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The Second Generation and the Children of the Native Born:
Comparisons and Refinements

by

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INTRODUCTION. We have constructed some preliminary comparisons involving present-day immigrants and natives, as well as their children, based on the 1990 Census. In particular we are interested in whether the prognosis for the second generation is as grim as recent discussions of “second generation decline” and of “segmented assimilation” would warn (we discuss these theories at length in an earlier Institute working paper).

This paper presents something of a preliminary answer; however its major focus lies elsewhere, namely in stressing the need to drop the comparison of native and immigrant offspring as too crude to be of any use, whether for analytic understanding or for policy formulation. The ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Asian’ classification is only marginally preferable; indeed, the reason it is preferable at all will be made clear by our argument for a different kind of distinction.

The crucial distinction, is between the Mexican immigrants and all other immigrants. We do not claim that no other immigrant groups are as disadvantageously situated as the Mexicans. However, the Mexicans are not only disadvantageously situated, they are also by far the largest group of immigrants, and an even larger proportion of the second generation -- of the children of immigrants growing up in the United States. If the Mexicans are distinguished from the others, the effect is to see that the non-Mexican immigrants and their children are much better off than might otherwise appear -- and the resulting comparisons to native-born whites and their children is especially instructive. Assuredly, some relatively large immigrant groups other than the Mexicans are in trouble, however, their numbers are simply swamped by the still larger immigrant groups that are more happily situated economically.

Needless to say (we trust), in pointing out these trends, we are not presenting an argument

about Mexican culture or character; our finding reflects the fact that the Mexican immigration is both the very largest and the most uniformly comprised of people who come as unskilled or semiskilled workers, with relatively little education, job skills, or capital. Nor is this observation in itself any recommendation as to policy along the Mexican border; that the Mexican immigration has this job profile must be seen, at a minimum, in the context of the need for low-skill jobs in the American economy. Our wish is not to take a stand on legislation to alter the immigrant mix but simply to show that thinking about that mix somewhat differently than has been common will be very helpful in understanding the social reality.

THE EVIDENCE. Several crucial subgroups can be identified in the 1990 Census Public Use Samples (PUMS: two datasets that include 5% or 1% of the American population respectively).

a) *Children 0-17 living with their parents.* We followed Lief Jensen in selecting all children living with a parent who was an immigrant head of household. Notice that this sample includes children born abroad (members of the “first generation” themselves, as are their immigrant parents) as well as the more numerous children born in the United States (members of the true “second generation”). These children were drawn from the 5% PUMS. We compared them to a sample of all children living with native-born parents found in the 1% PUMS. Moreover, we subdivide the native-born by race. For this working paper, we used subsamples of the relevant samples, so that the sampling ratios of subsample to U.S. population are 1/200 for the children of immigrants and 1/2,000 for the children of the native born.

We made one change from Jensen’s selection criteria: we included those whose parents were born in Puerto Rico. These are not ‘immigrants’ in a legal sense, but they still an important

group of arrivals. While this usage may seem quite quixotic, it should be appreciated that had we classified the Puerto Ricans with the “native-born” all the contrasts that we highlight below, in Tables 4-8 would have been stronger than they appear in the tables. In other words, our classification of the Puerto Ricans with immigrants tends to ‘stack the deck’ against our arguments.

The sample we have described thus far is useful in giving us a profile of the immigrant households of origin, in which the children of immigrants grow up, but it is less useful for the study of extended education or full-time work information, since those experiences apply to an older cohort.

b) *Young adults 18-25 living with parents.* We also selected all children living with an immigrant parent who were between the ages of 18 and 25. These individuals are much more likely to be at work or in college, which is just as revealing). But these are not a representative group of all children of immigrants in the age range, since many over 17 have left their parents’ homes.

c) *Young adults who had been brought to the U.S. before reaching age 5.* Had the census asked about the respondents’ parents’ place of birth, we could have studied those children who had left their parents’ homes directly. Since the Census did not ask that question, we have resorted to indirect evidence of second-generation attainments with which to supplement sample (b). We studied what Ruben Rumbaut has called the ‘1.5ers’: we define these here as foreign-born individuals of age 18-25 who had arrived in the United States before their fifth birthday. The procedure can be used only for a very narrow set of ages and dates of arrival, but it is nevertheless revealing of much wider trends, since this group of arrivals should be quite similar to

the group of children of the same age born to immigrants who had already reached the United States (with the one exception of the Indochinese representation among the ‘1.5ers’, to be noted later).¹ Probably not too much separates the ‘1.5ers’ from native-born children born in the same immigrant groups in the same year.

Thus, we study two imperfect samples of 18-25 year-old children of immigrants: young adults living with parents (b above, who are both native-born and foreign-born), and young adults brought to the U.S. before reaching age 5 (c above, foreign-born by definition). In addition, we can compare some characteristics of these groups to a more perfect sample of younger children (a above), especially with regard to immigrant origin and to indicators of family well-being.

For the sake of clarity, the list that follows indicates in one place which samples, a, b or c, are found in each table.

