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INCOME SEGREGATION AND LOCAL PROGRESSIVE TAXATION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND

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Abstract

This study investigates spatial segregation of the population in fiscally decentralized urban areas. The theoretical part proposes the progressivity of local income taxes as a new explanation for income segregation. The empirical part studies how income tax differentials across municipalities in the Swiss metropolitan area of Basel affect the households’ location decisions. The (multinomial) location choice of households is investigated within the framework of the random utility maximization model (RUM). The theoretical model is used to identify the household preferences applied in the RUM. The empirical results show that rich households are significantly and substantially more likely to move to low-tax municipalities than poor households.

JEL Code: H71, H73, R20, R23.

Keywords: location choice, income segregation, fiscal federalism, progressive taxation, discrete choice.

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1 Introduction

Fiscal Federalism is often viewed as the natural counterpart of decentralized decision making. Oates (1972) for example argued that local units deciding upon public programs are more likely to trade off costs against benefits if these programs are financed by local taxes. Or as Musgrave (Buchanan and Musgrave 1999, p. 156) pointedly remarks: “To secure an efficient outcome, the provision of public services should be determined and paid for by those who benefit.”

While the virtues of decentralized financial responsibility are uncontested, the resulting tax differentials are highly disputed. Tax differentials are often seen as consequence of different preferences for the level of locally provided public goods. However, different tax rates can also be the result of different economic resources of the local population, since rich local jurisdictions can raise the same revenue with lower tax rates as poor ones. While the effect of the tax base on tax rates is trivial, the opposite effect is less evident. This paper addresses the question whether tax differentials across local jurisdictions are not just the consequence but also the cause of differences in local average income.

The theoretical part of this paper proposes the progressivity of a local income tax as a new theoretical explanation for income segregation of the population. The empirical part studies the community choice of households in Switzerland. Swiss metropolitan areas are a laboratory for federal systems as they are divided into a multitude of municipalities with extensive political and fiscal autonomy. Switzerland is also unique in that the main local tax is on income rather than on property. The estimated multinomial response models show that rich households are significantly and substantially more likely to move to low-tax municipalities than poor households.

The theoretical literature on the local provision of local public goods goes back to Tiebout (1956). Tiebout showed that fiscal decentralization leads to an efficient provision of local public goods because people with similar preferences would settle in particular municipalities and vote for their desired level of public goods provision. Tiebout’s result rests on the assumption that households have equal incomes. The location of households and the local provision of public goods when the households differ in incomes was studied by Ellickson (1971), Westhoff (1977) and the literature surveyed in Ross and Yinger (1999).

The segregation hypothesis is one of the central propositions in multi-community
models in the tradition of Tiebout. Endogenous segregation means that different people choose different locations in equilibrium. While the Tiebout model focuses on preference heterogeneity, Ellickson and Westhoff turned the attention to income as the main dimension of difference. Several mechanisms have been proposed that explain why rich households make different choices from poor households (see Ross and Yinger, 1999, for property tax models and Schmidheiny, 2002a, for income tax models). The nature of the local public good, ranging from a monetary transfer to a non-substitutable pure public good, induces a self-sorting of the population when rich households esteem public goods relatively more than poor households. Another mechanism draws on the income elasticity of housing. If housing expenditures become relatively less important with increasing income, rich households are less concerned about high housing prices than poor households.

The segregation mechanism in this paper builds on the empirical fact that most income tax schemes are progressive and that local jurisdictions can often only set the tax level within a given federal tax scheme. This mechanism explains the high priority of tax rates in rich households’ decisions through the progressivity the of tax scheme.

The segregation hypothesis of Tiebout type models has been challenged by a series of empirical studies.\(^1\) A first strand of research investigates the equilibrium predictions of multi-community models using data on aggregate community characteristics. Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) develop a strategy for estimating the household preference parameters of a full equilibrium model where the local income distribution and local policy variables are simultaneously determined. They show that the differing income quantiles across 92 local jurisdictions in the Boston area are well explained by the model predictions. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) regress the share of various income classes in Swiss cantons and main cities on income tax rates. They find a strong negative relationship between the tax rate and the share of rich households. However, their treatment of the generic endogeneity of tax rates by instrumental variables from mainly lagged observations does not solve the problem, as the general equilib-

\(^1\)The early empirical literature on multi-community models investigated the relationship between local tax differentials, public goods provision and housing prices. Oates (1969) and a multitude of subsequent studies (surveyed in Ross and Yinger, 1999) strikingly confirm the so-called capitalization hypothesis, which predicts that low taxes and attractive public goods provision should be reflected in high housing prices.
rium of tax rates and income segregation is most likely a long-run phenomenon. Rhode and Strumpf (2003) assess the importance of the segregation mechanism in Tiebout type models from a historical perspective. They collected an impressive data set with various measures of heterogeneity in the population over a period of 140 years. Given that the costs of moving dramatically declined during this time, multi-community models predict that the population within local units should have become more homogeneous while the differences across local units have aggravated. They conclude that their data do not support the model predictions on a national scale. For metropolitan areas, however, the observed pattern does not contradict the segregation hypothesis.

The second empirical approach - also used in this paper - directly targets the location choice of individual households using a multinomial response framework. This approach circumvents the endogeneity problem because from the perspective of a single household the community characteristics can be taken as given. Friedman (1981) used a conditional logit model to study the location choice of 682 households among nine residential areas close to San Francisco. Nechyba and Strauss (1998) use the same model to study the choice of over 22,000 households among six school districts in the suburbs of Philadelphia. Both studies show that public expenditures are an important locational factor. The segregation hypothesis needs explicit consideration as household specific variables are not identified in linear conditional logit models (see Section 4.1). In need of a variable that depends on both household and community characteristics, Nechyba and Strauss calculate the households’ hypothetical consumption of private goods for all school districts. This variable depends on after-tax local housing prices under the ad-hoc assumption that households consume the same amount of housing in all school districts. They therefore implicitly assume that the price elasticity of housing is zero. This assumption is relaxed by using another ad-hoc specification using community-specific coefficients for household income (see footnote 6). Note that the empirical approach depicted in this paragraph neglects the (long-run) reaction of aggregate community characteristics.

Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2002) attempt a combination of the two empirical approaches. Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) they first estimate the households’ choice of a neighborhood, using neighborhood fixed effects and a multitude of interaction effects between household and neighborhood characteristics. In a second step they explain the neighborhood fixed effects by neighbor-
hood characteristics using instrumental variables. The estimation strategies in both steps make use of an explicit general equilibrium model. The predictions of the estimated model therefore adequately take into consideration the (long-run) adjustment of the endogenous aggregate neighborhood characteristics.

This study follows the second approach but departs from the previous studies by shifting the focus to assessing the (income) segregation hypothesis. The general locational attractiveness of a community, including local public goods, is considered in community specific fixed effects, thereby avoiding the difficulty of measuring public goods provision. The identification of household effects is drawn on an explicit theoretical multi-community model. Furthermore, recent econometric developments using simulation methods are applied to consider the spatial structure in the error components.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional organization of fiscal federalism in Switzerland. A theoretical model of location choice based on progressive income taxation is proposed in Section 3. The econometric model is discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 describes the data. The empirical results and two policy experiments are presented in Section 6. Section 7 draws conclusions.

2 Fiscal Federalism in Swiss Metropolitan Areas

Switzerland is an exemplary federal fiscal system. The Swiss federation comprises 26 states, the so-called cantons. The cantons are divided into roughly 3000 municipalities of varying size and population. All three state levels finance their expenditures essentially by their own taxes and fees. The total tax revenue of all three levels was 93 billion CHF in 2001, of which 46% is imposed by the federation, 32% by the cantons and 22% by the municipalities. While the federal government is mainly financed by indirect taxes (61% of federal tax revenue) such as the VAT, the cantons and municipalities largely rely on direct taxes. Income taxes account for 60% of cantonal and 84% of municipal tax revenue. In total, 46% of the income tax revenue go to the cantons, 38% to the municipalities and only 16% to the federal government. Transfers between the three levels are not

The cantons organize their tax systems autonomously. For example, they decide upon the level of income and corporate taxes and the degree of tax progression. The individual municipalities in turn can generally set a tax shifter for income and corporate taxes. The municipal tax is then the cantonal tax rate multiplied by the municipal tax shifter. In some cantons, for example in the Canton of Basel-Stadt before 2001, the individual municipalities also have some freedom in setting the tax scheme. The decisions in the cantons and municipalities are made by the legislative body and are subject to referendums. Federal and cantonal systems of fiscal equalization limit the tax differences across cantons and across municipalities within the same canton to some extent, but still leave room for considerable variation.

