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On-the-job search and sorting

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ON-THE-JOB SEARCH AND SORTING

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ON-THE-JOB SEARCH AND SORTING

Abstract

We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers’ bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing.

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1 Introduction

Two out of every three jobs among young workers end within a year and the bulk of those separations reflect job-to-job changes rather than layoffs, see Topel and Ward (1992).\textsuperscript{1} This suggests that there are search or information frictions in the labor market that prevent worker types to immediately match with their optimal job type. Any model that aims to give a good description of actual labor market flows should therefore allow for job-to-job transitions. This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model with a continuum of worker and job types.

Incorporating two-sided heterogeneity into a search model is useful because one of the most important functions of the labor market is to find \textit{the right man for the job}. This optimal assignment problem obviously depends on the production technology. We assume log supermodularity so that high skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs. Then, a well functioning labor market sorts low skilled workers into the simple jobs and high skilled workers into complex jobs. Search frictions frustrate this process and make the assignment of workers to jobs imperfect.

This approach generates strong testable implications. If wages are determined by Nash bargaining, they should for a given skill type be concave in job complexity: workers earn most at their optimal assignment and earn less the further they are away from their optimal assignment. Gautier and Teulings (2004) show that this is indeed the case for the 6 OECD countries they consider. For the US, the cost of search frictions as a share of total production is in the order of 25%. Alternatively, the cost of search can be derived from the natural rate of unemployment. If the match surplus is shared equally and there is no on-the-job search, unemployment, mismatch and the cost of vacancy creation each make up for one third of the cost of search, see Teulings and Gautier (2004). Hence, a natural rate of 5% implies that the cost of search is 15%, which is considerably less than the 25% derived from the concavity of wages. On-the-job search can resolve this inconsistency because it makes unemployed workers less choosy about their first job and as a result the unemployment rate falls. The cost of search therefore becomes more than three times the unemployment rate. On-the-job search also increases wage differentials for workers with equal skill levels, mainly because unemployed job seekers increase the range of job types that is acceptable for them. Therefore, the ratio of the cost of search

\footnote{Only for workers with less than a year of labor market experience the lay-off rate is larger than the job-to-job transition rate.}
and wage differentials is lower with on-the-job search.

Finally, allowing for on-the-job search yields new empirical predictions regarding the
tenure distribution as a function of the quality of the match. This research program
results in a more reliable empirically backed estimate of the importance of search frictions
for the labor market.

On-the-job search also has important implications for efficiency. We find that when
off- and on-the-job search are equally efficient, unemployed job seekers accept all jobs that
pay more than the value of leisure and employed workers accept all jobs with a higher
wage than their current one. Therefore, workers behave socially optimally irrespective of
their bargaining power. In addition, we impose that vacancies do not cause congestion
on each other with respect to the meeting rate of possible job candidates. We show
that even then, firms create too many vacancies in the decentralized equilibrium due to
a business-stealing effect. When opening a vacancy, firms do not internalize the output
losses that a job switcher imposes on her previous employer. We find that this externality
is non-monotonic in the degree of search frictions. Starting from a situation with high
frictions, excess vacancy supply increases as search frictions become smaller. However,
for very low frictions, excess vacancy supply reduces again and in the limiting case of no
search frictions the measure of vacancies reduces to zero. Those results do not depend on
our specific contact technology. A constant returns contact technology only introduces
additional (congestion) externalities without eliminating the business-stealing externality
of the present paper.

The implications of on-the-job search for wage bargaining in search models have been
debated recently in Shimer (2005). Without on-the-job search, a larger piece of the cake
for the worker implies an equivalently smaller piece for the firm. This symmetry breaks
down when there is on-the-job search because the expected match duration is increasing
in the wage. Hence, firms are willing to pay a no-quit premium for good matches. This
makes the set of feasible payoffs of firms and workers possibly non-convex. Shimer shows
that a strategic bargaining game in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) may generate multiple
equilibria and that the wage that maximizes the product of worker and firm surpluses is
always an equilibrium. However, local maxima are also equilibria in his strategic game.
In this paper we also have potential non-convexities in the payoffs set. For many of the
special simplifying cases that we focus on, i.e. firms have all the bargaining power, those
problems do not occur.
The analysis of a model with hierarchical two-sided sorting is a complicated affair. In particular, the lower left and upper right corner of the matching space of skill and complexity levels cause serious analytical problems. Teulings and Gautier (2004) approximated the equilibrium for the model without on-the-job search by Taylor expansions around the Walrasian assignment. This approach turned out not to work when we add on-the-job search. Hence, we take a more convenient approach here. In Gautier et al. (2005), we show that the approximated equilibrium in the hierarchical model has roughly the same properties as the equilibrium of the circular model of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) with an increasing returns to scale contact technology. Since the circular model is simpler than the hierarchical model, we introduce on-the-job search in the circular model.

There are a number of papers that are related to this one. Pissarides (1994) also studies on-the-job search in a matching framework. His model differs from ours in at least 3 ways: (1) he considers identical workers and two job types while we consider a continuum of different workers and jobs, (2) unlike Pissarides’ model in our model the different worker types do not cause congestion on each other, (3) in our model, wages either maximize the Nash product or are an equilibrium to an alternating offer game while Pissarides assumes a linear sharing rule. Barlevy (2002) has a model that is very similar to ours except that in his model, wages are determined by a linear sharing rule, he uses a different contact technology and his main results are based on simulations where we present analytical solutions. His focus also differs from ours. He makes the important point that the sulllying effect of recessions (workers move slower to their optimal job types because of low vacancy creation in recessions) dominates the positive cleansing effect of recessions for realistic parameter values. As in Jovanovic (1979, 1984), our model predicts individual separation probabilities to be decreasing in job tenure because the good matches are the ones that survive. In a companion paper we give empirical evidence for this. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that worker and job heterogeneity is not necessary for job-to-job-movements. They show that the trade off between higher profits and a larger hiring probability leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium for the firms. Finally, on-the-job search in a bargaining environment is studied in Gautier (2002), Moscarini (2002, 2005), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Burdett et al. (2004) but these papers either do not consider ex ante heterogeneity or assume a different bargaining environment.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the assumptions and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. In this section,
we consider three cases: (i) no on-the-job search and positive bargaining power for the workers, (ii) on- and off-the-job search equally efficient and firms have all the bargaining power, (iii) on-the-job search is less efficient than off-the-job search and firms have all the bargaining power. In Section 4 we conduct welfare analysis for those cases. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model

The economy that we consider has the following properties.

Production

There is a continuum of worker types $s$ and job types $c$; $s$ and $c$ are locations on a circle with circumference 1, so that $s = 1$ is equivalent to $s = 0$, and the same for $c$. Workers can only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity $Y$ of a match only depends on the ”distance” between $s$ and $c$: $x(s, c) = \min_{k \in \mathbb{Z}} |s - c + k|$. Hence: $Y = Y(x)$. We assume that $Y(x)$ is twice differentiable and globally concave: $Y_{xx}(x) < 0$, with an interior maximum. Without loss of generality, this maximum is located at $x = 0$ and the value of the maximum is normalized to unity: $Y(0) = 1$. Hence, $x$ is a measure of the degree of mismatch of an assignment. These assumptions imply that $Y_x(0) = 0$, since $x = 0$ maximizes $Y(x)$. We consider the simplest functional form that meets those criteria.

$$Y(x) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2.$$  

We are interested in non-trivial equilibria where workers do not accept all jobs.\(^2\) The parameter $\gamma$ is related to the complexity dispersion parameter discussed in Teulings and Gautier (2004: 558) and Teulings (2005). Low values of $\gamma$ imply that worker types are close substitutes.

Labor supply

We assume that labor supply per $s$-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference of the circle and that, without loss of generality, total labor supply is normalized to one. Hence, the density of type $s$ is also equal to one. Unemployed workers receive a value of leisure $B$. Employed workers supply a fixed amount of labor and their payoff is equal to the wage they receive.

\(^2\)This requires $Y(x) < 0$ for at least some $x$. Since $0 \leq x \leq \frac{1}{2}$, a sufficient condition is $\gamma > 8$. 

4
Labor demand

There is free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The flow cost of maintaining a vacancy is equal to $K$ per period. After a vacancy is filled, the firm only pays for the wage of the worker.

Job search technology

We assume a quadratic contact technology. Under these assumptions, the contact rate of an unemployed worker is:

$$\lambda_{(s, \text{unemployed})} \rightarrow c = \lambda v(c),$$

and for a worker employed in a z-type job with a vacancy of type c it equals:

$$\lambda_{(s, \text{employed in } z) \rightarrow c} = \psi \lambda v(c)$$

where $v(c)$ denotes the density of vacancies of type c per unit of the labor force and where $0 \leq \psi \leq 1$ and $\lambda > 0$. The parameter $\psi$ measures the efficiency of on-the-job search relative to search while unemployed; $\psi = 0$ is the case with no on-the-job search, as analyzed in Teulings and Gautier (2004); $\psi = 1$ is the case where off- and on-the-job search are equally efficient. Since each contact between a particular type of worker with a particular job is at the same time a contact of a particular job with a particular type of worker, the contact rates of job types must therefore satisfy:

$$\lambda_{c \rightarrow (s, \text{unemployed})} = \lambda u(s)$$
$$\lambda_{c \rightarrow (s, \text{employed in } z)} = \psi \lambda e(s, z)$$

where $u(s)$ denotes the density of unemployed workers of type s and where $e(s, c)$ denotes the density of type s workers employed in job type c, both per unit of the labor force. The quadratic contact technology implies increasing returns to scale (IRS) and the absence of congestion externalities: the number of unemployed $u(s)$ or employed job seekers $e(s, c)$ does not enter into the contact rate for (un)employed workers and mutatis mutandis the same applies for the number of vacancies $v(c)$ in the contact rate of vacancies. Hence, we can interpret the efficiency parameter $\lambda$ as the scale of the labor market. The search process is more efficient when the scale of the market is larger. The limiting case, $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$, yields the Walrasian equilibrium. Teulings and Gautier (2004) give a number of motivations for the IRS assumption. The main motivation is that it avoids congestion effects between workers with very different skills. Another motivation is that it simplifies the model.
Job separation

Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at rate $\delta > 0$.

