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Subsidising Renewables but Taxing Storage?
Second-Best Policies with Imperfect Carbon Pricing

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Subsidising Renewables but Taxing Storage?  
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Carsten Helm† and Mathias Mier‡

We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is efficient for low market shares of intermittent renewables in the energy system, but it turns inefficient once there are sufficient renewables to partly displace fossil electricity production at times of high availability. Moreover, the subsidy scheme is substantially more complex than a first-best Pigouvian tax. The optimal renewable subsidy is always positive but tends to decrease as electricity production becomes less reliant on fossils. The optimal storage subsidy even changes its sign. It is usually negative as long as fossils contribute to filling the storage, but turns positive if fossils are used only during times of low availability of renewables. This is because more storage capacity reduces the price during times of destorage, but raises it when electricity is taken from the market to fill the storage. This has countervailing effects on firms’ incentives to invest in fossil capacities, and these effects are more pronounced the higher the round-trip efficiency losses during a storage cycle.

Keywords: intermittent renewable energies, electricity storage, carbon externality, subsidies, peak-load pricing, optimal control

JEL Classification: H23, Q42, Q58, O33

1 Introduction

Dramatic cost reductions and substantial subsidies have created a worldwide boom of renewable energies (IRENA, 2017b). Subsidies for renewables are mainly motivated by the environmental costs of electricity production from fossil energies, which include climate change due to CO₂ emissions as well as local air pollution. However, the fastest-growing renewable energies, wind and solar, are characterised by a highly intermittent supply and, in particular, low reliability (dark doldrums). These characteristics are the main obstacles in transitioning to an energy system based primarily on renewable energy sources, which is widely deemed necessary in order to meet the target of the 2015 Paris agreement to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

The intermittency in supply from wind and solar energies may be reduced by technological improvements like wind turbines that are able to operate at lower wind speeds, panels that are more efficient at absorbing low levels of solar radiation, or enhanced power transmission grids that can exploit spatial differences in the availability of intermittent renewables. Moreover, it is widely perceived that electricity storage should be part of the solution. For example, according to IEA’s sustainable
development scenarios (SDS) generation capacity of energy storage must increase from 176.5 GW in 2017 to 266 GW in 2030 (see also IRENA, 2017a). Such storage will probably be a mix of traditional pumped hydro storage, small- (as in electric vehicles) and large-scale batteries, power-to-gas (mainly hydrogen), and compressed air storage. Since the deployment of pumped hydro storage is limited (Gimeno-Gutiérrez and Lacal-Aránategui, 2015; Sinn, 2017), much of the build-up must come from technologies that are not competitive yet, which leads to requests for additional policy support.¹

We analyse optimal support policies for renewable and storage capacities when a Pigouvian tax to internalise the carbon externality from burning fossil fuels cannot be implemented, for example, due to political economy reasons.² For parsimony, we focus on a per unit subsidy for capacity investments rather than on the more widely used feed-in tariffs, market premiums, and, more recently, tenders.³ These instruments also imply an implicit subsidy for investments in renewables and storage so that their effects are quite similar. Indeed, we later argue that they are often identical within our specific modelling framework where support policies are financed by lump-sum taxation. We build on the peak-load pricing model and consider an economy with three types of firms: those that produce with a polluting fossil energy, those that use carbon-neutral but intermittent renewable energies, and those that engage in electricity storage. First, firms make long-term investments in their respective capacities, taking into account the subsidies granted by a benevolent regulator. Thereafter, firms produce electricity and interact with consumers in a perfectly competitive market. Note that storage firms have a dual role. They buy electricity—that is, act like consumers—at the low prices that prevail during times of high availability of renewables, but supply electricity at the high prices that obtain during times of low availability. This exploitation of price differences and the increasing role of flexible pricing schemes motivates our assumption of dynamic pricing.⁴ To keep the model tractable, we assume that the availability of renewables can be forecasted perfectly and follows a repeating cyclical pattern, for example, a day-night (solar) or seasonal pattern.⁵ This assumption allows us to model storage decisions as an optimal control problem.

For a model comprised of competitive markets, dynamic pricing, lump-sum taxation and no R&D spillovers, it is straightforward to see that a Pigouvian tax per unit of pollution would implement the first-best solution. Given that we neglect dynamic aspects of resource extraction and of the climate system, the tax would even be constant for constant marginal damage costs (see Lemoine and Rudik (2017) for dynamic pricing schemes). Subsidies for renewables reduce pollution only indirectly. First, more renewables capacities reduce the expected electricity price and, therefore, incentives to invest in fossils. Second, fossil capacities may remain unused when the availability of intermittent renewables, which have lower variable costs, is high. Together with a (usually negative) subsidy for storage, this may even lead to the first-best solution, but only when the share of renewables in the

¹ Costs of batteries fell by 22% from 2016 to 2017 (https://www.iea.org/tcep/energy-integration/energystorage/). Schmidt, Hawkes, Gambhir, and Staffell (2017) predict (using experience curves) that battery storage will be competitive in the next 10 (electric vehicle transportation) to 20 years (residential energy storage) (see Kittner, Lill, and Kammen (2017) for similar predictions), although other studies are less optimistic (e.g., Brouwer, van den Brock, Zappa, Turkenburg, and Pajii, 2016).

² The literature discusses equity issues (e.g., Polinsky, 1979), lobbying and rent seeking (e.g., Fredriksson, 1997), and distributional implications (see Goulder and Parry (2008) for a discussion and Reguant (2018) for empirical evidence).

³ See, e.g., Eichner and Runkel (2014) for a similar approach. In 2016, 83 countries used feed-in tariffs or premiums to promote renewable energy, 58 countries used investment subsidies (capital subsidies, grants, or rebates), and 73 countries used auctions that do not exclude the use of an investment subsidy (IRENA and CPI, 2018). Moreover, most of storage subsidization is constructed as an investment subsidy (ESC, 2015).

⁴ Dynamic pricing of electricity is still often restricted to larger commercial customers (see, e.g., Borenstein and Holland, 2005; Joekow and Wolfram, 2012), but according to Helm and Mier (2018), this may be sufficient to create appropriate price signals. Moreover, recent technological advances have dramatically lowered the costs of smart metering technologies, and many regions have set ambitious targets for their deployment (e.g., in the EU Third Energy Package). In addition, several studies have found evidence that households actually do respond to higher electricity prices by reducing usage (e.g., Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Jesso and Rapson, 2014).

⁵ Short-term forecasts over a day-night cycle are actually quite accurate (see, e.g., Ivesen, Morales, Müller, and Madsen, 2016), and seasonal wind availability is, at least in the historic average, well-known. Moreover, in their empirical study for southeastern Arizona, Cowiasakaran, Reynolds, and Samano (2016) find that social costs of unforeseeable intermittency are small in comparison to those of intermittency overall.
electricity system is low so that fossil capacities are fully used during storage. For higher market shares of renewables, the subsidy scheme is only second-best. In addition, it is substantially more complex than a Pigouvian tax because the optimal subsidy levels depend on the market penetration of renewable energies. For the example of linear demand and constant marginal capacity costs, the renewable subsidy is constant as long as fossils are always the price-setting technology—that is, even when the availability of intermittent renewables is high—but falls in the level of renewable capacities thereafter. For more general demand functions, the optimal subsidy scheme becomes even more complex.

Storage capacities even out the intermittency of renewables and thereby raise their competitiveness. This makes subsidising storage seem reasonable, but it turns out that this intuition is wrong. Storage reduces the electricity price when stored energy is supplied to the market, but it raises the price when the storage is filled. This has countervailing effects on average electricity prices and, therefore, on the incentives to invest in fossil capacities. Due to round-trip efficiency losses during a storage cycle, more electricity has to be taken from the market than can be supplied to it during times of destorage.\footnote{Round-trip efficiency is usually in the range of 65 to 90 per cent, depending on the storage technology (IRENA, 2017a).}

Therefore, as long as fossils contribute to electricity production during times of storage, the price increasing effect tends to dominate and storage capacities should be taxed. This takes into account that the resulting lower renewable capacities can be addressed directly by raising the subsidies for them. These overlapping instruments mean that it is always optimal to set the storage subsidy only on the basis of its “direct” effects on fossils, and not to use it as an instrument to support renewables.

Once the level of renewable capacities is large enough to fill the storage during times where they are highly available, fossils no longer benefit from the price increasing effect during storage. However, they still suffer from the additional electricity supply during destorage so that it now becomes optimal to subsidise storage. This subsidy is constant under the same conditions that lead to a decreasing renewable subsidy. Roughly speaking, as the market share of fossil energies falls, it is optimal to gradually switch from the subsidisation of renewables to subsidising storage. To summarise, the main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it extends the peak-load pricing model by developing an analytically tractable model that integrates the optimal control problem of storage firms and accounts for rather general intermittency patterns of renewables. Second, we use this model to examine subsidies for storage and renewable technologies as an alternative to Pigouvian taxation to address the carbon externality of fossils.

Accordingly, our paper is related to several literatures. The first of these is the literature on the economics of intermittent sources of electricity production, of which Ambec and Crampes (2012, p. 321) wrote some years ago that they are ‘still in their infancy’. Since then, the literature has grown substantially, but most contributions rely heavily on numerical simulations (e.g., Green and Vasilakos, 2010) or are empirical (e.g., Liski and Vehviläinen, 2016). In this paper, we build on the contribution by Helm and Mier (2018), who analyse the market diffusion of renewable energies as they become cheaper. We extend their model by introducing storage as a third technology and, additionally, analyse renewables and storage support policies. Abrell, Rausch, and Streitberger (2018), using a simulation and a simpler analytical model, analyse a larger set of renewables support policies but abstract from storage. Like Fell and Linn (2013), the authors focus on the heterogeneity of intermittent natural resources. Hence both contributions distinguish between wind and solar, but use a simple binary pattern for their availability. Andor and Voss (2016) also consider efficient subsidy schemes for renewables, but their model neither includes fossils nor a storage technology.

Another strand of literature to which this paper relates is the economics of storage. Traditional applications include balancing stochastic production disturbances in agriculture (e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; Wright and Williams, 1984) and the combination of thermal capacity with mainly pumped hydro storage (e.g., Crampes and Moreaux, 2001). In a seminal contribution, Gravelle (1976) studies the implications of storage for peak-load pricing with variable demand. He finds that production during the off-peak period increases more than during the peak period, due to round-trip losses of storage. This is similar to the effect of storage during times with high and low availability of
intermittent renewables in our model. More recently, the focus has shifted toward the role of pumped storage as a natural complement to the intermittency of renewables (e.g., Crampes and Moreaux, 2010). Similar to us, Steffen and Weber (2013) determine optimal capacity investments, but only for the fossil and storage technologies. They then use a load duration curve to determine the effect of intermittent renewable energies and demonstrate their results numerically by using a case study for Germany. In a related contribution, Steffen and Weber (2016) use optimal control theory to provide a more precise representation of storage dynamics. However, like Horsley and Wrob el (2002), they only consider the problem of an individual storage firm, and they focus on differences between large (unconstrained) and small (constrained) reservoirs. Ambec and Crampes (2017) analyse the social value of storage in a model with renewables, but the availability of renewables is restricted to either 0 or 1. The related model by Durmaz (2014) uses discrete time and dynamic programming to determine the optimal storage pattern. However, he does not consider policy instruments and his problem is analytically not fully tractable.

Our paper also contributes to the more general literature on second-best policies and the ranking of policy instruments to incentivize pollution abatement. For a given abatement cost function, pollution taxes and abatement subsidies are usually seen as equivalent in the short run, whereas in the long run, subsidies lead to excessive firm entry (e.g., Kohn, 1992). In an extension of this literature that is more similar to our approach, firms can decide whether to incur the fixed cost of a new technology that reduces costs of emission abatement. In this framework, taxes on emissions and subsidies for emission abatement are usually equivalent (e.g., Milliman and Prince, 1989; Requate and Unold, 2003). Although this literature is often motivated by the problem of mitigating CO_2 emissions, specific aspects of energy markets such as the intermittency of renewables are often neglected (see also Fischer, Preonas, and Newell, 2017). Accounting for them changes the comparison of taxes and subsidies, as we show.

