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The Competitive Effects of Linking Electricity Markets Across Space and Time

Thomas Tangerås and Frank A. Wolak

The Competitive Effects of Linking Electricity Markets Across Space and Time*

Thomas P. Tangerås[†] and Frank A. Wolak[‡]

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Abstract

We show that a common regulatory mandate in electricity markets that use location-based pricing that requires all customers to purchase their wholesale electricity at the same quantity-weighted average of the locational prices can increase the performance of imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity markets. Linking locational markets strengthens the incentive for vertically integrated firms to participate in the retail market, which increases competition in the short-term wholesale market. In contrast, linking locational markets through a long-term contract that clears against the quantity-weighted average of short-term wholesale prices does not impact average wholesale market performance. These results imply that a policy designed to address equity considerations can also enhance efficiency in wholesale electricity markets.

Key Words: Electricity markets, equity, market design, market performance, market power, vertical integration.

JEL: C72, D43, G10, G13, L13

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1 Introduction

Locational marginal pricing or nodal pricing is used to manage transmission congestion in all formal wholesale electricity markets in the United States.¹ Locational prices and generation unit-level energy sales are computed by minimizing the as-offered cost of serving demand at all locations in the transmission network subject to all relevant operating constraints on the network. This process can give rise to thousands of different locational prices within the geographic footprint of the wholesale market each pricing period.

The locational marginal price (LMP) at location or node m in the transmission network is equal to the increase in the minimized as-offered cost of withdrawing an additional megawatt-hour (MWh) at node m . Therefore, if all suppliers submit a generation unit's marginal cost as its offer price to the Independent System Operator (ISO), the resulting LMPs are the economically efficient price signal for each location in the transmission network.² Despite these market efficiency properties of the nodal-pricing, it has been extremely difficult for regulators in the United States to charge electricity consumers a retail price that reflects the LMP at their location in the transmission network.

Moreover, the potential of the LMP market design to set different prices at different locations in the transmission network has been a major barrier to the adoption of this market design in many countries, despite demonstrated market efficiency benefits from doing so.³ The arguments against charging final consumers a retail price that reflects the LMP at their location in the transmission network are typically based on the view that it is unfair to charge customers in major load centers higher prices than customers withdrawing energy from other nodes in the transmission network, even though LMPs in load centers are usually higher than prices at other nodes.

In most all LMP markets, these equity concerns have been addressed by a regulatory mandate that requires all loads to pay a wholesale price equal to the quantity-weighted average of the locational prices at all nodes in a retailer's service territory or the entire geographic area of the wholesale market. For example, all retail customers in the service territory of each of the three investor-owned utilities in California pay a wholesale price

¹PJM Interconnection, California Independent System Operator (ISO), ISO-New England, New York ISO, Midcontinent ISO, and Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) all use locational marginal pricing for their day-ahead and real-time markets.

²Specifically, if these LMPs are set at each node in the transmission network, then all suppliers will find it unilaterally profit-maximizing to produce at a level of output that minimizes the total variable cost of serving demand at all locations in the transmission network.

³Wolak (2011) finds that the transition from a zonal to a nodal market design was associated with annual savings in the variable cost of serving demand of over 100 million dollars annually.

equal to the quantity-weighted average of LMPs at all load withdrawal nodes in that utility's service territory. All customers of each utility purchase their wholesale electricity at the same Load Aggregation Point (LAP) price regardless of where they are located in their utility's service territory. Singapore operates a nodal pricing market and all loads purchase their wholesale electricity at the Uniform Singapore Electricity Price (USEP) which is equal to the quantity-weighted average of the LMPs at all load withdrawal points in Singapore.

This paper demonstrates that a regulatory mandate that requires all loads to purchase their wholesale electricity at a quantity-weighted average of nodal prices can improve market performance in imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity markets. Hence, there is not necessarily a trade-off between policies to address equity considerations and market efficiency in electricity markets.

Our basic insight is that linking M local markets through a single retail contract in which consumers pay the quantity-weighted average of the locational short-term prices over the M markets for their wholesale energy and the L producers in each local market face the local short-term price, increases the competitiveness of all short-term markets beyond the level that would exist if there were M independent markets where retail customers in each local market purchased their wholesale energy at the local short-term price.

The competitive benefits of linking retail markets across space can be substantial. In a standard symmetric Cournot model, linking together three local duopoly markets ($M = 3$, $L = 2$) through retail contracts causes the short-term price-cost margin to drop by 44% in each local market. This competitive effect is purely the result of integrating the retail markets in the M local markets. It does not rely on entry or on physical trade between locations. All of our results are derived for a fixed number of producers each with the ability to exercise unilateral market power in their local market and under the assumption that there is no transmission capacity at all between the local markets.

The starting point of our analysis is the observation that virtually all large electricity retailers in formal wholesale markets are vertically integrated between generation and retailing. As is well-known, vertical integration can improve short-term wholesale market performance because an output expansion has a smaller effect on the share of output that suffers from the spot price decrease if the firm has committed a larger part of its output to the retail market.

The equilibrium degree of vertical integration that emerges from our model balances two opposing forces. First, increased vertical integration commits the firm to more aggressive behavior in the short-term market that triggers a strategic response which causes competitors to reduce their output. The short-term market profit increases as a consequence of this output contraction. Second, increased retail sales reduces the retail price and thereby retail profit.

Some of the retail price effect spills over to other local markets when retail markets are linked. For historical reasons, vertically integrated firms typically have a significant presence only in a few local markets, usually their historical service territory during the former vertically integrated monopoly regime. If so, they will not fully internalize the negative retail price effects of their retail sales across all local markets. Therefore, in equilibrium vertically integrated firms sell a larger share of their output in the retail market when retail markets are linked compared to the case when these markets are independent. This increased vertical integration in turn improves short-term market performance.

We also explore the implications of linking markets over time using a fixed-price long-term contract for electricity. For the case of a long-term contract, the M markets are different versions of the same market over time, and the L suppliers are the generation unit owners in those M markets. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that all suppliers participate in all M markets. The weighted average of the short-term market price-cost margins is found to be the same under long-term as short-term retail contracts. However, if firms do not produce in all periods, because of scheduled maintenance, long-term contracts improve short-term market performance compared to short-term contracts.

Recent experience in Germany illustrates the policy relevance of our findings. Subsidies to renewable electricity generation have created a large production surplus in northern Germany (because this is where the conditions for solar and wind electricity production are the most favorable) despite the fact that a large share of demand is located in the South. Germany currently comprises a single price area with Austria and Luxembourg. Suggestions have been made to break this price area into smaller ones to manage these local supply and demand imbalances within Germany.⁴ Our results imply that dividing Germany into several price areas for producers while maintaining a uniform wholesale energy purchase price based on the weighted average of those area prices, would improve congestion management, maintain price equality for German consumers and improve short-term market efficiency.⁵

Vertical integration between generation and retailing in a single market is formally equivalent to a producer selling in the forward market under the assumptions of our model. Allaz and Vila (1993) are the first to demonstrate the pro-competitive effects of forward contracting in a model with a single short-term market.⁶ Our main contribution to this literature is

⁴See, for instance, Egerer et al. (2016) and references therein. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators recently proposed to break out Austria as a separate price area (ACER, 2015), but the involved parties turned it down.

⁵As an example of the practical applicability of such an approach, Italy has precisely this type of market design.

⁶A difference between vertical integration and forward contracting is that firms are likely to be better

to show how linking retail markets across geographical locations through a uniform wholesale purchase price for all consumers improves performance in all local wholesale markets.⁷ Mahenc and Salanié (2004) find forward contracting to reduce market performance if firms compete in prices in the spot market instead of in quantities as assumed here. Holmberg (2011) establishes conditions under which forward contracting improves market performance when firms compete in supply functions. These results indicate that the competitive effects of linking retail markets are sensitive to the mode of competition in the short-term market. Cournot competition has been used by empirical researchers to model strategic interaction among suppliers in many wholesale markets for electricity, including California, New England and PJM (Bushnell et al., 2008), the Midwest market (Mercadal, 2016), the German market (Willems et al., 2009) and the Nordic market (Lundin and Tangerås, 2017).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model and establishes the pro-competitive effects of vertical integration on short-term market performance. Section 3 contains our main result showing that linking retail markets has an additional positive effect on market performance unless all firms are active in all local markets. Section 4 shows the fundamental difference between linking retail markets versus forward contract markets on the performance of short-term markets. Section 5 considers the case of both linked retail and forward markets. In Section 6, we investigate the implications of long-term retail contracts. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results for design of wholesale electricity markets.

2 The baseline model: Spatially independent markets

We consider a model of $\mathcal{M} \geq 1$ local electricity markets. There are $L_m \geq 1$ firms that possess market power in market $m \in \{1, \dots, \mathcal{M}\}$. These firms are vertically integrated between production and retail. We also assume that each local market has a number of independent retailers and producers that behave competitively. All local markets are physically disconnected from one another in the sense that there is no flow of electricity between them. This assumption hugely simplifies the analysis, but also reveals a key insight: There can be market performance gains from linking markets even if there is no actual trade of goods between

informed about competitors' retail sales than forward contracting positions.

⁷Green and Le Coq (2010) show that increasing the contract length (linking electricity markets across time) has ambiguous effects on the ability to sustain collusion. We consider unilateral market power and thus leave the question of how different market designs affect collusion for future research.

them.⁸

We analyze a two-stage game in which firms compete in the retail market in the first-stage and in the short-term market in the second stage. This setup captures in a simple manner the fact that consumers usually are on long-term retail contracts that span multiple production periods, whereas production and consumption are short-term decisions. We expand the model to consider long-term retail contracts in Section 6. In this section we show that our result holds for even single-period retail contracts.

Electricity is a homogeneous good with highly price inelastic demand. Hence, we assume total demand to be constant and equal to D_m in local market m . All electricity is sold at a uniform price r_m in the retail market m and a uniform price p_m in short-term market m .

In the first stage, each vertically integrated firm $l \in \{1, \dots, L_m\}$ inelastically supplies $k_{lm} \geq 0$ megawatt hours (MWh) of electricity to retail market m , taking the retail supply $K_{-lm} = \sum_{i \neq l} k_{im}$ of the other $L_m - 1$ vertically integrated firms as given. Independent retailers cover the residual demand $D_m - K_m$, where $K_m = k_{lm} + K_{-lm}$ is the total amount of retail energy sold by vertically integrated suppliers in m . These firms have no production of their own and purchase their electricity in the short-term market at price p_m . We assume that this short-term price is the (constant) marginal cost of the independent retailers selling electricity. We also assume the retail market is perfectly competitive, which implies that the market-clearing price in the retail market is $r_m = p_m$.