Text tables	Sample type	Appendix tables	Sample type
1	c		
2	a, b, c		
3	a, b		
4	a		
5	a		
6	b	A6	c
7	b	A7	c
8	b	A8	c
		Aa	a

¹ We could determine age of arrival indirectly, by subtracting year of arrival from 1990, to obtain years in U.S., and then by subtracting the result from the respondent’s age to learn age at arrival. The procedure was complicated by the fact that the Census did not ask respondents for the exact year they had arrived, but only in which 5-year range of years they had arrived. Thus there are many individuals who might have been eligible for our sample, but we could not be certain that they had arrived when they were less than 5 years of age, rather than at age 6 or 7, for example; all these uncertain cases were excluded from the sample.

CLASSIFYING IMMIGRANTS BY ORIGIN. In the following tables we have tried to classify immigrants and their children by country of origin in such a way as to retain both large groups and groups which differ in important ways. We all know that if we focus on Iranian immigrants and on the Hmong we will find dramatic differences in well-being, and be able to show that not all immigrants face the same experience. However, the Iranians and Hmong together account for barely 1% of all immigrants; the issue, then, is how much difference we find among groups that comprise larger proportions of all immigrants.

We have therefore created categories for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Caribbeans, other Hispanics, Indochinese other Asians, Europeans and Canadians and all others. These distinctions could surely be revised. For example, 30% of the Caribbeans are from Cuba; perhaps (given their distinctive patterns and their size) the Cubans should be treated separately. Nevertheless, refining the groupings would have no effect on the major point of this paper, and so we adopt the grouping for present purposes without more elaborate discussion.

Table Aa in the appendix shows the countries included in each aggregate category of national origin (e.g. in "Other Asian"), as well as the number of sample members from each country. The countries from which appreciable numbers have come are identified by name and the rest by 1990 PUMS birthplace code.

A FEW PRELIMINARIES. Table 1 shows the percentage of individuals living with their parents in sample type c ('1.5ers' and all natives of age 18-25). Roughly half of the cohort is found in a parent's home, and the proportion varies from group to group. Clearly, to depend exclusively on the sample of those 18-25 living at home (sample type b) would be risky.

However, by comparing results from that sample and from sample c of '1.5ers' we can verify that the general pattern of results we discuss below usually holds in both samples of young people (in sample c as well as in sample b). As such, we limit most discussion in the text, in connection with the crucial tables 6-8, to the sample of young people living with their parents and leave the confirming evidence from the sample of 1.5ers to the appendix (tables A6-A8).

Certainly, we not expect the b and c samples to show identical patterns; at a minimum, the b sample (children 18-25 who were living with a parent) will be younger on average than the c sample (all '1.5ers' 18-25). Moreover, the sample of the 1.5 generation is affected by the nature of its selection, limited as it is to a very narrow range of ages and arrival times. In particular, the Indochinese arrivals, who came during a narrow band of years are virtually absent from the sample of 1.5ers (the first two columns of the table). . We will not, therefore, be able to compare the accuracy of the b and c samples with regard to the Indochinese. There are also more Puerto Ricans in this sample of 1.5ers and fewer children of European and Canadian origin, whether because of trends in the ages of immigration, the likelihood of having started to raise children abroad, or the pattern of flow from each country.

The second, third and fourth columns of Table 2 all refer to children of the household head; the columns differ in terms of the age of the children. Consequently, the differences across columns reflect the changing flows of immigration over time. Of course, the difference across columns also reflect any differences in ethnic propensities for young people to leave their parents' homes in the 17-25 age range, but it is unlikely (as Table 1 confirms) that the large shifts from oldest to youngest cohort is due to such a factor; the pattern of change in the composition of the immigrant pool is also seen in more muted form between the youngest and middle cohorts. The

proportion of children whose families had come from Europe or Canada dropped from a surprisingly high 27% for immigrant families with children 18-25 to 17% for families with children 1-9. At the same time, the proportion of children of Mexican origin rose from 24% to 32%. These are large and important changes, and none of the other shifts were of remotely comparable magnitudes.

Finally, Table 3 shows the percentage of the children of immigrants in each group who were themselves born abroad. This percentage varies from group to group, reflecting both recency of bulges in the migration flow, the timing of marriage and childbirth, fertility and the like. The dramatic rise in the percentage foreign-born by age presumably reflects these factors too, and especially the fact that older children were more likely to be the first children born into the marriage, before an immigrant couple arrived. However, this table suggests that *the fraction of Mexican children born abroad was not high enough* to explain much of the Mexican disadvantage we find in Tables 4-8.

COMPARISONS OF FATHER'S OCCUPATION, POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLING, AND EARLY JOBS. We can present in one section all three of our crucial comparisons --- because the observations we wish to make largely hold across all three measures of well-being.

Our major focus is the economic well-being of the children of immigrants. However, much of what we can glean from direct evidence can be reinforced by indirect evidence -- specifically about the economic well-being of the children's families of origin and about the children's extended schooling.

Consider first, in Tables 4-5, the family of origin for children 0-17 years of age; we examine the occupations of the father (or if father absent, of the mother). And we will compare

children of the immigrant groups we have already identified with the children of native-born blacks, whites and others.

