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**Working Paper**

## Improving Business Cycle Forecasts' Accuracy - What Can We Learn from Past Errors?

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Roland Döhrn

# Improving Business Cycle Forecasts' Accuracy

What Can We Learn from Past Errors?

No. 51

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**Roland Döhrn\***

## **Improving Business Cycle Forecasts' Accuracy – What Can We Learn from Past Errors?**

### *Abstract*

This paper addresses the question whether forecasters could have been able to produce better forecasts by using the available information more efficiently (informational efficiency of forecast). It is tested whether forecast errors covariate with indicators such as survey results, monetary data, business cycle indicators, or financial data. Because of the short sampling period and data problems, a non parametric ranked sign test is applied. The analysis is carried out for GDP and its main components. The study differentiates between two types of errors: Type I error occurs when forecasters neglect the information provided by an indicator. As type II error a situation is labelled in which forecasters have given too much weight to an indicator. In a number of cases forecast errors and the indicators are correlated, though mostly at a rather low level of significance. In most cases type I errors have been found. Additional tests reveal that there is little evidence of institution specific as well as forecast horizon specific effects. In many cases, co-variations found for GDP are not reflected in one of the expenditure side components et vice versa.

JEL classification: E370, C530, C420

Keywords: Short term forecast, Forecast evaluation, informational efficiency

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## 1. Background and Structure of the Paper

Evaluating forecasts is an exercise which is done more or less regularly by producers of business cycle forecasts as well as independent researchers. Reviewing recent literature on this issue, the papers aim at quite different directions. Some primarily take the users' view and present implicitly a ranking of different forecasts with respect to their accuracy (e.g. Öller, Barot 2000). Other analyses try to detect common features from various forecasts by different institutions (Rouss, Savioz 2002; Döpke, Fritzsche 2005). A different strand of research comes from institutions evaluating the accuracy of their own forecasts often employing a wide spectrum of statistical measures (Keereman 1999; Kontsogeorgopoulos 2000; Timmermann 2006). Finally, only few researchers try to gather hints from past forecast errors, how to improve future forecasts (for Germany e.g. Neumann, Buscher 1985; Kirchgässner, Savioz 2001; for the U.S. Steckler 2002: 232–233 gives an overview).

This paper tries to add some new evidence to the last category from a forecaster's perspective. For that purpose, some short term forecasts for the German economy the author of the paper is engaged in are analysed. In particular it is asked whether a broad set of information available at the time of the projection has been used properly. This issue is addressed as one aspect of informational efficiency of forecasts in the forecast evaluation literature. Various tests for informational efficiency are proposed having one feature in common: They analyse forecast errors with respect to their correlation with past data supposed to contain information about future economic developments and presumably have been known to the forecaster when he made his prediction. If errors are uncorrelated with such variables, it can be assumed that the accuracy of the forecast could not have been improved by making a better use of these data. If the opposite is true, there should be reason to check, whether the data in question could have been utilised better.

As far as this kind of analyses has been carried out earlier the focus mostly was on GDP forecasts. However, it must be taken into account how short term forecasts are made in practice. Without going into detail, they are mostly built bottom-up, starting with forecast of the expenditure side of GDP at a disaggregated level. These detailed forecasts are added up to yield a GDP forecast, which, however, may be subject to some fine tuning thereafter. Therefore it would help little to improve predictions if a correlation is detected between some economic indicators and the errors of GDP forecasts. If, e.g., it turns out that the error in GDP forecast and share prices are correlated, a forecaster would not know whether he failed in assessing the wealth effect, which would require to scrutinize consumption forecast, or whether he did not take into account properly the impact of share prices on financing conditions and, thus, on investment. Therefore, this paper also takes into account the in-

formational efficiency of forecasts of the expenditure side components of GDP.

