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‘Can you pass the salt?’ The legitimacy of international institutions and indirect speech

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Abstract
This article introduces the concept of indirect speech and shows what it can contribute to understanding ‘legitimacy talk’ regarding international institutions. Indirect speech occurs when one kind of illocutionary act is used to communicate another. Examples include euphemism, some forms of politeness and when a request is expressed as a question (‘Can you pass the salt?’). Transporting concepts from pragmatics and sociolinguistics, this article argues that legitimacy talk often serves this function in international politics, operating by expressing specific requests in the form of more generalized legitimacy claims. Understanding this double role of legitimacy talk sheds light on otherwise puzzling empirical phenomena, such as why states frame their demands in terms of legitimacy when they are transparently self-serving, why states with different interests can nonetheless express their demands in the same terms, and why they persist in doing so long after there is any realistic hope of being ‘persuasive’. An analysis of the debate on Security Council reform illustrates the benefits of this approach for the study of international relations.

Keywords
Dialogue, diplomacy, institutions, legitimacy, rhetoric, Security Council

Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. (George Orwell, Politics and the English Language 1946/2002)

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Introduction

The nature of legitimacy — what it is, how it works and its causal significance — has been of growing interest in the scholarship on international institutions, and global governance more broadly (Barnett, 1997; Brassett and Tsingou, 2011; Coicaud and Heiskanen, 2001; Hurd, 1999; Reus-Smit, 2007; Risse, 2004; Seabrooke, 2007; Steffek, 2003; Zürn, 2004). Shifting away from a primarily normative focus on legitimacy as an evaluative criterion (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Coleman and Porter, 2000), the perceived legitimacy of international institutions has increasingly been exposed to empirical appraisal (Bernstein, 2011; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011; Hurd, 2007a; Steffek, 2003; Symons, 2011).

Because legitimacy cannot be directly observed, empirical legitimacy research relies on proxy indicators. Increasingly, scholars have turned to the analysis of public communications and statements as a methodology for the empirical study of legitimacy and the process of legitimation (Binder and Heupel, 2014; Eisentraut, 2013; Haunss, 2007; Schmidtke and Nullmeier, 2011; Schneider et al., 2007; Steffek, 2003). In contrast to survey-based approaches, which ask members of a political community what they think about the legitimacy of institutions (Gibson et al., 2005; Weatherford, 1992), communication-based approaches study what members say about the legitimacy of institutions. Ian Hurd (2007b: 203) argues that ‘States (and people) appear to find it irresistible to provide a justification for their behaviour’, and according to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 892), this need for justification will ‘leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study’. Consequently, central to the empirical turn in legitimacy research has been a shift towards textual and discursive analysis as the central methodology in uncovering, classifying and measuring processes of legitimation.

This communicative turn in legitimacy research throws up some fundamental questions: ‘What status should we accord appeals to normative principles in international politics?’; and ‘What role do they play in accounting for behaviour?’. This article proposes a new approach to such questions by suggesting that legitimacy talk in international politics can — sometimes — serve as a form of indirect speech. Legitimacy talk occurs when speakers invoke normative claims in order to evaluate and make demands on an institution in a public communicative setting, while indirect speech refers to the expression of one meaning via another. Approaching legitimacy talk through the theory of indirect speech suggests how normative appeals can be used in a way that expresses specific requests in the form of a more generalized legitimacy claim. This also helps to clarify some important empirical puzzles regarding how legitimacy claims are wielded in world politics, such as why states frame their demands in terms of legitimacy when they are transparently self-serving, why states converge on common vocabularies of legitimation despite attaching very different meanings to them, and why they persist in doing so long after there is any realistic hope of being ‘persuasive’. These arguments are developed through a study of legitimacy claims made by states regarding the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The article clarifies what indirect speech is and how it functions, illustrates its communicative mechanisms with examples drawn from international politics, and applies it to the empirical case of legitimacy claims made in negotiations over Security Council reform.
The article proceeds as follows. First, indirect speech is defined and contrasted to other approaches to international communication, such as arguing, bargaining and rhetorical action. The second section elaborates on the concept, role and mechanisms of indirect speech. It highlights the functionality of indirect speech to international communication, and elaborates scope conditions under which legitimacy talk is likely to fulfil this function. Third, the theory’s analytical value is illustrated by application to the ongoing intergovernmental debates about the reform of the Security Council. It is argued that, in many respects, the language of the ‘legitimacy’ of the Security Council has effectively become an important indirect medium with which states can advance their own interest-based demands.

The legitimacy of international institutions and interstate communication

Whereas international institutions have traditionally been approached from a rationalist perspective as mechanisms by which states realize mutual gains from cooperation, it has become increasingly common to associate international institutions with the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy has been identified as one of the three major mechanisms that underpin international orders and institutions, along with coercion and shared interests (Hurd, 1999; Hurrell, 2005; Kratochwil, 1984). Legitimacy conveys a reason for a member to comply with an institution not out of coercion or inducement, but out of normative conviction. At the same time as international institutions require legitimacy in order to command support, states appeal to notions of legitimacy when they advance their claims. Legitimacy then becomes the subject of political contestation. Dynamics of legitimation and delegitimation ensue, in which states seek to utilize and manipulate symbols of legitimacy at the same time as international institutions seek to shore up their legitimacy by appealing to these — potentially conflicting — legitimacy demands.

