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Working Paper
Global approaches to social policy: A survey of analytical methods


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Global Approaches to Social Policy
A Survey of Analytical Methods

Nicola Yeates

prepared for the UNRISD project
New Directions in Social Policy:
Alternatives from and for the Global South

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The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an autonomous research institute within the UN system that undertakes multidisciplinary research and policy analysis on the social dimensions of contemporary development issues. Through our work we aim to ensure that social equity, inclusion and justice are central to development thinking, policy and practice.

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Introduction to Working Papers for New Directions in Social Policy: Alternatives from and for the Global South

This paper is part of a series of outputs from the research project New Directions in Social Policy: Alternatives from and for the Global South.

The project examines the emergence, nature and effectiveness of recent developments in social policy in emerging economies and developing countries. The purpose is to understand whether these are fundamentally new approaches to social policy or welfare systems which could offer alternative solutions to the critical development challenges facing low- and middle-income countries in the twenty-first century. This research aims to shed light on the policy options and choices of emerging/developing countries; how economic, social, political and institutional arrangements can be designed to achieve better social outcomes given the challenges of the contemporary development context; how the values and norms of human rights, equity, sustainability and social justice can be operationalized through “new” social policies; and how experiences, knowledge and learning about innovative approaches can be shared among countries in the South. For further information on the project visit www.unrisd.org/ndsp.

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Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AU  African Union
CARICOM  Caribbean Community
CCT  Conditional cash transfers
DfID  Department for International Development
IDB  Inter-American Development Bank
IGOs  Intergovernmental organizations
ILO  International Labour Organization
IT  Information technology
NGO  Non-governmental organizations
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNRISD  United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WB  World Bank
WHO  World Health Organization
WTO  World Trade Organization

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Summary

This paper aims to contribute to a scholarly dialogue aimed at fostering understanding of the nature of border-spanning (or transnational) practices and relations that structure and connect social policy across countries in different parts of the world. The premise of the paper is that diverse kinds of border-spanning social processes permeate social life and social policy formation in myriad ways. They are woven into the very texture of social life. They are institutionalized and enduring, and they are variable, multi-faceted and pluralistic. Good research and analytical approaches and methods are needed to move beyond and behind the abstractions of globalization and to help comprehend this concretely in relation to social policy. Based on an extensive survey of published research on this topic aiming to identify the most promising analytical approaches, this paper considers the scope and results of major research initiatives across low-, middle- and high-income countries and across different policy sectors and issues.

In doing so, the discussion highlights that border-spanning forces and structures are variously enabled, governed, regulated and opposed by a range of national and transnational actors working in relation to defined socio-institutional contexts, within and across myriad domestic and cross-border spheres of global (and sub-global) governance and policy making. Three aspects of this are identified as crucial in mediating the manifestations and impacts of transnational dynamics: context, institutions and politics. Local, national and regional contexts mediate globalizing processes of convergence and unification. Heterogeneous and path-dependant changes in welfare states point to more moderate claims about the impacts of globalizations. Finally, the dynamics of political contestation, resistance and opposition determine the pace, course, timing and effects of globalizations on welfare institutions, social policy making and social policy outcomes.

This paper also highlights that the methods, approaches and perspectives studies of global and transnational social policy and their analysis are multiform and multidisciplinary. Such studies have variously focused on policy making processes in spheres of global (and sub-global) governance; the influence of transnational policy on domestic policy reform; new sub-global transnational political spaces in which social policy projects are inscribed; and connections and interdependencies forged between health and welfare institutions, providers and users through different kinds of global networks. However, there are significant research opportunities to purposively foreground the ways in which border-spanning social formations, institutions and actors relate to and influence the course of national and sub-national social policy development. This paper accordingly calls for a greater emphasis on the co-production of social policy by combinations of national and transnational actors in defined settings. As part of this, it calls for case studies within a comparative framework, which are needed for theory-building.

The broader question addressed by this paper is whether social policy can still be understood as the outcome of sociopolitical forces exclusively rooted in and playing out through domestic spheres of governance. This question points to deep-rooted and difficult analytical and methodological issues relating to the analysis of social and public policies, whether at national or transnational levels. Indeed, the delineation of border-spanning phenomena in relation to social policy raises several fundamental questions regarding received knowledge about the nation state, sovereignty and territorial autonomy embedded in models of social policy and development; the prioritization given to the study of single societies at the expense of comparative analyses capable of providing a rich source of data and theories for “developing” and “developed” worlds alike; and the “co-production” of social policy by combinations of intersecting and interacting national and transnational actors, institutions and forces. In emphasizing the promise of an
analytical approach focused on the co-production of social policies, it opens up the path for a productive dialogue among methodological nationalists and methodological transnationalists in relation to social policy and development. Such a dialogue holds out of the promise of significant conceptual, theoretical, methodological and empirical advances that in turn are capable of profound insights into the sources, dynamics and consequences of greater interconnectivity and interdependence characteristic of the conditions of contemporary social policy development and change.
**Introduction**

A perennial concern among scholars of social science is how social, political and economic globalizing processes are shaping contemporary societies. Burgeoning multidisciplinary literatures highlight the diverse activities, exchanges, links and ties routinely spanning international state borders, and the ways in which globalizing processes generate increasing interdependence between all countries. From the perspective of this paper, and the UNRISD project New Directions in Social Policy: Alternatives from and for the Global South, the key question arising is how these cross-border relations of connectivity and interdependence among populations, economies, institutions and polities around the world mediate and influence the course of social policy, welfare programmes, human welfare, and ultimately, the conditions of social development.

Several prominent kinds of border-spanning activities are central to addressing this key question. Illustratively, these include cross-border flows of capital, goods and services; cross-border flows of images, information, cultural modes and sociopolitical ideas; cross-border movements of people; and cross-border sites and spaces of political engagement and action. Such border-spanning activities permeate social life and social policy formation in myriad ways: in relation to awareness of global social and environmental issues, the processes by which laws and policies are made, the organization and content of advocacy and reform campaigns, the content, scope and nature of social provision, and the lived experiences of individuals and families, among other things.

The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to a scholarly dialogue aimed at fostering understanding of the nature of border-spanning (or transnational) practices and relations that structure and connect social policy across countries in different parts of the world. If “social life crosses, connects, underlies, alters, transcends and even transforms boundaries and borders, as well as structures, processes and agents ostensibly contained in them” (Khagram and Levitt 2005: 1), then we need good research and analytical approaches that help comprehend this concretely in relation to social policy, and move beyond and behind the abstractions with which this paper has, of necessity, begun. This paper has two such concretizing objectives. First, it seeks to identify diverse actors, structures, sites, spheres, processes and ideas that are related to the interactions between national and transnational social policies of various kinds. Second, it considers the implications of these globalizing processes and forces for social policy analysis.

A brief note on definition and usage of the term social policy in this paper seems essential at this juncture, and two points stand out in particular. The first concerns the broad definition of social policy. Social policy is broadly defined as “collective interventions directly affecting transformation in social welfare, social institutions and social relations” (Mkandawire 2001: 1), entailing actions by governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supportive of the right to the means of social participation. This right is underpinned by services and arrangements to ensure an adequate income, a relevant education, affordable housing, a healthy existence and a sustainable livelihood. This formulation does not deny that social policies may be conceived and implemented with considerations other than the welfare of the public in mind, or that they may take on repressive, punitive and coercive forms, or that policies not conventionally identified as “social policies” may make a comparable or even greater contribution to the realization of social welfare and social participation. On this latter point, conventional definitions of
social policy exclude important policy domains of environment, infrastructure (energy, water, transport), land, trade, investment and finance.

The second point concerns the difference between social policy as a political practice of social actors and social policy as a subject of academic research and study. Because “social policy” can refer to the extant ways in which social programmes are financed, regulated, provided and taken up, and to the outcomes of these programmes, as well as to the academic study of those arrangements, both reference points fall within the scope of this paper. Accordingly, the paper distinguishes between social policy as a sociopolitical practice and social policy as a field of academic study and research. In this it identifies how social policy is bound up in border-spanning processes and comments more generally on what a globalization perspective means for the methods of social policy analysis.

The broader question inspiring this paper and to which it speaks is: can social policy be understood any longer as the outcome of sociopolitical forces rooted in domestic spheres of governance and playing out solely through them? Posed as a different question, this asks: can social policy be studied in isolation from its embeddedness in an international society of nations, away from the border-spanning institutions, policies and practices that shape that international society and the governance of territories and populations? Despite the reflex negative answer both may incline to invoke, they are not “straw men” questions. They point to deep-rooted and difficult methodological issues relating to the analysis of social policy, whether at national or transnational level. The delineation of border-spanning phenomena in relation to social policy raises several fundamental questions regarding:

1. received knowledge about the nation state, sovereignty and territorial autonomy embedded in models of social policy and development;
2. the social processes and forms of social organization occurring within countries at the expense of those that cut across them (and their interaction with intra-national forces);
3. the prioritization given to the study of single societies at the expense of comparative analyses of social policy capable of providing a rich source of data and theories for “developing” and “developed” worlds alike;
4. what constitutes a transnational actor, institution or process as distinct from a national one;
5. and the ways in which social policies are co-produced in practice by interactions and combinations of national and transnational forces.

**Globalizations and States of Welfare: Perspectives, Debates, Findings**

“Globalization” entered the lexicon of social policy in the 1990s to signal large-scale shifts in the direction of social change. At the heart of this discussion was the general idea that the extension and intensification of cross-border processes of exchange and connection were bringing populations and territories of the world into closer, more intense relations of connectivity and interdependence than ever before. The main focus was on transformations of the economy (finance, production, services) and to a lesser extent on polities, in particular on the changing role and powers of the state. Understandably, perhaps, much of the concern lay with the forces of neoliberalism and processes of
economic liberalization and how these seemed to have taken hold of the content and direction of social and public policies around the world.

The implications of globalization for social policy were not among the primary concerns of the early literatures, but when they did feature transformations in models of social development and the social organization of welfare were largely read off from changes in the structure and institutions of the economy and employment. As the field developed, however, more diverse forms of globalization were “found” and added. With this growing complexity in understandings of globalizations, the multi-faceted implications for societies and, later, welfare institutions and social policy became apparent. Rapidly changing social structures, and sites and modes of social organization in the world economy, politics, and in cultural and social reproduction seemed to be combining in ways that promised to lead to fundamental social transformations, including the conditions of institution-building, the nature of welfare funding, regulation and provision (including the mix of public, commercial, voluntary and informal sectors), the dynamics of policy making, and welfare and wider development outcomes.

From the vantage point of the time, the future outlook for progressive social policies was far from optimistic (at least, from leftist perspectives). Scenarios of rising social polarization, inequality and poverty within and between countries, the wholesale retrenchment of public welfare, the lowering of social, health, labour and environmental standards, and the resurgence of welfare markets and private (commercial, corporate) welfare provision, and the diminution in the quality of social rights (to name but a few) were all issues at the forefront of writing in this area. Few anticipated the strength of countervailing or moderating forces, or the prospects of new political spaces emerging in parallel or in response to globalizing forces, let alone imagined how these could potentially expand the horizons of social policy as a political practice.

