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Bid rigging and entry deterrence in public procurement: Evidence from an investigation into collusion and corruption in Quebec

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February 9, 2018

Abstract

We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Our focus is on Montreal's asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding and bribes to bureaucrats, and where, in 2009, a police investigation was launched. We collect procurement data and use a difference-in-difference approach to compare outcomes before and after the investigation in Montreal and in Quebec City, where there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption. We find that entry and participation increased, and that the price of procurement decreased. We then decompose the price decrease to quantify the importance of two aspects of cartel organization, coordination and entry deterrence, for collusive pricing. We find that the latter explains only a small part of the decrease.

JEL-Code: L22; L74; D44; H57.

Keywords: Collusion; Corruption; Bid rigging; Entry deterrence.

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1 Introduction

In October 2009, Canadian news television show *Enquête* broadcast a program shedding light on the collusion and corruption allegedly rampant in the construction industry in the greater Montreal area (see *Enquête*, Radio Canada (2009)). It detailed allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding, and bribes to bureaucrats. The show sent shockwaves through the province and led to the creation on October 22nd 2009, of a police task force, *Opération Marteau* charged with investigating the allegations.¹

The objective of this paper is to study the impact of this police investigation on firm behaviour in order to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Successful cartels depend on the ability of members to overcome two challenges: (i) *coordinating an agreement* amongst themselves (selecting and coordinating profitable collusive pricing strategies and monitoring behavior to prevent defection) and (ii) *detering the entry of other firms* into the market (see for instance Levenstein and Suslow (2006)). While considerable attention has been paid to the impact of coordination, little has been directed at the distortion caused by entry deterrence, or to trying to separate the two effects. This is despite the fact that adverse participation effects could be economically as significant as other cartel-related sources of inefficiency and damages. By excluding potential rivals, the cartel might be able to charge higher prices than it otherwise would and earn greater profits. In this paper we quantify the relative importance of these two challenges. Doing so is relevant for understanding the functioning of cartels, and also for evaluating the impact of collusion on municipal spending and for learning how to prevent it.

We collected detailed data for the municipal procurement of asphalt, through *Access to Information* requests at the Municipal Clerk's offices for the period 2007 to 2013. The provincial inquest into collusion and corruption in the construction industry that followed the police investigation revealed that a sophisticated cartel had existed since at least 2000 in this market. Testimony during the inquest provided detailed information on the organization of the cartel, characterized Montreal's asphalt market as *closed*, and documented violent behaviour towards potential entrants.²

¹**Legal disclaimer:** This paper analyses the alleged cartel case strictly from an economic point of view. We base our understanding of the facts mostly on data obtained from the municipal clerk's office through access to information requests, through transcripts of testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, and the testimony presented in the *Enquête* broadcast. The investigation into, and prosecution of, firms involved in the alleged conspiracy is ongoing. The allegations have not been proven in a court of justice. However, for the purpose of this analysis, we take these facts as established.

²See for instance pages 56-57 of the Final report of the Charbonneau Commission (Charbonneau and Lachance (2015)).

The data provide information on all public tenders, and the participating bidders before and after the investigation started. In order to estimate the causal impact of the investigation, we collected this information not only for Montreal, but also for Quebec City, which was not mentioned in the broadcast and was not the focus of the initial investigation. Moreover, to our knowledge, there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption in its asphalt industry.³ These observations, and the fact that prior to the investigation bidding patterns are similar in the two markets (i.e. they have a common trend), qualify Quebec City as a suitable control and so we use a difference-in-difference approach comparing contracts in Montreal to those in Quebec City to estimate the effect of the investigation on bidding behaviour. This approach has been used to study the impact of alleged price fixing in other markets (see for instance Clark and Houde (2014)).

Our estimates indicate that entry and participation increased in Montreal following the investigation. Three new firms entered in Montreal, increasing the total number of firms in the market by 50%. These firms began bidding on contracts throughout the city. In contrast, no new firms entered in Quebec City. We estimate a 61% increase in the participation rate in Montreal relative to Quebec City, with 1.6 more bidders per auction after the investigation. We also find that the investigation led to an 18% decrease in the raw price (per ton) of asphalt in Montreal.

These results show that entry occurred and that prices fell, but do not inform as to the relative importance of entry vs coordination in explaining the price reduction. For this we consider calls for tender in which we restrict attention to auctions featuring no entrants. Our results imply that, even in auctions without entrants, prices are lower in Montreal after the investigation. These findings suggest that the price decrease is mostly due to changes in bidding behavior by incumbent firms.

Since the participation decision is endogenous and this approach allows us to control only for the threat of entry but not the actual presence of an entrant, we also use a model-based approach to confirm our reduced-form results. We structurally estimate production costs from the post-cartel period in Montreal for all firms that were present (incumbents and entrants), and then use these cost estimates to decompose the reduced-form price change into coordination and entry-deterrence effects. Specifically, we simulate counterfactual prices under the scenario that the entrants had not in fact entered the market and compare these prices to the benchmark estimated using our difference-in-difference

³In recent months authorities have started to look into contracts in cities near to Quebec City, but as of the time of writing there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption in the asphalt market in Quebec City itself.

estimates. Our findings are consistent with those from our reduced-form estimates that control for entry. Specifically, they suggest that the inability of cartel members to deter entry explains only a small part of the price change (about 20%), with the majority of the change being explained by the loss of their ability to coordinate pricing.

Our results shed light on the organization of cartels. Although entry deterrence is clearly part of the cartel mechanism, it is less important than the ability to coordinate pricing. These findings can have policy implications in terms of providing guidance regarding how governments and international organizations should allocate scarce resources in the fight against collusion and corruption. Academics and policy makers have emphasized the need to encourage the participation of a large number of bidders in the procurement process by eliminating policies that place restrictions on entry or participation (see for instance Coate (1985) and OECD (2012)).⁴ However, at least in the case of the cartel we examine, our results suggest that less energy should be dedicated to ensuring that the tender process is designed to maximize participation, and more resources should be devoted to eliminating communication and coordination.

Related literature: Our paper is related to a growing empirical literature on the organization of cartels. Some of this has focused on describing the inner workings of cartels and bidding behaviour, for instance Pesendorfer (2000), Genesove and Mullin (2001), Roller and Steen (2006), Asker (2010), and Clark and Houde (2013). Other papers have focused on distinguishing collusion from competition, for instance Porter and Zona (1999), Bajari and Ye (2003), Conley and Decarolis (2016), Kawai and Nakabayashi (2014), and Chassang and Ornter (2015).

There is also a literature on cartel sustainability, whose focus has mostly been on the detection of cheating and retaliation to this behaviour (see Genesove and Mullin (2001) and Stigler (1964) regarding detection, and Green and Porter (1984) regarding retaliation). However, many cartels collapse because of pressures from firms outside the cartel. The role of entry deterrence and rivalry suppression in sustaining collusion is starting to receive more attention. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) point out that most successful cartels actively create barriers to entry either by engaging in predation (see Scott-Morton (1997), Podolny and Scott-Morton (1999) and Asker (2010)), by refusing to share production technology (Harrington (2006)), by turning to the government to create regulations, or by using vertical exclusion (see Heeb et al. (2009)). Marshall et al. (2015) develop a

⁴For example, contracts should be well defined in terms of products and delivery times to encourage firms with excess capacity to bid (Coate (1985)).

model which allows them to consider the incentives for cartels to eliminate non-members from the market. What is less often discussed is the role that intimidation and violence can play. As pointed out by Porter (2005), illegal sanctions may be available for use in deterring entry, especially in industries linked to organized crime.

There is growing interest in the role of entry (participation) in auction outcomes (see for instance Li and Zheng (2009), Roberts and Sweeting (2013), Marmer et al. (2013), and Coviello and Mariniello (2014)). Participation is endogenous and not all potential bidders are observed to bid in every auction. We show that collusion is one factor preventing potential competitors not only from entering the market, but participating in and winning calls for tender.

Finally, we are also related to a long literature on public procurement (see for instance Somaini (2011), Lewis and Bajari (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Gil and Marion (2013), Bajari et al. (2014), and the survey by Dimitri et al. (2006)). There has also been considerable attention paid to corruption in procurement (see for instance Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), Bandiera et al. (2009), Ferraz and Finan (2011), Lewis-Faupel et al. (2016) and Coviello and Gagliarducci (2017), or Fisman and Golden (2017) for a broader discussion of corruption).

Outline: The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A description of the market is presented in Section 2. Section 3 explains the alleged conspiracy and investigation. Section 4 describes the data and some descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy for examining the impact of the investigation, the estimation and the test results are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 decomposes the estimated price change into an entry effect and a coordinated-behaviour effect. Finally, section 7 concludes. The Appendices contains a large number of robustness checks and details of the model.

2 The markets and the adjudication process

Our focus is on the municipal procurement of asphalt in Montreal and Quebec City. The City of Montreal is composed of nineteen boroughs. Until 2009, Quebec City was composed of eight boroughs. In 2010, the boroughs of Quebec City were amalgamated bringing the total number to six. Figures A.1 and A.2, located in Appendix A, present maps of each city and their boroughs (before and after the amalgamation for Quebec City).

The contract adjudication process is the same in Montreal and Quebec City. When submitting their budgets, the boroughs each make predictions about the required amounts of

asphalt to maintain their roads over the course of the upcoming year. The vast majority of contracts are for the *summer season*, with a small minority of contracts for work in the *winter season*. Our focus is on the summer-season contracts.⁵

Neither city has factories to produce asphalt, but each has the manpower required to repair roads with the asphalt provided. Interested firms are invited to submit bids for multiple boroughs and the results for each are announced simultaneously. In Montreal, produced asphalt can either be for delivery or for collection by the city. Delivered asphalt is taken to the borough's designated reception point, while collected asphalt is picked up by the city's trucks. Some types of asphalt are only delivered or only collected, while other asphalt types are both delivered and collected. These auctions are all performed separately. In contrast, in Quebec City, all asphalt types are collected at the firms' plants by the city's trucks. In our empirical analysis we include all asphalt types, but our results are robust to focusing on a homogeneous set of contracts.

Firms propose bids with two components. First, firms submit a unit price per metric ton for each type of asphalt required. Second, firms submit a bid that matches the total unit cost multiplied by the quantity required for each type of asphalt and to this they add their shipping costs and taxes. Auctions are first-price sealed bid and single-attribute (cost). In our empirical analysis below we focus on raw bids without the transportation cost, because there were changes to the way transport charges were calculated in Montreal during our sample period.

Several different varieties of asphalt are available for paving work. Each of these types of asphalt has different characteristics and is suitable for specific work conditions (for instance some are better for the cold). During our sample period, eleven different asphalt types were ordered in Montreal, and five different types for Quebec City. In our empirical analysis we control for the different asphalt types.

In each of the nineteen boroughs of Montreal there can be one auction per asphalt type. So every year there can be up to 209 contracts awarded in Montreal. Quebec City operates differently, using a single auction per borough, combining all asphalt types. As a result, there are more calls for tender in Montreal than in Quebec City. In Montreal, firms are constrained to bid the same unit price for the same asphalt type in different boroughs, and to bid the same transport cost for delivery of all types within a given borough. Although

⁵Only one percent of Montreal's contracts are for the winter season, and just six percent for Quebec City. These contracts are also auctioned at the city level, unlike summer contracts which are auctioned at the borough level. Finally, in Quebec City winter contracts can also vary in the period that they cover. For all these reasons, we omit these contracts from our analysis.

most of the analysis abstracts from this constraint, in the robustness section we suppose that auctions are for types and investigate the impact of the investigation on type prices and find similar results.

Cities retain the right to reject any bid deemed non-compliant, but this is very rarely implemented. Indeed, in our data, this occurs only once, in Montreal in 2012. In this case, the city canceled the tender and called on all firms to resubmit. Once the auction is completed, the City must publish the results of all firms that bid.

In 2009, Quebec City introduced a by-law forbidding a firm from winning contracts in more than half the boroughs in any given year (more than four prior to 2010, more than three afterwards). Even if a firm was the lowest bidder on a call for tender, it only won the four (three after 2010) calls on which there was the largest difference between the lowest and second lowest bidders. The second lowest bidder wins otherwise. Below we explain how we address this in the empirical analysis.

3 The alleged conspiracy and the investigation

The *Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in the Construction Industry* (commonly referred to as the Charbonneau Commission) was formed on October 11th 2011 to dig into the allegations of collusion and corruption first exposed in 2009 by Radio Canada and Opération Marteau. The Commission's mandate was to: (i) examine the existence of schemes and, where appropriate, to paint a portrait of activities involving collusion and corruption in the provision and management of public contracts in the construction industry (including private organizations, government enterprises and municipalities) and to include any links with the financing of political parties, (ii) paint a picture of possible organized crime infiltration in the construction industry, and (iii) examine possible solutions and make recommendations establishing measures to identify, reduce and prevent collusion and corruption in awarding and managing public contracts in the construction industry.⁶

Since the creation of the Commission, testimony has substantiated the allegations of corruption and collusive schemes in various construction-related industries in and around Montreal, including the asphalt industry in Montreal proper. According to testimony, collusion has existed in the construction industry in and around Montreal and

⁶See <https://www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca/la-commission/mandat.html>.

for provincial contracts (with the Ministry of Transport) at least as far back as the 1980's.⁷ Contracts involving asphalt, sewers, aqueducts and sidewalks were all affected.⁸

Collusion involved market segmentation, complementary bidding and payoffs to bureaucrats. Before contracts were allocated by the municipalities or the Ministry of Transport conspiring firms would acquire private information about the contracts (location, size, etc.) from officials.⁹ Testimony during the Charbonneau Commission detailed bribes provided to city officials.¹⁰

Subsequently, representatives would meet to determine which firm would win which contracts based the firms' capacities of production and the location of their plants. The specified winner was then responsible for organizing all of the contracts (its bid and those of competitors). To do so, before the submission closing date, it would contact the other participants to provide instructions on complementary bidding.¹¹ According to dissidents interviewed during *Enquête's* investigations, these complementary higher bids were submitted to simulate competition. In case their conversations were overheard, the participants used a coded vocabulary to exchange information. The specified winner would claim to be organizing a round of golf. He would call other firms saying, for example, "we will start from the 4th hole and we will be 9 players". This meant that the complementary bids must be over \$4 900 000 (4th=\$4 000 000 and 9 players= \$900 000). The specified winner would bid just below this threshold.¹² The winner would reveal implicitly its bid. To our knowledge, no sidepayments were ever transferred between the colluding firms.