The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the concept of informational efficiency of forecasts is discussed and the method employed in this paper is described. Section 3 provides some details about the forecasts considered and gives some measures of their accuracy. Furthermore the short term indicators are described. In Section 4, the results of the tests for information accuracy are presented. The final section offers some conclusions.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 Concepts of Informational Efficiency

Several measures to evaluate forecast efficiency are proposed in literature. A simple test is the so called Mincer-Zarnowitz equation, which regresses the realized rate of growth  $r$  of a variable on the predicted change  $f$  of the same variable

$$(1) \quad r_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot f_t + \varepsilon_t.$$

$\varepsilon_t$  is an error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. In an efficient forecast ("Mincer-Zarnowitz-efficiency"),  $\alpha_0$  should be equal to 0 and  $\alpha_1$  equal to 1, which can be tested by an F-test. In case  $\alpha_1$  is above 1, the forecaster is "timid", i.e. he underestimates high and overestimates low growth rates: The opposite applies if  $\alpha_1$  is lower than 1. If  $\alpha_0$  differs from 0 while  $\alpha_1$  equals 1, the forecast is biased.

For a stronger test for informational efficiency, various extensions of the Mincer-Zarnowitz equation are proposed. One approach is to enclose  $r_{t-1}$  as an additional explanatory variable

$$(2) \quad r_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot f_t + \alpha_2 \cdot r_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t.$$

If  $\alpha_2$  differs from zero significantly, the forecast tends to covariate with the last observation. If  $\alpha_2$  is negative, the forecast is systematically too optimistic in years following a "good" year and over-pessimistic in those following "bad" years. In the case  $\alpha_2$  is positive the opposite applies. In a more direct test  $r_{t-1}$  is replaced by other data  $x_t$  which have been known by the forecaster when making his prediction.

$$(3) \quad r_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot f_t + \alpha_2 \cdot x_{t,t-1} + \varepsilon_t.$$

Whether the factors included in (2) and (3) do really improve a forecast can be tested in different ways. Stekler (2002: 224) proposes the null hypothesis



$\alpha_2 = 0$ , which can be tested by a simple t-test. Holden/Peel (1990) suggest the null hypothesis  $\alpha_0 = 0, \alpha_1 = 1$  and  $\alpha_2 = 0$  and to apply an F-test instead.

## 2.2 A Non-parametric Test

However, these tests might be inappropriate in the case at hand for various reasons. First of all, the number of observations is rather small here, so that the results of the test may be spurious. This problem is aggravated by the fact that in short term forecasts the total error typically can be attributed to a rather small number of cases in which forecast errors are extraordinary large. Therefore it may be more appropriate to employ non-parametric tests as e.g. a sign test which has been suggested for similar applications (e.g. forecast comparisons; Diebold, Mariano 1999: 392). A less sophisticated testing technique may also be suitable because of the quality of the data: On the one hand, real time data for the indicators  $x$  would be required to get an adequate picture of the forecaster's information background. These are, however, hard to collect for many indicators. On the other hand, the forecast errors measured can only be approximations of the "true" error, because many institutions rounded off their forecast values to 0.5 percentage points until the late 1990s.

Therefore the subsequent analyses will be based on a non-parametric test which has been proposed by Campbell/Ghysels (1995). In the following the forecast errors will be denoted as

$$(4) \quad e_t = f_t - r_t.$$

As the test is based on the number of positive signs of  $e$ , it can only be applied for unbiased forecasts. Therefore, a sign test for unbiasedness will be applied at first whether the median forecast is 0

$$(5) \quad S = \sum_t I_+(e_t)$$

where:

$$I_+(e_t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } e_t > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

$S$  is cumulative binominal distributed with probability 0.5. In our case ( $n=14$ ), unbiasedness must be rejected in a two tailed test on a 10% level, if the number of positive signs is not larger than 3 or above 11 (5%: 2 or 12; 1%: 1 or 13). To take into account a potential bias,  $e_t$  will be corrected subsequently by subtracting the median bias

$$(6) \quad e_t^c = e_t - \text{median}(e_{t-n}, e_{t-n+1}, \dots, e_t).$$

There is a further reason why (3) may lead to wrong results when it is applied in a way widely used. In the estimate the entire sample of forecast errors and indicators is used. But this is not the typical situation a forecaster is in: In period  $t$  he only knows the  $t-1, t-2 \dots$  observations. In the regression, also the  $t+1, t+2 \dots$  data are used. Therefore, the test for informational efficiency as described in (3) may be misleading. To avoid this problem here, the  $x$  will be “normalised” with respect to past data. Campbell/Ghysels (1995) propose in this context to subtract the median of  $x$  in the most recent  $k$  years from  $x$ . The transformation is similar to (6)