Wage setting

We assume that wages are determined by bargaining between the worker and the firm while firms cannot commit on future wage payments. Shimer (2005) argues that the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution can no longer be applied in the presence of on-the-job search because of non-convexities in the set of feasible payoffs. He shows that any wage that locally maximizes the product of worker and firm surplus is an equilibrium to a strategic game where workers and firms make alternating offers and the breakdown rate goes to zero. We assume here that wages are set according to such a game. The combination of bargaining and on-the-job search brings our model close to the wage posting literature, i.e. Burdett and Mortensen (1988), and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003). In both frameworks, firms pay ”no-quit” premiums, but only in the wage posting models firms pay ”hiring premiums” (i.e. premiums that result in higher acceptance probabilities from the worker side). In bargaining models where wages are continuously renegotiated, hiring premiums are not credible because they will be immediately eliminated after hiring. Workers anticipate this, and will therefore not respond to such premiums. Hence, firms will not offer them in the first place.

Golden-growth path

We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate $\rho > 0$ is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. This assumption is only made for reasons of tractability: it allows for an analytical solution of an integral which otherwise would have to be computed numerically.\footnote{This problem also arises in wage posting models. The usual assumption made in these models is that $\rho/\delta$ is infinitesimal (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). The same assumption would also be helpful in our model, but we have chosen for the alternative representation of a golden-growth path.} Since the quadratic matching function implies IRS, the growth of the labor force implies an upward trend in the efficiency of the search process. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is an offsetting downward trend in the efficiency of the market so that $\lambda$ remains constant and the labor market does not continuously become more efficient over time.\footnote{We can think of $\lambda$ as consisting of a size-of-the-market part and a search efficiency part. We assume that the product of both remains constant over time.}
Strategies of workers

Workers accept any job offer that yields a larger present value than the current job. If workers receive a wage offer equal to their current wage they move with strictly positive probability to the new firm.\(^5\)

Strategies of the firms

A firm’s strategy is an entry decision and conditional on entering, a location on the unit circle. We assume that firms do not know the realizations of the strategies of the other firms and the realized matches. This implies that strategies can only be based on the steady-state distribution of worker and firm locations. We consider the vacancy suppliers to be ex ante identical and consider symmetric equilibria (identical firms play the same strategy). Non-symmetric equilibria might exist but require a lot of coordination. Pure-strategy equilibria do not exist in this setting because that would imply that all vacancies would be located at the same spot. This cannot be an equilibrium since a single firm is able to improve profits by posting vacancies at the other side of the circle.\(^6\) This implies that we do not have to consider these pure-strategy equilibria.

In Gautier et al. (2005), we proof that given that the labor force is distributed uniformly along the circumference of the circle, vacancies must also be distributed uniformly: \(v(c) = v\). This proof is based on the assumption that there is no on-the-job search. We will show that when we allow for on-the-job search, this uniform distribution of vacancies is again an equilibrium, but we cannot proof that no other equilibria exist. However, we do conjecture that the uniqueness result carries over to the case where \(\psi > 0\). The intuition behind this is that wages should be high at locations with relatively many vacancies. This is due to both the increase in the outside option of the unemployed workers and the increase in the “no-quit” premium. The high wages at these locations suggest that the value of a vacancy is relatively low there which violates the assumption of free entry. Hence, a situation where some locations have more vacancies than others cannot be an equilibrium. Since we focus on equilibria where both supply and demand are uniformly distributed, all outcome variables do not depend on either \(s\) or \(c\) separately, but only on the distance \(x\) between them. Hence, we use \(x\) as the only argument. For variables depending only on either \(s\) or \(c\), like \(v(c)\), we simply drop the argument. This simplifies

\(^5\)If indifferent workers were not to move, the vacancy distribution would become degenerate, see Shimer (2005).

\(^6\)A formal proof of this can be obtained upon request.
notation considerably.

2.1 Derivation of the equilibrium

Let \( \hat{V}^E (W) \) be the asset value of holding a job paying a wage \( W \) and let \( \hat{V} (W) \) be the number of vacancies that pay a wage equal to or higher than \( W \). The asset value \( \hat{V}^E (W) \) satisfies the following Bellman equation:

\[
\rho \hat{V}^E (W) = W + \delta \left[ V^U - \hat{V}^E (W) \right] + \psi \lambda \int_{W}^{\infty} \left[ \hat{V}^E (Z) - \hat{V}^E (W) \right] d\hat{V} (Z)
\]

\[
\hat{V}^E_W (W) = \left[ \rho + \delta + \psi \lambda \hat{V} (W) \right]^{-1}
\]

where \( V^U \) is the asset value of unemployment. Throughout the paper, subscripts of functions denote the relevant (partial) derivative. A sufficient condition for equilibrium is that the wage \( W (x) \) paid to an \( s \)-type worker employed in a job of type \( c = s \pm x \) maximizes the following product:

\[
W (x) \in \arg \max_W \left[ \hat{V}^E (W) - V^U \right]^\beta \left[ \frac{Y (x) - W}{\rho + \delta + \psi \lambda \hat{V} (W)} \right]^{1-\beta}
\]

The first factor in square brackets is the increase in wealth for the worker relative to the status of unemployment, the second factor is the increase in wealth for the firm. The latter is the current income stream \( Y (x) - W \) divided by a modified discount rate, accounting for the interest rate \( \rho \), the separation rate \( \delta \), and the quit rate of the worker to better paid jobs, \( \psi \lambda \hat{V} (W) \). By paying higher wages, firms and workers reduce the probability that the worker quits to a better paying job. This increases the Nash product in the present job. Hence, firms pay a no-quit premium which raises the wage above the simple sharing rule that applies in models without on-the-job search, see also Shimer (2005).

The wage offer distribution, \( \hat{V} (\cdot) \), can have no mass point in \( W \). If \( \hat{V} (\cdot) \) would have a mass point at \( W^* \), then the surplus product would jump upward by a slight increase in \( W \) above \( W^* \), since all vacancies at the mass points would no longer be able to poach a worker from the job paying this slightly higher wage. This contradicts \( W^* \) being a maximum of the surplus product. Since the surplus product is continuous in \( W \) and since

\footnote{Since at this stage we cannot rule out that the set of feasible pay offs is non-convex we cannot use the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution. Our solution is consistent with Shimer’s alternating offer game where we interpret the \( \beta \)'s either as different discount factors or as probabilities to make an offer.}
both \( Y(x) - W(x) \) and \( \hat{V}^E[W(x)] - V^U \) are positive (otherwise, either the firm or the worker would not be willing to match), \( W(x) \) satisfies the following first order condition:

\[
\beta [Y(x) - W(x)] = (1 - \beta) \left[ \hat{V}^E[W(x)] - V^U \right] \times \left[ \rho + \delta + \psi \lambda \hat{V} [W(x)] + \psi \lambda W [W(x)] [Y(x) - W(x)] \right]
\]

This condition states that the gain from a marginal wage increase for the worker is equal to the cost of that increase for the firm, where both are weighted by their respective bargaining power \( \beta \) and \( 1 - \beta \). Since \( Y(x) \) is decreasing in the distance \( x \), \( W(x) \) is decreasing in \( x \). Hence, we can define the number of vacancies and the asset value of a job as functions of \( x \) instead of \( W \):

\[
V(x) \equiv \hat{V}[W(x)] \\
V^E(x) \equiv \hat{V}^E[W(x)]
\]

\( V(x) \) is now the number of vacancies located at a shorter distance to worker type \( s \) than \( x \). These vacancies therefore offer a higher wage than \( W(x) \). Since vacancies are distributed uniformly over the circumference, \( V(x) \) does not depend on \( s \). Similarly, \( V^E(x) \) is the asset value of holding a job at distance \( x \) from the optimal type \( c = s \). By the chain rule, we get:

\[
2v \equiv \hat{V}_W[W(x)] W_x(x) \\
V^E_x(x) \equiv \hat{V}^E_W[W(x)] W_x(x)
\]

In the first equation we use the uniform distribution of vacancies: the density of vacancies of type \( c \) is \( v \). The factor 2 comes in because increasing \( x \) adds a vacancy both to the left and to the right of the optimal type \( c = s \). Substitution of these expressions and the expression for \( Y(x) \) in the first order condition and rearranging terms yields:

\[
W_x(x) = \frac{2 (1 - \beta) \psi \lambda v \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right] [V^E(x) - V^U]}{\beta \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right] - (1 - \beta) [V^E(x) - V^U] (\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda v x)}.
\]