The above outlined federal system leads to ample differences of income taxes across Swiss municipalities. For example, for a two-child family with a gross income of 80,000 Swiss francs (CHF) the sum of cantonal and municipal income tax ranged from 3.6% in the city of Zug to 11.3% in Lauterbrunnen in the Canton of Bern in the year 1997 (see the data sources in the appendix). The federal income tax for this household was 0.7%. With an income of 500,000 CHF a two-child family faced much higher tax rates due to the progressive federal and cantonal tax schemes, namely ranging from 10.9% in Wollerau in the Canton of Schwyz to 28.7% in Onex in the Canton of Geneva. The federal income tax for this household was 9.4%.

The tax differences across municipalities within a single metropolitan area are smaller but still substantial. Figure 1 shows characteristics of the municipalities in the metropolitan area of Basel\(^3\) (data sources in the appendix). In 1990 the Basel area was the third largest Swiss metropolitan area with a total of 406,000 inhabitants. The city of Basel with 178,000 inhabitants, hereafter called the center, is the central business district of the area. The top-left map shows the share of workers commuting to the center. The white area to the north and west of the City of Basel is French and German territory and is not included in this study. The Basel area comprises 38 municipalities from four cantons: Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Solothurn and Aargau. There is great variability in both tax

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\(^{3}\)Definition of the area according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office based on Census 1990 data.
levels and tax schemes. The totalled municipal and cantonal income tax rate for a two-child family is depicted in the bottom-left map. The taxes are highest in the center municipality (9.4%) and up to 35% lower in the municipalities around the center.

It is particularly interesting to contrast the local tax rates with the income of the residents. The bottom-right map in figure 1 shows the local share of households with incomes above 75,000 CHF. The map represents to a great extent an inverted picture of the tax rates. The high-tax center municipality has the lowest proportion of rich households, whereas the low-tax municipalities close to the center are populated by many more rich households. The rental prices for housing also seem to be correlated with the tax rates. The low-tax fringe of municipalities around the center exhibits higher average prices than the center, although municipalities further away from the center are clearly the lowest-price locations.
3 A Model of Location Choice and Local Progressive Income Taxation

The theoretical model describes a metropolitan area with a fixed number \( J \) of distinct local jurisdictions, called communities. The political borders of the communities are the outcome of a historical process and thus taken as given. The area is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous households, which differ in incomes. Income is distributed according to a distribution function \( f(y) > 0 \) with support \([y, \overline{y}], y > 0, \overline{y} < \infty\). There are three goods in the economy: private consumption \( b \), housing \( h \) and a public good \( g \).

The local public expenditures are financed by a tax on the residents’ income. The income tax rate \( t_j(y) \) in a community \( j \) depends on the households’ income \( y \). The provision of the public good \( g \) is fixed by the state government and, hence, is identical across communities. This assumption is motivated by the observation that the autonomy of local decision making is in fact often strongly limited by state and federal laws.\(^4\) In the case of expenditures for neighborhood schools, for example, teachers’ salaries as well as class sizes are regulated by the cantons.

The price for housing \( p_j \) in community \( j \) is determined on a competitive housing market. Hence, The communities are fully characterised by their local income tax level and their local price for housing. A household can move costlessly and chooses the community maximizing its utility as place of residence.

3.1 Household Preferences

The preferences of the households are described by a utility function\(^5\)

\[
U(h, b),
\]

\(^4\)The exogenous determination of public goods provision substantially simplifies the model and turns the focus to income segregation induced by local taxation. A comprehensive model of local provision of local public goods would have to endogenize the provision of local public goods. However, this greatly complicates the analysis without providing qualitatively different results for location choice and income segregation. In addition, the more general approach makes it intractable to consider progressive tax schemes, which are crucial in the empirical investigation. See Schmidheiny (2002a) for a discussion of the technical problems and Schmidheiny (2002b) for the properties of a model with endogenous local public goods provision financed by proportional local income taxes.

\(^5\)The public good does not explicitly enter the utility function because it does not affect the following considerations as it is assumed to be constant across communities.
where $h$ is the consumption of housing and $b$ the consumption of the private good. The utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave and twice continuously differentiable in $h$ and $b$.

Households face a budget constraint:

$$ ph + b \leq y_d = y[1 - t \cdot r(y)] , $$

where $p$ is the price of housing. The price of the private good is set to unity. The disposable income $y_d$ depends on the local income tax shifter $t > 0$ and the exogenous tax rate structure $r(y)$. The tax scheme $r(y) > 0$ is assumed to be continuous in $y$. The (average) tax rate $t_j(y) = t \cdot r(y)$ is smaller than the marginal tax rate $\partial(t \cdot r(y)) / \partial y = t + y \cdot r'(y)$ and both are assumed to lie in $[0, 1]$.

Maximisation of the utility function with respect to $h$ and $b$ subject to the budget constraint yields the housing demand function $h^* = h(p, y_d) = h(t, p; y)$, the demand for the private good $b^* = y(1 - t \cdot r) - ph(t, p; y)$, and the indirect utility function

$$ V(t, p; y) := U(h^*, b^*) . $$ (1)

Property 1 is a trivial result of the strictly increasing nature of the utility function and is derived by applying the implicit function theorem and the envelope theorem:

**Property 1 (MRS between community characteristics)**

$$ M(t, p, y) := \frac{dt}{dp} \bigg|_{dV=0} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial p} \frac{\partial V}{\partial t} = -\frac{h^*}{y \cdot r(y)} < 0 . $$

The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between community characteristics reflects a household’s trade-off between taxes and housing prices. Property 1 simply follows from the fact that households dislike both high taxes and high housing prices. A household can therefore be compensated for a tax increase by a decline in housing prices and vice-versa.

The following two assumptions about the form of the indirect utility function generate the segregation by income.

**Assumption 1 (Income elasticity of housing)**

$$ \varepsilon_{h,y_d} := \frac{\partial h^*}{\partial y_d} \frac{y_d}{h^*} \leq 1 \quad \text{for all } y_d \text{ and } p. $$
Assumption 1 means that housing is a normal good, i.e. the elasticity of housing with respect to disposable income is smaller or equal to unity. This implies that the share of housing in the household’s budget decreases with after-tax income.

**Assumption 2 (Progressive taxation)**

\[
\frac{\partial r(y)}{\partial y} \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } y.
\]

Assumption 2 states that the income tax scheme is proportional or progressive.

**Property 2 (Relative preferences)**

If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and if and only if one of them holds with strict inequality, then

\[
\frac{\partial M}{\partial y} = \left[1 - \frac{\partial h^* y_d}{\partial y} \frac{\partial h^*}{\partial y} \frac{y_d}{h^*}ight] + \frac{\partial r(y)}{\partial y} y r^2(y) > 0
\]

for all \(y, t\) and \(p\).