There are numerous ways in which we might measure the relative levels of economic well-being of these groups; even having settled, as we have in this paper, on the occupational stratum of the father as the criterion, there are numerous ways in which we can compare the distribution across strata. We focus first on the percentage of gainfully employed in each group, and in then on the distribution of the gainfully employed across three levels: high, middle and low end occupations. Under higher strata occupations, we include the fathers (or mothers) working in managerial, professional or technical occupations. Under middle-strata jobs we include skilled manual work, clerical and sales jobs. Under lower skilled occupations we include the fathers working in service, low manual and farming (chiefly, no doubt, farm laboring) occupations. And finally, when no occupation is listed for a parent, the father is classified under “no occupation.”

Compare first all immigrant parents and all native-born parents -- the first row of the table and the fourth row from the end. The immigrant parents are slightly worse off: Table 4 shows that 82% of the immigrants are gainfully employed, compared with 85% of the native-born parents; and Table 5 shows that of the gainfully employed, 28% of the immigrant parents are found in the higher strata, 38% in the lower strata, whereas among the natives the comparable proportions are 31% and 32%. Nevertheless, the occupational distributions do not strike one as radically different.

How large a difference is ‘radically different?’ Consider blacks and whites as a rough yardstick for comparisons: blacks and whites do differ ‘radically’ (by American standards of social differences) on many measures, and our measures are no exception. Among the native-born

white parents, 89% were gainfully employed, among the native-born black parents only 66%.

And despite this staggering difference, in gainful employment, those that were employed still differed considerably in their occupations: 32% of native-born whites were in high strata occupations, and 30% in low strata occupations; among native-born blacks, the figures were 19% and 48%.

The point we wish to stress, with these measures of black-white difference in mind, is that no less notable contrasts among immigrant groups exist as well. And since the Mexicans are by far the single largest immigrant group, and are very likely to enter at or near the bottom of the occupational ladder, distinguishing between them and all others is very telling. The percentage gainful employment is not a measure of this disparity between Mexicans and all others: 83% of non-Mexican immigrants are employed, and 81% of Mexicans. However, among the gainfully employed (Table 5), 37% of the non-Mexican household heads are in higher strata occupations, and 29% in lower strata occupations, whereas the figures for Mexican immigrant heads are 8% and 61%. Thus the contrast among the gainfully employed between Mexican and all other immigrants is much starker than between the gainfully employed native-born blacks and whites. Of course, part of the reason for this starker contrast among immigrants is that so many more of the native born black families are headed by the unemployed or by individuals not in the labor force. However, even if we were to draw the contrast differently -- *considering together the unemployed, those not in the labor force and those working in the low strata occupations* -- then 65% of the native-born blacks, and 67% of the Mexican immigrants would be in that low-end category; on the other hand, 40% of the native-born whites and 41% of the non-Mexican

immigrants would be in that category.² Or to put it differently, when calculated in the manner just indicated, the Mexican and non-Mexican positions among the foreign-born are virtually identical to the black and white positions respectively among the native-born.

While the Mexican case is the most striking example of the need to distinguish groups of immigrants, we can appreciate the nature of the immigrant diversity still more if we now subdivide the non-Mexican immigrants in the manner noted at the outset. Employing this distinction reveals that while the "Hispanic" category is dominated by the large number and the extreme pattern of the Mexicans, other Hispanics groups are better off -- with the exception of the Puerto Ricans. Nor is the more favorable position of these non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants due simply to the relative well-being of the Cubans; on the contrary, the Caribbeans (30% of whom are Cubans) and the "other Hispanics" are very similar in their occupational distributions, and both are considerably better off than the Mexicans -- with 24-25% in the higher strata and 40-41% in the lower strata as against 8% and 61% for the Mexicans..

Among the "Asians," the internal contrasts are also striking. The Indochinese form one large subgroup of similar experience and all other Asians -- Chiefly Filipinos, Taiwanese, Koreans and other Pacific Rim countries as well as Indians, Iranians, and so on -- form a far more advantaged group (Table 5). While the Indochinese are much less numerous than the other Asians, they do comprise 20% of all Asian immigrants. Finally, among those 0-17 in 1990, it was still the case that the children of Europeans and Canadians were four-fifths as numerous a group as the children of Asians and this group too was relatively well-off.

². Calculated as follows: $(a*b)+c+d$ where a =% of the employed in low strata (shown in Table 5) b , c , d = %s of all who are employed, unemployed, and not in labor force respectively (shown in Table 4). Thus for native-born blacks: $(.48*.66)+.10+.23 = .65$.

These observations about the groups' comparative levels of well-being also hold when we look at the children of immigrants themselves. Table 6 shows the prevalence of post-secondary schooling among the groups. Among Mexicans, 18-25 years of age, 7% had the equivalent of a college degree (completion of 16 or more grades of schooling), 44% had dropped out before completing grade 13, and another 28% were still in school, in a grade lower than 13. Among non-Mexican immigrants, these proportions were generally more favorable than among native whites. Note, by the way, that even *with* Mexicans included, the children of immigrants do not appear to differ much from the children of the native-born. There may be a second generation decline, there may be a segmented assimilation; but if we ask *what percent* of all children of immigrants are on the wrong side of the tracks, it would appear that the percentage among the immigrants' children is not particularly different than the percentage of the children of the native born by this measure.

