the baseline situation in their quest for GHG emission reductions, but have no impact on supply. This means that at any given price of oil, demand for oil is reduced by a certain amount, which we label  $\Delta D$ . The demand function (1) becomes now

$$(6) \quad D_t(p) = a \cdot (\bar{p}_c - p) - \Delta D,$$

that is, CDM activities decrease market demand of oil by the amount  $\Delta D$  at all price levels  $p$ . However, in the new market equilibrium, the consumption of oil does not decrease by the full amount of  $\Delta D$ . The new market equilibrium  $(p_t, q_t)$  is found by solving

$$(7) \quad D_t(p) = S(p).$$

Inserting (6) and (2) to (7) yields the new market equilibrium

$$(8) \quad p_t = \frac{a \cdot \bar{p}_c + b \cdot \bar{p}_t - \Delta D}{a + b} = p_0 - \frac{1}{a + b} \cdot \Delta D \quad \text{and}$$

$$(9) \quad q_t = \left( \frac{a \cdot b}{a + b} \right) \cdot (\bar{p}_c - \bar{p}_t) - \frac{b}{a + b} \cdot \Delta D = q_0 - \frac{b}{a + b} \cdot \Delta D.$$

That is, the reduction of oil consumption in the CDM projects by  $\Delta D$  units decreases the price of oil in the global markets by  $\frac{\Delta D}{a + b}$  relative to the baseline situation. This price reduction leads to increased consumption of oil by other agents, and hence the total consumption of oil decreases only by the amount  $\frac{b}{a + b} \cdot \Delta D$ , which depends on the slope coefficients  $a$  and  $b$ , reflecting the price elasticity of demand and supply, respectively.

Market leakage  $L$  can be calculated as the difference between the CDM's initial reduction of oil consumption and the effective reduction, that is

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positive direct economic leakage effects.

$$(10) \quad L \equiv D_1(p_1) - D_1(p_0).$$


In this case:

$$(11) \quad L = \Delta D - \frac{b}{a+b} \cdot \Delta D, \text{ which can be rearranged to } L = \frac{a}{a+b} \cdot \Delta D.$$

In other words, for every barrel of oil that CDM projects cut down on, a share of  $\frac{a}{a+b}$  is market leakage, because other agents respond to reduced prices by increasing their consumption. Observe that

- the higher the supply coefficient  $b$  (*i.e.*, the more elastic the supply), the lower the leakage factor. In case of perfectly elastic supply (*i.e.*,  $b \rightarrow \infty$ ), CDM activities would be 100% effective and no leakage occurs.
- The higher the demand coefficient  $a$  (*i.e.*, the more elastic the demand), the higher the leakage factor. In the extreme case of perfectly elastic demand (*i.e.*,  $a \rightarrow \infty$ ), CDM activities would be futile because of 100% leakage.
- In the case of linear demand and supply functions, the leakage factor does not depend on the scale of CDM activities. A constant share  $\frac{a}{a+b}$  of any demand decrease by CDM projects is market leakage irrespective of the size of  $\Delta D$ .

Figure 1 illustrates market leakage graphically. The axes  $q$  and  $p$  represent quantity and price, respectively. Supply and demand are represented by the linear functions  $S$  and  $D_0$ . The initial market equilibrium occurs in point  $(q_0, p_0)$ , where supply equals demand. CDM activities decrease demand by the amount  $\Delta D$ , and the demand function shifts to the left. In the absence of leakage accounting, the emission reductions associated with this demand reduction  $\Delta D$  would be certified. The new demand function is denoted by  $D_1$ . The price level decreases from  $p_0$  to  $p_1$ , and the new market equilibrium is reached at point  $(q_1, p_1)$ . Consumption decreases from the initial equilibrium by  $q_0 - q_1$ , which is only a part of the reduction  $\Delta D$  that took place within the CDM projects. The difference  $q_1 - (q_0 - \Delta D)$  is market leakage.




**Figure 1: Market leakage**

The previous theoretical treatment should suffice to demonstrate that standard microeconomic tools enable us to both understand the mechanisms behind market leakage as well as to quantify its magnitude. Having said that, our highly stylised analysis can be extended to incorporate at least two further important features of market leakage: non-linearities and interactions between several markets.

### 3.2. Non-linearities


An obvious limitation of the previous analysis was that we restricted attention to linear demand and supply functions. In the real world, demand and supply functions may exhibit significant non-linearities that should not be assumed away beforehand. Non-linear functions can make the calculus of leakage factors more complicated, but we can safely assume that in almost all cases a market equilibrium can be found, perhaps numerically if not analytically. The main complication arising from non-linearities is that the leakage factor is generally no longer independent of the total scale of CDM activities, that is, market leakage  $L$  does not need to be directly proportional to  $\Delta D$ . Whether the leakage factor increases or decreases with scale depends on the relative curvature of the demand and supply functions on the relevant market. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this.

Figure 2 presents a case in which the supply function is more curved than the demand function, which is – for illustration purposes – assumed to be linear. We assume that a first group of projects shifts the oil demand function by  $\Delta D$  from  $D_0$  to  $D_1$ . The market equilibrium changes from  $(q_0, p_0)$  to  $(q_1, p_1)$ , and the leakage effect (in terms of increased oil demand) is  $L_1$  or  $q_1 - (q_0 - \Delta D)$ . A second group of projects of the same size as the first group shifts the oil demand function further from  $D_1$  to  $D_2$ . The resulting market equilibrium is  $(q_2, p_2)$ , and the leakage effect is  $L_2$  or  $q_2 - (q_1 - \Delta D)$ .  $L_2$  is smaller than  $L_1$ , which means that marginal leakage decreases with increasing size of  $\Delta D$ .



**Figure 2: Decreasing marginal leakage ( $L_2 < L_1$ )**

Figure 3 presents an opposite example, where the demand function is more curved than the supply function, which is now assumed to be linear. It is easy to see that under these assumptions  $L_2$  is larger than  $L_1$ , which means that marginal leakage increases with increasing size of  $\Delta D$ .




**Figure 3: Increasing marginal leakage ( $L_2 > L_1$ )**

Figure 4 illustrates the dependence of leakage on the size of the CDM-induced demand change and the shape of the leakage function. We know that leakage must be a monotonously increasing function of the CDM-induced demand change, but without further investigation we cannot say whether leakage increases at constant, decreasing, or increasing rates as the CDM becomes larger, in other words, whether the leakage function is linear, concave, or convex.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> We restrict ourselves to the most relevant cases, even though more complicated functional forms can be thought of: The leakage function might be initially locally convex, but exhibit concavity as the scale of the CDM increases. It need not be smooth and differentiable, it may have discontinuities at points where some firms find it profitable to enter or exit the market.



**Figure 4: Leakage functions**

### 3.3. Multiple markets

A second limitation of the previous analysis is its exclusive focus on a single market (oil), ignoring the second order effects of the price change in this market to markets of substitutes and complements (*e.g.* coal, natural gas, automobiles). As noted above, the slope of the demand function for oil depends on the consumers ability to substitute oil by other energy resources. Therefore, the price of oil influences the consumption of other fossil fuels. To calculate the leakage factor correctly, we have to take into account these interdependencies, calculate the changes in the equilibrium quantities of all relevant markets, and measure the joint effect in GHG emissions. While the multiple market perspective further complicates the analysis outlined above, the leakage factor can still, in principle, be calculated. We have to estimate a fully-fledged system of demand and supply equations, which include not just oil but, for instance, also other major energy sources. Fortunately, the economics profession has a long tradition of carrying out this type of multiple market equilibrium analyses, and a large body of literature, including detailed applied models, is available.

