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Automatic Identification of Faked and Fraudulent Interviews in Surveys by Two Different Methods

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Abstract

This paper presents two new tools for the identification of faking interviewers in surveys. One method is based on Benford's Law, and the other exploits the empirical observation that fakers most often produce answers with less variability than could be expected from the whole survey. We focus on fabricated data, which were taken out of the survey before the data were disseminated in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). For two samples, the resulting rankings of the interviewers with respect to their cheating behavior are given. For both methods all of the evident fakers are identified.

JEL Classification: C 8, C 4

1 Introduction

1.1 Faking

In any survey in which the data are collected by personal interviews there is a danger of cheating by interviewers. We can distinguish several forms of cheating: First, the most blatant form is when an interviewer fabricates all ‘responses’ for an entire questionnaire. The U.S. Bureau of the Census refers to this practice as ‘falsification’ or ‘fabrication’. Falsification also includes the acceptance of proxy information when self-response is required and the unauthorized use of the telephone when a personal visit is required. A second, more subtle form of cheating is when an interviewer asks some questions in an interview and fabricates the responses to others. A third form of cheating is when an interviewer knowingly deviates from prescribed interviewing procedures, for example by conducting an interview with someone who is more easily reachable than the appropriate person and willing to participate in his or her place.

In this paper we only address the first form of cheating, the fabrication of an entire interview.

1.2 Previous findings on cheating behavior

Compared to other methodological topics, the literature contains only a few studies dealing with cheating by interviewers.

Crespi (1945) investigated the factors that may contribute to cheating behavior. He distinguished between factors relating to questionnaire characteristics (design and length, difficult and antagonistic questions), administrative demoralizers (inadequate remuneration and training of the interviewer) as well as external factors (bad weather, bad neighborhoods, etc.). He proposed a twofold strategy of eliminating demoralizers. Furthermore he used a verification method to deter cheating. Some more recent studies refer to these verification methods and deal with optimal designs of quality control samples to detect interviewer cheating (Biemer and Stokes 1989) and the evaluation of quality control procedures for interviewers (Stokes and Jones 1989).

Because of the lack of factual information concerning the nature of interviewer falsification, the U.S. Census Bureau implemented an ‘Interviewer Falsification Study’ in the year 1982 (Schreiner, Pennie, and Newbrough 1988). In this study, data was accumulated from fifteen surveys conducted by twelve U.S. Census Bureau regional offices over a five-year period. They found 205 cases of confirmed falsification. Most of these (74%) were detected through reinterviews and the majority (79%) was determined to have fabricated interviews. Their results provide evidence that the shorter the length of service, the more likely it is that an interviewer will falsify data (Schreiner, Pennie, and Newbrough 1988). Furthermore, when new interviewers falsify data, it is usually a relatively high proportion of their assignments and they tend to fabricate entire interviews. Interviewers with five or more years of experience usually falsify a smaller proportion of their assignments and tend to classify eligible units as ineligible (Hood and Bushery 1997).

Other studies like the one of Reuband (1990), Schnell (1991) and Diekmann (2002) deal with the ‘quality’ of faked interviews and the impact of fabricated data on substantive analysis. For example, Schnell (1991) performed a study in which he substituted 220 real interviews of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS 1988, N = 3052) with fictive interviews and analyzed their effect on substantive results.

1.3 Fabrication within the Socio-Economic Panel

In contrast to cross-sectional surveys, falsification is extremely difficult in complex long-term panel studies like the SOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel Study) because the respondent is interviewed face to face every year, and because a consistency check between waves shows irregularities immediately. Hence we can assume that fabricated data will be a problem mainly in the first wave and will be detected quickly after conducting the second wave. From the fieldwork organization we get faked records. Notice, that other fieldwork organizations hide this problem. Furthermore we get some hints about the quality control procedures which are performed as standard to detect fakes. These verification methods as well as ‘conventional’ statistical tests of stability

and consistence are the ones proposed by Crespi (1945).

