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Preferences for Redistribution and International Migration*

Abstract

The Tiebout hypothesis suggests that people who migrate from more to less redistributive countries are more negative towards redistribution than non-migrants. However, differences between migrants' and non-migrants' redistributive preferences might also reflect self-interest. We present a model incorporating these competing mechanisms and test it using survey data on Danish emigrants and non-migrants. We find strong support for the Tiebout hypothesis among men, while women's preference patterns are opposite to what the hypothesis predicts. Even though emigrants neither pay taxes nor receive benefits in their country of origin, they tend to support policies that would be beneficial for people like themselves.

JEL code: D64, D72, F22, J61, H2

Keywords: Migration; emigration; welfare state; redistribution; political preferences

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1. Introduction

Economists usually view international migration as being motivated by differences in disposable income across countries, and tempered by costs of migration (Borjas 1987, Grogger and Hanson 2011). From this perspective, a higher level of income redistribution is a pull factor for low-income earners and a push factor for high-income earners (Pauly 1973; Epple and Romer 1991; Wildasin 1991). Yet, preferences towards redistribution depend strongly on fairness considerations and beliefs about the determinants of success (Alesina et al. 2001; Fong 2001; Corneo and Grüner 2002). This raises an important question: are migrants self-selected and sorted according to their wish to live in a society which redistributes justly? Such voting with one's feet was suggested already by Tiebout (1956), who derived conditions under which individuals sort into jurisdictions pursuing policies they prefer. This hypothesis has, to our knowledge, not been tested with respect to opinions about what constitutes a fair level of redistribution. Although previous literature has found that migration decisions of some selected groups respond strongly to tax incentives (Abramitzky 2008, 2009; Kleven et al. 2014; Akcigit et al. 2016), these findings are not enough to show that emigrants from a highly redistributive setting would consider less redistribution to be more fair since taxes have a direct effect on migration incentives through self-interest.

In this paper, we present a model that distinguishes the roles played by self-interest and fairness considerations in the migration decision and in determining the preferred level of redistribution. It allows testing whether there is self-selection and sorting of emigrants according to their fairness preferences, in addition to previously established self-selection according to income maximization. Fairness preferences refer to an individual's views about the just level of income redistribution via taxes and transfers. We test the predictions of our model using European Social Survey (ESS) data on Danes living in Denmark and our own survey data on 4,068 Danes living in other countries, collected by Statistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark reached Danish emigrants living abroad by first contacting their relatives and asking them for the migrant's contact information. The key to our analysis is examining emigrants' preferences towards redistribution in their country of origin where they no longer pay taxes or receive transfers.

Identifying migrants' views about fair redistribution is important not just to researchers testing the Tiebout model, but also to policy-makers in countries worried about brain drain due to heavy redistribution. If potential migrants view generous redistribution fair, but are reluctant to pay for it in the form of high taxes, then increasing the salience of redistribution that is financed with tax revenue could encourage them to stay. If potential migrants, instead, view prevailing level of redistribution excessive also from a fairness perspective, then making redistribution more salient could backfire and encourage emigration.

Our model suggests that in the absence of self-selection according to fairness concerns, those with high household incomes should prefer a higher tax rate for their country of origin in the case of emigrating as opposed to staying. The reason is that emigrants no longer have to pay for the costs of higher redistribution in the country of origin. The Tiebout hypothesis suggests a different pattern among emigrants from a highly redistributive country, namely that people who find the prevailing level of redistribution unfairly high are more likely to emigrate to countries that redistribute less. If this effect is sufficiently strong, high-income emigrants to less redistributive countries can be expected to support less redistribution than high-income stayers, even though only those staying have to pay for it. We find strong support for Tiebout sorting according to fairness preferences for men. The preference patterns among women are opposite to what Tiebout sorting according to fairness preferences suggests, but in line with the prediction that high-income earners support more redistribution if not having to pay for it.

Besides investigating how attitudes towards redistribution differ between non-emigrant and emigrant Danes, we study how attitudes vary between Danes who migrated to different destinations. We distinguish between Danes who migrated to other Nordic countries, the United States, other English-speaking countries, the rest of Western Europe or the rest of the world. Our prior was that migrants to other Nordic countries would have quite similar fairness preferences to non-migrants, given that the prevailing level of redistribution is rather comparable in Denmark and other Nordic countries. Furthermore, we expected that migrants to the United States would prefer less redistribution than migrants to other Western countries. Already de Tocqueville (1965[1835]) suggested that Americans demand less redistribution than Europeans as they believe in higher social mobility. Subsequently, contributions by Piketty (1995), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) suggest that the stark divide in redistributive attitudes between the United States and European welfare states may reflect multiple equilibria. Americans highlight the role of effort and

own choices and, correspondingly, want less redistribution, and Europeans attach a bigger role to luck and family background, and therefore ask for more redistribution.

We find a striking gender difference in emigrants' redistributive preferences. A clear majority of male migrants living outside Nordic countries opposes the suggestion of increasing income redistribution in Denmark, while the majority of female emigrants support it, regardless of where they live. Analyzing ESS data shows that also non-migrant women are more positive towards increasing redistribution than men, but the gender gap is considerably smaller than among migrants. We also find that emigrant men living outside Nordic countries view redistribution more negatively than men living in Denmark, and emigrant women in all destinations view it more positively than women living in Denmark. The gender difference when comparing migrants and non-migrants prevails also if the attention is restricted to those working in high-skilled occupations, but becomes weaker if attention is restricted to those who worked 90% or more of the full working time in the year before migration.

The finding that emigrant men who live outside Nordic countries are more negative towards redistribution in Denmark than men staying there or living in other Nordic countries suggests that redistributive preferences are one of the drivers of both self-selection into emigration and sorting into specific country groups, in line with the Tiebout hypothesis. The result that emigrant women in all destinations are more positive towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than non-migrant women is opposite to what the Tiebout hypothesis suggests, but consistent with what our model predicts in absence of Tiebout sorting with respect to fairness preferences: women who no longer have to pay taxes to finance redistribution are more positive towards increasing it. Our results do not prove that there would be no self-selection and Tiebout sorting according to fairness preferences among women, but if there is, then it must be relatively weak and dominated by the self-interest to support more redistribution when no longer having to pay for it.

We did not find support for our prior hypothesis that migrants to the United States would be particularly negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark. The point estimates even suggest that men migrating to the United States are less negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than men migrating to other English-speaking countries or continental Western Europe, although this finding should be taken with caution as, in most specifications, the difference is not statistically significant. Danish men living in the United States are also

more positive towards increasing redistribution in their country of residence than Danish men living in other Western countries, regardless of the set of controls. Therefore, it appears that the majority of men migrating outside Nordic countries prefers a level of redistribution somewhere between the average levels prevailing in the United States and in other non-Nordic Western countries.

We also tested whether differences in how migrants living in various countries view redistribution in Denmark can be explained by their opinions about the determinants of individual success and generalized trust. Our results confirm the importance of beliefs about the determinants of success: those who highlight the role of own work and choices are more negative towards increasing redistribution as in Fong (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002). However, controlling for these beliefs does not change our other results. The same applies for trust: although low trust is associated with lower support for the welfare state, controlling for trust does not affect our other findings. We do find that Danes living in other Nordic countries have higher generalized trust and support higher levels of redistribution, in line with the twin peak relationship identified by Algan et al. (2015), but adding trust and beliefs about the determinants of success as additional controls leaves cross-country differences in support for redistribution in Denmark almost unchanged.

Selective immigration policies do not appear to explain different preferences across destinations. Danes can migrate freely to other European countries, while immigration restrictions could play a role in the self-selection of migrants into the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Yet, migrants to the United Kingdom and Ireland, continental Western Europe, as well as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have quite similar average attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark. This is in line with what Borjas et al. (forthcoming) find for self-selection according to earnings using Danish administrative data for emigrants to non-Nordic EU15 countries and Switzerland, where Danes can migrate without visa restrictions, and to the rest of the world. The distributions of pre-migration earnings of emigrants to these two country groups are very similar.

Besides contributing to the literature on migrant self-selection with respect to income-redistribution preferences, our research helps to separate the roles that self-interest and fairness considerations play for preferences to redistribute. Previous work on this has focused on non-migrants. Therefore, it is not surprising that redistributive preferences have been shown

to depend strongly on both self-interest and beliefs about the determinants of success (Fong 2001; Alesina and Ferrara 2005). Kuziemko et al. (2015) analyze how elastic preferences for redistribution are and find that providing American respondents customized information about US income inequality changes their concerns about inequality, but has relatively weak effects on policy preferences concerning top income tax rates and support for income transfers.¹ As migrants no longer pay taxes or receive benefits in their country of origin, self-interest should not play a role, and their attitudes towards redistribution should be driven merely by fairness preferences and possibly altruism towards family members still living there.²

If self-interest and fairness preferences are uncorrelated, migrant's socioeconomic status or own income should not matter for his or her preferences to redistribute in the country of origin. Yet, we find that own socioeconomic status and pre-migration income (and for women, partner's socioeconomic status) explain attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark in the same way as they explain attitudes towards redistribution in the migrant's current country of residence. Therefore, migrants tend to support policies that would be beneficial for people like themselves in the country of origin. One explanation for this could be self-serving beliefs for which Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Di Tella et al. (2015) provide evidence in several other settings (see also Karadja et al. (2017) for evidence from Sweden). Furthermore, we test how the pre-migration earnings distribution differs between those who support more redistribution and those who oppose it. We measure earnings using the concept of standardized annual income from the year before emigration as in Borjas et al. (forthcoming). The standardized income is defined by the ratio of the worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. We find a striking pattern: the cumulative distribution of pre-migration earnings of those who are against increasing redistribution in Denmark while living abroad almost stochastically dominates the earnings distribution of those who support more redistribution. Even more, a corre-

¹ Additional evidence comes from survey experiments in which respondents are asked their perception of their relative position in the income distribution in their country, and a random sample is then provided information on their true position. Cruces et al. (2013) find that Argentines who initially overestimated their relative position tended to demand more redistribution when being informed about their true position, while Karadja et al. (2017) finds for Sweden and Engelhardt and Wagener (2018) for Germany that those who initially underestimated their relative position in income distribution but were then informed about their true position became more negative to increasing redistribution.

² Luttmer and Singhal (2011) study migrants and non-migrants to separate the role of culture from that of the economic and institutional environment in redistributive preferences. They find a strong positive relationship between immigrants' preferences to redistribute in their current country of residence and the preferences prevailing in their (or their parents') country of origin.

sponding result arises when studying residual earnings, after controlling for the effects of education. Both patterns hold for men and women, and suggest that high-income earners tend to find less redistribution more fair, even when not having to pay for it themselves.

We also find some support for the hypothesis that redistributive preferences reflect altruism towards family members. Women who have a sibling in Denmark who was unemployed or on early retirement are more likely to support higher redistribution in Denmark. For men the effect is statistically insignificant. Regarding redistribution in the country of residence, the effects of having a sibling who was unemployed or on early retirement in Denmark are statistically insignificant for both genders.

The paper most closely related to ours is Abramitzky (2008) on the limits of redistribution in Israeli kibbutzim, communities that traditionally fully equalized their members' incomes. Following a financial crisis in 1980s, some of the kibbutzim reduced the level of income equalization. Abramitzky shows that high-skilled individuals are most likely to leave kibbutzim that maintain equal sharing. A higher wealth of a kibbutz increases the value of staying and allows maintaining a higher level of redistribution, as does stronger socialist ideology. The two papers are complementary. Abramitzky (2008) analyzes a planner's problem in choosing an optimal redistribution contract, subject to budget constraint and high-ability members' participation constraint. Ideological benefit from staying in a kibbutz is assumed to be identical for all members of a kibbutz, but can vary across kibbutzim. Our paper derives and tests predictions concerning Tiebout sorting in fairness preferences and separates the roles that fairness considerations play for preferences to redistribute from self-interest. Therefore, our model allows fairness preferences to differ across individuals, and analyzing such differences is the focus of our empirical analysis. We provide individual-level evidence that fairness preferences are systematically related to migration decisions, complementing the kibbutz-level analysis in Abramitzky (2008).

A major potential concern related to papers using survey data is that responses could be just cheap talk and not reflect genuine preferences. Importantly, Fong (2007) studied the effect of beliefs on giving to real-life welfare recipients in a lab setting. Donors were surveyed about their general beliefs about the causes of poverty one week before the lab session, and were then provided information about a real-life welfare recipient's attachment to the labor force

and desire to work. Participants had to decide whether to donate any of their money to this person. Those believing that poverty is caused by bad luck, whether inferred from information provided by the recipient or instrumented by prior beliefs, gave significantly more money to their recipient, than those believing that poverty is caused by lack of effort. This suggests that survey responses are not just cheap talk, but that a significant share of respondents is willing to act along their stated preferences also when real monetary stakes are involved.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical framework and derives conditions under which Tiebout sorting according to redistributive preferences can be established. Section 3 describes our own data and ESS data that we use to analyze non-migrants. Section 4 presents distributions of redistributive preferences among migrants and non-migrants, separately for men and women. Section 5 presents econometric analysis and section 6 concludes.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Self-selection into emigration

There are two countries. Country of origin is denoted by 0 and potential destination country by 1. We focus on the decision of residents in country 0 on whether to migrate to country 1, and normalize the population size of country 0 to one. In line with Borjas (1987) and most of the subsequent literature, the migration decision is assumed to be irreversible. We denote individual i 's human capital stock by h_i . Individual i 's gross wage would be

$$w_0^i = \alpha_0 + r_0 h_i$$

in country 0 and

$$w_1^i = \alpha_1 + r_1 h_i$$

in country 1, where r_0 and r_1 give rates of return for human capital in countries 0 and 1.

Country k , $k \in \{0,1\}$, collects proportional wage taxes at rate t_k , $0 < t_k < 1$. Tax revenue, net of any exogenous revenue requirement g_k , $k \in \{0,1\}$ is returned as lump-sum transfers, given by

$$b_k = t_k(\alpha_k + r_k \bar{h}_k) - g_k,$$

in which \bar{h}_k denotes the average human capital stock in country k . As is common in the literature, we analyze migration responses which are sufficiently small so that they do not trigger general equilibrium responses in wage rates or in the average human capital stocks. This can be motivated by our focus being on migration responses to marginal changes in tax rates. The effects of migration associated with the initial tax rates are already included in the average human capital stocks.

Individuals derive utility from consumption of private goods and from perceived fairness of redistribution and other amenities in the country they live in. We denote the level of taxation that individual i considers fair by \hat{t}_i . If taxation in the country of residence k deviates from this, individual suffers utility loss $-\gamma_i(t_k - \hat{t}_i)^2$. This can be interpreted as inequity aversion relative to the level of redistribution the respondent considers just (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Alesina and Angeletos 2005).³ Other amenities related to living in country k are denoted by ε_k^i . They include individual differences in the valuation of the consumption of public goods or publicly provided private goods.

