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Regulating speculative housing markets
via public housing construction programs:
Insights from a heterogeneous agent model

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Regulating speculative housing markets via public housing construction programs: Insights from a heterogeneous agent model

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Abstract

Since the instability of housing markets may be quite harmful for the real economy, we explore whether public housing construction programs may tame housing market fluctuations. As a workhorse, we use a behavioral stock-flow housing market model in which the complex interplay between speculative and real forces triggers realistic housing market dynamics. Simulations reveal that plausible and well-intended policy measures may turn out to be a mixed blessing. While public housing construction programs may reduce house prices, they seem to be incapable of bringing house prices much closer towards their fundamental values. In addition, these programs tend to drive out private housing constructions.

Keywords: Housing markets, boom-bust dynamics, extrapolative and regressive expectations, heterogeneous agent model, policy experiments, public housing construction programs

JEL classification: D84, R21, R31

1. Introduction

The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2006 caused a global financial crisis and pushed many countries around the world into deep economic recession. Without ques-

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1As is well known, Japan’s housing market crash in 1991 also triggered a prolonged economic recession. See Shiller (2015) for many more historical examples.
tion, it is thus of utmost importance to better understand the complex behavior of housing markets. According to Shiller (2015), the dynamics of housing markets depend to a large extent on market participants’ expectations. For instance, a fundamentally justified upswing may turn into a speculative boom if investors’ expectations become optimistic. Likewise, a dramatic housing market bust may occur if investors’ expectations spontaneously turn pessimistic. Following this lead, a number of behavioral housing market models have been proposed in the recent past (see, e.g. Dieci and Westerhoff 2012, Bolt et al. 2014, Kouwenberg and Zwickels 2014, Eichholtz et al. 2015, Burnside et al. 2016, Diks and Wang 2016 and Chai et al. 2017), which explain the intricate dynamics of housing markets via the expectation formation behavior of boundedly rational and heterogeneous investors.

In this paper, we seek to go one step further. We use the framework established by Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) as a workhorse to explore whether public housing construction programs are able to stabilize the dynamics of housing markets. Our analysis reveals that well-intended and, at least at first sight, plausible and properly implemented intervention policies may turn out to be a mixed blessing. While these programs may reduce average house prices, they fail to bring house prices much closer towards their fundamental values. Moreover, by depressing house prices, public housing construction drives out private housing construction. Overall, our analysis suggests that neither the amplitude of house price fluctuations nor their volatility can significantly be reduced by these programs, i.e. the boom-bust nature of housing markets seems to be a robust phenomenon.

More precisely, Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) develop a stock-flow housing market model in which speculative forces interact with real forces. The model’s basic structure may be summarized as follows. According to the model’s rental (flow) market, the rent level decreases with the housing stock. The model’s capital (stock) market implies that house prices depend positively on investors’ future house price expectations and on the rent level. Investors’ expectation formation is crucial for the model’s dynamics. In line with empirical evidence (Hommes 2011), investors use extrapolative and regressive expectation rules to forecast future house prices. In particular, more and more investors rely on regressive expectations when the housing market’s misalignment increases. Fur-
thermore, house prices depend negatively on the housing stock, which, in turn, depends positively on housing construction and negatively on housing depreciation. Finally, housing construction increases in line with house prices. As it turns out, the dynamics of their model is driven by a two-dimensional nonlinear stochastic map.

Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) show that their model can produce realistic housing market dynamics with lasting periods of overvaluation and overbuilding. It is important to note that the underlying parameter setting implies that the model’s fundamental steady state is unstable due to a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, i.e. the dynamics of their stochastic housing market model has a strong endogenous component. In a nutshell, the functioning of this model may be summarized as follows. Suppose that the housing market is slightly overvalued. In such a situation, most investors rely on destabilizing extrapolative expectations. As a result, a bubble may emerge during which an increasingly larger number of housing constructions triggers a lasting and substantial overbuilding process. A major market correction may set in once sufficiently many investors switch to the stabilizing regressive expectation rule. Since the rent level has also become rather low due to the overbuilding process, a high housing stock meets a low housing demand. The market’s consequent crash may become quite dramatic. Decreasing house prices turn investors’ expectations increasingly pessimistic. Since it takes some time for housing depreciation to correct overbuilding, a lower and lower housing demand is confronted with a still high and only slowly decreasing stock of housing. Eventually, however, the housing market recovers. If house prices are very low, investors return to regressive expectations. In such a situation, they expect increasing house prices and are willing to buy more houses, also because the rent level eventually improves. The lower the stock of housing has become during the downturn, the faster the recovery of the housing market.

It is important to note that the model’s boom-bust dynamics depends on the combined effect of real and speculative forces, as is the case in real housing markets.

Since their model is able to match the dynamics of actual housing markets quite well, it seems to be ideal for conducting a number of policy experiments. In particular, we are interested in the effects of four simple public housing construction programs that policymakers may use to seek to tame housing market dynamics. Our first intervention strategy implies that public housing construction increases in line with house prices.
The second intervention strategy recommends increasing public housing construction in periods in which the housing market is overvalued while the third intervention strategy suggests increasing public housing construction in periods in which the housing stock is below its fundamental value. According to the fourth intervention strategy, public housing construction is positive if house prices increase. Although these rules affect the dynamics of housing markets in different ways, they have a number of common effects. First of all, all intervention strategies increase the housing stock. However, a higher housing stock depresses the rent level and, consequently, house prices decrease. Lower house prices reduce the incentive of private constructors to build new houses, yet this crowding out effect does not overcompensate public housing construction, i.e. the total stock of housing increases. In the unregulated housing market, house prices and the housing stock oscillate around their fundamental values. Due to public housing construction programs, the housing stock oscillates on a higher level in the regulated housing market. Similarly, lower house prices imply that house prices tend to fluctuate below their fundamental values. On average, we thus observe an increase in house price distortion, i.e. an increase in the average distance between a house price and its fundamental value, and, ergo, less efficient housing markets. Our analysis also reveals that none of the four intervention strategies manages to reduce the volatility of house prices.

