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# WIDER Working Paper 2017/165

## Subjective income expectations and risks in rural India

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**Abstract:** This paper analyses the pattern and determinants of income risk and expectation in rural India. It uses unique primary survey data eliciting subjective income distribution from households in twelve villages in Bihar. It finds that expected future income is significantly and positively associated with its variance. Current income is a significant predictor of expected future income and its variance. While both expected future income and its variance increase with current income, there is a significant negative association between the coefficient of variation of future income and current income, suggesting that low-income households face greater variability in their income. Upper caste households and households reliant on non-agricultural income have significantly higher expected future income and variance. Income process is highly persistent. This paper is one of the first to utilize subjective expectation data to analyse income risk in a developing country.

Keywords: subjective income distribution, expected income, household income risk, rural India JEL classification: D81, O1, O53

Figures and tables: provided at the end of the paper.

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### 1 Introduction

Income risks and expectation about future income play a fundamental role in the decision making of households. When households are forward looking, expected income and income risks affect their saving and investment decisions (Sandmo 1970; Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2008), their human capital investment decisions (Kumar 2017), and their choice of economic activities and occupation (Alderman and Paxson 1994). Income risk and expectation may have differential effects on individuals' decisions. For example, standard inter-temporal models of saving with risk (Sandmo 1970; Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2008) predict that a higher expected income has a negative effect on saving, but a higher variance (mean preserving spread) has a positive effect on saving (precautionary saving).

The analysis of income risk is particularly important for developing countries, where incomes are more volatile than developed countries, and credit and insurance markets are inadequately developed, limiting opportunities available to households to diversify their risks (Dercon 2005). When households have inadequate opportunities to diversify their risks, income risks may lead to relatively high fluctuations in consumption and thus greater levels of transient poverty (Jalan and Ravallion 2001). This may also lead to a poverty trap, as poor households may enter low-risk, low-return activities (Eswaran and Kotwal 1989; Dercon 1996; Karlan et al. 2012), and low-return and less capital-intensive activities (Collier and Gunning 1999). Income-smoothing strategies may lead poor households to enter low-risk, but low-return, economic activities.

In most of the developing countries, a large part of the labour market is informal and segmented, particularly in rural areas. There is substantial evidence that individuals and households have imperfect information and misperceptions about the labour market returns and opportunities (Jensen 2010, 2012). Learning about the labour market opportunities and returns requires significant investment or good access to information networks. Poor households may have less information about the labour market and financial market opportunities. Thus, they may have different risk diversification opportunities and face different trade-offs between risk and return than richer households. Similarly, risk diversification opportunities and trade-off between risk and return may differ across social groups (e.g. caste, religion) if there are discriminations in the labour or other markets based on social identity. There is substantial evidence that lower-caste households face significant discrimination in India in economic, social, and political spheres (Rose 1967; Silva et al. 2001; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006).

Risks and uncertainties about income are not directly observed. Most empirical studies use realized income data to derive income expectation and measures of income risk, for example, variance. However, deriving income expectation and its variance using retrospective data requires strong assumptions. As discussed by Dominitz (2001), deriving income expectation and variance from realized income data requires knowledge of the information-set of agents and how they process the information. Researchers typically assume that agents have rational expectation. However, even with rational expectation, derived variance is upward biased if researchers have limited information about the information-set of agents, which is usually the case. Given the strong assumptions needed to derive income expectation and risk using realized income data and the problem of limited information, a literature has emerged which advocates the use of subjective expectations, which directly elicits probabilistic expectations from agents (see Manski 2004; Attanasio 2009; Delvande et al. 2011; and Delvande 2014 for a review). This is the approach I follow in this paper.

The main contribution of this paper is to use subjective income distribution data to characterize and analyse the determinants of income expectation and income risk faced by rural households in Bihar, which is one of the most populous and poorest states in India. This is one of the first papers to use subjective income distribution data to analyse determinants of income risk. A closely related paper is Attanasio and Augsburg (2016), who use income expectation data to analyse the dynamics of income in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, India. The focus of their study is expected income (first moment) rather than income risk (second moment).

The data for this study is taken from a household survey undertaken by the author from January to March 2017 in 12 villages in Bihar. The per capita income of Bihar is just 40 per cent of the all-India average (GOB 2017). The 2011–12 poverty rate was 34.1 per cent as against the all-India average of 21.9 per cent. It is one of the least urbanized states in India, with 89 per cent of its 104 million people living in rural areas. The coverage of the formal banking and financial sector is inadequate, particularly in rural areas, accounting for 4.6 per cent of total bank branches and only 1 per cent of total bank credit in the country in 2016, though its share in the all-India population was 8.6 per cent.

For a long time, Bihar has been considered to be a problem state, known mainly for floods, droughts, high incidence of migration, and ineffective governance (Das 1992; Sharma and Gupta 1987). However, in the past decade, it has grown rapidly with average per capita income growth exceeding the all-India average; it experienced the fastest rate of decline in the poverty rate among major Indian states with the poverty rate declining from 55.7 per cent in 2004–05 to 34.1 per cent in 2011–12.

The survey collected detailed information on household and village characteristics. It contained a module designed to elicit information on the cumulative probability distribution of the next year's household income. A respondent in each household was asked about their probabilistic expectation of the household's income over the next year, maximum and minimum income, and the probability that the next year's income would be higher than the current year's income and the mid-point of future income.

The sample consisted of 659 households with approximately 4,100 members. In terms of general characteristics, the average household consisted of seven members with two employed members and one child below five years of age. There was at least one migrant member in 57 per cent of households. The average household was headed by a male. About half of the household heads had education levels lower than primary schooling. About 25 per cent of households were upper caste, 40 per cent were backward caste, 24 per cent were scheduled caste (total Hindu households 89 per cent), and 11 per cent were Muslim. The majority of households were landless (57 per cent) and dependent on casual employment (45 per cent) or self-employment (32 per cent). Agriculture was the primary activity for 35 per cent of households.

Using survey data, I calculate household-specific expected future income and two indicators of income risk/variability: the variance of future income and its coefficient of variation. The variance and coefficient of variance are widely used in the empirical literature as indicators of income risk/variability (Dercon 2005; Hartog and Diaz-Serrano 2013). As discussed below, expected income differs substantially across households. The coefficient of variation provides a better measure of comparing income variability across households as it is dimensionless. However, by its very design, it confounds the effects of both expected income and its variance.

The main findings of the paper are as follows. Both expected future income and income risks (measured by both indicators) differ substantially across households. Upper caste and Muslim households have significantly higher expected future income and variance relative to backward

caste and scheduled caste/tribe households. The paper finds that households reliant on the nonagricultural sector as their primary source of income have significantly higher current and expected future income and higher variance than agricultural households. This suggests that the rural nonagricultural sector in Bihar may not be a *residual sector* which mainly employs workers who are not able to find jobs in the agricultural sector.

Expected future income is significantly and positively associated with its variance. Current income is a significant predictor of both the expected future income and its variance. While both expected future income and its variance increase with current income, there is a significant negative association between the coefficient of variation of future income and current income, suggesting low-income households face greater variability in their income relative to high-income households.

Finally, the income process is highly persistent, suggesting that it is a random walk process. Attanasio and Augsburg (2016) also find that the income process in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, India is highly persistent.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details of survey and income distribution data. Section 3 discusses the calculation of income expectation and income risks. Section 4 analyses the determinants of expected future income and current income. This is followed by the analysis of determinants of income risk. Section 6 analyses the inter-relationships between current income, expected future income, and income risk. This is followed by the conclusion.