We denote individual cost of migrating from 0 to 1 by c_i and define $\varepsilon_i = \varepsilon_i^0 - \varepsilon_i^1 + c_i$ as a measure of to what extent amenities and migration costs push towards staying in the country of origin. Given that migrants are typically a relatively small share of population, it is reasonable to expect that for a clear majority of country 0's initial population, $\varepsilon_i > 0$.⁴ We assume that ε follows a normal distribution with mean $\mu > 0$ and variance σ_ε^2 . The welfare effect of migrating from 0 to 1, apart from the terms in ε_i , is given by

$$(1) \quad v_i^* = (1 - t_1)(\alpha_1 + r_1 h_i) + t_1(\alpha_1 + r_1 \bar{h}_1) - g_1 - \gamma_i(t_1 - \hat{t}_i)^2 - (1 - t_0)(\alpha_0 + r_0 h_i) - t_0(\alpha_0 + r_0 \bar{h}_0) + g_0 + \gamma_i(t_0 - \hat{t}_i)^2.$$

Define the index function $I_i = v_i^* - \varepsilon_i$. Individual i migrates from 0 to 1 if and only if $I_i > 0$. The probability that individual i emigrates is

³ Abramitzky (2008) assumes that all individuals in a kibbutz derive an identical ideological benefit from staying there, but in his model this benefit does not depend on the level of redistribution. Instead, ideological benefit acts as a migration cost and allows the social planner to choose a higher level of redistribution. In our model, some individuals prefer the level of redistribution in their country of origin and others abroad, and these different preferences help to explain who migrates. For a discussion of how the level of redistribution can affect individual utility see Alesina and Giuliano (2011).

⁴ Already Smith (1976[1776]) noted that as the wage differences in the United Kingdom were much larger than price differences, "it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported."

$$(2) p_i(v_i^* > \varepsilon_i) = \Phi(v_i^*),$$

where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. The comparative statics with respect to the probability of migration are given by:

Proposition 1. (i) $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial h_i} = \Phi'(v_i^*)[r_1(1 - t_1) - r_0(1 - t_0)]$; (ii) $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial t_0} = \Phi'(v_i^*)[r_0(h_i - \bar{h}_0) + 2\gamma_i(t_0 - \hat{t}_i)]$; (iii) $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial t_1} = \Phi'(v_i^*)[-r_1(h_i - \bar{h}_1) - 2\gamma_i(t_1 - \hat{t}_i)]$.

Proof. Insert (1) into (2) and differentiate.

Proposition 1 suggests Tiebout sorting in both self-interest and fairness preferences. The first part states that the probability of migrating from country 0 to country 1 is increasing in the individual stock of human capital, if and only if the after-tax return to human capital is higher in country 1. This is in line with the Borjas (1987) analysis building on Roy (1951). The second and the third parts show that the effect of taxes on the probability of migration depends on individual's stock of human capital and fairness preferences. If individual's human capital stock is above average in the country of origin (potential destination) then an increase in the tax rate there monotonically increases (decreases) the likelihood of migration through the self-interest channel. The effects of changes in taxes on migration decisions through fairness preferences are non-monotonic. If the prevailing tax rate in the country of origin is below (above) what the individual considers fair, then an increase in it decreases (increases) the likelihood of emigration through the fairness channel. Correspondingly, if the prevailing tax rate in the potential destination country is below (above) what the individual considers fair, then an increase in it increases (decreases) the likelihood of emigration through the fairness channel. Depending on the income prospects and fairness concerns, the probability of migration can monotonically increase in the tax rate in the country of origin (for high-income earners who consider a low level of redistribution fair or attach a low weight to fairness concerns), monotonically decrease in it (for low-income earners who consider extensive redistribution fair, or attach a low weight to fairness concerns) or be U-shaped (for those who find an intermediate level of redistribution fair and attach a sufficiently high weight to fairness concerns).

2.2 Testing Tiebout hypothesis

The previous subsection analyzed how migration decisions depend on the prevailing tax rates. In this subsection, we derive empirically testable predictions for preferred tax rates that allow us to shed light on whether there is Tiebout sorting into migration with respect to redistributive preferences. In case of no migration, preferred tax rate is given by

$$(3) \ t_i^{NM} = \underset{t_i^0}{argmax} [(1 - t_i^0)(\alpha_0 + r_0 h_i) + t_i^0(\alpha_0 + r_0 \bar{h}_1) - g_0 - \gamma_i(t_i^0 - \hat{t}_i)^2].$$

Migrants' preferred tax rate in their country of residence is given by

$$(4) \ t_i^{M1} = \underset{t_i^1}{argmax} [(1 - t_i^1)(\alpha_1 + r_1 h_i) + t_i^1(\alpha_1 + r_1 \bar{h}_1) - g_1 - \gamma_i(t_i^1 - \hat{t}_i)^2 - \varepsilon_i].$$

As taxes are paid and transfers received only in the country of residence, migrants do not face any self-interest considerations related to taxation in their country of origin. Therefore, we assume that migrants are guided solely by their fairness considerations when it comes to their preferences in their country of origin⁵:

$$(5) \ t_i^{M0} = \underset{t_i^0}{argmax} [-\gamma_i(t_i^0 - \hat{t}_i)^2].$$

Equations (3), (4) and (5) imply:

Proposition 2. (i) $\forall \hat{t}_i, \gamma_i: \frac{\partial t_i^{NM}}{\partial h_i} < 0, \frac{\partial t_i^{M1}}{\partial h_i} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial t_i^{M0}}{\partial h_i} = 0$. (ii) $\forall \hat{t}_i, \gamma_i, h_i: t_i^{NM} < t_i^{M0}$ if $h_i > \bar{h}_0$, $t_i^{NM} = t_i^{M0}$ if $h_i = \bar{h}_0$ and $t_i^{NM} > t_i^{M0}$ if $h_i < \bar{h}_0$.

Proof. (i) Follows by differentiating (3), (4) and (5). (ii) Follows by differentiating (3) and (5), solving for t_i^{NM} and t_i^{M0} , and comparing these.

The first part of Proposition 2 follows directly from self-interest: with any given fairness concerns, those with higher income prefer lower taxes where they live, while own income has no effect on tax preferences in a country in which one does not live. The intuition behind part (ii) is that in case of staying, preferred redistribution balances self-interest and fairness concerns, while migrants' preference in their country of origin reflects only fairness concerns.

⁵ Alternatively, we could assume that fairness preferences in the country of origin and in the country of residence both enter migrants' utility function. We choose the current formulation for simplicity, as attaching a certain weight to the utility function in the country of origin even in case of emigrating would complicate the analysis of migration decisions, without adding any valuable insights.

Part (ii) cannot be tested directly as we do not observe what tax rate migrants would have preferred in case of not migrating. Nonetheless, it provides insights to testing whether there is Tiebout sorting with respect to redistributive preferences. If there is no Tiebout sorting with respect to redistributive preferences, we would expect high-income migrants from country 0 to prefer higher taxes in country 0 than high-income stayers, and low-income migrants to prefer less redistribution than low-income stayers. If country 1 redistributes less than country 0, and high-income migrants from 0 to 1 prefer less redistribution in their country of origin than high-income stayers, this suggests that Tiebout sorting into emigration is sufficiently powerful to outweigh the self-interest mechanism that would push high-income migrants to support more redistribution when not having to pay for it. We summarize these insights as two alternative hypotheses, to be tested against the null hypothesis that high-skilled migrants' preference distribution concerning taxation in the country of origin does not differ from the distribution among high-skilled non-migrants:

Hypothesis 1 (No Tiebout sorting according to fairness preferences): *High-income emigrants from a high-tax country to a low-tax country support higher taxes in their country of origin than high-income stayers.*

Hypothesis 2 (Strong Tiebout sorting according to fairness preferences): *High-income emigrants from a high-tax country to a low-tax country support lower taxes in their country of origin than high-income stayers.*

We analyze hypotheses 1 and 2 separately for men and women. Given that a large fraction of Danish women emigrate for family reasons while men emigrate mainly for their own work (see Munk et al., 2017), our prior is that Hypothesis 1 is more likely to hold among women. For high-skilled men, Hypothesis 1 is more likely to hold if the weight of the fairness concerns in migration decisions is relatively low, and Hypothesis 2 if fairness preferences are important.

Finally, asking migrants about their preference to redistribute in their country of origin and in their country of residence provides insights about the level of redistribution they consider fair in the absence of self-interest considerations and the relative importance of self-interest and fairness concerns. Fairness considerations suggest that high-income migrants in less redis-

tributive countries should support increasing redistribution there to a larger extent than in their country of origin. Self-interest, on the other hand, would suggest that the pattern could be opposite. If high-income migrants support increasing redistribution in their current country of residence but not in Denmark, this suggests that their preferred level of redistribution is between the levels prevailing in their current country of residence and Denmark. If high-income migrants, instead, would support increasing redistribution in Denmark to a larger extent than in their current country of residence, even though the latter would have a lower level of redistribution, this would suggest both that their fairness preferences would call for even higher taxes than in Denmark, and that the relative weight of fairness preferences is relatively low compared with self-interest.

3. Data

Our analysis uses our own survey data on Danes who have emigrated from Denmark, and European Social Survey data on Danes living in Denmark. The main questions in our own survey data concern attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark and in the respondent's country of residence, while the European social survey provides information on the attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark among Danes who live in Denmark. Our own survey data was collected by Statistics Denmark, and is linked in some analyses with administrative data on respondent's income and demographic controls through remote access. When analyzing self-selection of emigrants, we also use administrative data on full population in selected years. The survey was planned by Martin D. Munk and Panu Poutvaara within the project "Danes Abroad: Economic and Social Motivations for Emigration and Return Migration", financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council.

Our own survey data was collected as follows. Statistics Denmark used full population registers from 1987 to 2007 to identify all Danish citizens who had emigrated in 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001 or 2002 and who were still abroad in 2007.⁶ Emigrants had to be aged 18 or more when they emigrated, and at most 59 in 2007. They also had to have at least one parent who was born in Denmark. Statistics Denmark contacted first emigrants' parents or siblings to request their contact information abroad. Subsequently, they were asked to answer a web scheme in a survey that took place in June 2008. In the analysis of migrants

⁶This effectively limits the analysis to migrants who have stayed abroad for at least five years. Having stayed abroad for five years predicts longer migration spells. For example, according to Danish population registers 72% of men and 71% of women who left Denmark in 1996 and were still abroad after five years were also abroad after ten years.

we concentrate on Danes who migrated to destinations outside Greenland and the Faroe Islands.⁷ We also drop survey respondents who report having returned to Denmark when the survey took place. With these restrictions, we ended up with a sample of 1979 male and 2089 female migrants.⁸ In the following analysis the number of observations changes slightly due to missing observations in different survey questions. Table 1 reports the number of respondents and their basic background characteristics in the ESS and in our own survey. In 2008, of the 17,309 Danes in the target population, 9,415 had a parent or sibling living in Denmark with valid contact information. The majority replied, providing e-mail addresses of 6,984 emigrants. The survey reached 4,257 respondents, representing 24.6% of the target population, 45.2% of those with a parent or sibling with valid contact information, and 61.0% of those emigrants who could be contacted.

The five most important residence countries for men are the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Germany. For Danish women, the order is slightly different: the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, Germany, and Sweden. Together, these five countries account for 60 percent of respondents. Of these five countries, Sweden and Norway are culturally, economically and politically by far closest to Denmark. The languages are closely related and present-day Southern Sweden was part of Denmark for centuries. All three are highly redistributive and rich welfare states. All in all, this means that migrating to Sweden or Norway is very easy even for the less educated. The societies in the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, place a much higher responsibility on individuals themselves, and have lower taxes, less generous transfers, and wider income differences. One can also argue that work is culturally more central in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Based on these considerations, we classify destination countries into other Nordic countries, the United Kingdom or Ireland, rest of Western Europe,⁹ the United States, Canada, Australia

⁷ Greenland and the Faroe Islands are autonomous regions but still part of Denmark. We have excluded these destinations as many of these migrants could have originated in Greenland or the Faroe Islands, and many would actually be returning home rather than emigrating from Denmark.

⁸ It should be noted that the observations are unweighted in the following analysis, and their distributions do not reflect the distributions in the underlying target population directly. However, as the target population can be identified in the Danish population registers, it can be confirmed that the distributions of the main individual sociodemographic characteristics from the year before emigration reflect those of the target population fairly well.

⁹ Category *rest of Western Europe* includes the rest of EU15 (without Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Finland that are included in other categories) and Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco and Switzerland.

or New Zealand, and rest of the world. Furthermore, we analyze the United States separately. Alesina et al. (2001) show that Americans are much more negative towards redistribution than Europeans, and that the United States redistributes much less than Western Europe. Therefore, the United States can be expected to attract migrants who are more negative towards the welfare state. We combine Canada, Australia and New Zealand into one group as all are traditional immigration countries just as the United States, but still differ from the United States in many respects, like in having universal public healthcare. Most respondents are living in English-speaking countries that account for 38 percent of men and 40 percent of women. Other Nordic countries accommodate 20 percent of men and 21 percent of women, and rest of Europe 27 percent of men and 33 percent of women. Only 6 percent of women and 14 percent of men live in the rest of the world.¹⁰

To compare emigrants with Danes living in Denmark, we use data from round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2008/2009. The response rate for the survey in Denmark was 53.8%. We restrict our sample to those who were at least 24 and at most 60 years old when the survey took place, to have the same age group as respondents in the survey for migrants. Further, we restrict the sample to Danish citizens who have at least one parent born in the country, and have a non-missing answer for the survey question on redistribution preferences. We also dropped respondents with an occupation code referring to work in the armed forces, as the armed forces occupation category does not allow separating between different skill levels required at work. With these restrictions, we end up with a sample of 877 ESS respondents.

In some of the analyses we restrict the attention to respondents who were aged 25 to 54 years and worked 90% or more of the full working time in the year before emigration. The age range was restricted to 25 to 54 years in order to capture earnings after studies and before early retirement sets in, and is in line with Borjas et al. (forthcoming). In each year, earnings are standardized. The standardized income is defined as the ratio of the worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Selection in terms of unobservable characteristics is measured using residuals from

¹⁰ The biggest destination countries for men in the destination category rest of the world are Singapore (10.7% of migrants in the category), China (8.6%) Thailand (7.9%), Brazil (5.4%), Hong Kong (5.4%), Poland (4.3%), Japan (3.9%), Malaysia (3.9%) and the United Arab Emirates (3.6%). For women, the biggest countries are Israel (8.0%), Hong Kong (7.2%), South Africa (6.4%), Czech Republic (4.0%), Singapore (4.0%) and Poland (4.0%).

