Milberg, William

Working Paper
The Rhetoric of Policy Relevance in International Economics

Working Paper, No. 118

Provided in Cooperation with:
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College


This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/186801

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
The Rhetoric of Policy Relevance in International Economics

by

William Milberg*

Working Paper No. 118

June 1994


Correspondence: William Milberg
Research Scholar
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute
of Bard College
PO Box 5000
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000
Phone: 914-758-7700 Fax: 914-758-1149
Internet: MILBERG@LEVY.BARD.EDU
ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the link between the generation of economic knowledge and economic policy conclusions. Focusing on the case of research in international trade, I establish a taxonomy of rhetorical practices used to make such a link. The flexibility observed in these practices contrasts markedly with the rigidity of the conventions of theoretical and empirical knowledge creation. A survey of articles on international trade from four major journals from 1988-1992 shows that most policy-relevant research is entirely theoretical, but the incidence of rhetorical practices depends on the nature of the research method (theoretical or empirical), and the journal in which the research is published. The survey data support the view that the flexibility of rhetorical practices is integral to the legitimation of the knowledge generated by international trade economists.

JEL Classification: B41, F13

Keywords: Rhetoric, methodology, trade policy, new international economics, epistemology.
The Rhetoric of Policy Relevance in International Economics

"A text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination."
Roland Barthes (1977)

1. Introduction

In this paper I address a question rarely asked by economists, policy makers or philosophers of science: how are the policy conclusions of international economics legitimated? There is a widespread belief that economic policy prescriptions, perhaps especially in international economics, are of grave importance for individual and national well-being. The positive theory of trade (what determines the commodity composition and direction of trade), from its inception, has always been closely tied to the question of welfare (what are the gains from trade); indeed, the rationale for liberalized Anglo-Portuguese trade in Ricardo's famous example was that such trade would bring benefit to both trading partners. International economists have thus always been under pressure from other economists and policy makers to establish the policy relevance of their work. More than in any other branch of economics, the laissez-faire view in international economics ("free trade") is recognized as a policy choice. Thus theory and policy are closely linked and the policy conclusions, especially the free trade version, have received considerable public attention since Ricardo first stated his views.

Given this tradition of concern with policy and the policy relevance of international economics, it is surprising how little discussion has focused on the scientific or epistemological status of such policy conclusions. Economists and philosophers of science spend much time debating the status of truth claims generated from theory in
the social sciences, yet little thought is given to the status of policy prescriptions that "follow" from the theory. Generally such policy conclusions are seen to follow "straightforwardly" from theoretical insights. The move from theory to policy conclusion is perceived as completely natural and thus rarely receives any scrutiny. This paper is a first step in the analysis of how theoretical or empirical knowledge is used to validate and support policy conclusions. McCloskey (1991) describes the academic journal article as a "sandwich" in which the introduction and policy conclusions are "the bread" lying on either side of "the meat" of the article. In this paper, to carry the metaphor one step further, I look at what holds the sandwich together. The focus is on the rhetorical practices -- that is the types of arguments -- used to link theory to policy prescription in international economics.

A survey of the major U.S. academic journals in the field of international trade over the period 1988-1992 reveals a wide variety of such validating practices. There is a looseness of language and argument in the linking of theory to policy prescription which is in stark contrast with the rigidity of discourse in conventional of economic analysis. This contrast implies that the discourse of mathematical theory and econometrics is "unstable", lacking sufficient persuasive power in the legitimation of international economic policy.

Robert Baldwin puts the distinction in terms perhaps more familiar to economists. He chides trade economists for "using a different model to reach policy conclusions from the one they employ in analyzing most trading situations. The first model is much less formal than the latter..." (Baldwin, 1992, p. 827). The purpose of this paper is to analyze in detail the rhetoric of the less formal of
these models and to show that this type of model is not an accidental methodological discrepancy, but a necessary modeling strategy for legitimating policy conclusions generated by the more formal type of model. I argue that this methodological discrepancy occurs not because policy conclusions matter so little, but precisely because they are crucial to the legitimation of the field itself.

2. The Rhetoric of Economics and Contemporary Trade Theory

Two recent developments in economics render unacceptable the passive acceptance of the theory/policy links in international trade research. The first is the methodological upheaval brought on by McCloskey's (1985) claim that economics is inevitably rhetorical, rooted in argument and persuasion, not any absolute standard. Rhetorical is not a perjorative term, but embodies the recognition that facts do not make arguments; the arguments are critical. Such arguments entail a variety of strategies and techniques including metaphor, hierarchy of discourse, and appeals to authority.¹

According to McCloskey (1990, p. 56):

Economic stories depend on rhetoric. The point is not to expose the rhetoric and then condemn it for being rhetoric. Rhetoric is unavoidable. An economist or historian cannot avoid writing rhetorically since any argument has a rhetoric, a style of argument, taking "argument" to mean "any designs on the reader." A collection of random facts and assorted bits of logic does not add up to an argument; but as soon as a writer advocates a model or a story in which the facts and logic are to fit, he has begun to argue. If one is to argue in favor of this or that story

¹ See Milberg (1988) for a detailed treatment of these elements in the context of neoclassical trade theory.
there is no way of being non-rhetorical. This anti-modernist portrayal of economics, inspired by the philosophical work of Rorty and Habermas, has encouraged some economists to scrutinize the language (including mathematics and econometrics) used in economic argument to better understand how economic "science" functions. The link between theoretical or empirical analysis and policy conclusions is an obvious candidate for examination along these lines. The bread of the economic sandwich often reveals more than the "meat" (e.g. the theoretical model or econometric test) since the latter is closely scrutinized.