## 2 Data

## 2.1 Survey

The survey 'Risk and Investment in Education' funded by the International Growth Centre, United Kingdom, was conducted from January to March 2017 in 12 villages in six districts (two villages in each district) of Bihar. These districts are in three distinct regions of Bihar: North Bihar, Central Bihar, and South Bihar, with two districts (four villages) taken from each region. The sample consists of 659 households with approximately 4,100 household members. These households are part of the panel survey conducted by the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi. The survey was administered to households with children aged 5 to 17 years. Table 1 shows the distribution of these households over villages.

The survey consisted of a family questionnaire and a questionnaire for each 5- to 17-year-old in the household. It collected detailed information on schooling indicators such as enrolment, schooling expenditure, time use, perceptions about governmental educational schemes (e.g. midday meal provision), and household and parental background. The survey contained a module designed to elicit information on households' distribution of the next year's income.

Table 2 shows some salient characteristics of respondent households. The average household consisted of seven members, with two employed members and one child below five years of age. There was at least one migrant member in 43 per cent of households. The average household was headed by a 49-year-old married male. Half of the household heads had education levels lower than primary schooling. About 25 per cent of households were upper caste, 40 per cent were backward caste, 24 per cent scheduled caste (total Hindu households 89 per cent), and 11 per cent were Muslim.

The majority of households were landless (57 per cent) and the average landholding was just about one acre. Most of the households were dependent on casual employment (45 per cent) or self-employment (32 per cent). Agriculture was the primary activity for 35 per cent of households.

## 2.2 The income expectation module

The questionnaire was designed to elicit the cumulative distribution function (*cdf*) of future household income. In each household, an adult member (at least 18 years of age) was asked about their subjective expectation of the next year's household income. Table 2 gives some salient characteristics of respondents. The average respondent was a married 40-year-old with an education level lower than primary education. About 60 per cent of the respondents were women, half of whom had domestic work as their primary activity.

The questionnaire is similar to those used in previous studies (e.g. Dominitz 2001, Attanasio and Augsburg 2016). The questions asked in the survey are given in Appendix 1. The expectation module began with two simple questions to assess whether respondents understood the concept of probability and their response to high and low probability events. Following these preliminary questions, respondents were asked about the previous year's household income (year 2016) and the expected maximum and minimum income for the next year (year 2017). Respondents were then asked what the percentage chance was that the next year's income would be higher than the previous year's household income, and what would be the mid-point of the maximum and minimum of the next year's income (calculated by the interviewer and read to the respondent).

In most cases, the previous year's household income and the mid-point of the next year's income provided two thresholds. However, in 85 cases the current income and the mid-point of the next year's income turned out to be the same. The previous year's household income was used as one of the thresholds as the purpose of the survey was to elicit conditional subjective distribution. The previous year's income is likely to be one of the most important conditioning factors, which is confirmed by the analysis below. In the rest of the paper, I refer to 2016 household income as current income and 2017 household income as future income.

The survey provides information on current income (y\_cur), the support of future income distribution, the maximum future income (y\_max) and minimum future income (y\_min), the probability mass to the right of the mid-point of the support (y\_mid =  $(y_min+y_max)/2$ ), incdf\_mid, and the current income (y\_cur), incdf\_cur. Table 3 shows some salient properties of responses.

For 293 households, current income was greater than the mid-point of future income, and for 125 households it was lower than the mid-point of future income. For 15 households, current income was greater or equal to maximum income. For one observation, current income was less than or equal to minimum income. For 83 households, current income and the mid-point of future income were the same. Overall, for 99 households, I have observations for only one point of *cdf*. For the remaining 402 households, I have observations for two points of *cdf*. For 16 observations incdf\_cur was zero and for four observations it was 100. For 19 observations incdf\_mid was zero and for two observations it was 100. In the case of two households, the minimum income was zero.

Table 4 shows the response rate of households to the expectation questions, and whether these responses violate the laws of probability and the types of violation. Six households out of 659 did not provide answers to the income expectation module questions (response rate 99 per cent). However, out of 653 responses, 152 violated the laws of probability (24 per cent).

I exclude the households whose respondent violated the laws of probability in the calculation and analysis of expected future income and risk. Thus, the overall sample consists of 501 households. One important concern is whether excluded households are systematically different from included households. This would lead to selection bias. To examine this issue, I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model and a logit model to check whether the violation of laws of probability is related to household and respondent characteristics. The dependent variable (Prob\_Vio) takes value 1 if the respondent violated laws of probability and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: respondent characteristics (age, gender, education level, marital status, and whether the primary activity is domestic work); household characteristics (caste/religion, current income, household size, number of children aged five years or below, number of adults aged 61 years and over, whether the household has a migrant member, is landless, and has a bank account, whether the primary occupation of the household is casual labour in the agricultural or non-agricultural sectors, and whether the household has experienced significant deterioration in economic conditions in the last five years); and the characteristics of the household head (gender, education level).

The estimated models are displayed in Table 5. All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the village level. The estimated models suggest that none of the household and household head characteristics are significant. Among the characteristics of respondents, only the gender of the respondent in the logit model turned out to be significant, with male responders more likely to violate the laws of probability. Overall, these results suggest that excluded households are not systematically different from included households.

## 3 Calculation of subjective expected income and risk

Table 6 provides summary statistics of y\_cur, y\_mid, y\_max, y\_min, incdf\_cur, and incdf\_mid of households included in the analysis. Reported *cdfs* suggest that households put most of the mass of probability below current household income and the mid-point of future income. The average probability that the next year's income would be higher than current income was 13.4 per cent. Only 23 respondents put the probability of future income being greater than current income at 50 per cent or higher. Similarly, the average probability that the next year's income was 15.8 per cent. Only 25 respondents put the probability of future income at 50 per cent or higher. Similarly, the average probability that the next year's income would be greater than the mid-point of future income was 15.8 per cent. Only 25 respondents put the probability of future income at 50 per cent or higher.

To calculate household-specific expected future income and income risk/dispersion from this information, one needs to make distributional assumptions. In this paper, I assume a piece-wise uniform probability distribution. Attanasio and Augsburg (2016) also use uniform probability distribution in their analysis.

To measure income risks, I calculate two indicators: variance of future income and coefficient of variation These indicators are widely used in the empirical literature (Dercon 2005; Hartog and Diaz-Serrano 2013).

Table 7 provides summary statistics of household-specific expected future income, its variance, and the coefficient of variation. Row 1 of the table shows that the average expected future income is Rs. 81,799 with the minimum expected future income being around Rs. 5,211, and the maximum being Rs. 857,250.

Figure 1 depicts the scatter diagram of expected future and current income. It shows that both expected future income and current income are closely related. The correlation between expected income and current income is 0.96 and highly significant (Table 8).

While there is a close relationship between current income and expected future income, there are important differences. Firstly, average expected future income is around 12.5 per cent lower than current income (Rs. 93,399). This is consistent with the majority of respondents putting most of the mass of probability below current household income. Secondly, the standard deviation of expected future income (Rs. 73,693) is 11.2 per cent less than current income (Rs. 82,897). However, the variability of expected future income as measured by the coefficient of variation is marginally higher (0.90) compared to the coefficient of variation of current income (0.88). Finally, both the minimum and maximum expected future incomes are lower than the minimum and maximum current incomes.

The lower expected future income is somewhat at odds with the recent economic performance of Bihar. As discussed earlier, in the last decade Bihar has witnessed a higher than average growth rate in per capita income. In addition, this result is different from Attanasio and Augsburg (2016) who find these two averages to be almost equal in their study of income dynamics in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh.