A few comments are in order. Already Baumol (1961) points out that countercyclical intervention rules may fail to stabilize business cycles. However, this does not mean that simple feedback rules are unable to stabilize markets. Quite to the contrary: Westerhoff (2008) and, more recently, Franke and Westerhoff (2018) show that policymakers may stabilize financial markets either by trading against the current price trend or by targeting fundamental values. In doing so, they counter the behavior of speculators who rely on extrapolative expectations or they support the behavior of speculators who form regressive expectations, quite similar to the expectation feedback structure within the current housing market model. The stabilizing effects of the interventions in these environments is also surprising since the evolution of financial markets is close to a random walk and thus much more complex than business cycles or house price dynamics. As will become clearer in the sequel, a major reason for the apparent failure of public housing
construction programs - with respect to their ability to stabilize housing markets - has to do with a peculiar property of housing markets, namely the durability of the housing stock. Note that a period featuring a larger number of public housing construction increases the current housing stock. Given that depreciation rates of housing markets are quite low, it may take years for overbuilding in a housing market to dissolve. Finally, the effectiveness of public housing construction programs may be better if they could also decrease the existing stock of housing. Since the demolition of housing stock seems to be politically unfeasible, we have abstained from experiments in this direction so far. On the other hand, the effectiveness may also worsen. We assume that public housing construction programs are executed without any significant delays, i.e. they react to the last observable house price. In reality, the initiation of public housing construction programs may take a considerable length of time, which, in turn, can hamper their stabilizing effects even more.

The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first recap the housing market model by Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) and explain its functioning. In Section 3, we then explore the effectiveness of a number of public housing construction programs. In Section 4, we finally conclude our paper and point out some avenues for future research.

2. Boom-and-bust housing market dynamics

To understand the complex boom-and-bust behavior of housing markets, Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) develop a housing market model in which speculative forces interact with real forces. In Section 2.1, we recap their approach. In Section 2.2, we discuss the model's steady state and stability properties while we explore the functioning of their calibrated model in Section 2.3. As we will see, the model is able to produce quite realistic housing market dynamics with lasting periods of overvaluation and overbuilding, providing an ideal stage for investigating how certain public housing construction programs may influence the performance of housing markets. In Section 2.4, we introduce a number of statistics to measure the performance of housing markets and to evaluate the effects of public housing construction programs.
2.1. The basic model setup

Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) propose a stock-flow housing market model with boundedly rational housing market investors. The housing market consists of two connected markets, namely a rental (or flow) market and a capital (or stock) market. To begin with the rental market, the demand for housing services \( D_t \) in each period \( t \) is defined as \( D_t = k_0 R_t^{-k} \). This iselastic demand function states that \( D_t \) is a decreasing function of the rent level \( R_t \), the price of housing services. Parameter \( k_0 \) is a positive parameter and \( k > 0 \) outlines the constant elasticity of the demand for housing services. The flow of housing services \( S_t \) in the same period is proportionally dependent on the initial housing stock \( H_t \), i.e. \( S_t = bH_t \), where \( b > 0 \). Given these two requirements, the market clearing condition for housing services in period \( t \), \( D_t = S_t \), leads to the expression \( k_0 R_t^{-k} = bH_t \). Accordingly, the rent level depends negatively on the current housing stock, so that

\[
R_t = \frac{m_0}{H_t^m},
\]

where \( m := \frac{1}{k} > 0 \) and \( m_0 := (\frac{b}{k_0})^{-\frac{1}{k}} > 0 \). Parameter \( m \) represents the reciprocal value of the demand elasticity.

Concerning the market for housing capital, investors’ demand for housing stock is modeled on the basis of a standard one-period mean-variance framework. Assume that a representative investor is able to spread his wealth between housing capital and an alternative riskless asset over the time horizon from \( t \) to \( t+1 \). From this perspective and given a hypothetical house price level \( P_t \) at time \( t \), the investor’s end-of-period wealth \( W_{t+1} \) is

\[
W_{t+1} = (1 + r)W_t + H_{t}^{D}(P_{t+1} + R_t - (1 + r + \delta)P_t).
\]

\( W_t \) and \( H_{t}^{D} \) denote total wealth and the number of housing units held at time \( t \), and all random variables are indexed with \( t+1 \). Parameter \( \delta > 0 \) stands for the housing depreciation rate and \( r > 0 \) is the interest rate. The latter comprises the profit on alternative assets, i.e. the opportunity cost of capital, as well as additional costs of owning a house.\footnote{These additional costs are expressed on a proportional basis and include, for instance, insurance and property taxes.}

According to the real estate literature (Himmelberg et al. 2005), the amount \( r + \delta \) can be characterized as the user cost of housing.
The aim for housing market investors is to maximize the certainty equivalent for final wealth that leads to the following mean-variance optimization problem:

$$\max_{H_t^D} \left[ E_t(W_{t+1} - \frac{\lambda}{2} V_t(W_{t+1})) \right].$$

(3)

The functions $E_t(\cdot)$ and $V_t(\cdot)$ represent investors’ expectation and variance conditional on final wealth $W_{t+1}$, and the coefficient of (absolute) risk aversion is indicated by $\lambda > 0$.

For simplicity, investors’ beliefs about the variance of the price and payout at the end of the period is assumed to be constant over time, i.e. $V_t(P_{t+1}) = \sigma^2$. In addition, the market expectation of $P_{t+1}$ is formed at the beginning of period $t$ based on observations up to period $t-1$, and is defined as $P_{t,t+1}^e := E_t(P_{t+1})$. As a result of these considerations, the solution of the above maximization problem is

$$H_t^D = P_{t,t+1}^e + R_t - (1 + r + \delta) P_t - \frac{H_t \lambda \sigma^2}{1 + r + \delta}.$$  

(4)

Obviously, investors’ optimal demand for housing stock is a downward-sloping function of current price $P_t$ and user cost $r + \delta$. Moreover, it depends positively on investors’ one-period-ahead price expectations $P_{t,t+1}^e$ as well as on current rent level $R_t$.