The SOEP consists of several samples (Schupp and Wagner, 2002). Fabricated data are rare and they were always found in the first wave of each sample (with the exception of the East German sample C and the small sample D, which are clean). Only one interviewer was able to fabricate data for the first two waves without raising suspicion until wave 3 (Sample E). The first wave of samples A and B contains only 0.6 and 1.5% fabricated data, respectively, and the first wave of sample E contains about 2% faked household interviews. In the second wave approximately 1% of fabricated data was identified in sample E. In the first wave of sample F only 0.1% of the interviews were detected as fabricated. This share equals 11 records. Due to this small number of cases, only samples A/B and E will be analyzed.

Because Biemer and Stokes (1989) find that in two large demographic surveys cheating behavior differed between urban and rural areas, we examine these kind of differences. The results are not consistent: for sample A/B the area effect is significant on a 1% level ($\chi^2 = 1452$), whereas in sample E the existence of an area effect can not be shown ($\chi^2 = 0.06$).

Only very little is known about the characteristics of interviewers who cheat in surveys. Koch (1995) shows that younger interviewers with a higher educational level have more inconsistencies in their interviews than others. All interviewers who fabricated data ($N = 9$) in the SOEP are middle-aged males. We find no education effects. In addition in sample A cheating interviewers have on average a higher assignment of household interviews (18.3) than the interviewers in the non-faked data (9.6). In sample E the difference between the average assignments (non-faked data: 7.32; faked data: 11.67) is neither statistically significant on a 5% nor on a 10% level. In the first wave of all samples, almost all cheating interviewers falsified their entire assignments, and only one interviewer in samples A and B falsified just one of over 43 personal interviews. But each of those interviewers was working on this panel study for the first time. We can assume that they were not aware of the effectiveness of quality control in SOEP and of the fact that fakes in the panel design are easily identifiable by consistency checks over

two waves. Because those checks cannot be applied for cross-sectional surveys, we are seeking methods which can identify fabricated data with a ‘one-shot procedure’.

2 Two new methods for fraud detection in surveys

2.1 Benford’s Law

Benford’s Law is an empirical ‘law’ which states that in many tables of numerical data, the leading digits are not uniformly distributed as might be expected, but rather obey a certain logarithmic probability distribution. Benford (1938) derived a formula to predict the frequency of numbers found in many categories of tables. The leading (non-zero) digit obeys the law

$$Prob(\text{first significant digit} = d) = \log_{10} \left(1 + \frac{1}{d} \right), \quad d = 1, 2, \dots, 9.$$

Hence, a number chosen at random has leading digit $d = 1$ with probability 0.301, a leading digit $d = 2$ with probability 0.176, and so on monotonically down to probability 0.046 for leading digit $d = 9$. For many years the status of this law was little more than a numerical curiosity, but practical implications began to emerge in the 1960s (Scott/Fasli 2001).

A plausible theoretical explanation for the appearance of this logarithmic distribution is the *random-samples-from-random-distribution theorem* by Hill (1995). He shows that “if probability distributions are selected at random, and random samples are then taken from each of these distributions in any way so that the overall process is scale (or base) neutral, then the significant digit frequency of the combined sample will converge to the logarithmic distribution.” (Hill 1995, p.360). It is not required that individual realizations of a random variable be scale- or base-invariant. But it is necessary that the sampling process on the average does not favor one scale over another.

This theorem gives the answer to the question whether Benford’s Law is feasible for survey data, because survey data contain different variables with different distributions.

Therefore we can test whether the chosen mixture of variables from survey data are scale-unbiased. If this is the case, it is reasonable that this mixture of data follows Benford’s Law.

2.2 Results with Benford’s Law

First we provide a description of the data we examine using Benford’s Law. The selected data are restricted to variables with monetary values. Besides the monthly gross and net income, the data sets contain variables like the gross amount of Christmas or vacation bonus, gross amount of monthly unemployment benefits or monthly subsistence allowance, gross amount of early retirement benefits, amount of taxes, as well as many other monetary variables.