### 3.4. Quantification

As the previous theoretical discussion already reveals, leakage rates cannot be quantified analytically from some generally accepted premises, but empirical analysis



is needed for determining the unknown parameters of the model. The purpose of this section is to briefly indicate the key challenges in empirical analysis and offer some entries to the relevant streams of literature, though an exhaustive treatment of the issues related to quantification falls beyond the scope of this paper.

Appropriate specification of the empirical model of demand and supply presents the first challenge. In economic theory, it is generally accepted that demand curves should be downward sloping and supply curves upward sloping, but the specific functional form of these curves is an (open) empirical issue. Similarly, it is generally accepted that demand and supply are less elastic in the short run than in the long run, but the specific structure of time lags is again an empirical issue. Finally, changes in demand of one commodity are known to influence prices and quantities of other goods, but also other relevant variables such as income. The detail with which these indirect effects are modelled can influence the results.

There are essentially two approaches for determining the unknown parameters of the empirical model: “estimation” and “calibration”.

The “estimation” approach uses econometric (statistical) techniques for inferring the unknown parameters from empirical data. This literature has produced a large number of estimates for demand and supply elasticities for fossil fuels and other goods and factors of interest (*cf.* Espey, 1998, for a comprehensive treatment of gasoline demand), which could offer useful starting points for estimating leakage. The main challenge of the estimation approach is to specify the supply-demand system such that it is consistent with economic theory and also allows for meaningful statistical inference, both in principle<sup>10</sup> and in practice. Another challenge is that typically a number of alternative techniques are available depending on availability and quality of data as well as assumptions one is willing to maintain (*cf.* Hausman, 1983), while the choice of technique is not always self-evident.

In order to obtain econometric estimates of all the variables in the model, huge amounts of data are needed. Therefore, most modellers choose a different approach and “calibrate” their model. Calibration essentially means that the modeller uses a combination of economic theory, existing econometric results and his expert judgement to make the best available assumption regarding the model specification. Calibrated models should be able to replicate a given historical situation, but modellers have substantial freedom in the choice of the parameters that govern how consumers and producers react on price changes. The main advantage of the calibration procedure is that they allow the researcher to focus on the specification of

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<sup>10</sup> The classic problem in estimating supply-demand systems is that, in case of naïve model specification, any parameter values can explain the observed facts equally well, and hence it is impossible -even in principle- to infer the underlying true parameter values. This is known as the *identification* problem; see *e.g.* Hsiao (1983) for a comprehensive treatment.

the interactions between the different markets. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models represent one type of applied top-down models that are commonly calibrated. These models take all interactions between the different markets into account and are based on well-known microeconomic theory. For good entries into the literature on CGEs, see Conrad (1999) or Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997). This literature on calibrated models offers estimates for leakage factors, which will be briefly reviewed in the next section.

### 3.5. Top-down estimates of market leakage

An overview of top-down model studies in the field of climate economics is given in Metz *et al.* (2001). These studies show that total carbon leakage from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to be between 5% and 20%<sup>11</sup>: Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (2000) estimate a leakage rate of less than 5%; Paltsev (2001) around 10%, Manne and Richels (1999) and Bollen *et al.* (2000) give an estimate of 20%. Kuik and Gerlagh (2003) emphasise that trade liberalisation can increase the leakage rate substantially (they estimate the effect to be 3 to 4 percentage points).

The large differences between these estimates are mainly related to three sets of elasticities: substitution elasticities between domestic and foreign products, substitution elasticities between fuels, and fossil fuel supply elasticities. For example, Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (2000) estimate a low carbon leakage, based on the assumption that fossil fuel supply is very elastic.

The Kyoto targets for Annex I countries imply that any leakage-related emission increase in complying Annex I countries is compensated to meet the target. Thus, it is unnecessary from a theoretical point of view to account for the part of total leakage that occurs in countries which comply with their targets. In the global top-down applied models this is automatically taken into account, as these specify upper bounds on emissions for all relevant regions, and the calculated leakage factors entail only changes in emissions by non-Annex I countries. The withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol, however, considerably increased carbon leakage rates, as shown by Böhringer and Rutherford (2002). As all leakage factors reported above are based on the assumption of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the USA, they are underestimating the 'true' leakage factors.

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<sup>11</sup> Hourcade and Shukla (2001) write "In subsequent years, some reduction in this variance (of emission leakage rates – V,K&D) has occurred, in the range of 5%-20%. This (...) does not necessarily reflect more widespread agreement about appropriate behavioural assumptions. However, because emission leakage is an increasing function of the stringency of the abatement strategy, this may also be because carbon leakage is a less serious problem under the Kyoto targets than under the targets considered previously."

## **4. The practice of project-based leakage accounting**

### 4.1. Methodologies presented to the Executive Board

Currently, leakage effects are largely neglected in CDM Project Design Documents (PDDs), despite the Marrakesh Accord's requirement to take them into account. Leakage-related sections in PDDs are quoted in Appendix 1. Of the thirteen PDDs with methodologies that had been submitted to the Executive Board for evaluation and were available on the CDM website<sup>12</sup> on August 11, 2003, only three account for leakage effects. In two of these three cases (the Chilean projects Graneros and Metrogas), leakage is interpreted in a very literal technical sense: The accounted leakage refers to fugitive methane emissions associated with the production and transportation of natural gas demanded by the projects. In the third case (the Korean HFCs Decomposition Project in Ulsan), the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions associated with the project's electricity demand were accounted for. According to our categorisation, all three cases fall under the label "direct economic leakage". This means that market leakage has been neglected by all thirteen projects.

Of the ten projects that do not account for leakage at all, seven briefly label leakage effects as insignificant or non-existent. The three remaining cases are the following:

- In the Colombian La Vuelta/La Herradura Project, leakage is confused with baseline emissions.
- The Brazilian Vale do Rosário Bagasse Cogeneration Project provides evidence that direct trading partners have not changed their fuel use as a result of the project. This evidence is presented to prove that the decrease in biomass supply to the market that is associated with the project does not result in leakage. However, it has not been taken into account that the trading partners now demand biomass from other sources, which may (or may not) have an effect on the price for biomass.
- The Thai A.T. Biopower Rice Husk Power Project provides a market analysis for rice husk in Thailand. It is the only proper analysis of market leakage effects among the thirteen projects. The analysis reveals considerable oversupply, which implies that there is no leakage effect associated with the project's demand for rice husk. Not surprisingly, the only project that considers market leakage is one that is able to present evidence that there is none.

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<sup>12</sup> [http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Panels/meth/PNM\\_Recommendations/index.html](http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Panels/meth/PNM_Recommendations/index.html)

#### 4.2. Methodologies presented to the Prototype Carbon Fund

In addition to the methodologies presented to the Executive Board, we have investigated the PDDs of CDM projects that are available at the website of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF).<sup>13</sup> Eight PDDs and one baseline study were available on August 11, 2003.<sup>14</sup> Of these, eight neglect the existence of leakage. Leakage-related sections are quoted in Appendix 2. In six cases, the project proponents only provide a brief statement that leakage is irrelevant or that no leakage effects have been identified.

The new format of the PDD, which has been provided by the Executive Board, is more insistent in requiring project proponents to provide explanations on leakage accounting. However, this measure has fallen short of securing the consideration of leakage effects. In the case of the PCF projects, it has rather led to a more elaborate negligence of leakage (see the examples of the Guatemalan El Canada Project and the South African Durban project). Sentences as “If any oxygen shows up in the sample, the project operator will search for the leak and fix it.” reveal that some project developers do not understand the concept of leakage.

The Costa Rican Umbrella Project for Small-Scale Renewable Energy Sources is the only project where proponents give a satisfactory explanation for the negligence of leakage. In this case, the project boundary has been defined broadly enough to assume that indeed significant leakage is unlikely to occur.