In the following, the total number of investors is set to one. The market clearing condition for the stock of housing

$$H_t^D = H_t$$

(5)

implies that

$$P_t = \frac{P_{t,t+1}^e + R_t - H_t \lambda \sigma^2}{1 + r + \delta},$$

(6)

so that $P_t$ outlines the market clearing price. The term $H_t \lambda \sigma^2$ in equation (6) denotes the risk premium and thus $R_t - H_t \lambda \sigma^2$ can be interpreted as the risk-adjusted rent.

The evolution of the housing stock is described as

$$H_t = (1 - \delta)H_{t-1} + I_t^P + I_t^S.$$  

(7)

$I_t^P$ denotes private housing investments or, in other words, the amount of new private housing constructions in period $t$, and is defined as

$$I_t^P = q_0 P_{t-1}^a.$$  

(8)
where $q_0 > 0$. Parameter $q > 0$ describes the constant elasticity of the supply of new housing. Accordingly, the number of new private constructions in period $t$ is an upward-sloping function of the price of the previous period $t-1$, where $I_t^P > 0$ for $P > 0$. Initially, public housing constructions are set to zero, i.e. $I_t^S = 0$.

In combination with the equation for private housing investment (8) and with the assumption of $I_t^S = 0$, the development of the housing stock in (7) can be rewritten as

$$H_t = (1 - \delta)H_{t-1} + q_0 P_t^{q-1}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

A further important component of this model concerns investors’ rule-based expectation formation behavior. Based on Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) and consistent with the approaches by Day and Huang (1990), Brock and Hommes (1998), Boswijk et al. (2007) and Westerhoff and Franke (2012), two important expectation rules can be distinguished. First, extrapolative expectations are defined as follows:

$$P_{t,t+1}^{E} = P_{t-1} + \gamma(P_{t-1} - P_1^*).$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

As can be seen, investors with extrapolative expectations forecast that the price will continue to move further away from its fundamental value $P_1^*$, and thus they have a destabilizing effect on prices. Second, investors with regressive expectations act as a stabilizing force because they forecast that price movements will return towards the fundamental value, which can be illustrated by

$$P_{t,t+1}^{E} = P_{t-1} + \theta(P_1^* - P_{t-1}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Parameters $\gamma > 0$ and $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$ indicate the intensity of investors’ reactions to the observed mispricing, i.e. the deviation of the price from its fundamental value.

Investors tend to switch between the extrapolative and the regressive expectation rule depending on the prevailing market circumstances. While investors seek to chase price trends, they also fear bursting bubbles. Investors therefore prefer the regressive expectation rule with increasing misalignments. According to that, the share of investors

---

3. Throughout this paper, the fundamental steady states of house prices and housing stock are indexed with 1 due to the existence of further non-fundamental steady states.

4. The concept of modeling changes in market sentiment with respect to market circumstances can be traced back to de Grauwe et al. (1993). See Dieci and He (2018) for an excellent survey about the role of expectations in heterogeneous agent models of financial and housing markets.
$w_t$ that has extrapolative expectations can be described by

$$w_t = \frac{1}{1 + V_t(P_{t-1} - P_1^*)^2}. \tag{12}$$

The weighting function (12) has a bell shape, which means that the closer the house price is to its fundamental value, the higher the market impact of the extrapolative rule. In this case, if the price moves away from its fundamental benchmark, most investors expect this gap to become greater and greater, and they seek to profit from it. But with increasing deviation from the fundamental value, the risk of a bursting bubble is assessed as being high by more and more investors. As a consequence, an increasing share of investors turn to the regressive rule. The greater the sensitivity of investors towards the perceived mispricing, expressed by $V_t > 0$, the more quickly such switching occurs.

Note that housing market booms are more pronounced and longer lasting than housing market busts. It is therefore assumed that investors switch more quickly and strongly to the regressive expectation rule if the price is below its fundamental value and simultaneously more strongly distorted. This idea is formalized by

$$V_t = \begin{cases} v_u + c_u(P_t - P_1^*) & P_t \geq P_1^* \\ v_l - c_l(P_t - P_1^*) & P_t < P_1^* \end{cases}, \tag{13}$$

where $v_l \geq v_u \geq 0$ and $c_l \geq c_u \geq 0$.

A weighted average of extrapolative and regressive expectations is called the aggregate market expectation $P_{e,t+1}$ and is expressed by

$$P_{e,t+1} = w_tP_{e,t+1,E} + (1 - w_t)P_{e,t+1,R} \tag{14}$$

or

$$P_{e,t+1} = w_t(P_{t-1} + \gamma(P_{t-1} - P_1^*)) + (1 - w_t)(P_{t-1} + \theta(P_1^* - P_{t-1})), \tag{15}$$

respectively, which completes the description of our model.

2.2. Steady states and stability analysis

Combining (1), (6), (9), (12), (13) and (15) reveals that the model dynamics is driven by a two-dimensional nonlinear map

$$P_t = F(P_{t-1}, H_{t-1}) \tag{16}$$
and

\[ H_t = G(P_{t-1}, H_{t-1}). \]  

Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) define a fundamental steady state (FSS), say \((P^*_1, H^*_1)\), as a steady state at which expectations are realized, i.e. \(\bar{P}^e = P^*_1\). Moreover, they show that the FSS is implicitly defined by

\[ P^*_1 = \frac{R^*_1 - \lambda \sigma^2 H^*_1}{r + \delta}, \]  

and

\[ H^*_1 = \frac{I^*_1}{\delta}, \]  

where \(R^*_1 = \frac{m_0}{(H^*_1)^\gamma}\) and \(I^*_1 = q_0(P^*_1)^\gamma\). Accordingly, the fundamental price \(P^*_1\) is equal to the discounted value of future (risk-adjusted) rents. Note that (18) gives rise to two no-arbitrage conditions. First, agents are indifferent between investing in the safe asset and in the housing market. Second, agents are indifferent between owning and renting a house. From an economic perspective, the FSS thus has desirable properties.