As a general point, the onset and timing of globalization-induced changes, their causes and expressions, and their significance and effects were—and remain—matters of intense debate and contestation. Globalization studies is characterized by such different epistemological, methodological and disciplinary approaches that major differences of perspective and conclusions are understandable. For some, globalization is principally an ideological project (of the spread of neoliberalism subjecting states and populations to more intense market forces), while for others it is an ongoing (and unfinished) social process of international socioeconomic integration resulting from technological advancements. Differences exist as to whether globalization represents the beginning of a new global era, with the world experienced as a single place and the inexorable decline of the nation state, the flattening of historically and culturally specific development trajectories, reduced prospects for democratic self-determination and inclusive social development, or whether it is a continuation of existing trends (of global capitalism) whereby “fragmented” social, political and economic systems and local, national and regional contexts (and variations between them) continue to be most significant. Other axes of difference turn on the causes of globalization, manifested in debates about to what are the contemporary dynamics of transnational connection, interaction, integration and institutional development attributable (for example, the pursuit of material interests by dominant nation states and fractions of capital; the expansion of consciousness and perception of living in “one world”; the influence of worldwide (universal) norms and values internationally).

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One’s position on the question of what globalization implies for social policy turns on whether or not one accepts the initial claim that a qualitative shift in the world order has taken place: from the “old” international order based on international relations primarily between nation states, to a “new” order characterized by global relations between transnational actors (whether organized capital or other entities) under which relations between states are subsumed. In other words, conclusions about the degree of autonomy that transnational actors have in relation to states will largely determine conclusions about the implications of globalization for social policy. It is not necessary to subscribe fully to all the tenets of globalization theory in its various forms or reject all elements of its counterpoint (that states remain sovereign), but this is nevertheless a key axis that runs through (and tends to divide) academic scholarship, irrespective of subjects, fields and disciplines. It manifests itself particularly in social policy between those who adhere to a national perspective on social policy, where the primary site of policy formation and decisions about social policy is at country level and focused on the sphere of domestic governance, and those who adhere to a global or transnational perspective which holds that there are discernible transnational actors, institutions and spaces of policy making that are not (wholly or even marginally) contained by the domestic sphere of governance and policy making or dependent on states as final arbiters of policy decisions. These themes resonate throughout the paper.

In “strong” globalization theory,² to paraphrase a large literature, the world economy is dominated by uncontrollable global economic forces and transnational corporations which have been liberated from political constraint, owe no allegiance to any state and (re)locate to wherever in the world market advantage can be envisaged. Capital has broken free from its domestic base to become globally mobile, moving production and profit around the world to its advantage, through institutional pathways and networks created for it by alliances with key social and political elites in national and border-spanning institutions of governance and policy. These supposed “uncontrollable” powers of transnational corporations represent a new stage in the development of capitalism—“a weakening of all aspects of a society founded on national capitalism and the growing power and dynamic of global capitalism” (Petrella 1996: 68).

In this account, the primacy of global forces over national or local ones, and the primacy of economic forces over political ones are emphasized. The “new” institutions of global neoliberalism (dominant states, in particular the United States, but also regional organizations such as the European Union, multinational corporations and the World Trade Organization) became flashpoints for how the social rules of the international economy are rewritten in favour of capital accumulation at the expense of labour (impoverished working conditions and a diminishing social wage). In essence, the world economy had (or was said to be set to) become a globally integrated one, comprising a distinct transnational realm disembedded from the nationally founded social norms and values governing capital accumulation and the social pacts that had built up since the nineteenth century, and one in which corporate motives and operations are the major beneficiaries of rewritten social rules of capital accumulation.

This account of global capital having secured autonomy from and primacy over the national or local realm, then, heralds the “defeat” (or more mildly, the hollowing out) of the nation state and national democratic politics. In this scenario the welfare convergence thesis stands strong. The political power of these global relations among so-called external actors is such that it is said to impose a single model of development on countries. Thus, national policy on comprehensive, redistributive programmes of social provision,

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² The remainder of this section draws heavily on Yeates (1999 and 2001).
full employment and economic growth through inflationary policy are abandoned. As the boundaries of public responsibility are restricted, universalist systems are replaced by selectivist ones in which the state plays a greatly reduced role in welfare provision and non-state sectors (particularly commercial providers) assume a greater one. State responsibility is restricted to the stimulation of the supply of human capital necessary for economic growth and tackling inequities and other social “disorders” that interrupt the smooth operation of the economy and capital accumulation. Geyer (1998: 77) summarizes the convergence thesis well:

[Despite varying national contexts and the policies of differing political parties, the welfare states of the advanced industrial countries should become increasingly similar as the forces of globalization squeeze them into a market-oriented welfare state model. In essence it does not matter whether the national institutional contexts are conservative or social democratic, if the welfare state is conservative, liberal or social democratic; or if a leftist or rightist party is in power, the constraints have become so extreme that only market-conforming welfare state structures will be allowed.

Counter-arguments against “strong” globalization theory cast doubt on the predictions of the radical retrenchment of welfare and diminished capacities of the state’s regulatory and redistributive powers as an outcome of globalization processes (Yeates 1999, 2001, 2002). One major point of contestation is the way in which “globalization” is depicted as new and uncontrollable. Hirst and Thompson (1996) (later, Hirst et al. (2009)) stood tall among those who contested this strong economic globalization script of a distinct coherent transnational realm of integrated economic activities and entities liberated from constraints of the domestic realm and state power. They show that late twentieth century levels of trade, investment and migration are little higher than at the beginning of the twentieth century, and that much of what is passed off as globalization amounts to no more than the intensification of existing exchanges between distinct national entities and some loosening of the grip of governments on these. The global economy is, they argue, still best characterized by transactions between internationalizing yet still distinct national economies under the control of states, in a global governance system in which nation states remain the most powerful actor and arbiter.

In the same vein, globalization had become invoked so often and to such a wide range of phenomena that it often (and problematically) became a catch-all, ready-made explanatory theory of social change more generally. Yet there remained the small problem of method: of being able to sufficiently disentangle globalizations from the effects of other factors and trends impacting on welfare change, including a wide range of internal pressures. Pierson (1998), for example, argued that social policy change in “mature” welfare states is primarily related to the socioeconomic profiles of affluent “post-industrial” societies. The shift from manufacturing to services employment, the expansion and maturation of government social commitments, a demographic shift to an older population are the principal drivers of social policy change, and are related only loosely, if at all, to the changing international economy (Pierson 1998: 540-1).

The assumption of a predetermined economic rationality renders globalization theory vulnerable to accusations of being a totalizing theory and an expansively crude form of economic determinism (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Patel and Pavitt 1991; Green 1997). The portrayal of capital as a unified force with singular interests and objectives is incorrect: capital is as fragmented and fractured as the forces it generates globally. Foreign direct investment in a productive plant has very different interests than speculative capital that flows into real estate and currency speculation, for example.
Domestic and global capital also have different interests: domestic capital has often been at the forefront of arguments for greater, not less, protectionism. Furthermore, this economic determinism underestimates the continued importance of politics (whether progressive or otherwise) in the globalization processes. The depiction of the huge resources of capital and their ability to leave the bargaining table and set up elsewhere has been exaggerated. Most so-called global corporations are decidedly national in their location and make-up (Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1996; De Angelis 1997), and states continue to have strong regulatory powers over capital (Pitelis 1991; Pooley 1991). As Gordon (1987) argued, the relationship between multinationals and governments is “both cooperative and competing, both supportive and conflictual. They operate in a fully dialectical relationship … neither the one nor the other partner is clearly or completely able to dominate” (p. 61). Crucially, capital is dependent on states to perform a range of functions that secure the conditions in which it can operate: the enforcement of property rights, the provision of infrastructure, education, the maintenance of social stability and civil order, and social reproduction.

Because of the focus on unifying economic and technological processes as evidence of greater global interdependence, the continued fragmentation of political and social spheres (including path-dependent welfare) has been relatively neglected. The heterogeneous and path-dependant changes in welfare states in practice offer strong evidence about the moderating and mediating effects of countervailing changes and opposing forces that can restrict the convergence effects of globalization. Diverse responses of welfare states highlight the importance of domestic and transnational spheres of governance, which curtail the state's and capital's margin of operation. The forces and actors forming this diversity include: the nature and strength of ideologies; cultural and religious values and traditions; social identity (national, ethnic, class); social, religious, political and environmental movements; the strength and balance of political power between political parties, and between organized labour, civil associations and capital, and the political compromises between them; colonial legacy; and, last but by no means least, institutional and employment structures (Esping-Andersen 1996; Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005; Garrett 1998; Hay 1998; Pierson 1998; Rhodes 1996; Rieger and Leibfried 1998; Goodman 2001; Swank 2002).

These forces and actors, through resistance and opposition, have altered the international political economy of globalization: local factors across multiple fragmented spheres often play a decisive role in determining the pace, timing and outcomes of globalization. As Mittelman (1996: 232) cogently argued: “Confusion occurs when one overlooks the way that centralizing elements of globalization fuse with distinctive local and regional conditions” (emphasis added). Overall, globalization is neither unitary, nor hegemonic nor uncontested (Yeates 1999, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2014a, 2014b). Border-spanning processes are mediated by and refracted through domestic institutions and local conditions:

[T]he emerging debate on globalization and welfare states shares many of the flaws that can be found in globalization theory, notably with respect to the exaggeration of the strength and degree of unity of capital interests, the underestimation of the powers of the state and of both countervailing changes and oppositional political forces to globalization more generally… [T]he enduring power of “local” factors that impact on and mediate globalization suggests that national institutional, cultural and political differences are likely to prevail rather than be eliminated under the weight of global, “external” forces. (Yeates, 1999: 373)
Instead of the anticipated welfare convergence and homogeneity, we find continued variation and difference, with a multiplicity of forms of globalizations encountered and/or engendered in diverse contexts worldwide. Variegated and path-dependent patterns of development (or under-development) across different zones and territories of the world continue to exist, despite unifying and converging forces (Abu Sharkh and Gough 2010). There continues to be substantial heterogeneity among the welfare states of the Triad countries (the EU, North America, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, East Asia) and within Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries where economic globalization has been at its most intense. Mishra’s (1999) examination of Japan, Germany, Sweden, and a number of Anglo-Saxon countries found “substantial and continuing differences in the approaches, policies and outcomes concerning the welfare state between Anglo-Saxon countries on the one hand and those of Continental Europe and Japan on the other” (p. 102). There is also evidence divergence among countries within regions, such as Latin America and the European Union, where international integration has a long-established track-record. There, relatively similar welfare regimes (by global standards) have developed in a context of a high level of economic integration and where transnational actors have been active in reshaping national social policy for many decades (Yeates 2001). Distinctively different institutional formations of welfare remain even within in these supposed “convergence clubs”.