According to testimony during the Charbonneau Commission, while less structured collusion had existed since the 1980's, Montreal's asphalt cartel was formed in 2000, by four of the dominant construction firms active in and around Montreal (see Radio Canada (2013)). The participating firms met to decide: (i) the quantity of asphalt to be produced by each member, (ii) the territory of each member, and (iii) the price of raw materials for the production of asphalt. The initial firms concluded partnership agreements for the

⁷See paragraph 1118 of Piero Di Iorio's testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, November 26th 2012, Di Iorio (2012).

⁸See paragraphs 788, 790, 804, 1038-1042 and 1134 of Gilles Théberge's testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, May 23rd 2013, Théberge (2013a).

⁹See paragraphs 684-686 and 724 of Jean Théoret's Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, November 26th 2012, Théoret (2012).

¹⁰These included invitations to fishing and yachting trips, wine and hockey tickets, and also political donations. See paragraphs 1226, and 185 to 206 of Gilles Théberge's testimonies from the Charbonneau Commission, May 23rd and May 24th 2013, Théberge (2013a) and Théberge (2013b).

¹¹See paragraphs 997-1009 ad 1060-1100 of Gilles Théberge's testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, May 23rd 2013, Théberge (2013a).

¹²See minute 7:25 of *Enquête*, Radio Canada (2009)

asphalt market with other firms and extended the number of participants to include all six of the firms active in Montreal.¹³

Entry deterrence: Competition was deterred using threats and intimidation. The two dissidents interviewed during *Enquête*'s investigations, decided to remain anonymous for "fear of their physical integrity."¹⁴ In order to prepare submissions, firms have to request plans from the municipal officials. If a non-cartel firm requested the plans, municipal informants would contact the cartel immediately.¹⁵ Potential bidders would be informed that the contract did not belong to them, and that they either follow the rules of the cartel or remove their submission. Should they refuse, the cartel would harass potential bidders by calling unceasingly until the opening date of the submission. If they still would not join the cartel or leave, individuals would be sent to deliver a threat in person.¹⁶ If, despite the threats, a firm participated in the call for tenders and won the contract, there was little chance it would be able to complete the necessary work. According to a dissident, the cartel would tamper with equipment and materials, and would continue to exert physical violence.¹⁷

4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

We use borough-level asphalt contract data for Montreal and Quebec City, obtained through access to information requests at the Municipal Clerk's office. These requests yielded data on procurement auctions from 2007 to 2013 for both cities. Additional information was collected in the Cahiers d'appels d'offres (Call for tender books). We have information on all submitted bids (raw bids and transportation charges), and the identity of the winner. We also collected from the Quebec Ministry of Transport the addresses of all the asphalt plants in Montreal and Quebec City, and we have celled the addresses of the central point of reception for each neighbourhood in the two cities. This allows us to calculate the distances for delivery of the asphalt for each tender. For Montreal the books also contain information on the capacity of each firm for each year.

¹³See paragraphs 575 and 677-696 of Gilles Th  berge's testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, May 23rd 2013, Th  berge (2013a).

¹⁴See minute 13:50 of *Enqu  te*, Radio Canada (2009).

¹⁵See paragraphs 684-686 and 724 of Jean Th  oret's Testimony from the Charbonneau Commission, November 26th 2012, Th  oret (2012).

¹⁶For an example of this behaviour, see paragraphs 1102 to 1133 of Piero Di Iorio's testimony at the Charbonneau Commission, November 26th 2012, Di Iorio (2012).

¹⁷See paragraphs paragraphs 839-915 from Jean Th  oret's testimony at the Charbonneau Commission, November 26th 2012, Th  oret (2012).

4.1 Contracts

Table I describes the contracts awarded over the sample period in Montreal and Quebec City respectively. In Quebec City, from 2007 to 2013, there were 46 individual calls for tender to supply asphalt with an average of 3.45 bids per tender. In the nineteen boroughs of Montreal, during the period 2007-2013, there were 616 calls for tender, with an average of 3.41 bids per auction. From this table we can already see that there was a large increase in the number of bids per contract in Montreal post investigation. In contrast, the number of bids fell in Quebec City.¹⁸

Table I: Descriptive statistics for Montreal and Quebec City

| Year | \$ awarded (millions) | Nbr contracts | Nbr bidding boroughs | Avg tons of asphalt | Nbr bidding firms | Nbr bids per contract | Avg winning bid (\$/ton) |
|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Montreal | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | 3.1 | 73 | 12 | 637 | 6 | 3 | 65 |
| 2008 | 2 | 61 | 11 | 443 | 4 | 2.5 | 71 |
| 2009 | 3 | 81 | 14 | 392 | 6 | 2.4 | 89 |
| 2010 | 3 | 174 | 19 | 244 | 8 | 3.6 | 68 |
| 2011 | 2 | 149 | 15 | 189 | 8 | 4.4 | 66 |
| 2012 | 2.6 | 43 | 16 | 879 | 8 | 3.7 | 65 |
| 2013 | 3.1 | 35 | 16 | 1287 | 7 | 2.9 | 69 |
| | | Total | | | Average | | |
| 2007-2009 | 8.1 | 215 | 12 | 491 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 75 |
| 2010-2013 | 11 | 401 | 17 | 650 | 7.8 | 3.6 | 67 |
| Quebec City | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | 1.6 | 7 | 7 | 3539 | 6 | 3.6 | 55 |
| 2008 | 1.4 | 7 | 7 | 3552 | 6 | 3.6 | 48 |
| 2009 | 2.9 | 8 | 8 | 4361 | 7 | 3.9 | 69 |
| 2010 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 5243 | 6 | 3.5 | 52 |
| 2011 | 2.9 | 6 | 6 | 5562 | 4 | 3.2 | 72 |
| 2012 | 2.6 | 6 | 6 | 5435 | 4 | 2.8 | 64 |
| 2013 | 2.6 | 6 | 6 | 5358 | 5 | 3.7 | 63 |
| | | Total | | | Average | | |
| 2007-2009 | 5.9 | 22 | 7.3 | 3818 | 6.3 | 3.7 | 57 |
| 2010-2013 | 10 | 24 | 6 | 5399 | 4.8 | 3.3 | 63 |

We can also see that prior to the investigation raw bids in Montreal were \$75 per ton, but only \$57 in Quebec City. In the post-announcement sample the differences between

¹⁸The average number of tons per contract increases significantly in 2013, but this can largely be explained by one contract. In 2013, the district of Ville-Marie ordered 20 000 tons in a single contract. The average without this contract is 736.38 tons per contract. Overall, we observe that in 2010 and 2011 districts ordered smaller quantities of all asphalt types while in 2012 and 2013, they switched to fewer asphalt types but ordered in greater quantities.

Montreal and Quebec are considerably smaller. Note that this is due to changes both in Quebec City and in Montreal after the announcement. Prices increase by \$6 in Quebec City and fall by over \$8 in Montreal. As a preview of our empirical analysis below, we can already see that the difference-in-difference effect is \$14, suggesting the investigation had a large economic impact on bidding behaviour in Montreal's asphalt market.

Table II breaks contract allocation down by firm for Montreal and Quebec City. Between 2007 and 2009, a total of six firms bid for contracts for the supply of asphalt in Montreal. We label these firms 1 through 6. Three other firms entered subsequently. Firms 7 and 8 placed bids for the first time in 2010 and firm 9 began bidding in 2012. These three entrants had been active in the private sector prior to 2010. Despite the fact that they each had the capacity to supply public contracts, they never placed bids in municipal auctions prior to this date.

We can see that in Montreal prior to the investigation one firm had a revenue share greater than half, and that three firms dominated the market. After the investigation the market share of two of these firms fell dramatically, but increased for the smallest of the three. Two of the three entrants pick up around 35% of the market.

It is also worth pointing out that both during the cartel period and afterwards some firms participate often, but rarely win. During the cartel period this is consistent with the evidence suggesting that part of the cartel agreement involved complementary bids on the part of non-winning firms. Although there is no mention of side-payments, there is some evidence that these cartel members were also present in other nearby (in geographic- or product-space) markets, and that the role of winners and complementary bidders may have been reversed in these other markets

There were a total of seven firms that bid on tenders for the supply of asphalt in Quebec City in the 2007-2013 period. We label these firms 1 through 7. Firms 1 and 6 win large fractions of the contracts in both time periods, while firms 7 and 2 are active in the early and late period respectively.

4.1.1 Entry

As just mentioned, the three entrants in Montreal only began winning contracts in 2010, but then pick up approximately 35% of the market. While firm 9 participates and wins few auctions, the other two firms participate and win across sixteen of the nineteen boroughs: firm 7 participates and wins calls in twelve of the nineteen boroughs, while firm 8 participates in ten different boroughs and wins calls in nine of them. The two firms are

Table II: Firm statistics for Montreal and Quebec City

| Firm | Nbr of won auctions | Winning Percentage | Nbr of participation | Percentage of participation | Nbr won bids/ Nbr participations | Average share |
|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Montreal | | | | | | |
| 2007-2009 | | | | | | |
| 1 | 146 | 67.90% | 210 | 97.70% | 69.50% | 73.92% |
| 2 | 41 | 19.10% | 54 | 25.10% | 75.90% | 20.37% |
| 3 | 2 | 0.90% | 69 | 32.10% | 2.90% | 0.01% |
| 4 | 21 | 9.80% | 137 | 63.70% | 15.30% | 5.78% |
| 5 | 1 | 0.50% | 49 | 22.80% | 2.00% | 0.01% |
| 6 | 4 | 1.90% | 41 | 19.10% | 9.80% | 0.36% |
| Total | 215 | 100.00% | | | | |
| 2010-2013 | | | | | | |
| 1 | 178 | 44.40% | 399 | 99.50% | 44.60% | 38.88% |
| 2 | 12 | 3.00% | 128 | 31.90% | 9.40% | 7.93% |
| 3 | 18 | 4.50% | 144 | 35.90% | 12.50% | 6.48% |
| 4 | 93 | 23.20% | 199 | 49.60% | 46.70% | 17.46% |
| 5 | 9 | 2.20% | 169 | 42.10% | 5.30% | 1.94% |
| 6 | 3 | 0.70% | 162 | 40.40% | 1.90% | 0.04% |
| 7 | 65 | 16.20% | 212 | 52.90% | 30.70% | 24.27% |
| 8 | 20 | 5.00% | 126 | 31.40% | 15.90% | 11.87% |
| 9 | 3 | 0.70% | 4 | 1.00% | 75.00% | 0.42% |
| Total | 401 | 100.00% | | | | |
| Quebec City | | | | | | |
| 2007-2009 | | | | | | |
| 1 | 13 | 59.10% | 22 | 100.00% | 59.10% | 55.46% |
| 2 | 0 | 0.00% | 22 | 100.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 3 | 0 | 0.00% | 2 | 9.10% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 4 | 0 | 0.00% | 6 | 27.30% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 5 | 0 | 0.00% | 3 | 13.60% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 6 | 8 | 36.40% | 22 | 100.00% | 36.40% | 38.90% |
| 7 | 1 | 4.50% | 4 | 18.20% | 25.00% | 11.62% |
| Total | 22 | 100.00% | | | | |
| 2010-2013 | | | | | | |
| 1 | 5 | 20.80% | 18 | 75.00% | 27.80% | 26.85% |
| 2 | 5 | 20.80% | 23 | 95.80% | 21.70% | 24.99% |
| 3 | 0 | 0.00% | 4 | 16.70% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 4 | 1 | 4.20% | 9 | 37.50% | 11.10% | 8.23% |
| 5 | 0 | 0.00% | 1 | 4.20% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 6 | 13 | 54.20% | 24 | 100.00% | 54.20% | 49.74% |
| 7 | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| Total | 24 | 100.00% | | | | |

more active in years 2010 and 2011 and so one might be concerned that it is the increased number of auctions that drives participation; however, our results regarding the impact of the investigation on both prices and participation are robust to controlling for the number

of contracts and to restricting attention to boroughs that contract in every period.

5 Impact of the police investigation

In this section we evaluate the effect that the police investigation, Opération Marteau in October 2009, had on outcomes in Montreal. We employ a difference-in-difference strategy in which we compare changes in outcomes in the treatment market (Montreal) to those in a control market (Quebec City), before and after the start of the investigation. This approach hinges on a number of important assumptions. The first is that we are able to properly identify the cartel period. The second is that after the investigation bidding returned to competitive levels, and the third is that we are able to adequately control for market-specific developments during the operation of the cartel.

Since contracts in both our markets are negotiated only once a year in the spring, we establish our structural break in 2010, assuming that bidding in Montreal became competitive again starting at this point. Testimony during the Commission implied that the start of Opération Marteau caused collusion to abate. We use contracts in Quebec City as a competitive benchmark against which to compare the behavior of firms receiving the treatments, in the spirit of the test proposed by Porter and Zona (1999; 1993) and in line with Clark and Houde (2014).¹⁹ The choice of Quebec City as a competitive benchmark is justified by the fact that, to our knowledge, its asphalt market has never been cited during Opération Marteau or the Charbonneau Commission. Our understanding is that the initial focus of Opération Marteau was on Montreal based on the allegations in the *Enquête* broadcast. Quebec City is located a reasonable distance from the suspected markets (about 250 kms), which is important, since many markets surrounding Montreal have been cited and therefore, would not be reliable controls. Specifically, almost all the suburbs located on the North and South shores of the island of Montreal have been mentioned in the investigation. Furthermore, calls for tenders in the two cities are similar in many ways: (i) the auctions are held during the same period, (ii) the auctions are designed per borough, and (iii) the yearly budget for asphalt for the two cities is usually not too different.

This latter condition may affect the number of auctions a firm wins and induce spurious drops in winning probabilities and prices.

¹⁹See also Igami (2015) and Miller and Weinberg (2017) for other examples in which the end or beginning of coordinated behavior is used to estimate the impact of collusion.