In accordance with our results, there is a broad consensus that no additional subsidies are necessary to tackle an environmental externality if perfect carbon taxation is possible (Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tyvinski, 2014; Van Der Ploeg and Withagen, 2014). Positive externalities from R&D may require renewables subsidisation (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, and Hemous, 2012), but Parry, Pizer, and Fischer (2003) argue that the welfare effect from tackling climate change externalities is greater than the positive effect of R&D subsidisation (see also Goulder and Parry, 2008). Other reasons that have been put forward to motivate renewables subsidies are international tax competition with mobile capital (Eichner and Runkel, 2014), learning externalities and imperfect competition (Reichenbach and Requate, 2012), lumpy entry cost (Antoniou and Strausz, 2017) and imperfections in demand for energy efficiency (Fischer et al., 2017). We abstract from such market failures so as to focus on the role of intermittency of renewable energies and storage when addressing the carbon externality.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and the timing of the decisions. The game is then solved by backward induction. Section 3 considers electricity production and storage decisions, Section 4 examines capacity choices, and Section 5 determines the optimal subsidy levels. Section 6 concludes, and an Appendix contains the proofs.

2 The Model

Consider an electricity market with three technologies, indexed \( j = f, r, s \). Technology \( f \) represents a dispatchable fossil technology—like conventional power plants that burn coal or gas. Dispatchability means that electricity production can be freely varied at every point in time up to the limit of its installed capacity (see Joskow, 2011). Since we abstract from uncertainty, we can ignore ramp-up times because conventional power plants are well able to adapt production some time ahead. Technology \( r \) is a renewable technology with intermittent supply—like wind turbines, solar PV, or solar thermal plants. The third technology \( s \) does not generate electricity, but is able to store it for later usage.

For each of the three technologies there are a large number, \( n_j \), of identical firms that interact on competitive markets. We use lower-case letters to denote choices of firms and upper-case letters for aggregate values. Accordingly, the production and capacity choices of a firm that produces with
technology $j$ are $y_j$ and $q_j$, respectively, whereas overall production and capacity are $Y_j = n_j y_j$ and $Q_j = n_j q_j$. To keep the analysis focused, we consider only the most interesting case where strictly positive capacities are installed for all three technologies. Obviously, this depends on the cost parameters of the technologies.

A firm operating with technology $j$ has capacity costs $c_j(Q_j)q_j$, where $c_j(Q_j)$ are the costs of providing one unit of capacity, which are constant from the perspective of an individual firm. Thus, we assume that each firm is too small to affect technology costs $c_j(Q_j)$, just as it takes prices as given by the assumption of competitive markets. However, technology costs depend on the overall capacity level, which allows us to account for different assumptions used in the literature in regard to renewables. In particular, $c_j'(Q_j) < 0$ would capture that learning reduces unit costs (as in Green and Léautier, 2017). By contrast, if one wants to emphasize that the most efficient sites for wind and solar energies are used first, then $c_j'(Q_j) > 0$ seems more appropriate (as in Abrell et al., 2018).

Similarly, for storage, increasing unit costs could result from less suitable pump storage locations and the scarcity of the rare earths that are needed for batteries. For the renewable and storage technology we impose no restriction on the sign of $c_j'(Q_j)$. However, we assume that there are no learning effects for the established fossil technology so that $c_f'(Q_f) \geq 0$.

Electricity produced by the fossil and renewable technology is $y_j \geq 0$, $j = f, r$. We assume constant costs, $k_j > 0$, of producing one unit of output with the fossil technology, which are mainly variable costs for coal, oil, or gas. Moreover, fossil production leads to an environmental unit cost, $\delta > 0$, that may be internalised by a tax, $\tau$. Hence a fossil firm’s total unit costs are $b_f = k_f + \tau$, and this is equal to social costs if $\tau = \delta$. Variable costs of renewables are negligible and, therefore, ignored, as often done in other work.

Turning to the storage technology, $s$ denotes a firm’s level of stored electricity and $y_s(t)$ its supply of stored electricity at time $t$. Accordingly, $y_s(t) > 0$ characterises states in which stored electricity is fed into the electricity system, and $y_s(t) < 0$ means that electricity is stored. Storage leads to conversion losses so that the change in the level of stored electricity differs from the quantity of electricity that is fed into or taken out of the storage. Specifically, $\dot{s} := \frac{ds}{dt} = -\eta(t)y_s(t)$, where the parameter $\eta(t) > 0$ represents conversion losses. We assume that $\eta(t) = \eta_s \in (0, 1]$ during times of storage so that more than one unit of electricity is needed to fill the storage by one unit. Similarly, during times of destorage, $\eta(t) = \eta_d \geq 1$ so that more than one unit of electricity has to be taken out of the storage to sell one unit on the market. Finally, for intermediate periods during which the storage capacity is not used ($y_s(t) = 0$), we assume $\eta(t) = 1$. This implies that no electricity is lost during times of no storage use, i.e., $\dot{s} = 0$ if $y_s(t) = 0$.

Intermittency of renewables is represented by an availability factor $\alpha(t) \in [0, 1]$ that is a continuous function of time. Hence the level of renewable capacities that is available at time $t$ is $\alpha(t)Q_r$. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that $\alpha(t)$ follows a regular pattern, described in more detail below. For example, this pattern could represent daily fluctuations of solar power or seasonal fluctuations of wind. Storage serves to balance these fluctuations so that we choose one cycle during which the storage is filled and emptied as a “representative” period. The lifetime of installed capacities (assumed to be the same for all technologies) consists of $m$ such representative storage cycles.

The timing is as follows. In Stage 1, the government chooses subsidy levels for renewable and storage capacities. In Stage 2, competitive firms build their respective fossil, renewable, or storage capacities. In line with the literature on peak-load pricing, we assume a greenfield setting that disregards any capacity that is currently in place. Finally, in Stage 3, firms choose their production levels on the competitive electricity market and consumers demand electricity.

### 3 Production and Consumption Decisions

#### 3.1 Derivation of Optimality Conditions

The game is solved by backward induction, and we first analyse production and consumption decisions during the lifetime of installed capacities for given subsidies and taxes. The competitive market
equilibrium follows from firms’ profit maximisation and consumers’ utility maximisation, subject to
electricity prices, \( p(t) \), which balance supply and demand. Due to our assumption that the availability
of the renewable technology follows a regular pattern, the market outcome will be the same for each
representative storage cycle. We denote the initial and terminal time of a storage cycle by \( t_0 \) and \( T \),
respectively.

First consider the production decisions of fossil and renewable firms. Capacity costs are sunk so
that firms’ objective is to maximise the difference between revenues, \( p(t) y_f(t) \), and variable produc-
tion costs, \( b f y_f(t) \), over the length of a representative period, where variable costs are zero for the
renewable firm. Production by fossil and renewable firms is restricted by the (available) capacity,
\( y_f(t) \leq q_f, y_r(t) \leq \alpha(t) q_r \), and it must be non-negative, \( y_f(t), y_r(t) \geq 0 \). The latter constraint can
be ignored because profit maximising renewable and fossil firms will never choose negative quantities in
the unconstrained equilibrium. Thus, a fossil firm’s profit maximisation problem for a representative
cycle in Stage 3 is

\[
\pi_f(y^*_f(q_f)) := \max_{y_f(t)} \int_{t_0}^{T} (p(t) - b_f) y_f(t) \, dt \quad \text{such that} \quad y_f(t) \leq q_f. \tag{1}
\]

Here, \( \pi_f(y^*_f(q_f)) \) denotes the value function of this problem, that is, the maximum profits a firm can
achieve by optimising production \( y_f \) for all \( t \in [t_0, T] \), given the fixed capacity parameter \( q_f \). Noting
that production choices in \( t \) have no intertemporal effects, this is essentially a static constrained
maximisation problem and the Lagrangian for each \( t \in [t_0, T] \) is

\[
L_f(t) = (p(t) - b_f) y_f(t) + \mu_f(t)(q_f - y_f(t)), \tag{3}
\]

where \( \mu_f(t) \) is the Lagrangian multiplier regarding the capacity constraint of a fossil firm. Given
competitive markets, firms take prices as given so that the first-order and complementary slackness
conditions are (asterisks characterise values in the competitive market solution)

\[
\frac{\partial L_f(t)}{\partial y_f(t)} = p(t) - b_f - \mu_f(t) \leq 0 \quad \text{[= 0, if } y^*_f(t) > 0] \tag{4},
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L_f(t)}{\partial \mu_f(t)} = q_f - y_f(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu_f(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu_f(t)[q_f - y_f(t)] = 0. \tag{5}
\]

Due to the linearity of the objective function, the first-order condition is sufficient and leads to corner
solutions. Specifically, if the price exceeds variable production costs, the firm produces at full
capacity; i.e., \( y_f(t) = q_f \) if \( p(t) > b_f \). By contrast, fossil firms do not produce during times \( t \) for
which \( p(t) < b_f \), while any \( y_f(t) \in [0, q_f] \) is optimal if \( p(t) = b_f \).

Renewable firms face no variable costs, but their capacity constraint depends on the availability,
\( \alpha(t) \), of renewable capacities. Thus, the profit maximisation problem is

\[
\pi_r(y^*_r(q_r)) := \max_{y_r(t)} \int_{t_0}^{T} p(t) y_r(t) \, dt \quad \text{such that} \quad y_r(t) \leq \alpha(t) q_r, \tag{6}
\]

where \( \pi_r(y^*_r(q_r)) \) denotes again the value function. For each \( t \in [t_0, T] \), the Lagrangian of the
constrained maximisation problem is

\[
L_r(t) = p(t) y_r(t) + \mu_r(t)(\alpha(t) q_r - y_r(t)), \tag{8}
\]

6
where $\mu_r(t)$ is the Lagrangian multiplier regarding the capacity constraint of renewable firms. The first-order and complementary slackness conditions are

$$\frac{\partial L_r(t)}{\partial y_r(t)} = p(t) - \mu_r(t) \leq 0 \quad \text{[9]}$$

$$\frac{\partial L_r(t)}{\partial \mu_r(t)} = \alpha(t) q_r - y_r \geq 0, \quad \mu_r(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu_r(t) [\alpha(t) q_r - y_r(t)] = 0. \quad \text{[10]}$$

We consider only situations where renewable capacities have been installed (which requires that they are sufficiently cheap). Intuitively, it follows that $y^*_r(t) > 0$ for any $\alpha(t), p(t) > 0$ because, in contrast to fossils, renewables have no variable costs.\(^7\) Thus, for $\alpha(t) = 0$, we trivially have $y^*_r(t) = 0$, and for any $\alpha(t) > 0$, condition (9) can be replaced by

$$p(t) - \mu_r(t) = 0 \quad \text{[11]}$$

so that for all prices $p(t) > 0$, we have $\mu_r(t) > 0$. The complementary slackness condition in (10) then implies $y^*_r(t) = \alpha(t) q_r$ for all $t$ with $p(t) > 0$, i.e., renewables are used at full capacity. This is intuitive given their variable costs of 0. However, if the level of renewable capacities and their current availability are very large, supply at full capacity may exceed demand from consumers and storage firms, leading to an equilibrium price of zero.

Next, consider storage firms. They control the level of stored electricity $s$ (the state variable) so as to exploit price differences by buying and storing electricity ($y_s(t) < 0$) during times of low prices, while destoring ($y_s(t) > 0$) and selling when prices are high. Hence, a storage firm faces the following optimal control problem ($\pi_s(y^*_s(q_s))$ is the value function):

$$\pi_s(y^*_s(q_s)) := \max_{y_s(t)} \int_0^T p(t) y_s(t) \, dt \text{ such that }$$

$$s(t) = -\eta(t) y_s(t), \quad \text{[13]}$$

$$s(t_0) = s(T), \quad \text{[14]}$$

$$s(t) \leq q_s, \quad \text{[15]}$$

$$s(t) \geq 0. \quad \text{[16]}$$

The first constraint, (13), is the equation of motion for the level of stored energy, $s$. Condition (14) requires that the initial and terminal storage level must be the same, which follows from our assumption of a representative storage cycle, while the overall game consists of $m$ such cycles.\(^8\) Finally, (15) is the capacity constraint of storage firms, and (16) is the constraint that the level of stored energy must be non-negative. The Hamiltonian is

$$\mathcal{H} (y_s(t)) = p(t) y_s(t) - \lambda(t) \eta(t) y_s(t), \quad \text{[17]}$$

where $\lambda(t)$ is the adjoint variable of $s(t)$. Conditions (15) and (16) are pure state space constraints and can be accounted for by forming the Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L}_s(t) = \mathcal{H} (y_s(t)) + \varphi_s(t) (q_s - s(t)) + \varphi_d(t) s(t), \quad \text{[18]}$$

\(^7\) More formally, suppose by contradiction that $y^*_r(t) = 0$ although $\alpha(t) > 0$. Given that $q_r > 0$ by assumption, the complementary slackness condition $\mu_r(t) [\alpha(t) q_r - y_r(t)] = 0$ then implies $\mu_r(t) = 0$. For any positive price, this violates the condition $p(t) - \mu_r(t) \leq 0$ (see Equation (9)).