Examples abound and provide corroborating evidence of diversity in the face of the supposedly overwhelming unifying forces of the global economy and its neoliberalizing pressures. Achterberg and Yerkes’ (2009) 16 country study on convergence and divergence among western welfare states is a case in point. They found that globalization, operationalized as the extent of neo-liberalization, did not lead to overall neoliberal welfare convergence (welfare states resembling each other), as strong globalization theory predicts. Using indicators of neoliberal policy support, generosity of welfare and welfare expenditure, they show that “the most globalised countries are also the neoliberal in their ideology, and are more generous and spend more on social security” (p. 199).

Thus, countries and welfare regimes are converging but not in the ways expected. Liberal welfare regimes became increasingly generous and underwent an ideological shift to the left, but nor was there a move to “unwarranted” welfare generosity in these countries either. The authors’ empirical results show, instead, that the trajectory is towards a “middle-of the road” convergence—in contra-distinction to a neoliberal convergence. Within that, there are different experiences of convergence and divergence, depending on who and what is studied. For instance, countries with higher unemployment rates tend to converge in terms of welfare expansion, while countries respond quite differently (that is, divergently) in terms to a growing share of elderly people in their population. As the authors say, “for most welfare states, this is reason enough to expand generosity, for others it is not” (p. 199).

Schmitt and Starke (2011) in a 21 OECD country study (1980-2005) of welfare convergence argued that globalization influences the pace of welfare convergence, but, echoing Achterberg and Yerkes (2009), this movement is an “upward” convergence process, rather than a “race to the bottom” of neoliberal convergence. Thus, the greater the exposure to the international economy, the higher were spending levels. Convergence, they argue, has taken place both at the aggregate level of the whole welfare state and at the disaggregated levels of principal expenditure categories (old age, family, labour market policies). Notably, their study modelled conditional factors: globalization (as measured by extent of countries’ international economic integration in relation to trade and investment indicators), membership in a regional political club (the EU, which the study tested) and welfare regime type. Membership in regional clubs, in this case the EU,
also accelerates the speed of convergence within its member states—though it was not clear from this study whether it was a result of an economic process or as a result of increased cross-national policy learning (as engendered by the Open Method of Coordination). Finally, welfare regime types influence the speed of convergence, and this holds, they argue, at the level of overall welfare regime but also at the level of policy-specific typologies. For example, structures that emphasize links between contributions and benefits such as corporatist regimes and Bismarckian pension models inhibit convergence (Schmitt and Starke 2011: 131).

Paetzold (2013)’s study of 14 “old” EU Member States (not including Luxembourg), using data from 1980 to 2005, also characterizes overall results as “divergence within convergence”. Focusing on public social expenditure levels and net unemployment and pension replacement rates, his study showed that the convergence process was (again, echoing Schmitt and Stark (2011) and Achterberg and Yerkes (2009) cited above) not of the neoliberal kind nor was it uniform. The upward convergence process in social expenditure occurred among all countries (except the Netherlands) but was fastest in Southern European member states, even controlling for cyclical, socioeconomic and demographic factors. Looking at replacement benefit rates, he found in the area of pensions that rates increased on average (growth being driven by Southern European member states) alongside “negligible” convergence trends in relation to unemployment (with some evidence of declining rates in more than half the countries). Paetzold concludes two principal points. First, the majority of countries follow national trajectories, that national peculiarities and the path dependency of single welfare states continuously produce different welfare outcomes in terms of social rights, even when the challenges they face are similar’ (p. 49). Second, that membership of a regional club (the EU) does not lead to a single social model; rather, the findings “bolster the idea of a ‘European social snake’ with countries moving towards parallel, but different, levels of social provisions” (p 50).

The overwhelming focus of welfare convergence studies have taken OECD and EU countries as their focus, and have not examined the experiences of countries outside those political clubs in poorer parts of the world. Outside of this literature, however, numerous other studies of the experiences of selected countries in the global South confirm that there is no clear-cut convergence game going on and that country “peculiarities” remain pronounced. In relation to South America, for example, Stallings (1992) showed that manifestations of powerful transnational processes during the 1980s and early 1990s came in the form of lending policies and policy prescriptions of multilateral economic institutions. Among other things, these levered support for export-oriented models of industrial development and trade, the diminution of the tax base, public services, privatization of social provision and the reduction of the social wage. However, crucially, domestic regimes were a vital factor determining the extent of compliance with social models sponsored by multilateral economic institutions. The implementation of multilateral agreements, policies, and programmes (of structural adjustment) nationally varied between policy areas and depended on a range of country characteristics such as government ideology, political and social institutional regimes, interest group organization and mobilization, state capacity, and strategic location (Stallings 1992). More generally, and beyond Latin America, policy responses and strategic responses by states to globalizing pressures reflect their particular histories, factor endowments and capacities, as well as their position in the international political system (Palan et al. 1996). The social, economic, cultural, political and institutional contexts in which globalizing strategies and responses are developed are therefore paramount. Victory, defeat or compromise depend on the context in which social policy reforms occur. This is entirely
consistent with the findings of decades of internationally extensive cross-national comparative research, notably the country case studies in UNRISD research projects (current and past).

In sum, more pluralistic conceptions of globalization have emerged which give due emphasis to the multiplicity of globalization processes (including distinctive parallel or alternative strategies of regionalism, nationalism and localism), continued divergence (fragmentation) in social and political spheres (including development contexts, welfare systems and social policies), and the co-existence (or fusion) of unifying and converging forces with distinctive local and regional conditions across different territories and zones of the world. Context still matters greatly, as do countervailing and oppositional forces. Political contestation, resistance and opposition remain a major part of these trends, in that they determine the pace, course, timing and effects of economic globalizations on welfare institutions and the course of social policy change. The ways in which states promote, “receive” and react to globalization differ according to their position within the global political economy (core or periphery, strategic economic or military location), their institutional, cultural and historical traditions and arrangements, and the national balance of forces between the state, labour, capital and civil society—and the compromises between them. And while globalizing forces may straddle the globe (or part thereof), they have to manifest themselves at the regional, national and local levels, at all of which they run into institutions and actors of conformation or opposition.

While no studies found evidence of outright neoliberalization of welfare, and offer some cautious support for the impact of globalizing processes on welfare convergence, it must be said that this conclusion is far from definitive. Studies to date have been uneven in their focus and do not clearly enough distinguish between multiple different globalization processes at work. In the case of the EU between general economic integration versus European social policy versus effects of more general openness and policy learning between member states and non-member states have not been tested. The “most favoured nations” for study are OECD and EU member states, to the neglect of poorer middle-income and low-income countries and the effects of globalizations have been traced in relation to rich-country welfare regimes (liberal, conservative corporate, Bismarckian, etc.) but not on those in poorer country ones (notably in relation to “informal welfare regimes” in Africa and beyond). Attention to quantitative indicators of welfare development and easily enumerated branches of social programmes (with a notable emphasis on social security/protection) prevail, while few studies have looked at different programmes within branches of social (security) expenditure, across sectors of welfare state (health, housing, etc., in addition to social security), or have traced the qualitative changes in social rights and other welfare outcomes. Despite the innovations in welfare convergence literatures in recent years, and the methodological and substantive contributions these have made to our understanding, there remains substantial research to be undertaken in examining the effects of globalization processes on national welfare trajectories.

Trans-border Social Policy: Scope, Instances, Problems of Method

Globalizing corporate activity, international economic integration, and capital accumulation have not been the only focus of academic scholarship on globalization, welfare and social policy. Substantial literatures have demonstrated and reiterated various social and political forms of globalizations and “everyday” border-spanning and transnationalization processes in different spheres. These include spheres of political and
community activism and advocacy campaigns\(^3\); communities, epistemic\(^4\) and diasporic\(^5\); households, families and parenting\(^6\); migration\(^7\); and professions\(^8\). Among these, the transnationalization of public and social policy making has received its fair share of attention (for example, Moutsios (2010) on education; Orenstein (2008a, 2008b, 2011) on pensions; Deacon (2013) on social protection; see also Yeates (2008, 2014a) covering different policy sectors).

Collectively, these literatures have expanded the analytical scope of the wide-ranging types and modes of globalizing, trans-border sociopolitical interaction, connectivity and cooperation that exist beyond international economic competition, economic strategies and corporate actors, directing attention also to diverse state and civil society actors routinely engaged in transnational activities and practices, which at once organize and are organized across international state borders. They point to the existence of transnationalizing processes of different kinds and in different spheres, and to “new” border-spanning and transnational social formations such as networks and institutions.

Not all of these have been purposively dedicated to explaining which actors, institutions and processes shape social policy in particular, but those that have done so have grown in number and scope over the last two decades. The methods, approaches and perspectives they bring are multiform, be it by proceeding through case studies of policy making in spheres of global governance, by tracing the influence of transnational policy on domestic policy reform, by identifying new sub-global transnational political spaces in which social policy projects are inscribed, or by identifying how health and welfare systems and the welfare of populations around the world are connected and interdependent through globe-spanning economic and social networks.

This body of scholarship has lent substantive credence to a far more mixed, complex and interesting picture of the globalizing and transnational states of social policy formation. It has revealed that globalizing forces and structures are variously enabled, governed, regulated and opposed by a wide range of national and transnational actors working (often in conjunction with each other) in relation to defined institutional contexts, within and across myriad domestic and cross-border spheres of governance (Yeates 2002, 2014a, 2014b). Furthermore, as a means of operationalizing the principle of assigning a greater share of the analysis to intersecting (intra, trans-border) social structures, actors and processes shaping social policy development and change, the literatures that focus on the concrete, diverse forms of trans-connections and interdependencies around the world are most promising. This is because it provides a framework capable of understanding multiple border-crossing actors, structures and processes operating at diverse levels and scales in an integrated manner and of capturing instances of dynamic interactions between identifiable policy and other social actors in their contexts, together with the social entities and socio-institutional formations structuring those interactions across those different levels/scales.

Broadly, transnational and global approaches to social policy examine: (i) how social policy issues are increasingly being perceived and understood as being cross-border in scope, cause and impact; (ii) how cross-border flows of people, goods, services, ideas and finance relate to the course of social policy development (as a process, in content or as

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3 For example, Tarrow 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 1999; Smith and Johnson 2002.
4 For example, Haas 1992; Stone 2004; Seabrooke 2013.
5 For example, Baubock and Faist 2010; Pasura 2014.
7 For example, Schiller et al. 1995; Yeates 2009; Faist et al., 2013.
8 For example, Seabrooke 2014; Faulconbridge and Muzio 2012; Negi and Furman 2010.
outcome); (iii) the emergence of transnational forms of collective action, including the development of multilateral and cross-border modes of governance and policy making; and (iv) how those cross-border modes of governance and policy making shape the development and impacts of social policy around the world.