In the second stage, each vertically integrated firm l in market m observes K_{-lm} and decides how much additional electricity, $\tilde{q}_{lm} - k_{lm}$, to inelastically supply to the short-term market at constant marginal cost c_{lm} , taking the production $\tilde{Q}_{-lm} = \sum_{i \neq l} \tilde{q}_{im}$ of the other firms with the ability to exercise unilateral market power as given. The demand facing independent producers in the short-term market equals the demand $D_m - K_m$ by the independent retailers minus the short-term market supply $\tilde{Q}_m - K_m$ of the L_m vertically integrated firms, where $\tilde{Q}_m = \tilde{q}_{lm} + \tilde{Q}_{-lm}$. The competitive fringe supplies electricity at a linear marginal cost $b_m Q_{fringe}$, so the market-clearing short-term price equals $p_m = b_m(D_m - \tilde{Q}_m)$. If we let $a_m = b_m D_m$, then the inverse demand curve facing the L_m firms with the ability to exercise unilateral market power in short-term market m becomes $P_m(\tilde{Q}_m) = a_m - b_m \tilde{Q}_m$ as a function of their total production \tilde{Q}_m . We later refer to the ratio K_m/\tilde{Q}_m as the *degree of vertical integration* in local market m .

By construction, our baseline model represents a generalization of the two-stage game of forward contracting in Allaz and Vila (1993) to the case of $\mathcal{M} \geq 1$ markets with $L_m \geq 1$

⁸See Holmberg and Philpott (2012) and references therein for illustrations of the complications caused by analyzing supplier behavior in imperfectly competitive electricity markets with network constraints.

producers in each market. Instead of forward contracting, we consider vertical integration between production and retail markets. Assuming Cournot competition in the retail market as well is consistent with the basic model by Allaz and Vila (1993) and greatly simplifies our analysis.⁹ We solve for the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium to this two-stage game by backward induction.

Equilibrium in the short-term market The earnings of producer l in market m consists of its retail revenue plus the revenue from sales in the short-term wholesale market:

$$r_m k_{lm} + p_m(\tilde{q}_{lm} - k_{lm})$$

Because the vertically integrated firms have the ability to exercise unilateral market power, they take into account the effect of their behavior on the short-term price when they decide how much to produce in the second period. Hence, the profit in the second stage can be written as

$$(r_m - P_m(\tilde{Q}_m))k_{lm} + (P_m(\tilde{Q}_m) - c_{lm})\tilde{q}_{lm} \quad (1)$$

as a function of producer l 's output, \tilde{q}_{lm} . The first term is the retail profit because $P_m(\tilde{Q}_m)$ represents the opportunity cost of the electricity supplied in the retail market. Hence, the retail position k_{lm} is essentially a forward contract that clears against the short-term price. The second term in the above equation is the profit from sales in the short-term market.

The first-order condition for profit maximization is (quantities without the tilde denote equilibrium values throughout):

$$-P'_m(Q_m)k_{lm} + P_m(Q_m) - c_{lm} + P'_m(Q_m)q_{lm} = 0. \quad (2)$$

The first term is due to vertical integration and represents the reduction in the opportunity cost of the electricity sold in the retail market. The remaining terms constitute the usual trade-off in a Cournot oligopoly between the benefit of a higher output against the cost of a lower price. Production is independent of the retail price r_m because the retail revenue $r_m k_{lm}$ is sunk at the second stage. Solving this linear equation system for the L_m firms in market m yields:

Lemma 1 *Assume that K_m is sufficiently small so that all L_m producers have positive production in equilibrium. The markup of the short-term price over the average marginal pro-*

⁹Appendix A.5 shows that the fundamental results of the paper continue to hold if retail competition is in prices instead.

duction cost $c_m = \frac{1}{L_m} \sum_{l=1}^{L_m} c_{lm}$ of the L_m vertically integrated firms in short-term market m is given by

$$p_m(K_m) - c_m = P_m(Q(K_m)) - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1} - \frac{b_m K_m}{L_m + 1}. \quad (3)$$

The corresponding equilibrium production of firm l is

$$q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) = \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m} + \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m} + \frac{L_m k_{lm}}{L_m + 1} - \frac{K_{-lm}}{L_m + 1} \quad (4)$$

and the sum of the production of all other firms in market m :

$$Q_{-lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) = \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m} - \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m} - \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} k_{lm} + \frac{2K_{-lm}}{L_m + 1}. \quad (5)$$

An increase in the volume of electricity sold in the retail market mitigates a firm's incentive to exercise unilateral market power in the short-term market, $\frac{\partial q_{lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = \frac{L_m}{L_m + 1} > 0$, but also triggers a strategic response by which all other firms reduce their production, $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} < 0$. The direct effect is stronger than the strategic effect, so the total effect of an increase in k_{lm} on the short-term price is negative: $p'_m(K_m) = -\frac{b_m}{L_m + 1} < 0$.

Equilibrium in the retail market The market-clearing price in retail market m equals

$$r_m(K_m) = p_m(K_m) = P_m(Q_m(K_m)), \quad (6)$$

and the first-stage profit of firm l is

$$(r_m(K_m) - p_m(K_m))k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}).$$

The marginal effect on profit of increasing k_{lm} can be written as

$$\underbrace{r'_m(K_m)k_{lm}}_{\text{Marginal retail profit}} - \underbrace{(p_m(K_m) - c_{lm}) \frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})}{\partial k_{lm}}}_{\text{Strategic effect in short-term market}} \quad (7)$$

after invoking equilibrium condition (6) and the short-term market first-order condition (2). The firm's optimal amount of retail sales trades off the cost of a marginal reduction in retail profit against the strategic benefit of the marginal reduction in competitors' production. The following result generalizes Proposition 2.3 in Allaz and Vila (1993) of symmetric duopoly to asymmetric oligopoly:

Lemma 2 Assume that the \mathcal{M} local electricity markets are spatially independent. The volume of retail contracts sold by the L_m vertically integrated firms in local market m equals

$$K_m^I = L_m \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m^2 + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m}$$

in an interior equilibrium. The average equilibrium markup in the short-term market m equals

$$p_m^I - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m^2 + 1}.$$

Proof. Set (7) equal to zero, substitute in the marginal effects $r'_m(K_m) = -\frac{b_m}{L_m+1}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}$, sum up over all L_m firms and use the definition of c_m to get

$$-\frac{b_m K_m^I}{L_m + 1} + L_m \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} (p_m^I - c_m) = 0.$$

Add $\frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1}$ to both sides of this expression, and use $p_m^I - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1} - \frac{b_m K_m^I}{L_m + 1}$ to solve for $p_m^I - c_m$. Plug this expression into the first-order condition to solve for K_m^I . Hence, the only possible interior equilibrium is the one specified in the lemma. The equilibrium exists because the profit of each firm l is strictly concave in k_{lm} . ■

Market performance under vertical integration A strategic incentive makes it individually rational for producers to vertically integrate into the retail market with the purpose of committing to aggressive behavior in the short-term market (marginal profit (7) is strictly positive if $K_m = 0$). A prisoners' dilemma arises by which all firms with the ability to exercise unilateral market power are vertically integrated in equilibrium.

Notwithstanding the pro-competitive effects of vertical integration, the equilibrium short-term price still remains excessive from a welfare viewpoint because firms' degree of vertical integration is incomplete in equilibrium:

$$\frac{K_m^I}{Q_m(K_m^I)} = \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m} < 1.$$

Hence, it would be socially valuable to reinforce producers' incentives to participate in the retail market. The key insight of this paper is that linking retail markets creates such an incentive.

3 Linking retail markets across space

Let the \mathcal{M} local markets be partitioned into X regional markets, and denote by M_x the set of local markets in regional market $x \in \{1, \dots, X\}$. The local markets in region x are linked in the sense that each retailer must sell all wholesale electricity at the same price to all its retail customers regardless of where they are located in the region. Retailers then buy electricity at the price

$$p_x(\mathbf{K}_x) = \sum_{m \in M_x} \frac{D_m}{D_x} p_m(K_m) \quad (8)$$

in the short-term market independently of which of the local markets in x they serve, where $D_x = \sum_{m \in M_x} D_m$ is total demand in region x , and $\mathbf{K}_x = \{K_m\}_{m \in M_x}$ is the quantity of retail contracts sold by all vertically integrated firms in each of the local markets in region x .

The price p_x defines a quantity-weighted average of all $|M_x|$ short-term prices, where each short-term price p_m is weighted by the size of local market m relative to the size of regional market x , where size is measured in terms of MWh consumed.

Under this market design, independent retailers' marginal cost of supplying electricity to retail market $m \in M_x$ equals p_x instead of p_m as in the case of spatially independent retail markets. Under the maintained assumption that these retailers offer retail contracts at marginal cost, the market-clearing retail price r_x equals p_x at all locations in x . The total revenue of firm l in market $m \in M_x$ then equals:

$$r_x k_{lm} + p_m(\tilde{q}_{lm} - k_{lm}).$$

The retail revenue $r_x k_{lm}$ is sunk independently of how the retail price is determined when the L_m vertically integrated firms in market m decide how much electricity to bid into the short-term market. Hence, the short-term equilibrium in market m is still characterized by equations (3)-(5) as functions of the firms' retail positions.

3.1 Producers active in one location

Assume that each vertically integrated firm is active in one location in the sense that it sells retail contracts and has generation capacity in a single local market. As noted earlier, geographical concentration of production and retailing activity is realistic in electricity markets where many companies are former monopolists with local production capacity and distribu-

tion networks connected to local consumers.¹⁰ We consider the effects of producers operating in multiple locations below.

The first-stage profit of firm l in market m is given by

$$(r_x(\mathbf{K}_x) - p_m(K_m))k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) \quad (9)$$

when retail markets are linked. The marginal effect on profit of increasing k_{lm} is

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial r_x(\mathbf{K}_x)}{\partial K_m} k_{lm} + r_x(\mathbf{K}_x) - p_m(K_m)}_{\text{Marginal retail profit}} - \underbrace{(p_m(K_m) - c_{lm}) \frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})}{\partial k_{lm}}}_{\text{Strategic effect in short-term market}}. \quad (10)$$

Solving the set of linear first-order equations yields (the proof is in Appendix A.1):

Lemma 3 *Assume that a regional market x links a subset M_x of local electricity markets through a common retail price that is the quantity-weighted average of all short-term prices in all markets $m \in M_x$. The average equilibrium markup in short-term market $m \in M_x$ equals*

$$p_m^R - c_m = \frac{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}} \frac{1}{\Psi_m} + \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{(\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i - 1}{L_i + 1})(c_m - c_i) + \frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1} - \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{a_i - c_i}{L_i + 1}}{(1 - \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} - \frac{L_i - 1}{L_i + 1})(\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1})} \frac{1}{\Psi_m}$$

in an interior equilibrium if each vertically integrated firm is active in one local market, where

$$\Psi_m = \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i - 1}{L_i + 1}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}} \frac{1 - \frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} - \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}}{1 - \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} - \frac{L_i - 1}{L_i + 1}}.$$

The equilibrium exists in regional market x if and only if $L_m + 1 \geq \frac{D_x}{D_m}$ for all $m \in M_x$.