The estimated leading digit distributions for the first wave of sample A/B and the first two waves of sample E have almost the same shape. The distributions are unimodal and the medians are always lower than the means, leading to positive skewed distributions. A unimodal positive skewed distribution is one important requirement for the use of Benford’s Law (Scott/Falsi 2001).

We have shown that the interviewers fabricate a large proportion of their assignments. Therefore in order to increase the statistical power of our analysis, we analyze whole clusters of interviews per interviewer (‘interviewer cluster’) rather than individual questionnaires. If real survey data follows the logarithmic distribution and fabricated survey data does not, we should be able to identify these clusters of fabricated interviews and to test them for significance.

To explore the fit of each cluster we calculate χ^2 values

$$\chi_i^2 = n_i \sum_{d=1}^9 \frac{(h_{d_i} - h_{b_d})^2}{h_{b_d}},$$

where n_i is the number of first digits in the interviewer cluster i , h_{d_i} is the observed proportion of digit $d = 1, \dots, 9$ in interviewer cluster i and h_{b_d} is the proportion of digit d under Benford’s distribution. Since the χ^2 values depend on the number of

observations, we calculate the probability for the realized χ^2 values with a bootstrap method.

An approximation of the probability of obtaining a value of the χ^2 -statistic more extreme than that actually observed, $Prob(\theta > \hat{\theta})$, can be obtained directly from the proportion of bootstrap replications B higher than the original estimate $\hat{\theta}$. These probabilities reflect the *plausibility* of the fit to Benford independent of the number of digits in the cluster. Our hypothesis is that cheating interviewers have very low probabilities. Hence we construct an interviewer-ranking by probability values.

Table 1 shows the top of the ranking list for the first wave of samples A/B and E. The known faking interviewers are marked. We see that several cheating interviewers occur on the top of the list because their fit statistics are not plausible. If we look at the first ten interviewers as suspicious, with Benford we identify one out of three fakers in sample A, and in sample E, three out of five fakers.

TABLE 1: *Interviewer ranking with Benford (faking interviewers marked)*

Sample A/B, wave 1					Sample E, wave 1				
Rank	Int.no	digits	χ^2	P(perc)	Rank	Int.no	digits	χ^2	P(perc)
1	128279	122	52.30	0.0020	1	236837	221	49.07	0.0030
2	53147	94	46.88	0.0040	2	252328	61	42.58	0.0140
3	157856	28	28.48	0.0060	3	260665	40	40.08	0.0170
4	126500	32	23.95	0.0180	4	249289	158	52.16	0.0260
5	138878	29	21.56	0.0410	5	176796	177	43.48	0.0430
6	72320	16	28.01	0.0450	6	196908	27	32.22	0.0930
7	158003	45	25.50	0.0470	7	249281	7	28.15	0.1030
8	63363	46	25.37	0.0510	8	48674	85	30.14	0.1440
9	106097	25	22.51	0.0630	9	254690	173	35.62	0.1750
10	96687	27	19.34	0.0680	10	119059	18	23.60	0.1630
11	113425	94	26.19	0.0800	11	217085	136	37.32	0.1940
12	125830	20	21.22	0.0890	12	257613	143	34.36	0.2050
13	131563	33	19.18	0.0930	13	263184	71	30.04	0.2170
14	127566	58	31.81	0.0970	14	89370	271	33.66	0.2080
15	154016	26	19.35	0.1000	15	166901	137	34.49	0.2360
16	353	4	18.24	0.1000	16	215899	109	31.60	0.2790
17	167525	24	20.69	0.1020	17	250376	89	25.23	0.2720
18	77208	33	18.62	0.1040	18	249335	41	22.28	0.2860
19	3654	226	41.93	0.1040	19	236937	9	23.92	0.3280
20	132632	36	19.09	0.1080	20	236608	258	25.33	0.3080
21	36846	33	18.43	0.1090	21	122424	13	19.27	0.3570
22	101877	33	18.09	0.1190	22	165441	83	24.78	0.4490
23	110841	11	23.76	0.1200	23	240761	178	25.93	0.4720
24	165085	37	20.14	0.1220	24	245534	105	26.91	0.4740
25	136760	170	42.35	0.1260	25	228818	90	21.15	0.5020
26	161365	45	21.13	0.1340	26	252689	81	25.95	0.4850
27	111066	7	22.00	0.1380	27	138118	159	26.91	0.5360
28	13200	37	19.50	0.1430	28	199907	103	26.05	0.5280
29	166650	29	17.15	0.1440	29	177393	84	22.87	0.4970
30	153052	24	18.81	0.1540	30	232785	111	24.20	0.5340