The asset value for an unemployed job seeker satisfies the Bellman equation:

\[
\rho V^U = B + 2\lambda v \int_0^\pi [V^E(x) - V^U] \, dx
\]

where \( \pi \) is the maximum distance of a job offer that is acceptable for an unemployed job seeker. For interpretation, \( \pi \) is also the probability that a job offer is acceptable for an
unemployed worker. Similarly, the asset value for an $s$-type worker holding a job of type $c = s \pm x$ satisfies the Bellman equation:

$$
\rho V^E(x) = W(x) + 2\psi \lambda v \int_0^x \left[ V^E(z) - V^E(x) \right] dz - \delta \left[ V^E(x) - V^U \right]
$$

The disadvantage of writing the asset value this way is that it yields an implicit equation in $V^E(x)$. In Appendix A.1 we show that the asset value can also be written in explicit form:

$$
V^E(x) = \frac{W(x)}{\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda vx} + \frac{\delta}{\rho + \delta} V^U + 2\psi \lambda v \int_0^x \frac{W(z)}{\left(\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda vz\right)^2} dz
$$

where the first term is the discounted wage income at the current job. The discount factor consists of a time preference term, $\rho$, and two terms that take into account the rate at which a match ends. This happens either by exogenous shocks, $\delta$, or if the worker finds a better job $2\psi \lambda vx$. The number of better job types is given by $2vx$ (the worker can accept jobs both to the left and to the right of her favorite job type) and the rate at which the worker meets those jobs is $\psi \lambda$. The second term is the probability to move to the state of unemployment times the properly discounted value of this state and the final term is the probability to find a better job times the discounted expected wage at this better job.

For the latter discount factor we have to take into account that both the transition rate and the new state are discounted at rate $(\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda vx)^{-1}$. Substitution of this explicit expression for $V^E(x)$ in the wage equation yields:

$$
W_x(x) = \frac{(1 - \beta) \psi \kappa v \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right] R}{\beta \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right] - (1 - \beta) (1 + \psi \kappa vx) R}
$$

where $R \equiv \frac{W(x)}{1 + \psi \kappa vx} - \rho V^U + \psi \kappa v \int_0^x \frac{W(z)}{(1 + \psi \kappa vz)^2} dz$

$$
\kappa \equiv \frac{2\lambda}{\rho + \delta}
$$

This is a differential equation in $x$. Its solution requires an initial condition. At the marginal job, $x = \bar{x}$, the surplus from matching is zero and hence neither the worker nor the firm gains from matching. Hence,

$$
W(\bar{x}) = Y(\bar{x}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \bar{x}^2
$$
Substitution of equation (4) in equation (2), and some rearrangement of terms yields:

\[
\rho V^U = \frac{B}{1 + \kappa \psi \kappa x} + \frac{\kappa \psi \kappa x}{1 + \kappa \psi \kappa x} \times \int_0^x \left[ \frac{W(x)}{1 + \psi \kappa \psi x} + \psi \kappa V \int_0^x \frac{W(z)}{(1 + \psi \kappa \psi z)^2} dz \right] dx
\]  

(7)

Finally, since \( \rho V^E (\overline{x}) = \rho V^U \), (4) implies:

\[
0 = \frac{W (\overline{x})}{1 + \psi \kappa \psi \overline{x}} - \rho V^U + \psi \kappa V \int_0^\overline{x} \frac{W (x)}{(1 + \psi \kappa \psi x)^2} dx
\]  

(8)

Note that all these relations depend on the composite parameter \( \kappa \), not on its separate components, \( \rho \), \( \delta \), and \( \lambda \).

Let \( E(x) \) be the number of individuals of type \( s \) that are employed in jobs that are located at greater distances from \( s \) than \( x \), and that are therefore less attractive than a job at distance \( x \). Hence, \( E(0) \) is total employment of type \( s \), and \( E(\overline{x}) = 0 \), since there is no employment located at a distance greater than \( \overline{x} \). Since the density of labor supply is normalized to unity, the rate of unemployment satisfies:

\[
u = 1 - E(0)
\]

The equilibrium flow condition for employed workers at distance \( x \) or less from their favorite job is:

\[
2 \lambda \nu x \left[ u + \psi E(x) \right] = (\rho + \delta) \left[ E(0) - E(x) \right]
\]

The left-hand side is the number of people that find such a job, partly from unemployment (the first term in square brackets), partly by mobility from a less attractive job (the second term). The latter number is downweighted by the factor \( \psi \), reflecting the effectiveness of on-the-job search. The right-hand side is the number of people that lose such a job and the growth of the number of people that hold such a job due to the growth of the labor force as a whole: the number of jobs at distance smaller than \( x \), \( E(0) - E(x) \), times the separation rate \( \delta \) plus the growth rate \( \rho \). Mobility within the segment \( E(x) \) of jobs that are at smaller distance than \( x \) is irrelevant for this purpose, because the disappearance of the old job and the emergence of the new job cancel. Setting \( x = \overline{x} \) yields the equilibrium flow condition for unemployment:

\[
2 \lambda \nu u \overline{x} = (\rho + \delta) E(0)
\]
Substitution in the labor supply equation yields an expression for the rate of unemployment:

\[ u = \frac{1}{1 + \kappa v x} \]  

(9)

and employment at distances greater than \( x \):

\[ E(x) = \frac{1}{1 + \psi \kappa v x} \left( 1 - \frac{1 + \kappa v x}{1 + \kappa v x} \right) \]  

(10)

By the free entry condition for firms, the option value of a vacancy of type \( c \) must be equal to \( K \). Hence:

\[
K = 2\lambda \int_0^x [u + \psi E(x)] \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x)}{\rho + \delta + \psi \lambda V(x)} \, dx \\
\]

\[
= \kappa \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v x}{1 + \kappa v x} \int_0^x \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x)}{(1 + \psi \kappa v x)^2} \, dx 
\]  

(11)

The first factor in the integrand on the first line is the effective number of individuals willing to accept a vacancy of type \( x \). It equals the number of unemployed plus the number of workers presently employed at greater distance than \( x \). By the uniform distribution of workers and jobs, the latter number is equal to the number of workers of type \( s \) employed in jobs at a greater distance from \( s \) than \( x \). The second factor is the value of a filled vacancy. Just as in the wage equation, we discount current revenue \( Y(x) - W(x) \) by the discount rate plus the separation rate \( \delta \) plus the quit rate \( \psi \lambda V(x) \). The second line follows from substitution of the relations for employment and unemployment. Note that again these relations depend on the composite parameter \( \kappa \), not on its separate components, \( \rho \), \( \delta \), and \( \lambda \).

**Definition 1** The equilibrium consists of the set \( \{ W_x(x), W(\bar{x}), \rho V^U, v, \bar{x} \} \) satisfying (5) - (8) and (11). The unemployment rate \( u \) can be solved as a post-endogenous variable from equation (9).

### 3 Characterization of the equilibrium

This section characterizes the equilibrium for 3 cases. Section 3.1 briefly discusses the case without on-the-job search, \( \psi = 0 \), \( 0 \leq \beta < 1 \). This case serves as a benchmark. Section 3.2 considers the monopsony model where on- and off-the-job search are equally efficient, \( \psi = 1 \), \( \beta = 0 \). The case of equal efficiency has the advantage that the derivation
of the reservation wage of an unemployed job seeker becomes trivial: it is simply equal to
the value of leisure, \( W(x) = B \). Unemployed workers simply accept any job paying more
than \( B \). Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the more general case \( 0 < \psi < 1, \beta = 0 \). We show
that the two previous models are just special cases of the more complex model presented
in Section 3.3. The general case \( 0 < \psi < 1, 0 < \beta < 1 \) is hard to analyze analytically,
since an explicit solution for the wage function \( W(x) \) is not available. We return to this
case in Section 4.2.

3.1 The case without on-the-job search: \( \psi = 0, 0 \leq \beta < 1 \)

In order to compare the results with the hierarchical model of Teulings and Gautier
(2004) we first solve the model for the case without on-the-job search, \( \psi = 0, 0 \leq \beta < 1 \).
Equations (5) till (8) simplify considerably:

\[
W(x) = \beta \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 \right] + (1 - \beta) \rho V^U
\]

\[
\rho V^U = W(\bar{x}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \bar{x}^2
\]

\[
K = \frac{\kappa}{1 + \kappa v} \int_0^\bar{x} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right] dx
\]

In the first equation we use the fact that \( W_x(x) \neq 0 \). Hence, since the numerator on
the right-hand side of equation (5) equals zero, this equation has a solution only if the
denominator is also equal to zero. Rearranging terms yields the first equation above.
This equation shows that wages are a simple weighted average of the worker’s outside
option, \( \rho V^U \), and the productivity of the job, \( Y(x) \), so that workers receive a share \( \beta \) and
firms a share \( 1 - \beta \) of the match surplus. This simple linear sharing rule of the match
surplus holds only without on-the-job search because with on-the-job search, firms start
paying no-quit premiums, giving rise to the type of differential equations discussed in the
previous section. The second equation combines (6) - (8) and implies that the flow value
of unemployment, \( \rho V^U \), is equal to the reservation wage of the unemployed, \( W(\bar{x}) \). Again,
this equality holds only without on-the-job search. With on-the-job search, workers retain
a share \( \psi \) of the option value of search, so that accepting a job becomes less costly. This
raises the flow value of unemployment above the reservation wage. The asset value of
unemployment (7) reduces to:
\( \rho V^U = B + \kappa v \int_0^\pi \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - W(x) \right) dx = B + \frac{1}{3} \beta \gamma \kappa v \pi^3 \) \hspace{1cm} (13)

This is a similar expression as the Taylor expansion in Teulings and Gautier (2004, Proposition 2). However, in this model the relationship is exact and not an approximation. Three additional assumptions made in this paper allow the exact calculation of \( V^U \). First, we apply a circular instead of a hierarchical representation of heterogeneity. Second, the skill distribution is uniform while it can take any form in Teulings and Gautier (2004). Third, \( Y(x) \) is a quadratic function.