Because retail markets are linked, market performance in each local market m depends not only on the demand and cost characteristics of that particular market, but also on the conditions in the other local markets that form regional market x . For instance, short-term market m tends to be less competitive if either marginal production costs are higher or the residual demand facing the vertically integrated firms is less price elastic (b_m is relatively large) than in the other markets.

Contrary to the case with spatially independent markets, the model with linked retail markets does not guarantee the existence of an equilibrium at the retail stage. But equilib-

¹⁰Owning generation units in the same local markets that the vertically integrated firm serves load provides a physical hedge against locational price difference between where a retailer produces or purchases wholesale energy and where it sells this energy to final consumers.

rium non-existence is a general problem that does not arise specifically as a result of linking retail markets. To see this, rewrite the first-stage profit as

$$(p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})(q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) - k_{lm}) + (\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K}) - c_{lm})k_{lm},$$

where we allow firm l 's retail price in market m to depend on the vector of retail positions more generally through an arbitrary price function $\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K})$. The first part of the profit function is always strictly convex in k_{lm} independent of how the retail price is determined:

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial k_{lm}^2}(p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})(q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) - k_{lm}) = \frac{2b_m}{(L_m + 1)^2} > 0. \quad (11)$$

Hence, the total first stage profit is well-behaved if and only if $(\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K}) - c_{lm})k_{lm}$ is concave enough in k_{lm} to dominate the convexity of the first term. This condition is satisfied in Allaz and Vila (1993) because of full pass-through of the short-term price to the retail price:

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial k_{lm}^2}(\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K}) - c_{lm})k_{lm} = 2p'_m(K_m) = -\frac{2b_m}{L_m + 1}.$$

It is never satisfied with zero pass-through, as would be the case under fixed-price regulation of the retail price, because then $(\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K}) - c_{lm})k_{lm}$ would be linear in k_{lm} . In general, pass-through must be sufficiently high for the profit function to be well-behaved.

With linked retail markets, pass-through is high in local market m if there is a sufficient amount of vertically integrated firms in that market:

$$\frac{2b_m}{(L_m + 1)^2} + \frac{\partial^2(\hat{r}_m(\mathbf{K}) - c_{lm})k_{lm}}{\partial k_{lm}^2} = -\frac{2b_m}{L_m + 1} \left[\frac{D_m}{D_x} - \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \right].$$

Hence, the existence condition stated at the end of Lemma 3.

The effects on market performance of linking retail markets across space By comparing the first-stage marginal profit expressions (7) and (10), we first see that the retail price is less sensitive to an increase in individual firms' retail sales when local markets are linked through a regional retail price relative to the case when local markets are spatially independent,

$$\frac{\partial r_x(\mathbf{K}_x)}{\partial K_m} = \frac{D_m}{D_x} p'_m(K_m) > p'_m(K_m) = r'_m(K_m), \quad (12)$$

because the short-term price in market m now constitutes only a fraction $\frac{D_m}{D_x}$ of the retail price. Some of the retail price effect of a higher retail supply in market m spills over to the other local markets in region x under linked retail contracts. This negative externality on retail profit tends to push integrated firms in all local markets to increase sales in the retail market beyond what they would do if local markets were independent, which improves market performance in *all* local short-term markets.

The retail markup $r_x - p_m$ in (10) can either be positive or negative depending on whether m is a low-price or high-price location, which either reinforces or mitigates firms' incentives to participate in the retail market. Thus, linking electricity markets across space unambiguously improves short-term market competition in low price areas, but may have an ambiguous effect on market performance in high price areas. The following key proposition establishes the competitive effect of linking electricity markets across space:

Proposition 1 *Linking a subset M_x of local electricity markets through a regional market x that establishes a common retail price equal to the quantity-weighted average of all short-term prices in M_x , causes p_m^R , the short-term price in local market $m \in M_x$, to change by*

$$p_m^I - p_m^R = \frac{1 - \frac{D_m}{D_x}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}} \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} (p_m^I - c_m) + \frac{r_x^R - p_m^R}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}}.$$

compared to p_m^I , the short-term price for the case of spatially independent markets, if all vertically integrated firms are active in one local market. Short-term market performance improves in all local markets in M_x if these are oligopolistic and sufficiently similar in terms of demand, cost characteristics and market structure (D_m , b_m , c_m and $L_m \geq 2$ are similar for all $m \in M_x$).

Proof. Set (10) equal to zero, substitute in the marginal effects $\frac{\partial r_x}{\partial K_m} = -\frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{b_m}{L_m+1}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}$, sum up over all L_m firms and use the definition of c_m to get:

$$-\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{b_m}{L_m+1} K_m^R + r_x^R - p_m^R + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} (p_m^R - c_m) = 0.$$

Add $\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1}$ to both sides of this condition and use (3) to solve for the equilibrium markup:

$$p_m^R - c_m = \frac{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}} - \frac{r_x^R - p_m^R}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}}.$$

Subtract this expression from $p_m^I - c_m$ characterized Lemma 2 to obtain the expression in

Proposition 1. The equilibrium retail price

$$r_x^R = \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} p_i^R$$

is close to p_m^R for all $m \in M_x$ if all local markets in x are sufficiently similar. In this case, the second term on the right-hand side of the expression in Proposition 1 is dominated by the first term, so that $p_m^I > p_m^R$ for all $m \in M_x$. ■

Market integration can improve market performance in all product markets despite the fact that it is impossible to trade in physical goods between them. All production and consumption is cleared locally in this model. Integration of retail markets is enough to improve incentives for competitive behavior by vertically integrated suppliers in all local product markets.

In the special case of perfect symmetry across the local markets in x , so that $a_m = a$, $b_m = b$, $c_m = c$ and $L_m = L$ for all m , index

$$H(L, M) = 1 - \frac{p^R - c}{p^I - c} = \frac{L(L-1)(M-1)}{ML(L-1) + L + 1}. \quad (13)$$

measures relative market performance between linked and independent markets by the associated percentage reduction in the short-term price-cost margin. This index depends only on the number L of firms with market power in each market and the number M of local markets that are linked. Conveniently, the demand and cost characteristics cancel out because of symmetry and the linear structure of the model.

Market performance is relatively higher when retail markets are linked and improves as the number of linked markets increases. The number L of vertically integrated firms in each local market places an upper bound to the number M of local markets that can be linked while preserving equilibrium existence. Linking retail markets can nevertheless have substantial quantitative welfare effects because the incremental effects on wholesale competition are the strongest for small M . Figure 1 plots $H(L, L+1)$, the competitive effects of linking the maximum number of local markets consistent with equilibrium. The incremental pro-competitive effect is the largest when local competition is weak, i.e. L is small. Linking three duopoly markets causes the average markup to drop by nearly half (44 per cent) in each market. Linking four triopoly markets generates a 20 per cent additional improvement in market performance.




Figure 1: The competitive effects of linking retail markets across space

3.2 Producers active in multiple locations

Assume now that vertically integrated firms can have production facilities in more than one of the local markets in region x . Firm l chooses its retail portfolio $\mathbf{k}_l = \{k_{lm}\}_{m \in M_x}$ across the local markets it is active in to maximize profit

$$\sum_{m \in M_x} \beta_{lm} [(r_x(\mathbf{K}_x) - p_m(K_m))k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})],$$

where β_{lm} is an indicator function taking the value 1 if firm l has a production facility in local market m and 0 if not. The marginal effect on profit of increasing k_{lm} is

$$\sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{\partial r_x(\mathbf{K}_x)}{\partial K_m} \beta_{li} k_{li} + r_x(\mathbf{K}_x) - p_m(K_m) - (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm}) \frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})}{\partial k_{lm}}. \quad (14)$$

Compared to the case in which producers are active in only one market, the firm now takes into account the spill-over effects of the retail price reduction in the other markets in which it is present.

By the linearity of the marginal profit functions, one could solve explicitly for the equilibrium level of retail sales in each local market for each firm. To obtain results that are easier to interpret, we here impose perfect symmetry on the model, similar to the case considered

in (13). Let there be S vertically integrated firms with the ability to exercise unilateral market power, each of which has production facilities in N of the M local markets contained in regional market x . Firm locations are symmetric, with the same number $L = SN/M$ of firms active in each local market. Then (the proof is in Appendix A.2):

Lemma 4 *Assume that a regional market links M local and symmetric electricity markets through a common retail price that is the quantity-weighted average of all M short-term prices. The markup in each short-term market equals*

$$p^R - c = \frac{a - c}{\frac{M-N}{N}L(L-1) + L^2 + 1} \quad (15)$$

in a symmetric interior equilibrium if each vertically integrated firm is active in $N \geq 1$ local markets. This equilibrium exists only if $L + 1 \geq \frac{M}{N}$. The condition is also sufficient if firms are restricted to symmetric retail positions.

The convexity problem of the first-stage profit function established in (11) for the case when firms have production in a single local market becomes more severe under multi-market presence. We show in Appendix A.2 that it would always be a profitable deviation under the conditions of Lemma 4 for a vertically integrated producer to concentrate its retail sales in *one* of its local markets and reduce retail sales proportionally in the other local markets. However, such an asymmetric deviation could be difficult to achieve under symmetric market conditions. The retail price is the same across region x . Hence, the firm is equally likely to attract retail customers from all local markets in x . To build an asymmetric market share, the firm would then have to accept customers from one location, but systematically refuse to sell retail contracts to customers from all other locations. A regulatory rule prohibiting such location-based discrimination in the retail market would serve to even out market shares in a symmetric, linked competitive retail market. This rule would not bind and therefore entail no welfare loss in symmetric equilibrium.

The effects on market performance of linking retail markets Multi-market presence implies that vertically integrated firms account for a larger share of the spill-over effects of the retail price into the other local markets. This increased internalization of retail price effects softens the incentive to participate in the retail market. Subtracting p^R defined in Lemma 4 from p^I yields

Proposition 2 *Linking M local and symmetric electricity markets through a regional market that establishes a common wholesale purchase price for consumers equal to the quantity-weighted average of all M short-term wholesale prices, causes short-term prices in each local market to fall by*

$$p^I - p^R = \frac{(M - N)L(L - 1)}{ML(L - 1) + N(L + 1)}(p^I - c) \geq 0.$$

Linking electricity markets drives down short-term market prices in all symmetric equilibria unless all firms have production in all local markets so that $N = M$.

4 Linking forward markets across space

In Section 3, we studied vertical integration and the effects of linking of local electricity markets through a common retail contract. We consider now forward contracting and analyze instead the consequences of linking local markets through a forward contract that clears against the quantity-weighted average $\sum_{m \in M_x} \frac{D_m}{D_x} p_m$ of the short-term wholesale market prices. Such contracts are common for instance in the Nordic market, where the standard forward contract clears against the market-wide system price. US LMP markets often create trading hub prices, which are quantity-weighted averages of LMPs in a sub-region of the market. Because these hub prices are typically less volatile than any individual component LMP, market participants manage their short-term price risk by purchasing forward contracts that clear against these trading hub prices.