Mincerian earnings regressions, which are calculated using same restrictions as standardized earnings separately for men and women and including as explanatory variables education, age and year dummies, as well as dummy for being married and having children. Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics of the part of the respondents that worked 90% or more of the full working time in the year before migration according to register data.

4. Attitudes towards Income Redistribution

In this section, we show how Danish emigrants compare with Danes who live in Denmark in their attitudes towards income redistribution. We also study how attitudes differ between migrants to different destinations. As discussed above, preferences for redistribution are likely to reflect both self-interest and fairness considerations. We asked in our survey Danes living abroad to state their opinion regarding the suggestion to increase income redistribution in Denmark and in their country of residence. Our main interest is in attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark. This allows us to focus on fairness considerations, provides a common point of reference to respondents living in various countries, and allows a comparison with attitudes of Danes living in Denmark.

In the European Social Survey, attitudes towards income redistribution were measured by asking respondents to state whether they agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree strongly with the statement “*The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.*” Table 2 presents the distribution of answers separately for men and women living in Denmark. Women are somewhat more positive towards increasing redistribution, in line with findings by Edlund and Pande (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), although differences are not very big. There is no majority in favor of or against increasing redistribution. This is in line with what we would expect from median voter models of redistribution, following Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). If median voter would not be neutral towards increasing or decreasing redistribution, then the prevailing level would not be a political equilibrium. Table B.2 shows that the distribution among high-skilled respondents is almost the same as in the rest of the population.

In our survey for Danes living abroad, preferences for redistribution in Denmark were measured with the following question: “*What is your opinion of a suggestion to increase taxes on those with high incomes in Denmark, and distribute the money to those with low incomes?*”

Correspondingly, the preferences for redistribution in the country of residence were measured with the question “*What is your opinion of a suggestion to increase taxes on those with high incomes in the country you live in, and distribute the money to those with low incomes?*” For both questions, we used a 5-point scale from “Strongly in favor” to “Strongly against”. Table 3 a reports the answers concerning redistribution in Denmark by men and table 3 b answers by women, according to the residence country group.

Comparing tables 2, 3a and 3b reveal that there is a much bigger gender difference in attitudes towards income redistribution among emigrants than among non-migrants. The majority of emigrant men oppose a suggestion to increase income redistribution in Denmark, and majority of emigrant women support it. Majority of Danish men in all other destinations than other Nordic countries are against a suggestion to increase redistribution in Denmark. The majority of women in all destinations are in favor of increasing redistribution in Denmark.

Analyzing separately migrants in high-skilled and low- or medium-skilled occupations shows that the difference between migrants and non-migrants is mainly driven by men in high-skilled occupations (Table B.3). The results for men in high-skilled occupations are in line with Hypothesis 2, and against what Hypothesis 1 predicts. Among men emigrating outside Nordic countries, 67% of those in high-skilled occupations are against increasing redistribution in Denmark and 26% in favor, while 50% of those in low- or medium-skilled occupations is in favor and 37% against. Among women, support for increasing redistribution is larger than opposition among both high-skilled and low- or medium-skilled, and the results for women in high-skilled occupations are in line with Hypothesis 1, and against what competing Hypothesis 2 on self-selection into emigration according to fairness preferences predicts. Similarly, comparing men’s attitudes in Denmark, other Nordic countries and rest of the world suggests Tiebout sorting into different destinations according to fairness preferences, while there is no such pattern among women. As men working in high-skilled occupations who emigrate outside Nordic countries are more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than men who work in high-skilled occupations and stay in Denmark, their fairness preferences differ sufficiently to overrule the effect of self-interest that would push migrants to prefer more redistribution as they no longer have to pay for it. We do not find Tiebout sorting across different English-speaking countries: men who migrated to the United Kingdom or Ireland are more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than men who migrated to the United States, even though the United States redistributes less. For

women, the differences in attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark differ much less between those living in different countries of residence, suggesting much weaker or even non-existent Tiebout sorting according to redistributive preferences, in line with what comparing migrants and non-migrants also suggested.

Tables 4a and 4b show preferences concerning redistribution in the country of residence. A clear majority of women support more redistribution in their current country of residence. Majority of men support more redistribution in the United States. Comparing Tables 3a and 4a shows that both Tiebout sorting and common norms related to fairness are important in explaining cross-country differences in support for increasing redistribution in the current country of residence. Relatively high support for more redistribution in already highly redistributive other Nordic countries, compared with somewhat less redistributive other Western European countries, can be best explained by Tiebout sorting. One possible interpretation for our results is that although majority of Danish emigrant men in the United States and non-Western countries view redistribution in Denmark excessive, they find the level prevailing in the United States and most non-Western countries unfairly low.¹¹

Borjas et al. (forthcoming) already showed that emigrants from Denmark are strongly positively self-selected in terms of education, earnings (whether standardized or not) and unobservable abilities, measured by residuals from a Mincerian wage regression. Figures 1a and 1b present cumulative distribution functions of log standardized annual income from the year before emigration according to support for redistribution in Denmark. Those who were against increasing redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who were in favor are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to those working 90% or more of the full working time; annual earnings of a student or a recent graduate who started working in, say, October are misleading about their real earnings potential. Strikingly, the pre-migration earnings distribution of those who are against increasing redistribution first-order stochastically dominates that of those who are in favor of increasing redistribution. This holds among both men and women. As migrants neither gain nor lose from redistribution in their country of origin, this is strong evidence that fairness concerns are

¹¹ Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find that Danish migrants tend to be more negative towards redistribution than natives across 32 countries. Furthermore, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find that immigrants' redistributive preferences in their country of residence are strongly positively correlated with the average preferences in their home country. As we find that male emigrants are more negative and female emigrants more positive towards redistribution than non-migrants, pooling men and women as Luttmer and Singhal do may overlook an important gender difference. Instead, it would be advisable to analyze men's and women's preferences separately.

strongly correlated with what would be the material interest of similar people, even in the absence of self-interest.

Figures 2a and 2b present cumulative distribution functions of earnings regression residuals for full-time workers, based on the Mincerian wage regressions in Table B.4. Those who are against increasing redistribution have higher earnings residuals than those supporting increasing redistribution. Again, the relationship holds among both men and women and illustrates that support for redistribution is negatively correlated with both observable and unobservable drivers of earnings, even in absence of self-interest related to redistributive policies.¹² Table B.5 shows that Danes who worked full time or close to full time in the year before emigration are more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than migrants on average (Table 3). The difference is especially pronounced for women; almost half of women who worked full time or close to full time are against increasing redistribution in Denmark. Their preferences appear more in line with Hypothesis 2 than with Hypothesis 1, just as among men.

5. Explaining Attitudes

5.1 *Fairness considerations, self-interest and Tiebout sorting*

The descriptive statistics in the previous section suggest that women are more positive towards redistribution than men, and that those men who migrated to other Nordic countries are more positive towards redistribution than other men. This still leaves open to what extent the differences are driven by socio-economic differences between migrants to different destinations, and to what extent by migrants sorting themselves to different residence countries according to their redistributive preferences, after controlling for other characteristics. In this section, we make three main contributions to understanding migrants' redistributive preferences.

First, we shed light on Tiebout sorting in terms of redistributive preferences, by controlling for various socio-economic characteristics. Second, we explore what type of role self-interest and fairness considerations play in attitudes towards redistribution among emigrants. Third,

¹² We performed corresponding analyses for residuals from a regression where the dependent variable is natural logarithm of standardized annual earnings. Figures B.1.a. and B.1.b. in the appendix present the cumulative distribution functions for these alternative residuals.

we use preferences towards redistribution in the country of origin and in the country of residence to evaluate to what extent fairness preferences are in line with what would be good to people like oneself, even in the country one no longer lives in.

To answer the first question, we analyze what role dummies for different country of residence groups play in explaining attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark, when controlling for characteristics that have been shown earlier to affect attitudes towards redistribution. To do this we run linear probability regression models¹³ controlling for gender, age, family situation (measured by an indicator variable for being married or having a registered partner, and an indicator for having children) and occupational status (*not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled*), first without country of residence group dummies and then with those.

To answer the second and the third question, we compare emigrants' preferences towards redistribution in Denmark and in the country of residence. Preferences towards redistribution in the country of residence depend on both self-interest and fairness considerations, making it difficult to distinguish what is the level of redistribution that a respondent considers fair from the level of redistribution he or she prefers when taking into account also self-interest. Asking about preferences towards redistribution in the country in which one does not live helps to distinguish the role of fairness and altruistic considerations. As self-interest should not affect preferred taxes in one's home country if one does not plan to return, testing the effects of age, occupational status and own income abroad on preferred taxes in one's country of origin allows testing to what extent fairness considerations are in line with what would be good for people like oneself.

We first report as table 5 analysis on to what extent age, family situation and dummies for three occupational categories explain attitudes towards redistribution among Danes living in Denmark. The reference category are those working as low- or medium skilled employees.¹⁴ First column shows that support for redistribution is higher among women and those who are not working and increases in age, in line with what our theoretical model suggests. Among

¹³ Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in all the regressions in the paper. Our results are robust to using ordered logit. Appendix C presents ordered logit results.

¹⁴ The category *high skilled* includes those who are self-employed in a profession (e.g. doctor, dentist, lawyer), working in top management and high skilled workers (e.g. physicists, engineers, doctors and architects). Detailed description of the occupation categories is provided in the appendix.

men, only age has an effect that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, with support for redistribution increasing in age (in the age group 24 to 60, the age restriction being selected to be in line with the age range among survey respondents living abroad). Those who are low- or medium-skilled self-employed are also more negative towards redistribution than low- or medium-skilled employees. Surprisingly, the effect of being in a high-skilled occupation is weak and not statistically significant. Among women, being married reduces support for redistribution.

Table 6 presents a corresponding analysis for Danish emigrants with the same explanatory variables. The key difference with previous literature on attitudes towards redistribution is that these preferences are measured among people not living in the country in question. This helps to minimize the effect of self-interest. The first column shows the results for men and women together, and the following two columns separately. As in Table 5, women are more positive towards increasing redistribution, and the support increases in age. Furthermore, those who are high-skilled are clearly more negative towards increasing redistribution. This suggests that even though respondents would not be directly affected by taxes and transfers in Denmark, they are still more likely to adopt views that would be in line with the interests of people like themselves. The effect of not working is positive although statistically insignificant for men, but negative and statistically significant for women. This can reflect the possibility that many women who are not working are spouses whose partner has so high income that they can afford staying at home. Indeed, Munk et al. (2017) show that female labor force participation among Danish couples that emigrate outside Nordic countries is significantly lower abroad than in Denmark. This pattern is especially pronounced among couples in which only the male partner holds a college degree, as well as among couples migrating to the United States and to non-Western countries. Being married or in a registered partnership reduces support for redistribution among emigrant women, just as among Danish women living in Denmark.

Columns 4 and 5 introduce migration-related variables by including residence country group dummies with *Nordic countries* as the omitted category, and dummies *family related* and *work related* for the purpose of migration. Men migrating for work-related reasons are more negative towards redistribution and male migrants to English-speaking countries, the rest of Western Europe and the rest of the world are more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than migrants to other Nordic countries. Surprisingly, the negative coefficients

for other English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are bigger than the coefficient for the United States, running against the Tiebout sorting intuition that those men who are most negative towards redistribution would be most likely to self-select to the least redistributive country, which is in this case the United States.

Having a high-skilled occupation is the most significant determinant of preferences. However, there are significant differences between men living in different destinations, and migrating for different reasons. The main finding is that the men migrating for work-related reasons and men residing in destinations outside Nordic countries are more negative towards redistribution of income, but these effects are smaller in size than the effects of own occupation. Column 5 shows that the main motivation to emigrate and the country of residence group have no statistically significant effect on the preferences towards redistribution among women. If income is added as control, support for redistribution is decreasing in it among both men and women (see Table B.6 in the appendix, in which the analysis is restricted to respondents who provide income information). The dummy variable for not working loses its effect among women, which can be explained by income information being missing for spouses staying at home. Among both men and women, those with higher gross income prefer less redistribution.¹⁵

A possible explanation for the gender differences in residence country dummies is that many of the women in the data are so called tied migrants who have migrated because their spouse obtained a job abroad. When respondents were asked their main motivations to emigrate, 51 percent of men referred to their own work and 18 percent to partner and family, with most important motivations among the rest being studying and search for adventure. Among women, 42 percent replied that considerations related to partner and family were the main reason to emigrate, and only 21 percent own work.

¹⁵It is plausible that emigrants' preferences towards redistribution in the country of origin should depend on whether they plan to return there. Table B.7 presents the analysis corresponding to that in columns 4 and 5 separately for those with no plans to return to Denmark, and those planning to return, as well as when a dummy is added as a control for plans to return. The results among men and women not planning to return are very close to the results in columns 4 and 5, while the group of those planning to return is so small that no clear differences emerge compared with those not planning to return. Most notably, when return plans are added as a control, men planning to return are somewhat more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark. A possible interpretation is that those who plan to return would prefer less taxes as they would actually be paying them in the future. However, age and occupational status affect preferences in Denmark whether one plans to return, suggesting that people tend to view what would be good for people like them as just, even in a country they do not plan to return to.

To establish the effect of spousal occupation and how it interacts with the main motivation to emigrate, we analyzed separately men and women who emigrated for work-related reasons and those who emigrated for family-related reasons and added a dummy for having a spouse interacted with eventual spouse's occupational status. The analysis, included as table B.8 in the appendix, shows that spousal occupation plays an important role for the preferences of those who emigrated due to family reasons. Having spouse who is high-skilled is related to lower support for redistribution among both men and women who emigrated mainly for family reasons, but has no statistically significant effect on support for redistribution among those who emigrated mainly for reasons related to their own work.

Previous research has shown that individuals who believe that hard work is important for getting ahead in life are less in favor of redistribution (Fong 2001; Corneo and Grüner 2002) and that individuals who believe that others are trustworthy support more redistribution (Algan et al. 2015; Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011). To account for these links, our survey asked for opinions about the determinants of individual success and also an attitude question measuring generalized trust. This allows us to test later whether different attitudes towards redistribution in different destinations reflect different opinions about the determinants of individual success, or differences in generalized trust.¹⁶ Controlling for beliefs about the determinants of success and trust has only relatively small effects on the estimated effects of other variables (see columns 6 and 7). In line with results in Fong (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002), those who highlight the role of own work and choices as the determinants of success are more negative towards increasing redistribution. Those with low trust are also more negative towards redistribution, although the point estimate is statistically insignificant for men.