\(^8\) The overall length of the game coincides with the lifetime of the storage capacities. Therefore, in the last period it would be optimal to completely empty the storage. For parsimony, we ignore this complication by simply requiring $s(t_0) = s(T)$, just as we ignore other (more relevant) problems such as the fact that the storage capacity of batteries gradually decreases over time.
where $\varphi_s(t)$ and $\varphi_d(t)$ are the Lagrangian multipliers for the respective constraints. The first-order conditions are (see, e.g., Sydsaeter, Hammond, Seierstad, and Strom, 2005, p. 385)

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_s(t)}{\partial y_s(t)} = p(t) - \lambda(t) \eta(t) = 0, \tag{19}
\]

\[
\dot{s}(t) = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_s(t)}{\partial \lambda(t)} = -\eta(t) y_s(t), \tag{20}
\]

\[
\dot{\lambda}(t) = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_s(t)}{\partial s(t)} = \varphi_s(t) - \varphi_d(t), \tag{21}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_s(t)}{\partial \varphi_s(t)} = q_s - s(t) \geq 0, \ \varphi_s(t) \geq 0, \ \varphi_s(t) [q_s - s(t)] = 0, \tag{22}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_s(t)}{\partial \varphi_d(t)} = s(t) \geq 0, \ \varphi_d(t) \geq 0, \ \varphi_d(t) s(t) = 0, \tag{23}
\]

\[
s(t_0) = s(T). \tag{24}
\]

Here, (19) is the standard first-order condition for the control variable $y_s(t)$, which must always bind because $y_s(t)$ is not constrained to be non-negative. It follows that $p(t) = \eta(t) \lambda(t)$. Remembering that $\eta(t)$ are conversion losses, this coincides with the standard interpretation of the adjoint variable $\lambda(t)$ as the change in the value function due to a unit increase in the state variable $s(t)$—that is, in the level of stored electricity, whose value is simply its price. Next, (20) and (21) are the differential equations for the state and adjoint variable. Conditions (22) and (23) account for the pure state space constraints that the level of stored electricity can neither exceed the available storage capacities nor become negative.

Turning to consumers, utility maximisation leads to a demand function $x(p(t))$. We impose no restrictions other than $\frac{\partial x}{\partial p} \leq 0$ and that the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) exceeds the total costs per unit of fossils, i.e., $p_{\text{max}} > b_f + \beta_f$. This assures that it is always efficient to install a positive capacity level. Consumption choices on the competitive electricity market maximise consumer surplus, which, for each $t$, can be expressed as $\int_{p(t)}^{p_{\text{max}}} x(\bar{p}) d\bar{p}$. Demand is restricted by production and cannot be negative. However, the latter condition can be ignored because the above assumption that the maximum WTP exceeds variable costs ensures non-negative demand in equilibrium. Then, the maximisation problem of consumers is $(w(x^*))$ is the value function

\[
w(x^*) := \max_{x(t)} \int_{t_0}^T \int_{p(t)}^{p_{\text{max}}} x(\bar{p}) d\bar{p} \ dt \text{ such that } \\
x(t) \leq \sum_j Y_j(t), \tag{25}
\]

where $\sum_j Y_j(t)$ is aggregate production of all firms producing with technologies $j = f, r, s$. The Lagrangian is

\[
\mathcal{L}_x(t) = \int_{p(t)}^{p_{\text{max}}} x(\bar{p}) d\bar{p} + \nu(t) \left( \sum_j Y_j(t) - x(t) \right), \tag{27}
\]

where $\nu(t)$ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (26). The first-order conditions are

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_x(t)}{\partial x(t)} = -\frac{\partial x(t)}{\partial x(t)} - \nu(t) x(t) - \nu(t) \leq 0 \quad [= 0, \text{if } x(t^*) > 0], \tag{28}
\]

\footnote{Conditions (19) to (24) are sufficient because the Hamiltonian $\mathcal{H}$ is linear in $y_s(t)$ and the constraints (15) and (16) are linear in $s(t)$ (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1986, pp. 313-318).}
\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_x(t)}{\partial \nu(t)} = \sum_j Y_j(t) - x(t) \geq 0 \quad \nu(t) \geq 0, \quad \nu(t) \left(\sum_j Y_j(t) - x(t)\right) = 0.
\] (29)

By assumption, \( \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} < 0 \) so that \( \nu(t) > 0 \) for all \( x(t) > 0 \) from (28). Moreover, a price that induces \( x(t) = 0 \) cannot be profit maximising if supply, \( \sum_j Y_j(t) \), is positive. From the complementary slackness condition in (29), it follows that \( \sum_j Y_j(t) = x(t) \), that is, demand equals supply. In conclusion, the competitive solution follows from this market clearing condition, the inverse demand function, \( p(x(t)) \), and the first-order conditions of fossil firms, (4) and (5), renewable firms, (10) and (11), and storage firms, (19) to (24).

### 3.2 Determination of Competitive Equilibrium

Remember that storage capacities are given in Stage 3. Thus, a priori, they might always exceed the level at which profit maximising firms would want to store electricity. To exclude this unrealistic case, we assume that unit costs of storage capacities, \( c_s(Q_s) \), are sufficiently large so that the level of capacities installed in Stage 2 make them a scarce resource in Stage 3; meaning that the constraint \( s(t) \leq q_s \) binds for at least some \( t \).

We can distinguish three outcomes. **Storage periods** in which the storage is filled, **destorage periods** in which the storage is emptied, and **intermediate periods** with neither storage nor destorage, i.e., \( y_s(t) = 0 \). Obviously, during storage and destorage periods the storage can neither be full nor empty (except at the boundaries), i.e., \( s(t) < q_s \) and \( s(t) > 0 \). Thus, from the complementary slackness conditions in (22) and (23) we have \( \varphi_s(t) = \varphi_d(t) = 0 \) so that \( \lambda(t) = \varphi_s(t) - \varphi_d(t) = 0 \) from (21). Moreover, by assumption the round-trip efficiency loss parameter is constant at \( \eta(t) = \eta_s \) during storage and at \( \eta(t) = \eta_d \) during destorage. It follows from (19) that not only \( \lambda(t) \), but also prices are constant during each individual storage and destorage period. Note that we have imposed no technical restrictions on the speed of filling and depleting the storage. Thus, if prices varied during an individual storage or destorage period, firms would use their storage to buy electricity at low prices and sell it at high prices.

To this point, we have not restricted the evolution of the availability of renewables energies, \( \alpha(t) \), over time that drives the storage/destorage pattern. To keep the model tractable, we need to impose more structure as otherwise nearly any sequence of storage, destorage, and intermediate periods is conceivable. As the starting point of a representative period, \( t_0 \), we choose a time with zero availability, i.e., \( \alpha(t_0) = 0 \). We assume that, thereafter, \( \alpha(t) \) is weakly increasing until reaching the maximum availability of 1. After reaching its maximum, availability is weakly decreasing until the end of a representative cycle, \( T \). By continuity of \( \alpha(t) \), the availability must be the same as that at the beginning of the next representative cycle, i.e., \( \alpha(T) = 0 \).

The black solid curve in Figure 1 is an example of such a distribution. The figure depicts solar PV production in Germany on 30 June 2018, where maximum production has been normalised to 1 and the length of a representative cycle from \( t_0 \) to \( T \) is 24 hours (downloaded from https://transparency.entsoe.eu on 2 July 2018). The transparent segments to the left and to the right illustrate our simplifying assumption that the availability of renewables is the same in periods prior and subsequent to the depicted one.

Obviously, firms should destore electricity when the availability of renewables is low (lower bold parts of the curve), and store electricity when the availability is high (upper bold part of the curve), leading to the following sequence of periods: destorage, intermediate, storage, intermediate, destorage, ... . Together with our assumption that we consider a representative cycle, a repeated pattern of identical destorage and storage periods obtains. Therefore, the storage should be completely emptied at the end of each destorage period, and completely filled at the end of each storage period. Otherwise, some stored electricity and/or some storage capacity would never be used, which cannot be optimal. This property keeps the analysis tractable and is the reason for the above assumptions about \( \alpha(t) \). In the remainder of this subsection, we derive an intuitive solution for the competitive equilibrium.
and show in Appendix A that it satisfies all equilibrium conditions from Subsection 3.1. For later reference, we state the solution in terms of aggregate values, $Y_j = n_j y_j$, $Q_j = n_j q_j$, and $S = n_s s$.

![Diagram showing availability of renewables and competitive equilibrium](image)

**Fig. 1:** Availability of renewables and competitive equilibrium

Dispatchable electricity from storage and fossils is most valuable when the availability of renewables is minimal, i.e., at $t_0$ for which $\alpha(t_0) = 0$. Therefore, fossils must be fully used at $t_0$ as, otherwise, some capacities would always lie idle. Given that renewables have lower variable costs, they obviously must be fully used too. Moreover, we have already shown that the electricity price is constant at $p_d = \lambda(t_0) \eta_d$ during the destorage period that starts at $t_0$. Hence, fossils and renewables continue to be fully used during this destorage period.

As argued above, our assumptions about the availability of renewable energies, $\alpha(t)$, imply that the destorage period continues until the storage runs empty at $t = t_d$, i.e., $S(t_d) = 0$ (see Figure 1). Thus, $t_d$ is characterised by $Y_f(t_d) = Q_f$, $Y_r(t_d) = \alpha(t_d) Q_r$, and $S(t_d) = 0$. By continuity of $\alpha(t)$ and, thus, of available production capacities, we must have $p(t_d) = p_d$. This implies $x(t_d) = x_d$, where demand $x_d$ is constant during destorage. Solving the market clearing condition for $Y_s(t) = x_d - Y_f(t) - Y_r(t)$ and using $x_d = x(t_d) = Q_f + \alpha(t_d) Q_r$, we have

$$Y_s(t) = (\alpha(t_d) - \alpha(t)) Q_r \text{ for all } t \in [0, t_d],$$

that is, during the first destorage period. Intuitively, the level of destorage just balances the fluctuation of renewables.

Now turn to the second destorage period that starts at $t = t'_d$. In Figure 1, this is the bold segment to the left of $T$. Noting that we consider a representative cycle, this period is identical to the one that precedes $t_0$. Accordingly, the two destorage periods can be viewed as being connected and, therefore, must have the same constant electricity price. It follows that production is also the same, that is, fossils and renewables produce at full capacity and destorage is as given by (30). Moreover, $\alpha(t_d) = \alpha(t'_d) =: \alpha_d$ as, otherwise, destorage should be shifted to periods with lower availability of renewables.

Finally, the “connectedness” of the two destorage periods and the repeated cycle of identical destorage and storage periods imply that the storage must be full at $t = t'_d$ and run empty at $t = t_d$ (see
Figure 1). Hence, integration of the equation of motion (20) over the destorage periods must satisfy
\[ Q_s = \eta_d \int_{t_0}^{T_d} Y_s(t) dt + \eta_d \int_{t_d}^{T} Y_s(t) dt. \]
Substitution from (30) gives
\[ Q_s = \eta_d \int_d (\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) Q_r dt, \quad (31) \]
where \( \int_d dt := \int_{t_0}^{t_d} dt + \int_{t_d}^{T} dt \) denotes the combined duration of the two destorage periods. Noting that
\[ \alpha(t_d) = \alpha(t'_d) = \alpha_d, \]
condition (31) implicitly determines the critical availability \( \alpha_d \) where destorage ends. Intuitively, the destorage period is shorter when the storage capacity \( Q_s \) is low, when conversion losses \( \eta_d \) are large, and when the level of renewable capacities that has to be substituted by destorage, \((\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) Q_r,\) is large. The first line in Table 1 summarises production in the destorage period.