There are two potential reasons for expected future income to be significantly lower than average current income. Firstly, after four years of deficient rainfall, Bihar had normal levels of rainfall in 2016. The average rainfall was just 89 per cent of the normal level in 2015, and the agricultural sector witnessed negative growth of -2.2 per cent in the April 2015 to March 2016 period (GOB 2017). During 2016, the agricultural sector growth rate was expected to be very high. Therefore, rural households may have experienced relatively high current income. They might expect that the next year's rainfall would be deficient and therefore expect lower agricultural growth and future income. As discussed earlier, current income is higher than the mid-point of future income for the majority of households.

Secondly, the government of India announced sudden demonetization (*Notebandi*) in November 2016, when it decided to withdraw old currencies with high denominations from circulation and to replace them with new currencies to check illegal activities. However, the roll-out and implementation of the policy were quite haphazard and caused severe disruption to economic activities. In particular, this hit the informal and construction sectors, which were more reliant on cash transactions. Most of the rural households are dependent on these sectors for their livelihood. At the time of the survey (January to March 2017), there was still a severe shortage of currency, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas. Lower expected future income may reflect pessimism about economic activities due to demonetization.

The lower standard deviation of expected future income compared to current income may partly be due to the fact that the variability caused by unexpected shocks is not reflected in expected future income. However, such a substantial fall in the standard deviation seems more in line with households putting most of the mass of probability below current household income, potentially due to demonetization and/or expectation of deficient rainfall. These factors may also explain the decline in the minimum and maximum expected future incomes compared to the minimum and maximum current incomes.

Table 7 reports the summary statistics of the standard deviation and variance of household-specific future income (standard deviation/variance around their own expected future income). The average household-specific standard deviation was Rs. 8,934 with the standard deviation of Rs. 14,549. The average household-specific variance was Rs. 29,100 (x  $10^4$ ), with the standard deviation

of Rs. 25,400 (x 10<sup>5</sup>). The results imply that household-specific standard deviation/variance of future income is much smaller than the cross-sectional standard deviation/variance of current income. For 18 observations, standard deviation/variance turned out to be zero. The reason was that for 16 observations both incdf\_cur and incdf\_mid were zero. For two observations, households were certain (the maximum, minimum, and current income were the same).

Expected future income and its variance are positively correlated, implying that higher expected future income is associated with a higher variance of future income. The correlation coefficient between the two is 0.42 and highly significant (Table 8). Similarly, the current income and its variance are positively correlated with the correlation coefficient being 0.37. Since, the variance of future income increases with expected future income, the coefficient of variation of future income shows a small negative correlation (-0.07) with expected future income (-0.07) and current income (-0.08).

### 4 Econometric model and explanatory variables

To examine the major determinants of expected and current income and income risks, I estimate versions of following model:

$$\log(y_i) = \beta' X_i + u_i \tag{1}$$

where log( $y_i$ ) is the (natural) log of either expected income or current income, or indicators of income risk of ith household,  $X_i$  is the matrix of explanatory variables including constant,  $\beta'$  is the associated vector of coefficients, and  $u_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$  is the normally distributed error term. The standard errors are clustered at the village level to account for correlations in error terms across households in a village. All regressions include village fixed effects to control for the effects of unmeasured village characteristics, which may affect income distribution and at the same time be correlated with explanatory variables. Figures 2 and 3 show graphs of the log of expected future income, and current income respectively. Figures 4 and 5 show the graph of log of variance and the coefficient of variation respectively.

In the analysis, I use a large number of explanatory variables suggested by theoretical models and existing empirical studies. Explanatory variables include demographic characteristics of households: the size of household, number of children five years of age and below, the number of 61-years-olds and over, whether the household has a migrant member, and caste/religion of household. I use indicator variables to capture caste and social hierarchies: upper caste households, intermediate caste households, backward caste households, and Muslim households. Scheduled caste and tribe households are taken as the base group.

The survey provides information on the primary source of household income. This is indicated by: whether the primary source is self-employment in agriculture, self-employment in the nonagricultural sector, casual employment in the non-agricultural sector, regular/salaried employment, and non-employment income such as pensions, interest, rent, and remittances. Households whose primary source of income is casual employment in agriculture are taken as the base group.

Other indicators of economic conditions are whether the household is landless and has a bank account. The survey also provides information on the perception of households as to whether their economic conditions have significantly deteriorated in the last five years. Households that did not experience significant deterioration in their economic conditions in the last five years are taken as the base group.

I include a large number of characteristics of household heads such as their education level, occupational status, age, gender, and marital status. I use two indicator variables to capture the education level of the household head: whether the household head has completed grades 5 to 9 and whether the household head has completed grade 10 and higher. Household heads who have completed less than 5th grade (primary schooling) are taken as the base group. The occupational status of the household head is indicated by whether the head is self-employed, a regular/salaried employee, a casual worker, or has a non-employment income source (pension, rent, interest, remittances, etc.). Household heads whose primary occupation is domestic work are taken as the base group. The summary statistics of explanatory variables are given in Table 9.

## 5 Determinants of expected and current income

I first discuss the effects of different sub-sets of explanatory variables on expected future and current income. Caste is an enduring feature of India and has been found to be one of the most important factors determining social and economic status (Rose 1967; Silva et al. 2001; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). Table 10 shows that caste status is significantly correlated with expected future and current income. Households belonging to the upper caste and intermediate caste have significantly higher expected future and current income than households belonging to scheduled caste and tribes. There is no significant difference in the expected future and current income of other backward caste, scheduled caste, and tribe households. Muslim households also have significantly higher expected and current income than scheduled caste households. Among the social groups, upper caste households have the highest income.

Table 11 shows the relationship between other demographic variables and the expected future and current income. It shows that household size is positively and significantly associated with expected future and current income. The number of children below five years of age is significantly and negatively associated with expected future and current income, but at a 10 per cent level of significance. The number of 61-year-olds and above is significantly and positively associated with current income. Whether a household has a migrant member or not is insignificantly associated with expected future and current income.

Table 12 shows that both expected future and current income are significantly associated with the type of primary source of households' income. Households with regular/salaried income have the highest expected future and current income, and households reliant on casual work in the agricultural sector have the lowest income. Interestingly, households whose primary income source is self-employment in non-agriculture have significantly higher income than households with self-employment in agriculture. Similarly, households whose primary income source is casual employment in non-agriculture have higher income than households with casual employment in agriculture.

These results have implications for the role of rural non-agricultural employment in the development process. This has been a subject of controversy (Kumar 1993; Kumar and Shergill 2014). One view is that it is a residual sector and its relative importance in the rural areas should decline with agricultural development (Hymer and Resnick 1969). This sector mainly employs workers who are unable to find jobs in the agricultural sector and its growth is largely a manifestation of the economic distress caused by the failure of agriculture to gainfully absorb the growing rural population (Vaidyanathan 1986).

The other view is that the growth of the rural non-agricultural sector plays a critical role in the alleviation of rural poverty, particularly in the case of small and marginal farmers (Ravallion and

Datt 1995). Its growth is crucial for agricultural development due to its strong forward and backward production linkages (Ranis and Stewart 1993). The household income pattern suggests that the rural non-agricultural sector may not be a residual sector in Bihar.

Similarly, the nature of self-employment has been a matter of controversy (Blanchflower 2004; Kumar and Schuetze 2007; Kumar 2011). One argument is that workers choose self-employment due to limited job opportunities, i.e. it is a residual sector. The other view is that self-employment is chosen by more entrepreneurial or less risk-averse workers. The household income pattern in Bihar shows that, on average, self-employed households have lower income than regularly employed households, but they have higher income than casually employed households. It will be interesting to explore the determinants of the occupational choice of households in Bihar, which will throw light on whether self-employment is a residual sector in rural Bihar or is a dynamic sector attracting entrepreneurial and risk-taking households.

Table 13 shows the association between expected future and current income and other economic indicators. The results indicate that landless households have significantly lower expected future and current incomes. Households with bank accounts and those who experienced significant deterioration in economic conditions have an insignificant association with expected future and current incomes.