The second development lies within international economics itself. The sterility and narrowness of the basic neoclassical model of international trade, the Heckscher-Ohlin or factor endowments model, came under increasing scrutiny in the 1970's. Most important, neoclassical economists began to question the usefulness of this standard model. The inability of factor endowments to explain a number of widely observed phenomena put the framework of the model itself under attack by policy makers and business experts and then by mainstream economists. These phenomena were (1) intra-industry trade, that is the abundance of instances of simultaneous export and import by a country of similar goods (e.g. France's simultaneous exporting and importing of automobiles); and (2) the apparent success of selective protection, subsidies and industrial policy, especially in

---

1 There is now a vast literature of interpretation of economic texts as well as a debate over the methodological implications and importance of McCloskey's "rhetoric of economics". Two excellent collections of articles are Samuels (1990) and Klamer, McCloskey and Solow (1988).

3 Mayer's (1993) "principle of the strongest link" illustrates this point. See also McCloskey (1990, p. 73)
the cases of Japan and South Korea.

The response to this explanatory failure led to the development of "the new international economics," beginning in the late 1970's. This new approach stresses economies of scale, imperfect competition, and strategic interaction among rival firms and governments, and has increasingly provided a rational basis for phenomena previously unexplained by neoclassical thought. While solving some important problems, the new international economics has created dilemmas of its own. In particular, by devising theoretical models in which selective trade protection (so-called "strategic trade policy") is welfare-enhancing for a nation under certain conditions, the new international economists are faced with the necessity of prescribing policies which run counter to the long-standing free trade position of international economists. But instead of defying the neoclassical tradition, many of these economists have backed away from the logical conclusions of their models. Robert Lucas (1990), hardly a critic of neoclassical economics, remarks at length about this contradictory voice in his review of Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman's (1989) *Trade Policy and Market Structure*. Lucas states:

> Throughout *Trade Policy and Market Structure*, Helpman and Krugman exhibit what strikes a reader as extreme discomfort with the policy implications of the new trade theory. At one point they even protest that "this book is about theory and methods, and not about policy," (p.8) as though someone else had chosen the title of the book! The clearest statement of the source of the discomfort comes in the concluding chapter: "Is the case for

---

* See Krugman (1983) for a concise explanation of the break from the traditional model. See Krugman (1986, 1987) for non-technical expressions of the implications of the new international economics.
free trade, so long a central tenet, now invalidated? Despite what we have said about the effects of trade policy we do not think so" (p. 185) ...Helpman and Krugman seem not so much to be defending the validity of what they are calling the "central economic tenet" of free trade as trying to avoid the blame for being the first to expose its emptiness!

One can sympathize with this discomfort...I take disclaimers such as "strategic trade policy arguments have already appeared in support of views none of the concept's originators hold" (p. 8) as attempts by the authors to avoid such responsibility. This is certainly a defensible personal stance, but what does it have to do with economic theory?.

Lucas is thus critical of the "two separate models" of economic analysis identified by Baldwin (1992), one a highly sophisticated model of the economy and the other a highly simplified model of the state. The latter is invoked in the formulation of policy conclusions. A related tendency is to scrutinize relatively more carefully those policy conclusions which conflict with the laissez-faire view, to the point where completely new criteria are established for the legitimation of policy conclusions. The result is to place in the spotlight the rhetoric of -- that is, the argumentative basis for -- the link between theory and policy conclusions.

1 In his own defense, Krugman (1992) has stated first, that "It was only as a sort of afterthought that new trade theorists began to talk about policy implications," (1992, p. 428) and second, that empirically, "the gains from deviating from free trade, furthermore, are very small." (1992, p. 435)

2 See, for example, Dixit (1986, p. 263). Heilbroner (1988) comments on this phenomenon generally in economic thought.
3. A Taxonomy of the Rhetoric of Theory-Policy Links

The leap from theory to policy is taken, of course, only if it is believed that theory is "relevant" -- that is, necessary to guide the making of actual economic policy. Many articles in academic journals, both theoretical and empirical, never make such a claim and in fact are concerned strictly with non-policy related issues, such as the effect of exchange rate variations on prices or the importance of international trade in international productivity convergence. I am interested, therefore, only in those articles with explicit policy relevance. There, I have identified five types of arguments for policy relevance in international economics:

I. "No Frills - Theory": Under this practice the policy conclusions follow directly from the logic of the theoretical model and do not go beyond this. No attempt is made to argue for the relevance of the theoretical model as a guide for policy conclusions or to establish the presence of the ceteris paribus conditions needed to secure its intended outcome. Instead, these conclusions involve the simple reporting of mathematical results (for example, comparative static results involving the effects of a change in the exogenous tariff variable). Mai and Hwang (1989) present their model results in a table and state:

...all the established results on the price effects of tariffs, ratio quotas and volume quotas can be summarized in table 1. Our results indicate that, in general the three alternative trade restrictions result in non-equivalence, as it depends upon the behavior patterns of firms in the industries. (p. 182)

In similar fashion, Lapan (1988) states:

We have shown that if production lags are present and tariff
precommitment is not feasible, then the time-consistent tariff equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the precommitment equilibrium, and the second-best solution will include a production tax on importables.

Less modest, but equally true to the model, Grossman and Helpman (1990) state:

Concerning policy, we find for the first time a link between trade intervention and long-run growth. Any (small) trade policy that switches spending toward the consumer good produced by the country with comparative advantage in R&D will cause long-run growth rates to decline... Once we recognize that comparative advantage can be acquired as well as natural, we find a role for country size and demand-size bias in determining the long-run effects of policy.

Behind what I have called the No Frills - Theory mechanism is a reliance on Pareto optimality derived from axiomatic, choice-theoretic models. It is on this premise that international economists can claim a "rational basis" for economic policy, since there is no truth or relevance claim beyond the logic of the rational choice model. In this view, the purpose of economics is simply to state the "implications" of neoclassical theory, with the implicit assumption that the setting of the "real world" will not affect these implications.

II. "No Frills - Empirics": Under this practice the policy conclusions follow from the logic of a theoretical model and are bolstered or weakened by an empirical test of the model. This is the classic sophisticated positivist methodology, derived from Popper's "conjectures and refutations". The author generates a refutable
hypothesis and then puts this hypothesis to empirical test. Markusen and Wigle (1989), for example, base their policy conclusions on a theoretical model and a simulation of a computable general equilibrium model calibrated to actual data for the U.S. and Canada, showing that the optimal tariff for the U.S. is greater than that for Canada. Khan and Knight (1988) develop a theoretical model which reveals how import compression can reduce export growth and foreign exchange earnings. They then test the model using regressions and simulation. Note that most empirical studies of policy relevance follow an approach of simple empirics, described below.

III. "Casual Empirics": Under this practice, policy conclusions follow from the logic of the theoretical model plus an assertion of the relevance of the results based on (a) their compatibility with some casually observed phenomenon or (b) the addition of a stylized fact or facts. Bagwell and Staiger (1990), for example, move directly from their theoretical conclusions that "periods of unusually high trade volume present countries with unusually strong incentive to defect from cooperative trading arrangements" to the claim for relevance that:

The 'safeguards' provisions of the GATT, whereby countries are given the right to raise protection in the event of unforeseen developments, may to some extent represent an explicit institutional manifestation of our ideas. (emphasis added)

This is a "cart before the horse" type argument for policy relevance: it is casually observed that governments (or individual agents) undertake a certain type of action and deem it welfare-enhancing. Thus a theoretical model which supports such a policy has policy relevance.
The preceding quotation is followed in the text by a footnote in which the authors add additional support for their claim by quoting a 1970 institutional study of GATT. The authors then restate their policy conclusion and implicitly invoke its empirical relevance in order to further legitimate the (casually observed) policy conclusions:

Our analysis suggests a role for safeguard provisions when trade volume is unexpectedly high as a means of avoiding a reversion to noncooperative interaction among countries. In this light, the recent proliferation of safeguard "substitutes," for example VERs and OMAEs, may reflect the general inadequacy of the existing safeguards provisions to maintain the credibility of the rest of the GATT system. (emphasis added)

Gardner and Kimbrough (1989), in a purely theoretical article, summarize their results:

More specifically, it has been shown that in contrast to conventional wisdom, both permanent and temporary tariffs may worsen the trade balance. For instance, in an example characterized by identical and homothetic tastes, it was demonstrated that a temporary tariff may worsen the trade balance if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is low enough ($\theta < 1$) and the tariff-imposing country is running a deficit.

With the use of stylized facts and broad characterizations of behavioral processes, they move, without transition, to a discussion of "policymakers," who:

persuaded by the conventional wisdom, are inclined to use tariffs in times of trade balance difficulties in an attempt to improve
matters... Both permanent and temporary tariffs may worsen the trade balance and policy makers should be aware of this possibility... Policy makers need to realize that while once enacted a tariff may improve the trade balance, lengthy debates that lead consumers to anticipate the tariff will cause the trade balance to deteriorate prior to its enactment. (emphasis added)

Andersen (1992) leaps from a theoretical model to a discussion of U.S. anti-dumping law. He asserts without argument that the model "may be useful for designing codes for trade policy, such as the Uruguay Round attempt to design anti-dumping codes." Note that such leaps are also possible (but much less common) from largely empirical studies. Morrison (1988), for example, describes her regression results as "provocative", allowing her to extrapolate as follows: "If Japan is more flexible this could have been an important advantage during the volatile 1970s, contributing to its relatively strong productivity growth and other economic performance." Staiger et al. (1988) appeal explicitly to "casual empiricism."