Proof: Assumption 1 states that \((\partial h^*/\partial y_d)(y_d/h^*) \leq 1\). The assumptions about the relation and the bounds of the average and the marginal tax rate guarantee that \((\partial y_d/\partial y)(y/y_d) = [1 - t r(y) - t y r'(y)]/[1 - t r(y)]\) lies in \([0, 1]\). If Assumption 2, \(\partial r(y)/\partial y > 0\) is strictly satisfied, both addends of \(\partial M/\partial y\) are strictly positive. If Assumption 2 is not strictly satisfied, \(\partial r(y)/\partial y = 0\), and Assumption 1 is strictly satisfied, \((\partial h^*/\partial y_d)(y_d/h^*) < 1\), then the second addend is zero and the first addend is strictly positive. This completes the proof of the “if” statement. The “only if” statement is given by the fact that if \(\partial r(y)/\partial y = 0\) and \((\partial h^*/\partial y_d)(y_d/h^*) = 1\) then both addends are zero. □

Property 2 states that the MRS between local tax levels and housing prices increases monotonically with income. This means that rich households have a relatively stronger preference for low taxes than poor households. Property 2 explains why rich households make different location decisions than poor households. It is therefore the central condition giving rise to income segregation. Westhoff (1977) called the analogous assumption ‘relative preference assumption’. It is also called the single-crossing condition. In this model, relative preferences are either caused by the progressive tax scheme, the income elasticity of housing below unity or a combination of both. As will become apparent in Section 4, Property 2 plays a key role in the identification of tax rate effects in random utility maximization models of location choice.
3.2 Location Choice

A household with income $y$ chooses the community which maximizes its utility. Hence, given the set of community characteristics $(t_j, p_j)$ for $j \in C = (1, \ldots, J)$, a household prefers community $j$ if and only if

$$V(t_j, p_j; y) \geq V(t_i, p_i; y) \quad \text{for all } i.$$  

(2)

The following propositions describe the allocation of households to communities when all communities are populated and exhibit different characteristics.

Proposition 1 (Order of community characteristics)

*If all communities are populated and exhibit different community characteristics, then communities with higher housing prices impose lower income tax rates.*

Proof: Suppose the opposite, i.e. that one community exhibits both lower prices and lower taxes. Then all households would prefer that community for the same reason that lead to Property 1. This is a contradiction. □

Proposition 2 (Perfect income segregation)

*If the relative preference property holds and all communities are populated and exhibit different community characteristics, then all households choosing a community with lower taxes are richer than all households choosing a community with higher taxes.*

Proof: The proof proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it is shown that there is a ‘border’ household in a comparison of two communities. Secondly, income segregation is shown in a two community case. Thirdly, the result is extended to more than two communities.

1. Define $V_j(y) := V(t_j, p_j, y)$ as a household’s utility in $j$ and $V_i(y) := V(t_i, p_i, y)$ in $i$. Let the household with income $y'$ prefer $j$ to $i$, hence $V_j(y') - V_i(y') \geq 0$ and a household with income $y''$ prefer $i$: $V_j(y'') - V_i(y'') \leq 0$. From the continuity of $V$ in $y$ follows the continuity of $V_j(y) - V_i(y)$ in $y$. The intermediate value theorem states that there is at least one $\hat{y}$ between $y'$ and $y''$ s.t. $V_j(\hat{y}) - V_i(\hat{y}) = 0$. This household is called the border household.

2. This part uses Figure 2. The figure shows the indifference curves in the $(t, p)$-space for three different income levels $y' < \hat{y} < y''$. The indifference curves
Figure 2: Indifference curves in the \((t, p)\) space.

represent all \((t, p)\) pairs that households consider to be as good as community \(j\)'s \((t_j, p_j)\)-pair. Households prefer pairs south-west of the indifference curve to \((t_j, p_j)\). Note that the indifference curves are decreasing in the \((t, p)\)-space (Property 1). Note also that, due to Property 2, they become flatter as income rises.

Imagine a community \(i\), characterized by \((t_i, p_i)\), where household \(\hat{y}\) is indifferent to \(j\). All richer households, e.g. \(y''\), prefer the low-tax community \(i\) to \(j\) and all poorer households, e.g. \(y'\), prefer the low-price community \(j\).

(3) The proposition implies that \([\underline{y}, \overline{y}]\) is partitioned into \(J\) non-empty and non-overlapping intervals \(I_j = \{y| \text{household with income } y \text{ chooses } j\}\). Suppose the opposite, i.e. \(y'\) as well as \(y''\) prefer community \(j\), but an \(y'''\), \(y' < y''' < y''\) strictly prefers community \(i\). It follows from step 1 that there is an \(\hat{y}, y' \leq \hat{y} < y''\). Step 2 implies that \(y'' > \hat{y}\) strictly prefers \(i\) to \(j\), which is a contradiction. \(\square\)

Proposition 2 claims that any community is populated by a single and distinct income class or more fundamentally that rich households choose different communities than poor households. This proposition is assessed in the empirical part of this paper.

**Proposition 3 (Non-existence of income segregation)**

*If the local income tax rate is proportional and the household preferences are homothetic, then rich households choose the same communities as poor households.*

Proof: Neither Assumption 1 nor 2 are satisfied with strict inequality. Therefore, Property 2 does not hold and the indifference curves in Figure 2 coincide. Hence,
all households are, independently of their income, either indifferent between all communities or all prefer the same community. □

Proposition 3 shows that Property 2 is a necessary condition for income segregation. There is no systematically different behavior of rich and poor households in the absence of a ‘screening device’ such as progressive taxation and/or non-proportional housing demand.

3.3 Adding Taste Heterogeneity

So far, it has been assumed that households with identical preferences differ by income. This section extends the basic model by letting the households differ in both income $y \in [\underline{y}, \bar{y}]$, $0 < \underline{y}, \bar{y} < \infty$, and a parameter $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ describing their taste for housing. Income and taste are jointly distributed according to the density function $f(y, \alpha) > 0$.

The housing preference enters the utility function $U(h, b; \alpha)$ and the indirect utility
\[ V_j = V(t_j, p_j ; y, \alpha) = U(h^*_j, b^*_j ; \alpha) . \quad (3) \]

Households with a larger preference parameter $\alpha$ are assumed to spend, ceteris paribus, more on housing than households with a small $\alpha$. The housing demand function thus increases with $\alpha$:

**Assumption 3 (Housing taste)**

\[ \frac{\partial h^*}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\partial h(t, p ; y, \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} > 0 \quad \text{for all } t, p, y \text{ and } \alpha. \]

This specification of preference heterogeneity preserves income segregation within a subpopulation with identical preferences. Moreover, segregation of preferences emerges:

**Proposition 4 (Preference segregation)**

Consider a subpopulation with equal income $y$. If all communities are populated and exhibit different community characteristics, then all households choosing a community with higher housing prices have a weaker taste for housing than all households choosing a community with lower housing prices.

Proof: The proof is analogous to Proposition 2 using the counterpart to Property 2,
\[ \frac{\partial M}{\partial \alpha} = - \frac{\partial h^*}{\partial \alpha} \frac{1}{y \cdot r(y)} < 0 . \]
Simultaneous heterogeneity by incomes and tastes leads to a more realistic pattern of household segregation in a metropolitan area. Although income groups tend to gather, the segregation is not perfect. Figure 3 shows the resulting allocation of household types to communities. The households on the borders are indifferent between neighboring communities $j$. Community 1 with the lowest housing prices is populated by the poorest households with strong taste for housing, while the richest households with low housing taste are situated in community $J$ with the lowest tax rate and the highest housing price. However, rich households with strong taste for housing prefer lower-priced communities and poor households with weak taste for housing group with relatively rich households in the lower-tax communities.

### 3.4 A Benchmark Case

This section presents the model with a specified utility function for homothetic preferences. Income segregation is therefore solely induced by the progressivity of the tax scheme. The derived indirect utility function will serve as a benchmark in the empirical study.

Household preferences are described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function

$$U(h, b; \alpha) = \alpha \log(h) + (1 - \alpha) \log(b).$$

The resulting demand for housing

$$h^* = h(t, p; y, \alpha) = \alpha y[1 - t r(y)]p^{-1}$$
increases with $\alpha$. The parameter $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ can therefore be seen as a measure for housing taste as defined in Section 3.3.

The indirect utility function in community $j$ is

$$V_j = V(t_j, p_j; y, \alpha) = k - \alpha \log(p_j) + \log(y) + \log[1 - t_j r(y)],$$

where $k = \alpha \log(\alpha) + (1 - \alpha) \log(1 - \alpha)$.

### 3.5 Closing the Model

Sections 3.1 to 3.4 described individual location decisions given local tax rates and housing prices. This section outlines the complete general equilibrium model, in which local tax rates and housing prices arise endogenously from aggregate behavior. Individual location choices and community characteristics are thus simultaneously determined. As the empirical part of this paper solely relies on the location decision, this section shall only be a brief presentation.