Moreover, the fundamental housing stock depends on the steady-state investment level and the depreciation rate such that housing depreciation is only set off by new housing construction.

The FSS becomes unstable due to a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation if the stability condition

\[ \gamma < \frac{r + 2\delta}{1 - \delta} \]  

is violated. In such a situation, endogenous quasi-periodic dynamics is set in motion. However, the FSS may also become unstable due to a Pitchfork bifurcation. If the stability condition

\[ \gamma < r + \delta + \frac{(\lambda \sigma^2 - R'(H^*))I'(P^*_1)}{\delta} \]  

is violated, the FSS becomes unstable and two new non-fundamental steady states (NFSS), say \((P^*_2, H^*_2)\) and \((P^*_3, H^*_3)\), where \(P^*_2 < P^*_1 < P^*_3\) and \(H^*_2 < H^*_1 < H^*_3\),

\[ ^5 \text{Due to the isoelastic nature of the demand and supply curves, the FSS can only be expressed explicitly if investors are risk-neutral. For } \lambda = 0, \text{ the FSS is given by } P^*_1 = \left(\frac{m_0}{r + \delta}\right)^{1/\gamma} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\sigma}\right)^{m_0/\gamma} \text{ and } H^*_1 = \left(\frac{m_0}{r + \delta}\right)^{1/\gamma} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\sigma}\right)^{m_0/\gamma}. \]
are born. The housing market may then get stuck in a permanent bull or permanent bear market. Note that the Pitchfork bifurcation boundary is more binding if 

\[(\lambda \sigma^2 - R'(H^*_1))IP'(P^*_1) < \frac{\delta^2(1+r+\delta)}{1-\delta}.\]

From an empirical perspective, however, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is more relevant than the Pitchfork bifurcation (see Section 2.3). Nevertheless, the Pitchfork bifurcation may play an important role for the model's global behavior. Overall, these results indicate that the stability of housing markets depends on speculators’ extrapolative behavior and a number of real factors such as the interest rate and the depreciation rate.

2.3. Unregulated housing market dynamics

Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) explore how the complex interplay between real and speculative forces shapes the dynamics of housing markets. A time period in their calibrated model corresponds to a quarter of a year. Table 1 provides an overview of the model parameters. The real parameters, e.g. the interest rate or the supply elasticity, are based on empirical observations. The remaining model parameters, in particular those that capture agents’ expectation formation, are fixed such that the model dynamics mimics a number of important features of actual housing markets. Note that a small amount of exogenous noise is added to the house price equation (shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation \(\sigma_p\)). See Dieci and Westerhoff (2016) for more details.

Note that the calibrated model parameters imply that the FSS is given by \(P^*_1 = H^*_1 = 100\). For completeness, we also mention that the level of private housing construction at the FSS amounts to 0.5 and that all agents form extrapolative expectations. Moreover, \(\gamma = 0.15\) implies that the FSS is unstable due to a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, which occurs at \(\gamma^{NS} \approx 0.0151\). Since a Pitchfork bifurcation would require that \(\gamma^\text{PF} = 0.27\), we also know that the FSS is the unique steady state of the calibrated

\[\text{Theoretically, the model's dynamical system may also give rise to a Flip bifurcation. Instead of a locally stable FSS, we then observe an attracting period-two cycle. Since the stability condition}
\]

\[(\lambda \sigma^2 - R'(H^*_1))IP'(P^*_1) < (2-\delta)(2+r+\delta+\gamma)\]

is always fulfilled for realistic parameter values, we can safely neglect this scenario.
Table 1: Base parameter setting used in the simulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate</td>
<td>$r = 0.005$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>$\delta = 0.005$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrapolation parameter</td>
<td>$\gamma = 0.15$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression parameter</td>
<td>$\theta = 0.125$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price volatility (beliefs)</td>
<td>$\sigma = 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute risk aversion coefficient</td>
<td>$\lambda = 0.00125$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additive price noise</td>
<td>$\sigma_p = 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switching parameters</td>
<td>$v_l = v_u = 0.01, c_l = 0.01, c_u = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand elasticity</td>
<td>$m = 4, m_0 = 1.5 \times 10^8$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply elasticity</td>
<td>$q = 4, q_0 = 5 \times 10^{-9}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of exogenous noise, the model’s house price and housing stock display strong oscillatory fluctuations around their FSS levels.

Figure 1 depicts a stochastic simulation run of the model. Since one period corresponds to a quarter of a year, the 200 observations represent a time span of 50 years. The panels show from top to bottom the evolution of house prices (black line) and housing stock (green line), the market share of regressive expectation and private (black line) and public housing constructions (red line), respectively. The gray line featured in the top panel represents the fundamental value of both house prices and housing stock. As can be seen, the housing market is quite volatile and subject to significant bubbles and crashes. Furthermore, there is a mismatch between the fluctuations and turning points of house prices and housing stock. Recall that private housing construction depends on past prices. Hence, the current housing stock may still increase when house prices start to deflate, provided that new housing construction offsets housing depreciation. As it turns out, the level of overbuilding reached during a boom period is, along with investors’ price expectations, a crucial factor for the timing and size of housing market crashes.