The remainder of this section is organized into three sub-sections. The first of these airs some problems of method in identifying who or what is a transnational actor and a national actor, while the second does similarly in relation to transnational social policy. In the third, the multi-faceted and multidimensional nature of transnational entities and processes are highlighted, and are connected to social policies (and underlying dynamics) of different kinds and in different spheres and loci. Following this, section 4 then turns to illustrate concretely how different border-spanning phenomena connect with social policies in practice. The examples and areas chosen are used to illuminate key theoretical and conceptual propositions identified in the introduction.

**Identifying transnational actors**

Broadly defined, transnational actors are “organizations (multilateral state, or non-state) or individuals that seek to develop and advocate well-elaborated policy proposals in multiple national contexts” (Orenstein 2008b: 1; see also Beland and Orenstein 2009). They are “proposal actors” not just “veto players” (Orenstein 2008b): actors that have control over their own policy agendas (ideas and proposals), and pursue influence over the framing, making and enactment of policy through advocacy initiatives and policy reform campaigns directed at more than one country (Orenstein 2008b). In this view, what distinguishes transnational from national actors is not so much the sphere of governance (multilateral versus national) that they operate in, but that they seek influence the course of events across many countries. As such, they include (but are not confined to) multilateral governmental organizations and other entities seeking policy influence through these organizations. They also embrace policy actors that are embedded in the domestic realm and which operate within and—crucially—beyond it. Transnational policy actors are thus distinguished by their interactions with other actors outside any specific country context in which they operate and the resources they draw on for material, ideational and political support in pursuit of policy influence.

By this definition transnational social policy actors include international governmental organizations, international NGOs, transnational activist networks, epistemic communities, expert networks and policy entrepreneurs. These actors have “all become leading sources of policy norms and ideas in countries worldwide that often exceed their original mandate” (Orenstein 2008b: 6). Importantly, it also includes domestic governments and non-governmental actors (such as businesses engaged in global production and civil society engaged in global policy reform). These are key participants in multilateral spheres of governance and policy making, and exert influence on policy and provision in many other countries through foreign policy (on development, trade, and aid). They act within and through multilateral forums as well as bilaterally (often serially) with other countries. Moreover, domestic policies fall within scope either insofar as they are “made” under conditions of influence by transnational actors (see above) and/or insofar as they tangibly impact upon populations, territories and policy making around the world.

A narrower definition—and arguably a more easily operationalized one—restricts transnational social policy actors to “elite” global institutions and actors. Deacon et al. (1997: 195) defined global social policy as:
a practice of supranational actors [which] embodies global social redistribution, global social regulation, and global social provision and/or empowerment, and … the ways in which supranational organizations shape national social policy.

This definition directs focus to intergovernmental multilateral “global” institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the UN; international non-state actors such as Oxfam working around social development issues; and international consultancy companies providing policy and technical advice. This definition was informed by the authors’ study of changes to the welfare systems in central and eastern Europe, where a range of international actors were vying to influence the direction of national policy reforms. It successfully drew attention to a highly active set of political forces and policy actors that had either been omitted from explanations of national policy change or relegated to the status of “context”. In focusing on these supranational global agencies, this work highlighted how the battle over social policy ideas and programmes was being waged within and between international organizations and how influential competing policy prescriptions were over the course of national social policy reform (Yeates, 2008).

Over time, the scope of who is a transnational policy actor (as well as what is transnational social policy, see section 2.2, below) has been widened while also recognizing a greater diversity of sites, spheres and scales on/across which these actors operate. While a core focus on international governmental organizations (IGOs) remains, there is increasing focus on the multiple socio-spatial sites, levels and scales across which social policy formation occurs and how diverse transnational policy actors are positioned in relation to them. This has brought a welcome expanded focus on sub-global formations, such as regional groupings of countries (for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Union of South American Nations, Southern African Development Community, and United Nations Regional Commissions) and (trans)continental groupings (for example, the African Union and European Union) as sites of and platforms for (global) social policy making (Deacon et al. 2010; Yeates 2014b, 2014c). It has also surfaced sub-national actors and formations in the making of transnational social policy, along with other “non-elite” transnational policy actors and the campaigning networks in which they are embedded and enabled by. With this has opened up a wide range of ways in which social regulation, financing and provision routinely take place across borders and has shone a light on the policy processes and domains not otherwise visible (Yeates 2008, 2014a, 2014b).

With such a wide definition and range of possible transnational policy actors come important methodological conundrums. As Orenstein (2008b: 39) argues, transnational networks may be difficult to recognize because they depend on diffuse (often long-term) social processes and relationships that may not be immediately identifiable. Transnational policy influence is not limited to coercion (for example, through international financial institutions’ loan conditions to indebted countries) and often occurs through “soft” and diffuse means of persuasion. For instance, international organizations may co-opt local actors as one mode of persuasive influence so that what appears as “homegrown” policy is interpreted as domestic policy rather than as a process and outcome of transnational policy influence. Such institutions may also appoint their own employees to high positions in country-level policy reform teams. In some cases, these may be citizens of the country, which further compounds the problem of identification. Concretely, discussing this “coding” problem in his study of global pension privatization, Orenstein (2008b: 39) asks: “Is a reform team with all Estonian members ‘local’ if two of the
members have run World Bank projects in the past? Or are they better understood as local members of a transnational policy network?” Robertson and Dale (2014) make a similar point in relation to the widespread promotion of educational public-private partnerships (PPPs) by international organizations: “Arguably…the most powerful pressure for PPPs as a global education policy has come from a small network of policy entrepreneurs and education experts located at the interstices of a select range of international organizations, transnational education consultancy firms and global universities that include the World Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Centre for British Teachers and Harvard University” (p. 227). They argue that, together, these networks of expertise, advocacy and policy activism are responsible for framing and promoting the idea of PPPs within the wider development policy domain.

Similarly, transnational policy influence may occur through social learning processes. Non-hierarchical social observations of other countries’ experiences in their search for solutions to policy problems are often interpreted as evidence of the significance of domestic policy influence (Orenstein, 2008b: 33-35). However, what are defined as peer countries, which policies are selected for study, and what evidence is used to determine success or failure inform what policy lessons are subsequently drawn and integrated into policy reforms at home may also be steered in different ways by transnational actors embedded in the country as well as international organizations.

Additionally, the organizational forms and methods that transnational policy actors use may underestimate their presence and make their influence more difficult to identify. For example, policy campaigns by transnational campaign coalitions tend to be issue-focused and have the opportunity to shift between different forums when necessary and work at multiple levels of policy making. Multi-sited actors within these transnational networks may divide responsibility for countries among them, thereby giving the appearance that they are national or domestic policy actors. And because mechanisms of contact and coordination may be informal there may be no trail of membership of a wider transnational network. Thus, focusing on one highly visible actor or venue to indicate the extent of transnational policy influence on domestic policy making may underestimate the ways in which policy actors organize, pursue and achieve influence over the content of policy in multiple countries (Orenstein 2008b: 41).

Two examples concretely illustrate this point well. One comes from Orenstein’s (2008a, 2008b) study of the transnational movement and policy campaign for pension privatization, the other from Foli’s (2015) study of conditional cash transfers in the Ghanaian context. In the case of pension privatization, Orenstein argues that one reason for the World Bank’s success in policy influence in the area of pensions is the coalitions (alliances and partnerships) it formed with other policy actors (USAID, regional development banks and domestic policy officials) to provide ongoing intellectual, technical and financial support to lever its policy preferences and proposals to the stage of adoption and implementation (Orenstein 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2011).

Similar processes and conclusions derive from research into the international spread of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). Foli’s (2015) study of CCTs in the Ghanaian context shows the existence of transnational policy networks at work together with a clear insight into the multiple agencies (bilateral, multilateral, national) of international development cooperation that gave rise to the Ghana’s entry into the world of CCTs. She argues that this was, from the outset, a transnational policy process that spanned three continents and took on distinctly regional and national dimensions. Starting in the mid-2000s, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and UNICEF-sponsored study
exchanges between the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development (charged with the implementation of Bolsa Familia) and several African countries. These exchanges were parallel-tracked by an African Union (AU) conference on social protection (with representatives from 13 African countries, Brazil, UN agencies, other development partners and NGOs) recommending greater cooperation between African and other countries on matters of social protection. The resultant Livingstone Call for Action agreement emphasized the implementation of CCTs as part of a broad regional social protection plan. Work between the AU, DFID, Brazil and the UNDP-sponsored International Policy Centre and the African Commission (chaired by Tony Blair) recommended the implementation of CCTs in African countries based on the success of Latin American cash transfer programmes (Commission for Africa, 2005). UK DFID and Brazil formally signed a technical cooperation agreement in 2007. In addition to study trips and publications, conferences, workshops and seminars attended by Ghanaian officials were organized by various organizations including the World Bank, the AU and the Economic Policy Research Institute. Ghana was the first African country to receive technical assistance to support the design of its conditional cash transfer programme, the LEAP.

These examples serve to highlight the broader methodological point captured by Orenstein so well, namely that “evidence of transnational actor involvement needs to be sought at all stages [of the policy process], with the time dimension of reform in mind” (2008b: 163). In this way, process-tracking transnational actor involvement in policy reform from early stages of agenda setting through to the implementation phases and outcomes of the reform process, using comparative case study methods, is vital to capturing this influence (Orenstein 2008b).

These definitional issues reveal both methodological and theoretical points. In one sense, the definition of transnational policy actors can encompass most policy actors. All governments are members of collective forums by virtue of their participation in policy making in international institutions – whether as member states of the United Nations (UN) system, or as member states of regional associations of nations, or as participant members of other international groupings (G77, World Economic Forum, etc). All governments have policies that seek to engage with those beyond its national borders through their foreign policy and overseas programmes, though of course some enjoy greater international presence, ambition, visibility, resources and power than others. And if we consider global consciousness and a sense of belonging to a world society bound by universal liberal norms (human rights, development, equality) then all policy actors are in this sense transnational, in that their agendas are structured by worldwide social norms (Meyer et al. 1997), even if their policy agendas and their methods of pursuing of them do not bear the direct hallmarks of transnationalization processes.

There are other important considerations in defining who or what is a transnational social policy actor. The above definition excludes a multitude of social actors who are among the most emblematically indicative of transnational connectivity and relations of welfare, but who are not organized in relation to policy making: cross-border migrants and individual households. Migrants are invariably excluded from studies of transnational policy actors and influence, unless they are part of migrant (and diasporic) associational groupings seeking direct representation, participation in and influence within policy making processes. Yet their international state border-crossing, propelled and sustained by transnational networks that mobilize and channel their movement and settlement, structure their social relations of belonging and integration. These networks are conduits through which significant social and financial remittances necessary to sustain human
welfare and social development, and they are among the most significant instance of transnational formations and relations of welfare. Their movements and their ongoing relationships with family members “left behind” or living in other countries abroad, also show another level of widespread transnational connectivity otherwise obscured by a focus on the highly institutionalized, visible forums of global policy making. Households and families in-migration and diasporic networks instantiate the transnational relations and provision of welfare, and are key to understanding the critical transnational dimensions and connections within country social policy institutions, politics, policies and practices (Yeates 2009). This point is taken up and concretely illustrated in section 3.