Local public expenditure $C_j = C(g, n_j)$ is a function of exogenous public good provision $g$ and the number of local residents $n_j$. In equilibrium, the jurisdiction’s budget is balanced, i.e. local expenditure $C_j$ equals local tax revenue $T_j$:

$$C_j = C(g, n_j) = T_j = \int_0^1 \int_{\underline{y}_j(\alpha)}^{\overline{y}_j(\alpha)} t_j y f(y, \alpha) \, dy \, d\alpha = n_j t_j E y_j,$$

where $\underline{y}_j(\alpha)$ and $\overline{y}_j(\alpha)$ are the lowest and highest income for the subpopulation with taste $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ in community $j$. The double integral aggregates individual tax payments over the local population. Aggregate tax revenue can be expressed as the population weighted tax payment of a household with average income $E y_j$.

For a given local population, equation (5) determines the local tax rate $t_j$. The model therefore does not require us to assume a local public choice mechanism such as a majority vote.

Housing supply $H S_j = H S(p_j, L_j)$ in each community $j$ is a function of the local housing price $p_j$ and land area $L_j$. In equilibrium, $p_j$ clears the local housing market:

$$H S_j = H S(p_j, L_j) = H D_j = \int_0^1 \int_{\underline{y}_j(\alpha)}^{\overline{y}_j(\alpha)} h(t_j, p_j, g_j; y, \alpha) f(y, \alpha) \, dy \, d\alpha,$$

where $H D_j$ is aggregate housing demand in community $j$. 

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A set of local characteristics \((p_j, t_j), \ j = 1, \ldots, J\), and an allocation of individual households across communities is an equilibrium if (a) all households choose their location to maximise their utility, (b) the housing market clears in all communities, and (c) the budget is balanced in all communities. Proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibria in multijurisdiction models with taste heterogeneity is notoriously difficult (see e.g. Epple and Platt, 1998) and depends on the properties of the public production function \(C(g, n_j)\) as well as the housing supply function \(HS(p_j, L_j)\). However, equilibrium equations (2), (5) and (6) provide the basis for a computational strategy to find equilibria numerically. Schmidheiny (2003, chapter 1) presents equilibria in a calibrated version of the model presented here. I show that there exists an equilibrium, in which some communities show low tax rates, high housing prices and other communities high tax rates and low housing prices. The low-tax communities attract relatively richer households and the high-tax communities poorer households.

4 The Econometric Model

The empirical part of this study aims to establish factors that determine a household’s choice of the residential community in a metropolitan area. The location choice in the theoretical model of the previous section leads naturally to a multinomial response model based on random utility maximization (RUM). Multinomial response models are closely connected with McFadden’s (1974, 2001) seminal work on ‘economic choices’. The subsequent presentation draws upon Train (2003).

The choice of one of many unordered alternatives is driven by a latent variable, often interpreted as indirect utility. The indirect utility \(V_{nj}\) of a household \(n\) in a community \(j\) is the sum of a systematic and a stochastic part

\[
V_{nj}^* = V_{nj} + \varepsilon_{nj},
\]

where \(n\) indicates the household and \(j\) the community. \(V_{nj}\) is a deterministic function of observable household and community characteristics and \(\varepsilon_{nj}\) is a household and community specific error term.

A household \(n\) chooses community \(j\) among the choice set \(C = (1, \ldots, J)\) as its place of residence if it offers the highest value of indirect utility, i.e.

\[
V_{nj}^* \geq V_{ni}^* \quad \text{for all } i \in C.
\]
This is equivalent to equation (2) in the theoretical model.

4.1 Functional Form and Identification

The indirect utility function in the theoretical part guides the choice of systematic factors in the indirect utility function

\[ V_{nj} = V(t_{nj}, p_j, k_j, y_n, a_n), \]  

(8)

where \( t_{nj} \) is the income tax rate of household \( n \) in community \( j \), \( p_j \) is the housing price in community \( j \), \( k_j \) indicates further community specific dimensions of attractiveness, \( y_n \) is household income and \( a_n \) indicate further household characteristics.

From the point of view of an individual household, the community characteristics are exogenous, although they are the (long-term) aggregate of the agents’ decisions. Therefore the household’s location decision is optimal given the community characteristics. In the theoretical model this is established by the assumption that there is a continuum of households, i.e. that a single household is ‘small’ and does not influence the equilibrium.

For the empirical implementation the functional form of the deterministic part (equation 8) of the latent variable needs to be specified. Starting point is the indirect utility function (4) from the benchmark case presented in Section 3.4,

\[ V_{nj} = \beta_0 k_j + \beta_1 \log(1 - t_{nj}) + \beta_2 \log(p_j) + \beta_3 \log(y_n), \]

where \( k_j \) and \( \beta_0 \) can be vectors. Note that the parameters are identical across the alternatives.

The theoretical model offers two mechanisms which explain why rich households move to different communities than poor households: progressive taxation and income elasticity of housing below unity. Two interaction terms are added to allow for the latter segregating mechanism:

\[ V_{nj} = \beta_0 k_j + \beta_1 \log(1 - t_{nj}) + \beta_2 \log(p_j) + \beta_3 \log(y_n) + \beta_4 \log(1 - t_{nj}) \log(y_n) + \beta_5 \log(p_j) \log(y_n). \]  

(9)

The implied MRS between tax rate and housing price satisfies Property 2 (relative preferences) even in the counterfactual case of proportional taxes

\[ \frac{\partial M}{\partial y} \bigg|_{t_{nj}=t_j} = \frac{(1 - t_j)(\beta_1 \beta_5 - \beta_2 \beta_4)}{p_j [\beta_1 + \beta_4 \log(y_n)]^2} y_n > 0 \]  

(10)
if $\beta_1 \beta_5 > \beta_2 \beta_4$. As one expects $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 < 0$ for any household this is guaranteed by $\beta_4 > 0$ and $\beta_5 > 0$. This means that the effect of the tax rate increases with income while the effect of the housing price decreases. As is shown in the proof of Property 2, the progressive tax scheme reinforces this segregation mechanism.

The idea of heterogenous tastes for housing in Section 3.3 is applied by substituting the constant housing price effect $\beta_2$ with a household dependent effect $\beta_6 + \beta_7 a_n$:

$$V_{nj} = \beta_0 k_j + \beta_1 \log(1 - t_{nj}) + \beta_6 \log(p_j) + \beta_3 \log(y_n) + \beta_4 \log(1 - t_{nj}) \log(y_n) + \beta_5 \log(p_j) \log(y_n) + \beta_7 \log(p_j) a_n,$$

where $a_n$ and $\beta_7$ can be vectors.

The level of the indirect utility function is not identified as the agents only care about the differences between alternatives. Consequently, factors that shift the indirect utility of all alternatives in the same way are not identified; hence $\beta_3$ cannot be estimated. This leads to the identified indirect utility function:

$$V_{nj} = \delta_j + \beta_1 \log(1 - t_{nj}) + \beta_4 \log(1 - t_{nj}) \log(y_n) + \beta_5 \log(p_j) \log(y_n) + \beta_7 \log(p_j) a_n.$$

Note that the scale of the indirect utility function will be arbitrarily set by the specification of the error term.

The community characteristics $k_j$ may be imprecisely measured or not observable. It is therefore advantageous to include community fixed effects which capture all unobserved dimensions of intrinsic community attractiveness. However, the effect of an observed community characteristic cannot be distinguished from the fixed effect of this community and is thus not identified. The identified fixed effects specification is:

$$V_{nj} = \delta_j + \beta_1 \log(1 - t_{nj}) + \beta_4 \log(1 - t_{nj}) \log(y_n) + \beta_5 \log(p_j) \log(y_n) + \beta_7 \log(p_j) a_n,$$

where the community-specific constant $\delta_j$ is identified by setting the constant of an arbitrary community to zero. Note that the effect of the tax rate $t_{nj}$ can still be estimated because it depends on both the community $j$ and the household $n$. 

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4.2 Modelling the Stochastic Part

So far, the stochastic element $\varepsilon_{nj}$ of household $n$’s utility in community $j$ has not been discussed. The stochastic part stands for all factors of community choice that are hidden from the researcher but known to the household. It therefore represents all unobserved factors such as more detailed socio-demographic information about the household as well as all unobservable factors such as the household members’ attachment to a certain place. There is very little theoretical guidance that would help to model the stochastic term. Several specifications are therefore used and compared in the empirical analysis.