Table 14 displays results regarding the association between the characteristics of household heads and expected and current income. It shows that households whose heads have completed primary grade education and above have significantly higher expected and current incomes than households whose heads have completed lower than primary grade education. The age of the household head and whether it is male have a significant positive effect on the expected future and current incomes. Households with a married head have lower expected future and current incomes, though this is significant only at 10 per cent.

Table 15 shows the results when I include all the explanatory variables. It also shows whether the coefficients of expected and current income equations are significantly different from each other. The results show that upper caste and Muslim households have significantly higher expected future and current incomes than scheduled caste households. Household size has a significant positive effect on the expected future and current incomes.

Households whose primary source of income is non-agricultural employment (self-employment or casual), regular employment, and non-employment income sources have significantly higher current and expected future incomes than agricultural households. Households whose heads have completed grade 10 education and above have significantly higher expected future and current incomes. However, households headed by married females have significantly lower expected future and current incomes.

The last column of Table 15 reports the p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between the two models. The results show that most of the explanatory variables have similar effects on expected future and current incomes, both in sign and size. However, the coefficients differ significantly across these two models with respect to the effects of characteristics of household heads such as gender, marital status, and primary source of income. Also, the coefficient of intermediate caste households is significantly larger in the case of the current income model.

## 6 Determinants of income risk

To examine the determinants of income risk, I use a log of variance of future income and its coefficient of variation as dependent variables. I first discuss the effects of different sub-sets of explanatory variables.

Table 16 shows that caste status is significantly correlated with the variance of future income. Households belonging to scheduled caste and tribes have significantly lower variance than other caste groups and Muslim households. Since the scheduled caste and tribe households also have lower expected future incomes, there is no significant difference in the coefficient of variation of future income across social groups, except for Muslim households, who have significantly higher coefficient of variation (significant at 10 per cent).

Table 17 shows the relationship between other demographic variables and income risk. It shows that household size is positively and significantly associated with variance, but not with the coefficient of variance. The number of children under five years of age, the number of 61-year-olds and above, and whether households have a migrant member are insignificantly associated with both variance and coefficient of variance.

Table 18 shows that households whose primary source of income is from regular/salaried work, non-agricultural work (self-employment or casual), and non-employment income sources have significantly higher variance. However, the coefficient of variation is significantly higher only for the households whose primary source of income is from non-employment income. None of the other economic indicators have a significant association with the variance or coefficient of variation (Table 19).

Households whose heads are reliant on non-employment income have a significantly higher variance and coefficient of variation (Table 20). None of the other characteristics of household heads is significantly associated with either variance or coefficient of variance, except that households whose heads have completed education grades 5 to 9 have significantly lower coefficient of variation.

Table 21 shows the results when I include all the explanatory variables. It shows that social groups and the type of primary sources of income are significantly associated with variance. Upper caste, intermediate caste, and Muslim households have significantly higher variance than scheduled caste and tribe households. Households whose primary source of income is non-agricultural employment (self-employment or casual), regular employment, and non-employment sources of income have significantly higher standard deviation than agricultural sector households. Apart from these variables, larger households whose heads have non-employment income have significantly higher variance. However, households that experienced significant deterioration in economic conditions have significantly lower variance.

In the case of coefficient of variation, Table 21 shows that intermediate caste and Muslim households, households with non-employment income, and households whose heads are married and self-employed have significantly higher coefficient of variation. On the other hand, households experiencing a significant deterioration in economic conditions whose heads have completed education at grades 5–9 have a significantly lower coefficient of variation.

Comparing Tables 15 and 21 shows that variables such as social groups, primary source of income, and household size are significant determinants of current and expected future incomes and their variance. They also affect these variables in a similar direction. However, there are variables which

affect the variance (households experiencing significant deterioration in economic conditions, non-employment income of household head) but not the expected future and current income. Similarly, there are variables which affect the expected future and current incomes (characteristics of the household head such as gender, marital status, and education completed at grade 10 and higher) but not the variance.

## 7 Current income as a predictor of expected future incomes and income risks

As discussed earlier, there is a significant correlation between expected future income, indicators of income risk, and current income. Now, I examine the issue of how good a predictor current income is of expected income and income risks. This analysis will shed light on the dynamics of income distribution and the choices made by households regarding economic activities and their risk-mitigating strategies.

To examine these issues, I estimate the following model:

$$\log(y_i) = \alpha + \mu \log(y_{u_i}) + \beta X_i + u_i$$
(2)

where  $y_i$  is the expected future income or indicator of income risk and y\_cur i is the current income. The focus is on the size, sign, and significance of  $\mu$ .

One issue that has received considerable attention in the literature is the persistence of the income process. There is considerable evidence (mainly using realized data) that the income process is highly persistent (MaCurdy 1983; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004; Alvarez and Arellano 2003; Guvenen 2007). The regression of future income on past income finds large and highly significant  $\mu$ . These studies suggest that income is a random walk process, i.e.  $\mu = 1$ .

To examine the persistence of the income process in rural Bihar, I first regress expected future income on current income (Table 22, Model 1). The estimated coefficient is 0.9980 and a Wald test shows that the null hypothesis that  $\mu = 1$  cannot be rejected. Table 23, Model 1 shows the results when I use all the explanatory variables. The coefficient of current income remains similar in magnitude and the null hypothesis that it is equal to 1 cannot be rejected.

These results suggest that the income process in Bihar is highly persistent. One important issue is whether the observed relationship between expected future and current incomes is due to high persistence of the income process itself or to some unobserved factor. For example, high ability households may have higher current and expected future incomes. Similarly, households with superior information about the labour market or economic opportunities may have higher current and expected future incomes. Thus, the observed persistence in the income process may be due to unobserved ability or differential information of households. Since, I have only cross-sectional data for one period, I cannot address this issue.

Attanasio and Augsburg (2016) examine income dynamics in the Anantpur district, Andhra Pradesh, in India, using subjective income distribution data for two years. They find that the income process is highly persistent in Anantpur district and they could not reject the hypothesis that income is a random walk process even after controlling for time-invariant unobserved factors.

Table 22, Model 1 also shows that apart from current income, the characteristics of household heads are significant predictors of expected future income. Households with self-employed or female heads have significantly lower expected income. Other significant predictors of expected future income are whether the household head is married, whether the household is reliant on

non-employment income, and whether it belongs to intermediate caste. However, their coefficients are significant only at 10 per cent.

Table 22, Model 2 shows the relationship between (log of) variance of household future income and (log) current income. It shows that the current income and variance of future income are significantly and positively associated. However, there is a significant negative association between the current income and coefficient of variation (Table 22, Model 3). The results remain the same when I add other explanatory variables (Table 23, Models 2 and 3).

Overall, these results show that in rural Bihar higher current income is associated with both higher expected future income and variance. However, current income is significantly and negatively associated with the coefficient of variation. This suggests that expected future income is more responsive to current income than the standard deviation of future income. Another interpretation is that the trade-off between expected future income and its variability is smaller at higher levels of current income and larger at lower levels of current income, i.e. higher-income households are able to reduce a given amount of income variability by sacrificing a smaller amount of expected returns.

There are a number of reasons for a positive association between current income and expected future income and its variance. One reason may be that there is heterogeneity in the risk-preferences of households. Households with higher levels of risk-aversion may be engaged in activities with low income and low risk. On the other hand, households with lower levels of risk aversion are engaged in activities with high income and high risk.