The language of Casual Empirics is such that it may be difficult to determine if it is the model or the observed world that is being discussed. Gruenspecht (1988), for example, admits the "practical" difficulties in operationalizing his model and then asserts:

These difficulties should not obscure the message that the availability of a current cost antidumping standard changes the behavior of both domestic and foreign firms in internationally competitive industries where learning is important. This impact is likely to be pernicious from both a national and world welfare perspective where the markets under consideration are roughly 'parallel' in terms of market size, production cost and
concentration.
The implication is that this is a practical, policy relevant, claim. The move from theoretical result to actual policy relevance is almost invisible.

Casual Empirics also includes the illusionism of language, in which care is taken to phrase the theoretical model in terms of realistic categories, such as the use of "North-South" in some models of trade and development. Illusionism serves to establish the theory as an allegory and lends itself to comparison with actual institutions and policy situations. 7

Note that this practice comes close, but is not, a justification of policy conclusions based on explicit argument for the realism of the assumptions of the model. Instead, the legitimation of the policy conclusions is based on the "illusionism" of the language described above or the argument that the results seem to have relevance for the casually observed situation.

IV. "Modesty": Under this practice the policy conclusions follow from the logic of the model, plus an assertion of relevance based on (a) the admission of the narrowness of the model's assumptions or (b) a warning of the likelihood of government abuse if the prescribed policy is implemented. Case (a) is in effect a perversion of Casual Empirics. The argument for policy relevance takes the form of a self-serving modesty, in which the author admits the narrowness of the model and at the same time asserts its "real-world" relevance. This tactic is a trademark of policy relevance arguments in the new international economics. For example, Matsuyama (1990), admits that

---

7 For an analysis of illusionism and how it works in an early article in the new international economics, see Milberg (1988).
"there are many aspects of reality ignored in the model." Cheng (1988) qualifies his results because the assumption of linear demand "is a special case" ... and because of "the abundance of equilibria from different oligopoly strategies." This admission of narrowness is used to assert the legitimacy of the theoretical result.

Case (b) involves a denial of the usefuiess of the policy conclusions because of potential misuse of such knowledge by the state, presumably because the state is dominated by special interest groups. The case invokes the caveat that the results "can be misused in practice." (Panagariya, 1992). Often, Modesty cases (a) and (b) are used in tandem. Clemenz (1990) states his theoretical results that free trade may not be optimal for attaining desired R&D levels and then asserts that "this conclusion has to be treated with care," because the model is partial equilibrium (case (a)) and because "problems specific to various policy measures...have not been accounted for." This is an example of case (b). In particular, "Subsidies create problems of their own" and "there may be cheaper ways of doing this" than protection. Matsuyama (1990) also uses a combination of cases (a) and (b) of the Modesty practice. In his concluding remarks he first summarizes the theoretical result, a game-theoretic model in which:

rather surprisingly, optimal temporary protection can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium... In this

---

8 Krugman (1992, p. 429) describes his "model" of GATT behavior ("GATT-think") as "a simple set of principles that is entirely consistent, explains most of what goes on in negotiations, but makes no sense in terms of economics."

9 It is of note that when free trade yields optimality in theory, there is never discussion of treating the results "with care." See Dixit (1986).
equilibrium, the government's payoff is smaller than the first best outcome, due to its inability to make a credible commitment. He then begins a list of caveats, admitting the model's narrow treatment of the state:

However, I do not mean to say that the government cannot make a credible commitment to the future liberalization in reality. There are several possibilities which the liberalization game fails to take into account. First, the government might be aware of "the demonstration effect" of liberalization... Second, the governments might be able to sign a contract with a third party (perhaps, the GATT).... Third, the domestic government might want to ask a foreign government to exert diplomatic pressure to liberalize the domestic market (as some observers suspect that Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has done with the United States... Perhaps the most problematic feature of the model is its treatment of the domestic government as a unified, coherent body of decision makers. In reality, any economic policy is a product of complex interactions among different parts of the government, each of which has its own objectives. (emphasis added)

Note that the admission of the model's limitations involves the use of a casual empiricism reminiscent of practice III. Modesty is similar to Casual Empirics in that the conception of the state invoked is a stylized fact, never developed (theoretically or empirically) in the article. Illusionism of language is also common under the Modesty practice.

V. "Empirics Only": Under this practice the policy conclusions follow from an empirical test of a model with little theoretical
Important here is that the policy conclusion has no explicit root in a rational-choice framework. Empirics Only is often used in cases where the theoretical hypothesis is already well established in the literature. Noland (1989), for example, verbally states the argument for the J-curve effect and then moves quickly to the econometrics. He concludes with a simple reporting of the regression estimates and the following policy conclusion:

The estimates reported in this paper indicate that if policymakers wish to target the trade balance, policies which affect the level of economic activity would be more effective than those which operate through the exchange rate.