The first specification assumes that the error terms follow independently and identically an extreme value distribution. The cumulative distribution function is

$$F(\varepsilon_{nj}) = e^{-e^{-\varepsilon_{nj}}}.$$ 

This leads to the conditional logit model. The probability that household $n$ chooses community $j$ is

$$P_{nj}(\theta) = \frac{e^{V_{nj}}}{\sum_{i=1}^{J} e^{V_{ni}}},$$

(13)

where $V_{ni}$ is the deterministic part of the utility of household $n$ in community $i$ and $\theta = \beta$ is the set of parameters to be estimated. The independence of the error term across the alternatives is a strong assumption. It implies that a household’s stochastic, i.e. unobserved, preference for a certain community is fully independent of its stochastic preference for other communities. The strong and unpleasant consequences of this assumption are discussed in the literature as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).

The nested logit model is a generalization of the conditional logit model that avoids IIA by allowing a specific pattern of correlations across the error terms (see McFadden, 1984). The vector of all community specific error terms $\varepsilon_n = (\varepsilon_{n1}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{nJ})$ follows the generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) introduced by McFadden (1978):

$$F(\varepsilon_n) = e^{-\sum_{k=1}^{K}(\sum_{i \in C_k} e^{-\varepsilon_{ni}/\lambda_k})^{\lambda_k}}.$$ 

6The conditional logit model is also called multinomial logit model. Modern treatises on multinomial response use the notion of multinomial logit for a specification in which the slope parameter $\beta_j$ depends on the alternative $j$. These alternative specific parameters are difficult if not impossible to derive from economic choice behavior.
The choice set $C = (1, ..., J)$ is divided into $K$ mutually exclusive subsets $C_k$, called nests. The unobserved portions of utility $\varepsilon_{ni}$ are correlated within the same nest $k$ and independent across nests. The parameter $\lambda_k$ captures the correlation within nest $k$, i.e. $\text{corr}(\varepsilon_{ni}, \varepsilon_{nj}) = 1 - \lambda_k^2$ for all $i, j \in C_k$ (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The extreme case $\lambda_k = 1$ means that there is no correlation within nest $k$. The nested logit model is consistent with random utility maximization if (but not only if; see Börsch-Supan, 1990) $\lambda_k \in [0, 1]$. Setting all $\lambda_k$ to unity leads to the conditional logit model. The probability that household $n$ chooses community $j$ is

$$P_{nj}(\theta) = \frac{e^{V_{nj}/\lambda_l} \left( \sum_{i \in C_l} e^{V_{ni}/\lambda_l} \right)^{\lambda_l - 1}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \sum_{i \in C_k} e^{V_{ni}/\lambda_k} \right)^{\lambda_k}},$$

(14)

where $l$ is the nest of community $j$ and $\theta = (\beta, \lambda)$.

The nested structure of the error term can be looked at as the result of a two-step choice: households choose a certain nest first and afterwards an alternative within the nest. In the empirical study the first step is naturally the decision whether to stay in the center community or to move to a community in the periphery. Households with a large unobserved preference for a community in the periphery therefore also have a higher preference for all other communities in the periphery. In this case the center community is a nest on its own, called a degenerate nest with $\lambda_k = 1$. This nested structure can be considered as a simple form of a spatial correlation pattern.

The multinomial probit model enables a more flexible specification of the error term compared to the previous two models. The vector of error terms across alternatives is assumed to follow a $J$-variate normal distribution

$$\varepsilon_n \sim N(0, \Omega),$$

where $\Omega$ is the $J \times J$ variance-covariance matrix. This general form allows for all possible correlation patterns across the unobserved part of utility. This flexibility, however, comes at a price: the estimation of multinomial probit models

$^7$Note that this form of the likelihood function is directly derived from the random utility model and the generalized extreme value distribution. Some software packages, e.g. the nlogit command in Stata, and textbooks, e.g. Greene (2003), use a slightly different likelihood function in their implementation of nested logit. These likelihood functions are not consistent with random utility maximisation. See Hensher and Greene (2002) for a critical discussion. Stata offers a revised command nlogitrum (see Heiss, 2002) which correctly implements a nested logit model. This command is, however, not able to deal with degenerate nests and a full set of alternative fixed effects.
is numerically demanding (see Section 4.3) and the general variance-covariance needs to be restricted for both theoretical and practical reasons. Due to the fact that the agents only care about the utility differences across alternatives, Ω needs normalizing and only a maximum of $[(J-1)J/2] - 1$ parameters can be estimated compared to the $J(J+1)/2$ distinct elements in Ω (see Train 2003). In the case of e.g. 17 alternatives there are still 135 parameters to be estimated. These parameters are in practice hardly identified. This study uses a very parsimonious specification of Ω. Following Bolduc (1992) and Bolduc, Fortin and Gordon (1997), the alternative specific error terms follow a first order spatial autoregressive process (SAR)

$$\varepsilon_n = \rho W \varepsilon_n + \xi_n,$$

where $\xi_n \sim N(0,I)$ and $\rho \in (-1,1)$ is a parameter to be estimated. $W$ is an exogenous $J \times J$ weighting matrix where the weight $w_{ji}$ is a decreasing function of the distance $d_{ij}$ between community $j$ and $i$

$$w_{ji} = \frac{1/d_{ji}}{\sum_{s=1}^{J} 1/d_{js}},$$

and satisfies $w_{ji} = w_{ij}$, $w_{ii} = 0$ and $\sum_{s} w_{is} = 1$ by construction. The variance-covariance of the error term can be derived as

$$\Omega(\rho) = (I - \rho W)^{-1}(I - \rho W)^{-1}$$

because $\rho \in (-1,1)$ guarantees the nonsingularity of $(I - \rho W)$ (see Berman and Plemmons, 1994, p.133). The probability that household $n$ chooses community $j$ is

$$P_{nj}(\theta) = \text{Prob}[\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_j > V_{nj} - V_{n1}, ... , \varepsilon_J - \varepsilon_j > V_{nj} - V_{nJ}],$$

where $\theta = (\beta, \rho)$. The above spatial pattern means that households with a strong unobserved taste for a certain community also like other communities geographically close to that community.\(^{10}\)

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\(^{8}\)Bolduc, Fortin and Fournier (1996) present one of the rare applications of SAR in multinomial response models. They use a slightly different specification and mix the multivariate normal SAR process with an extreme value distribution.

\(^{9}\)See Anselin and Florax (1995) for a general treatise of SAR processes.

\(^{10}\)I also estimated mixed logit models (see McFadden and Train, 2000, Ben-Akiva et al., 2002, Hensher and Greene, 2001, Walker 2002). In the spirit of section 3.3, I assumed that the taste for housing does not only depend on observed household characteristics but also on unobserved factors. However the estimation results showed that adding noise to the housing price parameter did not at all increase the likelihood of the observed sample.
4.3 Estimation

The conditional and nested logit models are estimated using maximum likelihood (ML) and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) respectively. The log likelihood function is

\[ \log L(\theta) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{J} z_{nj} \log P_{nj}(\theta), \]

where \( z_{nj} = 1 \) if the household \( n \) chooses community \( j \) and \( z_{nj} = 0 \) otherwise. The choice probabilities \( P_{nj} \) of the conditional logit and nested logit model are defined in equations (15) and (14), respectively. The maximum likelihood estimator \( \hat{\theta} = (\hat{\beta}, \hat{\lambda}) \) is consistent, asymptotically efficient and normally distributed.

The multinomial probit model is estimated with maximum simulated likelihood (MSL, see Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994) based on equations (14) and (16). The calculation of the likelihood requires the integration of a 16-variate normal distribution. As there is no analytic solution to this problem numerical integration routines or simulation methods are applied. A standard method is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane GHK choice probability simulator (see Geweke, Keane and Runkle, 1994 and Börsch-Supan, and Hajivassiliou, 1993). GHK simulates the choice probabilities \( P_{nj} \) in equation (15) by recursively drawing from univariate normal distributions. The number of draws \( R \) determines the quality of the approximation. This study uses \( R = 1000 \) pseudo-random draws in each dimension. The properties of the MSL estimator \( \hat{\theta} = (\hat{\beta}, \hat{\rho}) \) are equivalent to standard ML if the number of draws \( R \) grows faster than \( \sqrt{N} \) (see e.g. Train, 2003).