The use by states of normative arguments and claims about legitimacy has been the subject of a rich body of theoretical literature. These approaches take legitimacy talk — public statements about legitimacy and standards of legitimacy — as their major empirical domain. This literature has approached legitimacy primarily in two ways. One is to approach legitimacy talk as an indicator of legitimacy perceptions or beliefs. Such research has primarily focused on such questions as: ‘To what extent are international institutions regarded as legitimate?’; and ‘What standards of legitimacy are considered relevant to their evaluation?’ (Binder and Heupel, 2014; Eisentraut, 2013; Rixen and Zangl, 2012; Schmidtke and Nullmeier, 2011; Schneider et al., 2007). Others are sceptical of attempts to ‘measure’ legitimacy (Hurd, 2014), and have sought to theorize legitimacy claims and normative appeals as part of a discursive process that is worthy of investigation in its own right (for overviews, see Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Such theories have sought answers to such questions as: ‘What do these legitimacy claims mean?’; ‘What status should we accord legitimacy claims in international public life?’, and ‘Should we pay attention to motives and intentions in order to interpret their meaning and impact?’. In general, ‘How is this discursive process to be understood?’ These are the questions addressed by theories of communicative behaviour.
Existing accounts of communicative behaviour fall broadly into three clusters: theories of arguing, bargaining and rhetorical action. Sometimes, these theories are seen as if they are embedded in different social theories, different ‘logics of action’, with incommensurate ontologies. However, it is also possible that each of these perspectives derives its theoretical arguments by departing from different forms of speech act (Müller, 2004: 397). Speech acts are linguistic utterances that use communicative symbols (such as words) to convey meaning for a particular purpose (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1964; Skinner, 2002: 90–127). We refer to ‘speech acts’ to acknowledge the fact that when we communicate, we are also doing something, such as describing, greeting or satirizing. From a speech act standpoint, bargaining is aimed at realizing preferences through the strategic exchange of information, threats and promises. As such, rationalist bargaining theory has tended to discard ostensibly moral discourses as a focus of investigation (Fearon, 2003; Powell, 2002). The basic assumptions of rationalist theory render legitimacy talk puzzling. Arguing consists of exchanging legitimacy claims as part of a sincere deliberative process to find out what is true or normatively valid — what Habermas referred to as ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1981; see also Deitelhoff, 2009; Risse, 2000). Between the two lies the notion of ‘rhetorical action’ (Schimmelfennig, 1997, 2001) or the ‘strategic use of norms’ (Hurd, 2005). Rhetorical action consists of legitimacy claims as statements that are strategically driven, but which present themselves as sincere and deliberative. This disingenuousness does not make them inconsequential, however. According to accounts of rhetorical action, even if states do utilize legitimacy claims strategically, their claims may be effective if they strike a chord with others’ prior normative commitments (Hurd, 2005). Moreover, this is often said to be a risky strategy. As Hurd (2008: 213) explains: ‘public statements about a principle of legitimation might be turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can’t escape’. As a consequence, invoking beliefs about legitimacy can expose states to rhetorical entrapment and the civilizing force of hypocrisy (Elster, 1995; Finnemore, 2009: 72–76; Skinner, 2002: 145–157; Weaver, 2008).

In contrast to arguing, bargaining and rhetorical action, indirect speech is not defined by any particular communicative intention. It is largely variance in their illocutionary and perlocutionary forces that differentiates not just ‘arguing’ and ‘bargaining’ (Müller, 2004: 397), but also varieties of dissembling, such as lying and bullshitting (Seymour, 2014: 574–578). By contrast, indirect speech simply conveys one utterance indirectly through the performance of another. ‘Indirect speech acts’ were defined originally by John Searle (1975: 60–61) as utterances in which:

the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and non-linguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.

The most basic and widely given example is the utterance ‘Can you pass the salt?’. This conveys the request ‘Pass me the salt’ indirectly by raising a factual question (Asher and Lascarides, 2001: 183; Green, 2009; Lee and Pinker, 2010: 785; Searle, 1975: 65).
Other common forms of indirect speech include politeness, euphemism, innuendo, metaphor, circumlocution and doublespeak (Obeng, 1997: 53; Pinker et al., 2008: 833).

Indirect speech can be utilized in order to inform, ask questions, issue commands, give warnings or communicate any other illocutionary force. Moreover, despite some commonalities, indirect speech differs from rhetorical action and other forms of dissembling rhetoric. Rhetorical action uses normative arguments strategically for the purposes of convincing and persuading others. Using legitimacy talk as indirect speech, by contrast, is not primarily intended to convince or persuade, but to communicate preferences or beliefs indirectly. Although indirect speech may also create a discrepancy between public rhetoric and real intentions, in indirect speech, this discrepancy is entirely deliberate and overt. Moreover, unlike forms of ‘dissimulative rhetoric’, such as lying or hypocrisy (Seymour, 2014: 575), indirect speech is not intended to deceive. While its semantic meaning may appear disingenuous (‘Can you pass the salt?’), its intended meaning is perfectly sincere.

If legitimacy talk can sometimes operate as indirect speech, this would also give rise to different empirical predictions. Despite its strengths, rhetorical action has been criticized because if every actor was really engaged purely in rhetorical action, they would all engage in highfalutin legitimacy claims without actually convincing anybody. For this reason, Habermasians see rhetorical action as the ‘slippery slope’ towards genuine deliberation, as the actors are forced to come up with ever-more sophisticated justifications for their positions or face reputational costs for repeating their claims ad infinitum (Müller, 2004: 406; Risse, 2000: 8–9). Moreover, it would become non-rational for pure strategists to continue to invoke normative principles in support of their claims if their addressees were not open to persuasion — rhetorical action therefore only works if there is a chance that arguing can occur (Müller, 2004: 406). However, what if states do, indeed, use legitimacy talk in a transparently self-serving manner, and persist in doing so long after there is any realistic hope of being ‘persuasive’? The proposition that legitimacy talk can, under certain conditions, fulfill the role of indirect speech offers an alternative explanation that can make sense of such puzzles. Approaching legitimacy claims as a form of indirect speech predicts that states may persist in using ‘arguments’ about legitimacy long after they have lost any reasonable expectation of persuading others. This is because legitimacy talk is often tendered not in an attempt to be persuasive, but to issue statements and requests indirectly. As will be illustrated later in this article, legitimacy talk may become ritualized as a euphemism for straightforward bargaining.

If legitimacy talk often serves the purpose of indirect speech, this would challenge some of the explanatory power of theories about arguing and rhetorical action. What may appear on the surface as genuine attempts to deliberate, or even as attempts to strategically persuade others of a certain argument, may, in fact, be forms of indirect speech in which generalized normative language is used in order to bargain indirectly. From a rationalist perspective, however, the proposition that legitimacy talk can be a form of indirect speech is counter-intuitive: why would an actor use the vocabulary of legitimacy if they could communicate the same information in a more direct form? The next section addresses this puzzle by outlining the rational logic of indirect speech in international politics.
The logic of indirect speech and international politics

Speech act theory emphasizes that the meaning of an utterance is deeply dependent not only on its semantic content, but also on contextual factors, such as the speaker’s illocutionary intent and the social context of communication (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1964; Skinner, 2002: 90–102). Language does not simply convey information, but must also be attuned to the social environment in which communication takes place. Politeness theorists suggest that at the same time as transmitting information, social communication must navigate the dynamics of existing social relationships (Lee and Pinker, 2010: 794–795; Pinker et al., 2008: 835). Consequently, linguists have noted that politeness is a key mechanism for mitigating conflict, and is a feature of nearly all linguistic groups: a ‘universal in language use’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson’s classic formulation of politeness theory suggests that politeness emerged as the mechanism by which parties to communication collaborate with each other in order to save ‘face’. Issuing requests, making offers and tendering compliments all have the capacity to threaten the face-wants of both the person speaking and the addressee. Consequently, politeness arises as a means of minimizing these ‘face-threatening acts’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61–64). Many sociolinguistic interpretations of politeness emphasize its role in reducing friction in personal interactions, often by offering muted ways to express criticisms or demands (Watts, 2005: 45–47). As such, the competent conduct of language and behaviour is fundamental to human cooperation and the formation of social orders (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 21).