Source: SOEP, individual questionnaire, only monetary variables (own calculation)

2.3 Variability method

The variability method is based on the empirical evidence that the variance of all answers across all questionnaires delivered by a faking interviewer is lower than the variance achieved by questionnaires of non-fabricated interviews. There are several points that could explain the absence of variance in fabricated interviews:

- Fakers tend to answer every question. Thus they produce less missing values.
- In questions where one needs to assign a score, for example from (1) ‘I agree’ to (5) ‘I disagree’, fakers tend to make a check mark in the middle. Extreme values are avoided.
- Since the interviewers know the questionnaire and understand the meaning of the questions, they will not produce any astonishing answers when faking. Such answers can be found in non-fabricated interviews because the interviewees have misunderstood a question.

The variability method consists of the following steps: first measure the variance within all the questionnaires of one interviewer, second, compare this value to the expected variance for a questionnaire cluster of the given size on the whole survey. More formally, let I_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$, denote the interviewer i , and n is the number of interviewers that have conducted the survey. The number of questionnaires Q_j is given by m with $j = 1, \dots, m$ and $m = m_1 + \dots + m_i$, where m_i denotes the number of questionnaires delivered by interviewer I_i . Without taking into account any meaning of the answers – whether a 5 encodes for ‘5 years’ or for ‘I disagree’ – we calculate the variance for every question $Q(k)$, $k = 1, \dots, l$ on all questionnaires Q_j of an interviewer I_i and sum up over all questions:

$$T_{I_i} = \sum_{k=1}^l \sum_{j=1}^{m_i} (Q_j(k) - \overline{Q(k)})^2. \quad (1)$$

Here, $\overline{Q(k)}$ denotes the mean for question $Q(k)$ and the index j accounts all questionnaires Q_j , $j = m_{i1}, \dots, m_{im_i}$ of the interviewer I_i .

The distribution of the test statistic T is estimated using a resampling approach on the whole survey. From this distribution we can derive a probability of the observed value. In the following we will denote this probability with plausibility. By sorting the interviewers with respect to the plausibility they achieved we obtain an interviewer ranking. The interviewers with the lowest plausibility are at the top of the ranking. They are considered to be potential fakers.

The procedure is defined as follows: The value of T_i (as defined in equation ??), which is assigned to interviewer I_i , is compared to the corresponding distribution of the test statistic T , which is estimated using a resampling approach. The area under the density curve on the left side of the realization T_i defines the plausibility. If the plausibility is too small, the interviewer is considered to be a potential faker. The procedure corresponds to a one-sided statistical test. One could argue that interviewers who achieve a plausibility that is suspiciously large could be fakers as well. Following this argument, one has to conduct a two-sided test. However, there is empirical evidence that this argument does not hold and that for the given task, a one-sided statistical test is more appropriate.

2.4 Results with the variability method

In table 2 the interviewer rankings for sample A/B and sample E, wave 1 are shown. Interviewers who achieve the same plausibility value are sorted in increasing order of their personal identification number. The known fakers appear at the beginnings of the rankings. It is remarkable that interviewer 249289, who had faked questionnaires in two waves of sample E and who was detected only in the third wave, is immediately debunked with the variability method in wave 1. Notice as well that for Sample A/B, the variability method is more effective than the Benford test.