Under the Empirics Only mechanism, policy relevance depends on the relation to policy of the empirical test, and is established with the simple reporting of empirical results. Dinopoulos and Kreinen (1988), for example, conclude their article as follows:

In 1982, the total social cost of the VER was put at $4 billions and the VER saved an estimates 22,358 jobs. This works out to an annual cost of $181,000 per job saved - a multiple of the average annual compensation of U.S. auto workers.

Sometimes Empirics Only is used for hypotheses that do not have a strong microfoundation, choice theoretic basis, even in the pure theory literature. On occasion the hypotheses tested are developed using simple accounting identities or general functional forms, and thus are immediately translated to regression models (e.g. Audretsch and Yamawaki, 1988). Often they are simply stated as having a tradition in the literature (e.g. Dinopoulos and Kreinin, 1988). That is, the hypothesis may be well-established on optimization grounds or not. The key is that a verbal rendition of the hypothesis is
sufficient to justify moving on quickly to empirical testing.

I have also divided those articles which have no direct policy relevance between those containing only theoretical content (No Policy - Theory) and those using empirical analysis as well (No Policy - Empirics). These are entered as rhetorical practices VI and VII in the results reported below.

4. Survey Results

The survey included four major U.S. academic journals containing articles on international trade -- The American Economic Review (AER), The Journal of International Economics (JIE), The Journal of Political Economy (JPE), and The Review of Economics and Statistics (RES) -- to determine the incidence of each of the rhetorical practices described above. The sample period is 1988-1992, and includes all articles on international trade from the four journals. The sample size is 180 and the full data set is available from the author on request.

The coding was done by examining the body of the article to determine (1) if it was in the field of international trade; (2) if it had explicit or implicit policy implications; (3) if it contained empirical content or not. Finally, the rhetorical practice used in the legitimation of the policy implications, usually located in the concluding section, was identified.

The data are presented in summary form in Table 1. Overall,

---

10 I have chosen only neoclassical journals in order to leave aside the (separate) question of how ideology influences the rhetoric of policy relevance. A potentially interesting extension would be to survey articles in non-mainstream journals (e.g. The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, The Review of Radical Political Economics, The Journal of Economic Issues) to compare the incidence of rhetorical practices across schools of thought.

11 Each journal is quarterly. I excluded the proceedings issue of the AER, since most papers are short summaries of research. For 1992, only the first issue of each journal was used.
62.2% of the articles sampled contained policy conclusions -- either explicit policy prescriptions or direct policy implications. Of the total sample, 31.1% contained empirical content and 68.9% were entirely theoretical. A significantly lower percentage of articles containing policy conclusions had empirical content compared to those without policy conclusions. Of articles containing no policy conclusions, 55.9% included empirical studies. Of articles with policy relevance, only 16.1% had empirical content. This is precisely the opposite of the expectation that policy-relevant research will tend to be grounded on empirical support, and that when such relevance is not at stake, empirical support will be less important. According to the survey, empirical analysis is often used to explore positive issues, whereas policy-related issues are most often analyzed using purely theoretical arguments.12

Of all articles claiming policy relevance, 42.0% used No Frills--Theory to legitimate the conclusions and 32.1% used Casual Empirics, ranking as the two most popular rhetorical mechanisms used to legitimate policy results. No Frills--Theory represents the least...
# Table 1: Policy Relevance Survey Results By Rhetorical Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. No Frills-Theory</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>As % of Full Sample</th>
<th>As % of Those With Policy Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. No Frills-Empirics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Casual Empirics</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Modesty</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Empirics Only</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. No Policy-Empirics</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. No Policy-Theory</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ADDENDA:**

Of Full Sample:
- % policy relevant: 62.2
- % theoretical: 68.9
- % academic: 82.2
- % U.S.: 72.2

Of Sub-sample With Policy Conclusions:
- % theoretical: 83.9
- % academic: 84.8
- % U.S.: 69.6

Of Sub-sample With No Policy Conclusions:
- % theoretical: 55.9
- % academic: 77.9
- % U.S.: 76.5

**Notes:**
- n.a. = not applicable
- "% policy relevant" includes practices I-V.
- "% theoretical" includes practices I, III, IV, and VII if applicable.
- "% academic" includes articles where author(s) have no non-academic affiliation.
- "% U.S." includes articles where all authors are affiliated with U.S. institutions.
complex link of theory and policy; however, this should not be taken to mean most "scientific." Regardless of the rhetorical practice chosen, each represents an effort to most persuasively and credibly present the policy implications of the analysis. In this sense, *No Frills - Theory* should be evaluated for what it does not include as well as what it includes. For example, it entails neither discussion of the realism of assumptions nor any argument for the applicability of the analysis to a situation of actual policy making. In short, the value of the policy conclusions, and more generally of the knowledge generated in such articles is based on the reader's acceptance of the "economy" depicted in the model. As Summers (1991, pp. 144-45) states:

*I suspect that there is a meta-theorem that any policy recommendation can be derived from some model of optimizing behavior... If empirical testing is ruled out, and persuasion is not attempted, in the end I am not sure these theoretical exercises teach us anything at all about the world we live in. Mechanisms I and II do less than the other mechanisms in quelling such skepticism.*

The new international economics in its early days relied heavily on *Modesty.* Increasingly, modelers of trade under various oligopoly conditions have turned to *No Frills - Theory* to articulate policy conclusions. This is consistent with an apparent admission on the part of new international economics economists that their aim is no longer to speak to policy makers but to provide other economists with

---

13 McCluskey (1990, p. 56) writes, "'Just give me the facts' is itself a rhetoric, Sergeant Friday urging his case by claiming not to."