On the other hand, one might point to factors that imply that Quebec City is not a perfect control. First, as alluded to above, the calls for tender are for very different quantities of asphalt, since in Montreal there are up to eleven auctions per borough per year (one per asphalt type), while in Quebec City there is just one per borough. Second, there was a municipal reorganization of the boroughs in Quebec City that coincided with the start of the investigation. Since the boroughs are now bigger, demand patterns for asphalt could change, possibly favouring larger firms that can satisfy bigger contracts. Finally, the change in legislation that took place in Quebec starting in 2009 that established a limit on the number of contracts that a firm could win in any given year.


To alleviate these concerns we have carefully analysed Quebec City contracts and performed several tests to learn about the impact of these factors on pricing and winning probability. In particular, we focus our attention on quantities in tons of asphalt, and we have run specifications in which we control for the type of asphalt being requested. This allows us to partial out demand effects. Regarding the change in legislation we define a winner as the lowest bidder even if the firm has won already half the contracts. Despite this correction, one might be concerned that bidders in Quebec City adjusted their behaviour to this change in legislation, for instance by bidding more intensely on a smaller set of contracts. To address this, we regress winning bids and number of bidders on an indicator for whether the legislation was in place (and the same set of controls we use below). We find that the legislation has no impact on bidding. All this evidence suggests, albeit indirectly, that Quebec City is a valid control market.

As we explain in more detail in Section 5.1.1 below, our analysis is robust to the inclusion of two additional cities (one treatment and one control), for which we have access to more limited data.

5.1 Prices

In this subsection we study the effect of the investigation on prices. Figure 1 plots the evolution of raw bids over time in Montreal and Quebec City. Prices are higher in Montreal than in Quebec City prior to the investigation, but the trends in the two cities were common with bids roughly following the price of crude oil (with a lag) until the start of the investigation at which point prices in Montreal diverge. This qualifies Quebec City as a valid comparison group for Montreal such that we can interpret the difference-in-

Figure 1: Average bids



difference estimates of the impact of the investigation presented above as causal.²⁰

Next we investigate the extent to which our descriptive results are robust and not driven by other city- and/or borough-level factors that may act as confounding factors of our causal effect of interest. Our main econometric specification is:

$$B_{i,a} = \alpha + \delta_1 Mtl_{i,a} * Marteau_{i,a} + \delta_2 Marteau_{i,a} + \delta_3 Mtl_{i,a} + \beta X_{i,a} + \epsilon_{i,a}, \quad (1)$$

where $B_{i,a}$ is the raw bid of bidder i in auction a taking place in borough r , and where $X_{i,a}$ includes year, borough and asphalt-type fixed effects, and variables that capture (i) the proportion of contracts in borough r won by firm i in the previous year (Con), (ii) the lagged average price of crude oil, (iii) the distance between the production site and the delivery site (Distance), (iv) the HHI, (v) the quantity of asphalt in the call for tender and (vi) the firm's potential capacity defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the

²⁰Below we test formally for the similarities of trends and the robustness of our results to their inclusion. It should also be noted that, despite the evidence provided at the beginning of this section that there was no collusion in Quebec City in the pre-investigation period, the reader might nonetheless be concerned that collusion extended into this market. Given the similar trends experienced by the control, if there was in fact collusion, our findings still provide causal estimates of the effect of the investigation on prices, since the investigation focused on Montreal initially. In this case our results would underestimate the effect of collusion on prices.

firms under competition (Capacity).²¹ *Marteau* indicates the start of Opération Marteau in 2010 and *Mtl* is a dummy for Montreal. The parameter of interest is δ_1 , which can be interpreted as the difference between the change in the price in Montreal relative to the change in price in Quebec from before to after the investigation started. Standard errors are clustered at the borough-year level, but our results are robust to different forms of clustering (for instance city, and city-year).²²

Results from the estimation of equation 1 for raw bids are presented in Table III. We present results for all bids and also for winning bids. We focus our discussion on winning bids. Column (4) reproduces the findings from Table I. From columns (5) and (6) we can see that adding controls yields only a slightly smaller estimate of the effect of the investigation of \$10.23, or 13.51%. Overall the results suggest that the police investigation led to a reduction in the prices paid for municipal procurement.²³

5.1.1 Robustness

Perhaps the biggest concern is that there is a sizeable change in the number of auctions in 2010 and 2011 in Montreal (the number of contracts is more than double the number in other years). In 2010-2011, boroughs requested smaller quantities of asphalt but for more types. In Table IV, we control for the number of auctions per year in each city. Results are similar to those reported above. In Appendix B we also report results when we restrict attention to *always-contracting* boroughs and again find little change.

The other main concern is that the results may not be robust to the presence of city-

²¹For Quebec City we use the HHI that would have prevailed had there been no change in legislation regarding the maximum number of contracts.

²²Note that we omit two time dummies: one for the constant and one for the (lagged) crude oil variable. This is because lagged crude oil shows a very high correlation with prices (See Figure 1). Furthermore, we omit one borough from the specification.

²³The R-squared of the regressions suggests that the specification with controls does fairly well in explaining the variation in the bids and in the winning bids, 73.1% and 91.3% respectively. In Appendix B we present formal tests for the presence of common trends in prices between Montreal and Quebec City before the investigation, which is the main identifying assumption of the difference-in-difference estimation method. A violation of this assumption would imply that our estimates are non-causal. Panel A of Table A.1 shows that the hypothesis of linear trends is strongly rejected in our data, whereas Panel B shows that the coefficients of *MontrealXYear2008* and *MontrealXYear2009* are very similar and not statistically different (i.e., large p-values of the difference) for the majority of our specifications. This evidence is compatible with the non-linearities in prices depicted in Figure 1. To assess the robustness of our results to the possible violation of the common trend assumption, in Table A.2 we report estimates obtained with the same specification used in Table III but adding heterogeneous linear (Panel A) and non-linear trends (Panel B). We conclude that our estimates are robust to this possible threat to the identification strategy since, once we control for heterogeneous trends, our estimates are comparable in sign and magnitude to our baseline estimates.

Table III: Difference-in-difference for the submitted raw bids

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Sample | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bid (4) | Winning bid (5) | Winning bid (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | | -10.677*** (3.303) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.693** (3.347) | -13.670*** (3.472) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.231*** (3.484) |
| Montreal | | 16.239*** (2.953) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 8.314*** (2.991) | 18.078*** (3.104) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 6.141 (4.766) |
| Marteau | | 4.760* (2.674) | -5.678* (3.188) | -6.042* (3.633) | 4.982* (2.862) | -4.681 (3.623) | -5.472 (3.960) |
| Crude_oil_lag | | | 0.128*** (0.003) | 0.133*** (0.004) | | 0.135*** (0.003) | 0.132*** (0.004) |
| Capacity | | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.130*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | | -0.140 (0.135) | | | -0.217 (0.155) |
| Distance | | | | -0.017 (0.025) | | | -0.088** (0.036) |
| CON | | | | -2.228*** (0.648) | | | 1.389** (0.641) |
| HHI | | | | -2.606 (4.423) | | | -7.747 (4.921) |
| Borough effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Year effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Type effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 | |
| R-squared | 0.128 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.213 | 0.893 | 0.913 | |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 | |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announcement of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. *Distance_{i,x}* is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

wide shocks since our sample only includes two cities. To alleviate this concern we obtained limited information on procurement contracts in two other markets in the province

Table IV: DID controlling for the number of auctions

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -10.258*** (3.138) | -10.258*** (3.138) | -10.416*** (3.124) | -11.143*** (3.555) | -11.143*** (3.555) | -10.833*** (3.378) |
| Montreal | 8.032*** (2.495) | 8.032*** (2.495) | 5.071 (3.621) | 8.931*** (2.879) | 8.931*** (2.879) | 8.420** (3.330) |
| Marteau | 17.846*** (3.440) | -2.714 (3.231) | -3.879 (3.692) | 18.058*** (3.886) | -3.933 (3.666) | -4.728 (4.123) |
| Nbr auctions | 0.043* (0.024) | 0.043* (0.024) | 0.049** (0.024) | 0.011 (0.027) | 0.011 (0.027) | 0.019 (0.027) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.126*** (0.003) | 0.133*** (0.004) | | 0.135*** (0.003) | 0.133*** (0.004) |
| Capacity | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.129*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.113 (0.131) | | | -0.207 (0.153) |
| Distance | | | -0.021 (0.025) | | | -0.091** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.231*** (0.648) | | | 1.311** (0.643) |
| HHI | | | -6.900* (3.954) | | | -9.556** (4.326) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.728 | 0.728 | 0.733 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Nbr auctions* is the annual number of auctions. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

of Quebec: Laval and Lévis.²⁴ Laval is a large suburb on Montreal, and has been frequently mentioned as a hotbed of collusive activity. Lévis is a suburb of Québec City and, to our knowledge, like Québec City, has not been the subject of allegations of collusion for its municipal asphalt contracts. In Appendix B.2 we present evidence showing that results are almost identical when extending the sample to four cities.

In the Appendix we have also analyzed the robustness of the effect of the investigation on prices with respect to the choice of controls, different windows around the start of the investigation, and concerns related to institutional features of the market. Overall, we conclude that the descriptive (and graphical) effect of the investigation on prices identified from Table I (and Figure 1) is robust to the specification of the empirical model, sample selection around the date of the investigation, and to different features of our market and data.

5.2 Entry and participation

In this subsection we study the effect of the investigation on entry and participation. As mentioned above, in Montreal three new firms entered the market following the investigation. In contrast, in Québec City, no firms enter and one firm no longer participates in any calls for tender. From Table I we also know that in Montreal the average number of participants increased following the investigation. Figure 2 presents the share of the dominant firm (as measured by total amounts of contracts won) in each borough in Montreal before and after the investigation. The incumbent firms win a smaller share of contracts after the investigation and in some cases are no longer the dominant firm in the borough afterwards.

Our main econometric specification for the entry analysis is similar to above:

$$I_a = \alpha + \delta_1 Mtl_a * Marteau_a + \delta_2 Marteau_a + \delta_3 Mtl_a + \beta X_a + \epsilon_a, \quad (2)$$

where I_a represents the following outcomes in auction a : (i) number of bidders, (ii) number of incumbent bidders, and (iii) share of the dominant firm (at the year level). The X_a includes the same variables and fixed effects as above.

Results from the estimation of equation 2 are presented in Table V.²⁵ The investiga-

²⁴In the appendix we explain in detail the dimensions in which these new data sets are inferior to those for Montreal and Québec City.

²⁵The market structure results are robust to the same set of robustness checks that we ran for the price outcome, and are available from the authors upon request.




Figure 2: Dominance of firms and market-share in Montreal

tion led to an increase in the number of bidders of 61.36% . The share of the dominant firm fell by 63.69% in Montreal relative to Quebec City. Overall, these findings suggest that Montreal’s market structure appears to have become more competitive after the investigation, with entry taking place, with more participation and with the incumbents winning a smaller share of contracts.

It is important to note that the observed change in participation could reflect (i) an increase in the participation of entrants that were excluded by the cartel, (ii) a change in the participation of incumbents, or (iii) some combination of the two. Moreover, incumbents could participate less under competition because they are no longer required to submit complementary bids and preparation of bids is costly, or they could participate more because the cartel agreement may have limited the number of cover bids required. To shed light on these different effects in column (2) of Table V we present regression results for incumbent participation only. This allows us to decompose the overall change in participation into an effect coming from entrants and an effect coming from incumbents. Our findings suggest that about half of the increase in participation is coming from an increase on the part of incumbents, with the remainder coming from the arrival of new entrants.

Related to this, one might be concerned about the impact that the simultaneous nature of the auctions in Montreal (across boroughs and types) has on participation and bidding behaviour. In particular, if firms are capacity-constrained, then part of the observed change in participation from collusion to competition reflects the influence of capacity:

Table V: Difference-in-difference for market structure variables

| Sample | All auctions | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| | Dependent variables | Number of Bidders | Number of Incumbents | Share of the Dominant firm |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| MontrealXMartreau | 1.598*** (0.323) | 0.775** (0.304) | -37.022*** (9.588) | |
| Montreal | 0.189 (0.370) | -0.438 (0.680) | -40.861 (30.947) | |
| Martreau | -0.902** (0.449) | -6.163** (3.052) | -8.644 (13.007) | |
| Crude_oil_lag | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.032* (0.017) | 0.008 (0.029) | |
| Capacity | -0.016*** (0.006) | 0.001 (0.006) | -1.396 (1.757) | |
| Quantit | 0.021 (0.025) | 0.025 (0.023) | -16.630 (10.303) | |
| Distance | -0.006 (0.007) | -0.006 (0.006) | 2.174 (1.685) | |
| CON | -0.354*** (0.135) | -0.272** (0.122) | | |
| HHI | -0.464 (0.819) | -0.971 (0.760) | | |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | No | |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | No | |
| Observations | 662 | 662 | 14 | |
| R-squared | 0.697 | 0.592 | 0.796 | |
| Average outcome | 3.418 | 3.418 | 49.64 | |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announcement of the Martreau investigation on the number of bidders (1), the number of incumbents (2), the share of the yearly dominant firm (3). The sample consists of all auctions in Montreal and Quebec City from 2007 to 2013. *Martreau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2005 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crudeoil_lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Distance_{i,x}* is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is the proportion of contract won by the firm *i* in the borough *x* the previous year. *HHI* is the yearly Herfindahl index of each city. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels, except for column (4) where the SEs are clustered at city and year level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

under collusion firms might have participated in auctions for work exceeding their capacity knowing that they were not actually going to win; under competition, bidding

strategies would be affected by capacity and risk preferences. This is not a problem in our particular case, since the capacities for the cartel firms appear to significantly exceed demand. We have information on the actual capacities for some of the firms in Montreal, which suggests that they could individually supply all of Montreal's needs simply by running their plants for less than two weeks.

6 Cartel organization: coordination vs entry deterrence

We have shown that, following the investigation, raw bids fell in Montreal relative to Quebec City. We have also described how, after the investigation, three new players entered the Montreal market, which led to a significant increase in the number of bidders per auction. In this section we investigate the role that entry played in explaining the observed price change in order to learn about the organization of the cartel. To collude, cartel members must overcome two main organizational challenges: (i) coordinating an agreement amongst themselves and (ii) entry deterrence. In what follows we quantify the relative importance of these two activities.