The only project that claims not to neglect leakage is the Brazilian “Plantar” project. It states: “In order to monitor possible leakage from the State Minas Gerais to the Carajás region in the Amazon, Plantar will gather and maintain data from independent industry sources as required by the MVP. This data will contribute to the renewal of the baseline every seven years.” Whether this leakage will only be monitored or also be accounted for in addition to the baseline change for the next 7-year baseline period, is left open. Furthermore, changes in deforestation rates in Carajás would not be a proof of leakage as they might not be attributable to the project. Thus, even if such changes in deforestation rates are monitored, leakage accounting remains arbitrary without a theoretical framework that establishes a connection between the project and changes that occur outside the project boundary.

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<sup>13</sup> <http://prototypecarbonfund.org/router.cfm?Page=DocLib&Dtype=1>

<sup>14</sup> There is double counting as one of the PCF projects has also been submitted to the Executive Board.

### 4.3. Why project-based market leakage accounting does not work

There are at least three basic reasons why project-based market leakage accounting is doomed to fail:

1. Project proponents are not trained to identify and measure indirect leakage effects that are transmitted by prices or other information, and which occur outside the project boundary, possibly far away from the projects geographic domain.
2. At the level of individual projects, the marginal contribution of each CDM project to market leakage may appear irrelevantly small, even if the total CDM activity, when taken as a whole, exhibits major leakage.
3. Even if changes outside the project boundary are identified, they cannot be attributed to the project without a generally accepted theory that describes the transmission mechanism at work.

An operational framework for leakage accounting should be able to solve all these three fundamental problems. The first two problems may be solved by providing project proponents with more detailed guidelines as well as *ex ante* determined leakage factors. We return to this issue in section 6 where we propose a systematic procedure for leakage accounting, identifying the tasks of the Executive Board, the project partners, and the Operational Entities.

As for the third problem, we have shown in section 3 that microeconomic theory can explain the mechanism of market leakage, and can be applied to the quantification of market leakage effects at the aggregate level. However, attributing thus calculated aggregate leakage to individual projects still remains an open question, which we address in the following section.

## **5. Attribution of market leakage effects to individual projects**

### 5.1. The attribution issue

It is often claimed that market leakage should not be accounted for. Geres and Michaelowa (2002, 461) argue that the lack of leakage accounting in the calculation of Annex I emissions implies that, if CDM projects “should not be treated in a more stringent way” than Annex I emission reductions, CDM market leakage should be neglected. Drawing a full parallel between Annex I and CDM emission reductions would, however, imply a complete negligence of leakage, which is not in line with the Marrakesh Accords’ mandate to take CDM leakage into account. Geres and Michaelowa fail to provide a criterion that would justify the difference in treatment of

direct economic leakage (which is considered in their proposal) and market leakage (which is neglected in their proposal).

A common reasoning against market leakage accounting is that market leakage is not attributable to an individual project, because the influence of an individual project on relative prices is usually unobservable. Does this imply that market leakage that is associated with an aggregate of CDM projects cannot be accounted for? A positive answer to this question simplifies the quantification of CERs, but undermines the Kyoto targets. Article 12.5 of the Kyoto Protocol states that CERs “shall be certified (...) on the basis of (...) real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change”. As leakage implies that the certified emission reductions are not “real”, we argue that Art. 12.5 implicitly disapproves a narrow interpretation of “attributable”. Literally, “attributable” means “can be attributed”. Thus, whenever measurable leakage effects can be attributed, they should be attributed.

The challenges that we face in the attribution of aggregate leakage effects to individual projects concern both the multitude of markets that any given project may affect and the heterogeneity of projects. In the following, we show that both challenges can be met: (1) It is possible to define and separate the markets that should be considered. (2) There are several sharing rules that allow to attribute aggregate market leakage to individual projects, even if the projects that are involved are very heterogeneous. With regard to the sharing rule that we consider most suitable, we give special attention to the case of non-linear leakage functions and their implications for the norm of conservatism if the size of the CDM is uncertain.

## 5.2. Defining the relevant markets

As has been shown in section 4.3, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tackle the attribution issue for market leakage when starting from the project level. Thus, it is advisable to start by investigating market leakage phenomena market by market, instead of project by project. This means that first the relevant markets need to be selected. In this selection process, there is a trade-off between low transaction costs and completeness: The more markets we want to look at, the more work has to be done to quantify and attribute the leakage effects found on these markets. In our view, it makes sense not to look at each and every market that may exhibit tiny CDM-induced price changes and possibly even tinier GHG emission leakages, but to concentrate on those with the largest market leakage effects and quantify and attribute these effects in a conservative manner.

The number of markets that we need to deal with depends not only on the amount of effects we neglect, but even more on the level of market aggregation we choose.

Markets can be disaggregated into very small pieces until the commodities that are traded on each market are homogeneous in all features including quality. Even for homogeneous commodities, markets can be further disaggregated according to the date and location of the trade. For our purposes, however, there are good arguments for aggregation: Similar commodities tend to be close substitutes. This implies that any price change on one market spills over to markets with similar commodities. To reduce the costs of quantification and attribution, markets should be aggregated whenever the commodities are close substitutes and have similar emission factors. To give an example: Fossil fuels would hardly qualify as a single market, because for instance coal and oil are not very close substitutes and have different emission factors. It may be appropriate, however, to aggregate the markets for Diesel and bunker fuel or the markets for different qualities of hard coal.

A difficult issue is the regional differentiation of markets. Leakage effects on markets in which goods are traded globally (*e.g.* fossil fuel markets) are roughly the same anywhere in the world.<sup>15</sup> This is not true for markets in which goods are only traded locally or regionally and where the magnitude of the impact of a project on market prices differs between regions (*e.g.* markets for electricity, timber or agricultural land). This is why, for some commodities, a regional differentiation of markets may become desirable.<sup>16</sup> One should bear in mind, however, that leakage quantification studies for each regional market may be expensive. What is more, scale and borders of regional markets will sometimes be arbitrary. Therefore, we propose to begin with leakage estimates for each relevant commodity on a global scale. These estimates should be conservative enough that they are unlikely to lead to underaccounting of leakage in any world region. Project developers should be given the opportunity to prove that in their region leakage rates are lower.

### 5.3. Sharing rules

As we abstract from more technical quantification issues, we assume that the total CDM-induced demand and supply changes on a given market are known and that the resulting leakage effect can be determined (and we are confident that this can indeed be done employing the methods that are briefly presented in section 3.4). In section 5.4, the first of these assumptions will be relaxed. Applying the notion of market leakage as developed in sections 2 and 3, we can say that all projects that change the supply on a market share the leakage effect that results from the total CDM-related

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<sup>15</sup> International differences in taxation may, however, have an influence on the magnitude of leakage effects.

<sup>16</sup> In fact, leakage rates of LULUCF projects may be site-specific to an extent that makes a project-specific analysis of induced land use changes necessary.

supply changes on this market. Correspondingly, the same applies to all projects that change the demand on that market. It is unclear, however, what the rule should be according to which the projects share the total effect. What part of the total price-induced leakage effect on a market should be attributed to the demand/ supply changes of the individual projects?

The sharing rule should satisfy five criteria:<sup>17</sup>

- I) It should be *equitable* in the sense that identical projects are attributed the same amount of leakage;
- II) it should be *consistent* in the sense that the sum of attributed leakage over all projects equals total market leakage at the aggregate level;
- III) it should be *incentive compatible* in the sense that it does not provide perverse incentives with respect to the project developers' scale and timing decisions;
- IV) it should be *predictable* in the sense that project developers can find out at least the rough magnitude of the attributed leakage already in the development phase of the project; and
- V) it should be *practical* in the sense that transaction costs are low.