Our main result in this section demonstrates that linking retail and forward markets have fundamentally different effects on short-term market performance. We only detail the case of linked forward markets here because the analysis of spatially independent forward contracts is formally equivalent to analysis in Section 2.

Equilibrium in the short-term market Producers with the ability to exercise unilateral market power take into account how their forward contract position affects their output choice in the short-term market.¹¹ The second-stage profit of producer l in market m thus becomes

$$(f_x - \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} P_i(\tilde{Q}_i))k_{lm} + (P_m(\tilde{Q}_m) - c_{lm})\tilde{q}_{lm},$$

¹¹Wolak (2000) demonstrates the empirical relevance of this mechanism for a large supplier in an Australian wholesale electricity market.

where f_x is the delivery price of the composite forward contract, k_{lm} here refers to the volume of forward contracts sold by firm l in market m , and we assume that firms with market power are active in one local market only. The first-order condition for the firm's quantity choice reads:

$$-\frac{D_m}{D_x} P'_m(Q_m) k_{lm} + P_m(Q_m) - c_{lm} + P'_m(Q_m) q_{lm} = 0,$$

which differs from the case of spatially independent forward markets, see equation (2), by an increase in production now having a relatively smaller positive effect on forward profit because of the term $\frac{D_m}{D_x}$. Therefore, holding the forward contract quantity constant, the short-term market behavior by the vertically integrated firms is less competitive than under spatially independent forward markets, which implies the following result:

Lemma 5 *Assume that a set M_x of local markets are linked through a forward contract that clears against the quantity-weighted average of the short-term prices in those local markets. Assume also that K_m is sufficiently small that all producers have positive production in equilibrium. The average equilibrium markup is given by*

$$p_m\left(\frac{D_m}{D_x} K_m\right) - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1} - \frac{b_m}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_m$$

in short-term market m . The corresponding equilibrium production of firm l is

$$q_{lm}\left(\frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm}, \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{-lm}\right) = \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m} + \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m} + \frac{L_m}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm} - \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{-lm}$$

and of all other firms in local market m :

$$Q_{-lm}\left(\frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm}, \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{-lm}\right) = \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m} - \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m} - \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm} + \frac{2}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{-lm}.$$

Note that the strategic effect is weaker than in equations (4) and (5) because an increase in k_{lm} now has a smaller effect on output q_{lm} .

Equilibrium in the forward market Assuming perfect foresight makes the forward price satisfy the equation:

$$f_x(\mathbf{K}_x) = \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} p_i\left(\frac{D_i}{D_x} K_i\right)$$

in a perfectly competitive forward market. Firm l in market m chooses k_{lm} to maximize the first stage profit

$$(f_x(\mathbf{K}_x) - \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} p_i(\frac{D_i}{D_x} K_i)) k_{lm} + (p_m(\frac{D_m}{D_x} K_m) - c_{lm}) q_{lm}(\frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm}, \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{lm}). \quad (16)$$

The marginal effect

$$\frac{\partial f_x(\mathbf{K}_x)}{\partial K_m} k_{lm} - (p_m(\frac{D_m}{D_x} K_m) - c_{lm}) \frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(\frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm}, \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{lm})}{\partial k_{lm}} \quad (17)$$

on profit of increasing forward sales k_{lm} differs in two respects from the marginal profit (7) when forward markets are spatially independent. On the one hand, an increase in the volume of forward contracts sold by an individual firm has a relatively smaller effect on the forward contract price when forward markets are linked. This effect tends to drive up forward sales and reinforce short-term market competition. On the other hand, the strategic effect is weaker under linked forward markets, which tends to soften competition for any given volume of forward contracts. As it turns out, the two marginal effects exactly offset one another compared to the case of spatially independent forward markets, which yields:

Proposition 3 *Assume that a set M_x of local markets are linked through a forward contract that clears against the quantity-weighted average of the short-term prices in those local markets. The volume of retail contracts sold by the L_m firms with market power in local market $m \in M_x$ equals*

$$K_m^F = \frac{D_x}{D_m} L_m \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m^2 + 1} \frac{a_m - c_m}{b_m} = \frac{D_x}{D_m} K_m^I$$

in interior equilibrium if each firm is active in one local market. The average markup in short-term market $m \in M_x$ equals

$$p_m^F - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m^2 + 1} = p_m^I - c_m.$$

Proof. Set (17) equal to zero, substitute in the marginal effects $\frac{\partial f_x}{\partial K_m} = -(\frac{D_m}{D_x})^2 \frac{b_m}{L_m + 1}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(\frac{D_m}{D_x} k_{lm}, \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_{lm})}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}$, sum up over all L_m firms and divide through by $L_m \frac{D_m}{D_x}$ to get the first-order condition

$$-\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{b_m}{L_m + 1} \frac{D_m}{D_x} K_m^F + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1} (p_m^F - c_m) = 0.$$

Add $\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m + 1}$ to both sides of the equation and solve for the equilibrium markup $p_m^F - c_m$ above. Plug this expression into the first-order condition to solve for K_m^F . ■

The effects on market performance of linking forward vs retail markets Linking forward markets through a contract that clears against a quantity-weighted average of wholesale prices has an effect on the firm's short-term market behavior that does not arise when retail markets are linked by requiring the firm to sell wholesale electricity to its retail customers at the quantity-weighted average of locational prices. The fundamental difference between the two market designs is illustrated by comparing the first-stage profit expressions (16) and (9). For a firm located in market m , a linked forward contract clears against the quantity-weighted average of short-term locational prices. A linked retail contract essentially clears against the local short-term price at location m , p_m . This difference softens the strategic benefit so much under forward contracting that the total competitive effect of linking markets vanishes.

5 Combined retail and forward markets

In this Section, we extend our model of vertically integrated firms selling their output to retail customers to allow them to sell forward financial contracts as way to commit to more aggressive behavior in the short-term market. For simplicity, we assume that firms in local market m sell forward contracts that clear against the local short-term price p_m .¹²

Equilibrium when markets are spatially independent The total revenue of firm l in market m equals:

$$r_m k_{rlm} + p_m (\tilde{q}_{lm} - k_{rlm}) + (f_m - p_m) k_{flm} = r_m k_{rlm} + f_m k_{flm} + p_m (\tilde{q}_{lm} - k_{lm}),$$

where k_{rlm} (k_{flm}) refers to the volume of retail (forward) contracts sold by l in market m , f_m is the delivery price in forward market m , and $k_{lm} = k_{rlm} + k_{flm}$ is the total volume of first-stage commitments.

The first stage revenues $r_m k_{rlm}$ and $f_m k_{flm}$ are sunk at the second stage, so the production decision of firm l depends only on the total first-stage volume k_{lm} . Hence, the equilibrium in the short-term market can be characterized exactly as in Lemma 1. The profit of firm l in

¹²Assuming instead that forward contracts clear against the quantity-weighted average short-term price as in Section 4 would not change the results.

market m therefore equals

$$r_m(K_m)k_{rlm} + f_m(K_m)k_{flm} - p_m(K_m)k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}),$$

where the retail price in market m and the forward price in market m are both equal to the short-term price:

$$r_m(K_m) = f_m(K_m) = p_m(K_m).$$

Because the second-stage profit only depends on the firm's total first-stage commitment k_{lm} , firm l divides any given volume k_{lm} across the retail and the forward market to maximize the first-stage revenue. But the retail price and the forward price are identical, so the firm is indifferent between participating in the two markets. Hence, it is optimal to set $k_{rlm} = k_{lm}$ and $k_{flm} = 0$ and then maximize total profit over k_{lm} , which brings us back to the analysis in Section 2. Hence, a forward market clearing against the local short-term price p_m adds nothing to competition when markets are spatially independent.

Equilibrium when retail markets are linked This section considers the case of linked retail markets with the option of vertically-firms to sell fixed-price forward contracts that clear against their local short-term price. The total profit of firm l can be written as

$$r_x(\mathbf{K}_x)k_{rlm} + f_m(K_m)k_{flm} - p_m(K_m)k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})$$

if retail markets are linked and the firm participates in one single local market. The firm is no longer indifferent between participating in the two markets in the general case where the retail price differs from the local spot price. A firm in a low-price location, $f_m = p_m < r_x$, would participate entirely in the retail market, whereas a firm in a high price location, $f_m = p_m > r_x$, would sell forward contracts. The following characterization is straightforward.¹³

Proposition 4 *Assume that a regional market x links a subset M_x of local electricity markets through a common retail price that is the quantity-weighted average of all short-term prices in M_x . Assume also that firms can sell forward contracts that clear against the local spot*

¹³The existence proof is complicated by kinks in the profit functions. We consider in Appendix A.3 the case of two local markets and show that sufficient conditions for existence, in addition to local concavity, are that the high-price area has a higher demand than the low-price area and that any cost advantage by firms in the high price area is sufficiently small.

price. The average equilibrium markups can then be characterized by

$$p_m^{RF} - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m^2 + 1} = p_m^I - c_m \text{ if } p_m^{RF} \geq r_x^{RF} \quad (18)$$

$$p_m^{RF} - c_m = \left(1 - \frac{1 - \frac{D_m}{D_x}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}}\right) (p_m^I - c_m) - \frac{r_x^{RF} - p_m^{RF}}{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m - 1}{L_m + 1}} \text{ if } p_m^{RF} < r_x^{RF} \quad (19)$$

if all vertically integrated firms are active in one local market.

Linking retail markets has no effect on short-term competition in high price locations, but has positive consequences for competition in low price locations. The markup in low-price locations is a fraction (less than one) of the markup in that location under independent retail markets less a factor that depends on the difference between the regional retail price r_x^{RF} and the local price p_m^{RF} . Therefore, even if suppliers have the option to sign fixed-price forward contracts that clear against their local short-term price, market performance is non-decreasing in all markets as a result of linking retail markets through the requirement that all retail electricity sell at regional price, r_x^{RF} .

6 Linking retail markets across time

Consider now the case of linking retail markets over time through a long-term retail contract. Assume that there is a single local market, M production periods and L vertically integrated producers with market power. We allow demand D_m to fluctuate across time, but assume it to be deterministic. Total demand across the M periods is given by $D = \sum_{m=1}^M D_m$. Denote by k_{lm} the retail obligation of firm l in period m and K_m the total retail obligations of all L firms in period m .

The output q_{lm} of producer l that maximizes period m profit is independent of the retail price r_m that period, so the short-term price, producer l 's equilibrium quantity and all other producers' output in period m are given by Lemma 1. A sequence of short-term retail contracts is equivalent to a set of spatially independent retail contracts, so Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium also under short-term retail contracts.

6.1 Fixed-price retail contracts

Let firms supply long-term retail contracts in period 1 that are valid for M periods. In this section we assume that customers pay the same price for every MWh of electricity consumed

during the contract period, consistent with the fixed-price retail contracts customers sign in many competitive retail markets. Under this contract, firm l cannot tailor its retail volume k_{lm} optimally period by period.¹⁴ Instead, we let each firm decide the average per-period volume k_l of electricity to supply to the retail market through this type of contract. Its retail position in period m therefore equals $k_{lm} = \frac{D_m}{D} M k_l$.