The other explanation which has received considerable empirical support (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995; Dercon 1996; Karlan et al. 2012) emphasizes heterogeneity in wealth rather than heterogeneity in risk aversion. Poorer households have a lower capacity to bear income risk and face larger welfare costs due to variability in consumption. They are willing to pay relatively large premiums (in terms of reduction in expected income) to reduce income risk. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) and Morduch (1995), using ICRISAT (The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) data for semi-arid regions of India, also find that poorer farmers are more willing to grow traditional and less risky crops and invest less in non-labour inputs to reduce their exposure to rainfall risk than richer farmers. For example, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that poorer farmers (bottom quartile) are willing to sacrifice around 35 per cent in profitability to reduce their profit variability for a one standard deviation increase in rainfall risk. At the mean wealth level, this reduced average profitability only by 4.5 per cent. Dercon (1996) and Karlan et al. (2012) report similar findings from Africa.

The positive relationship between current income and expected future income and its variance can also arise if poor households have less information about the higher-return labour market and economic opportunities. Due to lack of information, poor households may be concentrated in low-return, low-risk activities.

The negative relationship between the coefficient of variation and current income can also arise due to heterogeneity in risk preference, wealth, and information. More risk-averse or poorer households may be willing to sacrifice average income (or pay a higher price) relatively more for a given reduction in their income variability than less risk-averse or richer households. Thus, more risk-averse or poorer households may have relatively lower current and expected future income than less risk-averse or richer households, but higher variance relative to their own income. Similarly, poor households may have inferior information and opportunities to diversify their income risks than richer households. Thus, they may be able to trade off risks and returns less efficiently than richer households. Since, I have only cross-sectional data, I cannot distinguish among these competing explanations. However, it is important to note that the formal banking and insurance sector is not well developed in rural Bihar. It accounted for 4.6 per cent of total bank branches and only 1 per cent of total bank credit in the country in 2016, though its share in the total all-India population was 8.6 per cent (GOB 2017). Also, almost the entire labour force in rural Bihar is engaged in the informal sector.

Apart from current income, other significant predictors of the variance and coefficient of variation of future income are caste/religion, primary source of household income, and characteristics of household head. Upper caste, intermediate caste, and Muslim households have significantly higher variance and coefficient of variation of future income relative to the scheduled caste/tribe households. Similarly, households whose primary source of income is either regular and salaried employment or non-employment income, or who have a head reliant on non-employment income, have significantly higher variance and coefficient of variation. Households which experienced significant deterioration in their economic conditions or have a head who has completed education grades 5–9 have significantly lower variance and coefficient of variation.

## 8 Conclusion

In this paper, I analyse the main determinants of income expectation and income risk faced by rural households in Bihar using subjective income distribution data. I find that expected future income and income risks differ substantially across households. Expected future income is significantly and positively associated with its variance, suggesting a trade-off between higher future income and higher variability.

Current income, caste, and the primary source of household income are significant predictors of both expected future income and its variance. Households belonging to higher castes and reliant on the non-agricultural sector have significantly higher expected future income and higher variance.

The income process is highly persistent, suggesting that it is a random walk process. While both the expected future income and its variance increase with current income, there is a significant negative association between the coefficient of variation of future income and current income, suggesting low-income households face greater variability in their income relative to high-income households.

This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that poor households choose low-income, low-risk activities due to imperfections in the labour and financial markets. This can also be a reason for a highly persistent income process observed in data. Income risks along with imperfections in the labour and financial markets can be a cause of persistent poverty and can exacerbate income inequality. As discussed earlier, there is substantial evidence that income risks deter poor farmers from adopting higher-return, but riskier, crops or technologies. There is also evidence that income risks may act as significant barriers for poor households to enter high-return, high-risk non-agricultural activities (Ali et. al. 2016). As noted earlier, households whose primary source of income is rural non-agricultural activities have higher current and expected future incomes and variance in rural Bihar. The analysis of the effects of income risks and financial market imperfections on the rural non-agricultural sector is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.

The analysis suggests that income risks can be one of the most important reasons for persistent poverty in rural Bihar. Public policies designed to reduce these risks, such as provision of insurance (e.g. rainfall insurance), easier availability of consumer credit, and greater access to labour market information targeted towards poor households (Kumar 2008), are likely to have a significant effect on poverty and inequality. Microfinance institutions and non-governmental organizations can play an important role in the provision of insurance and labour market information. Public investment in irrigation, better weather information, and employment guarantee schemes, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, can reduce income and consumption risk.

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## Appendix 1

## Questionnaire for the Income Expectation Module

F1. What is the chance (in percentage) that the District Magistrate will visit your village tomorrow?

F2. What is the chance (in percentage) that you will eat rice at least once during the month of May?

F3. What was the household income from all sources in year 2016?

F4. For the maximum income: Imagine that you have a great year, time of bumper harvest, every member of working age in the household managed to have work, business doing very well, no drought or flood or anything like that. What would be the maximum amount of income your household would receive in such a situation in one year?


F5. For the minimum income: Now imagine, totally opposite happens: worst possible time, the harvest is bad, animals get sick, finding work is not possible, business is doing very badly. What would be the income of your household in such a situation in a year?

F6. What is the chance (in percentage) that the household yearly income in the coming year (2017) would be higher than the current household income (F3)?


F7. The mid-point of the household income = (F4+F5)/2 (calculated by the investigator)?

F8. What is the chance (in percentage) that the household yearly income in the coming year (2017) would be higher than the mid-point of household income (F7)?


## **Figures and Tables**




Source: Author's illustration.




Source: Author's illustration.



Source: Author's illustration.



Source: Author's illustration.



Source: Author's illustration.

Table 1

Distribution of Respondent Households over Villages and Districts (in %)

Village	District	Distribution of Households
Alapur Bishanpur	Gaya	5.00
Amrahi	Rohtas	4.29
Belabadan	Purnia	9.65
Chandkura	Nalanda	6.89
Dewan Parsa	Gopalgunj	8.88
Jitwarpur	Purnia	17.92
Khangaon	Madhubani	12.10
Mahisam	Madhubani	16.39
Mohiuddinpur	Nalanda	2.30
Paharpur Dayal	Gopalgunj	2.45
Rupaspur Salempur	Gaya	5.97
Samhauti Buzurg	Rohtas	8.12

Note: Total Number of Households and Respondents: 659.

Table	2
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Sample Characteristics	of Respondent Households	and Respondents

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Household Characteristics		
Current Income (in Rs.)	95333	86613
Household Size	6.88	2.94
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	0.81	1.08
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	0.36	0.63
No. of Children 5 to 17 Years	0.29	0.46
Migrant Member (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.57	0.50
Total Land Owned (Acres)	1.04	2.97
Landless (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.57	0.50
Bank Account (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.84	0.36
Primary Source of Household Income		
Self-Employment Agriculture	0.19	0.40
Casual Employment Agriculture	0.15	0.36
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	0.13	0.33
Casual Employment Non-Agriculture	0.30	0.46
Regular/Salaried Employment	0.13	0.33
Non-Employment Income	0.11	0.31
Experienced Significant Economic	0.10	0.29
Deterioration in the Last Five Years		
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)		
Caste/Religion		
Upper Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.25	0.43
Intermediate Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.16	0.36
Backward Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.24	0.43
Scheduled Caste/Tribe (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.24	0.36
Muslim (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.11	0.31
Characteristics of Household Head		
Age (Years)	49	12.42
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.91	0.28
Education less than Primary (5 <sup>th</sup> Grade)	0.49	0.50
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)		
Characteristics of Respondents		
Age (Years)	40	12.23
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.41	0.49
Marital Status (Married 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.88	0.32
Education less than Primary (5 <sup>th</sup> Grade)	0.58	0.49
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)		
Domestic Worker (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.49	0.50

Note: Total Number of Households and Respondents: 659

#### Characteristics of Responses: Income Expectation Module

	Number of Households
Total Number of Households	659
Total Number of Responses for Income Expectation Module	653
y_cur > y_mid	293
y_cur < y_mid	125
$y_cur = y_mid$	83
y_cur < =y_min	1
$y_cur \ge y_max$	15
y_min =0	2
incdf_mid =0	19
incdf_mid =100	2
incdf_cur =0	16
incdf_cur =100	4

Note:  $y_{cur:}$  current income;  $y_{mid} = (y_{min+} y_{max})/2$ : The mid-point of the support of the future income distribution;  $y_{max}$ : the maximum future income;  $y_{min}$ : the minimum future income; incdf\_cur: and the probability mass to the right of current income; incdf\_cur: and the probability mass to the right of y\_mid.