¹⁶ The measure of beliefs on the determinants of success is based on the survey question: “Which of the following describes your standpoint when it comes to the determinants of material success?” The answer alternatives were “Success is mainly determined by own work and choices”, “Success is about equally determined by own work and choices as well as luck or parental background”, “Success is mainly determined by luck”, and “Success is mainly determined by parental background.” As the last two categories had only few respondents, they are combined in the subsequent analysis. The measure of perceptions on general trustworthiness of people is based on the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The answer alternatives were “Most people can be trusted”, “Don’t know”, and “Need to be very careful”. Tables B.9 and B.10 present the answer distributions by the country of residence. Overall, men highlighted own work and choices somewhat more than women. Those who migrated to the United States highlighted own work and choices most, followed by those going to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The emphasis on own work and choices in English-speaking countries is in line with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) who studied differences between the United States and Europe, finding that the United States is also perceived as a land of opportunities. Trust is highest among migrants to other Nordic countries. This is not surprising, as Nordic countries have exceptionally high levels of trust in international comparison.

Table 7 presents a corresponding analysis concerning redistribution in the current country of residence. The effects of gender, age, occupational status if working, main motivation to emigrate and beliefs about the determinants of success are by-and-large similar as when it comes to preferences towards redistribution in Denmark in Table 6. The effect of trust is also quite similar, and marginally statistically significant also for men. The biggest differences concern country of residence dummies. For men, living in the United States and in the residual group Rest of the world, consisting mainly of non-Western countries, is associated with stronger support for increasing redistribution in the country of residence than living in the reference category of other Nordic countries. This suggests that fairness considerations play a significant role, especially as men living in the United States and in non-Western countries were more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than men living in other Nordic countries. Women living in the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland and the rest of the world support more strongly increasing redistribution in their country of residence than women living in other Nordic countries. The different views about redistribution in Denmark and in the country of residence strongly suggest that respondents can differentiate between the two. If earnings are added as control, support for redistribution is decreasing in it among both men and women, just as when it comes to explaining preferences towards redistribution in Denmark in Table B.6 (see Table B.11 in the appendix, in which the analysis is restricted to respondents who provide earnings information). Also the effects of spousal occupation and its interaction with the main motivation to emigrate for support for redistribution in the country of residence (see Table B.12 in the appendix) are quite similar as in table B.8 for attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark.

To sum up, we find that men who emigrate to non-Nordic destinations are much more negative towards redistribution in Denmark than men who stay in Denmark or migrate to other Nordic countries. This is in line with Tiebout sorting among men between Denmark (and other Nordic countries) and non-Nordic destinations. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence on Tiebout sorting for women. Women who emigrate are much more positive towards redistribution than women who stay in Denmark (and are directly affected by taxes or transfers). Interestingly, though, redistributive preferences that should *a priori* reflect fairness considerations appear to be rather correlated with what would be one's self-interest if still living in Denmark: those in high-skilled jobs and with higher income abroad support less redistribution in Denmark than those in low- or medium-skilled jobs or out of employment.

5.2 The effect altruism towards siblings in Denmark

Since the respondents are themselves living abroad, the level of redistribution in Denmark does not affect their own economic situation directly. However, the respondents could care more deeply about the economic situation of their relatives than about non-relatives. We expect persons whose close ones benefit from income redistribution to be more positive towards it. One possible explanation for this is evolutionary biological. Hamilton (1964a, b) argues that individuals compare benefits of their actions to their kin with the private cost, weighting the benefit by genetic closeness. To test this, we study whether those who have a sibling who clearly benefits from redistribution prefer more redistribution in Denmark. We searched respondents' siblings from the Danish population register, and ran regressions using an indicator variable *benefit* for having a sibling who resided in Denmark and was unemployed or on early retirement in 2007. Unemployment and retirement status are measured at the end of November each year, so the last calendar year before the survey took place was used. As reported in first four columns in table 8, the coefficient for the indicator variable *sibling benefits from redistribution* is statistically insignificant for men, but large, positive and significant for women. Among women, having a sibling who benefits from redistribution is associated with higher support for redistribution in Denmark in both the regression without migration-related variables and with those. In both regressions, the coefficient is of roughly the same size as the negative coefficient for *not working*, and a little over twice as big as the coefficient of having a spouse or a registered partner. The findings suggest that women's support for redistribution is to a greater extent driven by the interest of their kin than men's support. Columns 5 and 6 in table 8 report regressions explaining preferences for redistribution in the country of residence. For both men and women, the coefficient for the indicator variable *sibling benefits from redistribution* is statistically insignificant.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we presented a theory to test whether there is self-selection into emigration according to views about fair level of redistribution, and tested it using our own survey data on Danish emigrants and European Social Survey data on Danes living in Denmark. We found a remarkable gender difference among emigrants: majority of men who have emigrated outside other Nordic countries are against increasing redistribution in Denmark, and majority of women are in favor, independently of where they live. Women are somewhat more positive

towards redistribution also among non-migrants, but the gender difference is much smaller than among emigrants. Furthermore, emigrant men are more negative towards redistribution than men staying in Denmark and emigrant women are more positive than women staying in Denmark. This difference persists if restricting the attention to high-skilled migrants and non-migrants, but becomes weaker if the attention is restricted to those who worked full or close to full time in Denmark in the year before migration.

The results for men are in line with Tiebout sorting according to redistributive preferences. In the absence of Tiebout sorting, we would expect that high-skilled emigrant men would support a higher level of redistribution in their country of origin than high-skilled men still living and paying taxes there. Yet, in all other destinations than other Nordic countries majority of men are clearly more negative towards increasing redistribution in Denmark than men living in Denmark, also if attention is restricted to those working in high-skilled occupations. The attitudes of men living in other Nordic countries are quite similar as the attitudes of men living in Denmark, again in line with Tiebout sorting as other Nordic countries are similar to Denmark in the level of redistribution. Although majority of emigrant men outside other Nordic countries is against increasing redistribution in Denmark, support for increasing redistribution in their current country of residence is somewhat higher and majority of men living in the United States are in favor of increasing redistribution there, suggesting that while Danish level of redistribution is viewed excessive by most men, a similar majority finds redistribution prevailing in the United States too low.

The results among women are opposite to what Tiebout sorting predicts, but in line with economic self-interest: women who no longer pay taxes in Denmark are more positive towards increasing redistribution there, as theory predicts in the absence of Tiebout sorting in redistributive preferences if these women (or their spouses) are high-income earners. Another possible explanation for higher support for redistribution among women is that many welfare services, like childcare, are more salient for women and that women value the Danish welfare state even more after no longer living there. Furthermore, women are somewhat more likely to support increasing redistribution in Denmark if they have a sibling in Denmark who received unemployment or early retirement benefits. For men, having a sibling receiving welfare benefits in Denmark had no statistically significant effect on their views about redistribution.

We also analyzed support for redistribution over whole income distributions. When restricting the attention to migrants who worked full time or close to full time in the year before emigration, we find that the pre-migration earnings distribution of those who are against increasing redistribution almost first-order stochastically dominates that of those who are in favor of increasing redistribution among both men and women. This is not explained by educational composition only: when repeating the analysis with unobservable abilities proxied by residuals from Mincerian earnings regressions, the cumulative distribution function of those against increasing redistribution stochastically dominates that of those supporting more redistribution.

Given that the possibility of migration restricts the scope of governments to redistribute and that the emigrants are so strongly self-selected from upper parts of earnings distribution, an important question arises: how is it possible that Denmark has maintained such a generous redistribution even with free mobility of labor in the European Union? Previously, Abramitzky (2008) found that the Israeli Kibbutzim, communities that historically fully equalized incomes, were more likely to maintain high level of income equality if they had high wealth. Wealth served as a lock-in device that increases value of staying. Similar mechanisms can help to explain why high-skilled emigration from Denmark has remained at a manageable level. Denmark is among the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita, and ranks very highly in terms of safety, lack of corruption and various other quality of life measures.

Our data also sheds light on to what extent fairness preferences are correlated with income in the absence of self-interest. We find that support for redistribution in one's country or origin decreases in one's own income also among emigrants who no longer pay taxes or receive benefits there. Therefore, migrants tend to support policies that are good for people like themselves also if not being directly affected by such policies.

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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics

A. European Social Survey: Number of observations				
	Men		Women	
	432		445	
B. European Social Survey: Descriptive statistics				
Variable	Men		Women	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Age	44.35	10.21	43.78	9.66
Married	0.64	0.48	0.66	0.47
With children	0.51	0.50	0.60	0.49
Not working	0.12	0.33	0.19	0.40
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	0.06	0.23	0.03	0.16
High-skilled	0.28	0.45	0.23	0.42
C. Own survey of Danish emigrants: Number of observations by country of residence				
	Men		Women	
Other Nordic countries	396		443	
UK or Ireland	267		409	
Rest of Western Europe	542		688	
United States	360		294	
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	134		130	
Rest of the world	280		125	
Total	1979		2089	
D. Own survey of Danish emigrants: Descriptive statistics				
	Men		Women	
Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Age	41.10	6.22	39.78	6.18
Married	0.67	0.47	0.68	0.47
With children	0.65	0.48	0.71	0.45
Not working	0.03	0.17	0.21	0.41
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	0.14	0.35	0.12	0.32
High-skilled	0.61	0.49	0.27	0.44

Notes: *With children* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent has children living at home in the European Social Survey and it is a dummy equal to one if the respondent has children, regardless of whether or not they live at home in the survey of Danish emigrants. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership in the European Social Survey and for having a spouse or a registered partner in the survey for Danish emigrants. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The destination country groups are based on the country of residence at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables can be found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 2. Attitudes of non-migrant Danes towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Men	11	32	20	28	10
Women	4	29	21	32	13

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: European Social Survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 3a. Attitudes of emigrant men towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against	somewhat against	neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	23	17	12	30	18
UK or Ireland	38	23	10	20	9
Rest of Western Europe	39	20	8	24	9
United States	31	25	10	21	13
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	35	17	12	20	16
Rest of the world	44	24	7	14	11
Total	35	21	10	22	12

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 3b. Attitudes of emigrant women towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly Against	somewhat against	neutral	somewhat in favor	Strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	15	17	12	32	25
UK or Ireland	16	16	12	32	24
Rest of Western Europe	14	20	13	33	19
United States	17	20	10	30	23
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	13	21	12	36	18
Rest of the world	15	19	12	34	20
Total	15	18	12	33	22

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 4a. Attitudes of emigrant men towards increasing redistribution in the country of residence

	strongly Against	somewhat against	neutral	somewhat in favor	Strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	21	18	11	31	18
UK or Ireland	26	19	9	31	15
Rest of Western Eu- rope	28	21	9	30	11
United States	16	20	6	32	27
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	24	18	12	25	20
Rest of the world	22	17	13	25	24
Total	23	19	10	30	18

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 4b. Attitudes of emigrant women towards increasing redistribution in the country of residence

	strongly Against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	Strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	13	16	10	36	25
UK or Ireland	11	14	8	34	32
Rest of Western Eu- rope	10	17	10	40	23
United States	10	19	5	33	33
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	6	19	8	45	22
Rest of the world	7	10	5	33	45
Total	10	16	8	37	28

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE 5. Preferences of non-migrant Danes towards redistribution in Denmark

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women
Female	0.215*** (0.08)		
Age	0.014*** (0.00)	0.013** (0.01)	0.013** (0.01)
Married	-0.121 (0.09)	0.069 (0.14)	-0.299** (0.12)
With children	0.042 (0.09)	-0.060 (0.13)	0.115 (0.12)
Not working	0.273** (0.11)	0.304 (0.19)	0.216 (0.14)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.525** (0.22)	-0.525* (0.27)	-0.469 (0.40)
High-skilled	-0.092 (0.10)	-0.052 (0.14)	-0.173 (0.14)
Constant	2.425*** (0.20)	2.371*** (0.28)	2.777*** (0.29)
N	877	432	445
r ²	0.0424	0.0370	0.0377

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: European Social Survey round 4. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE 6. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.560*** (0.050)						
Age	0.019*** (0.004)	0.015** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.016** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)
Married	-0.126* (0.053)	-0.012 (0.077)	-0.209** (0.072)	0.024 (0.076)	-0.190** (0.073)	0.014 (0.075)	-0.190** (0.073)
With children	-0.009 (0.054)	0.032 (0.077)	-0.011 (0.076)	-0.027 (0.076)	0.008 (0.078)	-0.012 (0.076)	0.017 (0.077)
Not working	-0.360*** (0.080)	0.253 (0.204)	-0.410*** (0.087)	0.252 (0.196)	-0.415*** (0.089)	0.211 (0.191)	-0.433*** (0.088)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.620*** (0.076)	-0.655*** (0.112)	-0.617*** (0.106)	-0.510*** (0.112)	-0.630*** (0.107)	-0.467*** (0.112)	-0.579*** (0.106)
High-skilled	-0.683*** (0.054)	-0.826*** (0.078)	-0.511*** (0.077)	-0.633*** (0.082)	-0.520*** (0.078)	-0.628*** (0.083)	-0.535*** (0.077)
UK or Ireland				-0.404*** (0.115)	0.055 (0.101)	-0.400*** (0.114)	0.052 (0.100)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.384*** (0.097)	-0.038 (0.087)	-0.398*** (0.096)	-0.055 (0.087)
United States				-0.264* (0.106)	0.002 (0.111)	-0.220* (0.105)	0.024 (0.109)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.401** (0.153)	-0.021 (0.138)	-0.363* (0.149)	0.027 (0.137)
Rest of the world				-0.479*** (0.115)	0.089 (0.147)	-0.492*** (0.115)	0.102 (0.145)
Work related migration				-0.330*** (0.080)	-0.098 (0.089)	-0.325*** (0.078)	-0.097 (0.088)
Partner or family related migration				0.156 (0.099)	-0.136 (0.075)	0.140 (0.098)	-0.156* (0.074)
Own work and choices						-0.390*** (0.065)	-0.372*** (0.066)
Low trust						-0.132 (0.084)	-0.302*** (0.090)
Constant	2.388*** (0.160)	2.538*** (0.229)	2.874*** (0.210)	2.791*** (0.237)	2.863*** (0.229)	3.046*** (0.236)	3.134*** (0.230)
N	3782	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
r2	0.1036	0.0646	0.0444	0.0985	0.0470	0.1167	0.0695