6.1 Reduced-form approach

We start by estimating the same difference-in-difference specification as above, but this time controlling for whether there was an entrant present in the auction (in Montreal). Results are presented in Table VI. Columns (1) to (4) restrict attention to auctions featuring no entrants in Montreal after the investigation (columns (1) and (2) consider all bids, whereas columns (3) and (4) look at winning bids). Following the investigation the entrants began participating in calls for tender. Despite this, it is possible to find a set of auctions in which they did not take part, and to redo our price regressions for this subset of auctions. Our results imply that, even in auctions without entrants, prices are much lower in Montreal after the investigation. These findings suggest that the price decrease is mostly due to changes in bidding behavior by incumbent firms, which appears to be more competitive following the investigation.

The problem with this approach is that participation may be endogenous, and controlling for it in our regression introduces endogeneity bias. Moreover, this specification does not allow us to control for the threat of entry, but only the presence of an actual entrant in an auction. To address these issues, and confirm our reduced-form findings, we turn to a

Table VI: Difference-in-difference in calls featuring no entry

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | All bids No entrants | All bids No entrants | Winning bid No entrants | Winning bid No entrants |
| MontrealXMartreau | -9.883*** (3.339) | -7.312** (3.035) | -11.834*** (3.510) | -8.680** (3.378) |
| Montreal | 16.239*** (2.958) | 8.050* (4.185) | 18.078*** (3.112) | 3.405 (9.128) |
| Martreau | 4.760* (2.679) | -6.151* (3.391) | 4.982* (2.869) | -5.985 (3.883) |
| Crude_oil_lag | | 0.131*** (0.004) | | 0.132*** (0.006) |
| Capacity | | -0.033 (0.031) | | 0.115** (0.045) |
| Quantit | | -0.205 (0.444) | | -0.438 (0.442) |
| Distance | | -0.039 (0.034) | | -0.032 (0.071) |
| CON | | -1.851*** (0.509) | | 1.147 (1.066) |
| HHI | | -4.057 (4.097) | | -8.027 (4.914) |
| Observations | 1,052 | 1,052 | 393 | 393 |
| R-squared | 0.200 | 0.848 | 0.216 | 0.912 |
| Average outcome | 72.21 | | 71.59 | |

Notes. We restrict attention to auctions with no entrants after the investigation. Columns 1, 2 consider all bids, whereas columns 3, 4 the winning bid. The sample consists of all auctions in Montreal and Quebec City from 2007 to 2013. *Martreau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2005 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crudeoil_lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is the proportion of contract won by the firm *i* in the borough *x* the previous year. *HHI* is the yearly Herfindahl index of each city. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels, except for column (4) where the SEs are clustered at city and year level. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

model-based approach.

6.2 Model-based approach

In order to disentangle the entry-deterrence and coordination effects we simulate what bidding would have looked like had entry not occurred after the investigation. Our approach is to estimate bidding strategies during the post-cartel period in Montreal when all $N = 9$ firms (incumbents and entrants) are present in the market to back out the costs of each firm. We then simulate counter-factual bids under the scenario that the three entrants had not in fact entered the market. Finally, we compare these prices to those estimated using our difference-in-difference approach in order to quantify the two effects.

Since our objective is only to confirm the validity of the reduced-form results, we consider a simple model that captures the main features of the market, but abstracts from certain specific elements that would make the setup too cumbersome to analyse. Details of the model and our approach are provided in the appendix. The model consists of two stages. In a first stage, firms choose whether or not to participate in an auction. In the second stage, participating firms bid.

We use techniques developed by Guerre et al. (2000) (GPV) to estimate production costs in the bidding stage assuming that n firms have chosen to participate. The GPV approach is to back out costs based on the observed distribution of bids under the assumption of equilibrium behaviour. We consider the standard model with n symmetric bidders who each draw their costs iid from some distribution $F(\cdot)$. Using the first order condition and the observed distribution of bids, we can nonparametrically estimate the cost distribution. Ideally, all firms would be modelled asymmetrically. This, however, would create two kinds of difficulties. First, asymmetric auctions with entry are difficult to solve. Second, and more importantly, auction asymmetries would lead to an asymmetric participation game with multiple equilibria, necessitating an involved econometric analysis that would address equilibrium selection as e.g. in Bajari et al. (2010). But since we are also considering a counterfactual scenario with fewer firms, we would need to address equilibrium selection directly.

For the participation stage, we assume that one of the firms always participates in the auction. We are motivated in this assumption by the fact that in our dataset, there is a single firm (firm 1) with a participation rate close to 100% in both the collusive and competitive phases. This is a very large firm, active in many sectors. For the other firms, there are a number of different endogenous participation models proposed in the literature, and results are known to be sensitive to the magnitude of the participation cost.

To address this difficulty, we assume, as in Moreno and Wooders (2011), that the par-

participation costs are potentially heterogeneous in that they vary from auction to auction even for the same bidder. As the distribution of the participation cost is not identifiable with our data, we adopt a partial identification approach. We develop and estimate non-parametric bounds on the entry deterrence effect that hold across the participation cost distributions compatible with the data. The intuition is the following. When N falls there are two conflicting effects on prices: a *competition effect* and a *participation effect* (see Levin and Smith (1994) and Li and Zheng (2009)). With fewer potential bidders the competition effect suggests that prices should rise, since bidding is less aggressive. However, the participation effect works in the opposite direction, as bidders will be more inclined to participate when they face fewer potential rivals.

Our bounds are pinned down by considering the two extreme cases for the participation effect. The upper bound is computed under the assumption of exogenous participation. By this we mean that the probability that a fraction x of firms participates is the same when $N = 6$ as when $N = 9$ (and where the latter is estimated as the empirical frequency using the Montreal data over the competitive phase). In other words, the participation effect is zero. The lower bound is computed assuming homogeneous participation costs, which yields the maximum participation effect. If instead participation costs were heterogeneous, then marginal participants would have higher participation costs, and hence the increase in participation would be smaller. We show that the bounds are sharp, in the sense that each can arise for a certain distribution of the participation cost.

6.2.1 Results

Recall from Table III that the difference-in-difference effect is $-\$13.67$.²⁶ Our estimation results reveal what part of this price decrease can be attributed to entry deterrence and what part to coordination.

From the data, we can calculate that the participation probability amongst the fringe firms was 0.38 in Montreal/After. Using this information and the fact that firm 1 participates in almost every auction, we can understand the participation patterns across auctions. Table VII displays the distribution of auctions of different sizes in Montreal/After. The table shows that the most common auction sizes are those with 3 and 4 participants.

Using the GPV method, we then estimate costs. Figure 3 presents these along with


²⁶For simplicity, we present results in this section using difference-in-difference estimates derived without controls, but have also performed the estimation and simulation using normalized bids. Results from the decomposition are very similar and are available from the authors upon request.

Table VII: Number of auctions of each size in Montreal/ After with N=9

| | Number of bidders | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|----|-----|----|----|---|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Number of Auctions | 52 | 81 | 110 | 78 | 52 | 4 |

bids and markups, and in each case their bootstrapped confidence intervals, as a function of the number of participants. We can see from the figure that bids are falling in the number of participants, while costs are, for the most part, not statistically different across different N (as expected from the model). As a result, markups are strictly decreasing in the number of participants in the auction.

Figure 3: Bids, costs and markups



We use the estimated production costs to perform the counterfactual as explained above. The upper bound on the entry deterrence effect is estimated to be \$2.78 per metric ton, with a 95% confidence interval of [2.54, 2.95]. The lower bound on the entry deter-

rence effect is estimated to be $-\$0.29$ per metric ton, with a 95% confidence interval of $[-0.28, -0.23]$.²⁷ Thus the bound on the entry deterrence effect is estimated to be:

$$P(6) - P(9) \in [-0.29, 2.78].$$

The 5% bootstrap percentile of the lower bound is computed as -0.27 , while the 95% percentile of the upper bound is 2.92 . Combining these two percentiles, we obtain

$$P(6) - P(9) \in [-0.27, 2.92],$$

the Manski-Imbens 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the entry deterrence effect. These results imply that the entry deterrence effect accounts for no more than 22% of the overall price change, with the remainder attributed to the fact that the firms can no longer coordinate their bidding.

The lower bound, which is negative, corresponds to the counterfactual participation probability estimated according to the Levin and Smith model. It is negative because the counterfactual participation probability with $N = 6$ bidders, estimated to be $\hat{\rho}(6) = 0.61$ ($[0.58, 0.64]$), is higher than the observed participation probability with $N = 9$, $\hat{\rho}(9) = 0.38$ ($[0.36, 0.40]$). In other words, although there are fewer bidders, each one is more likely to participate in any given auction. This results in a participation effect strong enough to offset the competition effect.

The upper bound on the entry deterrence effect, 2.78 , corresponds to exogenous participation. Recall that this assumes that participation occurs with the same probability as for $N = 9$, such that $\rho(6) = \hat{\rho}(9) = 0.38$. In this case, the competition effect will dominate the participation effect, such that price will fall because of the decrease in the number of bidders.

It should be noted that our model assumes symmetry, but that one of the entrants, firm 9, participates in only 1% of auctions, while all of the other fringe firms participate with similar probability (between about 30% and 50%). Therefore, as a robustness check we drop this firm (and the four auctions in which it participates) and redo the analysis modeling only the behavior of the 7 remaining fringe firms and the always-participating firm. With this setup the upper bound on the entry deterrence effect falls by about a third to 14%, while the lower bound remains negative.

²⁷These confidence intervals are computed by taking 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the bootstrap samples.

7 Discussion

We have documented that following the investigation prices fell and entry and participation increased. Our results imply that coordinating a profitable and stable agreement was the main function of this particular cartel. The relatively small role of entry deterrence may be at least in part due to the fact that there are already six firms in the industry and so, absent collusion, a fairly competitive outcome can be achieved. However, in other contexts even larger numbers of firms did not guarantee the competitive outcome. For instance, Elsinger et al. (2015) find that when Austria joined the European Union and Europe-wide competitors were allowed to bid in their treasury auction the number of participants moved from 15 to 25 and bond yields fell.

Disentangling the coordination and entry-deterrence activities is important for understanding the organization of cartels, for evaluating the impact of collusion on municipal procurement spending, and for designing effective policies for fighting collusion and corruption. In particular, we might be interested in thinking about how to allocate resources for fighting collusion. By quantifying the relative importance of entry deterrence and bidders' coordination, our approach can shed light on where additional resources should be devoted. When describing how best to fight against bid rigging in public procurement, academics and policy makers have proposed the need to encourage the participation of many bidders by removing or restricting policies that place limits on entry or participation (see Coate (1985) and OECD (2012)). In the case of Montreal's construction cartel, our findings imply that less energy should be dedicated to ensuring that the tender process maximizes participation, and more to eliminating communication and coordination.

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Appendix A

Table A.1: Test of the Common trend assumption

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Sample | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bid (4) | Winning bid (5) | Winning bid (6) |
| | Panel A: Linear Trend | | | | | |
| MontrealXYear | 3.602*** (1.214) | 5.993*** (2.201) | 7.863*** (2.404) | 4.957* (2.607) | 6.692** (2.798) | 8.285*** (2.666) |
| | Panel B: Non-linear Trend | | | | | |
| MontrealXYear2008 | 9.919*** (2.310) | 11.393*** (3.564) | 12.051*** (3.550) | 13.355*** (4.661) | 14.971*** (4.594) | 13.758*** (3.953) |
| MontrealXYear2009 | 8.230*** (2.248) | 11.950*** (4.247) | 12.589*** (4.198) | 10.341** (4.675) | 13.818** (5.335) | 12.468** (4.693) |
| Borough effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| p-value | 0.0774 | 0.804 | 0.809 | 0.001 | 0.669 | 0.629 |
| Observations | 641 | 641 | 641 | 237 | 237 | 237 |
| R-squared | 0.716 | 0.948 | 0.953 | 0.754 | 0.971 | 0.978 |
| Average outcome | 73.89 | 73.89 | 73.89 | 74.03 | 74.03 | 74.03 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the interaction term between *Montreal* and a linear trend (*Year*) on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6) for all the observations before the *Marteau* investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. In Panel B, the trend is specified with two dummy variables for the years 2008 and 2009. *p-value* is the p-value for the F-test $MontrealXYear2008 = MontrealXYear2009$. The columns include the same variables included in Table III. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table A.2: Heterogeneous trends

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bid (4) | Winning bid (5) | Winning bid (6) |
| Panel A: Linear heterogenous trend | | | | | | |
| MontrealXMarteau | -7.376 (4.834) | -6.188 (5.162) | -6.704 (5.286) | -13.386** (5.150) | -13.148** (5.668) | -11.867** (5.562) |
| Panel B: Non-linear heterogenous trend | | | | | | |
| MontrealXMarteau | -17.825*** (1.176) | -15.636*** (1.778) | -15.944*** (1.766) | -19.031*** (1.198) | -17.173*** (1.968) | -16.228*** (1.940) |
| Borough effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.426 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.589 | 0.893 | 0.912 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. The model includes heterogenous trends: In Panel A, an interaction term between *Montreal* and a linear trend (*Year*); In Panel B interactions terms between *Montreal* and a year indicators (2007-20013). The columns include the same variables included in Table III. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).