Demand follows straightforwardly from \( x_d(t) = \sum_j Y_{jd}(t). \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( t )</th>
<th>availability of renewables</th>
<th>( Y_{iq}(t) )</th>
<th>( Y_{tq}(t) )</th>
<th>( Y_{eq}(t) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( d )</td>
<td>( 0 \leq \alpha(t) \leq \alpha_d )</td>
<td>( \alpha(t) Q_r )</td>
<td>( Q_f )</td>
<td>( \alpha_d - \alpha(t) ) ( Q_r )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>( \alpha_d \leq \alpha(t) \leq \min { \alpha_1, \alpha_r } )</td>
<td>( \alpha(t) Q_r )</td>
<td>( Q_f )</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>( \min { \alpha_1, \alpha_r } \leq \alpha(t) \leq \min { \alpha_2, \alpha_r } )</td>
<td>( \alpha(t) Q_r )</td>
<td>( x(b_f) - \alpha(t) Q_r )</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( \min { \alpha_2, \alpha_r } \leq \alpha(t) \leq \min { \alpha_3, \alpha_r } )</td>
<td>( \alpha(t) Q_r )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( \min { \alpha_3, \alpha_r } &lt; \alpha(t) \leq \alpha_s )</td>
<td>( x(0) )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( s )</td>
<td>( \alpha_s &lt; \alpha(t) \leq 1 )</td>
<td>( \min { \alpha(t) Q_r, x(0) - Y_s(t) } )</td>
<td>( Y_f(\alpha_s) )</td>
<td>( \alpha_s - \alpha(t) ) ( Q_r )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \alpha_d \) implicitly solves (31), \( \alpha_1 = \frac{x(b_f) - Q_f}{Q_r}, \alpha_2 = \frac{x(b_f)}{Q_r}, \alpha_3 = \frac{\epsilon(t)}{Q_r}, \) and \( \alpha_s \) implicitly solves (33).

As \( \alpha(t) \) starts to exceed \( \alpha_d, \) we enter the first intermediate period where neither storage nor destorage occurs. Hence \( y_s(t) = 0 \) and the solution follows from the first-order condition (4) for fossils and (9) for renewables, as well as the related complementary slackness conditions (5) and (10). Initially, fossils and renewables continue to be fully used. This is case 1 in Table 1. As the availability of renewables, \( \alpha(t) \), increases, supply increases and the equilibrium price falls. Case 1 obtains until the price has fallen to the variable costs of fossils, \( b_f \). Thereafter, case 2 obtains, for which the maximum feasible electricity output from renewables and fossils exceeds demand at \( p = b_f \). Hence only renewable capacities are used (due to lower variable costs), and fossils serve the remaining demand, \( x(b_f) - \alpha(t) Q_r \). For even larger values of \( \alpha(t) \), the equilibrium price falls below \( b_f \) so that only renewables are used, but still at full capacity (case 3). Finally, for very high levels of \( \alpha(t) \), case 4 may obtain, in which the available capacity of renewables, \( \alpha(t) Q_r \), exceeds demand at a price of zero, \( x(0) \), leading to excess capacities of renewables.

Let \( \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2 \leq \alpha_3 \) denote the availabilities where the respective cases end, and \( t_1 \leq t_2 \leq t_3 \) the associated times. Hence \( \alpha_i = \alpha(t_i) \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \). Depending on the size of storage and renewable capacities, not all cases need obtain. Ceteris paribus, a larger storage capacity takes longer to fill so that storage starts earlier, that is, already during case 1, 2, or 3 of the intermediate period. Conversely, larger renewable capacities imply that a given storage can be filled faster, hence storage starts later and more cases obtain. In Table 1, this is represented by the minimum operator in the column for availability, where \( \alpha_s := \alpha(t_s) = \alpha(t'_s) \) is the availability when the intermediate period ends and when storage starts \( (t'_s) \) denotes the end of the storage period; see Figure 1.

Accordingly, any one of cases 1 to 4 can prevail at the start of the storage period, during which the price remains constant (see above). By continuity of the available production capacities, this price, \( p_s \), must be the same as that at the end of the intermediate period, i.e., \( p_s = p(t_s) \). Renewables and fossils must serve the resulting constant demand, \( x_s = x(t_s) \), and fill the storage. Solving the market clearing condition, \( \sum_j Y_j(t) = x_s(t) \), for \( Y_s(t) \) and noting that there is no storage at \( t_s \) so that \( x_s = Y_s(t_s) + Y_f(t_s) \), we obtain \( Y_i(t) = Y_s(t_s) + Y_f(t_s) - Y_f(t) - Y_r(t) \) during storage. An optimal production schedule for \( Y_f(t), Y_r(t) \) during the storage period is to keep fossil production
constant at the level when storage started, i.e., \( Y_f(t) = Y_f(t_s) \), and to use any additionally available renewable capacities to refill the storage.\(^{10}\) It follows that

\[
Y_s(t) = (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) Q_r \text{ for all } t \in [t_s, t'_s],
\]

which leads to the last line in Table 1.\(^{11}\)

The empty storage is completely filled during the storage period. Hence integration of the equation of motion (20) yields \( Q_s = -\eta_s \int_{t_s}^{t'_s} Y_s(t) \, dt \). Upon substitution from (32),

\[
Q_s = -\eta_s \int_{t_s}^{t'_s} (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) Q_r \, dt,
\]

where \( \int_{t_s}^{t'_s} \, dt := \int_{t_s}^{t'_s} dt \) denotes the duration of the storage period. This condition implicitly defines the critical availability, \( \alpha_s \), when the storage period starts. Intuitively, the storage period will last longer when the storage capacity \( Q_s \) is large, when the storage efficiency \( \eta_s \) is small, and when the level of renewable capacities that is available for storage, \( (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) Q_r \), is small.

Finally, for the second intermediate period from \( t'_s \) to \( t'_s \) the solution follows from the same optimality conditions as for the first intermediate period. Thus, for each \( \alpha(t) \), the solution is the same as already summarised by cases 1 to 4 in Table 1. Note that \( \alpha(t) \) is (weakly) decreasing in \( t \) so that the four cases obtain in reverse order. Hence, in the second intermediate period \( t'_2 \leq t'_2 \leq t'_1 \), where \( t'_i \) is the time at which case \( i \) starts, and \( \alpha(t'_i) = \alpha_i, \, i = 1, 2, 3 \). Lemma 1 summarises these results.

**Lemma 1.** Equilibrium levels for production and storage are as given in Table 1. Demand and prices follow straightforwardly from the market clearing condition, \( x_i(t) = \sum_j Y_{ji}(t) \), and the inverse demand function \( p_i(x_i(t)) \). For low availabilities of renewable capacities, there is destorage, during which prices are maximal and constant. Conversely, for high availabilities there is storage, during which prices are minimal and constant. For intermediate availabilities, the electricity price and supply from fossil capacities are weakly decreasing in the availability of renewables.

For the subsequent analysis of optimal subsidies, we need to know how the triggered changes in capacities affect production and demand. In principle, this follows from Lemma 1, but for the storage and destorage periods it depends in a nontrivial way on effects via the boundaries of these periods, \( \alpha_d, \alpha_s \). Lemma 2 summarises the relevant comparative statics.

**Lemma 2.** Marginal changes in capacities \( Q_f, Q_r, Q_s \) have the following comparative static effects on demand, \( x(t) \), and on the availability levels of renewables that determine the length of the storage and destorage periods, \( \alpha_s, \alpha_d \).

\[
(a) \text{ Fossil capacities: } \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial Q_f} = \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial Q_r} = 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial x_i(t)}{\partial Q_r} = \frac{\partial}{\partial Q_r} \sum_j Y_{ji}(t), \text{ where } Y_{ji}(t) \text{ follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1.}
\]

\[
(b) \text{ Renewable and storage capacities: For the intermediate period, } \frac{\partial x_i(t)}{\partial Q_r} = \frac{\partial}{\partial Q_r} \sum_j Y_{ji}(t) \text{ and } \frac{\partial x_i(t)}{\partial Q_s} = 0. \text{ For the storage and destorage period, the derivatives are as given in the table below, with the following exception: if cases 2 or 4 obtain at the beginning of the storage period, then } \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial Q_s} = \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial Q_r} = 0.
\]

\(^{10}\) Given that the constant price during storage is the same as at the boundary to the intermediate period, i.e., \( p_s = p(t_s) \), production values of renewable and fossil firms at \( t_s \) remain optimal during storage. However, if storage starts in case 2 or case 4, this is not the only optimal solution. In particular, case 2 and a storage period that starts during case 2 are characterised by excess capacities of fossils and a price that equals variable production costs. These idle fossil capacities could be used to reschedule some of the storage to \( \alpha \in [\alpha_1, \alpha_2] \) without affecting profits. An equivalent argument applies to exceed renewable capacities if the storage period starts during case 4.

\(^{11}\) The term \( Y_{r,s}(t) = \min \{ \alpha(t) Q_r, x(0) - Y_s(t) \} \) accounts for the fact that storage may start in case 4 so that available renewable capacities, \( \alpha(t) Q_r \), exceed the sum of consumer demand at price 0 and storage, \( x(0) - Y_s(t) \).
If storage starts during case 2 or 4, then demand is constant at $x_s = x(b_f)$ and $x_s = x(0)$, respectively. Hence marginal changes in production capacities have no effect on demand. Turning to the values in the above table, first consider an increase in renewable capacities, $Q_r$, which (weakly) increase renewable production for all $t$ (due to lower variable costs than fossils). Therefore, a given storage capacity is filled faster and storage starts later, i.e., $\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_r} > 0$. The magnitude of this effect is given by the additional production of a marginal renewable capacity unit over the storage cycle, $\int_0^T (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) dt$, weighted by the overall capacity, $Q_r$, and the length of the storage period, $\int_0^T dt$. Similarly, the destorage period lasts shorter (if $\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_s} < 0$) because a given level of stored electricity, $Q_s$, has to substitute for a larger amount of renewables over the destorage period, $\int_0^T (\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) dt$. The marginal effect of $Q_s$ on this term, weighted by the level of $Q_r$ and the length of the destorage period, determines the magnitude of $\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_r}$. The corresponding marginal changes in demand during destorage and storage, $\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_r}, \frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_s}$, are simply additional renewable production over the destorage and storage period, weighted by the length of the respective period.

Next, consider an increase in the storage capacity, $Q_s$. Ceteris paribus, this trivially leads to longer storage and destorage periods, i.e., $\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_s} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial x_s}{\partial Q_s} > 0$. The size of this effect is smaller if the level of intermittent renewables, $Q_r$, that are balanced by storage and destorage is larger, and if the respective periods last longer. In addition, if conversion losses of storage are large (small $\eta_s < 1$), then it takes longer to fill an additional unit of storage so that $\alpha_s$ falls more strongly in $Q_s$. Similarly, if conversion losses of destorage are large (high $\eta_d > 1$), then the electricity that can be stored with an additional unit of $Q_s$ is depleted more quickly so that $\alpha_d$ and the length of the destorage period increase less.

Finally, consider again effects on demand. When an additional unit of $Q_s$ must be filled during storage, prices increase and demand, $x_s$, is reduced. The effect is stronger when more electricity has to be taken from the market because only little arrives in the storage due to conversion losses, that is, if $\eta_s \int_0^T dt$ is small. Similarly, an additional unit of $Q_s$ reduces the price and raises demand, $x_d$, during the destorage period. The effect is smaller when more of this additional electricity is lost over the destorage period due to conversion losses, that is, if $\eta_d \int_0^T dt$ is large.

### 4 Capacity Choices of Competitive Firms

We now turn to Stage 2, in which fossil, renewable, and storage firms choose their respective capacities, thereby anticipating the outcome of production decisions in Stage 3. Remember that the value functions $\pi_j(q_j^r)$, $j = f, r, s$, as given by (1), (6), and (12), represent, respectively, the maximum profits that fossil, renewable, and storage firms can achieve for given capacities, $q_j$, during one representative cycle, $t \in [t_0, T]$. Note that by construction, production choices in one cycle have no effect on other cycles. Therefore, the net present value of profits over the lifetime of capacities—which is $m$ representative cycles—is simply $\sum_{t=1}^m \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \pi_j(q_j^r) = \rho \pi_j(q_j^r)$, where $\rho = \frac{1}{r} - \frac{1}{(1+r)}$ and $r$ is the discount factor.\(^{12}\) Accounting for capacity costs, $c_j(Q_j)q_j$, and for a given policy vector of subsidies and taxes, $\theta = (\sigma_r, \sigma_s, \tau)$, the profits that the respective firms maximise in Stage 2 are given by

\(^{12}\)For parsimony, we assume that firms and the regulator face the same discount factor and ignore discounting within a representative cycle.
Optimal Subsidy and Tax Levels

5 Optimal Subsidy and Tax Levels

Now consider the regulator’s choice of a tax and, alternatively, of subsidies for renewable and storage capacities in Stage 1. Remember from Section 3.1 that \( w(x^*) \) is the value function of the consumer surplus maximisation problem in Stage 3, that is, for one representative cycle. Based on the same arguments presented in Section 4, the net present value over the lifetime of capacities is \( \rho w(x^*) \).