Source: Author's calculation.

#### Table 4

#### Types of Violation of Laws of Probability

	Number of Households
Total Number of Households	659
Total Number of Responses for Income Expectation Module	653
y_cur > y_mid & incdf_cur > incdf_mid	46
y_cur < y_mid & incdf_cur < incdf_mid	25
y_cur = y_mid & incdf_cur != incdf_mid	46
Total Number of Violation of Monotonicity	117
Other Types of Violation	
$Y_cur < =y_min \& incdf_cur < 100\%$	30
$Y_cur \ge y_max \& incdf_cur > 0\%$	3
incdf_cur or incdf_mid>100%	2
Total Number of Excluded Households	152
Total Number of Included Households	501

Note:  $y_cur:$  current income;  $y_mid = (y_min+ y_max)/2$ : The mid-point of the support of the future income distribution;  $y_max$ : the maximum future income;  $y_min$ : the minimum future income; incdf\_cur: and the probability mass to the right of current income; incdf\_cur: and the probability mass to the right of y\_mid.

#### Determinants of Likelihood of Violation of Laws of Probability: OLS and LOGIT Models

#### (Dependent Variable: Prob\_Vio)

	OLS M (1		LOGIT (2		Margina (3	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Marginal	SE
Respondent Characteristics						
Age	-0.0012	0.0012	-0.0095	0.0083	-0.0013	0.0011
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0667	0.0377	0.4889**	0.2510	0.0677**	0.0343
Marital Status (Married 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0209	0.0382	0.1302	0.2754	0.0180	0.0381
Education less than Primary (5 <sup>th</sup> Grade) (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0278	0.0362	0.2410	0.2710	0.0332	0.0373
Domestic Worker (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0746	0.0446	0.5372	0.3652	0.0744	0.0502
Household Characteristics						
Current Income (in Rs.)	-0.0001	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Household Size	0.0062	0.0102	0.0438	0.0694	0.0061	0.0100
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	-0.0325	0.0232	-0.2230	0.1725	-0.0309	0.0235
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	0.0272	0.0253	0.1859	0.1528	0.0257	0.0210
Migrant Member (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0275	0.0335	0.2025	0.2729	0.0280	0.0376
Landless (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0232	0.0418	0.1431	0.3084	0.0198	0.0426
Bank Account (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0009	0.0375	0.0010	0.2753	0.0014	0.0381
Casual Employment Agriculture	0.0293	0.0485	0.2375	0.3387	0.0329	0.0466
Casual Employment Non-Agriculture	0.0293	0.0347	0.1507	0.2496	0.0209	0.0342
Experienced Significant Economic Deterioration in the Last Five Years (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1029	0.0610	-0.9847	0.6516	-0.1364	0.0898
Upper Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.0373	0.0603	-0.1761	0.3897	-0.0244	0.0542
Intermediate Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.0482	0.0487	-0.3382	0.3264	-0.0468	0.0451
Backward Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.0722	0.0478	-0.4714	0.2991	-0.0653	0.0418
Muslim (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0654	0.0812	0.4847	0.5341	0.0671	0.0731
Characteristics of Household Head						
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0195	0.0613	0.1582	0.4908	0.0219	0.0681
Education less than Primary (5 <sup>th</sup> Grade) (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0316	0.0330	0.2230	0.2313	0.0309	0.0322
R- Squared	0.06		0.07			

Note: Number of Observations: 653. All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Summary Statistics of Responses (Income Expectation Module)

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Current Income (in Rs.)	93399.2	82897.4	6000	900000
Mid-Point of Future Income (in Rs.)	90620.2	83578.5	5500	900000
Maximum Future Income (in Rs.)	113098.6	95908.12	8000	990000
Minimum Future Income (in Rs.)	68141.7	73550.6	0	850000
Probability Mass to the Right of	13.41	13.71	0	100
Current Income (in %)				
Probability Mass to the Right of Mid-	15.18	14.08	0	100
Point of Future Income (in %)				

Note: Total number of observations 501.

Source: Author's calculation.

Table 7
Summary Statistics of Expected Future Income and Indicators of Income Risk

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Expected Future Income (in Rs.)	81799.0	73693.0	5211.5	857250
Standard Deviation of Future Income	8933.9	14549.5	0	226509.9
Variance of Future Income (in 0000	29100	254000	0	5130000
Rs.)				
Coefficient of Variation	0.1150	0.0934	0	0.9762
Range (in Rs.)	44956.9	35702.5	5000	300000

Note: Total number of observations 501.

Source: Author's calculation.

#### Table 8

Correlations among Current Income, Expected Future Income and Indicators of Income Risk

Variable	Current Income	Expected Future Income	Standard Deviation of Future Income	Variance of Future Income	Coefficient of Variation	Range
Current Income	1					
Expected Future Income	0.96*	1				
Standard Deviation of Future Income	0.37*	0.42*	1			
Variance of Future Income	0.14*	0.25*	0.89*	1		
Coefficient of Variation	-0.08***	-0.07	0.69*	0.51*	1	
Range	0.60*	0.58*	0.34*	0.06	0.20*	1

Note: Total number of observations 501. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

Table	9
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Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Household Characteristics				
Household Size	6.80	2.84	2	29
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	0.82	1.07	0	5
No. of 61-Year-Old sand Above	0.35	0.60	0	2
Migrant Member (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.45	0.50	0	1
Landless (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.56	0.50	0	1
Bank Account (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.84	0.36	0	1
Primary Source of Income (Yes 1, 0 otherwise)				
Self-Employment Agriculture	0.20	0.40	0	1
Casual Employment Agriculture	0.14	0.36	0	1
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	0.14	0.34	0	1
Casual Employment Non-Agriculture	0.29	0.46	0	1
Regular/Salaried Employment	0.13	0.33	0	1
Non-Employment Income	0.10	0.30	0	1
Experienced Significant Economic	0.11	0.31	0	1
Deterioration in the Last Five Years (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
Upper Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.25	0.43	0	1
Intermediate Caste (Yes 1, 0	0.16	0.37	0	1
Otherwise)				
Backward Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.26	0.44	0	1
Muslim (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.10	0.30	0	1
Characteristics of Household Head				
Age (Years)	48.91	12.59		
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.91	0.28	0	1
Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.86	0.35	0	1
Education Grade 5–9	0.25	0.43	0	1
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
Education Grade 10 and Above	0.27	0.44	0	1
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
Self-Employed (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.34	0.47	0	1
Casual Employed (Yes 1, 0	0.41	0.49	0	1
Otherwise)				
Regular/Salaried (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.10	0.29	0	1
Non-Employment Income (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.07	0.26	0	1
Otherwise)				

Note: Total Number of Households and Respondents: 501

#### Caste and Expected Future and Current Income

#### (Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

	Expected Future Income (1)		Current (2	
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient SE		SE
Upper Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.4017*	0.0864	0.3997*	0.0856
Intermediate Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.1810**	0.0825	0.2064**	0.0813
Backward Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.1178	0.0893	0.1232	0.0914
Muslim (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.2406*	0.0690	0.2778*	0.0719
R- Squared	0.09		0.09	
No. of Observations	501		501	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Scheduled Caste/Tribe Households.