Table A.3: Variables, Descriptions and Sources

| Samples | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| All bids | Is the raw bid of every participating firm in every auction. | |
| Winning bid | Is the raw bid of the firm winning the auction. | |
| Dependent variables | | |
| Variable | Description | Source/Calculation |
| Raw bid | Is the bid per metric ton of asphalt submitted by a firm. This bid does not include transport charges. | Data from calls for tenders obtained by access to information requests. In Montreal, one raw bid per type. In Quebec, there is one raw bid per type/borough. Auctions are won at borough level so the reported raw bid is the weighted average per borough. The weights are the quantity of each |
| Transportation Charges | It is the price per metric ton that the city will be charged to pick up the asphalt or to have it delivered. | Data from calls for tenders gathered by access to information. In both cities, there is one transport charge per borough. |
| Final/total bid | Is the sum of the raw bid and of the transport charge. | Same source as above. |
| Number of bidders | Is the number of firms participating in an auction. | |
| Number of employees | Is the number of employee within the company. It is measured at the company level | The information comes from the firms websites when available or from the Registre des entreprises du Quebec (Business register); http://www.registreentreprises.gouv.qc.ca/en/default.aspx . |
| Share of the dominant firm | Is the share of the yearly dominant firm and is measured at the year and city level. | The share of a firm is the value of won contract of the firm during a year weighted by the total value of awarded contracts. The firm with the largest share is the dominant one. |
| Distance from office | Is the average distance between the office and the production plants. It is measured at the company level. | The distances are calculated using Google maps. |
| Explanatory variables | | |
| Variable | Description | Source/Calculation |
| Montreal | Is a dummy variable equal 1 if the observations are those of Montreal and 0 otherwise. | |
| Marteau | Is a dummy variable equal 1 if the observations are after 2009 and 0 otherwise. | |
| Montreal*Marteau | Is a dummy equal 1 if the observations are those of Montreal and happened after 2009. | The coefficient of this variable measures the impact of the Marteau Investigation announcement on the prices in the difference-in-difference analysis. |
| Crude oil lag | Is the yearly average price of the crude oil lagged by one period. It is measured at the year level. | Data from the website of Natural Resources Canada: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/crude-petroleum/4541 . We take the average of all crude oils listed. |
| Capacity | Is the number of tons a year that a firm can produce. It is measured at the auction level. | It is the maximum among all years, of all the quantity a firm will bid on. |
| Distance | Is the round trip distance between the production site of a firm and the contract's delivery site. It is measured at the auction level. | For Montreal, the distance comes from the calls for tenders obtained by access to information requests. For Quebec, it was calculated using Google maps. |
| CON | Is the experience of a firm in a borough and it is measured at the year, company and borough level. | It is measured by the proportion of auctions won by a firm in a borough during the previous year. In Quebec, there is a change in the boroughs in 2010. The new borough of La Cite-Limoilou is the reunion of two previous boroughs; La Cite and Limoilou. A firm who won 100% of the contracts in La Cite in 2009 but 0% in Limoilou has an experience of 50% in the new borough. The new borough Sainte-Foy-Sillery-Cap-Rouge is the union of the prior borough of Sainte-Foy-Sillery and half of the prior borough of Laurentien. A firm that won all auctions in Laurentien in 2009 and none elsewhere, has an experience of 25% in the new borough since the new borough is formed with 25% of the borough of Laurentien. |
| HHI | Is the yearly sum of all firm's share squared and is measured at the year and city level. | The share of a firm is the value of won contract of the firm during a year weighted by the total value of awarded contracts. |

Figure A.1: Map of Montreal boroughs



Figure A.2: Map of Quebec City boroughs before and after amalgamation



Appendix B—for online publication

B.1 Robustness

In Section B.2, we consider whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional cities. We have managed to obtain information for two additional cities: Laval and Lévis. We consider Laval to be a *suspect* cities, and add it to the treatment group. We consider Lévis' municipal asphalt market to be *collusion-free*, and add it to the control group. Relative to our original data set, the new data have a number of limitations:

1. In Laval the contracts are sometimes for multiple years. Specifically, there were three-year contracts up for auction in 2006 (so 2006-2008), 2009 (2009-2011) and 2012 (2012-2014). We treat the 2006 and 2009 contracts as *before* the investigation, and the 2012 contract as *after*.
2. Information regarding firm capacity (hourly capacity per hour) is not available in the data and must be estimated for Laval and Lévis (as it is for Quebec City). In contrast, this information is available for Montreal.
3. Information on the type of asphalt purchased by the city of Lévis is missing. As a result, we cannot control for asphalt-type FEs (as in our main specification).
4. The original documents given to us by the City of Laval do not contain information on bids for one company for some years. The firm does not win in periods when the data are missing, and so this represents a problem only for the average bid calculation, but not the winning bid.
5. To obtain the data from Laval we were required to sign a non-disclosure agreement preventing us from presenting any information that might reveal the identities of the bidders. This would for instance prevent us from showing the participation rates, winning rates and market share for bidders in Laval before and after the police investigation like we do in Table II. Given the limited number of bidders a similar table would allow firms to be identified.

Our analysis of these data reveals patterns that are consistent with our results from the original data covering only Montreal and Quebec City. Figure B.1 presents the evolution of average and winning bids in the suspect (Montreal and Laval) and non-suspect (Quebec City and Lévis) cities. The figures show that Laval bids look very similar to those in Montreal.²⁸ In particular they fall sharply after the start of Operation Marteau. In contrast there is no fall in the prices in either Quebec City or Lévis. Focusing our attention on the before-investigation period, we also note that the parallel-trend assumption appears to be satisfied even when we include the two additional cities. Table B.1 confirms these patterns, displaying regression results. Comparing the results presented here to those in the text, it is clear that adding Laval and Lévis has little quantitative impact on results. Table B.1 also presents results for the number of bidders per auction. These findings too look much like those that we observe when using just Montreal as treatment and Quebec City as control. The results presented in columns 3, 6 and 9 in Table B.1 are obtained with a specification slightly different from the specification used in the text. The difference is that we cannot include fixed effects for the type of asphalt, since there is no information on types for Lévis (as discussed above). To be sure that this is not affecting results, we also present findings using only Montreal and Quebec City, but without type fixed effects. Results are presented in Table B.2. The findings suggest that there is little change from the results presented in the paper when using just the two cities.

In Section B.3, we consider different explanatory variables that have sometimes shown up in the literature, but which we do not include in our main specification. Our results are robust to the inclusion of the square of the capacity variable (Table B.3), which is sometimes included to account for non-linearities in the effect of firms' capacity on bidding. We also consider a specification that includes the square of quantity (Table B.4). Our results are also robust to the inclusion of a variable that indicates the number of bidders in the auction (Table B.5). We also present results from a specification in which we omit Con and HHI, since there may be some concern that these are endogenous variables. Our results are robust to this change too (B.6).

In Section B.4, we include different measures of crude oil price (Table B.7) and consider the use of the current (rather than lagged in Table B.8) price (and both current and lagged values, in Table B.9). Our results are also robust to these variations from the baseline model.

²⁸Note that there are only three data points on the Laval curve, since (as mentioned above) contracts in Laval are for multiple years.

In Section B.5, we repeat our analysis considering different time windows around the date of the start of the investigation. We consider the following windows: 2009-2010 (Table B.10), 2008-2011 (Table B.11) and 2007-2012 (Table B.12). In every case the interaction coefficient is statistically significant, and, except for the shortest window, the estimated investigation effect is very similar. For the shortest window the effect is smaller.

Next we consider a number of specifications to address particularities of the markets and/or bidding processes. Since in Montreal the firms are constrained to submit one price per type per year, there could be concern that firms were not bidding to maximize profits in each auction, but rather for each type. To address this concern, we suppose that auctions are for types and investigate the impact of the investigation on type prices. In Table B.13 we still observe a significant decrease in price of around 16%, depending on the exact specification. In Table B.14, we also test the effect of the investigation on the quantity demanded of these types and find no significant change in demand. This also allows us to rule out the possibility that our price effect is driven by changes in demand of asphalt in Montreal vs Quebec City from before to after the investigation.

Another particularity of Montreal's market is that two of the firms are owned by the same consortium, but bid as separate firms. These two firms actually share the same production plants. In Section B.6 we treat these two firms as one firm. Table B.15 shows that the estimated results are similar to our main results and are still statistically significant.

In Section B.7, we consider that in Quebec all the produced asphalt is collected by the city, while in Montreal some types are collected and others are delivered by the firms. Results are robust to using a sample consisting only of delivered or picked-up types and to controlling for the nature of the transport (Table B.16). We also find similar results if we keep only the districts that request asphalt every year in our sample (Table B.17).


In Section B.8, we consider the fact that the winner of a particular auction in Montreal is determined at the type/borough level, while in Quebec City, there is one auction per per borough and a firm bids for all the types needed in that borough. The firm with the lowest total submission wins the auction. In Table B.18 we also verify what happens when we treat every type in an auction in Quebec as an individual auction, like in Montreal. Once again the results are consistent.

Overall, we conclude that the descriptive (and graphical) effect of the investigation on prices identified from Table III (and Figure 1) is robust to the specification of the empirical model, sample selection around the date of the investigation, and different features of our market and data.

B.2 Additional cities

Figure B.1: Average and winning bids

(a) Four cities



(b) Suspect vs Control




Table B.1: DID with extra cities

| VARIABLES | (1) All bids | (2) All bids | (3) All bids | (4) Winning bids | (5) Winning bids | (6) Winning bids | (7) N. of bidders | (8) N. of bidders | (9) N. of bidders |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| SuspectXMart | -11.500*** (3.164) | -13.329*** (2.634) | -13.503*** (2.732) | -13.956*** (3.448) | -16.203*** (2.599) | -15.924*** (2.404) | 1.605*** (0.341) | 1.854*** (0.259) | 1.775*** (0.250) |
| Suspect | 14.892*** (2.810) | 10.528*** (2.532) | 25.252*** (9.115) | 15.413*** (3.102) | 12.227*** (2.217) | 6.469 (34.012) | -0.784*** (0.237) | 0.515 (0.448) | -8.772** (3.834) |
| Marteau | 5.552** (2.534) | 33.728*** (10.220) | 45.129*** (11.739) | 5.200* (2.906) | 42.460*** (12.468) | 45.254*** (15.289) | -0.290 (0.245) | -4.549 (3.258) | -4.479 (3.514) |
| Crude_oil_lag | | -0.108* (0.059) | -0.168** (0.069) | | -0.145** (0.071) | -0.167* (0.088) | | 0.021 (0.019) | 0.022 (0.020) |
| Quantity | | | -0.918*** (0.285) | | | -0.978*** (0.291) | | | 0.021 (0.024) |
| Capacity | | | -0.000 (0.000) | | | -0.004 (0.005) | | | -0.001*** (0.000) |
| Distance | | | -0.021 (0.021) | | | -0.202*** (0.053) | | | -0.002 (0.007) |
| CON | | | -1.756*** (0.567) | | | 3.682*** (0.833) | | | -0.419*** (0.134) |
| HHI | | | 0.002** (0.001) | | | 0.003*** (0.001) | | | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Observations | 2,331 | 2,331 | 2,322 | 700 | 700 | 697 | 700 | 700 | 697 |
| R-squared | 0.119 | 0.457 | 0.467 | 0.196 | 0.629 | 0.681 | 0.195 | 0.694 | 0.710 |
| Avg outcome | 75.98 | 75.98 | 75.98 | 75.82 | 75.82 | 75.82 | 2.507 | 2.507 | 2.507 |
| Eff.Suspect (%) | -15.13 | -17.54 | -17.77 | -17.81 | -21.37 | -21 | 64.03 | 73.97 | 70.81 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.2: DID Montreal/Quebec City using same specification

| VARIABLES | (1) All bids | (2) All bids | (3) All bids | (4) Winning bids | (5) Winning bids | (6) Winning bids | (7) N. of bidders | (8) N. of bidders | (9) N. of bidders |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| SuspectXMarteau | -10.677*** (3.303) | -10.458*** (3.348) | -11.180*** (3.288) | -13.670*** (3.472) | -12.624*** (3.736) | -12.251*** (3.228) | 1.633*** (0.329) | 1.760*** (0.322) | 1.654*** (0.322) |
| Suspect | 16.239*** (2.953) | 16.128*** (5.497) | 12.636** (5.431) | 18.078*** (3.104) | 16.668*** (5.139) | 13.242** (5.526) | -1.077*** (0.215) | 0.060 (0.493) | 0.077 (0.588) |
| Marteau | 4.760* (2.674) | 32.274*** (10.701) | 39.429*** (12.755) | 4.982* (2.862) | 42.443*** (13.044) | 44.249*** (15.168) | -0.390* (0.222) | -4.859 (3.372) | -5.363 (3.568) |
| Crude_oil_lag | | -0.116* (0.061) | -0.149** (0.074) | | -0.166** (0.074) | -0.182** (0.085) | | 0.023 (0.019) | 0.027 (0.020) |
| Quantity | | | -0.939*** (0.296) | | | -1.026*** (0.316) | | | 0.023 (0.023) |
| Capacity | | | 0.026 (0.021) | | | 0.207*** (0.062) | | | -0.018*** (0.006) |
| Distance | | | -0.010 (0.022) | | | -0.134** (0.060) | | | -0.007 (0.007) |
| CON | | | -1.860*** (0.639) | | | 3.155*** (0.800) | | | -0.377*** (0.132) |
| HHI | | | -3.306 (3.411) | | | -9.561*** (3.651) | | | -0.039 (0.744) |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.128 | 0.447 | 0.462 | 0.213 | 0.612 | 0.686 | 0.181 | 0.671 | 0.690 |
| Average outcome | 75.94 | 75.94 | 75.94 | 75.71 | 75.71 | 75.71 | 2.605 | 2.605 | 2.605 |
| Eff.Suspect (%) | -14.06 | -13.77 | -14.72 | -14.77 | -16.68 | -16.18 | 62.71 | 67.57 | 63.48 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.3 Model specification

Table B.3: D-i-D controlling for square of the capacity

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.762*** (3.339) | -8.762*** (3.339) | -8.738** (3.361) | -9.759*** (3.609) | -9.759*** (3.609) | -9.725*** (3.440) |
| Montreal | 9.126*** (1.920) | 9.126*** (1.920) | 8.033*** (2.983) | 8.432*** (1.460) | 8.432*** (1.460) | 8.180*** (1.437) |
| Marteau | 15.262*** (3.405) | -5.555* (3.204) | -5.957 (3.641) | 16.746*** (3.774) | -4.449 (3.532) | -6.272 (3.884) |
| Capacity | -0.183 (0.140) | -0.183 (0.140) | -0.179 (0.138) | -0.744*** (0.166) | -0.744*** (0.166) | -0.673*** (0.181) |
| Capacity2 | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.014*** (0.002) | 0.014*** (0.002) | 0.012*** (0.003) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.128*** (0.003) | 0.132*** (0.004) | | 0.130*** (0.003) | 0.130*** (0.004) |
| Quantity | | | -0.138 (0.134) | | | -0.200 (0.151) |
| Distance | | | -0.014 (0.026) | | | -0.025 (0.032) |
| CON | | | -2.250*** (0.665) | | | 1.583** (0.637) |
| HHI | | | -2.599 (4.434) | | | -7.405 (4.816) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.727 | 0.727 | 0.731 | 0.914 | 0.914 | 0.918 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Capacity* (*Capacity2*) is the firm's potential capacity (squared term), defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table B.4: D-i-D controlling for square of the quantity