At the same time, the question arises as to whether households and families must necessarily have direct relations with other members overseas in order to be included in transnational processes and as transnational actors. That is, do people or social formations (such as households, or institutions) need to move across international state borders in order to fall within scope of being transnational? This question is discussed further in the following sub-section on methodological issues in the context of identifying where and what are transnational social policies.

**Identifying forms and loci of transnational social policies**

Orenstein’s (2005, 2008a, 2008b) and Yeates’ (1999, 2001, 2008, 2014a) expanded analytical frameworks for studying trans-border social policies lend themselves to a focus on “low-level” transnational social policies as well as those enacted in the bureaus and boardrooms of the most visible multilateral institutions (Yeates 1999). Thus, social policies enacted nationally and sub-nationally may also be included to the extent that they are co-determined by transnational policy actors and are transnational in scope (Orenstein 2005: 177-8; Yeates 1999, 2008, 2014a). This wider definition includes the activities of “non-elite” actors. Examples include social movement and non-governmental organizations operating in the numerous shadow congresses and social forums that accompany international governmental meetings; NGO and local campaigns against local branches of multinational corporations as a sites of global social governance; and household internationalizing strategies (Yeates 1999; 2014a). With this, attention is drawn to the ways in which global social governance is not only multi-tiered (as in local, national, world-regional and global), but also multi-sphered in the sense of encompassing the social regulation of globalizing processes themselves—the activities of businesses’ outsourcing practices and the regulatory apparatus governing actors within global supply chains, of political and bureaucratic elites at state and supra-state levels, and the relations between them (Yeates 1999, 2002).

What we are moving towards, then, emphasizes the embeddedness of transnationalism. Rather than drawing a strict demarcation between the national tier and the transnational or global one, it recognizes the existence of transnational spaces within nation states and the playing out of transnational processes within national territories as well as across them. Transnationalism can be found in national identities, social institutions, economic interactions and political processes as well as in the more visible border-spanning structures and “high-level” forums and processes (Yeates 2008, citing Clarke 2004). This “embedded” transnationalism encompasses a far wider range of social policies and welfare arrangements and practices that hitherto apparent. It includes the “globalizing” strategies of a wide range of social policy actors that impact on welfare institutions and outcomes, whether they be firms and business executives (planning efficiency reforms involving the shedding of staff and relocation of production to another country or subcontracting production to other firms), trade unions (protesting about the offshoring of jobs overseas), consumer movements (initiating campaigns against child labour used in
the production of commodities or price fixing by cartels) or households (recruiting migrant domestic workers from poorer countries to provide social care for their children or elderly parents, or sending a member of the family to work overseas). Attention to the manifestations and dynamics of bottom-up processes (as well as top-down and institutional ones) usefully brings to the fore the ways that social relations of power and authority, of connectedness and responsibility, are structured across distant and proximate geographies.

In short, we need a framework capable of distinguishing between micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis, and the intersections between them. This framework needs to capture concrete instances of and the intersections between (for example) the strategies and experiences at the level of individual households, with the context and effects of institutions, and the wider globalizing economic, cultural and political processes that are at work. In similar vein, a multi-levelled framework cognisant of the inter-connections between local (and other sub-national), national, world-regional and global (multilateral) levels is required. Vocabularies of level and tier often assume supranational entities placed at the top of the hierarchy and city authorities at the bottom, with power and authority travelling downward. More productive, however, is to consider how these different levels are parts of an overall system in which all parts affect each other, with influence “travelling” multi-directionally (including sideways across different social spheres) rather than just from the top down. In this analysis, it is therefore as appropriate to ask questions about the ways in which, and the extent to which, actors located in domestic arenas influence the formation of supranational policy and other transnational policy actors and strategies as it is to ask questions about the ways in which supranational agencies and actors shape the course of national social policy (Yeates 2007).

**Transnational entities and social policy**

By way of beginning to set out such a framework, table 1 presents a typology of transnational entities in relation to social policy. It is illustrative in intent, and can undoubtedly be extended and expanded. It specifies and illustrates different kinds transnational entity and draws out their connection to different kinds social policy actors, actions and policies. Care has been taken to include multiple kinds of social policy actor, whether traditionally conceived of as national or transnational. The table incorporates different types of transnational social entities (column 1) and their definition (column 2), along with their principal motivation (column 3), exemplar instances (column 4), their relevance and implications for social policy in practice (column 5).

**Table 1: Typology of transnational entities and their relevance for social policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of transnational entity</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Social policy connection</th>
<th>Social policy instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic communities</td>
<td>Experts in different countries linked around the production and dissemination of knowledge.</td>
<td>Scientific ideas.</td>
<td>Think tanks, international consultancy firms, research institutes, governmental agencies.</td>
<td>Transfer of social policy ideas, such as competition, equality, social investment, privatisation, universalism and conditionality.</td>
<td>UN/ILO Social Protection Floor initiative.¹ Pensions policy privatization.² Public-private partnerships in health.³ education.⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 | 
7 | Notes: (1) Deacon 2013; (2) Orenstein 2008a, 2008b; (3) Koivusalo 2014; (4) Robertson and Dale 2014; (5) Sugiyama 2011, Leisering and Barrientos 2013; (6) Holden 2014; (7) O’Brien 2014; Farnsworth 2014 | 
6 | Strong opposition to international trade agreements on health and welfare. WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, sustained oppositional campaign to extending free trade rules to health and education. Corporate advocacy in favour of corporate social responsibility and self/voluntary regulation approach, in national and transnational governance structures.  
7 |
Transnational Social Policy Making in Practice: Selected Examples

This section elaborates on aspects of table 1, identifying how transnational fields of social policy are constituted through a vast range of social actors, institutions, ideas, policies and practices operating at different levels and across multiple scales. The discussion is organized around two thematic areas: first, transnational welfare networks, relations and practices, and second, transnational social policy reform campaigns. The discussion focuses on the policy areas of health, labour (and employment), and social protection. The examples drawn upon highlight the intersections of multileveled, multi-scale processes of policy making discussed in section 3. The limits of a paper such as this mean that these can be signalled only summarily, however. The summary of research findings in the following four sub-sections aim to illustrate a key proposition: that social policies are co-produced by interactions of national and transnational processes, and that these co-produced social policies are embedded and realized in relation to defined historical, political-economic, and development contexts.

Health care and migration

Section 3.2 argued that migration processes need to be thought of as instantiating the transnational and global dynamics of social policy. The contemporary health sector provides a good example of border-spanning processes in social policy (regulation, finance and provision). More specifically, the international “trade” in health professionals illustrates diverse layers of connection involved.

By way of context, it is important to note that total global migrant stock is about 244 million people in 2015, approximately 3.3 percent of the world’s population (UNDESA 2015). Though small in percentage terms, this represents a substantial increase since 1960, when the stock was 75 million, and even more recently 2005, where estimates indicated that the total migrant stock was 191 million (Human Development Report 2009). The health sector accounts for one in three international migrants (WHO 2006), and migrants form a sizeable proportion of the contemporary health labour force in many OECD and non-OECD countries. Nurses, for example, illustrate this particularly well. In 2000, foreign-born nurses represented 10.7 percent of the OECD nursing workforce, and nurse migration has increased in many OECD countries since then. Two in three migrant nurses in OECD countries originate from a non-OECD country, with the remaining migrating between OECD countries (OECD 2007; OECD/WHO 2010). The extent of this migration plays out in divergent ways across different countries, but the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand are among the most reliant of OECD countries on foreign-trained medical and nursing staff, with about one in three doctors and one in ten nurses being foreign trained or foreign nationals (OECD/WHO 2010).

There are many factors propelling health professionals and nurses in particular to migrate. Many are drawn to working overseas by higher wages, the desire for wider professional experience, better and more specialized training, increased promotional opportunities and a higher standard of living. The global scarcity of people with their skills means that they can to a certain extent choose the country to which they wish to migrate. This is not to say that such migration is determined by economic or market factors; migration also expresses a desire for travel, adventure, a better climate, greater personal autonomy and

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9 This section is principally derived from Yeates 2009a, 2009b and 2010.
security. It is also prompted by family or kinship obligations to secure socioeconomic status, security and advancement, not only their lifetimes but for future generations. It can be likened to a family transnational social investment strategy on the part of those directly involved, not least because often the decision to migrate is a collective (family) one. The proximity of countries is also relevant. This partly relates to the ease and cost of travel, the existence of a culturally available set of options, and a common language. However, regulatory structures and institutions at home and abroad also play a key role in channelling potential emigrant nurses towards particular destinations (Yeates 2009a, 2009b).

A number of low- and middle-income countries have formulated policies to foster, encourage and facilitate labour export as an economic and social development strategy, whether as an accompaniment to the adoption of export-oriented industrialization policies or as a result of the failure of such policies. These policies were initially seen in Southeast Asia but now extend across many countries within Asia and across diverse regions of the world (Yeates 2009b). In the Asian context, strategies of produce nurses for export are at a variety of different stages of development—from a mature industry in the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, India and Korea, to an incipient industry in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam. The different comparative advantages of different countries may be noted, with China, India and (to a lesser extent) Indonesia possessing major demographic advantages, while both India and the Philippines have English language advantages. The more recent market entrants (Bangladesh and Vietnam) are disadvantaged by a lack of English proficiency and poor quality nursing education, and tend to be confined to local and regional markets (Yeates 2009b). In an emerging mixed economy of public-private actors, international development aid is of particular significance in the development of health professional export markets. For example, Vietnam is using Canadian development aid to upgrade its nursing education, while Bangladesh has been advised to use development aid to found a nursing college consistent with international standards. Here we can see the globalization of nursing education occurring following the creation of a global nursing labour market: countries wishing to export to the global market (that is, to richer countries outside their region) need to ensure their nursing education systems conform to “global” (Western) standards (Yeates 2009b).

Health worker migration is in response to the increasing demand for health care workers in OECD countries. This demand is a result of rising incomes, new medical technology, increased specialization of health services, and population ageing (OECD/WHO 2010). The size of the nurse workforce has failed to keep pace with this growing demand due to the long-term effects under investment in nurse education and training together with a deterioration of working conditions so that many trained and qualified nurses leave the profession for another career offering better education and employment prospects, or emigrate overseas to countries that place greater value on and reward for their skills than their home countries do (WHO 2006).