To be more precise, the functioning of the model - despite being quite intricate due to the complex interplay between speculative and real forces - may be explained as follows. First of all, note that the majority of investors relies on extrapolative expectations
when house prices are near their fundamental value. Since extrapolative expectations are destabilizing, we may observe the start of a bubble. In our simulation run, such a development takes place shortly before period 50. As the price runs away from its fundamental value, the market share of regressive expectations increases. This has a stabilizing impact on the dynamics, as can be seen shortly after period 50. However, a real crash typically occurs only in this model if the housing stock also reaches high levels.
In fact, shortly after period 50, house prices first recover before they begin to tumble. Recall that a high housing stock implies low rents. Hence, in periods with high house prices and high levels of housing stock, investors predict a price decline, and it is economically uninteresting (low rents) to invest in the housing market. Both effects together depress housing demand which, in turn, pushes house prices downwards. Moreover, once house prices drop below the FSS, investors relying on extrapolative expectations become pessimistic and predict a further price decline. Since the housing stock remains high for a while (the depreciation rate is low), the rent level does not recover. For this reason, the housing market decline continues up to period 100. Now the situation starts to change. Investors switch to regressive expectation and predict an increase in house prices. Eventually, housing demand improves and house prices increase again.

2.4. Performance of the housing market
To evaluate the effects of public housing construction programs and to better understand the functioning of our model, we introduce nine statistics. The house price distortion $D^P$, given by the average absolute relative deviation between house price $P_t$ and its fundamental value $P_t^*$, is computed by

$$D^P = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{|P_t - P_t^*|}{P_t^*},$$

(22)

where $T$ denotes the sample length. Similarly, the housing stock distortion $D^H$ is captured by

$$D^H = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{|H_t - H_t^*|}{H_t^*},$$

(23)

representing the average absolute relative deviation of housing stock $H_t$ from its fundamental value $H_t^*$. Furthermore, the volatility of house price $V$ is defined as

$$V = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{|P_t - P_{t-1}|}{P_{t-1}},$$

(24)

reflecting the average absolute relative house price change. Average house price $\bar{P}$ and average housing stock $\bar{H}$ can be described by

$$\bar{P} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} P_t$$

(25)
and
\[ H = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t, \]  
respectively. In addition, average private housing construction \( \overline{IP} \) and average public housing construction \( \overline{IS} \) are characterized by
\[ \overline{IP} = \frac{1}{T} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} I^P_t, \]  
and
\[ \overline{IS} = \frac{1}{T} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} I^S_t, \]  
respectively. To understand the functioning of the model, we also keep track of the average market share of extrapolators
\[ \bar{w} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} w_t, \]  
as well as the average rent level
\[ \bar{R} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} R_t. \]

With these nine statistics, the state of the unregulated housing market, as discussed in the previous section, can be characterized as follows: first of all, housing markets are not efficient. In particular, \( D^P = 0.062 \) and \( D^H = 0.051 \) imply that house prices and the housing stock deviate significantly from their fundamental levels. Note also that house prices are quite volatile (\( V = 0.016 \)). Moreover, the average house price (\( \bar{P} = 100.30 \)) is slightly higher than the fundamental house price (\( P^*_1 = 100 \)). This stems back from the fact that the appearance of bull and bear markets is asymmetric, due to speculators’ switching between expectation rules. High house prices induce more average private housing construction (\( \overline{IP} = 0.52 \)) than in the steady state (\( I^P_1^* = 0.5 \)). This, in turn, results in a higher average housing stock of \( \overline{H} = 104.39 \) compared to the fundamental value of \( H^*_1 = 100 \). Due to the high housing stock, rent level \( \bar{R} = 1.29 \) is lower than the steady-state rent level \( R^*_1 = 1.5 \). Initially, average public housing construction \( \overline{IS} \) is set to zero, i.e. \( \overline{IS} = 0 \), while the average market share of extrapolators is given by \( \bar{w} = 0.56 \). All statistics are based on 50,000 observations.
3. Effects of public housing construction programs

So far, we have set public housing construction to zero. Hereafter, we introduce four simple intervention strategies to evaluate the effectiveness of public housing construction programs. In Section 3.1, we present the first intervention strategy, which states that public housing construction depends positively on the level of house prices. In Section 3.2, we consider the second intervention strategy, which implies that public housing construction increases in periods of overvaluation of the housing market. In Section 3.3, we introduce the third intervention strategy, which recommends increasing public housing construction in periods in which the housing stock is below its fundamental value, while the fourth intervention strategy suggests that public housing construction is positive if house prices increase, as described in Section 3.4.

3.1. Dependency on price levels

The first intervention strategy we evaluate implies that public housing construction increases in line with house prices, and can be described by

\[ I^S_t = xP_{t-1}, \]  

where \( x > 0 \) is defined as the public intervention parameter. Accordingly, the higher the house prices of the previous period \( P_{t-1} \), the higher the level of public housing construction \( I^S_t \).

To illustrate the performance of this intervention strategy, we depict a simulation run with 200 observations in Figure 2. Since we want to compare the housing market dynamics that arise in the unregulated housing market with those that occur in the regulated market, we use the same design as in Figure 1. The intervention parameter is set to \( x = 0.0015 \). The first panel shows the evolution of house prices (black line) and housing stock (green line). Apparently, periods of lasting appreciation still alternate with periods of lasting depreciation, i.e. the simulated price dynamics continues to display bubbles and crashes. However, compared to Figure 1, the housing stock oscillates on a higher level and the level of house prices is lower, implying that periods of undervaluation persist longer than periods of overvaluation. For instance, shortly before
Figure 2: The dynamics of the housing market model, including the first intervention strategy for $x = 0.0015$. The panels show from top to bottom the dynamics of house prices (black line) and housing stock (green line), the market impact of regressive expectations, and private (black line) and public housing construction (red line). The simulation run is based on 200 observations, and parameters are as in Table 1.

period $t = 200$, house prices are below the fundamental value in the regulated market and fluctuate very close around $P_1^*$ in the unregulated market. Here again, crashes are particularly pronounced if the housing stock reaches high levels, as can be seen around period $t = 100$. The second panel shows the corresponding market share of regressive expectations which, compared to Figure 1, is lower in periods of overvaluation and higher
if house prices are below the fundamental value, due to the overall drop of house prices. This can be seen between periods \( t = 50 \) and \( t = 90 \). In the regulated market, house prices fluctuate closer to the fundamental value than in the unregulated market. Therefore the market share of regressive expectations is lower, and most investors follow the destabilizing extrapolative expectation rule. It becomes evident from the bottom panel that private housing construction (black line) fluctuates on a lower level in the regulated housing market. Obviously, public housing construction depresses house prices, driving out private housing construction.