All estimations are performed with the author’s own programs in MATLAB.\textsuperscript{11} The Newton-Raphson algorithm with the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno method (BFGS) for updating the hessian matrix was used for numerical maximization. All parameters, including the coefficients of the correlation structure have been appropriately scaled during optimization. The numerically demanding estimation of the multinomial probit model runs around 70 hours on a Sun Fire V880.

\textsuperscript{11}A MATLAB toolbox with programs for conditional logit, nested logit, multinomial probit and mixed logit models is available from the author on request.
5 Data

The empirical investigation is based on non-public household data from the Tax Administration of the Canton of Basel-Stadt. The data contain information of all households in the city of Basel that moved within the city or from the city to a municipality in the periphery in the year 1997.

The decision maker in the theoretical model is a household. Households are operationalized as all persons that moved from a common old address to a common new address: families in a narrower sense, married and unmarried couples as well as people who simply share a flat.\textsuperscript{12}

The choice set of these households consists of roughly 3000 Swiss municipalities and the municipalities in neighboring France and Germany and in principal the whole rest of the world. However, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view this potential choice set is not the relevant one in the analysis. Tiebout type models of location choice are only suitable for narrow metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the econometric methods used are numerically unfeasible for large choice sets. The analysis is therefore restricted to the city of Basel and a circle of the 16 most integrated municipalities around it.\textsuperscript{14} This leaves 7,872 households with 11,540 members in the data set. The municipalities belong to three different cantons, Basel-Stadt (BS), Basel-Land(BL) and Solothurn (SO) and thus exhibit great variability in tax levels and tax schemes.

Some information on the municipalities in the choice set is also used in the analysis. As this study uses municipality specific fixed effects, variables describing the attractiveness of the municipality are not needed. The following enumeration describes the variables used. See the appendix for a detailed description of the variables and the data sources.

\textsuperscript{12}Married couples that move from single households into a common flat are treated as one household. Unmarried couples that start living together at the new address are treated as independent households.

\textsuperscript{13}Tiebout type models ignore the location of the work place. When households decide upon their place of residence on a national or global scale, job opportunities are naturally very important. In narrow metropolitan areas, however, it is reasonable to assume that any municipality is a feasible place of residence for households whose members are working in the central business district.

\textsuperscript{14}These municipalities are defined as all municipalities where more than 36\% of the working population is commuting to the center (Census 1990). This admittedly arbitrary cutting off point leads to a well-shaped geographic area and a tractable number of choice opportunities. The five smallest municipalities are omitted as they are not covered in the tax scheme data. Changing the choice set did not qualitatively change the results of the analysis.
Table 1: Characteristics of movers from the center in 1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>households moved in</th>
<th>mean income</th>
<th>median income</th>
<th>children</th>
<th>distance</th>
<th>rent</th>
<th>tax mid income¹</th>
<th>tax high income¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whole Area</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>61,612</td>
<td>54,449</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Basel (BS)</td>
<td>6370</td>
<td>59,334</td>
<td>52,328</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>26.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>71,271</td>
<td>61,874</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Binningen (BL)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>73,405</td>
<td>60,106</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>21.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Birsfelden (BL)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>52,351</td>
<td>52,033</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>23.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bottmingen (BL)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76,376</td>
<td>74,131</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>22.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Allschwil (BL)</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>69,302</td>
<td>63,138</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>21.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Münchstein (BL)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>58,962</td>
<td>54,567</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>22.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Oberwil (BL)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77,048</td>
<td>64,702</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Riehen (BS)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>83,950</td>
<td>72,428</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>21.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Muttenz (BL)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>63,333</td>
<td>56,688</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>22.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bettingen (BS)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69,978</td>
<td>67,177</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>20.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reinach (BL)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>72,242</td>
<td>61,992</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>22.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arlesheim (BL)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57,601</td>
<td>56,888</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>21.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Therwil (BL)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>91,735</td>
<td>79,672</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>22.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Biel-Benken (BL)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>88,610</td>
<td>72,350</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>20.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Aesch (BL)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62,968</td>
<td>53,506</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>23.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ettingen (BL)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>61,541</td>
<td>65,999</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>23.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hofst.-Flueh (SO)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64,902</td>
<td>55,863</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>24.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Cantonal and communal income tax rate for married couple with two children and income of CHF 80,000 and CHF 500,000 respectively.

- **Income** (household specific): Total gross income of all household members according to the last tax assessment before moving.¹⁵
- **Marital status** (household specific): Marital status of the primary earner.
- **Children** (household specific): Number of under-age children.
- **Tax rate** (household and community specific): Tax rate for totalled cantonal (state) and municipal income taxes. It reflects municipality/state specific tax deductions, municipality/state specific progressive tax schemes and municipal tax shifters and thus depends on household income as well as on marital status and children. The hypothetical tax rate is computed for any household as well as any of the 17 municipalities in the choice set.
- **Rent** (community specific): Average offer price per $m^2$ for a rented flat.
- **Distance** (community specific): Distance in $km^2$ between a municipality and the central business district.

¹⁵The relevant gross income would be the gross income after moving, which is not available. Income before moving is a good proxy if a household’s decision to move does not coincide with a change in its income.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of the household and community characteristics. From the total of 7,872 households that stayed within the choice set, 4/5 moved within the center community whereas only 1/5 moved to one of the 16 communities in the periphery. The latter were on average 20% richer than the ones remaining in the center. The tax rate of a typical two-child family with an income of CHF 80,000 is highest in the center community; this is more than 35% higher than in the neighboring community Riehen. The tax rate for an income of CHF 500,000 is about three times higher, reflecting the strong progressivity of the different tax schemes. Figure 4 visualizes the association between the local tax level and the average income of households that moved in. The number of children of households in the center and in the periphery are very similar. However, there is substantial variation across the communities in the periphery. The bottom maps in Figure 4 show the local housing rent and the average number of children of the incomers. The center community is surrounded by a fringe of communities with higher rents. Families with more children tend to locate in communities with lower rents.
6 Results

The estimates of the random utility models with fixed effects are given in Table 2. Three specifications of the error term structure are reported: Column one shows the results for the conditional logit model, column 2 for the nested logit model and column three for the multinomial probit model with a spatial autoregressive process (SAR). All models are estimated with a full set of municipality specific fixed effects using the city of Basel as reference.

The specification of the error term is discussed first. The nested logit model fits the data significantly better than the conditional logit model (likelihood ratio test statistic 5.4). The highly significant log-sum coefficient in the nested logit model clearly demonstrates the violation of the IIA assumption in the conditional logit model. The estimate $\hat{\lambda} = 0.53$ implies that the error terms across municipalities in the periphery are positively correlated. This means that households with an unobserved taste for a municipality in the periphery also prefer other municipalities in the periphery. The estimated spatial autocorrelation coefficient $\hat{\rho}$ in the multinomial probit model is not significantly different from zero.\(^{16}\) The spatial autocorrelation process therefore does not improve the probit model with independent error terms (not reported, log likelihood = -7442.7), which is the analogue of the conditional logit model and also saddled with the IIA. The nested logit model is thus the preferred model. The following discussion relates to the results of the nested multinomial logit model.

While the sign and significance of the coefficients in multinomial response models are informative they cannot be directly interpreted as marginal effects. The significantly negative fixed effects of all municipalities in the periphery indicate that these municipalities are intrinsically less attractive to movers from the city of Basel. These estimates are not surprising as 4/5 of the movers decided to stay in the center. The fixed effects take account of locational factors such as housing prices, public goods provision, distance to the central business district, cultural activities and landscape but also a possible distaste for leaving the accustomed neighborhood.