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm |
| MontrealXMarteau | -10.677*** (3.303) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.691*** (3.325) | -13.670*** (3.472) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.223*** (3.475) |
| Montreal | 16.239*** (2.953) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 8.332** (3.202) | 18.078*** (3.104) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 9.796*** (3.264) |
| Marteau | 4.760* (2.674) | 15.197*** (3.391) | 15.639*** (3.668) | 4.982* (2.862) | 17.389*** (3.861) | 16.079*** (4.092) |
| Capacity | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.130*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.132 (0.385) | | | -0.161 (0.357) |
| Quantity2 | | | -0.001 (0.019) | | | -0.004 (0.017) |
| Distance | | | -0.017 (0.025) | | | -0.088** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.228*** (0.649) | | | 1.388** (0.646) |
| HHI | | | -2.603 (4.456) | | | -7.724 (4.964) |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.128 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.213 | 0.893 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.5: D-i-D controlling for number of bidders

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -9.200*** (3.400) | -9.200*** (3.400) | -9.123*** (3.424) | -9.736*** (3.716) | -9.736*** (3.716) | -9.721*** (3.492) |
| Montreal | 9.299*** (1.969) | 9.299*** (1.969) | 8.287*** (3.033) | 9.387*** (2.439) | 9.088*** (1.746) | 9.811*** (1.628) |
| Marteau | 15.526*** (3.451) | -5.492* (3.230) | -5.853 (3.689) | 16.717*** (3.853) | -5.088 (3.597) | -5.760 (3.959) |
| N.bidders | 0.327 (0.251) | 0.327 (0.251) | 0.267 (0.247) | -0.616** (0.252) | -0.616** (0.252) | -0.319 (0.230) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.129*** (0.003) | 0.133*** (0.004) | | 0.134*** (0.003) | 0.132*** (0.004) |
| Capacity | | | 0.011 (0.023) | | | 0.125*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.142 (0.135) | | | -0.210 (0.154) |
| Distance | | | -0.019 (0.025) | | | -0.090** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.195*** (0.650) | | | 1.277* (0.653) |
| HHI | | | -2.465 (4.492) | | | -7.896 (4.909) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.727 | 0.727 | 0.731 | 0.895 | 0.895 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *N.bidders* is the number of bidders that submitted an offer. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity (squared term), defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

Table B.6: D-i-D controlling omitting Con and HHI

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm | Prixtm |
| MontrealXMarteau | -10.677*** (3.303) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.804*** (3.281) | -13.670*** (3.472) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.565*** (3.566) |
| Montreal | 16.239*** (2.953) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 9.182*** (1.999) | 18.078*** (3.104) | 4.929 (3.969) | 9.843*** (1.659) |
| Marteau | 4.760* (2.674) | -5.678* (3.188) | -5.385* (3.091) | 4.982* (2.862) | -4.681 (3.623) | -3.081 (3.429) |
| Crude_oil_lag | | 0.128*** (0.003) | 0.128*** (0.003) | | 0.135*** (0.003) | 0.130*** (0.003) |
| Capacity | | | -0.014 (0.023) | | | 0.138*** (0.034) |
| Quantity | | | -0.135 (0.134) | | | -0.226 (0.163) |
| Distance | | | 0.001 (0.023) | | | -0.103*** (0.032) |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.128 | 0.726 | 0.727 | 0.213 | 0.893 | 0.910 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.4 Different measure of crude oil and different lags of the crude oil price

In our main regression we include a measure of the price of lagged crude oil. This measure is the yearly average price of all crude oils reported by Natural Resources Canada²⁹. However, bitumen is the input used in the production of asphalt, which is a derivative of certain crude oils. We have price information for the bitumen from *Bitume Québec*, but we believe these prices to be endogenous. The measure we use is imperfect since only certain crude oils can be used in the production of bitumen. These crude oils are not traded on the market like regular ones, but are directly sold by the producers to refineries that will then transform them into bitumen. Three specific oils are used in Québec according to the above association³⁰: 1) the Maya from Mexico, 2) the Lloydminster blend from Saskatchewan and 3) the Cold Lake blend from Alberta. We were only able to find data for the Maya blend and the Lloydminster blend³¹. In our main regression we use the prices of the crude oils reported by Natural Resources Canada since we believe this source to be accurate and because the prices reported are highly correlated with the Maya and Lloyd blends. In table B.7, we run our regression on the same sample but we use as the average of the Maya and Lloyd blend as our crude measure (ML).

²⁹<http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/fuel-prices/crude/4913>

³⁰www.bitumequebec.ca/assets/application/.../47481a992acb429_file.pdf

³¹We managed to get the complete data for the Maya blend from the U.S. Energy Information Administration <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pets&s=imx2810004&f=m>. We gathered the Lloydminster blend prices from CLG Petroleum Consultants <https://www.gljpc.com/commodity-price-library>.

Table B.7: D-i-D with the average of the Maya and Lloyd blend as our crude oil measure

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.693** (3.347) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.231*** (3.484) |
| Montreal | 9.411*** (1.913) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 8.314*** (2.991) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 4.929 (3.969) | 9.673*** (3.057) |
| Marteau | 15.197*** (3.391) | | | 17.389*** (3.861) | | 12.846*** (3.821) |
| Crude oil lag (Maya and Lloyd blend) | | 0.313*** (0.070) | 0.322*** (0.075) | | 0.310*** (0.088) | 0.066* (0.034) |
| Capacity | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.130*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.140 (0.135) | | | -0.217 (0.155) |
| Distance | | | -0.017 (0.025) | | | -0.088** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.228*** (0.648) | | | 1.389** (0.641) |
| HHI | | | -2.606 (4.423) | | | -7.747 (4.921) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.726 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. *Distance_{i,x}* is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table B.8: D-i-D controlling for the contemporaneous price of crude oil

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.693** (3.347) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.231*** (3.484) |
| Montreal | 9.411*** (1.913) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 8.314*** (2.991) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 9.673*** (3.057) |
| Marteau | 15.197*** (3.391) | 11.301*** (3.087) | 10.619*** (3.694) | 17.389*** (3.861) | 12.470*** (3.538) | 10.948*** (4.001) |
| Crude oil | | 0.022*** (0.003) | 0.028*** (0.005) | | 0.028*** (0.004) | 0.029*** (0.005) |
| Capacity | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.130*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.140 (0.135) | | | -0.217 (0.155) |
| Distance | | | -0.017 (0.025) | | | -0.088** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.228*** (0.648) | | | 1.389** (0.641) |
| HHI | | | -2.606 (4.423) | | | -7.747 (4.921) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.726 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table B.9: D-i-D controlling for the contemporaneous and lagged price of crude oil

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMartreau | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.679*** (3.321) | -8.693** (3.347) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.231*** (3.484) |
| Montreal | 9.411*** (1.913) | 9.411*** (1.913) | 8.314*** (2.991) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 4.929 (3.969) | 9.750*** (1.591) |
| Martreau | 15.197*** (3.391) | | | 17.389*** (3.861) | | |
| Crude oil | | -0.029* (0.016) | -0.031* (0.019) | | -0.024 (0.019) | -0.028 (0.020) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.125*** (0.004) | 0.130*** (0.004) | | 0.133*** (0.004) | 0.129*** (0.005) |
| Capacity | | | 0.008 (0.023) | | | 0.130*** (0.036) |
| Quantit | | | -0.140 (0.135) | | | -0.217 (0.155) |
| Distance | | | -0.017 (0.025) | | | -0.088** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.228*** (0.648) | | | 1.389** (0.641) |
| HHI | | | -2.606 (4.423) | | | -7.747 (4.921) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,263 | 2,263 | 2,263 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.726 | 0.726 | 0.731 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.913 |
| Average outcome | 70.92 | 70.92 | 70.92 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Martreau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Martreau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* (*Crude oil*) is the price of the crude oil lagged (current). *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. *Distance_{i,x}* is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

B.5 Different time windows around the investigation

Table B.10: D-i-D from 2009 to 2010

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -2.086*** (0.524) | -2.086*** (0.524) | -2.422*** (0.557) | -5.722*** (0.407) | -5.722*** (0.407) | -4.761*** (0.532) |
| Montreal | 11.317*** (1.102) | 11.317*** (1.102) | | 10.930*** (0.638) | 10.930*** (0.638) | 14.529*** (1.141) |
| Marteau | -16.122*** (0.167) | | | -17.477*** (0.168) | | |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.079*** (0.001) | 0.078*** (0.001) | | 0.085*** (0.001) | 0.081*** (0.003) |
| Capacity | | | -0.098** (0.040) | | | 0.159** (0.061) |
| Quantity | | | -0.052 (0.320) | | | 0.256 (0.173) |
| Distance | | | -0.014 (0.038) | | | -0.116* (0.058) |
| CON | | | -0.853 (1.159) | | | 1.684*** (0.495) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 872 | 872 | 872 | 269 | 269 | 269 |
| R-squared | 0.756 | 0.756 | 0.763 | 0.961 | 0.961 | 0.980 |
| Average outcome | 75.55 | 75.55 | 75.55 | 73.76 | 73.76 | 73.76 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table B.11: D-i-D from 2008 to 2011

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -10.028*** (3.780) | -10.028*** (3.780) | -10.143** (3.888) | -14.036*** (3.740) | -14.036*** (3.740) | -12.604*** (3.717) |
| Montreal | -2.888 (4.032) | -2.888 (4.032) | -1.669 (4.178) | -4.457 (9.936) | -4.457 (9.936) | -4.391 (10.001) |
| Marteau | 9.236** (3.778) | 3.521 (3.783) | 3.318 (4.051) | 11.429*** (3.761) | 5.627 (3.757) | 4.905 (3.759) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.107*** (0.002) | 0.106*** (0.003) | | 0.108*** (0.002) | 0.105*** (0.002) |
| Capacity | | | -0.003 (0.031) | | | 0.140*** (0.035) |
| Quantity | | | 0.136 (0.325) | | | 0.195 (0.241) |
| Distance | | | -0.039 (0.030) | | | -0.074** (0.036) |
| CON | | | -2.858*** (0.882) | | | 0.818 (0.556) |
| HHI | | | -0.680 (2.977) | | | -3.443 (2.738) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,726 | 1,726 | 1,726 | 492 | 492 | 492 |
| R-squared | 0.756 | 0.756 | 0.763 | 0.941 | 0.941 | 0.954 |
| Average outcome | 72.16 | 72.16 | 72.16 | 70.80 | 70.80 | 70.80 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

Table B.12: D-i-D from 2007 to 2012

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.702** (3.697) | -8.702** (3.697) | -8.796** (3.636) | -11.601*** (3.969) | -11.601*** (3.969) | -11.148*** (3.568) |
| Montreal | 6.684 (4.061) | 6.684 (4.061) | 5.698 (4.262) | 6.432 (6.947) | 6.432 (6.947) | 4.703 (7.644) |
| Marteau | 13.116*** (3.767) | 14.830*** (3.847) | 15.599*** (3.837) | 15.153*** (4.056) | 14.438*** (4.165) | 13.625*** (3.924) |
| Crude oil lag | | -0.010* (0.005) | -0.011* (0.006) | | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.006) |
| Capacity | | | -0.005 (0.025) | | | 0.150*** (0.033) |
| Quantity | | | -0.096 (0.347) | | | -0.194 (0.331) |
| Distance | | | -0.020 (0.027) | | | -0.053 (0.037) |
| CON | | | -2.386*** (0.701) | | | 1.976*** (0.701) |
| HHI | | | -3.311 (4.517) | | | -6.985 (4.825) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,140 | 2,140 | 2,140 | 621 | 621 | 621 |
| R-squared | 0.732 | 0.732 | 0.738 | 0.902 | 0.902 | 0.921 |
| Average outcome | 71.04 | 71.04 | 71.04 | 69.47 | 69.47 | 69.47 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

Table B.13: D-i-D for the price of types

| Dependent Variable | Price of types | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All types | | | |
| Sample | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -12.25*** (3.994) | -12.55*** (3.970) | -12.24*** (3.995) | -12.70*** (3.908) |
| Montreal | 17.86*** (1.570) | 17.51*** (1.630) | 17.67*** (1.567) | 17.39*** (1.560) |
| Marteau | 16.23*** (3.261) | 16.92*** (3.312) | 17.92*** (3.176) | 18.05*** (3.151) |
| Median Quantity | | -0.812 (0.593) | | |
| Maximum Quantity | | | -0.541** (0.207) | |
| Average Quantity | | | | -1.376** (0.558) |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |
| R-squared | 0.678 | 0.681 | 0.692 | 0.688 |
| Average outcome | 68.38 | 68.38 | 68.38 | 68.38 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on the yearly average price of asphalt articles. *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *MedianQuantity* is the yearly median quantity of asphalt auctioned for contracts of a given type. *MaximumQuantity* is the yearly maximum quantity of asphalt auctioned for contracts of a given type. *AverageQuantity* is the yearly mean quantity of asphalt auctioned for contracts of a given type. All regressions include year effects. SEs are clustered at the city and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

In table B.14 we see that the size of the contracts in terms of quantity (i.e., demand) seems to be different (the p-value of *MontrealXMarteau* is 10.4%). In Montreal before the investigation the average quantity of asphalt auctioned is 184 tons and the average is 201 tons after the investigation. This difference between the means is not statistically different from 0 (p-value 68.95%). However, Quebec reduce its number of boroughs but not the surface of its road system and therefore, the average quantity auctioned of each asphalt type is bound to increase. In fact, the average demand of types goes from 711 tons to 1121 tons. The change in Quebec City explains the large negative interaction coefficient.