One grim difference between the relative standing of the groups on fathers' occupations and on schooling of the children. Whereas the black parents' jobs were somewhat better situated than those of the Mexicans, the children's schooling reverses that relative standing. The 'advantages' of the somewhat preferable black (compared to Mexican) occupational situation, as judged by Table 5, does not carry over to the schooling of the children; in that regard, the more somber realities shown in Table 4, dealing with the percentage of children growing up in a household with a gainfully employed parent, must be recalled.

Otherwise the situation is rather like that already discussed in connection with Table 5; notice in particular that only 17% of other Asians have left school without reaching post-secondary grades (36% for native whites).

And finally, the Census figures permit a look at the jobs of the second generation. Many are still enrolled in postsecondary schooling. Some of the rest also lack an occupation (of these, no doubt, some are in high school). These tables (7-8, A7-A8) will repay examination. For the limited purposes of this paper, we want to stress the immigrant-native comparison -- nearly as many children of immigrants gainfully employed as children of natives (60% vs. 64%) and more importantly, *a somewhat better occupational profile* even before the children of Mexicans are separated out: 15% of all immigrants' children are in high strata work and 36% in low; among the native-born, the comparable figures are 12% and 43% (Table 8). These figures apply, of course only to those living at home, but supporting evidence is found in Appendix Table A8 for the '1.5er' generation: 19%/33% all children of immigrants, 17%/40% all children of natives (and Table A7 shows that the proportions gainfully employed are quite similar for these two groups as well). In addition, the children of non-Mexican immigrants are better situated in terms of these occupational strata than the children of native-born whites.

Finally, the gap between the children of Mexicans and of non-Mexican immigrants is very large even by comparison to the gap between the children of native-born whites and blacks. It would be a mistake however, to assess the native black employment situation on the basis of Table 8 (occupational distribution of the employed). Two other perspectives need to be included. First, Table 7 shows that the percentage of children of native-born blacks who are in fact employed is much smaller than for the children of immigrants or native-born whites (48% as against 60-68% for other groups). Since in every group some of those not employed are in school, the most revealing way to see the distinctive position in which the children of native-born blacks are found is to focus on those 18-25 year old youth who are neither employed nor in

school: 35% among the children of native-born blacks, 14% among the children of native-born whites, 14% also among the children of other immigrants and 29% among the children of Mexican immigrants. With this large difference in the percentage employed, Table 8 indicates that blacks and whites who are employed hardly differ at all in occupational distribution; yet here we need to bring in our second shift in perspective. Specifically, we need to remember that Tables 7 and 8 pertain only to the youths 18-25 who are living with a parent. Tables A7 and A8, deal with groups of youths 18-25 years of age in all living arrangements. Among black youth in all living situations, (Table A8), the black-white gap is clearer: most notably, despite great differences in the percentage without a job and out of school, among the employed 17% of whites and 12% of blacks are in high strata occupations.

In sum to observe the grim reality of the black youth employment, we need to supplement Table 8 with Tables 7, A7 and A8. If we do so, we can then go on to offer the same sort of adjustment we offered in connection with the parents' occupations: we can take together (from Tables A7 and A8), 1) those in low strata occupations among the employed, as well as 2) all the unemployed and 3) those not in the work force or at school.³ Compared in this way, the percentages of each group found in this unfavorable position are: 57% black vs. 44% white for the native-born and 53% Mexican vs. 36% non-Mexican for the '1.5er' immigrants. In other words, even judged in this way, the situation of Mexican youths is very nearly as unfavorable as that of the blacks, whereas the situation of all other immigrants is rather better than that of native

³. See note 2 for the comparable calculation with regard to parents' occupations. Here we take $(a*b)+c+d$, where a =percentage employed in low strata jobs from Table A8, and b , c , and d = percentages employed (b), unemployed (c), and not in labor force or at school (d).

whites.⁴

We cannot speak to the impact that the prevalence of immigrants might be having on opportunities for blacks; nor can we speak to the costs and benefits of immigrants in a general sense to the society. But with regard to the specific argument that the children of immigrants face serious downward mobility or blocked opportunities, we can conclude that it is crucial to distinguish the Mexican situation from that of other groups, and we suggest that other distinctions are important as well -- at a minimum, distinguishing the Indochinese from the other Asian populations and noting the considerable representation of relatively advantaged Europeans and Canadians in the immigrant pool (although as we have seen their number is lower in the youngest cohorts -- Table 2). Perhaps most important, we can also conclude that the same reasons for making these distinctions in this analysis are good reasons to think it will be important to make the same distinctions in many other contexts of research and policy.