In the following, we use our nine statistics to explain the working of this strategy in more detail. First of all, public housing construction (\( I^S = 0.14 \)) increases the housing stock, which is now at the average level of \( \overline{H} = 109.87 \). Consequently, the housing stock distortion increases to \( D^H = 0.099 \). The higher supply of housing depresses the rent level (\( \overline{R} = 1.04 \)) which, in turn, reduces house prices, meaning that the average house price level drops to a value of \( \overline{P} = 94.59 \). Hence, on average the house price distortion rises slightly to \( D^P = 0.066 \) which, in turn, results in a decreased average market share of extrapolators (\( \overline{w} = 0.39 \)). Due to the lower level of house prices, private constructors have less incentives to build new houses and, consequently, private housing construction decreases to an average value of \( \overline{IP} = 0.41 \). However, the total stock of housing increases since the crowding out effect does not overcompensate public housing construction. On average, the volatility of house prices increases (\( \overline{V} = 0.018 \)).

In Figure 3, we show how the model performance depends on our first public intervention strategy. The panels illustrate from top left to bottom right the behavior of our nine statistics \( D^P, D^H, \overline{P}, \overline{H}, \overline{IP}, \overline{IS}, \overline{w}, \overline{R} \) and \( V \) for increasing values of parameter \( x \). As can be seen, the results from Figure 2 are confirmed by Figure 3. Obviously, average public housing construction \( \overline{IS} \) increases in line with parameter \( x \) (panel 6). Thus, the stronger the intervention, the higher average housing stock \( \overline{H} \) is (panel 4). Consequently, both average rent level \( \overline{R} \) (panel 8) and average house price \( \overline{P} \) (panel 3) decrease with parameter \( x \). Due to the crowding out effect, average private housing construction \( \overline{IP} \) decreases in line with parameter \( x \) (panel 5). However, the rise of \( \overline{IS} \) overcompensates the decline of \( \overline{IP} \) so that the average housing stock increases in line with parameter \( x \). As can be seen in the first panel, the house price distortion \( D^P \) initially marginally declines
Figure 3: The impact of the first intervention strategy on the performance of the housing market. The panels reveal how the nine statistics $D_P$, $D_H$, $\mathcal{P}$, $\overline{P}$, $\mathcal{P}^\prime$, $\mathcal{W}$, $\mathcal{R}$ and $V$ depend on the intervention parameter $x$. The computation of the nine statistics is based on 50,000 observations and the base parameters are as in Table 1.

in line with parameter $x$, but as of $x = 0.001$, the price distortion increases sharply. Similarly, the housing stock distortion $D_H$ (panel 2) also grows in line with parameter $x$. Due to the higher price distortion, the average market share of extrapolators (panel 7) decreases in line with parameter $x$. To sum up, the first public intervention strategy fails to stabilize the dynamics in the housing market, as can also be seen in the last panel, which shows a slightly growing volatility of house prices as parameter $x$ increases.

\footnote{As a robustness check, we also investigated the dynamics of the housing market for variants of the first intervention strategy. For this purpose, we conditioned the intervention strategy on threshold values of house prices and housing stock. Furthermore, we also explored the effects of nonlinear intervention functions. However, none of these variants led to a significant reduction of the distortion of house prices.}
3.2. Measures against positive mispricing

According to our second intervention strategy, the level of public housing construction increases in line with the overvaluation of the housing market, i.e. the further house prices move above the fundamental price, the higher the level of public housing construction. In case of undervaluation, public housing construction is set to zero. This strategy can be characterized by

\[ I_t^S = \begin{cases} 
  x(P_{t-1} - P_t^*) & P_{t-1} > P_t^* \\
  0 & P_{t-1} \leq P_t^* 
\end{cases} \]  

(32)

The simulation run depicted in Figure 4 is based on \( x = 0.05 \). All other parameters used in the simulation are defined as in Table 1. For comparability, the design of Figure 4 is as in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 4 reveals that house prices oscillate around the fundamental value \( P_t^* = 100 \) (gray line) and that significant bubbles and crashes may occur. However, the average house price level is lower than in the unregulated housing market, i.e. house prices fluctuate more frequently below \( P_t^* \). In addition, fluctuations in the housing stock are more pronounced and \( H_t \) reaches higher levels than in Figure 1 (above \( H = 115 \)). Therefore, housing market crashes turn out to be stronger, which results in sharp declines in the housing stock. This development can be observed shortly after period 150. After the housing stock rises to over 115, house prices decline sharply and the housing stock falls again. Due to the lower level of house prices, the market share of regressive expectations is lower in periods in which the housing market is overvalued and is higher in periods of undervaluation. This can be seen shortly before period 200. In the regulated market, house prices are below the fundamental value, therefore the market share of regressive expectations is higher than in the unregulated market in which \( P_t \) fluctuates very close to \( P_t^* \). Due to the crowding out of private housing construction by public housing construction, \( I_t^P \) fluctuates on a lower level. The more the housing market is overvalued, the higher public housing construction is. In periods in which \( P_t \) is equal to or below the fundamental value, \( I_t^S \) is zero.