The coefficient for $\log(1 - \text{tax})$ gives the effect of the tax rate on the indirect

\(^{16}\)Note that the coefficients in the multinomial probit model are smaller than in the logit models because the model is scaled by the variance of the standard normal distribution $\sigma_\varepsilon = 1$ rather than that of the extreme value distribution $\sigma_\varepsilon = 1.7$.\]
### Table 2: Multinomial response models with fixed effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conditional Logit</th>
<th>Nested Logit</th>
<th>Mult. Probit, SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slope Coefficients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(1-tax)†</td>
<td>15.40 (2.54)</td>
<td>14.55 (2.00)</td>
<td>8.06 (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(1-tax) × [log(inc)-log(60k)]</td>
<td>11.28 (2.00)</td>
<td>11.04 (1.75)</td>
<td>7.59 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rent) × [log(inc)-log(60k)]</td>
<td>0.70 (0.81)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rent) × children</td>
<td>-1.32 (0.82)</td>
<td>-1.16 (0.56)</td>
<td>-0.80 (0.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation Structure Coefficients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-sum periphery (λ)</td>
<td>0.53 (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.46 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial autocorrelation (ρ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binningen (BL)</td>
<td>-4.14 (0.12)</td>
<td>-3.08 (0.20)</td>
<td>-2.69 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birsfelden (BL)</td>
<td>-4.54 (0.12)</td>
<td>-3.24 (0.23)</td>
<td>-2.86 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottmingen (BL)</td>
<td>-5.45 (0.18)</td>
<td>-3.77 (0.31)</td>
<td>-3.31 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allschwil (BL)</td>
<td>-3.70 (0.11)</td>
<td>-2.84 (0.17)</td>
<td>-2.53 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Münchstein (BL)</td>
<td>-4.68 (0.13)</td>
<td>-3.35 (0.24)</td>
<td>-2.99 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberwil (BL)</td>
<td>-4.90 (0.15)</td>
<td>-3.51 (0.26)</td>
<td>-3.12 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riehen (BS)</td>
<td>-3.52 (0.10)</td>
<td>-2.72 (0.15)</td>
<td>-2.47 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muttenz (BL)</td>
<td>-4.46 (0.12)</td>
<td>-3.23 (0.22)</td>
<td>-2.89 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bettingen (BS)</td>
<td>-6.93 (0.35)</td>
<td>-4.53 (0.45)</td>
<td>-3.87 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinach (BL)</td>
<td>-4.17 (0.12)</td>
<td>-3.07 (0.20)</td>
<td>-2.79 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlesheim (BL)</td>
<td>-5.21 (0.17)</td>
<td>-3.65 (0.29)</td>
<td>-3.25 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therwil (BL)</td>
<td>-5.35 (0.17)</td>
<td>-3.70 (0.30)</td>
<td>-3.31 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biel-Benken (BL)</td>
<td>-6.38 (0.26)</td>
<td>-4.29 (0.39)</td>
<td>-3.74 (0.14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aesch (BL)</td>
<td>-5.08 (0.16)</td>
<td>-3.53 (0.28)</td>
<td>-3.19 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettingen (BL)</td>
<td>-5.97 (0.22)</td>
<td>-4.01 (0.35)</td>
<td>-3.55 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hôf-St.-Flueh (SO)</td>
<td>-6.06 (0.24)</td>
<td>-4.00 (0.37)</td>
<td>-3.53 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-7439.2</td>
<td>-7436.5</td>
<td>-7442.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>7872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets. ***, ***, *, ~ Significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level.

†The coefficient gives the effect for a household with an income of CHF 60,000 as the interaction term log(1 − tax) · [log(inc) − log(60,000)] becomes zero.

Utility function for a household with an income of CHF 60,000, i.e. the average income. It is significantly positive on the 0.1% level and confirms that taxes have a negative effect on utility. The significantly positive coefficient of the interaction with [log(inc) − log(60,000)] implies that the effect from taxes increases with income. For example, the effect from log(1 − tax) for a household with an income of CHF 500,000 is 14.55 + 11.04 · [log(500,000) − log(60,000)] = 37.96. The quantitative impact of the tax rate will be explained using an example. Consider a household with an income of CHF 500,000 that compares the city of Basel.
to the neighboring municipality of Riehen. The tax rate it faces is 26.4% in Basel and 21.8% in Riehen. The utility difference from this tax differential is 
\[ \log(1 - 0.218) - \log(1 - 0.264) \times 37.96 = 2.30. \] 
Hence the negative fixed effect of Riehen (-2.72) is almost offset by its lower taxes. However, for a household with an income of CHF 80,000 the implied utility difference is only 0.5.

The coefficient of the local housing prices \( \log(\text{rent}) \) is not identified as its part is taken by the municipality specific fixed effects. The interaction of the housing price with income can still be estimated but turns out to be insignificant. The housing rent also interacts with the number of children in the household. This effect is significantly negative at the 5% level. As one can sensibly suppose a negative effect of housing prices on utility, the negative sign of the interaction means that households with children are more concerned about housing prices than childless households.

How do these results correspond to the segregation hypotheses postulated in the theoretical model? The effect of the tax rate without interaction is identified only through the variation across households induced by the progressivity of the tax scheme. The significant positive sign of this coefficient establishes the income segregation from progressive taxation. Equation (10) depicts the conditions for segregation that are induced by mechanisms beyond the progressive tax scheme. The signs of the estimated coefficients satisfy this condition under the assumption that the unobserved price effect is negative. There is clear evidence that rich households prefer low-tax municipalities but to an even greater extent than is explained by the tax scheme.

The quantitative implications of the estimated nested logit model are revealed by inspecting its predictions. Given the attributes of the households and the municipalities, the model is able to predict the fraction of the households that move to a particular municipality \( j \):

\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} P_{nj}(\hat{\theta}).
\]

Table 4 (column 3) shows the predicted migration to the municipalities. The actual values in the data set are given for comparison in column 1. Note the perfect forecast of migration which is an artefact of the full set of municipality specific fixed effects. However, these predictions will change in the policy experiments conducted in Section 6.1. The predicted segregation pattern is more informative.
Table 3: Multinomial response models with municipality characteristics.

<table>
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<th>Conditional Log</th>
<th>Nested Log</th>
<th>Mult. Probit, SAR</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Slope Coefficients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(1-tax)†</td>
<td>15.89 (2.26)</td>
<td>14.10 (1.98)</td>
<td>10.11 (1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(1-tax)×[ log(inc)−log(60k)]</td>
<td>12.65 (1.91)</td>
<td>12.47 (1.68)</td>
<td>8.18 (1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rent)†</td>
<td>-2.88 (0.77)</td>
<td>-1.84 (0.48)</td>
<td>-1.81 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rent)×[ log(inc)−log(60k)]</td>
<td>0.15 (0.67)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.37)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(rent)×children</td>
<td>-0.96 (0.73)</td>
<td>-0.83 (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.60 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>periphery</td>
<td>-3.47 (0.10)</td>
<td>-2.67 (0.20)</td>
<td>-2.29 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation Structure Coefficients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-sum periphery (λ)</td>
<td>0.51 (0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.76 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial autocorrelation (ρ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation rent (σ_{nu})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-7778.1</td>
<td>-7774.5</td>
<td>-7759.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>7872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, *, ~ Significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level.

†The coefficient gives the effect for a household with an income of CHF 60,000 as the interaction term \( \log(1−tax) \cdot [\log(inc)−\log(60,000)] \) becomes zero.

The average income of the households moving to municipality \( j \) is predicted as

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} y_n P_{nj}(\hat{\theta}) / \sum_{n=1}^{N} P_{nj}(\hat{\theta}) .
\]  

(18)

Table 4 shows the predicted average income (column 4) of the migrants compared to the actual values (column 2). The top maps in Figure 5 visualize the actual income segregation and the segregation predicted by the nested logit model. As can be seen, the predicted pattern of income differences across municipalities is very similar to the observed pattern. This remarkably demonstrates the appropriateness of the econometric specification in equation (12).