Table B.14: D-i-D for the quantity of asphalt types

| Dependent variable | Quantity |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Sample | All types (1) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -200.0 (122.6) |
| Montreal | -723.4*** (233.0) |
| Marteau | 226.2* (136.2) |
| Borough effects | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes |
| Observations | 1,570 |
| R-squared | 0.322 |
| Average outcome | 304.9 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. The regression includes year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

B.6 Firms' ownership

We have treated all firms as separate even though in Montreal firm 4 is owned by firm 2 and each will sometimes use the other's plant to produce asphalt. They do not compete in auctions prior to 2009, but do so afterwards. In the following table, we treat these firm as one and assume that firm 4 is a plant of firm 2. We define the lowest bid of these two firms as the serious bid.

Table B.15: D-i-D when treating firm 2 and 4 as one firm

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Sample | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.667*** (3.321) | -8.667*** (3.321) | -9.623*** (3.349) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.770*** (3.690) | -10.234*** (3.692) |
| Montreal | 6.437 (3.960) | 6.437 (3.960) | 7.392* (3.966) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 8.920*** (1.822) | 8.818*** (1.988) |
| Marteau | 15.202*** (3.392) | -5.683* (3.188) | -4.458 (3.511) | 17.389*** (3.861) | -4.681 (3.623) | -5.471 (4.083) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.128*** (0.003) | 0.129*** (0.004) | | 0.135*** (0.003) | 0.131*** (0.005) |
| Capacity | | | -0.119*** (0.014) | | | 0.021 (0.021) |
| Quantity | | | -0.132 (0.132) | | | -0.223 (0.163) |
| Distance | | | -0.059*** (0.021) | | | -0.131*** (0.029) |
| CON | | | -1.518** (0.607) | | | 1.493** (0.582) |
| HHI | | | 0.336 (4.022) | | | -3.291 (4.542) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,261 | 2,261 | 2,261 | 662 | 662 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.726 | 0.726 | 0.744 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.906 |
| Average outcome | 70.93 | 70.93 | 70.93 | 69.37 | 69.37 | 69.37 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year, borough and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

B.7 Picked-up and delivered asphalt types

In Quebec City, all asphalt types are picked by the city's trucks. In Montreal however, some articles of asphalt are delivered by the firms to the boroughs' reception point.³² In Table B.16 we run the difference-in-difference regression only on collected articles.

Table B.16: D-i-D for picked up asphalt types

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -10.627*** (3.395) | -10.627*** (3.395) | -10.181*** (3.127) | -13.077*** (3.645) | -13.077*** (3.645) | -12.517*** (3.164) |
| Montreal | 12.575*** (3.913) | 12.575*** (3.913) | 11.733*** (4.018) | 14.728*** (1.209) | 14.728*** (1.209) | |
| Marteau | 14.451*** (3.743) | -4.686 (3.159) | -4.874 (3.099) | 16.541*** (4.289) | -3.499 (3.546) | -4.484 (3.500) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.117*** (0.008) | 0.121*** (0.008) | | 0.123*** (0.008) | 0.124*** (0.008) |
| Capacity | | | 0.046 (0.030) | | | 0.090* (0.051) |
| Quantity | | | -0.046 (0.701) | | | -0.143 (0.773) |
| Distance | | | 0.063* (0.036) | | | -0.088* (0.051) |
| CON | | | -1.872*** (0.635) | | | 1.380 (0.999) |
| HHI | | | -0.290 (4.571) | | | -5.890 (4.814) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,148 | 1,148 | 1,148 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| R-squared | 0.603 | 0.603 | 0.612 | 0.859 | 0.859 | 0.870 |
| Average outcome | 68.20 | 68.20 | 68.20 | 66.35 | 66.35 | 66.35 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

³²Some types are both collected and delivered. When it is the case, 2 auctions will be held. One under the name of article 1 and the other one under the name of article 2.

In table B.17, we run the difference-in-difference regression only for Montréal’s delivered articles, while we keep all of Québec’s asphalt auctions as a control.

Table B.17: D-i-D for delivered types

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -6.359* (3.266) | -6.359* (3.266) | -6.413* (3.327) | -8.445** (3.843) | -8.445** (3.843) | -7.850** (3.553) |
| Montreal | 5.883 (4.023) | 5.883 (4.023) | 4.307 (4.322) | 8.825*** (1.759) | 8.825*** (1.759) | 8.764*** (1.433) |
| Marteau | 14.375*** (3.361) | 11.911*** (3.481) | -6.910* (3.509) | 15.009*** (4.049) | 12.034*** (4.088) | -8.244** (3.884) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.015** (0.007) | 0.132*** (0.004) | | 0.018* (0.011) | 0.129*** (0.005) |
| Capacity | | | -0.031 (0.022) | | | 0.145*** (0.036) |
| Quantity | | | -0.206 (0.129) | | | -0.267 (0.169) |
| Distance | | | -0.067** (0.026) | | | -0.041 (0.037) |
| CON | | | -1.711*** (0.654) | | | 2.046** (0.913) |
| HHI | | | -5.992 (4.117) | | | -11.340** (4.782) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 389 | 389 | 389 |
| R-squared | 0.826 | 0.826 | 0.831 | 0.905 | 0.905 | 0.926 |
| Average outcome | 72.26 | 72.26 | 72.26 | 70.76 | 70.76 | 70.76 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Crude oil lag* is the price of the crude oil lagged. *Capacity* is the firm’s potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***)

B.8 Contracting boroughs

Some of the boroughs of Montreal do not request asphalt for a certain period of time. In table B.18 we run our regression for boroughs requesting asphalt every year. There are 9 such boroughs out of 19 in Montreal. In 2009, the definition of the boroughs of Québec City changes, making it impossible for us to map an "old" borough the new geographic definition. As an example, a part of the Laurentien borough is now in the Haute-Saint-Charles borough while the rest is in the borough of Sainte-Foy-Sillery. For this reason, we keep all Québec City's boroughs.

Table B.18: D-i-D for boroughs always contracting

| Dependent Variable | Raw bids | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | All bids (1) | All bids (2) | All bids (3) | Winning bids (4) | Winning bids (5) | Winning bids (6) |
| MontrealXMarteau | -8.761*** (3.300) | -8.761*** (3.300) | -8.800*** (3.356) | -10.911*** (3.659) | -10.911*** (3.659) | -9.949*** (3.385) |
| Montreal | 6.509* (3.799) | 6.509* (3.799) | 5.856 (4.055) | 9.048*** (1.751) | 9.048*** (1.751) | 9.721*** (1.059) |
| Marteau | 14.708*** (3.352) | -6.113* (3.134) | -6.565* (3.622) | 16.736*** (3.850) | 13.229*** (3.897) | -6.216 (3.826) |
| Crude oil lag | | 0.128*** (0.003) | 0.134*** (0.004) | | 0.021*** (0.007) | 0.127*** (0.005) |
| Capacity | | | 0.030 (0.025) | | | 0.141*** (0.034) |
| Quantity | | | -0.137 (0.141) | | | -0.194 (0.157) |
| Distance | | | -0.021 (0.031) | | | -0.044 (0.038) |
| CON | | | -2.817*** (0.692) | | | 2.625*** (0.896) |
| HHI | | | -2.427 (4.420) | | | -8.202* (4.682) |
| Borough effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Type effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,725 | 1,725 | 1,725 | 477 | 477 | 477 |
| R-squared | 0.744 | 0.744 | 0.750 | 0.893 | 0.893 | 0.914 |
| Average outcome | 70.98 | 70.98 | 70.98 | 69.48 | 69.48 | 69.48 |

Notes. Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) of the effect of the announce of the Marteau investigation on raw bids: all bids (columns 1 to 3), winning bids (columns 4 to 6). *Marteau* is a dummy variable = 0 if the observations are previous to the investigation announcement (2007 to 2009 included). *Montreal* is also a dummy variable = 1 if the observations are those of Montreal. *Capacity* is the firm's potential capacity, defined as the maximum quantity ever bid on by the firm in our sample for Quebec, while in Montreal it is defined in all post-cartel years. *Quantity* is the number of tonnes in the call. $Distance_{i,x}$ is the distance from a firm to the delivery point of the borough where the job is located. *CON* is percentage of all contracts won in a borough by a firm in the previous year. *HHI* is the Herfindal index. For Quebec City we use the one that would prevail without the change in legislation in 2009. All regressions include year and asphalt types effects. SEs are clustered at borough and year levels. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).

B.9 Transport charges and final bids

We concentrate our main analysis on raw bids, but contract allocation is based on final bids. In Montreal, firms are asked to submit a raw bid for each asphalt type. Firms must also take into account the transport cost they face and submit transport charges for each type in each borough. The sum of the raw bid on transport charges is the final bid. In Québec City however, we do not have enough information to build a perfect measure of transport charges and thus, of final bids. We know only raw bids per asphalt type per borough and the aggregated final bid of each firm per borough. Since the contracts are won at the borough level, not the asphalt type level as in Montreal, firms submit an aggregated transport charge for a borough. Since prices per type are usually different, it is impossible for us to map an accurate transport charge per asphalt type. More precisely, for each aggregated auctions we have:

$$\sum_{k=1}^K (\mathbf{P}_k + t_k) * \mathbf{Quantity}_k = \mathbf{Aggregated\ final\ bid}$$

where k is the asphalt type, t is the unknown transport charge and P is the raw bid (what we know is in bold text). We can rewrite the equation above as:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k=1}^K (\mathbf{P}_k * \mathbf{Quantity}_k + t_k * \mathbf{Quantity}_k) &= \mathbf{Aggregated\ final\ bid} \\ \sum_{k=1}^K (t_k * \mathbf{Quantity}_k) &= \mathbf{Aggregated\ final\ bid} - \sum_{k=1}^K (\mathbf{P}_k * \mathbf{Quantity}_k) \\ \sum_{k=1}^K (t_k * \mathbf{Quantity}_k) &= \mathbf{Aggregated\ transport\ charge} \end{aligned}$$

since t_k is unknown for all k , the best we can do is compute the average transport charge:

$$\bar{T} = \frac{\mathbf{Aggregated\ transport\ charge}}{\sum_{k=1}^K (\mathbf{Quantity}_k)}$$

Similarly, we cannot compute final bids per type for Québec City.³³ This measure is imperfect, but we believe it is relevant to estimate DiD for transport charges and final bids.

³³Note that since there is one winner per borough, we know that the firm that bids the lowest aggregated final bid, which we observe, is the actual winner.

Appendix C—for online publication

C.1 Model

It is important to note at the outset that we are assuming that auctions are independent despite the fact that firms in Montreal are constrained to bid the same price for each asphalt type in each borough. In this section, we simply work with bids per metric ton of asphalt. It should be noted that this means that, like most of the empirical auctions literature, we also ignore the fact that the auctions are run simultaneously and bidders may have preferences over combinations of auction outcomes, for instance because of capacity limitations.³⁴ As discussed in the main text, the firms in Montreal appear to have sufficient capacity to individually cover all of Montreal’s needs and so this should be less of a concern in our context.

The model consists of two stages. In a first stage, firms choose whether or not to participate in an auction. In the second stage, participating firms bid. Since our objective is to characterize the post-cartel period in Montreal, in setting up our model we take into account the observed behavior in this period as described in Table II. Specifically, we note that firm 1 always participates and so we assign a participation cost of 0 to this firm, and only model the participation decisions of the other *fringe* firms.

We follow the literature and assume that the preparation of bids requires time and effort and so is costly. Following Athey et al. (2011), we assume that the participation cost is heterogeneous, and distributed according to some distribution $H(\cdot)$. This model includes as a special case the homogenous participation cost model as in Levin and Smith (1994), Li and Zheng (2009), Bajari et al. (2014) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011). We first describe the equilibrium of the participation and bidding game, following Athey et al. (2011). In our model, participation and bidding stages are independent in the sense that participation only affects bidding inasmuch as it affects the number of fringe firms participating in the auction.

We begin with the bidding stage assuming there are n firms that have chosen to participate. The bidders draw their costs iid from some distribution $F(\cdot)$. This is true for both

³⁴Recently, Gentry et al. (2015) have developed and estimated a model in which bidders have preferences over combinations.

the always-participating firm and the fringe firms, so there are no asymmetries in the bidding game. This is motivated by the fact that in our data, while the always-participating firm participates in almost all auctions, its winning rate is not significantly different from that of some other firms during the competitive phase.

At the bidding stage, the bidders who have chosen to participate know how many rivals they face.³⁵ In the unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the bidding game with n participants, the firms bid according to

$$B(c) = c + \frac{\int_c^\infty (1 - F(u))^{n-1} du}{(1 - F(c))^{n-1}},$$

and derive expected profit of

$$u(c, n) = (B(c) - c)(1 - F(c))^{n-1}.$$

We now consider the participation stage. At the participation stage, $N - 1$ fringe firms draw their participation costs e_i , simultaneously and independently from distribution $H(\cdot)$. For simplicity, we assume that $H(\cdot)$ has full support R_+ . A fringe firm chooses to participate if and only if its participation cost is below a cutoff $\bar{e}(N)$. This cutoff is found by solving the game backwards, as follows. If all rival fringe firms adopt this cutoff, then each will participate with probability

$$\rho(N) = H(\bar{e}(N)),$$

so a given fringe firm will expect to earn profit equal to $\Pi(\rho(N), N)$, where

$$\Pi(\rho, N) = \sum_{n=0}^{N-2} \binom{N-2}{n} \rho^n (1 - \rho)^{N-2-n} Eu(c, n+2).$$

This formula reflects the fact that a given fringe firm has $N - 2$ rival fringe firms, and that the leading firm always participates. If there are m rival firms participating, the total number of participants is $m + 2$, which includes both the leading firm and the given fringe firm that contemplates participating. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a fringe firm will participate if and only if $e_i \leq \Pi(\rho, N)$. This means that the participation cutoff $\bar{e}(N)$ is

³⁵The fact that one firm always participates in the auction means that we cannot easily allow for the possibility that the number of participants is unobservable. This would result in an asymmetric model that would be difficult to estimate.

equal to the above expected profit,

$$\bar{e}(N) = \Pi(\rho(N), N).$$

This equation will be fundamental in our bounding approach for the counterfactual price. It can be equivalently stated in terms of the participation probability only, as

$$\Pi(\rho(N), N) = H^{-1}(\rho(N)). \quad (3)$$

This equation is derived from the fact that the participation cutoff must be equal to the $\rho(N)$ th *quantile* of the participation cost distribution, $H^{-1}(\rho)$. Since the expected profit $Eu(c, n)$ is decreasing in n , the l.h.s. of the above equation is decreasing in the probability of rival participation $\rho(N)$, while the r.h.s. is increasing in this probability. This implies that there is a unique equilibrium entry probability $\rho(N)$, and a unique symmetric equilibrium of the complete participation and bidding game.