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE 7. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.447*** (0.048)						
Age	0.017*** (0.004)	0.011 (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.013* (0.006)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Married	-0.094 (0.052)	0.023 (0.078)	-0.185** (0.068)	-0.023 (0.079)	-0.188** (0.069)	-0.034 (0.078)	-0.196** (0.068)
With children	-0.067 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.079)	-0.080 (0.072)	-0.023 (0.079)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.006 (0.078)	-0.030 (0.072)
Not working	-0.127 (0.075)	0.410* (0.185)	-0.171* (0.082)	0.379* (0.183)	-0.240** (0.083)	0.331 (0.177)	-0.259** (0.083)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.412*** (0.076)	-0.403*** (0.115)	-0.437*** (0.103)	-0.375** (0.114)	-0.494*** (0.104)	-0.315** (0.114)	-0.436*** (0.101)
High-skilled	-0.423*** (0.053)	-0.510*** (0.077)	-0.314*** (0.074)	-0.446*** (0.081)	-0.339*** (0.074)	-0.443*** (0.081)	-0.356*** (0.073)
UK or Ireland				0.013 (0.117)	0.206* (0.096)	0.029 (0.115)	0.202* (0.095)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.135 (0.095)	0.085 (0.083)	-0.149 (0.094)	0.075 (0.083)
United States				0.423*** (0.106)	0.243* (0.106)	0.479*** (0.104)	0.266* (0.103)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.105 (0.148)	0.176 (0.125)	-0.055 (0.145)	0.231 (0.124)
Rest of the world				0.314** (0.118)	0.653*** (0.136)	0.310** (0.117)	0.663*** (0.134)
Work related migration				-0.272*** (0.080)	-0.083 (0.084)	-0.267*** (0.079)	-0.087 (0.083)
Partner or family related migration				0.188 (0.098)	-0.113 (0.071)	0.164 (0.097)	-0.136 (0.070)
Own work and choices						-0.479*** (0.065)	-0.371*** (0.063)
Low trust						-0.215* (0.087)	-0.357*** (0.089)
Constant	2.733*** (0.157)	2.908*** (0.229)	3.060*** (0.203)	2.856*** (0.236)	2.909*** (0.220)	3.171*** (0.233)	3.196*** (0.221)
N	3894	1933	1961	1933	1961	1933	1961
r2	0.0580	0.0295	0.0259	0.0636	0.0393	0.0922	0.0662


Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing in-come redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE 8. Effects of altruism towards a sibling on emigrant's preferences for redistribution in Denmark and in the country of residence

	(1) Men	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Women	(5) Men	(6) Women
Age	0.015** (0.006)	0.016** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.013* (0.006)	0.023*** (0.005)
Married	-0.013 (0.077)	0.022 (0.076)	-0.209** (0.072)	-0.190** (0.073)	-0.023 (0.079)	-0.187** (0.069)
With children	0.032 (0.077)	-0.026 (0.076)	-0.009 (0.076)	0.010 (0.078)	-0.023 (0.079)	-0.039 (0.073)
Not working	0.251 (0.205)	0.250 (0.196)	-0.407*** (0.087)	-0.412*** (0.089)	0.378* (0.183)	-0.240** (0.084)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.654*** (0.112)	-0.509*** (0.112)	-0.619*** (0.106)	-0.631*** (0.107)	-0.375** (0.114)	-0.495*** (0.104)
High-skilled	-0.824*** (0.078)	-0.632*** (0.082)	-0.513*** (0.077)	-0.522*** (0.078)	-0.446*** (0.081)	-0.340*** (0.074)
Sibling benefits from redistribution	0.125 (0.181)	0.097 (0.178)	0.378* (0.166)	0.382* (0.166)	0.050 (0.191)	0.203 (0.161)
UK or Ireland		-0.402*** (0.115)		0.059 (0.101)	0.014 (0.117)	0.208* (0.096)
Rest of Western Europe		-0.384*** (0.097)		-0.038 (0.087)	-0.135 (0.095)	0.085 (0.083)
United States		-0.263* (0.106)		-0.004 (0.112)	0.424*** (0.106)	0.239* (0.106)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand		-0.400** (0.153)		-0.015 (0.139)	-0.104 (0.148)	0.177 (0.126)
Rest of the world		-0.478*** (0.116)		0.091 (0.147)	0.315** (0.118)	0.654*** (0.136)
Work related		-0.331*** (0.080)		-0.097 (0.089)	-0.272*** (0.080)	-0.082 (0.084)
Partner or family related		0.156 (0.099)		-0.136 (0.075)	0.188 (0.098)	-0.112 (0.071)
Constant	2.536*** (0.229)	2.788*** (0.237)	2.876*** (0.210)	2.862*** (0.228)	2.855*** (0.236)	2.909*** (0.220)
N	1891	1891	1891	1891	1933	1961
r ²	0.0648	0.0986	0.0467	0.0494	0.0636	0.0400


Notes: The table presents OLS results. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 "Strongly against" to 5 "Strongly in favor". In columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is subjective support for income redistribution in the country of residence. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. *Sibling benefits* is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent had a sibling who resided in Denmark and was unemployed or in early retirement in November 2007. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

Figure 1 a. Log standardized annual income according to preferences for increasing redistribution in the year before emigration for men




Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of log standardized annual income from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The standardized income is defined by the ratio of the worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

Figure 1 b. Log standardized annual income according to preferences for redistribution in the year before emigration for women




Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of log standardized annual income from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The standardized income is defined by the ratio of the worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

Figure 2 a. Earnings regression residuals according to preferences for redistribution in the year before emigration for men



Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of earnings regression residuals from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The dependent variable in the regression model is the natural logarithm of annual earnings, in the regression model 1 of Table A.3. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

Figure 2 b. Earnings regression residuals according to preferences for redistribution in the year before emigration for women



Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of earnings regression residuals from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The dependent variable in the regression model is the natural logarithm of annual earnings, in the regression model 2 of Table A.3. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

APPENDIX A: Data and variables

A.1. The survey and register data sources

Registry data were accessed at the Statistics Denmark server and include administrative data on the full population. The data is maintained and provided by Statistics Denmark and is derived from the administrative registers of governmental agencies that are merged using a unique social security number.¹⁷ Survey questions were planned by Martin D. Munk (Aalborg University's Copenhagen campus) and Panu Poutvaara within the project "Danes Abroad: Economic and Social Motivations for Emigration and Return Migration", financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council. The data collection was carried out in 2008 by Statistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark used full population registers from 1987 to 2007 to identify all Danish citizens who had emigrated in 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001 or 2002, were aged at least 18 on their day of emigration and at most 59 by January 2007, and had not returned to Denmark. The survey only included those emigrants who had at least one parent born in Denmark. In web surveys, each respondent had a personalized link that allowed linking responses with population registers. Respondents were informed of the survey's purpose and of how their replies would be used.

A major challenge in reaching Danes living abroad is that there is no address data for them in Danish registers. In total, 17,309 Danes who were aged at least 18 on their day of emigration and at most 59 by 1 January 2007 had not returned to Denmark by 1 January 2007 but had relatives in Denmark. Of these, 9,415 had a parent or sibling living in Denmark with contact information. Statistics Denmark contacted the parents or siblings of all of these individuals. Relatives provided e-mail addresses of 6,984 emigrants. After several tests, the final web-based questionnaire was sent to all emigrants in June 2008, followed by three reminders sent to those who did not reply. By the end of data collection in August 2008, 4,260 had replied. The 61% response rate is very high for web-based surveys. Three respondents who were older than 59 in 2007 were excluded from the subsequent analysis. Table A.8 reports response rates according to the year of emigration and the destination country, including emigrants to Greenland and the Faroe Islands. There are no large differences in response rates. In the final analysis, emigrants whose initial destination or the destination at the time of the survey was Greenland or the Faroe Islands were excluded because these are autonomous territories within Denmark. This provides N=4,068 for the analysis of respondents who have not returned.

A.2. Representativeness of the survey respondents

In our main analysis, we have analyzed survey data without weighting it. This simplifies the analysis and, because response rates for different years of emigration and different destination countries are very similar, weighting would not change the results.

To further investigate representativeness of the data with respect to the target population of emigrants, we construct inverse probability weights following the propensity cell method described in Lewis (2012). In the administrative population data, we can observe the target population of emigrants who satisfy the restrictions to be included in the survey according to the sampling design. As the probability for an individual to be included in our sample depends, for example, on the availability of contact information and on response behavior, this can potentially induce a bias in our regression results if this sample selection is non-random.

To account for a potential bias in our results we first estimate a logit model predicting the probability for an individual in the target population to be in the sample based on gender, emigration year-pair, age, destination country and education. These variables are included as dummy variables derived from the following categories: We distinguish between male and female individuals, 4 emigration year-

¹⁷ All residents in Denmark are legally required to have a social security number. This number is necessary to many activities in daily life, including opening a bank account, receiving wages and salaries or social assistance, obtaining health care, and enrolling in school.

pairs, 4 age categories (22-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59), destination country groups excluding emigrants to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, as well as education categories Less than high school, High school, Vocational school, Advanced vocational, Bachelor, Master's and PhD. As weighting of survey responses is based on the initial destination country of the migrants according to the administrative data, we exclude 166 observations for which information on the initial emigration country differs from our information in the survey. We present our main results with weighting in Tables B.13-B.15.

A.3. Description of some key variables

Preferences for redistribution

In the European Social Survey, the attitudes towards income redistribution are measured by two main questions. Asking respondents to state the level to which they agree or disagree with the statement *"The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"* is used as the main measure of attitudes towards income redistribution. The question uses a five-point scale with 1 indicating "Strongly agree" and 5 indicating "Strongly disagree". For the analysis the values are recoded so that a higher number indicates one is more favorable towards the statement.

In the survey on Danish emigrants, preferences for redistribution in Denmark were measured with the following question: *"What is your opinion of a suggestion to increase taxes on those with high incomes in Denmark, and distribute the money to those with low incomes?"* We used a 5-point scale with 1 indicating "Strongly against" and 5 indicating "Strongly in favor". Correspondingly, the preferences for redistribution in the country of residence were measured with the question *"What is your opinion of a suggestion to increase taxes on those with high incomes in the country you live in, and distribute the money to those with low incomes?"*

Plans to return

The categorical variable *return plans* is based on the question *"Do you plan to go back to Denmark within the next decade?"* Answer options were 1 "No", 2 "Probably no", 3 "Uncertain", 4 "Probably yes", 5 "Yes" and 6 "Don't know". Those who chose option 4 or 5 were defined as planning to return. The dummy variable *plans to return* equals one if the respondent has chosen option 4 or 5 and zero otherwise.

Occupation

For the European Social Survey, the occupation categories are formed as follows: *low or medium skilled self-employed* includes those in ISCO88 groups 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 who have reported working as self-employed and whose self-reported main activity during the last seven days was paid work, *low- or medium-skilled worker* includes those in the same categories who have reported working as employees. *High skilled* includes ISCO88 groups 1 and 2 and whose self-reported main activity during the last seven days was paid work. *Not working* includes those whose main activity during the last seven days was something other than paid work.

For the survey on Danish emigrants, the occupation categories are based on the survey question *"What is your current primary occupation?"* Primary occupation is defined as the type of occupation where you spend most of your working time. Profession is defined as an occupation, which usually involves prolonged academic training, formal qualifications and membership of a professional or regulatory body. The answer options were 1 "Farmer with paid help", 2 "Farmer", 3 "Self-employed workman or craftsman with paid help", 4 "Self-employed workman or craftsman", 5 "Self-employed in a profession (e.g. doctor, dentist, lawyer)", 6 "Self-employed in trade", 7 "Another type of self-employed", 8 "Top management (e.g. decision making, planning and management)", 9 "High skilled worker (e.g. physicist, actuary, construction engineer, doctor and architect)", 10 "Medium skilled worker (e.g. laboratory technician, programmer, photographer and nurse)", 11 "Low skilled worker (e.g. office work, customer service, rescue work) or workman or craftsman", 12 "Unskilled worker", 13 "Assisting spouse (paid)", 14 "Spouse", 15 "Apprentice", 16 "Student", 17 "PhD student", 18 "Retired", 19 "Temporarily unemployed", 20 "Other, write precise occupation, also if it is foreign".

Occupation category *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* consists of answer options 3, 4, 6, and 7, *low- or medium-skilled worker* of options 1, 2, 10, 11, 12 and 13, and *high-skilled* of options 5, 8, and 9. The rest were categorized as *not working*. In regressions, *low- or medium-skilled worker* serves as the omitted category.

Purpose of migration

The purpose of migration dummies are based on the survey question “*What was the main purpose in emigrating?*” The answer options were 1 “Own post/station”, 2 “Post/station of spouse or partner”, 3 “A fixed term appointment”, 4 “Obtain a job abroad, the employment opportunities weren’t good in Denmark”, 5 “Obtain a higher salary”, 6 “Obtain a more interesting job”, 7 “Ordinary studies”, 8 “Exchange studies”, 9 “Improve my language skills”, 10 “Migrate with a partner”, 11 “Migrate to live with a partner already in the country”, 12 “Other family reasons”, 13 “Sabbatical”, 14 “Adventure”, and 15 “Other reasons”. Options 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were classified as *work-related* reasons and 2, 10, 11 and 12 were classified as *partner- or family-related* reasons of migration. In the regressions, the rest of the options are pooled in the omitted category *other reasons*.

Having children

In the survey for Danish emigrants the dummy on having children is based on the survey question “*Do you have children?*” The answer options were 1 “Yes, and at least one child is living with me”, 2 “Yes, but none lives with me today” and 3 “No”. The dummy for having children equals one for options 1 and 2 and zero otherwise.

In the European Social Survey the dummy on having children equals one if the respondent has children living at home.

Country of residence and country groups

Country of residence is the country the respondent was living in at the time of the sampling. The category *rest of Western Europe* includes the rest of EU15 (without Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Finland that are included in other categories) and Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco and Switzerland. Category *rest of the world* includes all the destination countries outside the other five categories (other Nordic countries; UK or Ireland; rest of Western Europe; United States; and Canada, Australia or New Zealand). The most common destination countries for men within the category *rest of the world* are Singapore (10.7%), China (8.6%), Thailand (7.9%), Brazil (5.4%), Hong Kong (5.4%), Poland (4.3%), Japan (3.9%), Malaysia (3.9%) and the United Arab Emirates (3.6%). For women, the most common countries in the category *rest of the world* are Israel (8.0%), Hong Kong (7.2%), South Africa (6.4%), Czech Republic (4.0%), Singapore (4.0%) and Poland (4.0%).

Beliefs on what determines material success

Beliefs on what determines material success were measured with the survey question “*Which of the following best describes your standpoint when it comes to determinants of material success?*” The answer options were 1 “Success is mainly determined by own work and choices”, 2 “Success is about equally determined by own work and choices as well as luck or parental background”, 3 “Success is mainly determined by luck” and 4 “Success is mainly determined by parental background”. The dummy variable *own work and choices* equals one for option 1 and zero otherwise, and is used in the regressions.