**Proposition 2** For the case \( \psi = 0, \beta > 0 \) the equilibrium in \( u \) and \( \pi \) for the model is characterized by the following equations:

\[
\frac{3u + 2\beta (1-u)}{3u} \pi^2 = B^*
\]

\[
B^* = \frac{2(1-B)}{\gamma}
\]

\[
2\sqrt{6} \frac{u^{5/2} (1-\beta)}{[3u + 2(1-u)\beta]^{3/2}} = K^*
\]

\[
K^* \equiv \frac{\sqrt{\gamma}K}{\kappa (1-B)^{3/2}}
\]

**Proof:** First, we substitute the (steady-state) relationship \( v = (1-u)/(\kappa \pi) \) into equation (16) to obtain equation (14). Using \( \rho V^U = W(\pi) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \pi^2 \) and solving (13) for \( v \) yields:

\[
v = \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \pi^2 - B}{\frac{1}{3} \beta \gamma \kappa \pi^3}
\]

Substitution of (14) into equation (11) and rewriting results in equation (15).\[\]

Equations (14) and (15) form a system of equations that yield solutions for \( \pi \) and \( u \). Though the model has four structural parameters, \( K, B, \gamma, \) and \( \kappa \) (apart from the bargaining power, \( \beta \), and the relative efficiency of on-the-job search, \( \psi \)), the solution depends on only two composite parameters, \( B^* \) and \( K^* \). This feature applies for all other equilibria with different parameter values of \( \beta \) and \( \psi \) considered throughout the paper.

**Proposition 3** For \( K^* < \frac{2}{3} \sqrt{2} (1-\beta) \) there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive supply of vacancies.
Proof: The left-hand side of equation (15) is upward sloping and equal to zero when \( u = 0 \). Substitution of \( u = 1 \) in equation (15) and using the mean value theorem yields the critical value for \( K^* \). For lower values of \( K^* \), this equation has a single root.

For \( K^* \) larger than the critical value, we obtain the trivial equilibrium where no vacancies are opened and everybody is unemployed. All results we have obtained so far for the circular model correspond exactly to those obtained for the hierarchical model of Teulings and Gautier (2004). This raises hope that a similar equivalence applies for the model with on-the-job search.

Our comparative statics results are summarized in Table 1. The details can be found in Appendix A.2. Apart from two ambiguities, we derive general conclusions with respect to the comparative statics. The exceptions are the first order derivatives of \( v \) with respect to \( \gamma \) and \( \kappa \). The \( \cap \)-sign implies that the first order derivative is positive for small levels of \( K^* \) and negative for larger values and the \( \cup \)-sign implies the opposite situation. Essentially, the sign of this derivative only depends on the level of the unemployment rate, which has a positive relationship with \( K^* \). For levels of \( u \) smaller than \((-2\beta + \sqrt{6\beta})/(3 - 2\beta)\), the relationship between \( v \) and \( \kappa \) is negative, while the relationship between \( v \) and \( \gamma \) is positive. The turning point is the same for \( \gamma \) and \( \kappa \). It is increasing in \( \beta \), being equal to 0 for \( \beta = 0 \) and equal to \(-2 + \sqrt{6} \approx 0.45 \) for \( \beta = 1 \). In parenthesis, we give the expected sign for realistic values of the unemployment rate. Even for very small levels of \( \beta \) (i.e. 10 percent) the unemployment rate should be over 20% to falsify these expected signs of \( v \) and \( \kappa \) and \( v \) and \( \gamma \), which is an irrelevant range for most western economies.

Table 1: Comparative statics of the model for \( \beta > 0 \) and \( \psi = 0 \). A + -sign indicates that the first order derivative is positive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( u )</th>
<th>( \pi )</th>
<th>( v )</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( \cap ) (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa )</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( \cup ) (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B )</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>( K )</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</table>
3.2 Monopsony with on- and off-the-job search equally efficient: 
\( \psi = 1, \beta = 0 \)

With on-the-job search, the equilibrium characterization becomes considerably more complicated. One useful simplification is the case where on- and off-the-job-search are equally efficient. In that case unemployed workers do not give up any option value of continued search so their reservation wage simply becomes equal to \( B \). The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium for this case.

Proposition 4 For the case \( \psi = 1, \beta = 0 \), wages are given by:

\[
W(x) = 1 - \frac{\bar{\tau} - x}{\kappa v} - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x (2\tau - x) - \gamma \frac{1 + \kappa v x}{\kappa^2 v^2} \log \left( \frac{1 + \kappa v x}{1 + \kappa v \bar{\tau}} \right)
\]

and the equilibrium in \( u \) and \( \bar{\tau} \) for the model is characterized by the following equations:

\[
\bar{\tau}^2 = B^* \\
f(u) = K^*
\]

where \( f(u) \) is defined as:

\[
f(u) \equiv -2\sqrt{2} \left( \frac{u}{1-u} \right)^2 \left( \log u + \frac{1}{2} \frac{u\log u}{1-u} + 1 \right)
\]

Proof: Equation (17) is a trivial application of the proof of Proposition 6 to be discussed in Section 3.3. Equation (19) can be obtained by solving the integral in equation (11) and using the steady-state relationship (9).

The wage equation (17) is dramatically different from (12) for the case without on-the-job search. In the latter case, a simple linear sharing rule applies where wages are a weighted average of the outside option of the firm and the reservation wage of the worker. Then, the flatness of productivity in the optimal assignment implies the flatness of the wage function at that point: \( W_x(0) = Y_x(0) = 0 \). This characteristic does not carry over to the equilibrium with on-the-job search. The situation is sketched in Figure 1. We draw \( W(x) \) both for \( \psi = 0 \) (no on-the-job search) and \( \psi = 1 \). The locus of value added \( Y(x) \) does not depend on \( \psi \). On-the-job search lowers the reservation wage \( W(\bar{\tau}) \), since employed
workers retain part of the option value of search so that accepting a job is less costly and matching sets become larger. Firms pay "no-quit" premiums to avoid workers being poached by other firms. The premium of one firm induces other firms to pay even higher premiums in equilibrium. As a consequence, the wage locus is non-differentiable at the optimal assignment $x = 0$, leading to a peak in the locus. Since all firms pay "no-quit" premiums, they have no net effect on actual quit behavior. So even though firms compete for workers by paying "no-quit" premiums, the actual mobility pattern is unaffected by these premiums: workers keep on moving towards the optimal assignment, $x = 0$. Any vacancy type with a lower $x$ than the present job will be accepted.

The remarkable consequence of this argument is that the instantaneous profit margin for an employed worker, $Y(x) - W(x)$, does not reach its maximum at the optimal assignment, $x = 0$: while $Y_x(0) = 0$, $W_x^+(0) < 0$ (and the reverse for the left derivative). Hence, an $\varepsilon$ deviation leads to a rise in the surplus. The effect of on-the-job search on $W(x)$ is undetermined. Since reservation wages are lower with on-the-job search, wages for similar jobs can be either lower or higher: the no-quit premium pushes wages up, the lower reservation wages pulls them down.
Equation (19) for the unemployment rate can be directly compared to equation (15) for the model without on-the-job search. The right-hand side of both equations is the same. Surprisingly, the unemployment rate is determined by exactly the same structural parameters in both models, and these parameters carry the same relative weight. However, the sensitivity of the unemployment rate with respect to changes in these parameters differs, in the following order:

1. monopsony without on-the-job search, $\psi = 0, \beta = 0$
2. monopsony with on-the-job search, $\psi = 1, \beta = 0$
3. Nash bargaining without on-the-job search, $\psi = 0, 0 < \beta < 1$.

With on-the-job search, the direct effect of an increase in $\kappa$ on unemployment is partially offset by the stronger competition between firms for workers. This pushes up the ”no-quit” premium, reducing ex post profits and hence decreases the supply of vacancies. Without on-the-job search and positive $\beta$, workers become choosier as $\kappa$ increases which also dampens the decrease in unemployment.

**Proposition 5** For $K^* < \frac{2}{3}\sqrt{2}$ there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive supply of vacancies.

**Proof:** The equilibrium condition is of the form $f(u) = \text{constant}$ where $u$ is bounded between $0$ and $1$, with $f(0) = 0$ and $\lim_{u \to 1} f(u) = \frac{2}{3}\sqrt{2}$. Figure 2 shows that $f(u)$ is monotonically increasing so a unique interior equilibrium exists for sufficiently low $K^*$ ($K^* < \lim_{u \to 1} f(u)$). ■

The comparative statics of the model are the same as when $\beta > 0$ and $\psi = 0$ as represented in Table 1. We refer to Appendix A.3 for details. The only difference is that $\pi$ does not change with $\kappa$ and $K$. Again, the sign of the first order derivatives of $v$ with respect to $\kappa$ and $\gamma$ are determined by the level of the unemployment rate. For low levels of $u$, the first order derivative with respect to $\kappa$ is negative while it is positive for $\gamma$. For larger values of $u$, we find opposite signs. Again the turning point is at the same value for $u$ for both $\gamma$ and $\kappa$: $u = 27\%$. This level corresponds well with the levels found in the previous subsection.
Figure 2: The first derivative of $f(u)$.