14 See Krugman (1986).
an *ex post* rational basis for existing policy. In this sense the new international economics is a retreat on the part of international economists. The "old" international economics proclaimed, "If the world satisfies these assumptions, then the following will result and such-and-such policy will be optimal." The new international economics, on the other hand, says "We see the following phenomena in the world. If we then specify the model in this particular way, we can explain it in terms of individual agents' rationality." The aim of the new international economics is thus proof that a given result can be derived from a model of rational choice. But this aim can be of interest only to those who need a rational-choice-theoretic justification, which is not likely to include policy makers. The result is that new international economics economists are increasingly encouraged to retreat into highly stylized models, with very particular functional forms or assumptions on conjectural variations.

Most surprising is the almost nonexistent use of *No Frills*. Note that there is also a tension in the rhetorical approach to economics itself, which would be impossible to gauge. See Maki (1988).

14 Rhetorical practice I (*No Frills - Theory*) may include cases where the realism of the model's assumptions is defended. In this event, the author might not feel obligated to restate such a defense when stating his policy conclusions. The new international economics shows an ambivalence towards the realism of assumptions. On the one hand, the models are said to contain more realism than the old international economics. On the other hand, the (interventionist) policy conclusions which logically follow from these models are discounted because they lack the generality of more conventional models. Note that there is also a tension in the rhetorical approach to economics itself, which would insist that the question of realism is impossible to gauge. See Maki (1988).

15 Thus the new international economics represents a degenerate research program in the sense of Lakatos. According to Diesing (1991, p. 46), "...degenerating research programs do not predict new facts or produce new theories, but concentrate on adjusting their theories to events after they have happened." Bensel and Elmslie (1992), it should be noted, come to a different conclusion, arguing that most of the new international economics is neither degenerative nor progressive.
Empirics. Empirical work, most common in RES, was rarely preceded by substantial theoretical argument and was thus characterized as Empirics Only. But the No Frills - Empirics approach represents the classic Popperian conjecture and refutation methodology: Develop a new theoretical hypothesis and test it empirically. The fact that this methodology is so seldom used indicates that one must put stereotypes aside to understand how policy relevance is established in contemporary research.\textsuperscript{15}

The high incidence of Casual Empirics as a rhetorical device is best understood by considering how economics argument persuades. While the analysis itself must follow very strict logical rules, the analytical framework, because of its narrowness, may preclude convincing links to institutions, policies and histories. Casual Empirics then serves to bring in a realism which is not permitted in the analysis proper. The looseness which characterizes the approach of Casual Empirics offsets the rigidity of theoretical modelling conventions and thereby allays any discomfort with the unpersuasiveness of the model results in themselves. Such a technique is not unique to international trade research, as evidenced by Summers’s (1991) comment on “successful” (i.e. influential) empirical macroeconomic research:

First and foremost, in each case, the bottom line was a stylized fact or collection of stylized facts characterizing an aspect of how the world worked rather than parameter estimates or formal tests of a point hypothesis...The conclusion could prove to be

\textsuperscript{15} This divergence between what economists say they do and what they actually do is discussed below. Extending our survey back in time would be useful to gauge if such a method was ever common in international trade research.
persuasive or unpersuasive, but the reader was not in doubt that there was one. (p. 140)

Somewhat surprising is the low incidence of Modesty as a rhetorical stance, since this was previously the trademark of the new international economics. Most likely, such a stance was more common in the early and mid 1980's. By the late 1980's, the new international economics results are presented for the purpose of policy implications in a number of other forms, especially using the two No Frills approaches.