The functioning of the second intervention strategy is surprisingly similar to the first intervention strategy. Due to public housing construction (\( I^S = 0.08 \)) in periods of overvaluation, the housing stock rises sharply after a short time lag and reaches...
an average level of $\overline{P} = 107.6$. The distortion of the housing stock also increases to $D^H = 0.081$. This leads to a strong decrease in the average rent level ($\overline{R} = 1.16$), and thus to a sharp drop in house prices ($\overline{P} = 97.16$). As soon as $P_t$ falls below the fundamental value, there is no more public housing construction, i.e. $I^S_t = 0$. Consequently, the housing stock declines with the result that house prices revert towards...
the fundamental value. Once $P_t$ is higher than the fundamental value, public housing construction and hence $H_t$ increases until the housing market crashes again and the story repeats itself. In fact, this is exactly what we observe between period 50 and 100. Since public housing construction crowds out private housing construction, $I_t^P$ drops to an average value of $\bar{P} = 0.46$. Moreover, the average market share of extrapolators falls to $\bar{w} = 0.49$, and the house price distortion decreases slightly to $D^P = 0.061$. Since we observe only a small improvement in $D^P$ but otherwise a deterioration of the other statistics, especially the volatility of house prices increases to $V = 0.017$, the second intervention strategy is also incapable of improving the performance of the housing market.

Figure 5 shows that there is no value of the intervention parameter at which the dynamics of the housing market can be stabilized. Note that the nine statistics depicted in Figure 5 evolve very similarly to those depicted in Figure 3. To be more precise, as the intervention parameter increases, so do average public housing construction, average housing stock and the distortion of the housing stock (panel 6, 4 and 2, respectively). Consequently, the average rent level $\bar{R}$ (panel 8) and the average price level (panel 3) are in constant decline. Up to $x = 0.03$, the price distortion decreases slightly (panel 1). As parameter $x$ increases further, $D^P$ rises strongly, resulting in a decreasing average market share of extrapolators (panel 7). Average private housing construction $\bar{I}^S$ (panel 5) decreases as $\bar{I}^S$ increases, i.e. there is a crowding out effect. Finally, the volatility of house prices rises slightly with increasing parameter $x$ (last panel). In summary, we can say that the second intervention strategy also fails to stabilize the dynamics on the housing market.\[\text{\footnote{We also examined variations of the second intervention strategy. For instance, we replaced the fundamental price by different threshold price levels $\hat{P}$. This means that the further price $P_{t-1}$ moves away from $\hat{P}$ the higher the level of public housing construction is. If $P_{t-1} \leq \hat{P}$, it follows that $I^S = 0$. However, this alternative strategy also failed to stabilize the housing market.}}\]
Figure 5: The impact of the second intervention strategy on the performance of the housing market. The panels reveal how the nine statistics $D^P$, $D^H$, $P$, $H$, $I^P$, $I^S$, $w$, $R$ and $V$ depend on intervention parameter $x$. The computation of the nine statistics is based on 50,000 observations, and the base parameters are as in Table 1.

3.3. Countering underbuilding

The third intervention strategy assumes that public housing construction increases in periods in which the housing stock is below its fundamental value, i.e. policymakers seek to counteract housing shortages. However, if the housing stock is equal to or greater than $H^*_t$, there is no public housing construction, i.e. $I^S_t = 0$. This relationship can be formulated by

$$I^S_t = \begin{cases} 
  x(H^*_t - H_{t-1}) & H^*_t > H_{t-1} \\
  0 & H^*_t \leq H_{t-1}
\end{cases} \quad (33)$$

Figure 6 depicts a simulation run with 200 observations, following the design of Figures 1, 2 and 4. The base parameter setting is as in Table 1, and the intervention parameter is set to $x = 4$. As can be seen, the dynamics only change very little compared with those that
Figure 6: The dynamics of the housing market model, including the third intervention strategy for $x = 4$. The panels show from top to bottom the dynamics of house prices (black line) and housing stock (green line), the market impact of regressive expectations, and private (black line) and public housing construction (red line). The simulation run is based on 200 observations, and parameters are as in Table 1.

occur in the unregulated market. The reason for this is that in our simulation run, the housing stock falls slightly below its fundamental value only between period $t = 25$ and $t = 50$, and thus public housing construction can only be observed in this period. Consequently, the housing stock is slightly higher and the price level is slightly lower than in Figure 1. As a result, this intervention has no effect on the further evolution of the
dynamics. Changes in the development of the market impact of regressive expectations are virtually invisible. The third panel reveals that public housing construction occurs in periods in which the housing stock is below its fundamental value $H_1^* = 100$, which is the case before $t = 50$. Due to the small effect of public intervention, private housing construction changes negligibly.

The third intervention strategy functions according to similar principles as the previous two strategies. Public housing construction in periods in which the housing stock is below its fundamental value leads to an increased average housing stock ($\bar{H} = 104.7$). Since public housing construction is for the underlying intervention parameter rather low ($\bar{S} = 0.016$), all other statistics change only marginally. As a result of public intervention, $H$ moves closer to the fundamental value, whereby the distortion of the housing stock decreases to $D^H = 0.047$. Consequently, the average rent level declines ($\bar{R} = 1.27$) as well as the average house price level ($\bar{P} = 99.64$), which, in turn, causes the house price distortion to fall to a value of $D^P = 0.06$. Due to the crowding out effect of public housing construction, the average value of private housing construction falls to $\bar{P}' = 0.51$. In addition, the average market share of extrapolators is smaller than in Figure 1 ($\bar{\pi} = 0.55$). The third intervention strategy is also incapable of reducing the volatility of house prices ($\bar{V} = 0.017$).