Similarly, the net present value of environmental damages from fossil production is \( \rho \delta \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t, Q) \) \( dt \), where the integral term is aggregate fossil production during one representative period, \( \delta \) the associated environmental unit cost, and \( Q = (Q_f, Q_r, Q_s) \) the vector of overall capacities. Finally, a direct tax \( \tau \) on fossil production leads to revenues for the government with net present value \( \rho \tau \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t, Q) \) \( dt \).

Optimal subsidies and taxes maximise the discounted stream of consumer and producer surplus minus subsidy and environmental costs plus tax income:

\[
\max_{\sigma_r, \sigma_s, \tau} W := \rho w(x^*) + \sum_{j} n_j \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta) - \sigma_r Q_r - \sigma_s Q_s - \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t, Q) \ dt,
\]

where \( \sum_{j} n_j \pi_j(q_j^*, \theta) \) is the present value of overall producer surplus, and \( \delta - \tau \) can be viewed as that part of environmental damages that is not internalised by a tax on fossils. Note that all production
and capacity levels are equilibrium values from Stages 2 and 3, but for the sake of parsimony we drop the asterisk in the remainder, except in the value functions.

First, consider the regulator’s choice of subsidies, \( \sigma_r, \sigma_s \). These do not show up directly in the Lagrangian (27) of the consumer surplus maximisation problem. Hence the constrained envelope theorem implies 
\[
\frac{dw(z_*)}{d\sigma_j} = \int_{t_0}^T \frac{dC_j(t)}{d\sigma_j} \, dt = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad j = r, s.
\]
Similarly, profits, \( \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta) \), are also value functions so that the envelope theorem again implies that only direct effects of subsidies need to be taken into account. Hence, for \( j = f, r, s \) and \( k = r, s \) we have
\[
\frac{d\pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta)}{d\sigma_k} = \frac{\partial \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \sigma_k} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for} \quad j \neq k, \\ q_r & \text{for} \quad j = k = r, \\ q_s & \text{for} \quad j = k = s. \end{cases}
\] (41)

Using this and collecting terms, the first-order conditions for optimal subsidies are\(^{13}\)
\[
-\sigma_r \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} - \sigma_s \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau} - \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{d\sigma_j} \, dt = 0, \quad j = r, s.
\] (42)

Subsidies constitute revenues for firms but costs of the same size for the government. These direct effects cancel in the aggregate if subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxation. Therefore, optimal subsidies follow from their indirect effects via affecting capacity choices. From (38) and (39), \( \sigma_r \) and \( \sigma_s \) represent the amount by which the costs of a marginal capacity unit exceed the net present value of the resulting additional production. Hence, \( \sigma_r \frac{dQ_r}{d\sigma_j} \) and \( \sigma_s \frac{dQ_s}{d\sigma_j} \) can be interpreted as marginal costs of distorting renewable and storage capacities. At the optimal subsidy level, these must be equal to the present value of non-internalised avoided marginal damages.

The derivation of the first-order condition for taxes is more complex because during case 2 of the intermediate period and during storage that starts with case 2, the price is \( p(t) = b_f = k_f + \tau \). Thus, compared to subsidies, a tax can also have a direct effect on the electricity price that must be taken into account. However, the additional expenses of consumers that result from a tax-induced higher price are additional revenues for firms so that these effects cancel out in the aggregate (see Appendix C). Hence the first-order condition of the tax has a very simple form, too:
\[
-\sigma_r \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} - \sigma_s \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau} - \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{d\tau} \, dt = 0. \] (43)

It is straightforward to see that a tax \( \tau = \delta \) satisfies all three first-order conditions.

**Proposition 1.** The first-best solution obtains with a Pigouvian tax on fossils, \( \tau^* = \delta \), and no subsidies for renewable and storage capacities.

Proposition 1 shows that Pigouvian taxation also works in a model that accounts for the intermittency of renewables and for storage. However, it neither excludes the possibility that solutions with \( \sigma_r, \sigma_s \neq 0 \) are also efficient, nor does it provide guidance for second-best subsidy levels when Pigouvian taxes are not feasible—for example, due to political economy reasons. To examine this, we need a closer evaluation of the derivatives \( \frac{d\sigma_r}{d\theta}, \frac{d\sigma_s}{d\theta}, \frac{d\tau}{d\theta}, \theta = \sigma_r, \sigma_s, \tau \) that capture the interaction in Stages 2 and 3. As discussed in Subsection 3.2, the outcome of Stage 3 depends on which of the intermediate cases 1 to 4 obtain in equilibrium. If storage starts during case 1 (case 2), fossil capacities are fully (partially) used during storage. By contrast, if it starts in case 3 or 4, no fossils are used during storage. We now examine these cases in turn.

\(^{13}\) It is straightforward to show that all terms under the integral as well as their derivatives are continuous so that one can apply the Leibniz rule and differentiate under the integral sign [see Sydsæter et al. 2005, p. 156].
5.1 Fossil Capacities Fully Used During Storage

First, suppose that \( \alpha_s < \alpha_1 \) so that only case 1 obtains in the intermediate period. From Lemma 1, in this case fossil capacities are always fully used, i.e., \( y_f(t, Q) = q_f \) so that \( \frac{\partial y_f(t, Q)_{\partial Q_f}}{\partial Q_f} = 1 \). Moreover, for each \( t \) the equilibrium electricity price that obtains in Stage 3 does not directly depend on \( \sigma_j \), but is a function of capacities that are given at this stage, i.e., \( p(t) = p(t, Q) \). Thus, total differentiation of the first-order condition (37) for fossil capacities yields

\[
d \pi_{ff} = \left( \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_f} dt - c'_f(Q_f) \right) dQ_f + \left( \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_f} dt \right) dQ_f + \left( \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_s} dt \right) dQ_s. \tag{44}
\]

Using the compact notation \( \int_s dt \) and \( \int_d dt \) for the destorage and storage periods, the last integral term in (44) becomes \( \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_r} dt = \frac{\partial p_r}{\partial Q_r} \int_s dt + \frac{\partial p_d}{\partial Q_d} \int_d dt \), where \( p_s \) and \( p_d \) are the constant prices during storage and destorage. This takes into account that the price in the intermediate period does not (directly) depend on \( Q_s \), simply because storage capacities are not used in this period (see Lemma 1). Setting \( d \pi_{ff} = 0 \), dividing by \( d \sigma_j \), and rearranging yields

\[
\frac{dQ_f}{d \sigma_j} = \frac{\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_f} dt}{c'_f(Q_f)} - \frac{\rho}{\delta} \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_r} dt \frac{dQ_r}{d \sigma_j} + \frac{\rho}{\delta} \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_s} dt \frac{dQ_s}{d \sigma_j}, \tag{45}
\]

where the two fractions are simply the partial derivatives \( \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \sigma_j} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial \sigma_j} \), respectively. We can apply the chain rule when partially differentiating prices \( p(t) = p(x(t)) \) with respect to \( Q_r \). Using Lemma 2, this yields \( \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \sigma_j} = \frac{\partial x}{\partial \sigma_j} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \sigma_j} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial \sigma_j} = \frac{\partial x}{\partial \sigma_j} \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial \sigma_j} \). Similarly, \( \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial x(t)}{\partial \sigma_j} dt = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial x(t)}{\partial \sigma_j} \alpha(t) dt \) and \( \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial x(t)}{\partial \sigma_j} dt = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial x(t)}{\partial \sigma_j} dt \) from Lemma 1 and 2 for the current case where fossil capacities are fully used for all \( t \). Moreover, for this case \( \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial Y(t, Q)}{\partial \sigma_j} dt = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial Y(t, Q)}{\partial \sigma_j} dt \), which allows us to substitute (45) into the condition for optimal subsidies (42). Using the compact notation \( \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \sigma_j} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial \sigma_j} \) for the two fractions in (45) and rearranging yields the two first-order conditions for subsidies,

\[
\left( \sigma_r + \frac{\delta - \tau}{\rho} \int_{t_0}^{T} dt \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial Q_r} \frac{dQ_r}{d \sigma_j} \right) + \left( \sigma_s + \frac{\delta - \tau}{\rho} \int_{t_0}^{T} dt \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial Q_s} \frac{dQ_s}{d \sigma_j} \right) = 0, \quad j = r, s. \tag{46}
\]

Note that the two terms in brackets have the same value for \( j = r, s \). For any given \( \tau \), it follows that subsidies for which these two terms are both equal to zero satisfy the first-order condition. We obtain the following result.\(^{14}\)

**Proposition 2.** Suppose that \( \alpha_s < \alpha_1 \) so that the fossil technology always produces at full capacity. Then the optimal subsidies of renewable and storage capacities are

\[
\sigma_r^* = \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} dt \frac{\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t) dt}{\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} dt - c'_f(Q_f)} \left( \frac{\delta - \tau}{\rho} \right); \tag{47}
\]

\[
\sigma_s^* = \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} dt \frac{\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} dt - c'_f(Q_f)}{\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} dt - c'_f(Q_f)} \left( \frac{\delta - \tau}{\rho} \right). \tag{48}
\]

These subsidies implement the first-best solution. Moreover, for any \( \tau < \delta \), the renewable subsidy is strictly positive, whereas the storage subsidy is negative if and only if \( \frac{1}{\eta_s} \frac{\partial p_s}{\partial x_s} < \frac{1}{\eta_r} \frac{\partial p_r}{\partial x_r} \).

\(^{14}\) For any given \( \tau \), the optimal subsidies in Proposition 2 are the only solution to (46) if one abstracts from pathological cases such as \( \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \sigma_r} \neq \frac{\partial Q_s}{\partial \sigma_s} \neq \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \sigma_f} \neq 0 \).
Accordingly, a combination of subsidising renewables and—usually (see below)—a tax on storage can implement the first-best solution not only for $\tau = 0$, but for any imperfect taxation of the carbon externality.

To examine the optimal values for $\sigma_r$ and $\sigma_s$, note that we switched the terms in the denominator so that the fraction in (47) now stands for the term $-\frac{\partial Q}{\partial p_r} = -\frac{\partial y_r}{\partial Q_r}$. Accordingly, the optimal subsidy for renewables equals the net present value of non-internalised avoided damages, $\delta - \tau$, from the effect that renewable capacities displace fossils. Moreover, note that $\rho = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+\tau)^m}$ is decreasing in the discount factor $\tau$, increasing in the number of representative cycles $m$, and $\int_0^T dt$ is the length of such a representative cycle. Thus, $\sigma_r$ rises if renewable capacities are used longer, and if firms discount future profits less. Finally, $\sigma_s$ is larger when the resulting higher renewable capacities are more effective in displacing fossil capacities, i.e., when $-\frac{\partial r}{\partial Q_r}$ is large. This is the case when $\int_0^T \frac{\partial r(t)}{\partial Q_r} \alpha(t) dt = \int_0^T \frac{\partial r(t)}{\partial Q_r} \dd t$ is large so that renewable capacities greatly reduce the electricity price (making fossils less attractive); when $\int_0^T \frac{\partial r(t)}{\partial Q_r} \dd t = \int_0^T \frac{\partial r(t)}{\partial Q_r} \dd t$ is low so that lower fossil capacities raise the electricity price only little; and when lower fossil capacities lead only to a small reduction of their unit costs $c_f(Q_f)$.

Now consider expression (48) for the optimal storage subsidy. The terms $(\delta - \tau)\rho \int_0^T dt$ are the same as in (47), and the fraction now stands for $-\frac{\partial Q}{\partial Q_r}$. Accordingly, the optimal storage subsidy is equal to the net present value of the change in non-internalised damages from the use of fossil capacities that results from a marginal change in storage capacities. However, the sign of $\frac{\partial Q}{\partial Q_r}$, i.e., whether more storage capacities reduce or raise the equilibrium level of fossil capacities, is ambiguous and depends on the numerator in (48). In particular, subsidies $\sigma_s$ raise the storage capacity, $Q_s$, and, thereby, reduce the price of the destorage period ($\int_0^T \frac{\partial q(t)}{\partial Q_r} \dd t = \frac{1}{\eta_d} \frac{\partial q(t)}{\partial x_s} < 0$). This makes investment in fossils less attractive and reduces associated pollution. The effect is smaller if efficiency losses are large so that only a small share of electricity from the storage arrives in the market. Thus, a high $\eta_d$ reduces the reason for subsidising $Q_s$. Conversely, if storage subsidies induce a higher $Q_s$, then price of the storage period rises ($\int_0^T \frac{\partial q(t)}{\partial Q_r} \dd t = -\frac{1}{\eta_s} \frac{\partial q(t)}{\partial x_s} > 0$) and, thus, the profitability of investment in fossils. This effect is larger when efficiency losses are large so that more electricity has to be taken from the market to fill the storage. Therefore, a low $\eta_s$ motivates taxing $Q_s$. In conclusion, high efficiency losses during destorage (high $\eta_d$) and storage (low $\eta_s$) both strengthen the case for taxing storage capacities. Moreover, one would expect that demand is more price responsive when prices are high, that is, during destorage, than when prices are low, that is, during storage (see Faruqui and Sergici, 2010). This implies that $\frac{\partial x_s}{\partial p_r} > \frac{\partial x_r}{\partial p_r} \iff \frac{\partial p_f}{\partial x_s} < \frac{\partial p_f}{\partial x_r}$, further supporting the argument that storage capacities should be taxed rather than subsidised.