3.3 Monopsony with on-the-job search less efficient: $0 < \psi < 1$, $\beta = 0$

The case where $0 < \psi < 1$ complicates the analysis since the reservation wage is no longer equal to the value of leisure because workers have to give up part of the option value of search when accepting a job. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.

**Proposition 6** For the case $0 < \psi < 1$, $\beta = 0$, wages are given by:

$$W(x) = 1 + \gamma \frac{x - \bar{x}}{\psi \bar{v}} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma x (x - 2 \bar{x}) - \frac{1}{\psi^2 \bar{v}^2} \log \left( \frac{1 + \psi \bar{v} x}{1 + \psi \bar{v} x} \right)$$

Define:

$$z(u, \psi) \equiv \frac{1 - u}{\psi}$$

Then, equilibrium values of $z$ and $\bar{x}$ are the solution to the system of equations:

$$\bar{x}^2 \left[ \frac{1}{\psi} + \frac{1 - \psi}{\psi z} \log (1 + z) \left[ \frac{1}{z} \log (1 + z) - 2 \right] \right] = B^*$$

$$Q(z, \psi) = K^*$$

where:
Q(z, ψ) ≡ 2√2ψ^{5/2} \left( \frac{1 + z}{\psi + z} \right) \left\{ \log(1 + z) \left[ 1 + z - \frac{1}{2} \log(1 + z) \right] - z \right\} \left( z^2 + (1 - ψ) \log(1 + z) \left[ \log(1 + z) - 2z \right] \right)^{3/2}

**Proof:** See Appendix A.4. □

The proposition characterizes the equilibrium as a system of two implicit equations in x and z. Since z is a continuous and monotonically declining function of u with z(1, ψ) = 0 and z(0, ψ) = ∞, any positive value of z implies a unique value of u. It turns out that this transformation is convenient in all cases where on-the-job search is less efficient than off-the-job search, 0 < ψ < 1. Hence, it will be applied throughout the paper. The first relation reflects labor supply: the more jobs are opened, the lower the unemployment rate u (the higher z), the stronger the bargaining position of workers, the more choosy they are and therefore the lower is x. The second relation reflects labor demand. The right-hand side of the second line of equation (21) is the same as the previous equations for unemployment (15), and (19). Proposition 7 states that the right-hand side converges to the special cases ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 discussed in the previous sections:

**Proposition 7** The limits of \( Q(\psi \frac{1-u}{u}, \psi) \) with respect to ψ are equal to:

\[
\lim_{\psi \to 0} Q \left( \psi \frac{1-u}{u}, \psi \right) = 2\sqrt{2} \frac{u}{3}
\]
\[
\lim_{\psi \to 1} Q \left( \psi \frac{1-u}{u}, \psi \right) = -2\sqrt{2} \frac{u^2}{(1-u)^2} \left( \log u + \frac{1}{2} u \log u + 1 \right)
\]

These limits satisfy equation (15) and (19) respectively.

**Proof:** See appendix A.5. □

The next proposition shows uniqueness and provides conditions for existence of the equilibrium.

**Proposition 8** For \( K^* < \frac{2}{3} \sqrt{2} / \sqrt{\psi} \) there exists a unique equilibrium with a positive supply of vacancies.

**Proof:** See Appendix A.6. □
We show in the appendix that \( Q_z < 0 \) for any level of \( 0 < \psi < 1 \). This implies that \( dQ(\psi \frac{1-u}{u}, \psi) > 0 \) and hence unemployment increases with \( \gamma, K \) and \( B \) and it decreases with \( \kappa \). The other comparative statics, as derived in the previous sections, are very hard to derive for the present case. Proposition 7 in combination with the results derived in the previous sections suggest that the results should be qualitatively the same. This implies that the signs of the derivatives of \( v \) and \( \pi \) remain the same.

4 Welfare and the cost of search

In a world with search frictions, output is lower than it would be in a Walrasian world without search frictions. This section analyses the magnitude of the cost of search, defined as the relative loss in output compared to the frictionless equilibrium. We show that minimizing the cost of search is equivalent to maximizing the asset value of unemployment, \( V^U \).

There are two reasons why search frictions reduce output. First, the constraints imposed by the search technology cause unemployment mismatch and costly vacancy creation. This loss can only be reduced by a more efficient search technology. Second, output is lost due to inefficient decentralized decision making given the constraints of the search technology. Below, we decompose the cost of search in these two parts and suggest institutional remedies to reduce the second part, like changing workers’ bargaining power \( \beta \) or introducing unemployment insurance, so that agents’ decisions are better aligned. Another way to decompose the cost of search is by its three technical components: foregone production due to unemployment, the cost of maintaining vacancies, and the productivity loss due to suboptimal assignment. This decomposition is particularly important for empirical inference on the cost of search. Whether or not one allows for on-the-job search matters a lot for this exercise.

4.1 The cost of search and the asset value of unemployment

In a frictionless economy, all workers are assigned to their optimal job where they produce \( Y(0) = 1 \). Since labor supply is normalized to one, this is equal to total output. We define the cost of search \( X \) as the loss in current output relative to this first best outcome. Since the first best outcome is normalized to one, the absolute cost is equal to the relative cost. Hence, we focus on the absolute cost. This cost is equal to the sum of its three technical
components, unemployment, vacancies, and suboptimal assignment:

\[ X \equiv 1 - \int_{0}^{\bar{x}} Y(x) E_x(x) \, dx - uB + vK \]  

(22)

where \( E_x(x) \) is the absolute value of the first order derivative of \( E(x) \). This function is the density function of workers that work at distance \( x \) from their optimal assignment. The first term is first best output, while the second term is actual output. The difference is the cost of suboptimal assignment plus the output loss due to unemployment. However, unemployed job seekers do enjoy leisure, which is captured by the third term. The fourth term is the cost of keeping vacancies open. Using (10) we can derive:

\[ E_x(x) = \frac{\kappa v}{(1 + \psi \kappa v \bar{x})^2} \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v \bar{x}}{1 + \kappa v \bar{x}} \]  

(23)

Substitution of this equation together with equation (9) yields an expression for \( X \) as a function of the acceptance rule \( \bar{x} \) and unemployment \( u \), or alternatively using \( z \) as defined in the previous section:

\[ X(\bar{x}, u) = -\gamma \bar{x}^2 \frac{z + \psi - 1}{z^2 (z + \psi)} \left[ \left(1 + \frac{1}{z}\right) \log (1 + z) - \left(1 + \frac{1}{2} z\right) \right] \]

\[ + \frac{1}{z + \psi} (1 - B) + \frac{z K}{\psi \bar{x} \kappa} \]  

(24)

where we omit the arguments of \( z(u, \psi) \) for the sake of convenience. Note that this expression depends only on technical constraints, not on decision rules. Hence, a social planner can never do better than maximizing this expression. The subsequent proposition relates this expression for the cost of search to the asset value of unemployment in the decentralized equilibrium.

**Proposition 9** If \( \bar{x} \) and \( u \) satisfy the decentralized equilibrium of Proposition 6, then:

\[ X(\bar{x}, u) = 1 - \rho V^U \]

**Proof:** See Appendix A.7. ■

In other words, if we restrict ourselves to the market outcome, then maximizing the asset value of unemployment is equivalent to minimizing the cost of search. This conclusion deviates from the standard result in search models where unemployment carries a greater weight in the asset value of the unemployed than in current output, since the unemployed
have to pay the full cost of current unemployment while the future revenues of employment must be discounted. The reason that this problem does not show up here is the golden growth assumption, which sets the worker’s discount rate equal to the growth rate of the labor force. Current output is the result of earlier search effort of older and smaller generations of job seekers. Hence current output is less than the output that is to be expected from current search effort. In this way, the composition of current output exactly accounts for the discounting of future output by today’s job seekers. This feature simplifies our welfare analysis considerably. We can just maximize the asset value of unemployment $V^U$ or minimize the cost of search $X(\pi, u)$ in the steady state here. This is what we do in the subsequent analysis.

4.2 Welfare analysis

Given the constraints imposed on $X$ by the search technology, the market outcome depends on three types of decisions: (1) the number of vacancies $v$ opened by firms, (2) the job acceptance rule $\pi$ applied by unemployed job seekers, and (3) the job acceptance rule applied by employed workers. The latter decision rule is simple: employed workers accept any job offer that is at shorter distance from the optimal assignment than their present job. This decision rule is clearly efficient, since there is no option value lost by switching to a more productive job, neither for the worker, nor for the firm. Since this rule is efficient, a social planner will not change it. This leaves the social planner with two decision variables, $\pi$ and $v$. Since equation (9) provides the steady-state relation conditional on the degree of search frictions between $v$ on the one hand and $\pi$ and $u$ on the other hand, we can just as well use the latter two as the relevant decision variables. The social planner’s first best optimum minimizes $X(\pi, u)$ with respect to $\pi$ and $u$. For the general case this expression is hard to evaluate. However, for the special case that on- and off-the-job search are equally efficient, $\psi = 1$, we can again benefit from the fact that accepting a job yields no loss in the option of obtaining an even better job, so that $\pi = \sqrt{B^*}$. Substitution of these expressions in equation (24) yields:

$$X\left(\sqrt{B^*}, u\right) = \sqrt{2}(1 - B)\left(\sqrt{2\frac{u}{1 - u}}\left[\frac{u}{1 - u}\log(u) + 1\right] + \frac{1 - u}{u}K^*\right)$$

Minimizing this expression with respect to $u$ yields an implicit equation for the first best level of unemployment, $u^*$:

---

8The advantage of this is that $u$ is bounded between 0 and 1 while $v$ is not.
Note that the right-hand side of this expression is equal to the right-hand side of the market equilibrium in Proposition 4. Hence, we are able to compare the unemployment rate of the social planner with the rate achieved in a decentralized economy with $\beta = 0$ and $\psi = 0$ just by comparing the left-hand side expressions. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The upper curve is the decentralized equilibrium in equation (19), the lower curve is the unemployment rate preferred by the social planner in equation (26), both as a function of the expression on the left-hand side. We come to the following conclusion.