TABLE 2: *Interviewer ranking with the variability method (faking interviewers marked)*

Sample A/B, wave 1				Sample E, wave 1			
Rank	Int.no.	Q.no.	plausibility	Rank	Int.no.	Q.no.	plausibility
1	16306	25	0.00254	1	50202	25	0.00000
1	33111	222	0.00254	1	138118	27	0.00000
1	33766	40	0.00254	1	166901	29	0.00000
1	103012	89	0.00254	1	249289	25	0.00000
1	157856	18	0.00254	1	254690	29	0.00000
1	165441	29	0.00254	1	260665	12	0.00000
7	152870	22	0.00252	7	250201	10	0.00024
8	139378	32	0.00254	8	249281	2	0.00044
9	64343	35	0.00258	9	165441	19	0.00054
10	128279	35	0.00259	9	167240	24	0.00054
11	89370	119	0.00266	11	120820	25	0.00064
12	36145	22	0.00281	12	240290	71	0.00114
13	149624	64	0.00317	13	205273	22	0.00164
14	43800	38	0.00323	13	253502	18	0.00164
15	167916	13	0.00338	15	199907	27	0.00174
16	118320	6	0.00344	16	252328	15	0.00224
17	29440	13	0.00345	17	236837	32	0.00324
18	166901	14	0.00363	18	89370	49	0.00384
19	169161	11	0.00373	19	217086	2	0.00634
20	53104	66	0.00382	20	251275	15	0.00714
21	164704	2	0.00399	21	204145	14	0.00874
22	167460	8	0.00427	22	233862	27	0.00914
23	105473	33	0.00443	23	250376	12	0.01074
24	51187	6	0.00445	24	177393	15	0.01174
25	158747	60	0.00474	25	217921	9	0.01344
26	130206	24	0.00477	26	39160	13	0.01674
27	165093	11	0.00506	27	226904	3	0.02554
28	103730	30	0.00549	28	190691	8	0.02724
29	980340	10	0.00579	29	246689	19	0.02774
30	39160	29	0.00599	30	239330	9	0.03714
31	104043	49	0.00640	31	246379	17	0.04224

Int.no.: number of interviewers, Q.no.: number of questionnaires.
Source: SOEP, individual questionnaire (own calculation).

3 Discussion

The data basis consists of raw data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). A total of 90 faked household interviews and 184 faked individual interviews were detected by conventional verification methods such as reinterviewing, almost all of them after the first wave of a subsample. The share of fabricated data is low in all samples (far less than 1%) and the maximum is 2.4% in sample E. In subsamples C and D, no fakes occurred. One should note that except for the fakes in sample E, faked data was never disseminated within the widely-used SOEP: the fakes were detected before the data was released. But those fakes that were contained in the original data files provided by the fieldwork organization are kept at DIW Berlin and provide a rich source for methodological research.

We applied two new approaches for discovering frauds which do not require two waves of data but can be applied to cross-sections. First we applied a procedure based

on Benford's Law to survey data and used it for fraud detection in the SOEP. Second we developed a new method we call the variability method, which exploits the empirical observation that fakers most often produce answers with less variability than could be expected from the whole survey.

In both procedures, we derived test statistics for each interviewer cluster. The distributions of these test statistics were estimated using resampling approaches across the whole survey. From these distributions, we derived probabilities of the observed values. Then the interviewers were sorted with respect to the probabilities or plausibilities they achieved. From this, interviewer rankings were obtained. The interviewers with the lowest plausibility are at the top of the ranking. They are considered to be potential fakers.

We show that with both the Benford and the variability method, we can identify almost all of the clusters of fabricated interviews which we know to have been faked.

As logical next step, we explore the impact of faked and suspicious interviews. Due to space constraints, these findings are not reported here. The interested reader may refer to the publication Schräpler/Wagner (2005) which describes some of the findings. Further information is available from the authors on request. In summary, we find empirical evidence for the finding of Schnell (1991) that even small proportions of faked interviews can be an important problem in multivariate survey statistics.

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