$$(7) \quad x_{t,k}^c = x_t - \text{median}(x_{t-k}, x_{t-k+1}, \dots, x_t).$$

If  $x$  follows a clear upward (downward) trend, this transformation could result in  $x^c$  being positive (negative) in most cases. Therefore the  $x$  must be transformed in a way making the indicators stationary. Subsequently in the case of non-stationary indicators, their growth rates will be used to conduct the test.

Having done this, the orthogonality test for independence of  $e$  and  $x$  can be based on a rather simple statistic

$$(8) \quad z_t^k = e_t \cdot x_{t,k}^c.$$

Defining  $I_+$  in the same way as in (5), a first test statistic can be calculated as:

$$(9) \quad SO = \sum_t I_+(z_t^k).$$

It is cumulative binominal distributed with probability 0.5. The critical values are the same as cited before.

The sign test requires rather weak assumptions only, but it is on the other hand also a rather weak test. If errors are distributed symmetrically, a ranked sign test can be applied which was proposed by Campbell/Ghysels (1995: 23–24)<sup>1</sup>. In this test, the absolute forecast errors are ranked, and the ranks are used as weights for the signs in (9)

$$(10) \quad WO = \sum_t I_+(z_t^k) \cdot \text{rank}(|e_t|).$$

$WO$  is Wilcoxon rank signed distributed. For small samples, the critical values can be taken from special tables (e.g. Siegel 1956: 254). In the present case of 14 observations the hypothesis that  $x_{t,k}$  and  $e_t$  are independent must be rejected on a 10%-level when the sum of positive ranks is above 80 or below 25 (5%: 84 and 21; 1%: 92 and 13) in a two tailed test. For large samples, the

<sup>1</sup> For a deduction of this test see Campbell/Dufour 1995.

Gaussian distribution can be applied after having standardized  $WO^2$ . In the present case, the critical values calculated from the Gaussian distribution differ little from those taken from the tables. As the application of the Gaussian distribution makes it easier to conduct a large number of tests, it will be applied here.

### 2.3 Type I and Type II Errors

When using data to make a prediction, forecasters may be wrong in two ways. Firstly, they may neglect some indicators that would be useful for the forecast, or they underestimate their influence (type I error). Secondly, they may put too much emphasis on an indicator (type II error). These two cases will be illustrated by an example: If business surveys indicate more optimistic expectations in the manufacturing sector ( $x_t^c$  is positive), some forecasters may revise their prediction on GDP upward, some not. After GDP figures being published, and having compared forecasts with realisation it may turn out, that some forecasters may have been too pessimistic, because they did not sufficiently pay attention to the business expectation index. In the terminology used here, they made a type I error. If this happened several times in the past, forecast errors tend to be negative whenever business expectations improved. Hence, a type I error would show up in low values of  $WO$ . Some forecasters, on the other hand, may overdue. They may take any indication that expectations improve to revise their forecast upward, what in the rear view may turn out to be over-optimistic. That is the typical case of the type II error. It will lead to high values of  $WO$ . To be able to distinguish these two cases, all  $x^c$  variables in this study will be standardized in a way that positive (negative) values can be interpreted as indicators of high (low) growth rates.

## 3. Data Description

### 3.1 Forecasts Analysed

Subsequently the information efficiency of the forecasts produced by RWI Essen and the *Gemeinschaftsdiagnose* (GD) will be tested. Both predictions are outcomes of a national accounts based iterative forecasting procedure, which allows integrating various forecasting techniques. Hence it is not clear, what role the indicators considered later play in the end in making these forecasts. Therefore, this kind of forecast is highly suitable for the analyses carried out here.

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<sup>2</sup> The mean of the Wilcoxon test statistic with  $n$  observations is  $(n+1)/4$  and its variance  $n(n+1)(2n+1)/24$ . In the literature different thresholds can be found to mark whether a sample is large.