There are two basic approaches to the design of a sharing rule:<sup>18</sup> (1) The rule can be based on the projects' marginal contributions to market leakage. (2) It can be based on proportionality, *i.e.* projects share the total leakage effect in proportion to their demand or supply change.

If the leakage function is linear, in other words, the leakage effect is directly proportional to the magnitude of the CDM-induced demand or supply change (as in the stylised example of section 3.1), both approaches yield the same result, because marginal and average contributions are equal.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the discussion of sharing rules is only significant in the non-linear case. In the following we discuss first the marginal and then the proportional approach under the assumption of non-linearity.

### 5.3.1. Sharing rules based on marginal contributions

If the leakage function is known, each project can be attributed its own marginal contribution to total leakage at the moment when the project is validated. This approach is consistent, as the sum of marginal contributions is equal to the total leakage effect. It is equitable if we are ready to accept that otherwise identical CDM projects are attributed different amounts of leakage, depending on the order of their validation. This can be justified unless the order in which projects are validated is

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<sup>17</sup> Although other criteria may be imagined, we believe that these five are the most relevant in the present context.

<sup>18</sup> For a more detailed discussion of sharing rules, see Moulin (2002).

<sup>19</sup> This is an attractive property of the linear functional form to bear in mind in the empirical estimation of leakage functions.



heavily influenced by arbitrary delays in the procedure. However, the adjustment of leakage factors over time creates much work for validators and for the Executive Board as well as uncertainty for project developers. If the marginal leakage factor is expected to decrease as the size of the CDM increases (*i.e.*, the leakage function is concave), the project proponents have an undesirable incentive to postpone the project until the leakage factor has been reduced. If all project proponents wait for the leakage factor to fall, this will never happen, because the CDM never reaches the corresponding size. In summary, the approach to attribute marginal contributions in chronological order is consistent and equitable if we accept that timing matters, but it scores poorly regarding the criteria incentive compatibility, predictability and practicality. In fact, we consider the continuous updating of leakage factors so unpractical that this sharing rule is discarded.

Rejecting chronological differentiation of leakage factors implies that projects should be attributed a particular amount of leakage irrespective of their date of validation. There are two ways in which this can be achieved on the basis of marginal contributions: (1) the *ceteris paribus* assumption and (2) the Shapley value approach. Appendix 3 contains numerical examples that illustrate the impact of the different sharing rules on the distribution of leakage to different projects.

Under the *ceteris paribus* approach, each project is attributed its marginal contribution based on the assumption that it is the last (or marginal) project. In other words, we define the contribution of any individual project as its marginal contribution if it is added to the estimated total CDM-induced demand or supply change on the market. This is similar to the choice of an optimal environmental tax rate, which requires that the tax rate equals the marginal damage caused by the marginal agent in the optimum. The main problem with the *ceteris paribus* approach is that it is not consistent. In the case of a convex leakage function, the sum of attributed leakage is greater than total market leakage. Conversely, a concave leakage function results in underaccounting of market leakage (see appendix 3). Although the *ceteris paribus* approach scores well regarding the other criteria under examination, it is rejected, because it fails to attribute the correct amount of leakage in the case of scale uncertainty.

The Shapley value approach is a classic sharing rule from co-operative game theory. The marginal contributions of a project are calculated for all possible orders in which the projects can enter the CDM. The contribution of the project is then defined as the average of these marginal contributions. Using the Shapley value approach solves the problem of inconsistency. The approach is equitable if we accept that timing should not influence the magnitude of the attributed leakage. A disadvantage of the approach is that, depending on the shape of the leakage function, project developers

have an incentive or a disincentive to bundle projects, because one large project is attributed a different amount of leakage than an aggregate of several small projects of the same overall size. The main drawback of the Shapley value approach, however, is its lack of practicality: To calculate a project's contribution, we have to know *ex ante* not only the overall magnitude of the CDM-induced demand or supply change, but also the demand or supply change of each project involved. As we do not have the information on all CDM projects until 2012, we have to make some heroic assumptions. This makes the results rather arbitrary. Even with full information, the rule is complicated enough that it will be difficult to convince project developers that it makes sense. Also, they will find it hard to predict the amount of leakage that will be attributed to their project.

In summary, we find that marginal approaches, if we want them to be consistent, are impractical and lack incentive compatibility. Despite the fact that economists usually like to see marginal approaches to incentive-related problems, it is thus reasonable to investigate the properties of proportional sharing rules.

### 5.3.2. A sharing rule based on proportionality

Regarding the design of a sharing rule based on proportionality, the crucial question is "proportional to what?" As the projects' demand or supply changes of the leakage-relevant commodity cause the leakage effects, the most consequential proportional sharing rule is to attribute total leakage in proportion to these demand or supply changes.

In our view, the proportional approach satisfies all five requirements of equity, consistency, incentive compatibility, predictability, and practicality. Consistency is satisfied by construction. The same applies to equity, if we accept that timing does not influence the amount of leakage attributed. The approach is the most simple and hence the most practical of those presented here. The amount of leakage attributed to a project is easy to predict for project developers, and there are no perverse incentives regarding scale or timing decisions.

Table 2 summarises the performance of the different sharing rules regarding the criteria that we have considered. It shows the predominance of the proportional approach.

**Table 2: Performance of sharing rules under the selected criteria**

	marginal			proportional
	chronological order	ceteris paribus	Shapley	
equity	+	+	+	+
consistency	+	–	+	+
incentive compatibility	–	+	–	+
predictability	–	+	–	+
practicality	–	+	–	+

#### 5.4. How to ensure conservatism under scale uncertainty


Accurate market leakage accounting crucially depends on the correct estimation of the aggregate leakage effect that is to be distributed over the CDM projects. So far, we have assumed that the total CDM-induced demand and supply changes as well as the resulting leakage effects are known. While we still consider uncertainties concerning leakage quantification beyond the scope of this paper, scale uncertainties regarding the total CDM-induced demand and supply changes are closely linked to the issue of proportional attribution. In fact, scale uncertainty is the only uncertainty beyond quantification that affects the proportional sharing rule.

If we consider uncertainty, the norm of conservatism becomes relevant. Conservatism implies that the aggregate leakage effect should rather be over- than underestimated. In the following, we analyse how this can be ensured in the case of uncertainty about the CDM-induced demand change. As the analysis requires a bit more space, we concentrate on proportional attribution. Note that the marginal sharing rules in the *ceteris paribus* and Shapley versions also depend on the *ex ante* knowledge of the total CDM-induced demand and supply changes, which leads to similar problems as the ones analysed here. In the Shapley version, the information requirements are even much larger.

The case of a linear leakage function does not pose any problems in proportional attribution, because leakage is proportional to scale. If the leakage function is non-linear, however, some complications arise.

Consider first the case of a *concave* leakage function. Figure 5 shows that in this case an overestimation of the size of the CDM – and as a consequence of the CDM-induced demand change – leads to an underaccounting of leakage, while underestimation leads to overaccounting. CE is the total leakage effect at the *de facto* demand change 0C. This can be compared to the amount of leakage that is accounted for if the CDM size is overestimated. GH represents total estimated leakage at the

overestimated demand change  $0G$ . Proportional attribution implies that accounted leakage increases along the line  $0H$  as the number of CDM projects goes up. At the *de facto* CDM size  $0C$ , accounted leakage is  $CD$ , which is clearly less than *de facto* leakage  $CE$ . Now, suppose that the CDM size has been underestimated.  $AB$  represents total leakage at the underestimated demand change  $0A$ . Under the proportional attribution rule, accounted leakage increases along the line  $0B$ , which is extended towards  $F$  as the size of the CDM becomes larger than expected. At the *de facto* demand change  $0C$ , total accounted leakage is  $CF$ , which is greater than *de facto* leakage  $CE$ .