**Corollary 10** Unemployment is too low in the decentralized equilibrium, implying that the number of vacancies is too high.

Taking a natural rate of 5% as benchmark, unemployment should be about 25% higher than it is in the decentralized equilibrium with $\beta = 0$.

Why is unemployment too low in the decentralized equilibrium? As a benchmark for the subsequent discussion it is useful to briefly discuss the conclusion of Teulings and Gautier (2004) for the case with Nash bargaining and no on-the-job search, $\psi = 0, 0 <
\( \beta < 1 \). In that case, workers accept too many job offers. Since there is no on-the-job search, unemployed job seekers lose their full option value of search when accepting a job. Hence, their reservation wage is equal to the flow value of unemployment, which is the sum of the value of leisure and the option value of search. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the bargaining outcome is on the Pareto frontier and leaves no gains from unexploited trade. Hence, if the flow value of unemployment is first best, the acceptance rule is also first best. If not, job seekers and firms match too easily, so \( \beta \) is above first best. The quadratic contact technology implies the absence of negative congestion externalities both at the firm and the worker side of the market, only thick market externalities are relevant. Therefore, both the firm and the employer should get the full surplus of the match, which is obviously infeasible. Hence, firms create too few vacancies, the value of unemployment is below first best and matches are formed too easily. The only way to restore efficiency in a decentralized equilibrium is an unemployment insurance that pays workers the first best value of unemployment in combination with giving firms full bargaining power, \( \beta \rightarrow 0 \), so that they are able to capture the full match surplus. In the absence of unemployment insurance, \( \beta = 1/2 \) is the second best outcome. If \( \beta \rightarrow 0 \) without unemployment insurance, then firms capture the full match surplus. Due to free entry, firms invest that entire surplus in the creation of new vacancies, such that workers end up with just the value of leisure.

With on- and off-the-job search being equally efficient, \( \psi = 1 \), unemployed job seekers do not lose any option value by accepting a job. Hence, they are prepared to accept any job that pays more than the value of leisure, \( B \). This is also the efficient outcome, since there is no option value of search at stake. As before, there are no congestion effects, ruling out negative search externalities. However, the split of the match surplus is entirely different from the model without on-the-job search and \( 0 < \beta < 1 \), for three reasons. First, we assume monopsonistic wage formation, \( \beta = 0 \), which gives firms a large share of the surplus. Second, the acceptance rule \( \pi \) is less strict with than without on-the-job search (since with on-the-job search there is no option value lost). This reduces the reservation wage and shifts surplus to the firm. Third, on-the-job search introduces competition between firms for workers, which pushes up wages. This reduces the firm’s share in the surplus. We provided a graphical illustration of these differences in Figure 1. These three forces simultaneously make the share of the surplus for the firms too large. They create more vacancies than is efficient. The intuition behind the inefficiency is that there is a
poaching externality. A firm that opens a vacancy does not adequately internalize the output loss it imposes on another firm when it poaches a worker. Though the job move itself is efficient, its welfare gain is too small to justify the cost of opening a vacancy. Note that this externality is different from the standard poaching externality which is driven by investments in human capital, i.e. Moen and Rosen (2004). Poaching can reduce investments in human capital because parts of the returns to those investments go to future employers. In our model we have no investments in human capital but the equilibrium is still not efficient. Our finding is related to the "business-stealing" externality in for example Salop (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In these models economics of scale are not optimally exploited. In our setting, the expected private benefits of opening a vacancy are higher than the social benefits. Note that this result is based on the assumption that firms have all the bargaining power. Proposition 11 shows that the "business-stealing" externality need no longer exist whenever we change the bargaining power.

**Proposition 11** For $\psi = 1$, there exists a unique value of $\beta \in (0, 1)$ for which the decentralized unemployment rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum.

**Proof:** We already showed that unemployment is too low for $\beta = 0$. For $\beta = 1$, workers receive the full match surplus. This drives the number of vacancies to zero and unemployment to unity, which is obviously too high. Now consider the zero profit condition for $\psi = 1$:

$$K = \kappa \int_0^\tau \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2}x^2 - W(x)}{(1 + \kappa x)^2} dx$$

Since $\tau$ does not depend on $\beta$ for $\psi = 1$ and since $W(x)$ is determined by (5), which is continuous in $\beta$, vacancy supply is continuous in $\beta$. By the continuity of vacancy supply in $\beta$, there must be an intermediate value for $\beta$ for which the unemployment rate is equal to the social planner’s optimum. Uniqueness is a direct result of $W_x(x)$ being a decreasing function of $\beta$, see (5), and together with (6), this implies that for any $x < \bar{x}, \partial W(x)/\partial \beta > 0$. Hence, vacancy supply decreases with $\beta$.

The optimal value of $\beta$ can be calculated in the following way. First, we calculate the desired number of vacancies in the Planner’s equilibrium. Then, we numerically determine
Figure 4: Planner’s and market vacancy supply for different values of $K^*$ and when $\beta = 0$.

Figure 5: The optimal level of $\beta$ for different values of $K^*$. 
the level of $\beta$ that yields this desired number of vacancies, where we use (1) and (11). We let $K^*$ run from 0 to 0.9. Figure 4 shows the actual and optimal vacancy stock. Both increase with $K^*$ initially and start to decrease when $K^*$ becomes larger. This effect was already described in subsection 3.2, but as we show here also applies for the social planner. The turning point of the social planner lies to the right from the turning point of the market. Figure 5 shows that the level of $\beta$ needed to offset the "business-stealing" externality is quite large. The lower $K^*$, the higher the required value of $\beta$, since most workers are already close to the optimal assignment, and hence the "business-stealing" externality is large. The optimal level of $\beta$ can be even larger than 0.5, which is the optimal level for the case without on-the-job search, $0 < \beta < 1, \psi = 0$.

A formal welfare analysis for the intermediate case, $0 < \psi < 1$, is complicated. However, given the continuity of the equilibrium in $\psi$ and $\beta$, the conclusion from this analysis is obvious. For small $\psi$ (little on-the-job search), there is too little search and unemployment and the number of vacancies is too low. Raising $\beta$ does not offer a solution, since there is simply too little surplus to reward both job seekers and firms according to their marginal contribution to the search process, unless one can combine unemployment insurance and a large bargaining power for the firm. Without unemployment insurance, $\beta$ should be typically about a half. For high $\psi$ (on-the-job search highly effective), first best can be attained. That requires that $\beta > 0$. Even for $\psi = 1$, the optimal value of $\beta$ is again close to one half for reasonable values of $K^*$.

The previous analysis has shown that raising $\beta$ above zero raises efficiency by reducing the incentives to create vacancies. However, if the social planner has no instrument to change workers’ bargaining power, the introduction of unemployment insurance can be an alternative. From the outset we can see that this instrument can never implement first best because it distorts the job acceptance decision by a moral hazard problem: workers reject all jobs that pay less than the value of leisure plus the unemployment benefit, while the efficient rule would be to reject only jobs that pay less than the value of leisure. Since we consider the decentralized equilibrium, equation (25) applies. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on the case that the value of leisure is equal to zero, so that we can interpret $B$ as an unemployment benefit. In that case, a term $uB$ should be added to the cost of search, so that we minimize $X^+(u) \equiv X(\sqrt{B^*}, u) + uB$ subject to equation (18).

---

9A formal proof of this is similar to the one described earlier in the paper.
Proposition 12 \textit{The optimal level of UI benefits for the case } \psi = 1, \beta = 0 \textit{ is positive, } B > 0. \\

\textbf{Proof:} See Appendix A.8. \hfill \blacksquare

We are not the first to argue that even under risk neutrality there is a welfare improving role for UI benefits. Burdett (1979), Diamond (1981), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Teulings and Gautier (2004) all argue that UI benefits can serve as a search subsidy that prevents workers to stop searching too soon. Here we give a different argument, namely that unemployment insurance reduces the business-stealing externality that leads to excess vacancy supply by raising the reservation wage of the worker.