Given the relevance of this result, it is worth recapitulating the main intuition. If fossils always produce at full capacity, storage can reduce pollution only by making investment in fossils less attractive. This happens when the price reducing effect of storage capacities in the destorage period dominates the price increasing effect during the storage period. Importantly, this is the case although, ceteris paribus, the positive effects on investment incentives for renewables are even larger because they sell most during storage. However, the second policy instrument—the subsidy for renewables—is used to compensate this effect. Therefore, the optimal subsidy $\sigma_s$ only depends on its indirect effects on fossil capacities and the resulting pollution damage. With more specific assumptions about the functions for demand and capacity costs, the optimal subsidies obtain a very simple structure.

**Corollary 1.** Consider the case where the fossil technology always produces at full capacity (i.e., $\alpha_s < \alpha_1$), and assume that $\frac{\partial \gamma_p}{\partial \alpha} = 0$. For any $\tau < \delta$, it is optimal to tax storage capacities if there are conversion losses of storage. If the fossil technology has constant unit costs (i.e., $c_f(Q_f) = 0$), then optimal subsidies are $\sigma^*_r = \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_0^T \alpha(t) \dd t$ and $\sigma^*_s = -\rho(\delta - \tau) \left( \frac{1}{\eta_d} - \frac{1}{\eta_s} \right)$.

Renewable capacities are subsidised because they displace pollutive fossils. For linear demand and constant unit costs, this effect is very simple. An additional unit of renewable capacities reduces fossil
capacities and production by $\int_{t_0}^{T} \alpha(t) \, dt$. The optimal renewable subsidy equals the net present value of the non-internalised damage avoided.

The storage subsidy affects investments in fossil capacities by changing prices during destorage and storage in opposite directions. For linear demand and no round-trip efficiency losses, these countervailing effects cancel each other, and the optimal storage subsidy would be zero. If we account for conversion losses (low $\eta_s$ and high $\eta_d$), a tax is optimal because lower storage capacities reduce the price during storage by more than they raise the price during destorage. According to Corollary 1, the optimal tax equals the net present value of the non-internalised damage from round-trip losses during a storage cycle, $\frac{1}{\eta_s} - \frac{1}{\eta_d}$.

### 5.2 Fossil Capacities Partly Used During Storage

Next, consider the case where fossil capacities are only partly used during the storage period, which is characterised by $\alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2$. Thus, storage starts during case 2, and it follows from Lemma 1 that $p_2 = p_s = k_f + \tau$. Accordingly, the price in case 2 of the intermediate period and during storage equals the marginal production costs of fossil firms plus taxes. Hence during these periods, their marginal profits are zero, and marginal changes in capacities $Q_f, Q_r, Q_s$ have no effect on the price. Using this and otherwise applying the same manipulations to (44) that in Subsection 5.1 led to condition (45), now yields

\[
\frac{dQ_f}{ds_j} = \frac{\int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q} \, dt}{\rho} - \int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q} \, ds_j + \frac{\int_{d} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q} \, dt}{\rho} - \int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q} \, ds_j,
\]

where $\int_{d,1} dt := \int_{t_0}^{t_1} dt + \int_{t_1}^{T} dt$ denotes the joint duration of destorage and case 1. The two fractions represent again the partial derivatives $\frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_f}$ and $\frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r}$, respectively. In line with the preceding discussion, (49) is the same expression as (45) except that all derivatives $\frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_j}$, $j = r, f, s$, are zero during case 2 and storage. To determine optimal subsidies for a given $\tau$, we need to differentiate expected production of fossils, which yields (using Lemma 1)

\[
\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{d\sigma_j} \, dt = \int_{d,1} dt \frac{dQ_f}{ds_j} - \int_{2} dt \alpha(t) \, ds_j - \int_{s} dt \frac{d(\alpha_s Q_r)}{ds_j}.
\]

The expression reflects that fossil capacities are only partly used during case 2 of the intermediate period and during storage. Substitution of (50) and (49) into the first-order condition (42) for optimal subsidies yields, after some further transformations (see Appendix E), the following result.

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that $\alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2$ so that fossil capacities are only partly used during the storage period. Then, optimal subsidies of renewable and storage capacities follow from

\[
\sigma_r^* = \rho \left( \int_{d,1} dt - \frac{\int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t) \, dt}{\rho} + \int_{2} \alpha(t) \, dt \right) (\delta - \tau),
\]

\[
\sigma_s^* = \rho \left( \int_{d,1} dt - \frac{\int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} + \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t) \, dt}{\rho} - \frac{1}{\eta_s} \right) (\delta - \tau).
\]

For any $\tau \neq \delta$, these subsidies do not implement the first-best solution, and for $\tau < \delta$ raising the tax on fossil pollution would increase welfare. Moreover, for any $\tau < \delta$, the renewable subsidy is strictly positive, whereas the storage subsidy is negative if and only if $\frac{1}{\eta_s} \frac{\int_{d,1} dt}{\int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} dt - \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t)} < \frac{1}{\eta_s}$. 

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Accordingly, subsidies are no longer efficient if the market penetration of renewables is large enough so that during times of high availability fossil capacities lie partly idle. The reason is that a tax would raise the market price \( b_f = k_f + \tau \) during case 2 and storage, but subsidies not. Therefore, the latter lead to higher electricity consumption that is met with pollutive fossils during these periods. In line with this, we show in Appendix E that, for any \( \tau < \delta \), at the optimal subsidy levels welfare increases in the tax by \( \frac{dW}{d\tau} = -\rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_2}^T \rho(\delta - \tau) \frac{d\hat{Q}}{d\tau} dt > 0 \).

Similar to Proposition 2, the brackets in (51) and (52) represent the terms \( - \int_t^T \frac{\partial Y_f(t)}{\partial Q_s} dt \) and \( - \int_t^T \frac{\partial Y_f(t)}{\partial Q_s} dt \). Accordingly, optimal subsidies are again equal to the net present value of the change in non-internalised pollution damages induced by a marginal unit of renewable and storage capacities, respectively. During destorage and case 1, fossils are fully used so that over this range the effects are essentially the same as in Proposition 2. This is represented by the respective first fraction in the brackets. During case 2 of the intermediate periods and during storage—the other term in the brackets—fossil capacities are only partly used. Moreover, the price is constant at \( (p = b_f) \) so that there are no price effects, which simplifies the interaction. Specifically, a marginal increase in renewable capacities raises renewable production by \( \alpha(t) \) and replaces fossil production by this amount, thus mitigating pollution by \( (\delta - \tau) \int_{t_2}^T \alpha(t) dt \) (see (51)). In principle, the same intuition applies to the second term in the bracket of condition (52). However, storage capacities have no effect during the intermediate period, and during storage the change in fossil production induced by a marginal unit of storage capacities is \( \int_s \frac{\partial Y_f}{\partial Q_s} dt = \int_s \frac{\partial Y_f}{\partial Q_s} Q_s dt = -\frac{1}{\sigma_s} \) (from (50) and Lemma 2).

The renewable subsidy, \( \sigma_r \), is strictly positive. By contrast, the sign of the storage subsidy, \( \sigma_s \), depends again on the relative strength of its countervailing effects during storage and destorage. As in Proposition 2, higher conversion losses during destorage (high \( \eta_d \)) reduce the positive first term in the bracket of (52), and high conversion losses during storage (low \( \eta_s \)) increase the negative second term in the bracket. In conclusion, a less efficient storage technology supports the taxation of storage.

Note that the difference between the optimal subsidies in Propositions 2 and 3 result primarily from the absence of price effects during case 2 and storage when fossils are only partly used in these periods. In line with this, the following corollary shows that the optimal subsidies are the same if these price effects are suppressed by assuming linear demand.

**Corollary 2.** Consider the case where fossil capacities are only partly used during the storage period (i.e., \( \alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2 \)), and assume that \( \frac{\partial Y_f}{\partial Q_s} = 0 \). For any \( \tau < \delta \), it is optimal to tax storage capacities when \( \epsilon_f(Q_f) > 0 \) and/or when there are round-trip efficiency losses of storage. If the fossil technology has constant unit costs—i.e., \( \epsilon_f(Q_f) = 0 \)—then optimal subsidies are \( \sigma_r^* = \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T \alpha(t) dt \) and \( \sigma_s^* = -\rho(\delta - \tau) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_s} - \frac{1}{\sigma_0} \right) \).

The only difference from Corollary 1 is that the result regarding the optimality of a tax on storage capacities is even stronger. The difference obtains because changes in technology costs, i.e., \( \epsilon_f(Q_f) > 0 \), have an effect only when fossil capacities are fully used. This is now the case during destorage, but not during storage.

### 5.3 Only Renewable Capacities Used During Storage

We now consider the situation where the intermediate period extends to case 3, and possibly also to case 4. Formally, this situation is characterised by \( \alpha_2 < \alpha_s \). From Lemma 1, fossils do not produce in these cases, nor in the storage period that follows them. Therefore, subsidies have no effects on fossil production during these periods and expression (30) simplifies to

\[
\int_{t_0}^T \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{d\sigma_j} dt = \int_{d,1} dt \frac{dQ_f}{d\sigma_j} - \int_{2,2} \alpha(t) dt \frac{dQ_r}{d\sigma_j},
\]

(53)
As in Subsection 5.2, fossils produce at full capacity during destorage and case 1 so that (49) still applies. Substituting this and (53) into the two first-order conditions (42) for optimal subsidies yields the next result.

**Proposition 4.** Suppose that \( \alpha_2 < \alpha_s \), so that no fossil capacities are used during the storage period. Then, optimal subsidies of renewable and storage capacities are

\[
\sigma_r^* = \rho \left( \int_{d,1} dt \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t) dt - \frac{c_f'(Q_f)}{\rho} \right) (\delta - \tau),
\]

\[
\sigma_s^* = \rho \left( \int_{d,1} dt \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial x(t)} \alpha(t) dt - \frac{c_f'(Q_f)}{\rho} \right) (\delta - \tau).
\]

For any \( \tau \neq \delta \), these subsidies do not implement the first-best solution. Moreover, for any \( \tau < \delta \), both subsidies are strictly positive, and raising the tax on fossil pollution would increase welfare.

Conditions (54) and (55) are the same expressions as in Proposition 3, except that the terms for the storage period are dropped because fossils do not produce during storage. This reduces the reason for subsidising renewables as they can no longer replace fossil production and mitigate the associated pollution during times of storage. Nevertheless, without further assumptions about the derivatives of demand and cost functions (as in the corollaries) it is not possible to compare the subsidy level \( \sigma_r \) to that in Proposition 3 because the terms are evaluated at different capacity levels.

Also, the storage subsidy, \( \sigma_s \), is now unambiguously positive. This is because storage capacities now affect fossil production only during the destorage period, where they lower the price and, thus, make investment in fossil capacities less attractive. This effect is larger if conversion losses of destorage are small (\( \eta_d \) close to 1) so that a lot of electricity from the storage arrives on the market.

**Corollary 3.** Consider the case where fossil capacities are not used during the storage period (i.e., \( \alpha_2 < \alpha_s \)), and assume that \( \frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial x^2} = 0 \) and \( c_f'(Q_f) = 0 \). Then, the optimal subsidy for renewable capacities is

\[
\sigma_r^* = \rho (\delta - \tau) \int_{d,1,2} \alpha(t) dt \text{ and, thus, decreasing in the level of renewable capacities.}
\]

The optimal subsidy for storage capacities is constant at

\[
\sigma_s^* = \rho (\delta - \tau) \frac{1}{\eta_d}.
\]

To see why the renewable subsidy is decreasing in \( Q_r \), note that fossils are now used only during destorage and cases 1 and 2, as reflected by the integral \( \int_{d,1,2} dt \). This period is shorter for higher \( Q_r \) because the availability of renewables for which case 2 ends, \( \alpha_2 = x(b_f)/Q_r \), is decreasing in \( Q_r \). Accordingly, for higher \( Q_r \), fossil capacities are used less often so that there is less reason to subsidise their replacement by renewable capacities.