⁴. Two artifacts of the data should be recalled here. First, we have we have included the Puerto Rican migrants among the group of all other immigrants. Excluding them would make the contrasts shown here starker. Second, the native-born blacks and whites in Tables A7 and A8 include some children of immigrants.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF YOUTHS 18-25 WHO WERE
LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS -- BY ETHNIC ORIGINS

Ethnic Origin:* '1.5ers' and native-born	Living with parents	TOTAL 100%; N=
	%	
Mexico	55	3,641
Puerto Rico	46	1,629
Caribbean	51	1,122
Other Hispanic	52	894
Indochina	37	122
Other Asian	50	2,373
Europe +Canada	40	2,730
All other	47	630
Native-born black	48	1,668
Native-born white	44	10,399
Native-born other	47	615

* The '1.5er' sample (drawn from the 1990 PUMS) is described in the text. Ethnic origin is defined here by birthplace of the '1.5er' immigrant youth, and by race for the native-born youth. The rows for 'all' immigrants and 'all' native-born include, in addition to groups shown, small numbers of children from groups not shown separately. Also, as explained in the text, Indochinese are excluded due to an artifact of the sample.

TABLE 2. THE NATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS

National origin*	Type of sample of immigrant children ** (% and N total)			
	'1.5ers' 18-25	Children of immigrants (living with parents) by age		
		18-25	10-17	0-9
Mexico	28	24	29	32
Puerto Rico	12	7	7	6
Caribbean	9	10	8	8
Other Hispanic	7	9	9	10
Indochina	1	4	5	5
Other Asian	18	18	19	19
Europe +Canada	21	27	22	17
All other	5	2	3	4
TOTAL (100%) N =	13,141	9,395	17,280	22,757

SOURCE: 5% PUMS data. The second, third and fourth columns are based on a 1/10 subsample from this source.

* For the first column of the table, national origin refers to the birthplace of the '1.5ers' (who are defined below). For the second through fourth columns, national origin refers to the birthplace of the household head (a parent of the sample member).

** The first column is based on a sample of foreign-born individuals, 18-25 years of age who were brought to the United States before their fifth birthday. The second through fourth columns of the table are based on a sample of children, 0-25 years of age, living with a foreign-born parent. The children themselves may be either native-born or foreign-born.

*** The unit of analysis is the child; since the 1/10 subsample (used for the second third and fourth columns) included every 10th relevant child in order of appearance in the 5% PUMS, the subsample includes virtually no siblings (typically one child per household).

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS BORN ABROAD
-- BY AGE OF CHILD

Parent's place of birth	% of children born abroad (children living with parents only)		
	age 0-9	age 10-17	age 18-25
Mexico	17	33	52
Puerto Rico	19	29	28 *
Caribbean	13	39	58
Other Hispanic	21	48	67
Indochina	22	79	96 **
Other Asian	19	43	69
Europe +Canada	13	20	22

See notes to Table 2. All cell Ns > 800 except those marked with asterisk(s):
* N=689; ** N=364.

TABLE 4. HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS:
FOR CHILDREN (AGES 0-17) OF IMMIGRANTS
AND NATIVE-BORN

Ethnic origin*	Percentage of group in each employment status				
	em- ployed	unem- ployed	n.i.l.f.**	Total	N=
ALL IMMIGRANTS	82	5	13	100	40,037
Non-Mexican immigrants	83	4	13	100	27,875
Mexico	81	8	12	100	12,162
Puerto Rico	61	7	33	100	2,554
Caribbean	79	6	15	100	3,066
Other Hispanic	86	5	9	100	3,873
Indochina	56	4	39	100	1,919
Other Asian	90	3	7	100	7,540
Europe +Canada	90	3	7	100	7,656
All other	85	4	11	100	1,267
ALL NATIVE BORN	85	4	10	100	24,759
Native-born black	66	10	23	100	2,981
Native-born white	89	3	8	100	20,820
Native-born other	70	9	21	100	958

SOURCES AND NOTES: See Table 2.

*Place of birth of immigrant household heads, race for native-born heads.

**Not in the labor force.

TABLE 5. HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S OCCUPATION:
FOR CHILDREN (AGES 0-17) OF IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE-BORN

National origin*	Occupation of gainfully employed household head (% and N) **				
	High strata	Middle	Low Strata	TOTAL	N =
ALL IMMIGRANTS	28	33	38	100	32,928
Non-Mexican immigrants	37	34	29	100	23,117
Mexico	8	32	61	100	9,811
Puerto Rico	24	34	43	100	1,546
Caribbean	25	36	40	100	2,420
Other Hispanic	24	36	41	100	3,324
Indochina	23	33	44	100	1,083
Other Asian	46	33	20	100	6,788
Europe +Canada	41	35	24	100	6,880
All other immig.	47	29	24	100	1,076
ALL NATIVE BORN	31	38	32	100	21,155
Native-born black	19	33	48	100	1,980
Native-born white	32	38	30	100	18,502
Native-born other	24	39	37	100	673

NOTES TO TABLE 5.

SOURCE: A 1/10th subsample drawn from the 1990 PUMS 5% sample for children of immigrants, and a 1/20th subsample drawn from the 1990 PUMS 1% sample for children of natives). See also notes to Table 2.

*Place of birth of immigrant household heads, race for native-born heads.