RWI Essen publishes a GDP forecast twice a year, in February and July<sup>3</sup>, providing predictions for the current and for the next year (*RWI : Konjunkturberichte*). The February report contains a forecast for the next year only since 1998. Therefore, the forecast published in February for the following year cannot be analysed here due to an insufficient number of observations. The July forecast has a horizon of 7 quarters. All in all, three forecasts per year can be analysed subsequent. They are named according to their forecast horizon in terms of quarterly GDP figures to be projected:

- The July forecast for the following year with a horizon of 7 quarters (RWI-7),
- the February prediction of the current year with a horizon of 4 quarters (RWI-4), and finally
- the July forecast of the current year with an horizon of 3 quarters (RWI-3).

The forecast of the GD is a result of the joint effort of six (up to 1993 five) leading German economic research institutes (Arbeitsgemeinschaft, var. years), one of them being RWI Essen. It is commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Economics and published twice a year, in April and October. In April it comprises a forecast horizon of 8 (before 1997 of 4) quarters, the first quarter of the current year being still a forecast, in October the forecast period is 6 quarters. Again, the April forecast for the next year does not offer a sufficient number of data. Therefore, three forecasts from the GD can be analysed in this study:

- The October forecasts for the following year with a horizon of 6 quarters (GD-6),
- Those issued in April of the current year with a forecast horizon of 4 quarters (GD-4).
- Finally, the October forecasts for the current year with a horizon of 2 quarters (GD-2).

From a statistical point of view, it is desirable to analyse forecast accuracy over a long period to have a sufficient number of observations. However, the methodology as well as the data background of the forecasts underwent considerable changes over the last decades. National accounts data as well as many business cycle indicators are published more up to date today than they have been in the past. Furthermore, forecast methods as well as the personal and professional background of the forecasters might have changed. An analysis over a very long period could be spoilt by these factors too much. Hence, this

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<sup>3</sup> For the RWI forecast the publication date varies to some extent, but in each year it includes the data for the same number of quarters from the national accounts. The flash forecast for the year ahead published in December will be neglected subsequently, as it did not differ substantially from the February forecast.

Table 1

**Accuracy of Forecasts of Annual GDP Growth in Germany**  
1991–2004

Institution	Forecast horizon (quarters)	Month published	Mean Absolute Forecasting Error (MAFE)	Mean Squared Forecasting Error (MSFE)	BIAS
RWI (RWI-7)	7	July	1.26	2.87	1.03
IMF	6	September	1.22	2.93	0.96
GD (GD-6)	6	October	0.99	1.47	0.64
Sachverständigenrat	6	November	0.84	1.17	0.47
EU	6	November	0.91	1.32	0.56
OECD	6	December	0.92	1.35	0.45
Jahreswirtschaftsbericht	5	January	0.75	0.90	0.49
RWI (RWI-4)	4	February	0.76	0.98	0.54
IMF	4	April	0.53	0.45	0.11
GD (GD-4)	4	April	0.57	0.48	0.09
EU	3	May	0.55	0.50	0.11
OECD	3	June	0.49	0.45	0.06
RWI (RWI-3)	3	July	0.40	0.30	0.16
GD (GD-2)	2	October	0.17	0.04	0.05
Author's computations.					

paper is restricted to the years after 1991, taking the German unification as a “natural” break. From 1991 to 1994 forecasts for Western Germany only and thereafter for the unified Germany are considered. The sample period ends 2004.

National accounts data are often revised quite substantially after the first publication (Braakmann 2003; Öller, Hansson 2002). Therefore it is difficult to determine what figures should serve as “realisations” to compare the forecast with. In the following, the first published quarterly national accounts are taken as a yardstick. This procedure has been employed in other forecast evaluations too (e.g. Kirchgässner, Savioz 2001: 358). It seems plausible since the first “official” data are based mostly on the information which also forms the background of the forecast. Later revisions may be substantial, but they hardly could have been anticipated, in particular if they emerge from new definitions in the national accounts or from changed methods to compile data.