Steven Pinker (2007a, 2007b) has critiqued this understanding of politeness for its neglect of the conflictual side of human interactions. Human relationships always involve a mixture of cooperation and conflict, of collaboration and competition. Consequently, language must be used in a way that allows speakers to pursue their interests while preserving the possibilities for mutual cooperation. In this way, politeness is ultimately interpreted as a method for communities to regulate internal aggression. If cooperation within a social group is to be maintained, statements need to be attuned to the logics of appropriateness relevant to a given relationship. This can often be achieved through politeness and other forms of indirectness in communication.

Despite such linguistic devices being particularly common in domestic politics (Obeng, 1997; Wodak, 2007), indirect speech has been neglected in International Relations. This is surprising when one considers that diplomacy is rife with indirect speech. Here, the logic of indirect speech is explicated using examples drawn from international politics. As Pinker and others observe, although indirect speech is nearly ubiquitous, from a rationalist approach to communication, it would appear inefficient, vulnerable to being misunderstood and (strictly speaking) unnecessary. Nonetheless, it can serve valuable functions (Pinker et al., 2008: 833).

Plausible deniability

One function of indirect speech is to create plausible deniability. This is particularly relevant in situations where a direct statement might entail considerable social, legal or material costs. An example is attempting to bribe a police officer over a speeding
ticket. Here, the direct proposition of a bribe runs the risk of encountering an honest police officer who will arrest the driver for tendering a bribe. In contrast, an indirect speech act with only the ‘implicature’ (Grice, 1975) of a bribe preserves plausible deniability (‘Perhaps we can take care of the ticket right here?’). In such cases, an off-record indirect speech act preserves plausible deniability in situations where a direct statement is likely to attract legal and material sanctions. By communicating indirectly, it is possible both to send a message or request and to immunize against adversarial reactions by opponents. The reason is that indirect speech preserves the possibility for the speaker to deny to hostile audiences their true intentions. Without the definitive proof of an explicit and direct claim, hostile listeners are deprived of the opportunity to refute the claim directly.

A clear example of indirect speech being used in order to preserve plausible deniability is the modern avoidance of official declarations of war. It has been persuasively argued that states no longer declare war due to the high legal standards that are now expected of states under *jus in bello* (Fazal, 2012). Consequently, it is better to declare war ‘indirectly’ using more loosely worded ultimatums that threaten ‘military conflict’, as the US did in its ultimatum to Iraq in 2003 (Bush, 2003). In the same way, it may be possible for emerging major powers to be able to deny accusations that they seek new great power privileges by employing legitimacy talk, such as by calling instead for greater ‘equity’ or ‘democracy’ in international affairs.

**Maintain social relationships**

A second function of indirect speech lies in its capacity to negotiate the demands of *social relationships*. As the original domain of politeness theory, this is particularly relevant to the logic of politeness and euphemism. Language always serves two functions: to communicate information and to negotiate appropriate forms of intercourse based on relationship type (Lee and Pinker, 2010: 794–795; Pinker, 2007a; Pinker et al., 2008: 835). The type of relationship between actors determines the kind of communication and behaviour that will be considered acceptable and appropriate:

People achieve these dual ends by using language at two levels. The literal form of a sentence is consistent with the safest relationship between speaker and hearer. At the same time, by implicating a meaning between the lines, the speaker counts on the listener to infer its real intent, which may initiate a different relationship. (Pinker et al., 2008: 835)

This appears to be compatible with Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of ‘euphemization’. According to Bourdieu (1977: 191), euphemisms are an attempt to negotiate the gap between what it is we want to say and what is ‘allowed’ to be spoken. In principle, the logic of politeness and euphemism in this context is isomorphic to that of preserving plausible deniability, but where legal or material costs are replaced by ‘awkwardness’, social sanctions or loss of face (Pinker et al., 2008: 836). Common techniques in this repertoire are, *inter alia*, the use of alternative verbal moods to avoid making direct commands, disguising commands as observations and, as shall be argued later, issuing requests in the form of legitimacy claims.
Conveying requests indirectly, then, becomes useful to avoid the presumptuousness of simply demanding compliance. This is so widespread as to often be taken for granted, yet can persist in even the most adversarial kinds of diplomatic relationships. A good example of this form of indirect speech in a case of an adversarial relationship occurred in February 2010, when the US wanted to tell the government of Syria to stop transferring Scud-D ballistic missiles to Hezbollah. Rather than issue a command backed with an explicit threat, using careful and precise language, the US let Syria know about its ‘deep concern’ about the transfers, and observed:

Your interest in avoiding war should require you to exert maximum restraint … I know you are a strategic thinker, which is why I want to underscore for you that, from our perspective, your operational support for Hizballah is a strategic miscalculation that is damaging your long-term national interests. (Wikileaks Cable, 2010)

In this way, the US made use of indirect speech. A threat was conveyed, but in a euphemized manner that respected the etiquette of the social relationship: diplomatic communication between sovereign countries. It can be hypothesized that legitimacy claims can serve the same purpose by articulating potentially face-threatening demands in language appropriate to the diplomatic code.