Individual trust

Individual trust is measured with a survey question “*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?*” The answer options were 1 “Most people can be trusted”, 2 “Need to be very careful” and 3 “Don’t know”. The dummy variable *low trust* equals one for option 2 and zero otherwise, and is used in the regressions.

APPENDIX B: Additional results

TABLE B.1. Respondents who worked 90% or more of the full working time in the year before migration

A. Number of observations by country of residence				
	Men		Women	
Other Nordic countries	141		91	
UK or Ireland	85		60	
Rest of Western Europe	210		128	
United States	119		49	
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	40		23	
Rest of the world	117		24	
Total	712		375	
B. Descriptive statistics				
	Men		Women	
Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Age	43.52	5.51	43.23	5.23
Married	.72	.45	.74	.44
With children	.72	.45	.74	.44
Not working	.018	.13	.22	.42
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	.12	.32	.07	.26
High-skilled	.68	.47	.33	.47

Notes: *With children* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent has children, regardless of whether they live at home in the survey of Danish emigrants. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership in the European Social Survey and for having a spouse or a registered partner in the survey for Danish emigrants. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The destination country groups are based on the country of residence at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables can be found in the Appendix A.3

Table B.2. Attitudes of non-migrant Danes in a high-skilled occupation towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against	somewhat against	neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Men	11	35	18	23	13
Women	10	32	14	31	13

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: European Social Survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.3a. Attitudes of emigrant men in high-skilled occupation towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	31	19	10	29	12
Other destinations	44	23	8	17	9
Total	42	24	7	12	9

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.3b. Attitudes of emigrant women in high-skilled occupation towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly Against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	25	19	10	28	18
Other destinations	17	20	14	30	20
Total	19	20	13	30	19

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.3c. Attitudes of emigrant men in low- or medium-skilled occupation towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	14	17	15	33	21
Other destinations	19	18	13	36	13
Total	17	18	14	35	16

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.3d. Attitudes of emigrant women in low- or medium-skilled occupation towards increasing redistribution in Denmark

	strongly Against	somewhat against	Neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Other Nordic countries	9	15	14	35	27
Other destinations	9	15	12	37	28
Total	9	15	12	36	27

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.4. Mincerian earnings regressions, by gender

	(1) men		(2) women		(3) men		(4) women	
	B	Se	B	Se	B	Se		
Married	0.065***	(0.00)	-0.020***	(0.00)	0.064***	(0.00)	-0.022***	(0.00)
Children	0.019***	(0.00)	-0.045***	(0.00)	0.019***	(0.00)	-0.045***	(0.00)
High school	0.218***	(0.00)	0.170***	(0.00)	0.217***	(0.00)	0.169***	(0.00)
Vocational school	0.089***	(0.00)	0.092***	(0.00)	0.088***	(0.00)	0.092***	(0.00)
Advanced vocational	0.162***	(0.00)	0.187***	(0.00)	0.161***	(0.00)	0.185***	(0.00)
Bachelor	0.285***	(0.00)	0.211***	(0.00)	0.284***	(0.00)	0.209***	(0.00)
Master's	0.480***	(0.00)	0.527***	(0.00)	0.479***	(0.00)	0.526***	(0.00)
PhD	0.479***	(0.00)	0.601***	(0.00)	0.478***	(0.00)	0.601***	(0.01)
1987	0.055***	(0.00)	0.041***	(0.00)	0.002***	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)
1991	0.247***	(0.00)	0.240***	(0.00)	-0.006***	(0.00)	-0.008***	(0.00)
1992	0.277***	(0.00)	0.273***	(0.00)	-0.011***	(0.00)	-0.009***	(0.00)
1996	0.364***	(0.00)	0.333***	(0.00)	-0.014***	(0.00)	-0.025***	(0.00)
1997	0.387***	(0.00)	0.357***	(0.00)	-0.016***	(0.00)	-0.028***	(0.00)
2000	0.486***	(0.00)	0.460***	(0.00)	-0.020***	(0.00)	-0.030***	(0.00)
2001	0.520***	(0.00)	0.492***	(0.00)	-0.023***	(0.00)	-0.034***	(0.00)
Constant	11.814***	(0.00)	11.646***	(0.00)	-0.119***	(0.00)	-0.099***	(0.00)
Age fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
N	5 189 707		3 679 366		5 189 707		3 679 366	
R-squared	0.3730		0.4286		0.1684		0.1883	

*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Notes: The table reports OLS results for earnings regressions. The dependent variable in models 1 and 2 is natural logarithm of annual earnings. The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is natural logarithm of standardized annual earnings. Standardized earnings are defined by the ratio of a worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients for the age fixed effects are not shown. The category "advanced vocational" includes all the tertiary education programs below the level of a Bachelor's program or equivalent. Programs on this level may be referred to for instance with such terms as community college education, advanced vocational training or associate degree.

TABLE B.5. Attitudes towards increasing redistribution in Denmark among respondents who worked 90% or more of the full working time in the year before migration

	strongly Against	somewhat against	neutral	somewhat in favor	strongly in favor
Men	38	24	9	19	10
Women	20	27	12	25	16

Notes: Subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.6. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark with and without controlling for gross earnings

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Women
Age	0.017** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.007)
Married	0.035 (0.086)	-0.127 (0.093)	0.037 (0.085)	-0.115 (0.093)
With children	0.021 (0.085)	0.068 (0.102)	0.039 (0.084)	0.077 (0.101)
Not working	-0.068 (0.311)	-0.062 (0.218)	-0.060 (0.311)	-0.067 (0.219)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.566*** (0.126)	-0.539*** (0.136)	-0.514*** (0.127)	-0.513*** (0.136)
High-skilled	-0.773*** (0.095)	-0.484*** (0.097)	-0.749*** (0.096)	-0.388*** (0.101)
UK or Ireland	-0.401** (0.125)	0.130 (0.125)	-0.375** (0.125)	0.155 (0.125)
Rest of Western Eu- rope	-0.424*** (0.110)	0.000 (0.111)	-0.402*** (0.109)	-0.013 (0.110)
United States	-0.223 (0.117)	-0.025 (0.157)	-0.198 (0.117)	0.014 (0.156)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.413* (0.174)	-0.072 (0.171)	-0.407* (0.174)	-0.069 (0.171)
Rest of the world	-0.422** (0.129)	0.068 (0.234)	-0.398** (0.129)	0.051 (0.231)
Work related migra- tion	-0.272** (0.089)	-0.170 (0.119)	-0.260** (0.089)	-0.158 (0.119)
Partner or family relat- ed migration	0.233* (0.115)	-0.186 (0.099)	0.227* (0.115)	-0.214* (0.100)
Gross earnings USD1000			-0.003** (0.001)	-0.023** (0.008)
Constant	2.723*** (0.274)	2.610*** (0.310)	2.696*** (0.274)	2.651*** (0.308)
N	1500	1080	1500	1080
r ²	0.1060	0.0453	0.1145	0.0565

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Gross earnings USD1000* is individual labor and/or entrepreneurial income before taxes in 2007 in 1000 USD. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appen-

dix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.7. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark, according to return plans

	(1) Men, no plans to return	(2) Men, plans to return	(3) Men, dummy for plans	(4) Women, no plans to return	(5) Women, plans to return	(6) Women, dummy for plans
Age	0.012* (0.006)	0.033* (0.014)	0.016** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.016 (0.013)	0.023*** (0.005)
Married	0.079 (0.083)	-0.299 (0.191)	0.022 (0.076)	-0.169* (0.080)	-0.281 (0.184)	-0.191** (0.073)
With children	0.025 (0.083)	-0.264 (0.196)	-0.021 (0.076)	0.016 (0.086)	-0.084 (0.186)	0.005 (0.078)
Not working	0.342 (0.223)	-0.061 (0.398)	0.271 (0.195)	-0.301** (0.097)	-0.867*** (0.217)	-0.414*** (0.089)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.549*** (0.120)	-0.357 (0.316)	-0.520*** (0.112)	-0.716*** (0.114)	0.250 (0.278)	-0.632*** (0.107)
High-skilled	-0.654*** (0.088)	-0.536* (0.216)	-0.630*** (0.082)	-0.525*** (0.084)	-0.435* (0.207)	-0.520*** (0.078)
UK or Ireland	-0.304* (0.126)	-0.811** (0.284)	-0.396*** (0.115)	-0.020 (0.109)	0.591* (0.272)	0.058 (0.101)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.339* (0.105)	-0.685** (0.251)	-0.384*** (0.097)	-0.032 (0.091)	0.022 (0.267)	-0.037 (0.087)
United States	-0.268* (0.114)	-0.246 (0.299)	-0.269* (0.106)	-0.088 (0.120)	0.663* (0.303)	0.003 (0.112)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.333* (0.164)	-0.715 (0.423)	-0.395** (0.152)	-0.023 (0.152)	-0.024 (0.345)	-0.019 (0.138)
Rest of the world	-0.433*** (0.129)	-0.672* (0.282)	-0.463*** (0.116)	-0.025 (0.171)	0.677* (0.334)	0.097 (0.148)
Work related	-0.311*** (0.086)	-0.359 (0.232)	-0.320*** (0.080)	-0.093 (0.096)	-0.090 (0.242)	-0.096 (0.089)
Partner or family Related	0.180 (0.106)	0.008 (0.271)	0.157 (0.099)	-0.154 (0.080)	0.038 (0.201)	-0.134 (0.075)
Plans to return			-0.199* (0.087)			-0.044 (0.090)
Constant	2.880*** (0.257)	2.522*** (0.629)	2.839*** (0.239)	2.783*** (0.253)	2.840*** (0.539)	2.879*** (0.230)
N	1596	295	1891	1593	298	1891
r ²	0.0951	0.1500	0.1009	0.0510	0.1269	0.0471

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Plans to return* is a dummy that equals one if the respondent has answered that he/she is planning to return to Denmark probably or with certainty. In columns (1) and (2) only those respondents who plan to return and those who do not, respectively are considered for the analysis. In column (3), *plans to return* are introduced as an additional independent variable. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.8. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark, according to the main purpose of migration

	(1) Men, work- related	(2) Men, family- related	(3) Women, work- related	(4) Women, family- related
Age	0.029*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.011)	0.031* (0.012)	0.019* (0.008)
With children	-0.084 (0.104)	0.362* (0.175)	0.145 (0.156)	0.002 (0.129)
Not working	0.166 (0.387)	0.711** (0.274)	-0.547* (0.250)	-0.241* (0.118)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.612*** (0.164)	-0.280 (0.257)	-0.809*** (0.221)	-0.513** (0.165)
High-skilled	-0.508*** (0.129)	-0.658*** (0.170)	-0.578*** (0.153)	-0.424*** (0.126)
Married*spouse not working	-0.089 (0.126)	-0.280 (0.247)	0.337 (0.231)	0.029 (0.218)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled self-employed	0.397* (0.191)	-0.333 (0.298)	-0.338 (0.270)	-0.190 (0.159)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled	0.029 (0.128)	0.099 (0.210)	-0.039 (0.208)	0.154 (0.143)
Married*spouse high- skilled	0.006 (0.147)	-0.467* (0.218)	-0.168 (0.185)	-0.433*** (0.128)
UK or Ireland	-0.495** (0.157)	-0.305 (0.321)	-0.090 (0.230)	-0.111 (0.151)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.462*** (0.139)	-0.334 (0.213)	-0.184 (0.177)	-0.091 (0.125)
United States	-0.261 (0.158)	0.111 (0.208)	0.014 (0.252)	-0.120 (0.156)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.311 (0.286)	-0.355 (0.284)	-0.750* (0.333)	0.072 (0.173)
Rest of the world	-0.451** (0.157)	-0.638* (0.298)	0.405 (0.239)	-0.184 (0.215)
Constant	1.932*** (0.350)	3.339*** (0.483)	2.445*** (0.516)	2.908*** (0.347)
N	1018	359	431	884
r ²	0.0633	0.1393	0.0930	0.0656

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. Respondents are grouped into two samples based on their self-reported purposes

of migration, namely columns (1) and (3) for work-related migration and columns (2) and (4) for partner or family related migration. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.9a. Emigrant men's opinions on the determinants of material success

	own work and choices	Both	luck or parental background
Other Nordic countries	40	58	2
UK or Ireland	43	57	0
Rest of Western Eu- rope	36	63	1
United States	49	51	0
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	47	53	0
Rest of the world	35	65	0
Total	41	58	1

Notes: Opinions on what determines material success. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.9b. Emigrant women's opinions on the determinants of material success

	own work And Choices	both	luck or parental background
Other Nordic countries	37	61	2
UK or Ireland	36	63	1
Rest of Western Eu- rope	28	71	2
United States	38	61	0
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	45	55	0
Rest of the world	35	64	1
Total	34	64	1

Notes: Opinions on what determines material success. The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.10a. General trust in people among emigrant men

	need to be very careful	don't know	most people can be trusted
Other Nordic countries	11	3	85
UK or Ireland	16	6	79
Rest of Western Eu- rope	16	6	78
United States	17	5	78
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	18	4	78
Rest of the world	24	2	74
Total	16	5	79

Notes: Answers to the survey question “*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?*” The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.10b. General trust in people among emigrant women

	need to be very careful	don't know	most people can be trusted
Other Nordic countries	9	3	88
UK or Ireland	13	6	81
Rest of Western Eu- rope	16	7	77
United States	15	7	78
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	19	4	77
Rest of the world	15	7	78
Total	14	6	80

Notes: Answers to the survey question “*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?*” The numbers are row percentages. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. The country groups refer to the country the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3.