Table 1 compares some measures of forecast accuracy of the six GDP forecasts under scrutiny with a sample of other projections, partly from international institutions. It shows that the Mean Absolute Forecasting Error (MAFE) as well as the Mean Squared Forecasting Error (MSFE) and the BIAS do not differ to much from the values calculated for other forecasts published at the same time. Hence, the predictions analysed here seem to be state of the art.

Table 2

**Accuracy of RWI-4 and GD-4 Forecasts of the Annual Growth of GDP Components**  
1991–2004

	RWI-4			GD-4		
	MAFE	MSFE	BIAS	MAFE	MSFE	BIAS
Private consumption	0,91	1,12	0,61	0,71	0,75	0,30
Government consumption	0,69	0,64	–0,19	0,69	0,63	–0,20
Investment in						
equipment	4,61	31,27	3,61	3,71	21,14	2,46
structures	2,78	9,26	1,72	2,53	9,05	0,84
Export	3,33	17,04	0,76	2,90	11,11	0,03
Import	3,14	22,68	1,40	3,19	18,05	1,11
GDP	0,76	0,98	0,54	0,51	0,43	0,11

Author's computations

As already noted, short term predictions are mostly made bottom up. Even if in the very short run (1–2 quarters) the sectoral production forecasts also may play an important role, in the end the forecasts are dominated by projections of the demand side of GDP. Therefore, in addition to GDP also the efficiency of forecasts of the demand categories will be analysed. Attention will be paid to private (PC) and public consumption expenditure (GC), investment in equipment (IEQ) and structures (IS), and, finally, exports (EX) and imports (IM).

Table 2 presents some statistics of the accuracy of the demand side forecasts, taking the RWI-4 and GD-4 forecasts as examples. It clearly can be seen that the accuracy of the GDP forecast is owed to compensating errors: For almost each component, government consumption being the only exception, the forecast error is by far larger than that for GDP. Investment in equipment shows the largest error, and the forecasts are markedly biased upward. Large errors also occur in export and import forecasts. The somewhat better performance of GD-4 compared to RWI-4 is partly owed to the fact that the first is published at a minimum of 4 weeks later than the second which allows to make use of additional information helping to improve accuracy.

### 3.2 Short Term Indicators Employed

There is no clear rule at hand, which short term indicators should be employed in the tests to follow. As a rule, forecasters use many data for their work. Therefore, numerous variables could be tested whether they were used efficiently and a selection has to be made to restrict the scope of the further analysis. Subsequently five types of variables will be considered (for a detailed documentation of the indicators see annex.):

- *Economic sentiment variables*: Three indicators will be used: ifo business climate (IFOC), ifo business expectations (IFOE) and the consumer senti-

ment index (CSI) which is published by the European Commission. IFOC and IFOE are available during the last week of each month presenting the results for current month. For our test it is assumed that the forecasters know the data of the month before their forecast is published. The CSI is issued with a longer lag. It is assumed forecasters know the result of the last but one month. For forecasts published in July, e.g., the May CSI is included in our test.

- Three variants of *leading indicators* from official sources are considered: Total (NOMT) as well as foreign new orders in manufacturing (NOMF) are published by the German statistical office approximately 6 weeks after the end of the month the data were collected. New orders in construction (NOC) are issued about 2 weeks later. When forecasters issue their July forecast, they know the May data on orderbooks as a rule. As there are huge short term fluctuations in the data sometimes, they are smoothed by calculating two month averages of seasonal adjusted indicators. Using month over month changes makes sure that the data are stationary.
- Various interest rates as well as the real effective exchange rate are considered as *monetary variables*. These data are available very shortly after the end of a month. Therefore averages of the rates for the month before the forecast is published are included in the analysis. Thus, the yield curve (YC = long term rate LR minus short term rate SR), and the real short term rate (RSR) as an indicator of monetary policy stance. As monetary policy often shows its impact with long lags, also averages of the short term (SR-1), the long term (LR-1), and the real short term interest rate (RSR-1) as well as of the yield curve (YC-1) over the entire year before the forecast are introduced into our calculations. Kirchgässner/Savioz (2001) found a correlation between forecast errors and interest rates when they tested for such long lags<sup>4</sup>. As the interest rates are already stationary, no transformation is required. Furthermore the real effective exchange rate is included as a monetary indicator, in two variants: the year over year change in the last month (REER) as well as of the average of the last three months (REER3).
- As *financial market indicators* share price index CDAX is included in our study. Again, two transformations are tested: Firstly, the year over year change in the month before the forecast (CDAX) is published, secondly the change of the three previous months (CDAX3).
- Finally, the OECD composite leading indicator (OECD) is tested. It combines various data already considered here, namely the ifo business climate (IFOC) and total new orders in manufacturing (NOMT) with financial data (YC) and additional information taken from the ifo business survey (OECD 2002: 31).