**Figure 5: Proportional attribution with a concave leakage function under scale uncertainty**

In the case of a concave leakage function, the principle of conservatism implies that we should avoid overestimating the size of the CDM-induced demand change. The stringency of the interpretation of conservatism determines how exactly this norm should be implemented. We do not recommend the use of extreme estimates, *e.g.* the minimum demand change. Rather, we propose to use an estimate for which the true CDM-induced demand change is expected to be higher than assumed with a certain probability (*e.g.* 90%). This requires that a probability distribution for the CDM-induced demand change can be established.

While overaccounting of leakage is in line with the requirement of conservatism, it reduces the incentive to implement CDM projects. This can become a problem if the

leakage function is very concave and the CDM becomes much larger than conservatively estimated. This problem can be tackled in two ways: Firstly, as the CDM becomes clearly larger, the leakage factor can be reduced for new projects. This approach has the similar disadvantages regarding incentive compatibility and predictability as the approach to attribute to each project its own marginal contribution in chronological order. The discretionary adjustment of the leakage factor can be considered inequitable, because the same factor applies to a larger group of projects until it is lowered at a more or less arbitrary date. Secondly, one can base the issuance of CERs on the leakage factor that corresponds to the maximum expected size of the CDM, but only allow the CERs that are based on the leakage factor that corresponds to the conservative size estimate for sale, and assign the rest to a buffer. Buffer CERs can be released to the market once a larger CDM-induced demand change has been accomplished. This approach is more equitable and avoids the incentive to postpone projects. However, it involves higher management costs. As long as the potential overaccounting does not lead to a damage to the CDM that is more severe than bearing these management costs, it is the best option to accept the potential overaccounting as an inconvenient implication of conservatism.

In the case of a *convex* leakage function, the conclusions are reversed. Figure 6 shows that in the convex case an overestimation of the CDM-induced demand change leads to an overaccounting of leakage, while underestimation leads to underaccounting. The reasoning is analogous to Figure 5. CE is the total leakage effect at the *de facto* demand change 0C. GH represents total estimated leakage at the overestimated demand change 0G. Accounted leakage increases along the line 0H. At the *de facto* demand change 0C, accounted leakage is CF, which is greater than *de facto* leakage CE. AB represents total leakage at the underestimated demand change 0A. On the basis of this estimate, accounted leakage increases along the line 0BD. At the *de facto* demand change 0C, total accounted leakage is CD, which is less than *de facto* leakage CE.



**Figure 6: Proportional attribution with a convex leakage function under scale uncertainty**

Thus, in the case of a convex leakage function, conservatism implies that an underestimation of the CDM-induced demand change has to be avoided. However, basing leakage factors on large CDM size estimates has the disadvantage that the first projects confront high leakage factors, while it is not clear yet whether a large CDM will ever come into being. This may create a deadlock in the early stages of the CDM. We suggest to accept this disadvantage, as we consider potential cures unattractive. Again, leakage factors could be adjusted over time, with the disadvantages mentioned above. The buffer approach is an option, but it is less attractive in the case of a convex leakage function as compared to the concave case. The reason for this is that a smaller CDM-induced demand change can only be proven with certainty at the end of a commitment period, which implies that CERs can only be released from the buffer at that time. As commercial agents discount future assets at rather high rates, the present value of these additional CERs may well be lower than the transaction costs associated with the buffer.

Matters seem to be complicated by our result that concave and convex leakage functions have opposite implications on rules for conservatism. However, Hourcade and Shukla (2001) find that market leakage factors in empirical studies have been reduced due to the decreasing mitigation ambitions of the international community. This suggests that leakage functions may be convex, and that concavity is a bit of an

odd assumption. Hence, unless clear evidence for a concave leakage function is found, conservatism can be secured by basing proportional attribution on a size estimate that is very likely to be larger than the de facto size of the CDM-induced demand change.

Matters are especially simple if a linear leakage function provides a reasonable fit to the empirical data. Accepting a linear function form for the leakage function is very attractive regarding both the sharing rule and the uncertainty about the CDM size. Recall that the marginal and average contribution to leakage are always equal in case of a linear leakage function, because the leakage factor is a fixed constant at all sizes of the CDM-induced demand change. Hence, the uncertainty about the size of the CDM does not matter in the linear case. Thus, it is advisable to adhere to a linear leakage function in the empirical estimation, unless the statistical evidence suggests a significant violation of linearity. If non-linearities are important, the size of the CDM-induced demand change should be estimated keeping the principle of conservatism in mind.

## 5.5. Aggregating over markets

The proposed approach of proportional attribution assigns to each project a certain amount of leakage for the market that has been analysed. As any project may change demand or supply on several markets, a project will usually have several leakage factors, one for each of the leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. Different types of market leakage are aggregated in absolute terms, *i.e.* in terms of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents. Thus, emission factors have to be applied to the demand or supply changes. The emission factors represent the average emissions that are associated with the use (or, in case of a supply change, with the production) of the commodity per unit in countries that do not meet a quantified emission limitation under the Kyoto Protocol. The resulting changes in emissions – usually emission reductions – are multiplied with a leakage factor that represents the share of these emission reductions that are swept away by leakage. For practical details and an algebraic representation, see section 6.3.

## 6. The proposal

### 6.1. A 3-step approach

We propose that the Executive Board provides the leakage factors for the most relevant demand and supply changes (*e.g.* for different fossil fuels, electricity, timber, land) and the method for their application. This is in contrast to the usual baseline procedures according to which the project partners propose methodologies to the Executive Board, and the latter approves them or requests changes. In the case of

market leakage, the usual approach would result in excessive transaction costs: While quantification methods exist, their application is too complicated for most project developers. With our proposal, we keep the costs for project developers at a minimum. It consists of three major steps:

1. the specification of leakage factors under the responsibility of the Executive Board,
2. the calculation of the market leakage that is attributed to a project under the responsibility of the project partners,
3. the validation of the market leakage calculation by an Operational Entity.

## 6.2. Tasks of the Executive Board

The provision of market leakage factors itself involves a number of steps. As some of these require somewhat sophisticated methods, the EB may choose to commission scientists to produce the necessary studies. The steps that need to be taken are the following:

1. The most important market leakage effects must be identified. It makes sense to restrict greater efforts regarding market leakage accounting only to those markets that are most relevant, *e.g.* fossil fuels, timber.
2. The level of market aggregation must be chosen.
3. Emission factors must be determined that represent the average emissions in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents that are associated with the use and the production of each leakage-relevant commodity in non-Annex I countries (including non-ratifying Annex I countries).
4. The magnitude of the CDM related changes in demand and supply on the relevant non-Annex I markets has to be estimated.
5. Leakage factors have to be specified for these demand and supply changes. For the most relevant markets, it is advisable to use applied economic models to do this.<sup>20</sup> For other markets, the EB may choose to start with a default factor that has been determined by expert judgement (*e.g.* 10% or 15%). Note again that the leakage factors are meant to only represent leakage to non-Annex I countries and to Annex I countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
6. As project proponents should be allowed to prove a lower leakage factor, the EB has to take over the task of evaluating and possibly approving these leakage factors.

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<sup>20</sup> How to choose an appropriate model (consisting of model structure and calibration) is an issue left to another paper and depends on the particular market. We consider the task feasible, as high quality models are available for the most relevant markets, especially for fossil fuel markets. Where different models arrive at different leakage estimates, *e.g.* because they use different elasticities, conservatism has to be ensured analogously to the interpretation of conservatism that is used in other fields of baseline setting.