Preserve individuality of knowledge

Finally, it is important to point out that these mechanisms can apply even in cases where indirect requests and euphemisms are so widely understood that there can be no truly plausible deniability on behalf of the sender (Lee and Pinker, 2010: 795–797; Pinker et al., 2008: 836–838). In cases of iterated interaction in which the costs of a breakdown in social relations is high, it may remain in everybody’s interests not to acknowledge openly that a violation of social comportment has taken place — to avoid losing face. This ensures that the ‘individual knowledge’ conveyed by the implicature of the indirect message is not converted into the ‘common knowledge’ that the implicature has been made public. Both parties to a discussion may share a common interest in overlooking obvious transgressions in the interests of preserving a common ‘public transcript’ (Scott, 1985): ‘For these reasons people may be reluctant to acknowledge relational breaches lightly, and indirect speech can cater to this reluctance by attenuating the common knowledge that would render ignoring the breach an impossible charade’ (Lee and Pinker, 2010: 797).

A final example from the domain of international politics can be used to illustrate this third dimension of indirect speech. During the Crimean crisis of 2014, Germany, a country with strong trading ties with Russia and a dependence on Russian gas, initially found that it had a mutual interest with Russia in downplaying the extent of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Consequently, the German foreign minister sought to water down a European statement on the crisis that described the intervention as an ‘invasion’, and used instead the neologism of a ‘clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression’ (Council of the European Union, 2014; see also Waterfield, 2014). Although all sides could probably have agreed that what had occurred was effectively an invasion and violation of international law, common interests dissuaded the
sides from using direct language that would have escalated the situation. In this case, this helped the German side to avoid looking placatory while preserving the potential to find a face-saving exit for Russia.\(^\text{12}\) The role of indirect speech in preserving a mutually beneficial façade could also be attributed to legitimacy talk, as when states debate how to translate a norm such as ‘democracy’ into highly sensitive matters of institutional design, rather than resort to simple bargaining.

While clarifying the mechanisms of indirect speech, these considerations also raise the question of whether the mechanisms of indirect speech can be easily transposed from the level of interpersonal communication to the level of international politics. Three considerations should assuage such concerns in addition to the empirical examples provided earlier. First, it has been demonstrated that state representatives and diplomats are highly attentive to the social etiquette of communication (Keller, 1956; Marcus, 1984), suggesting that, to the extent that legitimacy debates take place in a realm of diplomatic interpersonal communication, the same conditions for indirect speech should hold. Second, theories that emphasize the *social* dimensions of international politics suggest that states, too, either as corporate agents with emergent properties (Wendt, 2004) or as groups of individuals (Sasley, 2011), are social actors. Consequently, we should expect interstate communication, like communication in other social contexts, to find utility in the mechanisms of indirect speech. Third, regardless of the ontological status of the state or the relevance of state representatives’ social roles, we can expect indirect speech to be a feature of communication whenever the demands arise for plausible deniability, to maintain social relationships and to preserve the individuality of knowledge. To the extent that intergovernmental debates or other forms of interstate communication meet these criteria, the theory of indirect speech furnishes mechanisms and predictions that are open to empirical appraisal.

It is also possible at this stage to outline the scope conditions under which indirect speech can be expected in international politics. Two scope conditions are implicit in the formulation of indirect speech itself. In order to be successful, indirect speech requires that the parties (1) share a level of mutual background information, and (2) possess a general capacity for inference as regards the implicit meaning of the speech act. Where these two conditions are not met, indirect speech will fall on deaf ears. Second, indirect speech presupposes that parties to communication share some common interest in mitigating the potential for conflict that their demands could engender.

Provided that these scope conditions are fulfilled, these considerations also lead to several empirical predictions and observable implications. Where directness and undrowned honesty are politically or socially costly, we would expect states to revert to indirect speech, such as euphemism or circumlocution. Second, Brown and Levinson (1987: 15) have suggested that the level of politeness (a form of indirect speech) used by a speaker will be a cumulative function of three factors: the relative *power* of the recipient vis-a-vis the speaker; the *social distance* between them; and the *degree of imposition* that a statement or request will generate (see also Lee and Pinker, 2010: 786). In order to mitigate face-threatening acts in such cases, indirect speech would be a rational choice. Moreover, it is likely that actors who frame requests as indirect speech make it easier for cooperation to continue if the request is denied, and will enjoy payoffs in the form of social esteem (Pinker et al., 2008: 837).
More concretely, if legitimacy talk can function as a form of indirect speech, what are the observable implications? Far from always approximating the linguistic traits of polite conversation, legitimacy talk can also be used as a weapon in political struggles, understood as a conflict-ridden process of shaming, cajoling and delegitimizing (Hurd, 2007a: 189–190; Schweller and Pu, 2011). Diplomatic language may be cast aside. But in the same way that dispensing with politeness can cause offense, using legitimacy talk in a confrontational manner also sacrifices the gains of indirect speech. Openly threatening the face-wants of others can endanger future cooperation, initiate spirals of negative reciprocity and risk the arousal of social opprobrium for the speaker. The likelihood that legitimacy talk will be used as a form of indirect speech can therefore be associated with features of the social environment that affect its expected utility. These social-environmental features include the capacity of addressees to generate costs for the speaker, their sensitivity to social status and reputation, and, most importantly, the existence of an iterated social relationship between the parties. Situations in which the gains of cooperation need to be preserved while mediating conflicting interests are likely to be rife with indirect speech. In turn, legitimacy talk in such situations is more likely to operate as indirect speech.

The following section applies these concepts to the case of contemporary debates about the UN Security Council, where legitimacy talk has often taken on the functional role of indirect speech.

**Legitimacy and indirect speech about the UN Security Council**

The reform of the UN Security Council provides a telling case to explore the hypothesis that legitimacy talk can function as a form of indirect speech. The Security Council is one of the principal organs of the UN, and has primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its combination of wide-ranging powers and a highly unequal mode of decision-making has made it particularly challenging for theories of institutional legitimacy (Claude, 1966; Hurd, 2007a, 2008; Morris and Wheeler, 2007). The Security Council was originally designed to ensure the control of the Permanent Five (P5) members over the United Nations at large (Hildebrand, 1990; Krisch, 2008), but the end of the Cold War opened up new space for the institutional design of the Security Council to be renegotiated. Excluded major powers such as Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (the G4) have agitated for their own permanent seats; other UN members have preferred to expand the number of non-permanent seats. The permanent members have pursued different strategies in relation to these reform efforts. The UK and France have sought to integrate new permanent members by aligning with the G4 proposal while defending their own positions; the other permanent members have adopted a more cautious and defensive approach (Blum, 2005; Evans, 2008; Von Freiesleben, 2013).