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<sup>4</sup> We refrained from including monetary aggregates such as M3 into the calculations as there is a break in the time series due to the start of EMU.

All these indicators are available at least back to 1979, CSI being the only exception (since 1985). The calculate the “centered” indicators according to (7), the median of the observations over the last 10 years is subtracted from the figure included in the test; the median has been calculated for monthly data. Before 1991 West German data have been used, thereafter data for unified Germany.

#### 4. Results of the Tests

In a first step it is tested whether the forecasts considered are unbiased (table 3). As this is not the case in particular for the projections with longer horizons and for most of the forecasts of private consumption expenditure (PC), the correction described in (6) has been applied to all forecasts. After this transformation the rank signed test is calculated.

Table 4 summarizes the results of the orthogonality test. In 100 out of 798 combinations of indicators, economic aggregates and forecasts co-variation was found which was significant at least at a 10%-level. Before making reference to specific results, some more general conclusions can be presented first:

- In many cases (45 out of 100) a co-variation between forecast errors and economic indicators is significant at a 10%-level only, giving a rather weak indication for possibilities to improve forecasts.
- There is no indication that the two forecasters exploit the data in a different way; in 44 cases a co-variation of indicators with the RWI forecast errors was found, in 56 cases with the GD forecast errors.  $\chi^2$  shows that the differences are not significant.
- Comparing forecasts of different horizons, a closer look at the indicators might help to improve the forecasts with a 4 months horizon in particular (40 cases). A smaller number of significant correlations was found for the forecast with longer (RWI-7, GD-6: 29 cases) as well with a shorter horizon (RWI-3, GD-4: 31 cases).
- Most correlations (30) are observed with errors in GDP forecasts. On the other hand, only in 6 cases errors in investment in structures forecasts covariate significantly with any of the indicators considered. For government consumption the number of correlations is quite small (9), too. For investment in equipment, which is the forecast with the highest average error, 15 cases of significant correlations are observed.
- If a correlation is detected between an indicator and GDP, the same indicator as a rule does not covariate with one of the demand side components of GDP et vice versa.
- Type I errors (72 out of 100) predominate, i.e. forecasters make insufficient use of some indicators. On the other hand, they over-estimate the impact of



Table 3

**Test for BIAS of the Forecasts Considered<sup>1</sup>**

1991–2004, S-values and their level of significance

	RWI-7	RWI-4	RWI-3	GD-6	GD-4	GD-2
GDP	12**	10	8	10	7	8
Private consumption (PC)	12**	12**	10	12**	10	7
Government consumption (GC)	7	6	5	5	6	2**
Investment in equipment (IEQ)	11*	11*	11*	10	9	9
Investment in structures (IS)	10	11*	9	10	10	6
Exports (EX)	9	8	8	8	5	6
Imports (IM)	9	8	9	8	7	9

Author's computations. – <sup>1</sup>See eq. (8). For abbreviations see tables 1. Level of significance: \*\*\* 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

the indicators only in a few cases. In the RWI forecasts the type II error is more common (21 cases) than in the GD forecasts.

Addressing some specific findings, an outstanding result is the strong correlation of changes in the OECD leading indicator with errors of the forecasts with relative long horizons, in particular the GD-6 forecast. Indeed, OECD (2002: 33) shows in hindsight that some turning points in the business cycle were indicated by the OECD index with a rather long lead in the 1990s. This was particularly true for the start of the downturn in 1992 and the recovery in 1993. The forecasters obviously were not aware of these interrelations in the past. But surprisingly the result for GDP is not mirrored in any of the GDP components.