** The gainfully employed are those listed in Table 4 as "employed" (rather than as unemployed or n.i.l.f.). The high-strata occupations include Managers and professionals as well as technical and supervisory workers. The low-strata occupations include service, low-skill manual, and farm (most of which were assumed to be farm labor). All other occupations were classified as middling (typically skilled manual and clerical and sales jobs).

***The N's in the last column refer to the number of gainfully employed in the relevant subsamples. As indicated above (sources), sampling ratios differ by nativity: 1/2000 ($1\% \cdot 1/20$) of the actual population for natives, 1/200 for immigrants ($5\% \cdot 1/10$).

TABLE 6. POST-SECONDARY SCHOOLING OF YOUTHS 18-25 YEARS OF AGE WHO WERE LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS: BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

Ethnic origin*	Post-secondary schooling (% and N)					
	None		Some (but less than 16 grades of school)		16 grades of school or more	TOTAL 100%; N=
	left school	in school	left school	in school		
ALL IMMIGRANTS	31	28	10	24	7	9,395
Non-Mexican immigrants	27	27	10	26	9	7,142
Mexico	44	31	7	16	2	2,253
Puerto Rico	43	28	11	14	4	689
Caribbean	27	31	11	24	7	898
Other Hispanic	29	32	10	24	6	816
Indochina	16	45	5	28	6	364
Other Asian	17	29	10	33	12	1,680
Europe +Canada	30	20	11	27	11	1,681
ALL NATIVE-BORN	38	21	12	23	6	5,204
Native-born black	50	19	12	15	3	775
Native-born white	36	21	12	25	6	5,126

NOTES AND SOURCES. See Tables 2.

* Defined by parent's place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for children of the native-born. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately.

TABLE 7. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF YOUTHS 18-25 YEARS OF AGE
WHO WERE LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS: BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

Ethnic origin*	Percentage of group in each employment status					Total	N=
	em- ployed	unem- ployed	not in labor force				
			not in school	in school			
ALL IMMIGRANTS	60	9	7	24	100	9,395	
Non-Mexican immigrants	60	8	6	25	100	7,142	
Mexico	60	11	18	11	100	2,253	
Puerto Rico	51	14	14	22	100	689	
Caribbean	60	10	8	22	100	898	
Other Hispanic	61	9	7	23	100	816	
Indochina	43	7	6	44	100	364	
Other Asian	58	5	5	32	100	1,680	
Europe +Canada	67	7	5	21	100	2,491	
ALL NATIVE BORN	64	9	8	18	100	5,204	
Native-born black	48	15	20	17	100	820	
Native-born white	68	8	6	18	100	4,212	

SOURCES AND NOTES: See Table 2.

* Defined by parent's place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for children of the native-born. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately.

TABLE 8. OCCUPATIONS OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED YOUTHS
18-25 YEARS OF AGE WHO WERE LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS:
BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

Ethnic origin*	% by occupational stratum -- and N				
	High stratum	Middle	Low Stratum	Total	N=
ALL IMMIGRANTS	15	49	36	100	5,660
Non-Mexican immigrants	16	51	32	100	4,308
Mexico	9	42	49	100	1,352
Puerto Rico	11	51	38	100	349
Caribbean	16	56	28	100	539
Other Hispanic	17	51	31	100	500
Indochinese	14	47	39	100	158
Other Asian	19	51	30	100	969
Europe +Canada	16	51	33	100	1,679
ALL NATIVE-BORN	12	45	43	100	3,336
Native-born black	11	45	43	100	393
Native-born white	12	45	43	100	2,853

SOURCES AND NOTES: See Table 2.

* Defined by parent's place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for children of the native-born. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately.

***** **APPENDIX TABLES** *****

TABLE A6. POST-SECONDARY SCHOOLING OF YOUTHS 18-25 YEARS OF AGE:
'1.5ERS' COMPARED WITH NATIVE-BORN YOUTH

Ethnic origin*	Post-secondary schooling (% and N)					
	None		Some (but less than 16 grades of school)		16 grades or more of school	TOTAL 100%; N=
	left school	in school	left school	in school		
ALL IMMIGRANTS	38	18	12	22	10	13,141
Non-Mexican immigrants	33	15	14	25	13	9,500
Mexico	51	25	9	13	2	3,641
Puerto Rico	55	16	11	13	5	1,629
Caribbean	38	12	19	18	12	1,122
Other Hispanic	33	15	15	27	11	894
Other Asian	14	21	9	40	17	2,373
Europe +Canada	36	11	17	21	16	2,730
ALL NATIVE-BORN	42	13	15	22	9	12,682
Native-born black	52	14	14	14	3	1,668
Native-born white	40	15	15	23	10	10,399

NOTES AND SOURCES. See Table 2. Defined by place of birth for immigrant and by race for native-born. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately. Indochinese are not shown because the arrival years included in the '1.5er' sample saw few very young Indochinese arrive in the U. S.