The following case study illustrates how legitimacy claims can function as indirect speech by focusing on the discursive strategies made by contending coalitions of states in debates over Security Council reform. In this intergovernmental discourse, states do not usually simply blurt out their preferences and demands for institutional reform; rather, they couch their proposals in the form of generalized legitimacy claims. The
case study is three-staged. First, it demonstrates how nearly all states have settled on a common pool of legitimacy ‘frames’ with which to discuss Security Council reform. These frames are illustrated through a qualitative survey of the legitimacy frames by which states have justified their demands in proposals, draft resolutions and official communiqués. While this establishes how legitimacy talk has featured in intergovernmental discussions, it does not clarify how these utterances should be understood. Consequently, second, it provides circumstantial evidence that these legitimacy claims are primarily motivated by strategic considerations. If states resort to legitimacy claims for reasons that are not primarily truth-seeking, it is possible that states make use of them because some desired message is implied by such claims. Third, it shows how such strategic legitimacy talk reflects the logic of indirect speech, and provides evidence of empirical fit to the theoretical argument. In doing so, it contrasts this interpretation to alternative accounts.

Framing the legitimacy of the Security Council

Legitimacy talk regarding international institutions tends to manifest in particular generalized normative principles or ‘frames’. These frames constitute common beliefs shared by a community, which become the basis for the generalized justification of political institutions (Zürn and Stephen, 2010: 93). In the modern context, these have often taken the form of powerful concepts, such as legality, democracy, social justice or progress. In order for legitimacy claims to be interpreted as appropriate, they must tap into this common pool of shared normative ideas.13 Competitive frame selection can then ensue as a form of strategic discursive positioning (Charnysh et al., 2014). This kind of frame analysis focuses on the content of discursive strategies and moral arguments, but from the point of view of indirect speech, the specific content of legitimacy claims is less significant than the role that they play in social communication. As long as a particular situation generates commonly accepted utterances that will be deemed appropriate and ‘resonate’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), they can become the material from which indirect speech acts can be made.

Three sources of evidence can be drawn upon to establish how legitimacy talk has featured in the case of the Security Council. First, the broadest terms of the debate were largely set in the early 1990s. In 1992, the members of the General Assembly voted to reopen the question of the structure of the Security Council, and they framed the issue not as an attempt to accommodate a new international distribution of power or to increase the political capacity of the institution, but on the issues of ‘equity’ and ‘representation’, establishing the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council (United Nations General Assembly, 1993). By framing the issue in such a way, all states have been able to pursue their proposals using a similar pool of symbolic language; it is flexible enough to accommodate divergent interests over exactly how the Security Council should be reformed. In the ensuing debates, nearly every state has enrolled this form of legitimacy talk in their arguments for their positions.

Second, a particular repertoire of legitimacy talk has been evident in the draft resolutions tabled at the General Assembly. Contending coalitions of states have sponsored
competing draft resolutions for Security Council reform. In doing so, they have all pursued their reform proposals using a particular language of legitimacy. These reform efforts culminated in July 2005, during the 59th Session of the General Assembly. Four draft resolutions were brought forward. The first reform proposal to be tabled was sponsored by a coalition of states that supported the ‘G4’ coalition of aspiring permanent members (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) (UN Document A/59/L.64). This proposed adding six new veto-wielding permanent members, as well as four non-permanent members. The draft resolution asserted that the Security Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy would be augmented ‘by its improved representative character, its better ability to discharge its primary responsibility and to carry out its duties on behalf of all members’. In addition, it would consequently ‘better reflect contemporary world realities’ (UN Document A/59/L.64). One week later, the 54 countries of the African Union sponsored a second draft resolution, linking the legitimacy of the Security Council to effective representation from all regions of the world, and calling for six more permanent seats. In response to these two attempts to expand the permanent membership, two subsequent resolutions were introduced. The first, initiated by the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ countries (led by regional rivals to the G4, such as Italy, Mexico and Pakistan), used identical vocabulary in its diagnosis of how to make the Security Council more legitimate (UN Document A/59/L.68). The proposal called for a Security Council that is ‘more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable’. Finally, in the aftermath of these failed reform efforts, a group of five small states (S5) circulated another draft resolution targeting, in particular, the working methods, rather than composition, of the Security Council. Resolution A/60/L.49 also invoked the principles of ‘accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, and representativeness of the work of the Security Council with a view to further enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness’. Despite widely diverging interests, however, UN member states chose very similar legitimacy vocabulary in their draft resolutions, as seen in Table 1. The proposals submitted by groups of states in the form of draft resolutions were coded inductively to establish the kind of legitimacy claims that are used in connection to the Security Council. Such an approach asks of the states’ proposals ‘Which criteria and arguments do they use to assess their regime and to justify these evaluations?’ (Schneider et al., 2007: 127). In particular, ‘representation’ has become a common normative principle through which many divergent institutional preferences have been expressed.

Third, legitimacy talk has been used prominently in states’ official communiqués and statements regarding Security Council reform, both by states pushing for changes to the Security Council and by permanent members seeking to defend their privileges. Examples of the former are the annual communiqués of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) Dialogue Forum. Since 2003, they have annually, and increasingly ritualistically, called for reform of the Security Council. In such statements, they do not state their claims for permanent seats directly, but usually opt for generic statements about making the Security Council more representative. The following excerpt from their Ministerial Communiqué of 2011 is representative: ‘They emphasized the need for urgent reform of the UN Security Council, including expansion of permanent and non-permanent categories of its membership, with increased participation of developing countries in both categories’ (IBSA Ministers, 2011). Similarly, Russia has sought to defend its position on the Security
Council through such statements as ‘Enhancing the representative character of the Security Council should not erode its effectiveness’ (UN Document A/60/PV.48: 12). While these statements’ literal semantic content takes the form of generalized legitimacy claims, they also clearly leave room for deriving clear implicatures by ‘reading between the lines’. Despite often heated and even emotional debates in the General Assembly, states almost never refer to other states by name in their declaratory rhetoric surrounding Security Council reform. By and large, statements refer to generalized justifications of the Security Council and the extent to which these are helped or hindered by different states’ proposals. Public rhetoric largely reflects a discourse of improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Security Council. The language of legitimacy has thus become the primary mechanism by which intergovernmental bargaining has taken place over the institutional reform of the Security Council. At times, states have resorted to direct demands or even inflammatory language in order to push their cases for favourable UN reform. Nonetheless, considerable evidence suggests that legitimacy talk has also functioned as a facilitative medium for exchanging indirect speech.