### 6.3. Tasks of the project partners

Once the most important leakage effects have been conservatively estimated for an expected CDM size, proportional attribution to projects is merely a matter of applying the predetermined factors to the demand and supply changes that are associated with the project. We have in mind a checklist of relevant demand and supply changes which the project developers can use to identify leakage-relevant commodities of their project. For each leakage-relevant commodity  $i$  that can be demanded or supplied, the project proponents have to go through the following steps to calculate market leakage:

1. Project demand  $D^P$  and project supply  $S^P$  have to be specified in the units that are used in the denominator of the associated emission factors  $EF$ . In most cases, a project will either supply or demand a certain commodity, not both.
2. Baseline demand  $D^B$  and baseline supply  $S^B$  have to be determined.
3. The project's decrease in demand (supply) relative to the baseline is calculated by subtracting project demand (supply) from baseline demand (supply). In some cases demand (supply) may increase. In these cases, the result of this exercise will have a negative sign.
4. Multiplication of the demand (supply) decrease with the emission factor  $EF^{USE}$  ( $EF^{PROD}$ ) yields the emission reduction that can be attributed to the respective demand (supply) change.  $EF^{USE}$  ( $EF^{PROD}$ ) represents the average emissions in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalents that are associated with the use (production) of the commodity per unit in non-Annex I countries and non-ratifying Annex I countries, *i.e.* in leakage-relevant areas outside the project.<sup>21</sup> In the case of an emission increase, the emission reduction has a negative sign.

Note that project partners have to go through steps 1 to 3 when they calculate the project's emission reduction. The leakage checklist may, however, help to identify some relevant commodities that might otherwise be overlooked. Step 4 is usually also carried out by the project partners in order to claim the emission reductions that are associated with baseline emissions. This is the typical procedure *e.g.* for electricity generation projects. Especially for sinks projects, the emission factor that is applied to supply changes will, however, sometimes differ from the one used in the calculation of the project's carbon sequestration, as what matters for leakage is the average carbon sequestered outside the project. The main additional work for project partners regarding leakage accounting comprises the following two steps:

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<sup>21</sup> Note that in the case of commodities that serve as sinks (*e.g.* timber), production is associated with an absorption of CO<sub>2</sub>, which implies a negative emission factor. As sinks projects increase the supply of such commodities relative to the baseline, the resulting "emission reduction" is positive.

5. Emission reductions associated with demand (supply) changes have to be multiplied with the demand (supply) market leakage factor  $LF^D$  ( $LF^S$ ) for the respective commodity. According to our proposal, these market leakage factors will have been provided by the Executive Board. As has been said before, project developers should be allowed to prove lower market leakage factors for their region. However, they are not required to carry out a leakage study for their project.<sup>22</sup>
6. A project's total market leakage  $ML$  is calculated by summing over all relevant market leakage effects. Total market leakage of the project can thus be written as:

$$(12) \quad ML = \sum_i \left[ (D_i^B - D_i^P) \cdot EF_i^{USE} \cdot LF_i^D + (S_i^B - S_i^P) \cdot EF_i^{PROD} \cdot LF_i^S \right].$$

#### 6.4. Tasks of the Operational Entity

In the context of the baseline validation, an Operational Entity has to validate the leakage accounting. Unless project partners want to change the given leakage factor, there is no need for an approval of the methodology by the Executive Board, because the EB has provided the methodology and the leakage factors.

## 7. Conclusions

Project-specific approaches fail to take account of market leakage, as single projects usually do not change market prices. However, market leakage matters on an aggregate level and must be accounted for if the Kyoto Protocol's Art. 12 imperative to certify only real emission reductions is not to be compromised. We show that aggregate market leakage effects can be proportionally attributed to individual projects and are thus attributable in the sense of the CDM baseline guidelines of the Marrakesh Accords. Major challenges are posed by the norm of conservatism and by the necessity to keep transaction costs low.

Our proposal is based on the idea of predetermined commodity-specific leakage factors which are applied by project developers to any emission reductions that are associated with a project's leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. These predetermined factors are provided by the Executive Board of the CDM on the basis of studies which will have to be carried out for the most leakage-relevant markets.

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<sup>22</sup> This proposal may be adjusted for some LULUCF project categories that require project-specific studies.

Whenever markets are regionally differentiated, project developers should be allowed to prove lower leakage factors for their region.

Establishing a leakage factor for a market requires an estimation of the aggregate demand or supply change associated with all CDM projects. Furthermore, the total leakage effect that results from this demand or supply change has to be determined, which requires the estimation of the new market equilibrium. The leakage factor is equal to the ratio of the total leakage effect – in terms of demand (supply) quantities – to the aggregate demand (supply) change. Conservatism can, in most cases, be secured by basing leakage factors on a CDM size estimate that is very likely to be higher than the *de facto* size of the CDM.

Despite the complexity of some of the issues raised in this paper, our proposal is sufficiently simple to keep transaction costs low and confusion among project developers at a minimum. It has the advantage that it helps the CDM to produce real emission reductions, not only in a narrow perspective, but also from a more global point of view – and the global view matters in climate policy.

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## **Appendix 1: Leakage identification in all methodologies proposed to the Executive Board as available on the CDM website<sup>23</sup> on August 11, 2003**

### NovaGerar Landfill Gas to Energy Project, Brazil

“Only the construction of the LFG collection and utilization system will lead to some GHG emissions that would not have occurred in the absence of the project. These emissions are however insignificant and would likely also occur if alternative power generation capacity were to be constructed at alternative sites. No increased emissions are discernable other than those targeted and directly monitored by the project. Moreover, because the project employs direct monitoring of ERs, indirect emissions will not distort their calculations.”

### Onyx Landfill Gas Recovery Project, Trémembé, Brazil

“Changes in emissions which occur outside the project boundary can occur from:  
- the transport of waste to the landfill site. However, as it is not likely that these emissions will change compared to the baseline scenario, they are not estimated.  
- use of power (either taken from the grid or produced with a generator using landfill gas or diesel). The emissions from diesel or from grid are for certain non-significant and need not to be estimated.”

### Salvador da Bahia Landfill Gas Project, Brazil

“No leakage applicable.”

### Vale do Rosário Bagasse Cogeneration Project, Brazil

“Assuming VR as the project boundary, there is no leakage associated with the VRBC. The surplus bagasse that used to be sold to three industrial consumers (Carol, Brejeiro, and Cargil) before the implementation of the project activity is now being consumed internally, at the cogeneration system. So, VR eliminated the GHG emissions associated to transportation of the bagasse to third parties. The bagasse transportation within the mill is minimal and the emissions associated with it are negligible. Furthermore, two of the three former consumers, Brejeiro and Carol, are currently purchasing biomass from other supplier (see negative declarations of substituting bagasse for fossil fuel, in following, in figure 14 and figure 15). And the third consumer, Cargil, has been advised by government agencies to replace its steam boiler fuel from oil to biomass as a measure to enhance the air quality of the city in which Cargil is located. Thus, the VRBC activity does not adversely impact the local market demand for the bagasse, neither incurs in leakage, and thus the parameter L1 (leakage) is null.”

Attached to the PDD are letters in Portuguese by Carol and Brejeiro in which they declare not to have switched to fossil fuel (figures 14 and 15).

### Graneros Plant Fuel Switching Project, Chile

“Electricity consumption at the project site is responsible for indirect emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> at power plants based on fossil fuels. However, electricity consumption is not affected by project activity, which involves fuel shifting for boilers and furnaces used to generate heat. Thus we do not expect electricity consumption or associated emissions to be affected by the project activity. Thus, such emissions are not considered.”