TABLE A7 EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF YOUTHS 18-25 YEARS OF AGE
1.5ERS' COMPARED WITH NATIVE-BORN

Ethnic origin*	Percentage of group in each employment status					N=
	em- ployed	unem- ployed	not in labor force		Total	
			not in school	in school		
ALL IMMIGRANTS	62	8	13	18	100	13,141
Non-Mexican immigrants	62	7	12	19	100	5,900
Mexico	61	11	15	13	100	3,641
Puerto Rico	52	11	23	14	100	1,629
Caribbean	69	7	12	12	100	1,122
Other Hispanic	69	6	10	15	100	894
Other Asian	58	4	6	32	100	2,373
Europe +Canada	68	6	12	15	100	2,730
ALL NATIVE BORN	67	8	11	15	100	12,682
Native-born black	52	14	19	15	100	1,668
Native-born white	70	7	9	14	100	10,399

SOURCES AND NOTES: See Table 2.

*Defined by birthplace of the '1.5er' immigrant youth, race for the native-born youth. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately.

TABLE A8. OCCUPATIONS OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED YOUTHS
18-25 YEARS OF AGE:
1.5ERS' COMPARED WITH NATIVE-BORN

Ethnic origin*	% by occupational strata -- and N				
	High strata	Middle	Low Strata	Total	N=
ALL IMMIGRANTS	19	48	33	100	8,119
Non-Mexican immigrants	22	49	28	100	5,900
Mexico	10	46	44	100	2,219
Puerto Rico	14	48	38	100	841
Caribbean	23	55	22	100	772
Other Hispanic	20	51	29	100	619
Other Asian	28	50	22	100	1,367
Europe +Canada	24	47	29	100	1,848
ALL NATIVE-BORN	17	43	40	100	8,451
Native-born black	12	42	46	100	863
Native-born white	17	43	40	100	7,227

SOURCE AND NOTES: See Table 2..

*Defined by birthplace of the '1.5er' immigrant youth, race for the native-born youth. The rows for 'All' immigrants and native-born also include small numbers of children of groups not shown separately.

TABLE AA. THE COMPOSITION OF THE ETHNIC CATEGORIES THAT CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE NATIONAL ORIGIN -- by 1990 PUMS birthplace codes, with major groups identified

CARIBBEAN

POB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
330	1	0.0	1	0.0
331	23	0.8	24	0.8
332	8	0.3	32	1.0
333	35	1.1	67	2.2
334	65	2.1	132	4.3
336	3	0.1	135	4.4
337 Cuba	945	30.8	1080	35.2
338	35	1.1	1115	36.4
339 Dom Rep	719	23.5	1834	59.8
340	21	0.7	1855	60.5
341	5	0.2	1860	60.7
342 Haiti	437	14.3	2297	74.9
343 Jamaica	484	15.8	2781	90.7
344	2	0.1	2783	90.8
345	1	0.0	2784	90.8
346	7	0.2	2791	91.0
348	16	0.5	2807	91.6
349	13	0.4	2820	92.0
350	20	0.7	2840	92.6
351 Trin+To	193	6.3	3033	98.9
352	4	0.1	3037	99.1
355	3	0.1	3040	99.2
358	26	0.8	3066	100.0

OTHER HISPANICS

310	53	1.4	53	1.4
311	103	2.7	156	4.0
312 El Sal.	837	21.6	993	25.6
313 Guat.	388	10.0	1381	35.7
314 Hond.	179	4.6	1560	40.3
316 Nic.	316	8.2	1876	48.4
317 Panama	160	4.1	2036	52.6
318	15	0.4	2051	53.0
375 Argen.	195	5.0	2246	58.0
376	53	1.4	2299	59.4
377 Brazil	124	3.2	2423	62.6
378 Chile	121	3.1	2544	65.7
379 Columb.	488	12.6	3032	78.3
380 Ecuador	256	6.6	3288	84.9
383 Guyana	160	4.1	3448	89.0
384	5	0.1	3453	89.2
385 Peru	274	7.1	3727	96.2
386	4	0.1	3731	96.3
387	42	1.1	3773	97.4
388	80	2.1	3853	99.5
389	20	0.5	3873	100.0

INDOCHINA

POB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
206 Cambod.	373	19.4	373	19.4
221 Laos	576	30.0	949	49.5
242 Vietnam	970	50.5	1919	100.0

OTHER ASIAN

200	46	0.6	46	0.6
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201	1	0.0	47	0.6	
202	33	0.4	80	1.1	
203	1	0.0	81	1.1	
205	26	0.3	107	1.4	
207	China	752	10.0	859	11.4
208		21	0.3	880	11.7
209	Hong K	203	2.7	1083	14.4
210	India	886	11.8	1969	26.1
211		93	1.2	2062	27.3
212	Iran	386	5.1	2448	32.5
213		90	1.2	2538	33.7
214	Israel	269	3.6	2807	37.2
215	Japan	494	6.6	3301	43.8
216		87	1.2	3388	44.9
217	Korea	863	11.4	4251	56.4
218		198	2.6	4449	59.0
219		2	0.0	4451	59.0
220		2	0.0	4453	59.1
222		156	2.1	4609	61.1
223		10	0.1	4619	61.3
224		34	0.5	4653	61.7
227		3	0.0	4656	61.8
228		1	0.0	4657	61.8
229		168	2.2	4825	64.0
231	Philip	1864	24.7	6689	88.7
233		23	0.3	6712	89.0
234		13	0.2	6725	89.2
236		13	0.2	6738	89.4
237		77	1.0	6815	90.4
238	Taiwan	411	5.5	7226	95.8
239		171	2.3	7397	98.1
240		66	0.9	7463	99.0
241		1	0.0	7464	99.0
243		2	0.0	7466	99.0
244		14	0.2	7480	99.2
245		5	0.1	7485	99.3
253		52	0.7	7537	100.0
256		3	0.0	7540	100.0