Source: Author's calculation.

#### Table 11

Other Demographic Variables and Expected Future and Current Income

(Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

	Expected Future Income		Current	Income
	(1)		(2	)
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Household Size	0.0698*	0.0152	0.0712*	0.0334
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	-0.0584***	0.0333	-0.0619***	0.0306
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	0.0471	0.0314	0.0535***	0.0270
Migrant Member (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0654	0.0639	0.0814	0.0687
R- Squared	0.14		0.15	
No. of Observations	498		498	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Primary Source of Income and Expected Future and Current Income

	Expected Future Income (1)		Current (2	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Primary Source of Income (Yes 1, 0 otherwise)				
Self-Employment Agriculture	0.1791**	0.0818	0.1899***	0.0923
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	0.3025*	0.0548	0.3151*	0.0621
Casual Employment Non-Agriculture	0.1802**	0.0767	0.1827**	0.0690
Regular/Salaried Employment	0.6126*	0.1041	0.6131*	0.1051
Non-Employment Income	0.3384*	0.0948	0.3430*	0.903
R- Squared	0.12		0.12	
No. of Observations	501		501	

(Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Casual Employment Agriculture.

Source: Author's calculation.

#### Table 13

Other Economic Factors and Expected Future and Current Income

(Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

	Expected Future Income (1)		Current	Income 2)
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Landless (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1899*	0.0618	-0.1938*	0.0593
Bank Account (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.1079	0.0764	0.1011	0.0773
Experienced Significant Economic	-0.0222	0.0392	-0.0264	0.0441
Deterioration in the Last Five Years				
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise) Backward Caste				
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
R- Squared	0.06		0.06	
No. of Observations	501		501	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Characteristics of Household Head and Expected Future and Current Income

	Expected Future		Current	Income
	-	Income		
	(1)		(2	)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient SE		SE
Self-Employed (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1480	0.1338	-0.0971	0.1373
Casual Employed (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1703	0.1002	-0.1404	0.1015
Regular/Salaried (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.0678	0.1317	0.0895	0.1234
Non-Employment Income (Yes 1, 0	0.0301	0.1442	0.0916	0.1249
Otherwise)				
Education Grade 5–9	0.1694**	0.0649	0.1544**	0.0602
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
Education Grade 10 and Above	0.2649*	0.0878	0.2475*	0.0792
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)				
(log) Age (Years)	0.3642*	0.0938	0.3804*	0.0788
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.2478**	0.1079	0.2164***	0.1074
Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.2731***	0.1320	-0.2336***	0.1314
R- Squared	0.16		0.16	
No. of Observations	501		501	

#### (Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Casual Employment Agriculture for Income Source and Education Less than Grade 5 for Education Level.

#### Determinants of Expected Future and Current Income (Full Model)

#### (Dependent Variable: log of expected future/current income)

	Expected Future Income		Current I	ncome	P-value for diff in coeff.
	(1)		(2)	1	(3)
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	
Upper Caste (1/0)	0.1619***	0.0915	0.1667***	0.0927	0.80
Intermediate Caste 1/0)	0.1344	0.0918	0.1625	0.0929	0.07
Backward Caste (1/0)	0.03653	0.0719	0.0496	0.0808	0.49
Muslim (1/ 0)	0.1525**	0.0671	0.1916*	0.0700	0.28
Household Size	0.0657*	0.0170	0.0660*	0.0162	0.92
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	-0.0440	0.0323	-0.0461	0.0310	0.70
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	-0.0303	0.0575	-0.0285	0.0532	0.90
Migrant Member (1/0)	-0.0087	0.0518	-0.0160	0.0566	0.16
Primary Source of Income $(1/0)$					
Self-Employment Agriculture	-0.0431	0.0785	-0.0410	0.0897	0.94
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	0.1654*	0.0674	0.1693*	0.0649	0.86
Casual Employment Non-Agr.	0.1714*	0.0683	0.1694*	0.0607	0.93
Regular/Salaried Employment	0.3829*	0.1431	0.3979*	0.1466	0.66
Non-Employment Income	0.1875*	0.0782	0.1864*	0.0727	0.96
Landless (1/0)	-0.0485	0.0676	-0.0479	0.0649	0.96
Bank Account (1/0)	-0.0240	0.0524	-0.0372	0.0558	0.55
Experienced Significant Economic	-0.0454	0.0517	-0.0519	0.0540	0.71
Deterioration $(1/0)$					
Household Head					
Self-Employed $(1/0)$	-0.1224	0.1099	-0.0669	0.1143	0.00
Casual Employed (1/0)	-0.1216	0.1088	-0.0879	0.1106	0.08
Regular/Salaried (1/0)	-0.0954	0.1558	-0.0857	0.1471	0.80
Non-Employment Income (1/0)	0.0367	0.1060	0.0997	0.0969	0.04
Education Grade $5-9(1/0)$	0.0912	0.0793	0.0753	0.0758	0.34
Education Grade 10 & Above $(1/0)$	0.2012**	0.0872	0.1881*	0.0755	0.56
(log) Age (Years)	0.1043	0.1207	0.1138	0.1007	0.84
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.2841**	0.1234	0.2535**	0.1204	0.00
Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.2638*	0.1003	-0.2305**	0.1003	0.01
R-Squared	0.28		0.29		
No. Observations	498		498		

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Caste and Income Risk/Variability

#### (Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

	Variance (1)		CV (2	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Upper Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.8011*	0.1897	-0.0208	0.1095
Intermediate Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.6308**	0.2691	0.1115	0.1153
Backward Caste (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.4297**	0.1615	0.0875	0.0873
Muslim (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.8739*	0.1526	0.1707***	0.0830
R- Squared	0.08		0.09	
No. of Observations	486		486	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Scheduled Caste/Tribe Households.

Source: Author's calculation.

Table 17

Other Demographic Variables and Income Risk/Variability

(Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

	Variance (1)		CV (2	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Household Size	0.1431*	0.0288	0.0042	0.0157
No. of Children 5 Years and	-0.0995	0.0614	0.0064	0.0254
Below				
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	0.0090	0.1615	-0.0500	0.0562
Migrant Member (Yes 1, 0	0.0642	0.2106	- 0.0342	0.0744
Otherwise)				
R- Squared	0.09		0.08	
No. of Observations	483		483	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Primary Source of Income and Income Risk/Variability

	Variance (1)		CV (2	•
Variable	Coefficient	<u>`í</u>		SE
Primary Source of Income (Yes 1, 0 otherwise)				
Self-Employment Agriculture	0.4013	0.2780	0.0189	0.0956
Self-Employment Non- Agriculture	0.7276**	0.2515	0.0744	0.1030
Casual Employment Non- Agriculture	0.4190***	0.2274	0.0338	0.0812
Regular/Salaried Employment	1.0564*	0.2483	-0.0327	0.1125
Non-Employment Income	1.0658*	0.2263	0.1955***	0.1019
R- Squared	0.09		0.09	
No. of Observations	486		486	

#### (Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Casual Employment Agriculture.

Source: Author's calculation.