The results by journal are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Consistent with the aggregate results, the empirical journal RES has a much lower percentage of articles with policy conclusions than does the largely theoretical journal JIE. But the table also yields some surprising insights. The JIE had a much higher percentage of articles with policy conclusions than any of the other journal surveyed. Moreover, of the articles claiming policy relevance, the JIE had a much higher incidence of the No Frills - Theory approach compared to the other journals. 55.4% of policy relevant articles in the JIE used this practice to legitimate policy conclusions compared to only 31.3% for the AER. That is, the AER contained a much higher incidence of the Casual Empirics, Modesty and Empirics Only practices. In other words, while a smaller share of AER articles are of policy relevance compared to the JIE, AER articles are more likely to legitimate these conclusions in a variety of ways. In particular, leaps to loosely relate the model results to the "real world" (Casual Empirics and Modesty) and empirical argument (No Frills - Empirics and Empirics
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>Incidence of Rhetorical Practices</th>
<th>By Journal Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>AER</td>
<td>JIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. No Frills-Theory</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. No Frills-Empirics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Casual Empirics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Modesty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Empirics Only</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. No Policy-Empirics</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. No Policy-Theory</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>AER</th>
<th>JIE</th>
<th>JPE</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. No Frills-Theory</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. No Frills-Empirics</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Casual Empirics</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Modesty</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Empirics Only</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. No Policy-Empirics</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. No Policy-Theory</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AER</th>
<th>JIE</th>
<th>JPE</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Policy Relevant</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Theoretical</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** See Table 1
Only) are more common in the AER than in the JIE. These results are also counter to what might have been expected. We might have expected the AER to have a higher percentage of articles with policy relevance, since it is the AEA official journal and thus to those outside the profession most visible and representative of the profession's relevance. At the same time, perhaps the desire on the part of the editors of the official journal of the AEA to seek intuitively appealing policy relevance explains the higher incidence of Casual Empirics and Modesty in the AER compared to the JIE. Editors of the JIE have less concern about the broader public. Moreover, the JIE is widely recognized as the "top journal" in neoclassical international

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>Incidence of Rhetorical Practices By Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. No Frills-Theory</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. No Frills-Empirics</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Casual Empirics</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Modesty</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Empirics Only</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ADDENDUM: | Total |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIE</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIE</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 The sample of JPE articles is too small to draw conclusions of this nature, although it shows a pattern more similar to the AER than the JIE.
economics. It is obviously more narrowly focused than the AER, and the prevalence of No Frills - Theory in this context can be viewed as a reflection of the pure-theory orientation of the journal. The use of the no-frills link to policy reflects both the unwillingness to go beyond statements directly emanating from the model and the lack of interest in legitimation of the policy conclusions to an audience broader than a group of neoclassical trade theorists.

5. Rigid, Flexible and Unstable Rhetoric

One of the premises of this project is that the legitimation of policy conclusions must employ rhetorical conventions. While the No Frills - Theory and Casual Empirics strategies dominate the rhetoric of policy legitimation in international trade research in the four journals surveyed, the survey results show that there are a wide variety of mechanisms used by international trade economists in their efforts to legitimize their policy conclusions. Moreover, the Casual Empirics and Modesty approaches each take a number of different forms, and are characterized by a looseness of logic and institutional description. The looseness of much of the rhetoric of policy relevance stands in stark contrast to the rigor of the theoretical discourse. I argue below that this looseness also compensates for the lack of persuasiveness of theoretical and econometric discourse.

Rhetorical devices are the ways by which economists argue a theory's relevance -- that is, establish the legitimacy of their

---

18 The diversity and looseness of the rhetoric of policy relevance found in our survey is further evidence of the oft-noted divergence between the methodology economists preach and the one they practice (Blaug, 1980, Caldwell, 1982 and Beed, 1991). International economists continue to insist that they do and should continue to practice science along logical positivist lines, as evidenced by Rassekh and Thompson's (1993) recent call for more empirical testing of the factor price equalization theorem in order to enhance its "scientific status".
policy conclusions. The point is not that one rhetorical approach is more scientific than another, but that the accepted rhetorical conventions for linking theory to policy conclusions are not of the same tenor as the accepted conventions of theoretical or empirical discourse. As a result, in a field where writing structure and even methodology are otherwise extremely uniform, the rhetoric of policy relevance is diverse, flexible and unrigorous. Paradigmatic convention seems not to dictate this aspect of the discourse. Norms of systematic and logical analysis break down precisely where the most is at stake in economic analysis -- the legitimacy of its policy conclusions.

There are a number of possible explanations for this absence of narrowly-defined rules for establishment of policy relevance. Each of the many views we find is based on a different conception of the function of policy conclusions in the economics text. One view is that the policy conclusions simply do not matter -- in other words, that the method of legitimating policy conclusions can vary widely precisely because it matters so little. This is one version of the sandwich theory: Scientific method applies only to the model construction and comparative static analysis that constitute the "meat" of the article. Policy conclusions are the bread, placed in the conclusion where the effects can be ignored. To invoke another food metaphor, policy conclusions are simply frosting on a theoretical cake -- decorative, not substantive. This view is supported by Solow (1991), who admits that, "Serious economics needs a bridge to the world of policy discussion because the people who do the research either cannot or will not build the bridge themselves."

But the case for "innocuous policy relevance" -- an analogue to
Blaug's (1980, p. 128) "innocuous falsificationism" is hard to make in a field which often defines its raison d'etre as analysis of the welfare effects of alternative policies in international trade. Over 60% of the articles surveyed contain such conclusions, and economists often complain about the unwillingness of policy makers to listen to their prescriptions.