The total retail profit of firm l equals

$$\sum_{m=1}^M k_{lm}(r - p_m(K_m)) = \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} M k_l (r - p_m(K_m))$$

where r is the retail price, and the discount rate set is equal to one. Perfect competition in the retail market and perfect foresight drive the retail profit down to zero, in which case the equilibrium price of the long-term contract becomes:

$$r(\mathbf{K}) = \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} p_m(K_m)$$

as a function of the retail profile $\mathbf{K} = (K_1, \dots, K_m, \dots, K_M)$ of the vertically integrated firms.

In period 1, firm l maximizes the total profit

$$\sum_{m=1}^M [(r(\mathbf{K}) - p_m(K_m))k_{lm} + (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm})q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})]$$

over k_l . The marginal effect on profit of increasing k_l equals

$$M \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} \left[\sum_{t=1}^M \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_m} k_{lt} + r(\mathbf{K}) - p_m(K_m) - (p_m(K_m) - c_{lm}) \frac{\partial Q_{-lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})}{\partial k_{lm}} \right]. \quad (20)$$

The expression inside the square brackets is similar to the one of vertically integrated firms being active in multiple (all) local markets, see equation (14), where a local market here is the same market repeated over time. The period-level marginal profit is then aggregated across all M periods because firms are constrained to sell the same average volume k_l of retail electricity every period, instead of tailoring contracts individually for each period.

Proposition 5 *Assume that firms sell fixed-price retail contracts that cover M periods. The average volume of electricity sold in the retail market each period by the L firms with market*

¹⁴We consider the implications of flexible long-term retail contracts below.

power equals

$$K^T = L \frac{L-1}{L^2+1} \frac{\frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M D_m (a_m - c_m)}{\sum_{m=1}^M a_m \frac{D_m}{D}} \quad (21)$$

in an interior equilibrium. The price-cost margins in the short-term market satisfy

$$\sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} (p_m^T - c_m) = \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L^2 + 1} = \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_m}{D} (p_m^I - c_m). \quad (22)$$

Proof. By setting (20) equal to zero and repeating the same steps as in the previous proofs, we obtain the aggregate first-order condition

$$-\frac{1}{L} \sum_{m=1}^M D_m \frac{b_m K_m^T}{L+1} + \frac{L-1}{L+1} \sum_{m=1}^M D_m (p_m^T - c_m) = 0.$$

after simplification. Adding and subtracting $\frac{a_m - c_m}{L+1}$ under the first sum allows us to solve for (22). Replacing $p_m^T - c_m$ in (22) with $\frac{a_m - c_m}{L+1} - \frac{b_m}{L+1} \frac{D_m}{D} M K^T$ yields K^T given by (21). This solution represents an equilibrium because the second-derivative with respect to k_l of l 's total profit function is negative: $\frac{-2L}{(L+1)^2} \sum_{m=1}^M a_m < 0$. ■

Note that the price-cost margin in any given period can be higher or lower under long-term than short-term retail contracts depending on how the demand and cost characteristics vary over time. Proposition 5 adapted to this context demonstrates that long-term contracts have no effect on average market performance. The average markup in the spot market is the same under both types of retail contracts if each period m is weighted by relative consumption $\frac{D_m}{D}$.¹⁵ The reason is because firms in this case produce in all periods and are constrained to sell the same average volume of electricity in the retail market in all periods.¹⁶

¹⁵However, contracting over time affects market efficiency. We show in Appendix A.4 that total production costs can be smaller or higher under long-term than short-term retail contracts depending on market heterogeneity. Specifically, long-term contracts yield comparatively small total costs if the main source of heterogeneity relates to cost differences across firms with the ability to exercise unilateral market power. Instead, short-term contracting is relatively more efficient if most of the heterogeneity stems from differences in demand across markets.

¹⁶The analytical analogue to the fixed-price contract in a spatial setting is a situation where firms have production capacity in all local markets. Furthermore, firms cannot individually target local retail markets. Instead, they attract retail customers from each local market m in region x in proportion to the relative size $\frac{D_m}{D_x}$ of the local market.

6.2 Planned Outages

Assume now that firms do not produce in all periods. Specifically, each firm must shut down its production exactly one period for maintenance reasons. To minimize the number of simultaneous outages, the system operator takes one firm off-line every period m . Scheduling is done prior to market transactions, so it is common knowledge at stage 0 which generators will be on-line in all periods. Let there be $L + 1$ vertically integrated firms, and assume that there are $M = L$ symmetric production periods. This means that there are L firms producing in every period m .

Maintenance does not affect production by the remaining firms, so firm l produces $q(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})$ when active in period m , the other firms produce $Q_{-l}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})$, and the spot price is $p(K_m)$. The equilibrium under short-term contracting remains unaffected, so the total retail position of the vertically integrated firms equals K^I , and the equilibrium price-cost margin is $p^I - c$ in every period.

When it comes to the long-term retail contracts, assume that these are fully flexible in the sense that firm l can set k_{lm} independently of k_{lt} for the entire contracting period. Maintain the assumption that there is no discounting of profit. Under these circumstances, long-term retail contracts are formally equivalent to a spatial contract, with each firm being active in all local markets but one. Hence, the equilibrium markup is characterized by Lemma 4 with $N = M - 1$. In light of Proposition 2, the following result is straightforward:

Proposition 6 *Assume that firms sell flexible long-term retail contracts that cover M periods and that outages are planned so that each firm shuts down its production exactly one period. Assume also that markets are symmetric. Then, the price-cost margins in the spot market are smaller under long-term retail contracts compared to the case of short-term contracts.*

Planned outages imply that some of the retail price effects of a larger retail position spill over to periods during which the firm is not active. In this case, a long-term retail contract is more competitive than a sequence of short-term retail contracts.

6.3 Random Outages

Assume that everything is as in Section 6.2, except now the system operator takes one unit off-line every period m by randomizing among the generators. The probability that generator l is on-line in period m is equal to $\mu = \frac{M-1}{M}$. This randomization is done prior to production taking place, but in such a manner that producers do not know the exact period they will

be off-line when they sell long-term retail contracts. However, it is common knowledge that there are L units on-line in every period.

Let $\mathbf{k}_l = (k_{l1}, \dots, k_{lm}, \dots, k_{lM})$ be the retail profile of firm l . The equilibrium production levels $q(k_{lm}, \tilde{K}_{-lm})$, $Q_{-l}(k_{lm}, \tilde{K}_{-lm})$ and the short-term prices $p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + \beta_{lm}k_{lm})$ in period m are qualitatively the same as in Lemma 1, except $\tilde{K}_{-lm} = \sum_{i \neq l} \beta_{im}k_{im}$ are the retail positions of those generators other than l are *active* in period m , whereas $K_m = \sum_{l=1}^{L+1} k_{lm}$ is the aggregate forward positions of all $L + 1$ producers that period.

We assume that all uncertainty about outages is resolved before firms choose their short-term retail positions in each period. This means that the equilibrium is exactly the same as in the case of independent markets characterized in Section 2: The price-cost margin in the short-term market equals $p^I - c$ in every period.

The expected net present value of a long-term retail contract is

$$\sum_{m=0}^M (r - \mu E[p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm})] - (1 - \mu)p(\tilde{K}_{-lm}))D,$$

where E is the period 1 expectations operator with respect to other firms than l being operative, conditional on firm l being operative. Perfect competition in the retail market and risk-neutrality drive the expected retail margin to zero, so

$$r(\mathbf{k}) = \frac{1}{M+1} \sum_{m=0}^M (\mu E[p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm})] + (1 - \mu)p(\tilde{K}_{-lm})),$$

where $\mathbf{k} = (\mathbf{k}_1, \dots, \mathbf{k}_l, \dots, \mathbf{k}_{L+1})$.

Producer l chooses \mathbf{k}_l to maximize the total expected profit

$$\sum_{m=0}^M E[(r(\mathbf{k}) - \mu p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm}) - (1 - \mu)p(\tilde{K}_{-lm}))k_{lm} + \mu(p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm}) - c)q(k_{lm}, \tilde{K}_{-lm})].$$

The marginal benefit of increasing k_{lm} is

$$\sum_{t=0}^M \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{k})}{\partial k_{lm}} k_{lt} + \mu(r(\mathbf{k}) - E[p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm})]) - \frac{\partial Q_{-l}(k_{lm}, \tilde{K}_{-lm})}{\partial k_{lm}} \mu(E[p(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm})] - c),$$

where $\frac{\partial r(\mathbf{k})}{\partial k_{lm}} = \frac{\mu}{M+1} p'(\tilde{K}_{-lm} + k_{lm})$. The ex ante probability of a spot price change in period m is only μ because of stochastic outages. However, each firm still internalizes all expected marginal externalities because of the linearity of the marginal effects. Hence, the outcome is

the same as under short-term contracts:

Proposition 7 *Assume that firms sell flexible long-term retail contracts that cover M periods and that outages are random. Assume also that markets are symmetric. Then, the price-cost margins in the spot market are the same under long-term and short-term retail contracts in stationary equilibrium.*

Proof. *If all firms sell the same amount of retail contracts and the equilibrium is stationary, $k_{lm}^T = k^T$ for all l and m , it follows that $E[p(\tilde{K}_{-lm}^T + k_{lm}^T)] = p(\tilde{K}_{-lm}^T) = p(Lk_m^T) = p(Lk^T)$. Hence, $r^T = p(Lk^T)$, which implies the first-order condition*

$$\mu\left[-\frac{b}{L+1}k^T + \frac{L-1}{L+1}(p(Lk^T) - c)\right] = 0,$$

with solution $Lk^T = K^I$. The equilibrium can be sustained under a restriction to symmetric deviations. ■

The result demonstrates that random outages alone are not a reason to link retail markets across time because market performance is independent of the probability μ of outages in a symmetric equilibrium.

7 Concluding policy discussion

A key problem with market performance in restructured electricity markets is the high degree of market concentration that sometimes arises when transmission constraints divide a region into smaller local markets with only a few producers in each. Increased market concentration reinforces the incentive suppliers have to exercise unilateral market power. Improving competition in each local market through entry or market integration is problematic in many electricity markets because of economic and/or political barriers to large supplier entry and network investment to expand the size of the geographic market.

We propose a solution to the problem of market power that neither involves supplier entry nor network investment. A market design where generation units are paid the short-term locational marginal price (LMP), but all consumers pay the same wholesale price for their electricity equal to the quantity-weighted average of LMPs at all load withdrawal nodes, can substantially increase short-term market performance compared to the case when local markets are independent.