One important source for calculating the OECD leading indicator is the ifo business survey. Therefore, it is not very surprising that forecast errors also covariate with ifo business expectations. However, it is a bit surprising that the survey contains some information that might help to improve even the GD-6 forecast, because the companies were asked to assess their expectation over the next six months only. But again, this interrelation is not mirrored in the components of GDP.

Finally, a strong correlation is also found between errors in the GDP forecast of GD-4 and GD-2 on the one hand and share prices on the other hand. At least in GD-4 the forecast error of exports also shows some co-variation with changes in share prices. Other channels through which the share market can be expected to influence GDP growth seem to have been taken into account correctly: Neither private consumption expenditure nor investment in equipment show any interrelation.

Table 4

**Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test<sup>1</sup>**

1991–2004

Indicator		RWI-7	RWI-4	RWI-3	GD-6	GD-4	GD-2
ifo business expectations (IFOE)	GDP		20,5**		4***	15,5**	21**
	PC					20**	
	GC						
	IEQ	81*					
	IS						
	EX						
	IM						
ifo business climate (IFOC)	GDP					25,5*	
	PC				17,5**	21,5*	
	GC		20**				
	IEQ	89**					24,5*
	IS						
	EX						
	IM						
Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI)	GDP						23,5*
	PC					23,5*	23*
	GC		26*				
	IEQ						
	IS	90**					
	EX						
	IM						13**
OECD leading indicator (OECD)	GDP	15,5**			0***	25*	11,5**
	PC					21**	
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						
	EX		18**	13,5**			
	IM	24*			21**		
New orders manufacturing sector (NOMT)	GDP					18,5**	
	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						
	EX						
	IM		87**				
New foreign orders manufacturing sector (NOMF)	GDP						
	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						
	EX						
	IM	17**	82*				
New orders construction sector (NOC)	GDP						
	PC	21**					
	GC						
	IEQ		94***		85**		
	IS						
	EX						
	IM						

Table 4 cont.

**Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test<sup>1</sup>**

1991–2004

Indicator		RWI-7	RWI-4	RWI-3	GD-6	GD-4	GD-2
Short term interest rate (SR)	GDP						
	PC			83*			
	GC			85,5**			
	IEQ		17,5**		9***		
	IS						
	EX	25*					
Long term interest rate (LR)	IM						82*
	GDP						20**
	PC						
	GC			83,5*			81,5*
	IEQ						
	IS	85**	79*		81,5*		
Interest rate spread (YC)	EX						11,5**
	IM				26*		
	GDP				16,5**	15,5**	
	PC						80,5*
	GC						
	IEQ				22*		
Short term interest rate–1 (SR–1)	IS						
	EX			25,5*			
	IM						
	GDP					24,5*	24,5*
	PC						
	GC			80,5*			
Long term interest rate–1 (LR–1)	IEQ		21,5*		24*		
	IS						
	EX						
	IM		14**		23*		
	GDP						24,5*
	PC						
Interest rate spread–1 (YC–1)	GC						79,5*
	IEQ						
	IS	79*					
	EX						9,5***
	IM		22*				
	GDP					10,5***	
Real short term interest rate (RSR)	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						
	EX		81*		26*	14,5**	24*
	IM			81,5*			89**
Real short term interest rate (RSR)	GDP						
	PC						
	GC		81*				
	IEQ						
	IS		89**				
	EX		22*		23*		
Real short term interest rate (RSR)	IM			95***			
	GDP						
	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						

Table 4 cont.

**Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test<sup>1</sup>**  
1991–2004

Indicator		RWI-7	RWI-4	RWI-3	GD-6	GD-4	GD-2
Real short term interest rate-1 (RSR-1)	GDP				26*	21**	
	PC	82,5*					
	GC						
	IEQ						
	IS						
	EX						
	IM						
Real effective exchange rate (REER)	GDP		24*				18,5**
	PC			81*			
	GC						
	IEQ					16**	
	IS						
	EX						
	IM						
Real effective exchange rate3 (REER3)	GDP		17**				18,5**
	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ	79,5*		26*		16**	
	IS						
	EX	80,5*					
	IM						
Share price index (CDAX)	GDP					3***	23,5*
	PC						
	GC				25*		
	IEQ		18**				
	IS						
	EX					21**	
	IM		17**				
Share price index3 (CDAX3)	GDP					3***	19**
	PC						
	GC						
	IEQ		18**				
	IS						
	EX					21**	
	IM		17**				

Author's computations. – <sup>1</sup>See eq. (10). For abbreviations see text and Annex.- Level of significance: \*\*\* 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

## 5. Conclusions

When evaluating their prediction errors, forecasters are in a dilemma to some extent. If their projections are unbiased and efficient, they have done a good job. But there is no lesson how to improve future forecasts, with no respect to the past accuracy. If errors appear to be systematic, this signals that not all information has been taken into account in an appropriate way. But this offers the chance to improve the quality in the future. This paper scrutinizes the information efficiency of German short term forecasts in order to evaluate, whether past forecast errors provide lessons for the future.

Even though correlations between short term indicators and forecast errors were found in a considerable number of cases, the results give little reason for optimism that a better use of information may help to improve forecast accuracy. Quite often the correlations show a low level of significance. There are only a few candidates whose ability to improve forecasts should be scrutinized more thoroughly. One of them is the OECD leading indicator and another share prices. More important is that co-variations are detected mostly either for GDP only and not for any of its demand side components, or they appear in some components, but not in GDP. As short term forecasts are made bottom up, the study gives no hint, where to integrate additional information.

However, the limitations of this analysis should not be forgotten. Firstly, the selection of indicators as well as the choice of lags is arbitrary. Maybe other indicators or longer lags show better results. Secondly, only pair wise correlations are calculated. It is not tested, whether forecasters draw the right conclusions from combinations of indicators.

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## Annex

### List of Indicators Analysed

Abbrevia- tion	Indicator	Source	Transformation	Lag <sup>1</sup>
CSI	Consumer Sentiment Index	Europ. Comm.	seasonally adjusted	t-2
CDAX	Share price index CDAX	Bundesbank	year over year change	t-1
CDAX3	Share price index CDAX	Bundesbank	3 month moving average, year over year change	t-1
IFOC	ifo business climate, manu- facturing	ifo	seasonally adjusted	t-1
IFOE	ifo business expectations, manufacturing	ifo	seasonally adjusted	t-1
LR	Long term interest rate, 10 years government bond yields	Bundesbank	–	t-1
LR-1	Long term interest rate, 10 year sgovernment bond yields	Bundesbank	12 month moving average	t-1
NOC	New orders construction sector	Destatis	year over year change	t-2
NOMF	New foreign orders manu- facturing sector	Destatis	2 month moving average, month over month change	t-2
NOMT	New orders manufacturing sector	Destatis	2 month moving average, month over month change	t-2
OECD	OECD leading indicator Germany	OECD	2 month moving average, month over month change	t-2
REER	Real effective exchange rate; Index of price competitive- ness of the German economy against 19 industrialised countries, deflated with con- sumer prices	Bundesbank	year over year change	t-1
REER3	Real effective exchange rate (see above)	Bundesbank	3 month moving average, year over year change	t-1
RSR	Real short term interest rate; short term rate (SR) deflated by consumer price inflation	Bundesbank	–	t-1
RSR-1	Real short term interest rate; short term rate (SR) deflated by consumer price inflation	Bundesbank	12 month moving average	t-1
SR	Short term interest rate, 3 month Euribor	Bundesbank	–	t-1
SR-1	Short term interest rate, 3 month Euribor	Bundesbank	12 month moving average	t-1
YC	Interest rate spread; long term minus short term rate	Bundesbank	–	t-1
YC-1	Interest rate spread; long term (LR) minus short term rate (SR)	Bundesbank	12 month moving average	t-1

<sup>1</sup>t-1 indicates that for forecasts e.g. published in March the February results of the indicator were included in the study.