#### Table 19

Other Economic Factors and Income Risk/Variability

(Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

	Variance		CV	
	(1)	)	(2	)
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Landless (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.2403	0.1733	0.0661	0.0461
Bank Account (Yes 1, 0	0.1290	0.2893	-0.0300	0.1298
Otherwise)				
Experienced Significant	-0.1415	0.1195	-0.0532	0.0387
Economic Deterioration (Yes 1,				
0)				
R- Squared	0.04		0.09	
No. of Observations	486		486	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Characteristics of Household Head and Income Risk/Variability

	Varia		CV (2)		
Variable	Coefficient SE		Coefficient	SE	
Self-Employed (Yes 1, 0	0.0859	0.4024	0.2313**	0.1026	
Otherwise)					
Casual Employed (Yes 1, 0	-0.1690	0.3752	0.1247	0.1264	
Otherwise)					
Regular/Salaried (Yes 1, 0	0.1507 0.3814		0.0936	0.1273	
Otherwise)					
Non-Employment Income (Yes	0.6450**	0.2908	0.3172***	0.1733	
1, 0 Otherwise)					
Education Grade 5–9	0.0468	0.1713	-0.1442**	0.0626	
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)					
Education Grade 10 and Above	0.2201	0.2444	-0.1544	0.0945	
(Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)					
(log) Age (Years)	0.2774	0.2624	0.2001	0.1222	
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.3109	0.2817	0.0995	0.0995	
Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1092	0.2787	0.1014***	0.1014	
R- Squared	0.07		0.13		
No. of Observations	486		486		

(Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively. Base Category: Casual Employment Agriculture for Income Source, Education Less Than Grade 5 for Education Level.

### Determinants of Income Risk/Variability (Full Model)

### (Dependent Variable: log of variance and CV)

	Varia		CV (2)		
	(1)		(2)		
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	
Upper Caste (1/0)	0.6763**	0.2342	0.1427	0.1079	
Intermediate Caste 1/0)	0.2741**	0.2741	0.2070***	0.1108	
Backward Caste (1/0)	0.2827	0.2205	0.0890	0.0821	
Muslim (1/0)	0.7791*	0.1642	0.2103**	0.0767	
Household Size	0.1412*	0.0291	0.0072	0.0145	
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	-0.0761	0.0771	0.0056	0.0239	
No. of 61-Year-Olds and Above	-0.1018	0.1060	-0.0218	0.0587	
Migrant Member (1/0)	-0.0981	0.2295	-0.0488	0.0719	
Primary Source of Income (1/0)					
Self-Employment Agriculture	-0.0862	0.2613	-0.0006	0.1010	
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	0.3854***	0.2025	0.0394	0.0846	
Casual Employment Non-Agr.	0.3702***	0.1938	0.0254	0.0674	
Regular/Salaried Employment	0.8940*	0.2961	0.1163	0.1206	
Non-Employment Income	0.8454*	0.1957	0.2428**	0.0844	
Landless (1/0)	-0.0359	0.1209	0.0540	0.0461	
Bank Account (1/0)	-0.0892	0.2912	-0.0103	0.1204	
Experienced Significant Economic	-0.2782**	0.1209	-0.0931*	0.0309	
Deterioration $(1/0)$					
Household Head					
Self-Employed (1/0)	0.2337	0.3082	0.2700*	0.0754	
Casual Employed (1/0)	0.0686	0.3630	0.1832	0.1143	
Regular/Salaried (1/0)	-0.1783	0.3733	0.0501	0.1773	
Non-Employment Income (1/0)	0.6371***	0.3430	0.2991	0.1730	
Education Grade 5–9 (1/0)	-0.1679	0.2093	-0.1709*	0.0513	
Education Grade 10 & Above (1/	0.0723	0.2419	0.1644	0.1008	
0)					
(log) Age (Years)	-0.1808	0.4196	-0.1928	0.1643	
Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)	0.3751	0.3003	-0.1019	0.1165	
Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)	-0.1118	0.2225	0.2031***	0.0985	
R-Squared	0.20		0.15		
No. Observations	483		483		

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

#### Current Income as a Predictor of Expected Future Income and Income Risk

(Dependent Variable: log of expected future income, variance and CV)

	Expected Future Income		Variance		CV	
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
(log) Current Income	0.9980*	0.0145	1.5918*	0.0962	-0.1967*	0.0592
Wald Test (p-value) <sup>1</sup>	0.89					
R-Squared	0.95		0.41		0.11	
No. Observations	498		486		486	

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

<sup>1</sup>: Wald Test: (H0:Coefficient of log of current Income =1).

#### Current Income as a Predictor of Expected Future Income and Income Risk (Full Model)

	Expected Future Income (1)		Variance (2)		CV (3)	
Variable	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	S.D.	Coefficient	SE
(log) Current Income	0.9999*	0.0164	1.5168*	0.1071	-0.2373*	0.0576
Upper Caste (1/0)	-0.0048	0.0179	0.3848***	0.1917	0.1883***	0.1016
Intermediate Caste 1/0)	-0.0281***	0.0157	0.4557***	0.2313	0.2522**	0.2522
Backward Caste (1/0)	-0.0131	0.1985	0.1957	0.1694	0.1027	0.1027
Muslim (1/0)	-0.0391	0.0379	0.4575*	0.1553	0.2606*	0.0850
Household Size	-0.0004	0.0037	0.0426	0.0262	0.0227	0.0145
No. of Children 5 Years and Below	-0.0021	0.0058	-0.0086	0.0457	-0.0049	0.0247
No. of 61-Years-Olds and Above	-0.0017	0.0148	-0.0552	0.0947	-0.0291	0.0535
Migrant Member (1/0)	-0.0247	0.0182	-0.1212	0.1627	-0.0452	0.0806
Primary Source of Income (1/0)						
Self-Employment Agriculture	-0.0021	0.0287	-0.0428	0.1780	-0.0074	0.1069
Self-Employment Non-Agriculture	-0.0039	0.0234	0.1315	0.1530	0.0791	0.0834
Casual Employment Non-Agr.	0.0019	0.0216	0.1142	0.1177	0.0655	0.0680
Regular/Salaried Employment	-0.0150	0.0313	0.3333***	0.1857	0.2040***	0.1085
Non-Employment Income	0.0011	0.0243	0.5592*	0.1417	0.2875*	0.0870
Landless (1/0)	-0.0006	0.0136	0.0910	0.0758	0.0453	0.0409
Bank Account (1/0)	-0.0132	0.0218	-0.0132	0.2421	-0.0222	0.1253
Experienced Significant Economic	0.0065	0.0180	-0.1984**	0.0685	-0.1055*	0.0331
Deterioration $(1/0)$						
Household Head						

0.0181

0.0195

0.0387

0.0322

0.0179

0.0244

0.0505

0.0109

0.0141

0.3937

0.2469

-0.0015

0.5121\*\*\*

-0.2677\*\*

-0.2053

-0.3453

-0.0292

0.2336

0.45

483

0.1755

0.2319

0.3125

0.2906

0.1093

0.1873

0.3448

0.2279

0.1762

0.2450\*\*

0.1553

0.0225

0.3187\*\*\*

-0.1553\*\*

-0.1210

-0.1671

-0.0387

0.1491

0.19

483

0.0865

0.1216

0.1653

0.1744

0.0591

0.0984

0.1705

0.1157

0.0933

#### (Dependent Variable: log of expected future, variance and CV)

Note: All regressions include village fixed effects and standard errors (SE) are clustered at village level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of level of significance respectively.

-0.0554\*

-0.0337

-0.0096

-0.0629\*\*\*

0.0159

0.0131

-0.0095

0.0307\*\*

-0.0333\*\*

0.99 0.95

498

<sup>1</sup>: Wald Test: (H0: Coefficient of log of current Income =1).

Source: Author's calculation.

Self-Employed (1/0)

Casual Employed (1/0)

Regular/Salaried (1/0)

Non-Employment Income (1/0)

Education Grade 10 & Above (1/0)

(log) Age (Years)

Gender (Male 1, 0 Otherwise)

Married (Yes 1, 0 Otherwise)

Wald Test (p-value)<sup>1</sup>

**R-Squared** No. Observations

Education Grade 5-9(1/0)