### 6 Concluding Remarks

In this article, we analysed optimal subsidies for installing capacities of intermittent renewable energies and storage when there is imperfect carbon pricing. Renewables reduce the profitability of fossil investments by lowering expected prices and displace fossil production at times of high availability. Therefore, the optimal renewable subsidy is always positive. Storage capacities raise the electricity price when the storage is filled and lower it during destorage. This has countervailing effects on the profitability of fossil, and the storage subsidy is chosen on the basis of the relative strength of these effects. As long as the energy system chiefly relies on fossils so that they are always the price-setting technology, storage capacities should be taxed.

For a low market penetration of renewables, this combination of a subsidy for renewables and a tax on storage even leads to the first-best solution. However, as soon as renewable capacities are sufficient to (partly) displace fossil production at times of high availability, the subsidy scheme is only second-best. In addition, optimal subsidies are more complex than a first-best Pigouvian tax.
They constitute a moving target because they vary, even in their sign, depending on the relative shares of the three technologies in the electricity system. Optimal subsidies also require substantially more knowledge about the electricity market—such as demand sensitivity—than does a Pigouvian tax, which, in our simple model, equals the environmental unit costs of fossil production, $\delta$. Hence one should read the paper not so much as a call for taxing storage, but as a lesson in the complexity of second-best policies that strengthens the case for directly addressing the externality with a price on carbon.

Our results show that accounting for intermittency of renewables—an aspect that is still often neglected in the analytical literature—has substantial implications for the design of policy instruments. Moreover, given the substantial public funds that currently subsidise renewables, and, increasingly, storage, this paper is of high policy relevance. At least under the simplifying assumptions in the corollaries, it provides an argument for gradually reducing subsidies for renewables as their market penetration rises, and raising subsidies for storage instead. Our analysis also has implications for the subsidization of electric vehicles, especially when their batteries are not only used for driving, but also as buffers to balance the intermittent supply of renewables. In countries where the share of renewables is still relatively low, our results weaken the case for their subsidization; although other reasons such as reducing local air pollution may still justify subsidies (see Holland, Mansur, Muller, and Yates, 2016).

This points to the limitations of our analysis that need be taken into account when drawing concrete policy recommendations, in addition to the usual caveat that the analysis is based on a stylized model that abstracts from many important aspects of real-world electricity markets. First, we only considered the carbon externality, but there are other relevant market failures, one of the most important of which involves positive externalities from R&D (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Given the current technological progress in storage technologies such as batteries and power-to-gas, these externalities may well provide an overriding argument for subsidising storage. Moreover, we only considered subsidies for capacities, whereas dominating instruments for renewables have been feed-in-tariffs and market premiums—that is, a subsidisation of electricity output. However, for most of the cases that we analysed, renewable capacities are fully used so that a subsidy per unit of output is equivalent to a subsidy per unit of capacity that is available on average. From this perspective, a subsidy for renewable capacities is quite similar to the feed-in-tariff in that both are paid independently of the price that obtains on the market for electricity.

There are several ways to broaden the analysis. Among them is the extension of the model to several renewable (e.g., wind and solar) and storage technologies (e.g., batteries, pumped hydro storage, and power-to-gas). This would allow a more accurate distinction between the different storage needs that result from daily and seasonal seasonal variations in the availability of intermittent renewables (see Sinn (2017) and Zerrahn, Schill, and Kemfert (2018) for a discussion). The model could also be extended by including other market failures—e.g., R&D spillovers and imperfect competition—or further aspects of electricity markets, such as variable demand, trade and the transmission grid. However, the first extension would make it more difficult to isolate the effects that were the focus of this contribution, and the second would probably come at the cost of greater reliance on numerical simulations.

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Appendix

A Proof of Lemma 1

The equilibrium values in Lemma 1 have to satisfy the first-order conditions of fossil firms, (4) and (5), of renewable firms, (10) and (11), and of storage firms, (19) to (24). Starting with the destorage period, it is straightforward to see that \( y_r(t) = q_r \) and \( y_f(t) = q_f \) satisfies (4), (5), (10), and (11) for \( \mu_r, \mu_f > 0 \). The equilibrium conditions for the storage firm are discussed at the beginning of Section 3.2, except for (20), which implies that \( \dot{s}(t) < 0 \). Hence the storage is depleting until it is empty so that \( s(t) = 0 \) and \( \varphi_d(t) \) turns (weakly) positive (see (23)).

This initiates the first intermediate period, during which \( \dot{s}(t) = y_s(t) = 0 \) (from (21)) and \( \dot{\lambda}(t) = -\varphi_d(t) \leq 0 \) (from (21)), where the latter implies that the price is weakly decreasing (from (19)).

Turning to the conditions for fossil and renewable firms, we show in the main text that, initially, fossil and renewable capacities continue to be fully used. From (5) and (10) it follows that \( \mu_r(t), \mu_f(t) > 0 \). Using the binding condition (4) and (11), we obtain \( p(t) = \mu_r(t) = b_f + \mu_f(t) > b_f \) and, thus, \( x(p(t)) < x(b_f) \). This is case 1, which continues until full usage of fossil and available renewable capacities have lowered the price to the variable costs of fossils, \( p(t) = b_f \). Accordingly, \( x(b_f) = \alpha Q_r + Q_f \) so that the critical availability where case 2 starts is \( \alpha_1 = \frac{x(b_f) - Q_f}{Q_r} \).

During case 2, fossils continue to be used so that (4) still binds. Hence \( \mu_f(t) = 0 < \mu_r(t) \) (from (4) and (11)) so that \( 0 < y_f(t) < q_f \) and \( y_r(t) = \alpha(t) q_r \) by the complementary slackness conditions in (5) and (10). Observe that the constant price, \( p(t) = b_f \), during case 2 implies that \( \lambda(t) = b_f \) (from (19)) and, thus, \( \dot{\lambda}(t) = -\varphi_d(t) = 0 \) (from (21)). Intuitively, the Lagrangian multiplier \( \varphi_d(t) \) represents the value of an additional unit of stored electricity. In case 2 it is zero because there are unused fossil capacities whose variable production costs, \( b_f \), are just equal to their market value, \( p(t) \).

Once available renewable capacities, \( \alpha(t) Q_r \), are large enough to satisfy demand at \( p(t) = b_f \), we enter case 3. Accordingly, \( x(b_f) = \alpha Q_r \) so that case 3 starts at \( \alpha_2 = \frac{x(b_f) - Q_f}{Q_r} \). For \( \alpha(t) > \alpha_2 \), (4) no longer binds so that \( y_f(t) = 0 \). Moreover, the multipliers still satisfy \( \mu_f(t) = 0 < \mu_r(t) \) so that available renewable capacities, \( \alpha(t) Q_r \), continue to be fully used (from (10)). Once \( \alpha(t) Q_r \) is large enough to satisfy demand at \( p = 0 \), i.e., at \( \alpha_3 = \frac{x(0)}{Q_r} \), we enter case 4. It is characterised by \( \mu_r(t) = \mu_f(t) = 0 \) and excess capacities of renewables, \( q_r(t) > y_r(t) > 0 \).

Storage \( y_s(t) < 0 \) can start during either of these four cases. The equilibrium values for fossil and renewable firms during storage have already been derived in the main text, and also those of storage firms (see the beginning of Section 3.2), except for (20), which now implies that \( \dot{s}(t) > 0 \). Hence the storage is filled until it is full so that \( s(t) = q_s \) and \( \varphi_s(t) \) turns (weakly) positive (see (22)). Thereafter, the second intermediate and destorage periods follow. Their solution and the critical availabilities that distinguish these solutions are the same as discussed above for each respective \( \alpha(t) \).

B Proof of Lemma 2

Conditions (31) and (33), which implicitly determine \( \alpha_d \) and \( \alpha_s \), can be written as

\[ f_d := \eta_d \int_{t_0}^{t_d} (\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) Q_r dt + \eta_d \int_{t_d}^{T} (\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) Q_r dt - Q_s = 0, \quad (56) \]

\[ f_s := -\eta_s \int_{t_s}^{t} (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) Q_r dt - Q_s = 0. \quad (57) \]

The comparative static effects of a change in \( Q_f, Q_r \), or \( Q_s \), thereby taking the other capacities as given, follow from applying the implicit function theorem, i.e., \( \frac{\partial \alpha_u}{\partial Q_j} = -\frac{\partial f_u}{\partial \alpha_u} / \frac{\partial f_u}{\partial Q_j} \) for \( u = d, s \) and

\[ 15 \text{ Note that firms are identical so that } y_r(t) = \alpha(t) q_r \text{ implies } y_r(t) = n_r y_s(t) = n_r \alpha(t) q_r = \alpha(t) Q_r, \text{ where } n_r \text{ is the number of renewable firms. An equivalent argument applies to the other quantities in the proof.} \]
\( j = f, r, s \). It follows that \( \frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial t_d} = \frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial t_s} = 0 \). Next, note that \( \alpha_d = \alpha(t_d) = \alpha(t'_d) \) and \( \alpha_s = \alpha(t_s) = \alpha(t'_s) \). This implies that the integral terms in (56) and (57) are zero if evaluated at the boundaries of the integral, \( t_d, t'_d \) and \( t_s, t'_s \), respectively. Using this when applying the implicit function theorem yields the comparative statics \( \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha} \), \( \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha_s} \), \( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha} \), and \( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha_s} \), in Lemma 2.

Demand during storage and destorage follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 and Table 1. In particular, \( x_d = \sum_j Y_{jd}(t) = Q_f + \alpha_d Q_r \). Differentiation yields \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha} = \alpha_d + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha_s} Q_s \) and \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha_s} = \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha_s} Q_s \).

Substitution of \( \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha_r}, \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha_s}, \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha_s} \) yields the values in Lemma 2, where we have used

\[
\frac{\partial x_d}{\partial Q_r} = \alpha_d - \frac{\int_d (\alpha_d - \alpha(t)) dt}{\int_d dt} = \alpha_d - \alpha_d \int_d dt + \int_d \alpha(t) dt.
\] (58)

For storage, demand depends on the case that obtains at the beginning of the storage period. If it starts during case 1, 2, or 3 of the intermediate period, then \( \min \{ \alpha(t) Q_r, x(0) - Y_s(t) \} = \alpha(t) Q_r \), so that \( x_s = \sum_j Y_{js}(t) = Y_f(\alpha_s) + \alpha_s Q_r \) from Table 1. If storage starts during cases 1 or 3, we obtain \( x_s = Q_f + \alpha_s Q_r \) and \( x_s = \alpha_s Q_r \), respectively. In both situations, \( \frac{\partial x_s}{\partial Q_r} = \alpha_s + \frac{\partial x_s}{\partial \alpha_s} Q_r \) and \( \frac{\partial x_s}{\partial \alpha_s} = \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha_s} Q_r \).

The values in Lemma 2 follow again after substituting for \( \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha_r}, \frac{\partial \alpha_d}{\partial \alpha_s}, \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial \alpha_s} \), where we have used

\[
\frac{\partial x_s}{\partial Q_r} = \alpha_s - \frac{\int_s (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) dt}{\int_s dt} = \alpha_s - \alpha_s \int_s dt - \int_s \alpha(t) dt.
\] (59)

If storage starts during case 2, then \( x_s = \sum_j Y_{js}(t) = x(b_j) \). Similarly, if it starts during case 4, then \( \min \{ \alpha(t) Q_r, x(0) - Y_s(t) \} = x(0) - Y_s(t) \) so that \( x_s = \sum_j Y_{js}(t) = x(0) \).