This market rule is also likely to facilitate retailer entry into more local markets by vertically integrated retailers because it mitigates a major source of risk they face in entering a

local market where they do not own generation units: spatial price risk between where they own generation units and this local market. This spatial price risk has led many vertically integrated firms to focus their retailing efforts on the local markets where they own generation units to avoid such risk. Moreover, an effective entry deterrence strategy by vertically integrated retailers with generation units in the same local market as their retail customers, is to use their ability to exercise unilateral market power to spike the local wholesale price and effectively eliminate any retail profit margin a new entrant without local generation capacity could earn from selling retail electricity.¹⁷ Requiring all retailers to purchase the wholesale electricity sold to final consumers at a quantity-weighted average of all LMPs significantly limits the spatial price risk any supplier faces from entering any local market, which should increase the competitiveness of retail markets in particular.

Our findings are highly relevant to the debate about future designs for wholesale electricity markets. Local imbalances in the supply and demand of electricity owing to increasing shares of intermittent electricity production have increased concerns about the security of electricity supply in situations with substantial shortfalls of renewable electricity production. Such security of supply problems would be reduced if prices are set based to local supply and demand conditions and all relevant constraints on operating generation units and the transmission network were explicitly priced as in a system with locational marginal prices (LMPs), as first discussed in Bohn et al. (1984).

As noted in the Introduction, charging consumers different local prices has so far been politically difficult, particularly in Europe. Critics argue that it is unreasonable for some consumers to pay more for electricity than others just because the former happen to live at a location with an "under-supply" of electricity. Such unfairness arguments received a lot of public attention following the division of the Swedish day-ahead market into four price areas in 2011. Previously, Sweden had constituted a single price area. Consumers in the southernmost price area were particularly upset because they would now have to pay a systematically higher price than consumers in the other three price areas.

A superior solution from a political and market efficiency viewpoint based on our results, would have been to introduce the four price areas for producers, but to maintain a single price area across Sweden for consumers based on the quantity-weighted average of prices across all locations. More generally, our results argue that introducing an LMP market where all

¹⁷Consistent with such entry deterrence incentives, Wolak (2009) presents empirical evidence demonstrating that over the sample period he studies, the four large vertically integrated retailers in the New Zealand wholesale electricity market concentrated their retailing activities in the regions where they owned generation units.

relevant operating constraints are explicitly priced and all generation units are paid their locational marginal price, but all loads pay a quantity-weighted average of these LMPs need not reduce market efficiency relative to an LMP market where all suppliers and loads face their local price.

Appendices

A.1 Proof of Lemma 3

Characterization Substitute (12) into (10), use the marginal effects $p'_m = -\frac{b_m}{L_m+1}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1}$, sum up the first-order conditions over all L_m firms in market m and divide through by L_m to get the aggregate equilibrium condition in market m :

$$-\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{b_m K_m^R}{L_m+1} + \left(\frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1} - 1 \right) (p_m^R - c_m) + r_x^R - c_m = 0.$$

Add and subtract $\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1}$ from the left-hand side above and use (3) to get

$$\left(\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1} - 1 \right) (p_m^R - c_m) + r_x^R - c_m - \frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1} = 0. \quad (23)$$

Subtract the first-order condition for market m from the one for market i to get

$$p_i^R - c_i = \frac{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1} - 1}{\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i-1}{L_i+1} - 1} (p_m^R - c_m) + \frac{c_i - c_m + \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{a_i - c_i}{L_i+1} - \frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1}}{\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i-1}{L_i+1} - 1}.$$

Multiply through by $\frac{D_i}{D_x}$ and sum up over all $i \in M_x$ firms:

$$\begin{aligned} r_x^R - c_m &= \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{\frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} + \frac{L_m-1}{L_m+1} - 1}{\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i-1}{L_i+1} - 1} (p_m^R - c_m) \\ &+ \sum_{i \in M_x} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{\left(\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i-1}{L_i+1} \right) (c_i - c_m) + \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} \frac{a_i - c_i}{L_i+1} - \frac{1}{L_m} \frac{D_m}{D_x} \frac{a_m - c_m}{L_m+1}}{\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{D_i}{D_x} + \frac{L_i-1}{L_i+1} - 1}. \end{aligned}$$

Substitute for $r_x^R - c_m$ in eq. (23) and solve to get the expressions in Lemma 3.

Existence Differentiate firm l 's marginal profit function (10) with respect to k_{lm} , using the expressions for p'_m and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}}$ to get the second-order condition:

$$-\frac{2b_m}{L_m + 1} \left(\frac{D_m}{D_x} - \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \right) \leq 0.$$

This condition is satisfied for all firms if and only if the conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied for all markets $m \in M_x$. ■

A.2 Proof of Lemma 4

Characterization Substitute (12) into (14) and use the marginal effects $p'(K_m) = -\frac{b}{L+1}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_{-lm}}{\partial k_{lm}} = -\frac{L-1}{L+1}$ to get the first-order condition

$$\frac{L-1}{L+1} (p_n^R - c) - \frac{b}{L+1} \frac{D - K_n^R}{MD - K^R} \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} k_{sm}^R = \left(1 + \frac{\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} k_{sm}^R}{MD - K^R} \right) (p_n^R - r^R),$$

where k_{sn}^R is the equilibrium retail position of vertically integrated producer s in local market n , K_n^R is equilibrium retail supply in local market n aggregated across all S vertically integrated producers, $K^R = \sum_{m=1}^M K_m^R$ is the supply of retail contracts aggregated across all S vertically integrated firms and M local markets, and r^R is the equilibrium retail price. Multiply both sides by β_{sn} , sum up over all S firms and use $p_n^R - c = \frac{a-c-bK_n^R}{L+1}$ to get the aggregate first-order condition in market n

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(L \frac{L-1}{L+1} + \frac{D - K_n^R}{MD - K^R} \frac{\sum_{s=1}^S \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sn} \beta_{sm} k_{sm}^R}{K_n^R} \right) (p_n^R - c) \\ &= \frac{a-c}{L+1} \frac{D - K_n^R}{MD - K^R} \frac{\sum_{s=1}^S \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} \beta_{sn} k_{sm}^R}{K_n^R} + \left(L + \frac{\sum_{s=1}^S \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} \beta_{sn} k_{sm}^R}{MD - K^R} \right) (p_n^R - r^R). \end{aligned}$$

Assume that the equilibrium is symmetric across firms and markets, i.e. $k_{sn}^R = k^R = \frac{K^R}{ML}$ for all s and n . Then $p_n^R = r^R = p^R$, so we get

$$\left(L \frac{L-1}{L+1} + \frac{1}{ML} \sum_{s=1}^S \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} \beta_{sn} \right) (p^R - c) = \frac{a-c}{L+1} \frac{1}{ML} \sum_{s=1}^S \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} \beta_{sn}.$$

Use $\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{sm} = N$ and $\sum_{s=1}^S \beta_{sn} = L$ to get (15) after simplification.

Necessity Let all firms except possibly s be at their symmetric equilibrium retail positions k^R . Then, Lk^R is the volume of retail contracts sold by vertically integrated producers in all local markets where s has no production capacity, $(L - 1)k^R + k_{sn}$ is the corresponding volume of retail contracts in a local market n where s does have production capacity, and $(ML - N)k^R + N\bar{k}_s$ is the total volume of retail contracts sold by all vertically integrated producers in all local markets, where $\bar{k}_s = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n \in N_s} k_{sn}$ is the average retail position of firm s in the N markets in which it is present. Consider a unilateral deviation by s from k^R to $k_{sn} = 0$ in all local markets where it has production capacity. This deviation profit equals

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(0) &= N(p((L - 1)k^R) - c)q(0, (L - 1)k^R) \\ &= \frac{N}{b}(p((L - 1)k^R) - c)^2,\end{aligned}$$

whereas the profit at the proposed equilibrium equals

$$\begin{aligned}\pi^R &= N(p^R - c)(q(k^R, (L - 1)k^R) - k^R) + (p^R - c)Nk^R \\ &= \frac{N}{b}(p^R - c)^2 + (p^R - c)Nk^R,\end{aligned}$$

where we have used $b(q(k_{sn}, K_{-sn}) - k_{sn}) = p(K_n) - c$. The net profitability

$$\pi(0) - \pi^R = bN \frac{M - N(L + 1)}{M} \left(\frac{k^R}{L + 1}\right)^2 \quad (24)$$

of this deviation is strictly positive if $L + 1 < \frac{M}{N}$. Hence, k^R can be sustained as a symmetric equilibrium only if $L + 1 \geq \frac{M}{N}$.

Sufficiency under symmetric deviations Consider a symmetric deviation by s to k in all local markets in which it has production capacity. The deviation profit $\tilde{\pi}(k)$ of firm s equals

$$\frac{\tilde{\pi}(k)}{N} = (\tilde{r}(k) - p((L - 1)k^R + k))k + (p((L - 1)k^R + k) - c)q(k, (L - 1)k^R),$$

in this case, with the retail price given by

$$\tilde{r}(k) = \frac{N}{M}p((L - 1)k^R + k) + \frac{M - N}{M}p^R.$$

The second-order condition

$$\tilde{\pi}''(k) = -\frac{2Nb}{L+1} \frac{N(L+1) - M}{M(L+1)} = -\frac{2Nb}{L+1} \left[\frac{L}{L+1} - \frac{M-N}{M} \right] \leq 0$$

is satisfied if $L+1 \geq \frac{M}{N}$.

Asymmetric deviations Assume that $N \geq 2$ and consider an asymmetric deviation by s from k^R in all markets to $k^R + \varepsilon$ in one local market and $k^R - \frac{\varepsilon}{N-1}$ in all other local markets. This deviation profit equals

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\pi}(\varepsilon) &= \tilde{r}(\varepsilon)Nk^R - p(K^R + \varepsilon)(k^R + \varepsilon) - p(K^R - \frac{\varepsilon}{N-1})((N-1)k^R - \varepsilon) \\ &\quad + (p(K^R + \varepsilon) - c)q(k^R + \varepsilon, (L-1)k^R) + (N-1)(p(K^R - \frac{\varepsilon}{N-1}) - c)q(k^R - \frac{\varepsilon}{N-1}, (L-1)k^R), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\tilde{r}(\varepsilon) = \frac{1}{M}p(K^R + \varepsilon) + \frac{N-1}{M}p(K^R - \frac{\varepsilon}{N-1}) + \frac{M-N}{M}p^R = r^R$$

is the corresponding retail price. The marginal deviation profit becomes

$$\tilde{\pi}'(\varepsilon) = \frac{2b}{L+1} \frac{N}{N-1} \varepsilon$$

after simplification, which implies that $\tilde{\pi}(\varepsilon)$ is strictly convex in ε and reaches its global minimum at $\tilde{\pi}(0) = \pi^R$. Hence, there always exists a strictly profitable *asymmetric* deviation from the symmetric equilibrium candidate k^R . ■

A.3 Sufficient existence conditions for Proposition 4

Consider a region consisting of 2 local markets. Assume that location 1 is the high price market when these are spatially independent, $p_1^I > p_2^I$, as well as linked, $p_1^{RF} > p_2^{RF}$. Let all L_m firms in local market m have the same marginal production cost c_m , with $c_1 \geq c_2$. Assume also that demand is higher in region 1 than 2, $D_1 > D_2$. Assume finally that the number of firms in each market is large in the sense that:

$$L_1 > \frac{D_2}{D_1}, \quad \frac{L_2^2 + 1}{2L_2} > \frac{D_1}{D_2}. \quad (25)$$

By the assumption that 1 is the high price market, Proposition 4 yields $p_1^{RF} = p_1^I$ and

$$p_2^{RF} - c_2 = \frac{\frac{1}{L_2} \frac{L_2^2+1}{L_2+1} \frac{D_2}{D} (p_2^I - c_2) - \frac{D_1}{D} (p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF})}{\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} + \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{D_2}{D}}, \quad (26)$$

where $D = D_1 + D_2$ is total demand in the region. By manipulating the two equilibrium conditions for p_1^{RF} and p_2^{RF} we get:

$$p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF} = \frac{\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} \frac{D_1}{D} (p_2^I - c_2) + (\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} + \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{D_2}{D}) (p_1^I - p_2^I)}{\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} + \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{D_2}{D} - \frac{D_1}{D}} > 0. \quad (27)$$

The numerator on the right-hand side of (27) is strictly positive by $p_2^I > c_2$ and the assumption that $p_1^I > p_2^I$. The denominator is strictly positive by (25). Hence, $p_1^{RF} > p_2^{RF}$ is consistent.