**Meaning in context**

At the outset, there are at least three considerations that call into doubt that this legitimacy talk should be taken at face value, and suggest that indirect speech may be a useful heuristic to understand the illocutionary force that lies behind it.

First, one must consider the political context and institutional setting of debates between UN members about Security Council reform. Regarding these kinds of speech act, recognizing someone’s communicative intentions will be assisted if we realize that they have a certain motive for performing it (Skinner, 2002: 119). While, in a strict sense, motives are unknowable, they are empirically adducible. Such empirical indicators include, among others: whether legitimacy claims consistently coincide with strategic interests; whether legitimacy claims are espoused inconsistently, either across time or across issue areas; and whether a convergence of legitimacy claims across a population also results in a convergence of political preferences. Moreover, social context and institutional setting are important: do debates take place in an environment where power

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**Table 1. Legitimacy frames of draft resolutions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>G4</th>
<th>Uniting for Consensus</th>
<th>S5</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles of legitimacy in draft resolution</strong></td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Participatio</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participatio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflect ‘realities’</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Reflect ‘realities’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s frame analysis based on UN Documents A/59/L.64, A/59/L.67, A/59/L.68 and A/60/L.49.
relations and material incentives are likely to influence what states say (see also Risse, 1999: 536–537; Schimmelfennig, 2003: 204–206)? Clearly, state representatives come to the UN primarily in order to secure their self-perceived national interests, and do so in a social context characterized by large disparities in power and influence. Legitimacy talk is, at the outset, likely to be imprinted with a significant degree of strategy and posturing. This may not make ‘arguing’ impossible (Ulbert and Risse, 2005), but it does give us reason to doubt that the main motivation for this public legitimacy talk is the expression of true beliefs or deliberative, communicative action. Others have already suggested that large-scale, open sessions of multilateral organizations are mostly given over to strategic, ‘rhetorical action’ (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 174). Measured by these criteria, the public spectacle of UN General Assembly debates appears to be a very likely forum for strategic legitimacy talk. Similarly, while the language employed in UN draft resolutions is of a fundamentally different kind, the capacity to frame demands for reform in the language of legitimacy also has clear payoffs for the states that invoke it. In framing draft resolutions in the language of legitimacy, UN member states are also able to articulate a demand to alter the composition and/or functioning of the Security Council.

Second, despite the vastly different interests involved in Security Council reform, and despite the pursuit of very different programmes of Security Council reform, different coalitions of states have all invoked isomorphic repertoires of legitimacy talk to justify their assessments and proposals. To be sure, different coalitions of states have chosen to emphasize different aspects of institutional legitimacy in order to more closely align with their preferences. For example, the G4 countries, who aspire to institutional privileges for themselves, did not choose to emphasize ‘accountability’ as a legitimacy criterion in their reform proposal, in contrast to the proposals by the Uniting for Consensus and the S5 coalitions. Nonetheless, despite the different proposals reflecting very different preferences for the institutional reform of the Security Council, all reform proposals have converged on a common vocabulary of ‘input’-focused, democratic frames of legitimation. Even non-democratic regimes, and the P5 beneficiaries of existing institutionalized inequality, frequently frame their appeals in the generalized and indirect language of institutional legitimacy, usually of the democratic variety (Eisentraut, 2013). Above all, discussions about the Security Council have been framed in terms of representation (Binder and Heupel, 2014; Bosco, 2009: 203). For some observers, ‘representation’ has, in fact, become so central to the discussions of Security Council reform that it has become ‘a proxy for legitimacy’ generally (Lowe et al., 2008: 33). This is in contrast to the expectations of framing theory, whereby states should select particular frames that support their claims and not others; this reinforces the capacity for a common vocabulary of legitimacy to mask deeply contested implications (Payne, 2001: 40). Also, from a deliberative point of view, it would indeed be puzzling if such divergent proposals for reform could give rise to such convergent legitimacy claims. This also makes allegations of ‘hypocrisy’ difficult because it is hard to identify behaviour that would then violate the norm. Even permanent members such as China, which have deeply opposing views on Security Council reform, use terms such as ‘democracy’ and ‘transparency’ to defend their positions. If these frames of legitimacy are indeterminate enough to accommodate such different and even contradictory preferences regarding the structures and procedures of the Security Council, their meanings appear to leave quite some room for states...
to draw their own conclusions about the claims’ meaning. As will be argued later, such ambiguities need not be a puzzle because they can be functional to social communication as they can function as indirect speech.

Third, perhaps the most compelling reason to consider that legitimacy talk at the Security Council is largely strategic is its failure to change the participants’ minds. Reform negotiations have persisted for over 20 years, and despite an apparent normative consensus that the Security Council should be re-legitimated by making it more representative, this has not translated into sufficient shifts in position to make an agreement possible. Thus, negotiations have been likened to ‘a bitter war of attrition’ (Von Freiesleben, 2013: 22) in which legitimacy talk is largely a ‘false front’ (Hurd, 2008: 213). In summarizing a major research project on communicative action in world politics, Ulbert and Risse (2005: 353) concluded that possible signs of strategic bargaining in multilateral negotiations included ‘compromise without change in preferences/interests’. In the case of the Security Council, even this compromise has been missing. However, this is fully consistent with the logic of indirect speech, which suggests that there is more to these statements than simple reflections on the legitimacy of the Security Council. As Ian Hurd (2008: 213) has argued:

Assuming that what states really want is to gain a seat for themselves and to deny one to their rival, we should look at both why states find this to be an appealing goal and why talking in terms of legitimacy is seen as a useful strategy.

The logic of indirect speech suggests three reasons to engage in such indirect linguistic hedging rather than directly blurting out demands: to retain plausible deniability; to negotiate social relationships; and to prevent individual knowledge from becoming common knowledge.