C) Proof of Proposition 1

We need to show that (43) is the correct first-order condition for taxes. As mentioned in the main text, this necessitates accounting for the direct effect of the tax on the electricity price whenever \( p(t) = k_f + \tau \). First, if \( \alpha_1 \geq \alpha_s \), then case 2 never obtains and \( p(t) = k_f + \tau \) for all \( t \). This is the case where the fossil technology always produces at full capacity. Second, if \( \alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2 \), then \( p(t) = k_f + \tau \) during case 2 and during storage, for which fossil capacities are only partly used. Finally, if \( \alpha_2 < \alpha_s \), then \( p(t) = k_f + \tau \) obtains only during case 2, and fossils do not produce during higher cases and storage. Using this, we obtain the following derivatives of optimised profits: \(^{16}\)

\[
\text{for } \alpha_1 \geq \alpha_s : \quad \frac{\partial \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \tau} = \begin{cases} -\rho \int_t^T y_j^*(t, q_f) dt & \text{for } j = f, \\ 0 & \text{for } j = r, s, \end{cases}
\]

\[
\text{for } \alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2 : \quad \frac{\partial \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \tau} = \begin{cases} -\rho \int_t^T y_j^*(t, q_f) dt & \text{for } j = f, \\ \rho \int_{d_f} y_j^*(t, q_f) dt & \text{for } j = r, \\ \rho \int_{d_f} y_j^*(t, q_r) dt & \text{for } j = s, \end{cases}
\] (60)

\[
\text{for } \alpha_2 < \alpha_s : \quad \frac{\partial \pi_j(q_j^*(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \tau} = \begin{cases} -\rho \int_t^T y_j^*(t, q_f) dt & \text{for } j = f, \\ \rho \int_{d_f} y_j^*(t, q_f) dt & \text{for } j = r, \\ 0 & \text{for } j = s, \end{cases}
\]

where, as usual, the subscripts to the integral sign denote the periods over which the integration applies. Intuitively, a higher tax on pollution reduces the profits of fossil firms, but only when they produce and make positive marginal profits. By contrast, renewable firms benefit if there is a tax-induced higher price during case 2 and storage. Finally, storage firms are unaffected during case 2.

\(^{16}\) The conditions for \( \alpha_1 < \alpha_s \) follow straightforwardly after isolating case 2 and storage in the integrals in (34) to (36) and noting that \( p(t) = k_f + \tau \) during case 2.
(they do not produce), but suffer if there is a tax-induced higher price during storage \((y^*_t(t,q_s) < 0\) during storage). An equivalent case distinction applies for the value function of consumers. From (27) we obtain \(\frac{dw(x^*_t)}{d\tau} = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial L_s(t)}{\partial \tau} dt = 0\) if \(\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_s\), but

\[
\frac{dw(x^*_t)}{d\tau} = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial L_s(t)}{\partial \tau} dt = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} -\int_{2,s} x(b_f) dt & \text{for } \alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2, \\ -\int_{2} x(b_f) dt & \text{for } \alpha_2 < \alpha_s. \end{array} \right.
\]

(61)

This reflects that consumers suffer from tax-induced higher prices. The general first-order condition for optimal taxes follows from differentiation of (40) as

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = \rho \frac{dw(x^*_t)}{d\tau} + \sum_j n_j \frac{\partial f_j(q_s^*(\theta),\theta)}{d\tau} - \sigma_r \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} - \sigma_s \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau} + \rho \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t,Q) dt - \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t,Q)}{d\tau} dt.
\]

(62)

Note that \(n_jy^*_j(t,q_j) = Y_j(t,Q)\), and for \(\alpha_1 < \alpha_s \leq \alpha_2\) we have

\[
-\int_{d,1} Y_f(t,Q) dt + \int_{2,s} Y_s(t,Q) dt + \int_{s} Y_s(t,Q) dt + \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t,Q) dt = \int_{2,s} x(b_f) dt
\]

(63)

as supply must equal demand, and \(\int_{2} Y_s(t,Q) dt = 0\). Similarly, for \(\alpha_2 < \alpha_s\), we have

\[
-\int_{d,1} Y_f(t,Q) dt + \int_{2} Y_s(t,Q) dt + \int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t,Q) dt = \int_{2} x(b_f) dt.
\]

(64)

Using this when substituting from (60) and (61) into (62) yields the same condition (43) for all three cases.

Finally, we need show that \(\tau = \delta\) is not only a critical point (i.e., satisfies the first-order conditions), but a global maximum. For the sake of parsimony, we relegate this to the proof of Proposition 2.

### D Proof of Proposition 2

It remains to prove that the subsidy levels \(\sigma_r^*(\tau)\) and \(\sigma_s^*(\tau)\) in Proposition 2 are indeed first-best for the case \(\alpha_s < \alpha_1\), where the notation clarifies that they are functions of \(\tau\). These subsidies are the solution of the first-order conditions in (42), but we need to show that the remaining first-order condition for taxes (43) is also satisfied at \(\sigma_r^*(\tau), \sigma_s^*(\tau)\). Dividing (44) by \(d\tau\), setting \(d\tau f_f = 0\), and rearranging yields

\[
\frac{dQ_f}{d\tau} = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_f} dt \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} + \frac{\partial p_s}{\partial Q_s} \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dQ_f}{d\tau} dt - \frac{\partial p_s}{\partial Q_s} \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dQ_f}{d\tau} dt.
\]

(65)

Moreover, for the case of Proposition 2, fossils always produce at full capacity so that \(\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t,Q)}{d\tau} dt = \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dQ_f}{d\tau} dt\). Multiplying this with \(\rho(\delta - \tau)\), substituting for \(\frac{dQ_s}{d\tau}\) from (65), and noting that the two fractions in (65) are the same as those in expressions (47) and (48) for optimal subsidies with reverse sign, yields

\[
\rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t,Q)}{d\tau} dt = -\sigma_r^*(\tau) \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} - \sigma_s^*(\tau) \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau}.
\]

(66)

Accordingly, any subsidy scheme that satisfies the first-order conditions (42) for subsidies—one for each \(\tau\)—satisfies the first-order condition for taxes (43), too. Noting that the first-order conditions
are necessary but not sufficient, this gives us all candidates for the optimal solution, but some of them may only be local maxima (or saddle points). We now show that all these solution candidates lead to the same welfare level and, therefore, constitute not only local but global maxima.\footnote{The standard approach of using the second-order conditions does not work because the derivatives in the Hessian are too complex to be interpretable.}

In particular, substituting \( \sigma^*_s(\tau) \) and \( \sigma^*_s(\tau) \) into (40) gives us welfare as a function of \( \tau \) when subsidies are adjusted optimally and, thus, welfare for all solution candidates (using \( Y_j(t, Q) = Q_j \)):

\[
W(\tau) = \rho w(x^*) + \sum_j n_j \pi_j \left( q_j^*(\theta), \theta \right) + \rho (\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T dt \left( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} Q_r + \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} Q_s - Q_j \right), \tag{67}
\]

where we have used the compact notation \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r}, \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} \) for the fractions in (47) and (48). Note that the producer surplus of renewable and storage firms (but not for fossil firms) depends directly on subsidies, i.e., we have after substituting for the optimal subsidy scheme

\[
\pi_j \left( q_j^*(\theta), \theta \right) = \rho \int_{t_0}^T p(t) y_j^*(t, q_j) dt \left( c_j(Q_j) + \rho (\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T dt \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_j} \right) q_j, \quad j = r, s. \tag{68}
\]

Using this and the envelope theorem when differentiating (67) with respect to \( \tau \), cancelling common terms and rearranging yields

\[
\frac{dW(\tau)}{d\tau} = \rho (\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^T dt \left[ \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} + \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau} - \frac{dQ_j}{d\tau} \right]. \tag{69}
\]

Remember that the terms \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} \) are simply the compact notation for the two fractions in (65) so that the square bracket in (69) is equal to 0. Therefore, \( \frac{dW(\tau)}{d\tau} = 0 \) not only at the Pigouvian tax \( \tau^* = \delta \), but for any \( \tau \) provided that subsidies are adjusted optimally. Given that \( W(\tau) \) describes all local maxima, they must all have the same welfare and, therefore, constitute global maxima. We conclude that for the case \( \alpha_s < \alpha_1 \) the subsidy scheme \( \sigma^*_s(\tau), \sigma^*_s(\tau) \) is indeed first-best.

### E Proof of Proposition 3

From Lemma 2, \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} = 0 \) so that total differentiation of \( \alpha_s Q_r \) gives

\[
d(\alpha_s Q_r) = \left( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_r} Q_r + \alpha_s \right) dQ_r + \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_s} Q_s dQ_s. \tag{70}
\]

Substitution of this and (49) into (50) and collecting terms yields

\[
\int_{t_0}^T dY_j(t, Q) dt = \left[ \int_{t_1} dt \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} - \int_{t_2} dt \left( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_r} Q_r + \alpha_s \right) \right] dQ_r + \left[ \int_{t_1} dt \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} - \int_{t_2} dt \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_s} Q_s \right] dQ_s, \tag{71}
\]

where \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} \) represent the two fractions in (49). Substituting for \( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_r} \) from Lemma 2, we obtain

\[
\left( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_r} Q_r + \alpha_s \right) \int_s dt = - \int_s (\alpha_s - \alpha(t)) dt + \alpha_s \int_s dt = \int_s \alpha(t) dt.
\]

Moreover, again from Lemma 2, \( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_r} \int_s dt = \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial x_s} \frac{1}{n_s} \) and \( \frac{\partial \alpha_s}{\partial Q_s} \int_s dt = - \frac{1}{n_s} \). Using this when substituting (71) into the first-order conditions (42) for optimal subsidies, and collecting terms with \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_r} \) and \( \frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial Q_s} \), yields the subsidy levels in Proposition 3.
It remains to prove the statement regarding the inefficiency of \( \sigma_r, \sigma_s, \) and we proceed similarly as in the proof of Proposition 2. From Table 1,

\[
\int_{t_0}^{T} Y_f(t, Q) \, dt = \int_{d,1} Q_f \, dt + \int_{2} (x(b_f) - \alpha(t) Q_r) \, dt + \int_{s} (x(b_f) - \alpha_s Q_r) \, dt, \tag{72}
\]

where \( b_f = k_f + \tau \). Differentiation yields

\[
\int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{dt} \, dt = \int_{d,1} \frac{dQ_f}{dt} + \int_{2} \left( \frac{dx(b_f)}{dt} - \alpha(t) \frac{dQ_r}{dt} \right) \, dt + \int_{s} \left( \frac{dx(b_f)}{dt} - \frac{d(\alpha_s Q_r)}{dt} \right) \, dt. \tag{73}
\]

Multiplying (49) by \( \frac{d\sigma_j}{d\tau} \) yields

\[
\frac{dQ_f}{d\tau} = \frac{\int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_r} \, dt}{\rho} - \int_{d,1} \frac{\partial p(t)}{\partial Q_f} \, dt + \frac{\int_{d} \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial Q_r} \, dt}{\rho} - \int_{d,1} \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial Q_f} \, dt \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau}, \tag{74}
\]

where the two fractions are the same terms that show up in the optimal subsidies (51) and (52), with reverse sign. Using this when substituting (74) and \( d(\alpha_s Q_r) \int_s \alpha(t) \, dt Q_r - \frac{1}{\sigma} dQ_s \) (see above) into (73) gives

\[
\rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{t_0}^{T} \frac{dY_f(t, Q)}{d\tau} \, dt = -\sigma_r \frac{dQ_r}{d\tau} - \sigma_s \frac{dQ_s}{d\tau} + \rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{s} \frac{dx(b_f)}{d\tau} \, dt. \tag{75}
\]

The left-hand side of the first-order condition for taxes (43) represents the marginal effect of taxes on welfare, \( \frac{dW}{d\tau} \). Accordingly, substitution of (75) yields

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = -\rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{s} \frac{dx(b_f)}{d\tau} \, dt. \tag{76}
\]

This term is strictly positive for any \( \tau < \delta \) because \( \frac{dx(b_f)}{d\tau} < 0 \) (remember that \( p(t) = b_f = k_f + \tau \)).

F Proof of Proposition 4

It remains to prove the statement regarding the inefficiency of subsidies. The proof is the same as for Proposition 3, if one adjusts it for the fact that fossils no longer produce during storage. Therefore, (72) and (73) still apply if one drops the terms for the storage period \( \int_s \cdot \, dt \). Moreover, as argued in the main text just before Proposition 4, condition (49) continues to holds so that multiplying by \( \int_{d,1} \frac{d\sigma_j}{d\tau} \) yields (74). Substituting this into the adjusted (\( \int_s \cdot \, dt \) is dropped) expression (73) gives (75) if the storage period is dropped in the last integral (i.e., \( \int_{2,s} \cdot \, dt \) is replaced by \( \int_{2} \cdot \, dt \)). Accordingly, at the optimal subsidy levels

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = -\rho(\delta - \tau) \int_{2,s} \frac{dx(b_f)}{d\tau} \, dt, \tag{77}
\]

which is strictly positive for any \( \tau < \delta \).
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