Turning to the existence of equilibrium, (25) implies that the local second-derivatives

$$\frac{-2b_m L_m}{(L_m + 1)^2} \text{ and } \frac{-2b_m}{L_m + 1} \left(\frac{D_m}{D} - \frac{1}{L_m + 1} \right)$$

of the profit function with respect to the own retail position are negative independently of whether location m is a high price or low price market.

Consider first the incentive for firm l in location 2 to deviate from k_2^{RF} , assuming all other firms play the proposed equilibrium strategies. Let \tilde{k}_2 solve $p_2((L_2 - 1)k_2^{RF} + \tilde{k}_2) = p_1^{RF}$:

$$\tilde{k}_2 = k_2^{RF} - \frac{L_2 + 1}{b_2} (p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF}).$$

By local strict concavity of the profit function, k_2^{RF} is l 's best reply in the domain $k_{l2} \geq \tilde{k}_2$. By the same token, marginal profit is positive in the entire domain $[0, \tilde{k}_2)$ if and only if marginal profit evaluated at \tilde{k}_2 is non-negative:

$$\frac{L_2 - 1}{L_2 + 1} (p_1^{RF} - c_2) - \frac{b_2 \tilde{k}_2}{L_2 + 1} = \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{L_2^2 + 1}{L_2 + 1} (p_2^{RF} - c_2) + \frac{2L_2}{L_2 + 1} (p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF}) - \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{a_2 - c_2}{L_2 + 1} \geq 0.$$

Substituting in the equilibrium expression (26), we get the condition:

$$p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF} \geq \frac{\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} D_1 (p_2^I - c_2)}{\frac{(L_2-1)^2}{L_2^2+1} D_1 + \frac{2}{L_2+1} (L_2 D_2 - D_1)}.$$

By virtue of (27), we arrive at the condition:

$$p_1^I - p_2^I \geq -\frac{\frac{1}{L_2} \frac{(L_2-1)^2}{L_2+1} D_1 [L_2(L_2-1) \frac{D_1}{D} + (L_2^2+1) \frac{D_2}{D}] (p_2^I - c_2)}{((L_2-1)^2 D_1 + 2 \frac{L_2^2+1}{L_2+1} (L_2 D_2 - D_1)) (\frac{L_2-1}{L_2+1} + \frac{1}{L_2} \frac{D_2}{D})},$$

which holds under the assumptions of this appendix. Hence, k_2^{RF} is a global best-reply for a firm with production in location 2.

Consider next the incentives of firm l in location 1 to deviate from k_1^F . Let \tilde{k}_1 be the solution to $p_1((L-1)k_1^{RF} + \tilde{k}_1) = p_2^{RF}$:

$$\tilde{k}_1 = k_1^{RF} + \frac{L_1+1}{b_1} (p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF}).$$

First, k_1^{RF} is l 's best reply in the domain $k_{l1} \leq \tilde{k}_1$ by local strict concavity of the profit function. Suppose now that $k_{l1} > \tilde{k}_1$, so that 1 becomes the low-price location. The profit of firm l equals

$$\frac{D_2}{D} (p_2^{RF} - p_1((L_1-1)k_1^{RF} + k_{l1})) k_{l1} + (p_1((L_1-1)k_1^{RF} + k_{l1}) - c_1) q_1(k_{l1}, (L_1-1)k_1^{RF})$$

in this case, and the corresponding marginal profit is

$$\frac{D_1 - b_1 k_{l1}}{D} \frac{1}{L_1+1} + \frac{D_2}{D} (p_2^{RF} - p_1((L_1-1)k_1^{RF} + k_{l1})) + \frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} (p_1((L_1-1)k_1^{RF} + k_{l1}) - c_1).$$

Evaluated at $k_{l1} = \tilde{k}_1$, this marginal profit becomes

$$\frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} \frac{D_2}{D} (p_1^I - c_1) - \left(\frac{D_1}{D} + \frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} \right) (p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF}).$$

By local strict concavity, marginal profit is strictly negative for all $k_{l1} > \tilde{k}_1$ if and only if

$$p_1^{RF} - p_2^{RF} \geq \frac{\frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} \frac{D_2}{D}}{\frac{D_1}{D} + \frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1}} (p_1^I - c_1).$$

By substituting in (27), we can write this condition as

$$\begin{aligned} p_1^I - p_2^I + L_2 \frac{L_2 - 1}{L_2^2 + 1} & \left[\frac{2L_1}{L_1+1} \frac{D_1 - D_2}{D} (p_1^I - c_1) + \frac{D_1}{D_2} (c_1 - c_2) \right] \\ & \geq - \frac{\frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} \frac{D_1 D_2}{D^2} + \frac{1}{L_2} \left(\frac{2}{L_1+1} + L_2 - 1 \right) \left(\frac{D_2}{D} \right)^2}{\frac{1}{L_2} \frac{L_2^2+1}{L_2+1} \left(\frac{L_1-1}{L_1+1} + \frac{D_1}{D} \right) \frac{D_2}{D}} (p_1^I - c_1). \end{aligned}$$

The right-hand side of this expression is strictly negative. The expression on the left-hand side is strictly positive by $p_1^I > p_2^I$, $D_1 > D_2$ and $c_1 \geq c_2$. In particular, the last two conditions can be relaxed. Hence, k_1^{RF} represents a best-reply for producers active in location 1, which establishes existence.

A.4 Effects of fixed-price retail contracts on production costs

The total production cost in period m equals

$$TC_m = \sum_{l=1}^L c_{lm} q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm}) + \frac{b_m}{2} (D_m - Q_m(K_m))^2$$

as a function of the retail positions in period m . By the definition of $q_{lm}(k_{lm}, K_{-lm})$ in eq. (4) and because $p_m(K_m) = a_m - b_m Q_m(K_m)$, we can write this cost as:

$$TC_m = \sum_{l=1}^L (c_{lm} - c_m) k_{lm} + \frac{1}{2b_m} (p_m(K_m) - c_m)^2 + \frac{c_m}{b_m} \left(a_m - \frac{c_m}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{b_m} \sum_{l=1}^L (c_{lm} - c_m)^2.$$

The difference in production cost under short-term contracting compared to the case when firms sign fixed-price long-term retail contracts therefore equals

$$TC_m^I - TC_m^T = \sum_{l=1}^L (c_{lm} - c_m) (k_{lm}^I - k_{lm}^T) + \frac{1}{2b_m} [(p_m^I - c_m)^2 - (p_m^T - c_m)^2].$$

It is straightforward to verify that

$$k_{lm}^I = \frac{K_m^I}{L} + (L_m - 1) \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m} \quad \text{and} \quad k_{lm}^T = \frac{K_m^T}{L} + \frac{D_x}{D_m} (L_m - 1) \frac{c_m - c_{lm}}{b_m}$$

By substituting these two expressions into the cost difference above and aggregating over all periods, we can write the total cost difference as

$$\sum_{m=1}^M (TC_m^I - TC_m^T) = \Delta C + \Delta P.$$

The term

$$\Delta C = (L - 1) \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{D_x - D_m}{a_m} \sum_{l=1}^L (c_{lm} - c_m)^2$$

is the part of the cost difference that can be traced down to *within-market* differences between firms with market power. It is strictly positive unless $c_{lm} = c_m$ for all L firms in every period m . The term

$$\Delta P = \sum_{m=1}^M \frac{1}{2b_m} [(p_m^I - c_m)^2 - (p_m^T - c_m)^2]$$

is the part of the cost differential that can be attributed to *between-market* differences. As the Lemma below shows, ΔP is strictly negative unless $\frac{a_m}{c_m}$ remains constant in all contract periods m . The total cost difference can be positive or negative, depending on which of ΔC and ΔP dominates. Long-term contracting leads to a reduction in total production costs if the main source of heterogeneity is differences between firms. Short-term contracting is more efficient if instead most of the heterogeneity stems from differences between markets.