By *revenue equivalence*, the expected profit of a bidder in the auction with n participants is equal to

$$E[u(c, n)] = \frac{1}{n} E[c_{2:n} - c_{1:n}] \equiv u_*(n). \quad (4)$$

Using this fact, and denoting the binomial weights by

$$\pi(n, \rho, N) = \binom{N-2}{n} \rho^n (1-\rho)^{N-2-n},$$

allows us to rewrite the expression for the ex-ante expected profit function as

$$\Pi(\rho, N) = \sum_{n=0}^{N-2} \pi(n, \rho, N) u_*(n).$$

C.2 Identification

Identification of the production cost

As in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (GPV; 2000), we identify the production costs c_i in each auction by applying the inverse strategy transformation. The conditional CDF of b_i is denoted by $G(\cdot|n)$ and the PDF by $g(\cdot|n)$, and these are directly identifiable from the

data. In the auction with n bidders, the inverse bidding strategy is given by

$$\phi(b|n) = b - \frac{1}{n-1} \frac{1 - G(b|n)}{g(b|n)}. \quad (5)$$

So the distribution $F(\cdot)$ is identifiable according to

$$F(c) = G[\phi^{-1}(c|n) | n].$$

Bounds on the counterfactual price

Our ultimate goal is to identify the entry-deterrence effect, defined as the difference

$$\Delta p = p(N') - p(N),$$

where $p(N)$ is the actual competitive price with N firms, $p(N')$ is the counterfactual competitive price with $N' < N$ firms. Here, N is the actual number of firms in Montreal after the breakup of the cartel, and N' is the number of firms in the cartel before the breakup. In our application, $N = 9$ and $N' = 6$. The key is to identify the counterfactual price $p(N')$. In our model the counterfactual price is driven solely by the entry probability $\rho(N')$.

The participation probability $\rho(N)$ is directly identifiable from the data. But the distribution of the participation cost is *not* identifiable in our model. Indeed, from (3), we are only able to identify its $\rho(N)$ th quantile, $H^{-1}(\rho(N))$.³⁶ But for our application, we are not interested per se in the distribution of the participation cost, but only to the extent that it affects the counterfactual price with $N' < N$ potential bidders. We are interested in the prices conditional on *buying*. In our model, these prices depend only on the participation probability ρ and are given by

$$P(\rho, N) = \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} w(\rho, n, N) p_*(n)$$

where, invoking revenue equivalence again, the expected price in an auction with n participants is given by the expected second-lowest cost,

$$p_*(n) = E[c_{2:n}],$$

³⁶Identification of the participation cost can be enhanced if there is an instrument that affects the participation cost but not the production cost. Alternatively, variation in N can also aid identification. Unfortunately, neither source of variation is available in our application.

and the weight function is given by

$$w(n, \rho, N) = \frac{\binom{N-1}{n} \rho^n (1-\rho)^{N-1-n}}{1 - (1-\rho)^{N-1}}.$$

(The denominator in the weight reflects conditioning on there being at least one fringe firm participating.) The equilibrium price is then given by

$$p(N) = P(\rho(N), N).$$

As N is reduced to $N' < N$, the counterfactual price $p(N')$ will also change, but only because the participation probability $\rho(N)$ will change and the prices $p_*(n)$ get re-weighted. One can easily show that the weights $w(\rho, n, N)$ and $\pi(\cdot, \rho, N)$ satisfy the stochastic dominance conditions

$$w(\cdot, \rho, N) \succ w(\cdot, \rho, N'), \quad w(\cdot, \rho, N) \succ w(\cdot, \rho', N), \quad N' < N, \quad \rho' < \rho \quad (6)$$

$$\pi(\cdot, \rho, N) \succ \pi(\cdot, \rho, N'), \quad \pi(\cdot, \rho, N) \succ \pi(\cdot, \rho', N), \quad N' < N, \quad \rho' < \rho. \quad (7)$$

Intuitively, increasing N leads to higher weights being put on higher realizations of the number of participants n in the Binomial distribution, both unconditionally (for the $\pi(\cdot)$), and conditionally on at least one firm participating (for the $w(\cdot)$).

These stochastic dominance conditions imply the following monotonicity facts concerning the ex-ante profit $\Pi(\rho, N)$ and the expected price $P(\rho, N)$. First, the ex-ante bidder profit $\Pi(\rho, N)$ must be decreasing in ρ . This is intuitive as a higher participation probability implies more weight put on larger n . Since $u_*(n)$ is decreasing in n , this implies that the ex-ante profit is smaller. Second, $\Pi(\rho, N)$ must be decreasing in N as higher N implies, keeping ρ fixed, more weight put on larger n . Similar considerations imply that the expected price $P(\rho, N)$ is also decreasing in ρ and N .

The fact that $\Pi(\rho, N)$ is decreasing in both arguments implies that the participation probability, as the solution to (3), increases as N falls to N' (see Figure C.1). The counterfactual participation probability is given by the intersection of the ex-ante profit curve $\Pi(\rho, N')$ and the participation cost quantile curve $H^{-1}(\rho)$. As this figure illustrates, the exogenous entry probability $\rho(N)$ is a lower bound for the counterfactual entry probability $\rho(N')$,

$$\rho(N') > \rho(N), \quad N' < N.$$




Figure C.1: Counterfactual bounds

Since we do not know $H(\cdot)$, $\rho(N')$ is not identifiable. However, as Figure C.1 illustrates, the counterfactual probability can be bounded in an informative way. Specifically, we have

$$\rho(N') \in [\rho(N), \bar{\rho}(N')] \quad (8)$$

where $\bar{\rho}(N')$ is the participation probability in the (original) Levin and Smith model with homogeneous participation cost (given by the dashed line in Figure C.1). That is, $\bar{\rho}(N')$ is determined as the probability that would equate the ex-ante profits with N and N' firms,

$$\Pi(\bar{\rho}(N'), N') = \Pi(\rho(N), N). \quad (9)$$

The counterfactual price $p(N')$ can be either lower or higher than $p(N)$. Under exogenous entry, the participation probability does not change, and the price would be unambiguously higher. Under endogenous entry, however, the participation probability will be higher with fewer bidders, N' . This is Li and Zheng's *participation effect* that works in the opposite direction. So the overall effect is in general ambiguous. But in a model with distributed participation costs as here, the participation effect could conceivably be small. This would be the case if the distribution $H(\cdot|x)$ put very small (think 0 in the limit) weight on the interval of participation costs

$$[\Pi(\rho(N), N), \Pi(\rho(N), N')],$$

so that there is in effect virtually no additional participation when N is reduced to N' . On the other hand, the participation effect is strongest for the atomic distribution of the participation cost, which results in the participation probability $\bar{p}(N')$. This case corresponds to the original endogenous participation model introduced in Levin and Smith (1993) and estimated in Li and Zheng (2009). The intuition here is that when the participation costs are heterogeneous, the marginal participants have higher participation costs, and hence there is less participation.

The bounds on the participation probability imply the following identifiable bounds on the counterfactual price

$$p(N') \in [P(\bar{p}(N'), N'), P(\rho(N), N')]. \quad (10)$$

In the next subsection, we develop nonparametric estimators for these bounds.

C.3 Estimation

The sample consists of T auctions, with individual auctions indexed by $t = 1, \dots, T$. The number of potential bidders is N , including the leading firm $i = 1$. We index the individual bidders by $i = 1, \dots, N$. The data generating process takes the following form.

1. The participation costs e_i are drawn from $H(\cdot)$ for all fringe firms. The participation decision of firm i is denoted as $y_{it} \in \{0, 1\}$. The leading firm always participates, so $y_{1t} = 1$ in all auctions t . Fringe firm i participates if and only if $e_i \leq \bar{e}(N)$,

$$y_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & e_i \leq \bar{e}(N_t) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} . \end{cases}$$

This participation process results in a binomially distributed number of participants $n_t = \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it}$.

2. Those firms that have chosen to participate, discover their production costs c_{it} , where c_{it} are iid and are distributed according to a cumulative distribution $F(\cdot)$, the same across all the firms. The participants bid in the auction according to

$$b_{it} = B(c_{it}|n_t). \quad (11)$$

If the leading firm is the sole participant, so that $n_t = 1$, then the auction is declared uncompetitive and is cancelled.

As in GPV, the c_{it} 's can be estimated by the plug-in method. The CDF $G(\cdot|n)$ of the bids can be estimated as the empirical CDF, and $g(\cdot|n)$ can be estimated by the kernel method:

$$\hat{G}(b|n) = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} I[b_{it} \leq b, n_t = n]}{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} I[n_t = n]}, \quad (12)$$

$$\hat{g}(b|n) = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} \frac{1}{h} K\left(\frac{b_{it}-b}{h}\right) I[n_t = n]}{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} I[n_t = n]}, \quad (13)$$

where $I[\mathcal{A}]$ is the indicator function of the event \mathcal{A} , $K(\cdot)$ is a suitable kernel function, and h is the bandwidth chosen as in GPV, $h = 1.06\hat{\sigma}_b L^{-1/5}$. The costs c_{it} are now estimated by the plug-in

$$\hat{c}_{it} = \hat{\phi}(b_{it}|n_t),$$

and their distribution is estimated as an empirical CDF

$$\hat{F}(c) = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} \tau_{it} I[\hat{c}_{it} \leq c]}{\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it} \tau_{it}}.$$

In order to account for boundary effects, we adopt the same trimming approach as in GPV, and only use the trimmed sample of the estimated costs, removing those that are close to boundaries. The parameter $\tau_{it} \in \{0, 1\}$ in the above formula reflects this trimming:

$$\tau_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & B_{min} + 2h \leq b_{it} \leq B_{Max} - 2h \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We now turn to the participation stage. The expected profits and prices in auctions with n participants can be estimated, for a typical project, by replacing the distribution $F(\cdot)$ with the estimate $\hat{F}(\cdot)$. This gives us the estimates

$$\hat{u}(n) = \frac{1}{n} \left(\int cd\hat{F}_{(2:n)}(c) - \int cd\hat{F}_{(1:n)}(c) \right), \quad \hat{p}_*(n) = \int cd\hat{F}_{(2:n)}(c).$$

The integrals with respect to the empirical distributions $\hat{F}_1(\cdot)$ and $\hat{F}_2(\cdot)$ that appear above

are actually weighted averages of the ordered sample of cost estimates,

$$\hat{c}_{(1:NT)} \leq \dots \leq \hat{c}_{(NT:NT)},$$

given that the overall sample size is NT . The distributions of the order statistics $\hat{F}_{(1:n)}(c)$ and $\hat{F}_{(2:n)}(c)$ are discrete distribution concentrated on the (ordered) sample of estimated costs $\{\hat{c}_{(k)}\}_{k=1}^{NT}$, with

$$\hat{F}_{(1:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k)}) = \hat{F}(\hat{c}_{(k)})^n = \left(\frac{k}{NT}\right)^n,$$

and

$$\hat{F}_{(2:n)}(c) = n\hat{F}_{1:n-1}(c) - (n-1)\hat{F}_{1:n}(c).$$

This yields the estimates³⁷

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{u}_*(n) &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^{NT} \hat{c}_{(k)} \Delta \hat{F}_{(2:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k)}) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^{NT} \hat{c}_{(k)} \Delta \hat{F}_{(1:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k)}), \\ \hat{p}_*(n) &= \sum_{k=1}^{NT} \hat{c}_{(k)} \Delta \hat{F}_{(2:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k)}).\end{aligned}$$

These estimates are then plugged in to derive the estimates of the ex-ante profit function and the expected price,

$$\hat{\Pi}(\rho, N) = \sum_{n=0}^{N-2} \pi(n, \rho, N) \hat{u}_*(n), \quad \hat{P}(\rho, N) = \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} w(\rho, n, N) \hat{p}_*(n).$$

We next use these estimates to obtain the counterfactual bounds on the participation probability $\hat{\rho}(N)$ and $\hat{\rho}(N')$, and the corresponding bounds on the counterfactual price. For $N = 9$, we estimate the participation probability $\rho(N)$ as the empirical frequency,

$$\hat{\rho}(N) = \frac{1}{NT} \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it},$$

while the counterfactual participation probability $\bar{\rho}(N')$ is estimated as the solution to the estimated analogue of (9),

$$\hat{\Pi}(\hat{\rho}(N'), N') = \hat{\Pi}(\hat{\rho}(N), N).$$

³⁷In the estimates below, we adopt the notation $\Delta \hat{F}(\hat{c}_{(k)}) = \hat{F}_{(2:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k)}) - \hat{F}_{(2:n)}(\hat{c}_{(k-1)})$, with $\hat{c}_{(0)} = 0$.

We then obtain the estimated bound for the counterfactual price difference

$$P(N') - P(N) \in \left[\hat{P}(\hat{\rho}(N'), N') - \hat{P}(N), \hat{P}(\hat{\rho}(N), N') - \hat{P}(N) \right],$$

exactly as described previously.

C.3.1 Confidence intervals of the bounds

To compute confidence intervals around our estimated bounds for the entry effect we follow the bootstrap approach taken in Marmer and Shneyerov (2012). In a first step we create a bootstrap sample of T auctions by drawing the auctions (as blocks) from the original sample with replacement. Next, we redo the entire estimation procedure for this bootstrap sample, including recomputing the costs. This will generate a new value for each of the bounds. We then repeat this step 500 times, which yields a bootstrap sample of 500 values for each bound. Finally, in order to determine a confidence interval $[\underline{\Delta}, \overline{\Delta}]$ that covers the true price difference with probability 95%, we follow Imbens and Manski (2004) and compute the lower 5% (for $\underline{\Delta}$) and upper 95% (for $\overline{\Delta}$) percentiles of these samples.