“The project involves switching from coal and petroleum fuels to natural gas. There are fugitive emissions of methane associated with natural gas supply. These occur in gas production (at the gas well) as well by leakage from the pipeline supplying the project site.

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<sup>23</sup> URL: [http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Panels/meth/PNM\\_Recommendations/index.html](http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Panels/meth/PNM_Recommendations/index.html)

These are direct off-site emissions or "leakage". There would also be fugitive emissions from the natural gas distribution network within the project site. For simplicity in calculations, we consider all of these fugitive methane emissions to be direct off-site.

*Methane leakage from natural gas production.* Natural gas that would be used in the project site is extracted in Argentina. However, country and well-specific data on methane emissions from natural gas production are not available for Argentina. We thus use region specific values indicated in the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Volume 3: Reference Manual (1996). Table 1-64 page 1.131 indicates values of 39,590 to 96,000 kg/PJ of gas *produced*. Since gas leaks are a small part of gas production, we may take the leakage to be approximately the same as kg per PJ of gas *consumption*, as well. We assume an average value of 70,000 kg/PJ of gas consumed at the project site. This is the same as 0.07 kg/GJ of gas consumed. While this methane leakage is outside the project boundary, and indeed outside the country, we still need to account for it, since it takes place in another non-Annex I party.

*Methane leakage from natural gas pipelines and distribution network.* Since measured data on pipeline leakage are not available in Chile, we use standard estimates as suggested in IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Volume 3, Reference Manual (1996). Table 1-64, p. 1.131 indicates values of 116,000 to 340,000 kg of methane per PJ of natural gas consumed in the "Rest of the world" region where Chile would fall. We assume an average leakage value of 230,000 kg/PJ, i.e. 0.23 kg/GJ of gas consumed. In all cases, the energy content (GJ) is based on the *lower* heating value of the fuel.

Considering gas production, transport and distribution, we consider a methane emissions factor from leakage to be  $(0.07 + 0.23)$  or 0.30 kg/GJ gas consumption."

#### Metrogas Package Cogeneration Project, Chile

"In the CDM context, off-site emissions that occur as a result of project activities are called 'leakage'. For this project (and for the baseline), one such element of off-site emissions is the fugitive emissions of methane from natural gas production, transport and distribution to the project site. There would also be fugitive emissions from the natural gas distribution network within the project site. For simplicity in calculations, we consider all of these fugitive methane emissions to be indirect off-site. We call this MLR, and express it in terms of kg methane per GJ of natural gas energy consumption. The formulae for estimating these emissions are given below. (...)"

#### Steam System Efficiency Improvements in Refineries in Fushun, China

"There are no potential sources of leakages."

#### La Vuelta and La Herradura Hydroelectric Project, Colombia

In section B.5., the project proponents state:

"Since methane emissions of hydro plants serving the system are at the same level of avoided carbon dioxide emissions of thermal power plants, they are included as indirect off-site emissions under project boundary option 2. Therefore, baseline emissions are going to be accounted as leakage. Since baseline emissions are almost emission reductions of the project (except for small amount of direct project emissions), all reductions are due to leakage effects (option 2)."

Section E.2, which should contain the formulae used to estimate leakage, comprises a description of the formulae for the calculation of baseline emissions.

#### Wigton Wind Farm Project, Jamaica

“The indirect on-site and off-site emissions that are excluded from the project boundaries are not identified as potential significant and therefore not as potential leakage. Therefore, these emissions will not be monitored. (...) No potential emission sources of leakage were identified.”

#### HFCs Decomposition Project in Ulsan, Republic of Korea

“The leakage effect of the project emissions is the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> emissions associated with the power generation:

$$PE_i^{[out]} = CO_2\_Power_i = Power_i \times I$$

where [out] denotes the outside of the project boundary. The CO<sub>2</sub> intensity  $I$  is that of fossil fuel power generation of the electricity supplier of the grid connected to the facility.

In the Ulsan Chemical case, the CO<sub>2</sub> intensity of the fossil fuel power generation of Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO) is derived from the latest statistics as the  $I$ .”

#### FELDA Lepar Hilir Palm Oil Mill Biogas Project, Malaysia

“This project activity leads to transboundary GHG emission from the transportation by the additional FFB to the baseline FFB reception. This emission is however insignificant and negligible (...).”

#### Durban Landfill Gas to Electricity Project, South Africa

“The Durban Landfill-gas-to-electricity Project does not result in significant leakage. The project is based on reducing on-site GHG emissions through the collection and combustion of landfill gas methane currently vented to the atmosphere. Emissions associated with on-site construction activities are not considered significant.”

#### A.T. Biopower Rice Husk Power Project, Thailand

In section B.3., the project proponents provide a detailed analysis of rice husk demand and supply in Thailand and conclude:

“It can be seen that surplus supply, which, according to the national inventory, is currently burned in open air, represents over four times the demand. Thus, surplus rice husk is shown to be plentiful in Thailand. It is concluded that the Project will neither lead to the displacement of new rice husk plants nor fuel diversion to carbon-intensive fuels, fulfilling a key criteria of the accompanying methodology.”

In section D.4., the project proponents state:

“To negate future leakage concerns, supply and demand analysis will be conducted annually in the same manner as in B.3.”

## **Appendix 2: Leakage identification in all CDM PDDs available on the PCF website<sup>24</sup> on August 11, 2003**

### Plantar Project – Sustainable Fuelwood and Charcoal Production for the Pig Iron Industry, Brazil

“In order to monitor possible leakage from the State Minas Gerais to the Carajás region in the Amazon, Plantar will gather and maintain data from independent industry sources as required by the MVP. This data will contribute to the renewal of the baseline every seven years.”

### Chacabuquito Hydro Project, Chile

“No leakage identified.”

### Jeipirachi Wind Power Project, Colombia

“Indirect emissions (i.e. those occurring outside and separate from the direct effects of the process targeted in this project) are not relevant for the particular case of the Jeparachi Carbon Offset project.”

### Umbrella Project for Small-Scale Renewable Energy Sources, Costa Rica

“Since all plants in the NIS are potentially affected, the boundaries of the Umbrella Project as well as the SPs are therefore defined as the whole NIS, which covers practically the whole country.”

“The cost and emissions baseline assumes that the NIS is an isolated market without interconnections between Costa Rica and neighbouring countries. In fact Costa Rica is already interconnected with Panama, Nicaragua and Honduras, although only through single circuit 110 kV lines of limited transport capacity. Costa Rica will soon be interconnected with the rest of the countries of the Central American Isthmus (Salvador and Guatemala) when the Salvador-Honduras interconnection is commissioned in 2001. Costa Rica currently sells hydroelectric surpluses (secondary energy) on an opportunity basis. For instance, in 1999 Costa Rica sold 128 GWh to Honduras (60%), Panama (30%) and Nicaragua (10%). This opportunity export does not, however, influence ICE’s expansion plan.

The sale of hydroelectric surpluses opens additional room for substitution by the Umbrella Project, because energy exported by Costa Rica substitutes thermal energy in the importing countries. However, emission reductions that might result from this export are not realized and not claimed by the Umbrella Project, because: (i) realization of energy exports is aleatory, and (ii) the applicable carbon intensity factors would correspond to those thermal units that would be operating in the margin at the time the export is made and thus difficult to predict.