TABLE B.11. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence, with and without controlling for gross earnings

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Women
Age	0.017* (0.006)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.017** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.007)
Married	-0.031 (0.089)	-0.112 (0.087)	-0.028 (0.089)	-0.106 (0.087)
With children	0.009 (0.089)	0.004 (0.095)	0.028 (0.089)	0.013 (0.095)
Not working	0.246 (0.303)	0.100 (0.194)	0.253 (0.303)	0.094 (0.195)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.464*** (0.128)	-0.389** (0.131)	-0.408** (0.128)	-0.370** (0.130)
High-skilled	-0.627*** (0.093)	-0.339*** (0.092)	-0.600*** (0.093)	-0.265** (0.096)
UK or Ireland	0.054 (0.129)	0.255* (0.117)	0.082 (0.129)	0.272* (0.117)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.111 (0.108)	0.120 (0.106)	-0.087 (0.108)	0.107 (0.106)
United States	0.471*** (0.117)	0.203 (0.151)	0.498*** (0.116)	0.230 (0.151)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.182 (0.170)	0.102 (0.157)	-0.176 (0.170)	0.101 (0.158)
Rest of the world	0.367** (0.132)	0.487* (0.213)	0.394** (0.132)	0.475* (0.210)
Work related	-0.185* (0.090)	-0.171 (0.112)	-0.173 (0.090)	-0.160 (0.111)
Partner or family related	0.263* (0.115)	-0.146 (0.094)	0.258* (0.114)	-0.168 (0.094)
Gross income USD1000			-0.003** (0.001)	-0.018** (0.007)
Constant	2.701*** (0.274)	2.573*** (0.291)	2.674*** (0.274)	2.620*** (0.291)
N	1535	1120	1535	1120
r ²	0.0721	0.0372	0.0815	0.0447

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Gross income USD1000* is individual labor and/or entrepreneurial income before taxes in 2007 in 1000 USD. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.12. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence and main motivation to emigrate

	(1) Men, work-related	(2) Women, family-related	(3) Men, work-related	(4) Women, family-related
Age	0.020* (0.008)	0.012 (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.022** (0.008)
With children	-0.013 (0.113)	0.206 (0.181)	0.113 (0.143)	-0.005 (0.123)
Not working	0.524 (0.366)	0.733** (0.234)	-0.407 (0.235)	-0.138 (0.114)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.274 (0.174)	-0.164 (0.264)	-0.677** (0.217)	-0.342* (0.159)
High-skilled	-0.263* (0.128)	-0.389* (0.171)	-0.518*** (0.146)	-0.273* (0.119)
Married*spouse not working	-0.050 (0.136)	-0.163 (0.250)	0.426* (0.199)	-0.126 (0.207)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled self- employed	0.097 (0.188)	-0.542 (0.351)	-0.324 (0.278)	-0.317* (0.154)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled	-0.046 (0.133)	-0.003 (0.210)	-0.097 (0.200)	0.022 (0.135)
Married*spouse high- skilled	-0.169 (0.153)	-0.316 (0.233)	0.012 (0.168)	-0.462*** (0.121)
UK or Ireland	-0.004 (0.160)	-0.053 (0.333)	0.054 (0.221)	0.113 (0.146)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.185 (0.136)	0.010 (0.210)	-0.122 (0.169)	0.059 (0.121)
United States	0.594*** (0.158)	0.402 (0.221)	0.316 (0.234)	0.169 (0.150)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.173 (0.274)	0.107 (0.279)	-0.218 (0.313)	0.208 (0.162)
Rest of the world	0.306 (0.157)	0.178 (0.319)	1.065*** (0.214)	0.497* (0.205)
Constant	2.147*** (0.353)	2.916*** (0.487)	2.986*** (0.509)	2.896*** (0.340)
N	1037	364	436	914
r ²	0.0548	0.0651	0.0990	0.0451

Notes: The table presents OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”.

Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.13. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark, with weighting

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.494*** (0.061)						
Age	0.019*** (0.005)	0.013 (0.007)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.015* (0.007)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)
Married	-0.103 (0.065)	0.054 (0.094)	-0.257** (0.086)	0.129 (0.092)	-0.247** (0.088)	0.105 (0.091)	-0.247** (0.086)
With children	0.041 (0.066)	0.109 (0.092)	0.033 (0.093)	0.011 (0.091)	0.049 (0.096)	0.039 (0.090)	0.050 (0.095)
Not working	-0.252** (0.096)	0.267 (0.240)	-0.322** (0.101)	0.259 (0.219)	-0.339** (0.103)	0.247 (0.204)	-0.343*** (0.103)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.586*** (0.093)	-0.584*** (0.135)	-0.612*** (0.126)	-0.446*** (0.135)	-0.620*** (0.128)	-0.410** (0.134)	-0.564*** (0.128)
High-skilled	-0.652*** (0.066)	-0.776*** (0.093)	-0.474*** (0.095)	-0.585*** (0.098)	-0.480*** (0.096)	-0.582*** (0.099)	-0.491*** (0.094)
United States				-0.284* (0.125)	0.050 (0.129)	-0.235 (0.124)	0.070 (0.127)
UK or Ireland				-0.409** (0.132)	0.097 (0.119)	-0.407** (0.131)	0.091 (0.118)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.414* (0.192)	-0.178 (0.174)	-0.389* (0.186)	-0.128 (0.170)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.436*** (0.119)	-0.051 (0.106)	-0.453*** (0.118)	-0.078 (0.106)
Rest of the world				-0.344* (0.143)	0.119 (0.164)	-0.346* (0.142)	0.120 (0.161)
Work related migration				-0.301** (0.101)	-0.107 (0.106)	-0.295** (0.098)	-0.113 (0.104)
Partner or family related migration				0.149 (0.118)	-0.083 (0.088)	0.134 (0.117)	-0.105 (0.088)
Own work and choices						-0.410*** (0.081)	-0.376*** (0.078)
Low trust						-0.195 (0.102)	-0.244* (0.107)
Constant	2.344*** (0.192)	2.512*** (0.276)	2.753*** (0.250)	2.710*** (0.286)	2.731*** (0.274)	3.028*** (0.279)	2.984*** (0.276)
N	3633	1806	1827	1806	1827	1806	1827
r ²	0.0896	0.0636	0.0467	0.0952	0.0505	0.1163	0.0705

Notes: The table presents weighted OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE B.14. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence, with weighting

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.414*** (0.059)						
Age	0.017*** (0.005)	0.009 (0.007)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.012 (0.007)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)
Married	-0.076 (0.065)	0.052 (0.097)	-0.202* (0.083)	0.045 (0.095)	-0.209* (0.084)	0.015 (0.095)	-0.216** (0.082)
With children	-0.039 (0.066)	0.071 (0.095)	-0.105 (0.090)	0.054 (0.093)	-0.062 (0.089)	0.087 (0.092)	-0.059 (0.088)
Not working	-0.018 (0.090)	0.424 (0.230)	-0.065 (0.096)	0.361 (0.227)	-0.153 (0.097)	0.353 (0.207)	-0.161 (0.097)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.361*** (0.094)	-0.344* (0.140)	-0.396** (0.121)	-0.332* (0.137)	-0.450*** (0.124)	-0.291* (0.136)	-0.383** (0.123)
High-skilled	-0.395*** (0.065)	-0.486*** (0.094)	-0.274** (0.091)	-0.415*** (0.097)	-0.298** (0.091)	-0.418*** (0.098)	-0.311*** (0.089)
United States				0.317* (0.125)	0.236 (0.122)	0.375** (0.122)	0.257* (0.121)
UK or Ireland				0.056 (0.131)	0.174 (0.118)	0.072 (0.128)	0.170 (0.115)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.179 (0.181)	0.120 (0.147)	-0.147 (0.176)	0.177 (0.143)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.199 (0.115)	0.072 (0.101)	-0.212 (0.113)	0.051 (0.100)
Rest of the world				0.443** (0.142)	0.745*** (0.141)	0.460** (0.142)	0.740*** (0.139)
Work related migration				-0.373*** (0.097)	-0.112 (0.099)	-0.368*** (0.095)	-0.125 (0.098)
Partner or family related Migration				0.119 (0.117)	-0.092 (0.084)	0.098 (0.115)	-0.117 (0.083)
Own work and choices						-0.453*** (0.080)	-0.389*** (0.075)
Low trust						-0.285** (0.104)	-0.318** (0.109)
Constant	2.687*** (0.189)	2.898*** (0.274)	2.970*** (0.242)	2.824*** (0.281)	2.887*** (0.267)	3.188*** (0.274)	3.165*** (0.269)
N	3738	1846	1892	1846	1892	1846	1892
r2	0.0514	0.0310	0.0276	0.0707	0.0439	0.0989	0.0695

Notes: The table presents weighted OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.


TABLE B.15. The effect of altruism towards a sibling on emigrant's preferences for redistribution in Denmark, with weighting

	(1) Men	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Women
Age	0.013 (0.007)	0.015* (0.007)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)
Married	0.052 (0.094)	0.127 (0.092)	-0.258** (0.085)	-0.247** (0.087)
With children	0.109 (0.093)	0.011 (0.092)	0.042 (0.092)	0.059 (0.094)
Not working	0.263 (0.241)	0.255 (0.219)	-0.318** (0.101)	-0.333** (0.103)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.581*** (0.135)	-0.442** (0.135)	-0.606*** (0.126)	-0.614*** (0.128)
High-skilled	-0.772*** (0.093)	-0.582*** (0.098)	-0.471*** (0.094)	-0.477*** (0.095)
Sibling benefits from redistribution	0.145 (0.211)	0.141 (0.198)	0.501** (0.159)	0.502** (0.159)
United States		-0.283* (0.125)		0.043 (0.129)
UK or Ireland		-0.407** (0.132)		0.102 (0.119)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand		-0.416* (0.193)		-0.172 (0.174)
Rest of Western Europe		-0.437*** (0.119)		-0.053 (0.105)
Rest of the world		-0.343* (0.142)		0.114 (0.164)
Work related		-0.301** (0.101)		-0.105 (0.105)
Partner or family related		0.148 (0.118)		-0.085 (0.088)
Constant	2.512*** (0.277)	2.710*** (0.287)	2.764*** (0.249)	2.739*** (0.273)
N	1806	1806	1827	1827
r ²	0.0638	0.0955	0.0511	0.0549

Notes: The table presents weighted OLS results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 "Strongly against" to 5 "Strongly in favor". Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. *Sibling benefits* is a dummy variable equaling one if the respondent had a sibling who resided in Denmark and was unemployed or on early retirement in November 2007, or zero otherwise. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.


***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

Figure B.1 a. Earnings regression residuals according to preferences for redistribution in the year before emigration for men



Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of earnings regression residuals from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The dependent variable in the regression model is the natural logarithm of standardized annual earnings, in the regression model 3 of Table B.3. Standardized earnings are defined by the ratio of a worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

Figure B.1 b. Earnings regression residuals according to preferences for redistribution in the year before emigration for women



Notes: Cumulative distribution functions of earnings regression residuals from the year before emigration according to support for increasing redistribution in Denmark. The dependent variable in the regression model is the natural logarithm of standardized annual earnings, in the regression model 4 of Table B.3. Standardized earnings are defined by the ratio of a worker's annual gross earnings to the mean gross earnings of workers of the same age and gender during the calendar year. Those who chose options 1-2 in the question about the support for redistribution in Denmark are classified as having low support and those who chose 3-5 are classified as having high support. The analysis is restricted to respondents who worked full time at least 90% of the year before emigration.

APPENDIX C: Ordered Logit Results

TABLE C.1. Preferences of non-migrant Danes towards redistribution in Denmark

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women
Female	0.325*** (0.13)		
Age	0.021*** (0.01)	0.018** (0.01)	0.021** (0.01)
Married	-0.183 (0.14)	0.119 (0.21)	-0.479** (0.20)
With children	0.046 (0.14)	-0.093 (0.20)	0.175 (0.20)
Not working	0.408** (0.16)	0.454 (0.29)	0.337 (0.21)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.946** (0.42)	-0.864* (0.47)	-1.019 (0.81)
High-skilled	-0.157 (0.16)	-0.110 (0.21)	-0.285 (0.24)
N	877	432	445
Pseudo r2	0.0145	0.0124	0.0134

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: European Social Survey round 4. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.2. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.730*** (0.064)						
Age	0.026*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.020** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.018* (0.007)	0.030*** (0.008)
Married	-0.150* (0.069)	-0.003 (0.098)	-0.261** (0.097)	0.021 (0.099)	-0.239* (0.098)	0.008 (0.099)	-0.239* (0.099)
With children	-0.036 (0.071)	0.011 (0.098)	-0.039 (0.103)	-0.059 (0.099)	-0.010 (0.105)	-0.043 (0.099)	-0.002 (0.105)
Not working	-0.452*** (0.101)	0.379 (0.271)	-0.531*** (0.114)	0.372 (0.265)	-0.538*** (0.118)	0.326 (0.260)	-0.572*** (0.118)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.767*** (0.098)	-0.779*** (0.139)	-0.793*** (0.140)	-0.595*** (0.140)	-0.814*** (0.143)	-0.542*** (0.141)	-0.750*** (0.144)
High-skilled	-0.862*** (0.070)	-1.010*** (0.096)	-0.666*** (0.104)	-0.793*** (0.101)	-0.683*** (0.105)	-0.786*** (0.104)	-0.710*** (0.105)
UK or Ireland				-0.509*** (0.147)	0.079 (0.137)	-0.509*** (0.148)	0.063 (0.138)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.498*** (.124)	-0.071 (.116)	-0.520*** (.125)	-0.102 (.120)
United States				-0.313* (0.133)	.017 (0.152)	-.261* (0.133)	.018 (0.105)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.541** (0.198)	-0.050 (0.177)	-0.501** (0.194)	0.018 (0.178)
Rest of the world				-0.627*** (0.153)	0.106 (0.194)	-0.637*** (0.155)	0.126 (0.194)
Work related migration				-0.406*** (0.103)	-0.119 (0.120)	-0.404*** (0.102)	-0.119 (0.119)
Partner or family related migration				0.191 (0.124)	-0.183 (0.099)	0.171 (0.125)	-0.207* (0.100)
Own work and choices						-0.464*** (0.086)	-0.495*** (0.089)
Low trust						-0.186 (0.113)	-0.401*** (0.118)
N	3782	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
Pseudo r2	0.0345	0.0215	0.0144	0.0331	0.0154	0.0388	0.0230

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing in-come redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.3. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence

	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7) Women
Female	0.578*** (0.063)						
Age	0.023*** (0.005)	0.014* (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.017* (0.007)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.014 (0.007)	0.029*** (0.008)
Married	-0.116 (0.069)	0.039 (0.098)	-0.248* (0.097)	-0.037 (0.101)	-0.260** (0.098)	-0.052 (0.102)	-0.273** (0.099)
With children	-0.101 (0.071)	-0.024 (0.099)	-0.149 (0.102)	-0.009 (0.101)	-0.084 (0.105)	0.014 (0.102)	-0.069 (0.105)
Not working	-0.148 (0.099)	0.604* (0.263)	-0.218 (0.112)	0.574* (0.268)	-0.320** (0.116)	0.546* (0.255)	-0.367** (0.118)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.501*** (0.101)	-0.455** (0.148)	-0.563*** (0.140)	-0.413** (0.149)	-0.654*** (0.144)	-0.343* (0.152)	-0.580*** (0.142)
High-skilled	-0.515*** (0.069)	-0.593*** (0.094)	-0.405*** (0.103)	-0.528*** (0.099)	-0.453*** (0.104)	-0.532*** (0.102)	-0.487*** (0.104)
UK or Ireland				0.022 (0.145)	0.314* (0.136)	0.036 (0.145)	0.305* (0.136)
Rest of Western Europe				-0.164 (0.117)	0.081 (0.113)	-0.186 (0.117)	0.065 (0.115)
United States				0.569*** (0.137)	0.394** (0.152)	0.644*** (0.136)	0.421** (0.153)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand				-0.155 (0.189)	0.168 (0.165)	-0.095 (0.190)	0.249 (0.167)
Rest of the world				0.415** (0.151)	1.010*** (0.212)	0.424** (0.152)	1.043*** (0.214)
Work related migration				-0.345*** (0.102)	-0.061 (0.119)	-0.337*** (0.102)	-0.071 (0.119)
Partner or family related migration				0.234 (0.127)	-0.138 (0.099)	0.208 (0.129)	-0.168 (0.099)
Own work and choices						-0.611*** (0.085)	-0.518*** (0.088)
Low trust						-0.266* (0.112)	-0.500*** (0.125)
N	3894	1933	1961	1933	1961	1933	1961
Pseudo r2	0.0186	0.0094	0.0086	0.0215	0.0145	0.0313	0.0239