EUROPE AND CANADA

POB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
100	10	0.1	10	0.1
102	107	1.4	117	1.5
103	47	0.6	164	2.1
104	16	0.2	180	2.4
105	79	1.0	259	3.4
106	57	0.7	316	4.1
108	27	0.4	343	4.5
109	163	2.1	506	6.6
110	Germany 908	11.9	1414	18.5
111	" 372	4.9	1786	23.3
112	" 6	0.1	1792	23.4
114	" 22	0.3	1814	23.7
115	2	0.0	1816	23.7
116	Greece 323	4.2	2139	27.9
117	128	1.7	2267	29.6
118	11	0.1	2278	29.8
119	221	2.9	2499	32.6
120	Italy 858	11.2	3357	43.8
123	2	0.0	3359	43.9
124	22	0.3	3381	44.2
126	200	2.6	3581	46.8
127	37	0.5	3618	47.3
128	Poland 388	5.1	4006	52.3
129	Portug. 384	5.0	4390	57.3
130	66	0.9	4456	58.2
131	3	0.0	4459	58.2
132	113	1.5	4572	59.7
133	1	0.0	4573	59.7
134	133	1.7	4706	61.5
136	60	0.8	4766	62.3
137	47	0.6	4813	62.9
138	172	2.2	4985	65.1
139	Grt Brt 711	9.3	5696	74.4
140	" 142	1.9	5838	76.3
141	" 11	0.1	5849	76.4
142	" 31	0.4	5880	76.8
144	" 3	0.0	5883	76.8
147	Yugosl 204	2.7	6087	79.5
180	USSR 245	3.2	6332	82.7
182	3	0.0	6335	82.7
183	21	0.3	6356	83.0
184	14	0.2	6370	83.2
300	23	0.3	6393	83.5
301	Canada 1260	16.5	7653	100.0
304	3	0.0	7656	100.0

ALL OTHER

POB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
060	43	3.4	43	3.4
066	Guam 108	8.5	151	11.9
069	8	0.6	159	12.5
078	42	3.3	201	15.9
079	1	0.1	202	15.9
096	Oth.terr 82	6.5	284	22.4
400	14	1.1	298	23.5
401	4	0.3	302	23.8
403	2	0.2	304	24.0
406	2	0.2	306	24.2
407	1	0.1	307	24.2
408	4	0.3	311	24.5
409	41	3.2	352	27.8
415	Egypt 151	11.9	503	39.7
416	1	0.1	504	39.8
417	38	3.0	542	42.8
420	2	0.2	544	42.9
421	36	2.8	580	45.8
423	2	0.2	582	45.9
425	2	0.2	584	46.1
427	26	2.1	610	48.1
429	24	1.9	634	50.0
430	6	0.5	640	50.5
431	1	0.1	641	50.6
432	1	0.1	642	50.7
434	1	0.1	643	50.7
436	30	2.4	673	53.1
437	2	0.2	675	53.3
438	1	0.1	676	53.4
439	1	0.1	677	53.4
440	Nigeria 135	10.7	812	64.1
441	1	0.1	813	64.2
442	1	0.1	814	64.2
444	2	0.2	816	64.4
445	6	0.5	822	64.9
446	1	0.1	823	65.0
447	16	1.3	839	66.2
448	3	0.2	842	66.5
449	South Af 66	5.2	908	71.7
451	11	0.9	919	72.5
453	14	1.1	933	73.6
454	2	0.2	935	73.8
456	4	0.3	939	74.1
457	16	1.3	955	75.4
459	10	0.8	965	76.2
460	7	0.6	972	76.7
461	10	0.8	982	77.5
462	40	3.2	1022	80.7

ALL OTHER (CONT.)

POB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
464	3	0.2	1025	80.9
468	1	0.1	1026	81.0
469	6	0.5	1032	81.5
501	Austral 90	7.1	1122	88.6
507	28	2.2	1150	90.8

508	3	0.2	1153	91.0
509	1	0.1	1154	91.1
510	4	0.3	1158	91.4
511	3	0.2	1161	91.6
514	33	2.6	1194	94.2
517	1	0.1	1195	94.3
518	1	0.1	1196	94.4
519	1	0.1	1197	94.5
522	29	2.3	1226	96.8
526	41	3.2	1267	100.0

NOTE: This table is based on the 5% PUMS 1/10 subsample for all children of immigrant household heads 0-17 (referred to in the text as sample 'a').