A second interpretation is that the lack of uniformity in the criteria for establishment of policy legitimacy reflects a deep-seated lack of agreement on the relation between analysis and policy prescription. Samuels (1980) conducted a survey of his colleagues at Michigan State University in 1977, asking: "What do you think is the relationship between the pro-free trade position and the status of economics as a science?" He concluded that:

there was considerable diversity, especially regarding arguing with respect to policy on a "scientific" basis ... There are enormous differences as to whether economics can properly address the policy issue at all; what economics can say on the issue, assuming it can speak to it; what considerations are relevant; and inter alia, the substance of any value premises involved. (p. 179)

Samuels notes that such diversity is similar to that found in a review of literature on the same question from the 1870-1914 era. This explanation is plausible for the profession as a whole, but the views of Samuels' colleagues at Michigan State University are likely more

For example, in his survey of "The Normative Theory of International Trade", Max Corden (1984) states:
The usefulness of normative trade theory depends on the readiness with which governments take the advice of economists who are trained in, and apply this body of theory. The difficulty is that often the arguments of economists have "fallen on stony ground".
diverse than those of economists publishing in the four journals we surveyed, since the latter includes almost exclusively the work of neoclassical economists.

A third view is that policy conclusions matter so much they cannot be left merely to the logic of optimization theory. The looseness of the policy-legitimation rhetoric exists because policy conclusions are too important to be left to the mercy of a highly abstract, often specialized game-theoretic logic which lacks institutional grounding, has little intuitive appeal and unproven robustness. From this point of view, the recourse to different metaphors of argument, as evidenced by the high incidence of Casual Empirics and Modesty, is an indication that the rhetoric of micro-based general equilibrium analysis and the Pareto efficiency criterion is insufficient to persuade readers of the practicality of the policy prescriptions based on them. The low incidence of No Frills Empirics shows that this is also true of econometrics argumentation. Weintraub (1991) has referred to this as evidence of the "instability" of such discourse. The instability of general equilibrium analysis has been located in its axiomatic roots, its "Procrustean tendencies" (Coddington, 1979) and most recently in its careful construction in the history of economic thought (Weintraub, 1991). The tenuous stability of econometrics discourse can be attributed to the acknowledged vagueness of most translations of theory into empirical text (Leamer, 1991), an awareness of the pervasiveness of data mining (Leamer, 1983, Caudill, 1987), the difficulty of replication (Dewald, et al., 1986) and the relatively wide variation in the estimated value of many "historical constants" (Mirowski, 1992).

Rhetoric in economics is neither bad, nor avoidable. It must be borne in mind that theoretical modelling and econometric estimation are rhetoric too. Observing these forms of rhetoric in the establishment of policy conclusions increases our understanding of the construction of economic knowledge itself. This awareness, I hope, will not simply lead to a reconsideration of existing modes for establishing relevance. What is needed is a rethinking of why these modes are necessary to make economics writing "work" — that is, effectively convey policy prescriptions. Rhetorical analysis of policy relevance in international trade research shows a looseness of argument forbidden within the theoretical or empirical portion of the text. I have argued that this reveals that the policy conclusions are too important to be left to these more rigid and unstable rhetorical conventions. Without this adaptability in policy-relevant rhetoric, policy conclusions would be less persuasive. To the degree that the social function of the economics article is to prescribe policy, reliance on a methodology based on individualist Pareto optimality or econometric evidence is apparently insufficiently persuasive, even for economists.

Those dissatisfied with the prominence of this adaptability in the rhetoric of economic "science" must ask what function its mechanisms have. If Boland (1989) is correct that the Popper-Samuelson criterion of testability is all that distinguishes the scientific economic model from a non-scientific one, then the crisis of policy legitimation is easier to understand. If the generation of new knowledge requires neither "realistic" assumptions nor empirical falsification, then the basis for the legitimation of policy
conclusions is an open matter. Still, there is an overriding sense among international economists that new knowledge should be policy-relevant, but considerable confusion over what constitutes such knowledge. What is the status of the knowledge generated from pure theory, whose resulting hypotheses are not tested and assumptions not defended? If "the world" is perceived to be "as if" the model assumes, then are its policy conclusions logically to be considered relevant to actual policy making? If a model's assumptions do not hold in practice, will not its conclusions be irrelevant, even misleading -- a point raised in the oft-forgotten literature on the theory of the second best? The range of rhetorical practices used to legitimate policy conclusions is not a sign of weakness, but of a search for necessary linkages not available by "rigorous" methods. Raising the policy relevance of international economics may require a reformulation of the conventional definition of rigor.
References


(1991) "Has Formalism Gone Too Far in Economics?" Methodus.
Mirowski, P. (1992) "What Could Replication Mean in
Econometrics," mimeo, University of Notre Dame.
Morgan, T. (1988) "Theory versus Empiricism in Academic Economics:
Update and Comparisons," Journal of Economic Perspectives, V. 2,
No. 4, Fall.
Noland, M. (1989) "Japanese Trade Elasticities and the J-Curve,
Panagariya, A. (1992) "Input Tariffs, duty Drawbacks and Tariff
Reforms, Journal of International Economics, V. 32,
February.
Factor Price Equalization theorem," Journal of International
Economic Integration.
Policy: The Example of Free Trade," Journal of Economic
Academic Publishers.
York Times.