**Legitimacy talk as indirect speech**

Articulating demands indirectly in the form of legitimacy statements preserves states’ plausible deniability that their demands are not simply self-interested. Unadorned requests for self-interested reform of the Security Council would force states to make plain their intentions, which can easily be rejected as simple demands of self-interest. Direct requests make it easy for unsympathetic states to reject the request or accuse the sender of hypocrisy. In contrast, a request veiled in the form of a legitimacy claim is likely to be endorsed by all states, even if its implicature (e.g. that the state in question seeks a permanent seat) is rejected by unsympathetic states. Such an indirect request is open to being ‘called out’ by opposing states as a deception for self-interest, but framing a request in terms of legitimacy preserves plausible deniability. For example, most states will understand that by calling for a reform of the Security Council through the addition of new permanent members in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa, the G4 states are really championing their own cause for individual privileges. Nonetheless, by framing this demand in legitimacy terms as increased geographical representation, the G4 nations communicate their demands while also providing the ‘plausible deniability’ that their interest is in representation.
on the Security Council. Supportive states will recognize the demand; opponent states will recognize the demand, but be deprived of the chance to criticize transparently self-serving demands. For these reasons, a deft state should therefore favour indirect forms of communication, as illustrated in Table 2.

Using legitimacy talk as indirect speech can also be useful in negotiating ambiguous social relationships between states in the context of the Security Council. In the case of the Security Council, two very different forms of relationship are in play. On the one hand, the UN is supposed to be based ‘on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members’ (UN Charter, Article 2, para. 1). Relationships between sovereign equals are supposed to be based on non-hierarchical reciprocity. However, on the other hand, the Security Council establishes an authoritative relationship by institutionalizing inequality through special rights for the veto-wielding P5 members. This creates a hierarchical, authoritative relationship. A relationship characterized by authority and deference operates according to different rules of etiquette than those based on reciprocity (Lee and Pinker, 2010: 794). Traditionally, the potential for awkwardness or disrespect that could emerge from a clash of these two modes of relations was mitigated by recognition of the existence of ‘great powers’, who maintained quasi-authority-based relationships with their empires or spheres of influence. Today, however, the relationship of sovereign equality between states is supposed to be marked by formal equality and reciprocity. Consequently, the interstate politics of the Security Council are unusually contentious, with the special rights of the P5 clashing with the etiquette of sovereign equality. In such a context, explicit defences of authority and hierarchy could be interpreted as crass or offensive. This means that existing permanent members must defend their authority while avoiding the appearance of arrogance, and aspiring permanent members must seek their own hierarchical privileges while mitigating the potential for offence of explicitly demanding them. Under such conditions, the theory of indirect speech would lead us to expect the parties to find a face-saving vocabulary, and what better way to bargain over hierarchical privileges than by euphemizing them in terms of representation, transparency, participation and effectiveness?

Importantly, the theory of indirect speech indicates that this may be the case even where it is universally understood that many of the states criticizing the ‘legitimacy deficit’ of the Security Council are doing so as a way to articulate their own interests indirectly. The reason is that UN members are involved in an ongoing (iterated) social relationship, where many states will have an interest in avoiding face-threatening acts. Using legitimacy talk as a mode of indirect speech enables states to communicate preferences while ensuring that individual knowledge does not cross the threshold into common

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit (interest-based demand)</th>
<th>Likely response of sympathetic states</th>
<th>Likely response of unsympathetic states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endorse</td>
<td>Rebut</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Implicit (legitimacy-based criticism) | Endorse | Refute indirectly |

Source: Adapted from Pinker et al. (2008: 836).
knowledge. By submitting preferences under the guise of legitimacy evaluations, it is possible for states to conceal from their audience their underlying intentions. This gives states the choice of maintaining the fiction of having a genuine discussion about legitimacy beliefs, rather than simply an acrimonious, self-interested bargaining session. These arguments are represented in Figure 1.

Three further arguments substantiate the validity of approaching intergovernmental legitimacy talk about the Security Council through the lens of the theory of indirect speech. First, a persistent feature of many countries’ statements about the Security Council is the recurrent use of the unelaborated trope of ‘global realities’ or ‘contemporary realities’. References to such ‘realities’ can be seen in the speeches of nearly all major powers as a criterion for reforming the Security Council. That these realities are not explained explicitly would appear puzzling if the purpose of these statements was either the unambiguous communication of information or the attempt to convince others through explicit argumentation. Rather, the theory of indirect speech indicates that such a trope may be useful in its ambiguity, and fulfil a euphemistic function. In such a way, what could be decried as simple appeals to the idea of power-based privilege can instead be communicated through the implicature of a vaguer formulation.

Second, treating legitimacy claims as indirect speech can also account for the puzzle of why UN member states have continued their ‘deliberations’ over Security Council reform long after any realistic hope of persuasion has evaporated. If the goal of the states engaging in the debates over Security Council legitimacy was really to persuade their opponents, why would states persist in this legitimacy talk when the chances of genuine persuasion appear so implausible? The conception of legitimacy talk as a common euphemism helps to make sense of such cases. That is, legitimacy claims not only issue a normative evaluation, but also express a straightforward request in a way that avoids

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**Figure 1.** Expected social costs of directness in the communication of requests.  
*Source: Adapted from Pinker et al. (2008: 835).*

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*Diagram showing the expected social costs of directness in the communication of requests.*
accusations of self-interest, mediates social relations and retains a measure of higher-order plausible deniability. As we have seen, this stands in contrast to the prediction of rhetorical action theory, which depends on the speaker engaging in rhetorical action being convinced that they have a capacity to be able to change somebody’s mind (Schimmelfennig, 1997, 2001). As Thomas Risse (2000: 8–9) has explained, ‘If everybody in a communicative situation engages in rhetoric — the speaker, the target, and the audience — they can argue strategically until they are all blue in the face and still not change anyone’s mind’.20 Yet, this would serve as an accurate description of the contemporary politics of legitimacy of the Security Council. This indicates that, in some cases, legitimacy talk still serves a purpose even when it is not judged or even really intended to be persuasive.

Third, the scope conditions of the theory suggest further explanations for why states sometimes use legitimacy claims as indirect speech and at other times opt for more contentious repertoires of delegitimation. In the same way that politeness is often dropped from interpersonal communication, states can decide to use direct speech acts to get their points across. During UN General Assembly debates, states often resort to direct demands or even inflammatory language, using denunciatory legitimacy talk as a way of ramping up tensions during negotiations. Hence, at the height of reform attempts, Cuba was moved to describe the Security Council as ‘the dictatorship of the super-Power established by the strength of arms and money’ (UN Document A/59/PV.25: 4), and India described the Security Council as ‘on the road to dictatorship’ (UN Document A/60/PV.50: 10). The logic of indirect speech clarifies the reasons that some states opt for this more confrontational strategy. If a state determines that little or no social opprobrium will be attached to direct speech, that it would not violate the norms of a given relationship, or that higher-order plausible deniability is unnecessary, it may determine that the costs inherent in the potential ambiguity of indirect speech outweigh its benefits. In particular, the theory of indirect speech would suggest that states may sometimes find it useful to threaten the face of other states as a way of forcing others to respond in kind. The costs of indirect speech may be judged to be too high, with states choosing linguistically to ‘burn bridges’ and to point out that ‘the Emperor has no clothes’. Unless such conditions are fulfilled, however, legitimacy talk as indirect speech remains a useful tool for mediating conflict and preserving cooperation within international institutions.