Many governments (especially in the global North) are increasingly recruiting health labour from abroad to fill their nursing labour shortages at home. At the destination end, states have been active determinants of migration patterns, whether manifested in the initiation of overseas recruitment drives, in recruitment partnerships between state and non-state (commercial or trade union) actors, or in regulatory controls on recruitment brokers (Yeates, 2009a). International recruitment has been broadly encouraged by international organizations and political clubs. The OECD, for example, is supportive of mass international migration of health workers as a viable solution to nurse shortages and failures of local nurse production and retention policies (Yeates and Pillinger 2013).
The impetus for overseas recruitment on the part of recruiting countries in part lies with the length of time it takes to train a nurse, which can be up to seven years between commissioning training places to the output of trained staff. Overseas recruitment of already trained and qualified nurses has become an attractive response to “quick fix” labour gaps. But recruiting overseas nurse labour also provides a substantial cost saving. In Britain, for example, the costs of recruiting a foreign nurse are between 5 and 10 percent of the cost of an experienced nurse already established in the UK (Padarath et al. no date). Importing labour from abroad helps keep wages from rising, as they would be expected to in a situation of scarce labour supply. The health system is thus able to integrate cheaper, flexible and possibly more submissive labour without the costs involved in education and training.

At the same time, many governments across the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are responding to overseas demand for skilled health care labour by adopting policies to produce nurses “for export”. Often these policies are part of a wider strategy to promote labour export as part of economic development, and have been encouraged by international organizations such as the World Bank and others who have supported export-led industrialization strategies more broadly. Such policies are often embedded in economic development strategies but not all are restricted to the domestic level of individual governments. Indeed, policies to manage health migration are rising on the policy agendas of regional organizations (Yeates 2014b; Yeates and Pillinger 2013) as one of an increasing number of social policy issues to which they are responding (Yeates 2014a, 2014b).

In regional social policy, we see competing policy approaches and models being played out between and within different regional organizations. The playing out of these differences involves not just domestic and regional actors but multilateral actors (IGOs) and, for developing regions in particular, development agencies (for example, donors) and international industry and labour interests. Contemporary regional social policy in the Caribbean relating to labour migration, and health worker migration, illustrates this point well (Yeates 2010). There, increases in intraregional migration following the implementation of the Caribbean Single Market raised the need for, and prospects of, a regionally coordinated response on education, training and labour. CARICOM’s Managed Migration Program was one such response, formulated within a context of global approaches to migration management promoted by global agencies such as the International Organization on Migration and the World Health Organization (WHO), and addressed in particular issues of a regional approach to nurse recruitment, retention, deployment, and succession planning throughout the Caribbean. The CARICOM programme is inflected by competing visions variously articulated by global agencies and others about the purpose, nature and orientation of regional policy. In particular, we find, on the one hand, coalitions of domestic, regional, and international actors articulating WHO-inspired visions of a health labour policy founded on principles of self-sufficiency aiming to reduce the attractions of emigration and to improve intraregional health worker migration and regional health worker resource management mechanisms. Alongside the WHO sits the World Bank and its vision of a regional migration policy oriented toward an export-oriented model of health labour production in which the Caribbean becomes a major global provider of health care labour worldwide. This latter vision has taken hold within the regional secretariat and among CARICOM governments. What started out as an attempt to forge a regional self-sufficiency programme may be trans-mutating into a regionalized industrial nurse-export production model resourced by (Northern) donor
agencies, private organizations, and recruitment agencies operating within and outside of the region (Yeates, 2010).

The social and economic development benefits to exporting countries of migrant health workers are said to be many. Migrant remittances support families and communities (through hometown association) projects at home. They invigorate the economy by supporting consumption and investment. Such is the significance (and reliability) of migrant and diasporic remittances that aggregate remittances are also used to assess the credit worth of governments in assessments of sovereign risk enabling cheaper government borrowing in international money markets (OECD 2009; Avendaño et al. 2011). Significantly, the impact of remittances on ratings is enhanced for small, low and middle-income economies (Avendaño et al. 2011).

There are major concerns about the effects of this migration on source countries. Although most countries simultaneously import and export nurses, poorer countries tend only to export nurses. The problem for these countries is that they have no further countries from which to recruit to make up for the losses of their own nurses and consequently experience nursing shortages. In this regard, both the Philippines and India—two major global nurse exporters—experience chronic nursing shortages (Hawkes et al. 2009; Yeates and Pillinger forthcoming). Such problems are not confined to countries which only export nurses. Jamaica, for example, has been able to make up some of its nursing losses by recruiting from Cuba, Guyana, India, Ghana, Burma, Russia and Nigeria, but still experiences serious nurse shortages (Salmon et al. 2007). Sub-Saharan Africa has been especially adversely affected by such shortages, with disadvantaged and rural areas being the worst affected (Adepoju 2010; Dovlo 2007; Awases et al. 2004). The emigration of trained health workers from these poorer countries to rich OECD ones has been described as a “fatal flow” due to its adverse impacts on health outcomes (Chen and Boufford 2005). In Malawi, for example, where 65 percent of nursing posts remain unfilled,\(^{10}\) the high maternal mortality ratio and the inability to expand antiretroviral therapy are attributed to the lack of trained midwives and nurses (Muula et al. 2006). The lack of nursing staff is linked to higher rates of death, disability and morbidity, with this “widening of the population health gap [resulting] in reduced productivity, loss of national economic investment, and potential damage to economic development” (Ahmad 2005). These examples illustrate why international nurse migration is commonly likened to asset stripping and characterized as regressively redistributive. Indeed, it entails a net flow of benefits from poor to rich countries: the economic value of nurse migration from poorer to richer countries exceeds the volume of international medical aid to developing countries. And although migrant remittances provide a significant form of revenue for source countries, remittances are private transfers, so do not flow directly into the public sector or translate into funding health system improvements (Chanda 2003).

In essence, overseas nurse recruitment policies have been developed by richer countries to solve their own (nursing) care shortages, but by doing so they are exporting those very shortages to poorer countries, who are much less able to bear them. Low-income countries are positioned at the bottom of this “global nursing care chain” (Yeates 2009, 2010) and often rely upon voluntary and charitable initiatives from richer countries within their regions or from high income countries (through development aid or international charitable work) to staff their health services. Not only does this contribute to a global public health crisis, but it also distorts and erodes informal social care provision that nurses (the vast majority of whom are women) would have otherwise sustained in their

\(^{10}\) https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-public-health-nurse-shortage/3753825.html
home countries. This is not to say that those emigrant nurses when abroad do not continue
to provide informal social care for their families. Research has shown how they continue
to have contact with and provide care for their families, whether through educational
tuition or emotional support for their children by telephone, or through the remittances
they send home that are used to support family educational, health, and housing costs in
the source country (Yeates 2008, 2009a; Parreñas 2005). They do provide care, but at a
distance.

From this case study we can see multiple kinds of border-spanning actors, institutions and
policies at work. A range of transnational policy and social actors are involved, ranging
from migrants and their families, to local education and commercial entities, to
governments (and sub-national state structures), to multi-level regulatory structures
(unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) and IGOs. Domestic policies on health services
finance and workforce policies are nested in a range of inter-state agreements, policies
and practices that shape access to countries, labour markets and professional occupations
(for example, mutual recognition, licensing, accreditation and immigration; also state
social entitlements and legal guarantees for migrants and family members). Cross-border
movements of people (health professionals) are deeply connected with the
internationalization of labour markets, regulatory systems by national governments and
international organizations, and the spread of social policy ideas among and between them
through transnational governmental and non-governmental networks about how to solve
health labour shortages.

We see the effects of underinvestment in health care and how it shapes labour policies
nationally and internationally. The transnational impacts of domestic policies of
international recruitment of health workers are also seen in the compromised quality of
health care and the health status of populations overseas. Populations and patients are
drawn into relations of interconnectedness and interdependency, while social systems of
labour production and health care services are structurally entwined. If health care staffing
in high income countries is assured by these migration flows, then this is at the expense
of source countries (and their populations) which bear the cost of education and training
health care workers.

At the same time, migrant health workers send significant sums of remittances home to
their families, which feature among the most significant forms of international financial
flows and which outstrip the volume of medical aid to low-income countries. These do
not compensate adequately for the loss of revenue publicly available for re-investment in
health (or other social protections) as they are a form of private finance. At the same time,
the provision of informal care by migrants for their families left behind in the source
country remains enabled by virtue of information, communication and travel
technologies.

The case study also reveals the extent to which social policy questions of distribution and
fairness play out on a global—in addition to a national—scale. In global nurse migration
(as in medical migration more generally), diverse interests coalesce and conflict.
Questions arise as to how the competing interests of state, commercial, professional,
labour and households can be balanced, but also whether these interests can be reconciled.
Is it possible, for example, to balance—let alone reconcile—the needs of individual
nurses and their families in low-income countries with the need for nursing staff to fill
vacancies in middle- and high-income countries with the wider adverse social
development impacts? Put another way, the need for nurses to provide care services for
people in developed countries has to be weighed against the need for nurses in developing
countries to help care for people with HIV/AIDS. This goes to the heart of the global policy problem: how can nurse migration be regulated in the interests of global public health, welfare, care and social development? Several issues arise here. Is it the responsibility of national governments to “self-regulate” in the wider interest of poorer countries? What is the role of national, regional and multilateral international organizations in developing an overall set of rules to which all governments should subscribe? How should such rules be developed, agreed and enforced? Is the answer perhaps not in better regulating nurse migration, but in changing the economics of export-oriented nurse production policies for source and destination countries, or in addressing the problem of uneven development that underlies drivers, pressures and choices to migrate?

**Pension reform**

Social protection is among the most studied areas of transnational policy formation and influence. Of these, the pension privatization campaign is probably the best documented case of how domestic policy reform has been heavily influenced by transnational policy actors. Orenstein’s (2005, 2008a, 2008b) work on pension privatization is seminal in the field. He documented the spread of pension privatization policy around the world especially during the decade between 1994-2005 and clearly showed the prominence of these actors’ role in policy reforms across a wide range of (mostly) middle-income developing countries spanning Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa (see also Orenstein 2008b, 2014). Not all cases of pension reform were explained by transnational actor interventions, but most of the reforming countries were heavily influenced by transnational actors at multiple stages of the policy process (Orenstein 2008a: 163). In both of Kazakhstan and Hungary for example, the World Bank-led coalition with USAID successfully persuaded domestic government leaders to adopt and implement its proposed pension reforms. In these cases, this persuasion was variously achieved by the leverage of loan conditions, a comprehensive strategy for reform adoption (public relations campaigns, access to top advisors and help with drafting reform legislation), access to transitional finance and extensive long-term technical assistance during the implementation phase. In China, World Bank advice and Asian Development Bank finance were paramount during the pension reform process, while in Peru the World Bank was not involved in the design of the pension system but played a supporting role for pension reform there through the provision of three structural adjustment loans, one of which was specifically dedicated to supporting pension reform work (Orenstein 2008a, 2008b).