The results of multinomial response models without fixed effects are given in Table 3. The only additional variables are distance from the central business district and the now identified local housing prices \( \log(rent) \). Remember that identifying locational factors is not the prime interest of this paper and not much effort was spent on finding proxies for municipality characteristics. A dummy variable for the periphery was also introduced to capture the high proportion of stayers. This dummy variable could as well have been labelled ‘staying’. The slope coefficients of the nested logit model are almost identical to the ones in the fixed effects model. As in the fixed effects model, the significant log-sum
Table 4: Model predictions and results of policy experiments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Values</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Experiment 1</th>
<th>Experiment 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>share mover income</td>
<td>share mover income</td>
<td>share mover income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole area</td>
<td>1 61,612</td>
<td>1 61,612</td>
<td>1 61,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Basel (BS)</td>
<td>0.809 59,334</td>
<td>0.809 59,231</td>
<td>0.772 56,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>0.191 71,271</td>
<td>0.191 71,710</td>
<td>0.228 78,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Binningen (BL)</td>
<td>0.021 73,405</td>
<td>0.021 73,362</td>
<td>0.025 80,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Birsfelden (BL)</td>
<td>0.012 52,351</td>
<td>0.012 63,702</td>
<td>0.015 68,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bottmingen (BL)</td>
<td>0.005 76,376</td>
<td>0.005 71,473</td>
<td>0.007 77,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Allschwil (BL)</td>
<td>0.032 69,302</td>
<td>0.032 73,655</td>
<td>0.038 80,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Münchenstein (BL)</td>
<td>0.012 58,962</td>
<td>0.012 69,193</td>
<td>0.014 75,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Oberwil (BL)</td>
<td>0.010 77,048</td>
<td>0.010 80,627</td>
<td>0.012 88,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Riehen (BS)</td>
<td>0.036 83,950</td>
<td>0.036 75,489</td>
<td>0.042 82,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Muttenz (BL)</td>
<td>0.014 63,333</td>
<td>0.014 66,291</td>
<td>0.017 71,905</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Bettingen (BS)</td>
<td>0.001 69,978</td>
<td>0.001 86,834</td>
<td>0.001 98,430</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reinach (BL)</td>
<td>0.019 72,242</td>
<td>0.019 69,510</td>
<td>0.023 75,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arlesheim (BL)</td>
<td>0.007 57,601</td>
<td>0.007 74,243</td>
<td>0.009 80,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Therwil (BL)</td>
<td>0.006 91,735</td>
<td>0.006 67,810</td>
<td>0.007 73,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Biel-Benken (BL)</td>
<td>0.002 88,610</td>
<td>0.002 84,549</td>
<td>0.003 93,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Aesch (BL)</td>
<td>0.007 62,968</td>
<td>0.007 65,115</td>
<td>0.009 69,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ettingen (BL)</td>
<td>0.003 61,541</td>
<td>0.003 62,628</td>
<td>0.004 67,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hofst.-Flueh (SO)</td>
<td>0.002 64,902</td>
<td>0.002 55,773</td>
<td>0.003 60,061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Predictions and results from experiments (see text) using the estimated nested logit model with fixed effects.

Coefficient shows the violation of the IIA. The now identified housing price effect is significantly negative as was expected above. Not surprisingly, distance from the center has a significant negative impact. The coefficient of spatial autocorrelation $\hat{\rho} = 0.73$ is now significantly positive. The predictions from the resulting multinomial probit model are very similar to the nested logit model.

### 6.1 Policy Experiments

An important feature of the estimated models is that they can be used to simulate the aggregate effects from changes in policy variables. Given the attributes of the households and the municipalities after the implementation of the experiment, the models can predict the number of migrants and their average income according to equations (17) and (18). Two experiments are performed.
Experiment 1 (Tax increase in the center)

The center municipality increases its income tax rate by a factor of 1.1 for all household types.

Table 4 shows the predicted effects of the two experiments based on the estimated nested logit model with fixed effects. Experiment 1 means that the tax rate of a two-child family with an income of CHF 80,000 rises by almost one percentage point from 9.4% to 10.3% in the center municipality. The tax increase is 2.6% for an income of CHF 500,000. As a result, fewer households would choose the center municipality. This can be seen in column 5 of Table 4. The center municipality would lose 3.7% of the moving population. The change of the spatial distributions of incomes provided in column 6 is particularly interesting. The average income would fall by CHF 2,500 in the center municipality and increase by CHF 6,500 in the periphery, ranging from CHF 4,300 in Hofstetten-Flueh to 11,600 in Bettingen. These effects are depicted in the bottom-left map in Figure 5.

Experiment 2 (Tax harmonization in one canton)

The Canton of Basel-Stadt decides that its two municipalities in the periphery (Riehen and Bettingen) will employ the same tax scheme and rate as its capital, the city of Basel.

Experiment 2 simulates the choice of moving households if the Canton of Basel-Stadt harmonized its taxes and applied the city’s tax rates in its other municipalities. The fairly dramatic effects are given in columns 7 and 8 in Table 4 and in the bottom-right map in Figure 5. The two peripheral municipalities Riehen and Bettingen would lose half of the new households. More interestingly, the average income of households that moved to Riehen and Bettingen would fall by CHF 23,400 and CHF 33,600, respectively. The average income of migrating households would increase by a meager CHF 400 in the city of Basel but by almost CHF 2000 in the other municipalities in the periphery.

It is important to keep in mind that the simulated effects neglect three potential sources of bias. Firstly, the estimated model neglects the possible migration to the center from households currently living in the periphery. Secondly, households that did not move under the actual situation may decide to move after the policy change and actually moving households may remain in their homes. Thirdly, the
estimated model ignores that municipality characteristics such as housing prices and public goods provision would adjust to policy changes. However, this reaction is likely to be a long-run effect while moving households immediately adapt their residential choice.

7 Conclusions and Outlook

Theoretical models of urban community systems postulate endogenous segregation of the population by incomes. The location choice of households with differing incomes is supposed to be cause and consequence of the local tax rate differentials. This paper empirically assesses the second causal connection by studying the municipality choice of households in a Swiss metropolitan area.

The estimation results show that rich households are substantially and significantly more likely to move to low-tax municipalities than poor households. This self-sorting of the migrating population perpetuates the existing income differentials across municipalities. The higher esteem of rich households for low taxes
is partly explained by the progressivity of the local income tax. However, there is evidence that rich households prefer low-tax municipalities to a greater extent than is explained by the tax scheme.

The observed sorting of the population by incomes could possibly be influenced by factors not considered in this study. A promising alternative explanation is ‘social interaction’: If rich households preferred to live near other rich households a similar segregation pattern would emerge. Such neighborhood interaction was found by Ioannides and Zabel (2002) and Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2002). Unfortunately, the present data do not allow to discriminate between the two explanations because the average local income levels and the local tax rates are almost multicollinear. A possible way to overcome this problem lies in inspecting the location choice below municipality level. The differences of average incomes across districts within the same municipality can be exploited to identify both the effects of the tax rates and of the neighborhood characteristics.

A possible further extension of this study is the collection of more information on potential locational factors, such as school quality. This additional information can be used to study e.g. the life cycle of residential choice by adding interaction effects of location characteristics with household characteristics, such as family structure and age. School quality for example is most likely an important locational factor for families with children, but not for single households. However, as argued in the beginning of Section 3, differences in the provision of public goods do not seem essential in Switzerland.
Appendix: Data

The data used in the empirical investigation were made available by the following institutions:

- Housing prices: Wüst und Partner, Zurich.

Notes on the construction of the variables:

Income (uses household data): The information on the household income is based on the tax assessment. Unmarried adult household members and children with their own income are assessed individually. The income of all individually assessed household members is added up. The income in the raw data is income before tax and deductions for children and spouse but after social security contributions and further deductions. The study uses (hypothetical) gross income which was calculated without considering further individual deductions.

Children (uses household data): Number of children that allow for tax deductions.

Tax rate (uses household and tax scheme data): The tables from the Swiss Federal Tax Administration report the totalled cantonal and municipal tax rates for different household types (single household, married couple without children and married couple with two children) and for selected gross incomes. The tax rate for households with income between the reported income classes and for household types not listed were interpolated. The tax rates for household members with individual tax assessment were first calculated individually. The tax rate of
the household is calculated from the totalled individual tax amounts.

Rent (uses housing price data): Wüest und Partner collected all rents for flats offered in newspapers and in the internet in 1997. Missing information on exact flat sizes was inferred from the information given in the advertisements.

Distance: Distance between the geographical centers of the municipalities. The center was taken as the middle of the maximal east-west and north-south extensions.
References


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<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
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