**Conclusion**

In introducing the concept of indirect speech to the realm of international politics, this article has focused on the case of the use of ‘legitimacy talk’ in relation to the Security Council. Doing so emphasizes that even highly codified and ritualistic moral discourses can have a double role, embodying both a surface illocutionary act and an implicit message. While initially puzzling from a rationalist perspective, the theory of indirect speech suggests that articulating requests in such a way can be both rational and functional to social communication. Seen from this perspective, the debates about the legitimacy of international institutions such as the Security Council acquire a different hue. In this case, it appears that legitimacy talk has become a terrain for interest-driven claims and
counterclalmes. For other language-oriented accounts of norms and legitimacy, this implies that while discourse may, indeed, be positioned in terms of a ‘spectrum’ or ‘continuum’ of different social logics of action (Risse, 1999: 532; 2000: 4; Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 352), language can operate on different ‘levels’ as well. The logic of indirect speech suggests that even an apparent normative consensus is capable of accommodating vast differences in preferences and behaviour. Norms can become a common language for hard bargaining, and become functional for bargaining due to their capacity to send implicit messages. In this sense, they can act simply as euphemisms. By recognizing this function of legitimacy talk, we can explain otherwise puzzling phenomena, such as legitimacy talk being used in patently egotistical ways, debates continuing to use normative language despite a failure for positions to converge, and allegations of hypocrisy failing to ‘stick’.

While the logic of indirect speech clarifies the functional purpose and empirical implications of indirect forms of communication, it does not account for the specific form or content that indirect speech is likely to take in a particular context. For this, reference must be made to the discursive environment in which communication takes place. This discursive environment has many names in social theory, including Michel Foucault’s understanding of ‘discourses’, Antonio Gramsci’s ideological ‘hegemony’, Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘practices’ and the concept of ‘lifeworld’ of Jürgen Habermas. Coupling these structural facets of the discursive environment to their enactment and utilization by specific agents would further clarify why it is that some claims become the foundations for legitimacy in the first place.

At a more general level, while the theory of indirect speech has been illustrated here primarily through the example of legitimacy debates about an international institution, the concept of indirect speech is likely to be able to shed new light on a host of other communicative processes in international politics. What is often simply understood on an intuitive level as ‘diplomatic language’ provides a fertile ground on which to elaborate the notion of indirect speech, politeness theory and other theoretical resources of pragmatic linguistics. In the same way that language can provide a window into human nature (Pinker, 2007b), it can provide a window into the nature of international politics too.

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Notes

1. See also special issues of *Globalizations* 11(3) on ‘Global governance, legitimacy and (de) legitimation’ (2014), the *Review of International Political Economy* 18(1) on ‘Legitimacy and global governance’ (2011) and *International Politics* 44(2) on ‘Resolving international crises of legitimacy’ (2007).


3. Fuller comparisons of these forms of communication can be found in Müller (2004), Risse (2000) and Seymour (2014).

4. Speech act theory can be traced back to the philosophy of Wittgenstein, whose dictum ‘words are also deeds’ set the scene for further theoretical development by J.L. Austin and John Searle. It is embedded in a philosophy of language often described as ‘pragmatics’. For overviews, see Blum-Kulka (1997), Green (2009) and Korta and Perry (2012).

5. Similarly to Grobe (2010), I will argue in the following that this is a mistake.

6. A similar logic underpins ‘bullshitting’, which is aimed not at persuasion, but at creating a favourable impression of the speaker (Seymour, 2014).

7. However, for a critique of this example, see Groefsema (1992).

8. This section’s title is adapted from Pinker et al. (2008).

9. This example is presented in game-theoretical terms in Pinker et al. (2008: 834–835).

10. This phenomenon is explicated by the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, and is isomorphic to the concept of an ‘open secret’. Lee and Pinker (2010) refer to this as ‘higher-order plausible deniability’.

11. Shared individual knowledge implies that actors know a certain thing. Common knowledge implies that actors know something, that they know that everybody else also knows, that everybody else knows that they know and so on.

12. Later, when it had become implausible to deny that Russian soldiers were operating within Eastern Ukraine, they would be presented as ‘getting lost’ and ‘on holiday’, which may be approaching the ‘impossible charade’ scenario of Lee and Pinker (2010: 797).


14. For example, as we saw earlier, Draft Resolution A/59/L.64 justified its proposal to reform the Security Council by emphasizing ‘its improved representative character, its better ability to discharge its primary responsibility and to carry out its duties on behalf of all members’. This sentence was coded in the frames of ‘representation’ and ‘effectiveness’. Every frame that was invoked at least once is included in the results. Due to the documents’ nature as draft resolutions, the justifications used are quite explicit and readily identifiable.

15. This is not to imply that states do not sometimes champion their claims to permanent seats explicitly. The point is that there is variation in the directness of communication.


17. Classics in this tradition considered motives to be ‘the most illusive of psychological data’ (Morgenthau, 1948: 6) and a ‘dark labyrinth’ (Wolfers, 1962: 67) that it is prudent to avoid. Recent iterations of similar logic include Hurd (2005: 522), Johnstone (2003: 453–454) and Krebs and Jackson (2007: 41).

18. The distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy was initially coined by Fritz Scharpf (1999) and has become a standard reference point for empirical legitimacy research (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Schmidtke and Nullmeier, 2011; Schneider, 2010). However, for a critique of this distinction, see Mügge (2011).
For example, China has clarified its position as one that reflects a need for the Security Council to fulfil criteria of ‘representation’ and ‘democratization’ (UN Document A/63/PV.54: 18).

Similarly, as Müller (2004: 406) explains: ‘Arguing makes sense only if the hyperstrategist assumes that among his interlocutors some may be guided by the logic of appropriateness’.

References


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