Lemma 6 *The difference in the variability of price-cost margins under short-term versus long-term contracting, as defined by ΔP , is strictly negative unless $\frac{a_m}{c_m} = \frac{a_t}{c_t}$ in all contract periods m, t , in which case $\Delta P = 0$.*

Proof: Let \hat{M} be the subset of periods with maximal ratio $\frac{a_m}{c_m}$. We first show that a marginal reduction in demand $-D_m$ in each of the periods in \hat{M} causes ΔP to increase. Substitute in

$$p_m^I - c_m = \frac{b_m D_m - c_m - b_m K_m^I}{L + 1} = \frac{b_m D_m - c_m}{L^2 + 1}, \quad p_m^T - c_m = \frac{b_m D_m - c_m - b_m D_m \frac{MK^T}{D}}{L + 1} \quad (28)$$

into ΔP and perform a total differentiation:

$$\begin{aligned} d\Delta P &= \sum_{m \in \hat{M}} \left[\left(1 - \frac{MK^T}{D}\right) \frac{p_m^T - c_m}{L + 1} - \frac{p_m^I - c_m}{L^2 + 1} \right] (-dD_m) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{L + 1} \sum_{t=1}^M D_t (p_t^T - c_t) d \frac{MK^T}{D}. \end{aligned}$$

Substitute in

$$d \frac{MK^T}{D} = - \frac{\sum_{m \in \hat{M}} a_m \left(\frac{K_m^I}{D_m} + L \frac{L-1}{L^2+1} - 2 \frac{MK^T}{D} \right) dD_m}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t}$$

into $d\Delta P$ to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} d\Delta P = & \sum_{m \in \hat{M}} b_m \left[\left(1 - \frac{MK^T}{D} \right) \frac{p_m^T - c_m}{L+1} - \frac{p_m^I - c_m}{L^2+1} \right. \\ & \left. - a_m \frac{L}{L+1} \left(\frac{1}{L} \frac{K_m^I}{D_m} + \frac{L-1}{L^2+1} - 2 \frac{MK^T}{DL} \right) \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M D_t (p_t^T - c_t)}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t} \right] (-dD_m). \end{aligned}$$

By utilizing the expressions in (28), we can rewrite the above expression as:

$$\begin{aligned} d\Delta P = & \frac{L}{L+1} \sum_{m \in \hat{M}} a_m \left[\frac{L}{L+1} \left(\frac{L-1}{L^2+1} - \frac{MK^T}{DL} \right) \left(\frac{L-1}{L^2+1} - \frac{MK^T}{DL} - \frac{1}{L} \frac{c_m}{a_m} \right) \right. \\ & \left. + \left(\frac{1}{L} \frac{K_m^I}{D_m} + \frac{L-1}{L^2+1} - 2 \frac{MK^T}{DL} \right) \left(\frac{1}{L^2+1} - \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M D_t (p_t^T - c_t)}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t} \right) \right] (-dD_m). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, use

$$1 - \frac{L^2+1}{L-1} \frac{MK^T}{DL} = 1 - (L^2+1) \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M D_t (p_t^T - c_t)}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t} = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M c_t D_t}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t}$$

and

$$\frac{1}{L} \frac{K_m^I}{D_m} - \frac{MK^T}{DL} = \frac{L-1}{L^2+1} \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M D_t \left(\frac{a_m}{c_m} - \frac{a_t}{c_t} \right) \frac{c_m c_t}{a_m}}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t}$$

to obtain

$$d\Delta P = \frac{L(L-1)}{(L+1)^2} \frac{2L^2+L+1}{(L^2+1)^2} \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M c_t D_t}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t} \frac{\sum_{t=1}^M \sum_{m \in \hat{M}} c_m c_t D_t \left(\frac{a_m}{c_m} - \frac{a_t}{c_t} \right) (-dD_m)}{\sum_{t=1}^M a_t D_t}.$$

By the construction of \hat{M} , $\frac{a_m}{c_m} = \frac{a_t}{c_t}$ for all $m, t \in \hat{M}$ and $\frac{a_m}{c_m} > \frac{a_t}{c_t}$ for all $m \in \hat{M}$ and $t \notin \hat{M}$. This implies $d\Delta P < 0$, unless $\frac{a_m}{c_m}$ is the same in all M periods, in which case $d\Delta P = 0$. It follows that any shaving of the peak periods (defined in terms of those with maximal $\frac{a_m}{c_m}$) by $-dD_m$ causes ΔP to increase. Hence, ΔP is maximized when $\frac{a_m}{c_m} = \lambda$ in every period m . If this is the case, then

$$p_m^I - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m}{L^2+1} = \frac{\lambda - 1}{L^2+1} c_m$$

and

$$p_m^T - c_m = \frac{a_m - c_m - b_m \frac{D_m}{D} MK^T}{L + 1} = \frac{\lambda - 1 - \lambda \frac{MK^T}{D}}{L + 1} c_m = \frac{\lambda - 1}{L^2 + 1} c_m,$$

where we have substituted in

$$K^T = L \frac{L - 1}{L^2 + 1} \frac{\frac{1}{M} \sum_{t=1}^M D_t (\lambda - 1) c_t}{\sum_{t=1}^M \lambda c_t \frac{D_t}{D}} = \frac{D}{M} L \frac{L - 1}{L^2 + 1} \frac{\lambda - 1}{\lambda}$$

into $p_m^T - c_m$ and simplified. As spot prices here are the same under long-term and short-term contracting in all periods, it follows that $\Delta P = 0$ if $\frac{a_m}{c_m} = \lambda$ in every period m . Hence, $\Delta P \leq 0$, with strict inequality in the generic case $\frac{a_m}{c_m} \neq \frac{a_t}{c_t}$ for some periods m and t . ■

A.5 A model of retail competition in prices

Let retail competition be in prices instead of quantities as in the main text. The purpose is to show that the mode of retail competition does not affect the main result of a pro-competitive effect of linking retail markets across space. Let each vertically integrated firm be active in one single local market. Assume that all local markets are symmetric.

Let the retail demand facing firm l in market m be

$$k_{lm} = k(r_{lm}, r_{-lm}) = \alpha - r_{lm} + (1 - \sigma)r_{-lm}$$

depending on the firm's retail price r_{lm} and the average price of all vertically integrated retailers other than l in local market m : $r_{-lm} = \frac{1}{L-1} \sum_{i \neq l} r_{im}$. The degree of horizontal differentiation is increasing in the parameter $\sigma \in [0, 1]$, with $\sigma = 1$ signifying monopoly prices. Alternatively, one can write retail demand as

$$k(r_{lm}, r_m) = \alpha - \left(1 + \frac{1 - \sigma}{L - 1}\right) r_{lm} + \frac{L}{L - 1} (1 - \sigma) r_m,$$

where $r_m = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{i=1}^L r_{im}$ is the average retail price of *all* vertically integrated producers in market m , including l . Summing up over all L firms yields the total volume of retail sales $K_m = L\alpha - L\sigma r_m$ by the L vertically integrated producers in market m .

Assume that the M retail markets are linked and that retailers compete in markups θ_{lm} over the quantity-weighted average price $r(\mathbf{K})$ defined in (8): $r_{lm} = \theta_{lm} r(\mathbf{K})$. Independent retail markets is a special case where $M = 1$. Let $\theta_m = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{l=1}^L \theta_{lm}$ be the average retail

markup in local market m . The M demand functions

$$K_m = L\alpha - L\sigma r(\mathbf{K})\theta_m$$

implicitly define total retail demand in market m , $K_m(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, depending on the vector $\boldsymbol{\theta} = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_m, \dots, \theta_M)$ of average retail markups in all M markets,

$$k(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) = \alpha + r(\mathbf{K}(\boldsymbol{\theta}))\left(\frac{L}{L-1}(1-\sigma)\theta_m - \left(1 + \frac{1-\sigma}{L-1}\right)\theta_{lm}\right),$$

defines the individual retail demand facing firm l in market m , and

$$K_{-lm}(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) = K_m(\boldsymbol{\theta}) - k(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$$

is the demand of the other $L-1$ firms in market m .

A total differentiation of retail demand yields

$$\frac{\partial K_m}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} = -\left(1 - \frac{L\sigma\theta_m \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_m}}{1 + \sum_{i=1}^M L\sigma\theta_i \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_i}}\right)\sigma\theta_m r(\mathbf{K})$$

and

$$\frac{\partial K_n}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} = \frac{L\sigma\theta_n \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_m}}{1 + \sum_{i=1}^M L\sigma\theta_i \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_i}}\sigma\theta_m r(\mathbf{K}) \text{ for } n \neq m.$$

For future reference:

$$\sum_{n=1}^M \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_n} \frac{\partial K_n}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} = \frac{-\frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_m}\sigma\theta_m r(\mathbf{K})}{1 + L\sigma \sum_{i=1}^M \theta_i \frac{\partial r(\mathbf{K})}{\partial K_i}}$$

is the marginal effect on the linked retail price of an increase in θ_{lm} .

Firm l sets its markup θ_{lm} to maximize the total profit

$$(\theta_{lm}r(\mathbf{K}(\boldsymbol{\theta})) - p(K_m(\boldsymbol{\theta})))k(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (p(K_m(\boldsymbol{\theta})) - c)q(k(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta}), K_{-lm}(\theta_{lm}, \boldsymbol{\theta}))$$

taking the markups of all other firms in market m as given. The profit maximizing markup

is a trade-off between the strategic spot-market effect and the marginal effect on retail profit:

$$(p(K_m) - c) \left[\frac{\partial q}{\partial k_{lm}} \left(\frac{\partial k}{\partial \theta_{lm}} + \frac{\partial k}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} \right) + \frac{\partial q}{\partial K_{-lm}} \left(\frac{\partial K_{-lm}}{\partial \theta_{lm}} + \frac{\partial K_{-lm}}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} \right) - Q'(K_m) \frac{\partial K_m}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} \right] \\ + (r + \theta_{lm} \sum_{n=1}^M \frac{\partial r}{\partial K_n} \frac{\partial K_n}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L}) k_{lm} + (\theta_{lm} r - p(K_m)) \left(\frac{\partial k}{\partial \theta_{lm}} + \frac{\partial k}{\partial \theta_m} \frac{1}{L} \right)$$

Set the marginal profit to zero, let $\theta_{lm} = \theta$ for all firms in all markets, invoke the functional forms from Lemma 1 and the above comparative statics results on the retail demand to obtain the symmetric equilibrium markup θ as a solution to $Z(\theta, M) = 0$, where

$$Z(\theta, M) = \left(1 - \frac{M-1}{M} \frac{b}{L+1} L \sigma \theta\right) \sigma \theta (p(K(\theta)) - c) \frac{2}{L+1} \\ + \left(1 - \frac{b}{L+1} \left(L - \frac{\theta}{M}\right) \sigma \theta\right) \frac{K(\theta)}{L} - (\theta p(K(\theta)) - c) \left(1 - \frac{b}{L+1} \left(L - \frac{\sigma \theta}{M}\right) \sigma \theta\right)$$

and

$$\frac{K(\theta)}{L} = \frac{\alpha - \left(c + \frac{a-c}{L+1}\right) \sigma \theta}{1 - L \frac{b}{L+1} \sigma \theta}.$$

is the firm-level retail volume. Let $\theta^R(M)$ be the smallest solution to $Z(\theta, M) = 0$, i.e. $\theta^R(M)$ is the most competitive retail equilibrium when retail markets are linked. Observe that

$$Z(\theta, 1) - Z(\theta, M) = \frac{b}{L+1} \frac{M-1}{M} \sigma^2 \theta^2 \left[\frac{K(\theta)}{\sigma L} + \frac{2L}{L+1} (p(K(\theta)) - c) - \theta p(K(\theta)) + c \right]$$

is positive for σ sufficiently close to zero. In this case, $Z(\theta, 1) > 0$ for all $\theta \leq \theta^R(M)$ and therefore all solutions $Z(\theta^I, 1) = 0$ satisfy $\theta^I > \theta^R(M)$ for $M \geq 2$. Under the reasonable assumption that $\frac{a+Lc}{bL} > \alpha$ so that the retail sales are decreasing in the markup,

$$\frac{K'(\theta)}{L} = - \frac{\sigma}{L+1} \frac{a+Lc - \alpha Lb}{\left(1 - L \frac{b}{L+1} \sigma \theta\right)^2} < 0,$$

it follows that retail sales are higher, $K(\theta^R(M)) > K(\theta^I)$, and spot market competition therefore more intense when retail markets are linked compared to the case of independent retail markets.

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