Orenstein also found evidence of transnational policy failure and the continuation of domestic veto, even in countries where there was extensive involvement by transnational policy actors. Korea and Slovenia are both examples where the World Bank was extensively involved in pension reforms, but was unsuccessful in achieving its reform outcome. In Korea, extreme leverage by the World Bank was resisted by the incoming democrat president in the midst of a major financial crisis and a multibillion dollar structural adjustment loan by the World Bank, which tried to influence the pension reform debate. In Slovenia, the World Bank-backed individual pension accounts proposal was initially strongly supported by the Ministry of Labour but lost that support in the face of opposition from pension experts, trade unions and the Finance Ministry within Slovenia and opposing policy advice from outside the country (EU-sponsored French consultants, and Italian officials) (Orenstein 2008b). In Brazil, the outcome of the World Bank-led

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11 For example, see Müller 2003; Orenstein 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Beland and Orenstein 2009; Deacon 2013; Orenstein and Deacon 2014).
policy reform campaign was not its preferred option of pensions based on the multi-pillar system. In this country case, the World Bank-led coalition of policy actors was forced to accept a less preferred outcome (of notional defined contributions) when its first-choice preference of a system of private accounts was deemed overly financially burdensome (Orenstein 2008b).

The transnational pension privatization coalition was not as successful in developed countries where, even though privatizing reforms were ongoing, the influence of these actors was not evident in the same way as it was in middle-income countries. Orenstein’s study considered countries that adopted private, individual accounts, but received little or no advice or support from transnational policy actors, that is, countries where the reform process was truly “homegrown”. These countries were mainly rich OECD ones, including Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as Chile, the first reforming country. However, it would be wrong to suggest that transnational policy actors had no impact in these countries. Chilean reformers were linked into transnational policy networks that advocated neoliberal reforms, as were their British counterparts. These networks clearly had an impact on their reform designs, but these impacts were more indirect:

   Reviewing the data from this global sample suggests that not all cases of reform can be explained by transnational actor interventions. Some countries adopt these reforms without transnational actor interventions. Some countries adopt these reforms without transnational actor support. In others, transnational actor interventions prove insufficient to overcome domestic opposition. However, the vast majority of reforming countries have been heavily influenced by transnational proposal actors at all stages of the reform process. This holds particularly true for middle-income developing countries. Transnational actors have exerted influence in numerous ways and at numerous stages, but particularly in pre-reform inspiration and technical support. This shows that transnational actors have not merely responded to calls by domestic supporters to assist in reform processes already under way, but have seeded the demand for reform by influencing the ideas of domestic reformers.

   It seems fair to conclude that many cases of reform would not have taken place without the interventions of transnational policy actors. The pension privatization trend would still exist, but would be travelling much more slowly and not have had such an impact on middle-income developing countries. (Orenstein, 2008b: 161-62).

This has not been an unstoppable process. In 2005 pension privatization ground to a halt, with no further countries privatizing their pension systems (Orenstein and Deacon 2014: 197-98). Orenstein attributes this rupture of the pensions privatization movement to several factors, including the failure of President Bush to initiate pension privatization in the US, the re-reform of the Chilean pension system under Michelle Bachelet, and the collapse of the World Bank consensus on pension privatization, as World Bank publications and former World Bank officials “took aim” at the policy (Orenstein and Deacon 2014: 198-99). The 2008 global financial crisis deepened the crisis in pension privatization, and some of the reforming countries dismantled or scaled back their private pension pillars to reduce their borrowing (Orenstein and Deacon 2014, Orenstein 2011).

As this policy case shows, several kinds of transnational policy actor and influence mechanisms are work. In terms of actors, these were multinational IGOs such as the World Bank and international aid organizations such as USAID, and regional development bank such as the ADB acting as coalition partners. They are not monolithic (USAID was often critical of pension privatization reforms during their implementation...
phase), inflexible (the World Bank was forced to concede its first-choice preferences in some cases), always successful (there were notable failures) or unchanging over time (the World Bank withdrew its support for pension privatization in latter). The methods they used varied between countries—for some financial incentives to lever support were sufficient, while strong persuasion was needed in others (especially where like-minded domestic reform actors were vital to the acceptance and implementation of pension privatization). The extent of involvement was varied, and while World Bank was most successful where it had “captured” the policy process through its involvement from the outset it also played only a supporting role in other cases. There are also differences between multilateral institutions: advice given by the World Bank was quite different compared with that given by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the EU in some cases. Nor were these institutions always involved in transnational reform of pensions: the cases of UK and Chile testify to the significance of other transnational policy networks and sources of neoliberal ideational inspiration involved.

**Conditional cash transfers**

Like pensions, policy diffusion is the dominant framework used to study the processes of the emergence, spread and development of conditional forms of social security (hereafter conditional cash transfers, CCTs). The speed and rate of their adoption internationally is indeed remarkable. Under conditions of highly divergent political, demographic and welfare regimes, over the space of a decade (1997-2007) some 30 countries across Latin America, Africa and Asia had developed CCT programmes, and some countries have introduced more than one such programme (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). These programmes are concentrated in low- and middle-income countries in all continents (including Europe), while the size of those programmes in terms of spending and coverage has also grown. CCTs are significant in the context of this paper for two reasons. First, they reveal transnational processes at work and their intersection with domestic arenas (regimes, actors, policy making). Second, they connect with debates in social policy in the global South about whether or not they constitute a pathway towards welfare universalism. On this latter point, it may be too early to say. One concern is that the (geographic and income) targeting methods and the efforts being put into implementing targeting systems of social provision will recalibrate the currently more universalistic systems towards more residualist ones. In any case, the CCT case offers an important laboratory for how post-neoliberal social (protection) programmes emerge and develop in transnational policy fields. In line with current consensus on the likelihood of divergent policy development trajectories:

As the range of countries running CCT programmes diversifies, we would expect their targeting mechanisms, and possibly the outcomes from them, to diversify as well. Some countries may choose universalism over targeting, as Bolivia has done in the Juancito Pinto programme for all first-grade students. Eastern European countries that already have established means testing systems may use those; community-based targeting may play a larger role in Africa and Asia than in Latin America. Moreover, the results that reasonably can be achieved will vary, depending on such context and design features as the range of ages covered by the programme. (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 80)

In many ways, the spread of CCTs seems to be a classic case of the influence of the most visible and global of transnational policy actors—international organizations—on national policy development. Indeed, a key factor in the rise of the CCT as a policy model for addressing poverty is the high degree of support and consensus it rapidly commanded among international organizations. The degree of unity among them cut across
institutions holding markedly different interpretive frameworks on poverty, social policy and development. Alongside the World Bank, four United Nations social agencies (UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, ILO) and regional development banks (in Latin America the Inter-American Development Bank) supported the CCT policy model. As Fenwick argues:

These agencies reach a consensus during the 1990s over what the WB called a two-pronged approach to social protection: economic growth combined with investment in poor people’s human capital, which would be expanded through investments in basic health care and primary education—well-targeted safety nets provided by the state (Fenwick 2013: 147).

The new interpretive framework used to understand poverty was one of social safety nets and residual social provision for the poorest. By some accounts the policy model was a key measure of the success of the World Bank in reframing the global social protection policy agenda (see Deacon 1997, 2007, 2013 on historic battles between the World Bank and the ILO in this arena). But, crucially, because CCTs were framed in terms of rights-based social justice they appealed to a far wider constituency than might otherwise have been expected and helped decontextualize the policy model from neoliberal World Bank social policy approaches (Fenwick 2013, Ancelovici and Jenson 2013).

In nearly every Latin American country where CCTs were adopted, international organizations were involved in some way. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank were consistent partners in these reforms, though UNDP was also a significant actor (especially in an early adopter country, Brazil) (Ancelovici and Jenson 2013: 306). With the exception of the earliest programmes, international funders promoted and subsidized them—in particular the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank in Latin America, and various European foreign aid agencies working in Africa, notably the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Norway, Sweden (Ancelovici and Jenson 2013: 305). In low-income (African) countries, the composition of international organizations and development agencies has differed. There, CCT policy promulgation also involved aid agencies, particularly from Europe, working in tandem with other international and multilateral actors (for example, regional development banks). As with the pensions case, international supporters offered technical assistance and financial support for governments willing to introduce CCT programmes.

In the case of Latin America, the influence of international organizations could not be explained by virtue of the coercive/leverage powers they could mobilize: the debt crisis had long since passed, while the neoliberal economic model that was propounded so strongly by international lending institutions was losing credibility, as was international organization policy advice along with it. At the same time, private capital flows had increased, removing the need to borrow from international financial institutions inclined to ask for policy conditionalities (Teichman 2007: 558). These conditions for international organization involvement were absent, leading one to expect little influence on the social policies of middle-income countries. Yet international organizations have been closely entangled with the development and spread of CCTs.

As with pensions, the spread of the CCT policy model was decidedly a co-production of transnational and domestic policy actors working in alliance with each other. The forms that CCTs take differ across contexts and its dynamics differ. Nevertheless, there is a

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12 The exception was Costa Rica which remained closed to international influence (Franzoni and Voorend 2011).
13 Sugiyama 2011; Franzoni and Voorend 201; Fenwick 2013; Teichman 2013
remarkable degree of similarity across CCT programmes of the world, suggesting the existence of a standard model even if local expressions are evident. Ancelovici and Jenson (2013) argue that in the case of Latin America the spread of CCTs was facilitated by the re-labelling of the provision. In particular, standardized CCT programmes were labelled as social policy rather than aid or emergency relief, even if they were still financed by international banks, aid agencies or NGOs. This designation as social policy blurred the distinction between national sovereignty and foreign aid, allowing countries to reclaim some space for national and local policy. Behind the spread of CCTs is a post-neoliberal discourse that includes the re-legitimization of state action and social investment in the health and human capital of countries’ population stock (Ancelovici and Jenson 2013).

Expert-driven international ideas penetrated the domestic policy process irrespective of domestic regime and circumstances, yet national factors associated with domestic regimes remain significant, in several ways. First, the “topography” of the domestic context matters. Teichman (2007) notes that the history of partnerships between international organizations and government as one factor relevant to the consideration of the degree of openness or closure to international policy prescriptions. These, along with the origins and policy approach of the international organization involved, are important in shaping the character of the policy partnership and the dynamics of the policy development progress, and thus the characteristics of the programme itself.