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.4. Effects of altruism towards a sibling on emigrant's preferences for redistribution in Denmark and in the country of residence

	(1) Men	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Women	(5) Men	(6) Women
Age	0.018** (0.007)	0.020** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.017* (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)
Married	-0.004 (0.098)	0.020 (0.099)	-0.258** (0.097)	-0.235* (0.098)	-0.037 (0.101)	-0.258** (0.098)
With children	0.010 (0.098)	-0.059 (0.099)	-0.039 (0.102)	-0.011 (0.105)	-0.009 (0.101)	-0.084 (0.105)
Not working	0.373 (0.272)	0.369 (0.266)	-0.532*** (0.114)	-0.537*** (0.118)	0.574* (0.269)	-0.321** (0.116)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.778*** (0.139)	-0.594*** (0.140)	-0.796*** (0.141)	-0.816*** (0.143)	-0.413** (0.149)	-0.654*** (0.144)
High-skilled	-1.009*** (0.096)	-0.792*** (0.101)	-0.669*** (0.104)	-0.685*** (0.105)	-0.528*** (0.099)	-0.454*** (0.103)
Sibling benefits from Redistribution	0.135 (0.220)	0.073 (0.226)	0.524* (0.226)	0.521* (0.229)	0.005 (0.246)	0.289 (0.233)
UK or Ireland		-0.506*** (0.147)		0.087 (0.137)	0.569*** (0.138)	0.388* (0.153)
Rest of Western Europe		-0.497*** (0.124)		-0.070 (0.116)	0.022 (0.146)	0.318* (0.136)
United States		-0.312* (0.134)		-0.040 (0.152)	-0.155 (0.190)	0.169 (0.165)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand		-0.539** (0.199)		-0.040 (0.179)	-0.164 (0.117)	0.080 (0.113)
Rest of the world		-0.625*** (0.153)		0.107 (0.194)	0.415** (0.152)	1.012*** (0.212)
Work related		-0.406*** (0.103)		-0.114 (0.120)	-0.345*** (0.102)	-0.060 (0.119)
Partner or family related		0.191 (0.124)		-0.178 (0.099)	0.234 (0.127)	-0.135 (0.099)
N	1891	1891	1891	1891	1933	1961
Pseudo r2	0.0216	0.0331	0.0153	0.0162	0.0215	0.0148

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 "Strongly against" to 5 "Strongly in favor". In columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the subjective support for income redistribution in the country of residence. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Own work and choices* is a dummy for the survey answer that material success is mainly determined by own work and choices. *Low trust* is a dummy for low trust towards people in general. *Sibling benefits* is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent had a sibling who resided in Denmark and was unemployed or in early retirement in November 2007. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.5. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark with and without controlling for gross earnings

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Women
Age	0.022** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.010)
Married	0.025 (0.114)	-0.171 (0.121)	0.026 (0.114)	-0.146 (0.121)
With children	-0.006 (0.111)	0.076 (0.134)	0.043 (0.111)	0.083 (0.134)
Not working	-0.043 (0.393)	-0.001 (0.316)	-0.025 (0.396)	0.009 (0.322)
Low- or medium-skilled	-0.654*** (0.158)	-0.675*** (0.178)	-0.553*** (0.160)	-0.634*** (0.181)
self-employed				
High-skilled	-0.967*** (0.119)	-0.622*** (0.126)	-0.892*** (0.124)	-0.499*** (0.134)
UK or Ireland	-0.517** (0.162)	0.167 (0.165)	-0.459** (0.163)	0.198 (0.166)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.546*** (0.142)	0.009 (0.146)	-0.505*** (0.143)	-0.020 (0.146)
United States	-0.259 (0.147)	0.036 (0.215)	-0.188 (0.149)	0.092 (0.216)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.574* (0.231)	-0.111 (0.206)	-0.557* (0.230)	-0.116 (0.209)
Rest of the world	-0.551** (0.173)	0.107 (0.301)	-0.494** (0.174)	0.071 (0.299)
Work related migration	-0.330** (0.115)	-0.221 (0.161)	-0.307** (0.118)	-0.206 (0.162)
Partner or family related migration	0.292* (0.146)	-0.254* (0.130)	0.277 (0.147)	-0.297* (0.132)
Gross earnings USD1000			-0.009* (0.004)	-0.032* (0.013)
N	1500	1080	1500	1080
Pseudo r2	0.0356	0.0145	0.0412	0.0184

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Gross earnings USD1000* is individual labor and/or entrepreneurial income before taxes in 2007 in 1000 USD. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.6. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark according to return plans

	(1) Men, no plans to return	(2) Men, plans to return	(3) Men, dummy for plans	(4) Women, no plans to return	(5) Women, plans to return	(6) Women, dummy for plans
Age	0.017* (0.008)	0.038* (0.019)	0.019** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.020 (0.020)	0.033*** (0.008)
Married	0.100 (0.109)	-0.422 (0.255)	0.019 (0.099)	-0.206 (0.109)	-0.405 (0.242)	-0.239* (0.098)
With children	0.009 (0.107)	-0.420 (0.270)	-0.050 (0.099)	-0.004 (0.118)	-0.077 (0.244)	-0.013 (0.106)
Not working	0.538 (0.316)	-0.136 (0.489)	0.406 (0.263)	-0.404** (0.129)	-1.129*** (0.292)	-0.537*** (0.118)
Low- or medium- skilled self-employed	-0.644*** (0.150)	-0.434 (0.410)	-0.609*** (0.141)	-0.932*** (0.155)	0.320 (0.366)	-0.816*** (0.143)
High-skilled	-0.810*** (0.110)	-0.741** (0.274)	-0.790*** (0.101)	-0.694*** (0.114)	-0.568 (0.290)	-0.683*** (0.105)
UK or Ireland	-0.371* (0.159)	-1.212** (0.389)	-0.502*** (0.146)	-0.022 (0.148)	0.833* (0.382)	0.081 (0.138)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.453*** (0.136)	-0.841** (0.314)	-0.498*** (0.124)	-0.069 (0.124)	0.012 (0.359)	-0.070 (0.116)
United States	-0.321* (0.144)	-0.303 (0.381)	-0.323* (0.134)	-0.093 (0.166)	-0.781 (0.406)	-0.019 (0.152)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.471* (0.211)	-1.079 (0.639)	-0.541** (0.198)	-0.040 (0.201)	-0.056 (0.415)	-0.047 (0.178)
Rest of the world	-0.544** (0.169)	-1.045** (0.387)	-0.609*** (0.154)	-0.072 (0.220)	0.975* (0.483)	0.114 (0.195)
Work related	-0.382*** (0.111)	-0.479 (0.310)	-0.392*** (0.103)	-0.129 (0.130)	-0.065 (0.335)	-0.117 (0.120)
Partner or family Related	0.218 (0.135)	-0.008 (0.350)	0.196 (0.124)	-0.202 (0.107)	-0.009 (0.266)	-0.181 (0.099)
Plans to return			-0.289* (0.116)			-0.043 (0.119)
N	1596	295	1891	1593	298	1891
r ²	0.0315	0.0592	0.0342	0.0166	0.0440	0.0154

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Plans to return* is a dummy that equals one if the respondent has answered that he/she is planning to return to Denmark probably or with certainty. In columns (1) and (2) only those respondents who plan to return and those who do not, respectively are considered for the analysis. In column (3), *plans to return* are introduced as an additional independent variable. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.7. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in Denmark, according to the main purpose of migration

	(1) Men, work-related	(2) Men, family-related	(3) Women, work-related	(4) Women, family-related
Age	0.037*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.015)	0.042* (0.017)	0.029* (0.011)
With children	-0.133 (0.137)	0.423 (0.237)	0.146 (0.204)	-0.045 (0.180)
Not working	0.216 (0.543)	0.926* (0.432)	-0.697* (0.321)	-0.324* (0.158)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.731*** (0.205)	-0.187 (0.363)	-1.022*** (0.285)	-0.669** (0.226)
High-skilled	-0.696*** (0.158)	-0.787*** (0.225)	-0.722*** (0.209)	-0.569*** (0.168)
Married*spouse not working	-0.155 (0.170)	-0.355 (0.330)	0.350 (0.298)	0.170 (0.320)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled self- employed	0.465 (0.246)	-0.491 (0.348)	-0.428 (0.357)	-0.205 (0.207)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled	-0.023 (0.173)	0.119 (0.285)	-0.128 (0.259)	0.260 (0.196)
Married*spouse high-skilled	-0.035 (0.199)	-0.596* (0.290)	-0.196 (0.247)	-0.525** (0.172)
UK or Ireland	-0.633** (0.207)	-0.458 (0.432)	-0.125 (0.316)	-0.148 (0.205)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.590** (0.181)	-0.490 (0.290)	-0.250 (0.236)	-0.106 (0.167)
United States	-0.312 (0.204)	0.112 (0.261)	0.094 (0.359)	-0.142 (0.215)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.486 (0.390)	-0.433 (0.370)	-0.843* (0.379)	0.096 (0.231)
Rest of the world	-0.616** (0.213)	-0.899* (0.433)	0.521 (0.334)	-0.267 (0.277)
N	1018	359	431	884
Pseudo r2	0.0217	0.0454	0.0290	0.0216

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in Denmark on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. Respondents are grouped into two samples based on their self-reported purposes of migration, namely columns (1) and (3) for work-related migration and columns (2) and (4) for partner or family related migration. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.8. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence, according to the main purpose of migration

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Women
Age	0.022** (0.008)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.022** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.010)
Married	-0.036 (0.114)	-0.160 (0.121)	-0.042 (0.115)	-0.150 (0.122)
With children	0.034 (0.113)	-0.034 (0.134)	0.085 (0.115)	-0.018 (0.134)
Not working	0.402 (0.409)	0.203 (0.291)	0.427 (0.410)	0.207 (0.294)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.526** (0.168)	-0.479** (0.179)	-0.436** (0.169)	-0.450* (0.180)
High-skilled	-0.755*** (0.116)	-0.442*** (0.125)	-0.684*** (0.120)	-0.347** (0.131)
UK or Ireland	0.060 (0.160)	0.341* (0.162)	0.126 (0.161)	0.363* (0.163)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.140 (0.134)	0.149 (0.142)	-0.097 (0.135)	0.127 (0.142)
United States	0.607*** (0.150)	0.388 (0.218)	0.689*** (0.153)	0.439* (0.220)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.260 (0.219)	0.048 (0.195)	-0.257 (0.220)	0.045 (0.198)
Rest of the world	0.474** (0.171)	0.712* (0.310)	0.537** (0.171)	0.689* (0.311)
Work related	-0.233* (0.114)	-0.176 (0.157)	-0.205 (0.117)	-0.167 (0.156)
Partner or family related	0.336* (0.151)	-0.185 (0.129)	0.338* (0.150)	-0.217 (0.130)
Gross income USD1000			-0.008* (0.003)	-0.023* (0.009)
N	1535	1120	1535	1120
Pseudo r2	0.0242	0.0126	0.0296	0.0151

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. *Gross income USD1000* is individual labor and/or entrepreneurial income before taxes in 2007 in 1000 USD. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

TABLE C.9. Preferences of emigrants for redistribution in the country of residence and main motivation to emigrate

	(1) Men, work-related	(2) Women, family-related	(3) Men, work-related	(4) Women, family-related
Age	0.026* (0.011)	0.016 (0.016)	0.027 (0.018)	0.030** (0.011)
With children	-0.003 (0.145)	0.309 (0.240)	0.145 (0.205)	-0.094 (0.183)
Not working	0.838 (0.538)	1.050** (0.400)	-0.587 (0.325)	-0.191 (0.158)
Low- or medium-skilled self-employed	-0.355 (0.221)	0.035 (0.384)	-0.970** (0.298)	-0.458* (0.223)
High-skilled	-0.345* (0.156)	-0.372 (0.219)	-0.652** (0.215)	-0.382* (0.165)
Married*spouse not working	-0.084 (0.173)	-0.248 (0.327)	0.494 (0.286)	-0.020 (0.316)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled self-employed	0.133 (0.235)	-0.786 (0.435)	-0.449 (0.413)	-0.374 (0.215)
Married*spouse low- or medium-skilled	-0.094 (0.171)	0.031 (0.280)	-0.246 (0.266)	0.091 (0.198)
Married*spouse high-Skilled	-0.224 (0.196)	-0.433 (0.311)	0.033 (0.241)	-0.599*** (0.169)
UK or Ireland	-0.020 (0.199)	-0.074 (0.441)	0.133 (0.316)	0.158 (0.208)
Rest of Western Europe	-0.221 (0.169)	-0.002 (0.272)	-0.163 (0.228)	0.057 (0.166)
United States	0.781*** (0.205)	0.559 (0.298)	0.578 (0.356)	0.304 (0.217)
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand	-0.288 (0.344)	0.098 (0.366)	-0.340 (0.351)	0.211 (0.220)
Rest of the world	0.387 (0.201)	0.252 (0.411)	2.093*** (0.451)	0.682* (0.302)
N	1037	364	436	914
Pseudo r2	0.0187	0.0231	0.0429	0.0163

Notes: The table presents ordered logit results. The dependent variable is subjective support for increasing income redistribution in the country of residence on a five-point scale from 1 “Strongly against” to 5 “Strongly in favor”. Data source: survey on Danish emigrants. *With children* is a dummy for having children, regardless of whether they live with the respondent. *Married* is a dummy for being married or in a civil partnership. *Not working*, *low- or medium-skilled self-employed* and *high-skilled* are dummies for occupation categories. The reference category is *low- or medium-skilled worker*. The country group dummies refer to the group of countries the migrant resides in at the time of the survey. *Work related migration* and *partner or family related migration* are dummies for self-reported purposes of migration. Detailed information on the construction of variables is found in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.

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