4.3 The cost of search by its three components

The cost of search \( X \) can also be decomposed by its three technical components, unemployment, the cost of vacancies, and the productivity loss due to a suboptimal assignment. Such a decomposition is useful for empirical inference on the empirical magnitude of search frictions. For example, Teulings and Gautier (2004) provided an approximate decomposition of the cost of search for the case of Nash bargaining and without on-the-job search, \( \psi = 0, 0 < \beta < 1 \), that applies for small values of \( X \):

\[
X \approx \frac{3}{2} \frac{(1-B)}{\beta} u \approx \frac{3}{2} \frac{v}{(1-\beta)} K \approx 3E [1 - Y(x)|x \leq \bar{x}]
\]

where we use \( Y(0) = 1 \). This decomposition allows one to estimate the cost of search from unemployment data. E.g., if the value of leisure \( B = 0 \), the bargaining power of workers \( \beta = \frac{1}{2} \), then the cost of search \( X \) is three times the unemployment rate \( u \). A natural unemployment rate of about 5% implies the cost of search to be 15%. However, there is an alternative way to estimate \( X \), namely by the average wage loss among employed workers relative to their wage in the optimal assignment. Since workers receive a share \( \beta \) of the value of output above the output in the marginal acceptable job type, \( W(x) - W(\bar{x}) = \beta [Y(x) - Y(\bar{x})] \), the mean wage loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment is:

\[
E [W(0) - W(x)|x \leq \bar{x}] = \frac{1}{3} \beta X \tag{27}
\]
This equality follows directly from the wage setting relationship: \( W(0) - W(x) = \beta [1 - Y(x)] \). Gautier and Teulings (2004) use standard human capital variables and occupation and industry dummies to obtain an estimate of the mismatch indicator \( x \). Applying this indicator in a wage regression yields an estimate of \( \text{E}[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \bar{x}] \cong 5\% \). Setting \( \beta = \frac{1}{2} \), this method yields a higher value of the cost of search, \( X \cong 25\% \), than the estimate of \( X \) derived from the unemployment rate. These conflicting estimates can be viewed as a rejection of the model without on-the-job search by the data.

On-the-job search offers a solution for this contradiction. For the case with on-the-job search and monopsonistic wage setting, \( 0 < \psi \leq 1, \beta = 0 \), the following expressions for the expected wage loss compared to the wage in the first best assignment and the cost of search can be derived, see Appendix A.9:

\[
\text{E}[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \bar{x}] = (1 - B) \frac{\psi 2 (2 + z) \frac{z \log (1 + z)}{z^2 + (1 - \psi) \log (1 + z)} }{z^2 + (1 - \psi) \log (1 + z) [\log (1 + z) - 2z]} 
\]

\[
X = (1 - B) \psi \frac{\log (1 + z) [2z - \log (1 + z)]}{z^2 + (1 - \psi) \log (1 + z) [\log (1 + z) - 2z]} 
\]

(28)

For these equations, we are able to derive the following approximations for small unemployment levels

\[
\lim_{u \to 0} \frac{\text{E}[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \bar{x}]}{(1 - B)u [2 \log(u) + 3]} = 1
\]

\[
\lim_{u \to 0} \frac{X}{2(1 - B)u \log(u)} = 1
\]

Note that the second term in parentheses of the denominator of the first line is of higher order. Hence, this term can be dropped without changing the order of the approximation. However, as we show in Figures 6 and 7, the extra term makes an important improvement in the speed of convergence. Remarkably, according to those approximations, the relation between the cost of search and the mean wage loss relative to the wage in the optimal assignment on the one hand and the unemployment rate on the other hand do not depend on \( \psi \). Second, the mean wage loss is larger than the cost of search. For an unemployment rate of 5\%, the first is about 30\% while the second is 15\%.

Table 2 summarizes our findings for the models with and without on-the-job search. We conclude the following. First, estimates of the cost of search from the mean wage
Figure 6: $E[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \pi]$ and $X$ and their approximations evaluated at various levels of $u$ for $\psi = 1/2$.

Figure 7: $E[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \pi]$ and $X$ and their approximations evaluated at various levels of $u$ for $\psi = 1$. 

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loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment are more robust than estimates from the unemployment rates because the latter require a stance on the value of $B$, while the former does not. Second, the ratio of the mean wage loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment and the unemployment rate is higher in a world with on-the-job search. The difference can be as high as a factor 6 when the unemployment rate equals 5 percent. Finally, note that these relations hold only approximately. This can be seen immediately, by letting $\beta \to 0$ in the first column and by letting $\psi \to 0$ in the second column (which is irrelevant, since $\psi$ does not enter the relevant expressions). These limits are not equal even though they approximate the same situation.\(^\text{10}\)

Table 2: Representation of the differences in the cost of search for the off- and on-the-job search model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X$</th>
<th>$0 &lt; \beta &lt; 1, \psi = 0$</th>
<th>$\beta = 0, 0 &lt; \psi &lt; 1$ ($\cong$ refers to $u = 0.05$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\mathbb{E}[W(0) - W(x)</td>
<td>x \leq \pi]}{\mathbb{E}[W(0) - W(x)</td>
<td>x \leq \pi]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\beta}{u}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{2 \beta} (1 - B)$</td>
<td>$-2 \log u (1 - B) \cong 6 (1 - B)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{1 - B}$</td>
<td>$- \frac{1}{2 \log u + 3} \frac{1}{1 - B} \cong \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{1 - B}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One important conclusion to draw from this Table is that if one wants to estimate $X$ from $u$, then allowing for on-the-job-search gives substantially larger estimates, especially when $u$ is low. Therefore, on-the-job-search can - compared to the situation without on-the-job search - bridge the gap between the independent estimates of $X$ based on wage and unemployment data.

5 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we characterize the equilibrium of a model with a continuum of job and worker types, search frictions, transferable utility and free entry, allowing for on-the-job search. On-the-job search has implications for (i) wage bargaining, (ii) entry of vacancies, and (iii) the value of unemployment relative to employment. We derived the total output losses due to the existence of search frictions and show that those losses are equal to\(^\text{10}\) the reason is that for both columns the limits are degenerate. This can be seen as follows, for column 1, compare equation (15); for column 2, taking a limit to an ever increasing efficiency of the search process (which is what we do when considering $u \to 0$ for the approximate relations in Table 1) implies that on-the-job search will dominate off-the-job search in the end; only by setting $\psi = 0$, this mechanism breaks down.
the difference between the reservation wage in the optimal assignment and the actual reservation wage. Teulings and Gautier (2004) derived in a model without on-the-job search that for equal bargaining power and no on-the-job search, this cost of search is about three times the unemployment rate which is lower than direct estimates suggest. Here, we show that although on-the-job search reduces the total welfare loss due to search frictions it increases the difference between the lowest and the highest possible wage for a given skill type. So allowing for on-the-job-search bridges the gap between the two independent methods to calculate the cost of search. In addition, we show that the number of vacancies is higher and the unemployment rate is lower than in the social optimum. This is due to a business-stealing externality: in a market with on-the-job search an individual firm does not fully internalize that opening a vacancy reduces expected job durations at other matches. For reasonable parameter values this externality turns out to be substantial. Positive unemployment benefits can improve efficiency.

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Appendix

A Derivations and proofs

A.1 Derivation of equation (4)

Taking total derivatives from equation (3) yields:

\[ V^E_x(x) = \frac{W_x(x)}{\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda v x} \]

The solution to this differential equation reads:

\[ V^E(x) = \int_0^x \frac{W_x(z)}{\rho + \delta + 2\psi \lambda vz} dz + C_0 \]

Substitution of \( x = 0 \) yields:

\[ C_0 = V^E(0) = \frac{W(0)}{\rho + \delta} + \frac{\delta}{\rho + \delta} V^U \]

Substitution of this into the solution of the differential equation yields the desired expression. ■

A.2 Comparative statics results for the case \( \beta > 0, \psi = 0 \)

Since the left-hand side of (15) is monotonically increasing in \( u \), the comparative statics conclusions follow straightforwardly. Substitution of (16) in (11) and some rearrangement of terms yields

\[ \left[ 1 - B - \left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{3} \beta \right) \gamma \bar{x}^2 \right] K - \frac{1}{9} (1 - \beta) \beta^2 K^3 = 0 \quad (29) \]

The relationship between \( \bar{x} \) and the exogenous parameters of the model can be derived by total differentiation of this equation. Total differentiation of equation (15). Taking total derivatives, substitution of equation (14) and (15) and rearranging terms yields:

\[ \frac{dv}{d\kappa} = \frac{1}{\kappa^2} \sqrt{\frac{\gamma}{6 (1 - B)}} \frac{\sqrt{3u + 2\beta (1 - u)}}{u (3 - 2\beta) + 5\beta} \frac{3u^2 - 2 (1 - u)^2 \beta}{u \sqrt{u}} \]

The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of \( 3u^2 - 2 (1 - u)^2 \beta \). Because of the positive relationship between \( K^* \) and \( u \) discussed above, this implies that for low levels of \( K^* \) an increase
in this parameter induces a decrease in the number of vacancies whereas such an increase has a positive impact on vacancies when $K^*$ is high. Using the same techniques, we can derive that the first order derivative of $v$ with respect to $\gamma$ equals:

$$\frac{dv}{d\gamma} = -\frac{\kappa}{2\gamma} \frac{dv}{d\kappa}$$

Hence, both derivatives have opposite sign. ■

A.3 Comparative statics results for the case $\beta = 0, \psi = 1$

Consider second line of the equilibrium condition (18). We have: $\bar{x} = \sqrt{B^*}$. Total differentiation of the second equation in the market equilibrium of Proposition 4 yields the partial derivatives with respect to $K$ and $B$. The derivative of $v$ with respect to $\kappa$ reads:

$$\frac{dv}{d\kappa} = \log u (2u + 1 - u^2 + u \log u) + 2 (1 - u)$$

The sign of this relationship depends on the sign of $\log u (2u + 1 - u^2 + u \log u) + 2 (1 - u)$. This function can be plotted for various values of $u$. It is negative for small values of $u$ and positive for larger values. The function has a single root at $u = 27\%$. Hence, there is a non-monotonic relationship between $v$ and $\kappa$. ■