Teichman (2007: 560) notes that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has “a closer and more cooperative relationship with the governments of Latin America than has been the case for the World Bank.” This is not only because there is a shared “cultural understanding”, with the IDB being of the region, but also because the IDB’s borrower members are also majority shareholders (Teichman 2007). The closeness of the IDB to governments in the region has meant that it has not pushed civil society participation on reluctant governments through its loan facilities. This contrasts with the World Bank, which is more autonomous from regional governments and became more intensively engaged with civil society organizations (Teichman 2007). The relationships the IDB forged shaped the degree of openness of the CCT policy community to it. Yet the degree of openness to international influence varied within the region, too. In Mexico, the transnational policy network is tightly knit and highly integrated, involving a high degree of trust and personalized friendships; it involved the IDB, an overseas consultancy (IFPRI) and Mexican government officials. In Chile, the transnational policy network was institutionally based and less tightly integrated; personal relationships did not play an important role. And, while the World Bank had a less important impact, it was nonetheless significant: it insisted upon civil society involvement in policy making and expressed a lower level of reticence about pushing borrowing on governments on this issue (Teichman 2007: 561). Furthermore, in the context of the specific cases of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Chile in relation to the uptake of the CCT model, Franzoni and Voorend (2011) arrive at similar general conclusions to much of the literature in arguing that there are structural reasons for the degree of influence of international organizations on the course of domestic social policy:

Welfare regimes seem correlated with a larger or smaller role of technocracies in adapting international policy prescriptions...the more informal the country’s welfare regime, the more reliant it is on either international technocracies or lesson drawing from countries with different welfare regimes. Under both state welfare regimes [considered in the study] domestic factors played a larger role in filtering international policy prescriptions (Franzoni and Voorend 2011: 291).
Conclusions

For all the difficulties that the concept of globalization raises, the burgeoning literatures on it have raised an intriguing set of discussions about the ways in which social policy and wider social development are embroiled in cross-border relations of connectivity and interdependence. Theoretical and methodological constructs gravitating around “container” notions of nation states have, it is argued, obscured major transnational social processes affecting the course of social policies (and their outcomes) and the diverse social arrangements in place to ensure full social participation. Indeed, the border-spanning, transnational exchanges and connections surveyed in this paper raise important questions about the determinants and directions of social policy: in a globalizing world, who, where and what are the key drivers and sites of social policy and development? In this, the delineation of different transnational phenomena questions received knowledge about the nation state, sovereignty and territorial autonomy embedded in theoretical models of social policy and development. Fully cognisant of the diversity of globalizing processes in practice, analytically a globalization perspective has the potential to offer key insights into contemporary conditions of social policy and development. It queries whether domestic spheres of governance institutions, actors and ideas shaping social policy can any longer be studied in isolation from their embeddedness in an international society of nations, or from the complex set of border-spanning institutions, rules, values, policies and practices that shape that society and its governance. It challenges the prioritization of single society studies as well as the focus on social processes and forms of social organization occurring within countries at the expense of those that cut across it. And it invites consideration of what kinds of social contracts are needed to address social phenomena and issues that transcend countries, and how these can be put in place and enforced.

The central argument of this paper is that understanding the context, processes and outcomes of social policy (and change) necessitates a thorough consideration of economic, political and social structures, actors, policies and practices that transcend the domestic arena. Research over the last two decades has become increasingly aware of the range of forces beyond the nation state that structure the social issues to which social policies (ostensibly) respond. This research has gravitated around studies of instantiated border-spanning political institutions and actors in relation to identified social policy making processes and issues: on the one hand, the ideas, discourses and programmes of social policy developed by international (multilateral) organizations, and on the other hand the influence of transnational policy actors on domestic social policy change. Additionally, a substantial body of research focuses on so-called lateral structures of production and reproduction that connect social actors and systems of health and welfare provision around the world. Global value chain analyses in relation to labour, migration and health have concretely furthered understandings of the globalization of the world economy and of the welfare state (or system).

From their different theoretical vantage points, these literatures corroborate and elucidate the value of identifying transnational processes in the (re)making of social policy. They provide evidence of the multiple manifestations of transnationalization and its significance in social policy as a political practice. These literatures point to border-spanning social processes being stable, embedded and structuring features of contemporary social policy. They show how embedded transnational actors and policies have become in policy making and provision in developed and developing countries, having substantial and regular involvement in policy processes and in government decision-making, and impacts on institutional development and the content of social provision. Transnational actors frame and shape policy agendas globally, and can change
the course of institutional pathways by exercising coercive and persuasive resources that initiate or progress policy reform initiatives. “Non-elite” transnational social actors are no less important in revealing and forging cross-national relations of interconnectedness between welfare systems: household and family strategies of internationalization respond to conditions of uneven development and opportunity, mobilize substantial amounts of cash and care across borders, supply the labour forces to staff welfare services overseas.

In short, ongoing processes of globalization are producing interconnected and interdependent welfare systems and policies. In this context, the importance of focusing on how domestic policy forges and shapes the transnationalization of welfare systems and structures sociopolitical relations of interconnectedness and interdependency between territories and populations has risen on research agendas. As discussed, these relations are dynamic: they generate new social risks at the same time as they generate new forms of collective action, actors and institutions. The manifestations of these relations are also variable, between contexts and over time. And these relations are pluralistic: the contemporary framing, progressing and materializing of social policy and institutional change involve many different kinds of policy actor operating across multiple spheres and scales of governance and institutional policy sectors. Research strategies that are open to the diverse border-spanning activities, exchanges, links and connections are a vital, indeed essential, feature of contemporary social policy research, both in its “landscape” and “portrait” versions. Such strategies can help better situate and understand the dynamics of social policy formation, and the intersecting forces combining to shape the social organization and relations of welfare within and between countries. They are capable of revealing sources and drivers of new social policy agendas and the arenas in which they are generated, progressed and contested.

A key objective of this paper was to open up a dialogue between methodologically nationalist and methodologically transnationalist approaches. These two analytical methods coexist within social policy research yet they rarely converse, not least because they fundamentally disagree on the degree of autonomy that transnational policy actors have over policy formation. To this end, the paper has sought to find points of contact and dialogue. While making the case for far greater emphasis on research strategies that foreground transnationalization processes, neither a totalizing, determining account of globalization or transnational social policy is advocated; nor do I argue that country-based studies should be dispensed with, or be displaced or superseded by a focus on transnational processes. Rather, better conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools are urgently needed to understand how structures of power and authority are configured and distributed within and across countries, and how the course of social policy making and its outcomes are impacted by this.

The evidence from both national and transnational social policy research both point to two shared principal conclusions. First, that variegated and path-dependent patterns of development and under-development across different territories of the world continue to exist, despite unifying and converging forces. Second, transnational actors, institutions and processes matter in the determination of social policy, but that they do all not matter equally in all contexts all the time. Sometimes they have little discernible influence at all.

A major theme in this field, as we have seen, is the extent to which transnational forces have centralizing and unifying tendencies and effects. Rather than monolithic forces of welfare change leading to worldwide convergence around neoliberal values and neoliberal social structures, we see the co-existence of centralizing, unifying forces alongside continued fragmentation and divergence. Instead of the anticipated inexorable
march to a unified global system of institutions, policy actors and agendas, there is a multiplicity of forces and actors working in different constellations (in alliance as well as in opposition with each other) at different points in time, on different issues, in different settings. Just as there is no single variety of welfare capitalism, or domestic social policy regime, so there is no single variety of social policy or policy agenda. This holds true as much at the level of global policy and international organizations as it does at the national level; at both levels we see fractions and divisions within and between them.

Yet it is clear that some ideas, actors and institutions attain more power and influence over the content and direction of social policy than others. The areas of pensions and cash transfer policies were highlighted examples of transnational actors’ influence over domestic social policy development. In both cases this happened in many countries and different continents and over a short space of time, though the constellation of circumstances, actors and countries involved differed. At the same time, it is far from clear that transnational forces are always significant or determining in the pace, timing and content of policy change—not least because we do not yet have enough research in this area. However, findings from this area suggest that transnational and national actors work closely with one another, within and across multiple venues and sites of policy making. They reciprocally interact with, and influence, one another to structure each other’s agendas. The determinants and sites of social policy making and provision, then, do not lie exclusively within either the domestic or global policy arenas. The question has been—and remains—what constellation of which actors under what conditions are able to produce “new” directions and settlements in social policy.

A key conclusion following on from the findings of this paper is that social policies are co-produced by constellations and combinations of “national” and “transnational” actors, institutions, policies and practices that play out in domestic and cross-border spheres and levels of governance and policy making. The distinction between who or what is a national as opposed to a transnational actor is not always evident, and points to the need for better conceptual and methodological clarity in future studies. Equally, the distinction between a “national” and “global” or “transnational” policy is not always clear-cut. And in the same vein, a better analytical understanding is needed of the intersections between multiple spheres (sub-national, national, cross-border; bilateral, trilateral, regional and multilateral), levels (micro, meso and macro), sites (between different institutions and policy domains), processes (economic, political, social, cultural) in the production of social policy and their outcomes.

We need more research evidence. Global policy making and policy diffusion studies have tended to focus on high visibility cases involving high profile global institutions (particularly those associated with neoliberal, and neoliberal–inspired, policy agendas) and/or “dramatic” events such as crises or where tidal waves of policy reform in many countries has occurred. Greater attention to a wider range of sectors and intersectoral issues, institutional sites and actors, and to “undramatic” events is needed. We need in-depth country-focused studies to understand the myriad of ways in which different social policies are structured and produced by transnational forces, within and between different regions of the world.

Analytically, this is not business as usual in international social policy analysis. Global processes and influences need to be integrated into research design from the outset. Case studies need to go beyond the “single societies” approach to examine other sites, forums and dynamics. Indicatively: the ways in which social policies are embroiled in regional integration processes and projects, and how these variously structure agendas and
decisions about social policy in domestic and global institutions; or the ways in which
advocacy, professions and corporations shape the definition and institutionalization of
social norms and standards in bilateral and multilateral spheres of cross-border
governance, whether bilaterally or multilaterally; or the ways in which transnational
corporate and/or migratory dynamics are reshaping education, social protection and
health systems. In this, the transnational connections between higher-income and lower-
income territories and zones need to be kept to the foreground, as well as between and
among lower-income ones. In similar vein, the ways in which certain Southern actors are
developing capabilities of their own to shape norms and policies within their own
“neighbourhoods” and beyond also constitutes a vital topic (Yeates 2014b, 2014c, 2017).
More cases from other sectors and fields of social policy using a comparative approach
are required in order to distil how actors and networks are differentially structured within
and between different policy areas and how this affects the course of social policy reform.
This could usefully incorporate a wider range of obvious “success” cases of rapidly
spreading policy models, but also of stalled or “failed” policy models.

Comparative methods are essential to this endeavour. Indeed, the empirical questions to
be addressed are essentially of comparative in nature: how are social provision and policy
structured by different kinds of transnational forces? Under what conditions and
circumstances do transnational agendas influence the course of social policy change, and
with what effects? In turn, studies of transnational social policy need to more
systematically account for variation over time, issue/policy area and place. Context-
specific factors—history and geography, institutions and politics—remain of immense
importance in mediating social policy change. If the lessons from the early globalization
literatures are to be carried over to this new research agenda, then it is vital to recognize
that the transnational social relations and organization of welfare are as incomplete and
contested as they are varied in their manifestations and impacts. In short, greater attention
is needed to the ways in which national and transnational processes combine to co-
produce social policy change in defined diverse contexts. Finally, I reiterate the
importance of the methodological tools of comparative analysis in post-national social
politics and policy research. A clearer focus on the co-production of social policy using
comparative research and policy analysis methods is critical to the intellectual and
research challenges of strengthening the evidence base and theory-building about the
sources, drivers, processes, effects and outcomes of contemporary welfare restructuring
and social policy change in widely diverse country and institutional contexts worldwide.
References