The current export by Costa Rica could theoretically lead to an overestimation of ERs. This would only happen if the carbon intensity used to calculate ERs in the NIS is higher than the carbon intensity of the energy displaced outside of Costa Rica. However, Costa Rica exports only surplus hydropower and only after it has satisfied Costa Rica’s own demand: in this situation the carbon intensity in the Costa Rican NIS is (near) zero. Given the small size of the systems in the recipient countries, it is reasonable to assume that the energy exported by Costa Rica as a result of the Umbrella Project replaces thermal energy from units of size and efficiency similar to those existing in Costa Rica. Thus the corresponding ERF in Costa Rica would not be higher than the carbon intensity of the energy displaced by Costa Rican exports in the importing countries. Under these assumptions, and adopting a conservative approach, it is considered unnecessary to monitor displacement outside the Costa Rican system.”

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<sup>24</sup> URL: <http://prototypecarbonfund.org/router.cfm?Page=DocLib&Dtype=1>



“Leakage from the SPs is likely to be negligible. The SPs are all small plants. They may make use of a small diesel generator, which is used only for start-ups and only if the plant is disconnected from the system. The use of these diesel generators is normally minimal and would be counted as SP emissions if significant. There may also be other sources of leakage such as from construction work and possibly methane emissions from water reservoirs. Emissions from construction of the SP are likely to be negligible, because of the small size of the SPs and because construction of equivalent thermal capacity would also result (probably similar) emissions. If significant, methane emissions from reservoirs (if any) will be counted as SP emissions.”

#### El Canada Hydro Project, Guatemala

“For run-of-river hydro power projects, emissions outside of the project boundaries are usually not significant and/or reasonably attributable to the project activity, and where they are, e.g. in the case of emissions from construction or transportation, similar emissions would occur in the baseline scenario in the absence of the project, e.g. from mining and transportation of fossil fuel or construction of alternative capacity, and from which emission reductions are usually not claimed, so that the net effect is zero or often negative.”

“Indirect emissions can result from project construction, transportation of materials and fuel and other up-stream activities. In the case of the proposed Project, these emissions are thought to be negligible, because similar or higher life cycle emissions would result from the eventual construction and operation of alternative capacity. The life-cycle emissions of alternative power generation plants, in particular of fossil fuel power plants, are typically higher than from hydro power plants when including emissions due to the mining, refining and transportation of fossil fuel. The Project does not claim emission reductions from these activities. Therefore, no significant net leakage from the above activities was identified.”

#### Mauritius Waste Incineration Project, Mauritius

“No identifiable leakage could occur.”

#### Gemina Rice Husk Project, Nicaragua

“CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during the construction phase considered irrelevant.”

#### Durban Landfill Gas to Electricity Project, South Africa

“The Durban Landfill-gas-to-electricity Project does not result in significant leakage. The project is based on reducing on-site GHG emissions through the collection and combustion of landfill gas methane currently vented to the atmosphere. Emissions associated with on-site construction activities are not considered significant. The baseline wells and the system feeding the auto-generators (pipelines) are not likely to be the source of any leakage as the majority of the system is under negative pressure. If there are leaks in the pipeline, oxygen gets into the system which reduces the efficiency of the engines. Therefore, the project operator has a strict interest in reducing the amount of leakage. The oxygen content of the landfill gas is monitored on a routine basis. If any oxygen shows up in the sample, the project operator will search for the leak and fix it. In any event, no significant amounts of methane should leak from the system due to the negative pressure. In the shorter positive pressure part of the system between the methane evacuation pump and the engines the normal site monitoring for MBIENT methane would quickly identify and leaks and any such leaks would be rapidly found and repaired. If air enters into the system this will not affect the accuracy of the measurements using the output of the engines. Furthermore, the MP includes a regular monitoring of the composition of landfill gas.”

#### West Nile Hydropower Project, Uganda

“No leakage identified; positive spill-overs possible (technology transfer). Increased emissions due to development effect of WNHPP not counted as leakage (CDM objective).”

### Appendix 3: Numerical examples of the sharing rules

This appendix illustrates the functioning of different attribution rules considered in Section 5 by means of a simple numerical example. Suppose there are three CDM projects involved in the market we investigate. Projects are labelled as A, B, and C in chronological order, and their demand for oil changes according to the following table:

project	demand change ( $\Delta D$ )
A	5
B	10
C	50
<b>total</b>	<b>65</b>

The following table summarises the notation:

symbol	legend	symbol	legend
$L$	total leakage	$n$	number of projects
$L_i$	leakage attributed to $i$ th project	$N$	set of projects
$\Delta D$	CDM-induced demand change	$S$	subset of projects
$\Delta D_i$	demand change of project $i$	$ S $	cardinality of $S$

The following four different leakage functions  $L = L(\Delta D)$  are considered:<sup>25</sup>

function type	formula	total leakage
linear	$L = \Delta D \cdot (100 / 65)$	100
logarithmic	$L = \ln(\Delta D) \cdot (100 / 4.174)$	100
quadratic	$L = (\Delta D)^2 \cdot (100 / 4225)$	100
square root:	$L = \sqrt{\Delta D} \cdot (100 / 8.062)$	100

The attribution rules are formally defined as follows:

attribution rule	formula
marginal, chronological order (MC)	$L_i = L\left(\sum_{j=1}^i \Delta D_j\right) - L\left(\sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \Delta D_j\right)$
marginal, ceteris paribus (MCP)	$L_i = L(\Delta D) - L\left(\sum_{j \neq i} \Delta D_j\right)$
marginal, Shapley (MS)	$L_i = \sum_{i \notin S} \sum_{S \subseteq N} \frac{ S !(n- S -1)!}{n!} \left[ L\left(\sum_{j \in S \cup \{i\}} \Delta D_j\right) - L\left(\sum_{j \in S} \Delta D_j\right) \right]$
proportional (PR)	$L_i = \frac{\Delta D_i}{\Delta D} \cdot L(\Delta D)$

<sup>25</sup> For illustration, all leakage functions are normalised such that total leakage is equal to 100.

Applying the attribution rules to the four different leakage functions yields the following results:

leakage function	project	attribution rule			
		MC	MCP	MS	PR
linear $L = \Delta D \cdot (100 / 65)$	A	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7
	B	15.4	15.4	15.4	15.4
	C	76.9	76.9	76.9	76.9
	<b>sum</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
logarithmic $L = \ln(\Delta D) \cdot (100 / 4.174)$	A	38.6	1.9	15.5	7.7
	B	26.3	4.0	24.8	15.4
	C	35.1	35.1	59.7	76.9
	<b>sum</b>	100.0	41.0	100.0	100.0
quadratic $L = (\Delta D)^2 \cdot (100 / 4225)$	A	0.6	14.8	7.7	7.7
	B	4.7	28.4	15.4	15.4
	C	94.7	94.7	76.9	76.9
	<b>sum</b>	100.0	137.9	100.0	100.0
square root $L = \sqrt{\Delta D} \cdot (100 / 8.062)$	A	27.7	3.9	12.7	7.7
	B	20.3	8.0	20.5	15.4
	C	52.0	52.0	66.7	76.9
	<b>sum</b>	100.0	63.9	100.0	100.0

The following observations are worth noting:

For the linear leakage function, all attribution rules give the same result, as theoretically expected. The following observations relate to the non-linear cases.

In the logarithmic case, the MC rule attributes the largest leakage to project A, which has the smallest individual demand change. In the square root case, the greatest leakage goes to the large project C, but A is still attributed a higher amount of leakage than the much larger project B.

The MCP rule fails to attribute total leakage for concave leakage functions (logarithmic, square root). It attributes excessively in the case of a convex function (quadratic).

The MS rule attributes substantially larger leakage to the small projects A and B and somewhat smaller leakage to the large project C as compared to the PR rule both in the logarithmic and square root cases. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that project A with a small individual demand change can have a large marginal leakage effect if it enters the CDM first. In the quadratic case, the two rules yield the same result. In general, the more linear the leakage function, and the more evenly distributed the individual leakage effects across projects, the more similar are the results of the MS and PR rules.