A.4 Proof of Proposition 6

For $\beta = 0$, equation (5) simplifies to:

$$W_x (x) = -\kappa\psi u \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - \frac{W (x)}{1 + \psi \kappa ux}\right)$$

This can be rewritten as:

$$W_x (x) + p(x)W (x) = s(x)$$

$$p(x) \equiv -\frac{\psi \kappa u}{1 + \psi \kappa ux}$$

$$s(x) \equiv -\frac{\psi \kappa u \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2\right)}{1 + \psi \kappa ux}$$

The general form of the solution is (see for example Kreyszig, 1993:31):

$$W(x) = e^{-t(x)} \left[ \int e^{t(x)} s(x) dx + c \right]$$

$$t(x) \equiv \int p(x) dx$$
Hence,

\[ W(x) = 1 + \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 - \gamma \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v x}{\psi^2 \kappa^2 v^2} \log (1 + \psi \kappa v x) \]
\[ + \frac{\gamma}{\psi^2 \kappa^2 v^2} + \frac{x}{\psi \kappa v} + c (1 + \psi \kappa v x) \]

Solving \( c \) from the initial condition for \( W(x) \), equation (6) yields:

\[ W(x) = 1 + \gamma x - \frac{x}{\psi \kappa v} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma x (x - 2\bar{x}) - \gamma \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v x}{\psi^2 \kappa^2 v^2} \log \left( \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v x}{1 + \psi \kappa v \bar{x}} \right) \]

Substitution of this relation for wages in equation (8) and (11), solving the integrals, and substitution of \( \kappa v \bar{x} \) for \( (1 - u)/u \), see equation (9), proves the Proposition. \( \blacksquare \)

A.5 Proof of Proposition 7

Using the continuous mapping theorem, the limit for \( \psi \to 0 \) can be rewritten as:

\[ \lim_{\psi \to 0} Q(z, \psi) = 2 \sqrt{2} \lim_{\psi \to 0} \frac{\log(1 + z) \left(1 + z - \frac{1}{2} \log(1 + z)\right) - z}{\psi^3} \times \lim_{\psi \to 0} \frac{(1 + z) \psi}{\psi + z} \]
\[ \times \left[ \lim_{\psi \to 0} \frac{\psi^3}{z^2 + (1 - \psi) \log (1 + z) \left[\log (1 + z) - 2z\right]} \right]^{3/2} \]

These limits can be calculated by substitution of \( z = \psi(1 - u)/u \) and using l’Hopital’s rule. The result follows from substitution of these results into the total limit above.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 8

Since \( z \) is a continuous and monotonic declining function of \( u \) with \( z(1, \psi) = 0 \) and \( z(0, \psi) = \infty \), any positive value of \( z \) implies a unique admissible value of \( u \). We have:

\[ \lim_{z \to 0} Q(z, \psi) = \frac{2}{3} \sqrt{2} \psi^{-1/2} \]
\[ \lim_{z \to \infty} Q(z, \psi) = 0 \]

Hence, a unique equilibrium exists if \( Q(z, \psi) \) is monotonically decreasing in \( z \) and:

\[ K^* < \frac{2}{3} \sqrt{2} \psi^{-1/2} \]
Hence, we have to show that $Q_z (z, \psi) < 0$. Since $\frac{dz}{du} < 0$, this is equivalent to showing that $\frac{d}{du} [Q (\frac{1-u}{u}, \psi)] > 0$ for the relevant domain $u \times \psi = [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$. We provide a plot in Figure 8.

\[ (30) \]

\[ \rho V^U = B + \frac{\gamma}{\psi} \left[ \frac{1}{2} z^2 + \frac{1}{2 \psi^2 \kappa^2 v^2} \log^2 (1 + \kappa v \psi \kappa u) - \frac{\kappa}{\psi \kappa} \log (1 + \kappa v \psi \kappa u) \right] \]

where we substitute $v$ for equation (9) and $z \equiv \psi \frac{1-u}{u}$ in the second line. Using the first line of equation (21), we obtain:

\[ 1 - \rho V^U = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\gamma x^2}{z} \log (1 + z) \left[ 2 - \frac{1}{z} \log (1 + z) \right] \]

For $X$ we substitute the term $E_x(x)$ using equation (23) into equation (22) to obtain:

\[ X = 1 - \frac{1 + \psi \kappa u \kappa u}{1 + \kappa u \kappa u} \int_0^\pi \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2}{(1 + \psi \kappa u \kappa u)^2} dx - uB + vK \]

Substitution of $K$ from the second line of equation (11) and then taking both integrals together results in:
\[
X = 1 - \left[ 1 + \psi \kappa \psi \int_{0}^{\tau} \frac{W(x)}{1 + \psi \kappa \psi} \, dx + uB \right]
\]

Solving for the integral and substitution of the definition of \( u \) and \( z \) yields:

\[
X = u(1 - B) - (1 + z)u \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\psi} \gamma \psi}{2 \gamma \psi} \left[ \frac{1}{1 + z} + z^2 \log^2 (1 + z) - \frac{2}{z} \log (1 + z) \right]
\]

Using the first line of equation (21) yields:

\[
X = u \frac{1}{2} \gamma \psi^2 \left[ \frac{1}{\psi} + \frac{1 - \psi}{\psi \gamma} \log (1 + z) \left[ \frac{1}{z} \log (1 + z) - 2 \right] \right]
\]

\[
- (1 + z)u \frac{1}{\psi} \frac{1}{2 \gamma \psi^2} \left[ \frac{1}{1 + z} + z^2 \log^2 (1 + z) - \frac{2}{z} \log (1 + z) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \gamma \psi^2 \frac{1}{z} \log (1 + z) \left[ 2 - \frac{1}{z} \log (1 + z) \right]
\]

This proves the proposition.\[\blacksquare\]

### A.8 Proof of Proposition (12)

The second best level of unemployment insurance maximizes the right hand side of equation (25) with respect to \( B \) and subject to equation (18). In order to derive the first order condition we need to derive the relationship between \( u \) and \( B \). This relationship can be derived from the second equilibrium condition in Proposition 4. Taking total derivatives and using the definition of \( f(u) \) as in equation (3), we find:

\[
\frac{du}{dB} = 3 \frac{1}{2} \frac{f(u)}{1 - B f'(u)}
\]

Using this relationship, it is possible to find that the first order condition of \( X^+ \) with respect to \( B \) reads:

\[
\frac{dX^+}{dB} = -\frac{3u}{(1 - u)^2} \frac{1}{1 - B f'(u)} \left[ \frac{1 + u}{u} \log(u) + \frac{\log^2 u}{1 - u} + \frac{1 - u}{u} \right] (1 - B) \quad (31)
\]

\[
+ \frac{3}{2} \frac{1}{1 - B f'(u)} B + u + 2 \left[ \frac{u^2}{(1 - u)^2} \log \left( \frac{1 - u}{u} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \right]
\]

Note that the expression for \( dX^+/dB \) in equation (31) depends only on \( u \) and \( B \) and is a continuous function of both variables. Due to the continuity, a proof that a positive level of \( B \) increases welfare is the same as showing that \( dX^+/dB \) is positive when evaluated at zero. Figure 9 shows that this is the case for any value of \( u \) between zero and one.\[\blacksquare\]
Figure 9: $\frac{dX^+}{dB}$ evaluated at $B = 0$ for various values of $u$.

### A.9 Proof of equation (28)

We have:

$$E[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \bar{x}] = \int_0^{\bar{x}} \frac{E_x(x)}{E(0)} dx$$

where $E_x(x)$ is defined in equation (23). The division by $E(0)$ corrects for the unemployed. Equation (20) implies:

$$W(0) - W(x) = \gamma \left[ -\frac{x}{\psi \kappa v} [1 + \log (1 + \psi \kappa v \bar{x})] - \frac{1}{2} x (x - 2 \bar{x}) + \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v x}{\psi^2 \kappa^2 v^2} \log (1 + \psi \kappa v x) \right]$$

while equation (23) and (10) implies:

$$\frac{E_x(x)}{E(0)} = \frac{1}{\bar{x}} \frac{1 + \psi \kappa v \bar{x}}{(1 + \psi \kappa v x)^2}$$
Substitution yields:

\[
E[W(0) - W(x) | x \leq \pi] = \gamma + \psi \frac{\kappa \nu \pi}{\pi} - \int_0^\pi (1 + \psi \kappa \nu x)^{-2} \left[ -\frac{x}{\psi \kappa \nu} \left[ 1 + \log (1 + \psi \kappa \nu x) \right] - \frac{1}{2} x (x - 2\pi) \right] \, dx
\]

\[
= \gamma + \psi \frac{\kappa \nu \pi}{\pi} - \int_0^\pi \left\{ \frac{2 + \psi \kappa \nu \pi}{1 + \psi \kappa \nu \pi} \log (1 + \psi \kappa \nu \pi) - \frac{3}{2} \frac{\psi \kappa \nu \pi}{1 + \psi \kappa \nu \pi} \right\} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \log^2 (1 + \psi \kappa \nu \pi) \right\} \left\{ \frac{u + \psi (1 - u)}{u + \psi (1 - u)} \log \left( 1 + \psi \frac{1 - u}{u + \psi (1 - u)} \right) \right\}
\]

Using the definition of \( z \) we find the first equation of (5). Substitution of the two equations (21) in equation (24) yields the second equation.
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