Figure 7 demonstrates that there is no value of intervention parameter $x$ that can improve the values of the nine statistics. As parameter $x$ rises, public housing construction increases (panel 6), as does the average housing stock (panel 4). As a result, both the average rent level and the average price level drop as the intervention parameter rises (panels 8 and 3, respectively). After a slight improvement of the two statistics $D^P$ and $D^H$ (panels 1 and 2), both of them rise sharply as parameter $x$ increases further. Due to the increasing price distortion, the average market share of extrapolators falls in line with parameter $x$ (panel 7). Again, the rising level of average public housing construction drives out private housing construction and, consequently, $\bar{P}'$ declines (panel 5). As the volatility of house prices also increases slightly in line with increasing public intervention (panel 9), the third intervention strategy has no stabilizing effect on the
The panels reveal how the nine statistics $D^P$, $D^H$, $P$, $H$, $I^P$, $I^S$, $w$, $R$ and $V$ depend on intervention parameter $x$. The computation of the nine statistics is based on 500,000 observation runs, and the base parameters are as in Table 1.

housing market dynamics

3.4. Anti-trend measures

The fourth strategy proposes that public housing construction increases if house prices increase. In case of falling or constant house prices, there is no public housing construc-

9We also evaluated alternative versions of the third intervention strategy. For instance, we supersede the fundamental housing stock $H^*_t$ by a threshold value of housing stock $H$. In this case, public housing construction is positive in periods in which $H > H_{t-1}$ and set to zero otherwise. This variation does not result in stable housing market dynamics either.
tion. This can easily be defined by

\[
I_t^S = \begin{cases} 
  x(P_{t-1} - P_{t-2}) & \text{if } P_{t-1} > P_{t-2}, \\
  0 & \text{if } P_{t-1} \leq P_{t-2}.
\end{cases}
\]  

To illustrate the results of this intervention strategy, we set \( x = 0.15 \) and show in Figure 8 the dynamics of the subsequent housing market. The design is as in Figures 1, 2, 4 and 6, and the base parameters are specified as in Table 1. It can be seen from the top panel of Figure 8 that house prices fluctuate on a lower level around the fundamental price \( P^*_t = 100 \), while the housing stock is always above \( H^*_t = 100 \), and thus reaches higher values than in Figure 1. Since investors put less weight on extrapolative expectations in undervalued markets, the overall drop of house prices leads to an increase in the market impact of regressive expectations. The bottom panel shows that public housing construction reaches repeatedly high levels and is strongly fluctuating due to the significant house price fluctuations. In contrast, the level of private housing construction decreases to a lower level.

The mode of action of the fourth intervention strategy is again similar to the effects of the previous three strategies. As soon as house prices rise, public housing construction is positive. The stronger prices increase, the higher the level of public housing construction. Due to high price volatility, the average level of public housing construction is quite high (\( \bar{T}^P = 0.12 \)), which, in turn, causes the private housing construction to fall to a value of \( \bar{T}^P = 0.42 \). As a result, the housing stock grows to a higher level (\( \bar{H} = 108.72 \)). Therefore, the distortion of the housing stock intensifies to more than twice its value in Figure 1, namely \( D^H = 0.087 \). Consequently, both the average rent level and average house prices decrease to values of \( \bar{R} = 1.08 \) and \( \bar{P} = 95.24 \), respectively. The market impact of destabilizing extrapolators decreases (\( \bar{w} = 0.42 \)), but the house price distortion is only marginally lower (\( D^P = 0.063 \)). Moreover, the volatility is higher compared to Figure 1 (\( V = 0.017 \)).

Figure 9 shows that no value of public intervention parameter \( x \) diminishes the oscillations of the housing market. An increasing parameter \( x \) leads to growing levels of public housing construction (panel 6). However, interventions increase the average housing stock (panel 4), while the average rent and average price level clearly decline (panels 8 and 3, respectively). Higher intervention forces do not bring about a reduction of the
Figure 8: The dynamics of the housing market model, including the fourth intervention strategy for $x = 0.15$. The panels show from top to bottom the dynamics of house prices (black line) and housing stock (green line), the market impact of regressive expectations, and private (black line) and public housing construction (red line). The simulation run is based on 200 observations, and parameters are as in Table 1.

hosing stock distortion (panel 2), but worsen the situation. It becomes apparent that higher values of parameter $x$ are able to decrease house price distortion in the first place (panel 1), but fail to perform well for values higher than about $x = 0.1$. Panel 9 shows that volatility does not change significantly at all. Due to the increasing house price distortion, the average market impact of extrapolators decreases sharply as parameter
Figure 9: The impact of the fourth intervention strategy on the performance of the housing market. The panels reveal how the nine statistics $D_P$, $D_H$, $P$, $H$, $I_P$, $I_S$, $w$, $R$ and $V$ depend on intervention parameter $x$. The computation of the nine statistics is based on 50,000 observations, and the base parameters are as in Table 1.

$x$ increases (panel 7). Finally, private housing construction is crowded out by public housing construction (panel 5).

4. Conclusions

Housing markets have repeatedly displayed dramatic boom-bust fluctuations in the past. Guided by empirical evidence, the behavioral stock-flow housing market model by Dieci

\footnote{Of course, we also discussed variants of the fourth intervention strategy to see if the dynamics of the housing market can be calmed. For instance, we looked not only at the price trend of the last two consecutive periods, but took larger lags into account. But these studies do not lead to any other result either.}
and Westerhoff (2016) explains such oscillations via the interplay between speculative and real forces. In particular, they show that the expectation formation behavior of bounded rational and heterogeneous investors is a crucial factor for the emergence of intricate housing market dynamics. However, the supply side of the housing market, namely price-dependent housing construction in the private sector and the slow depreciation of the existing stock of houses, further complicates these dynamics. Together, these forces can initiate lasting periods of overvaluation and overbuilding, including a mismatch between the fluctuations and turning points of house prices and the housing stock, as is the case in real markets.

Since their model is able to mimic the behavior of actual housing markets quite well, it seems ideal for use as a workhorse to explore the effectiveness of a number of stabilization policies. Overall, our analysis reveals that plausible and well-intended public housing construction programs fail to tame housing markets. While these programs may reduce average house prices, they do not bring house prices much closer towards their fundamental values. By lowering house prices, public housing construction also crowds out private housing construction, an aspect that most economists would probably regard as undesirable. The main reason for the apparent failure of public housing construction programs has to do with the long-lived durability of the housing stock. During a housing market bubble, private housing construction may create a lasting and substantial overbuilding process. Public housing construction programs that seek to counter a housing market boom amplify the overbuilding process, and thus are at least partially responsible for the consequent housing market bust. Compared to many other intervention policies, say countercyclical governmental expenditure, the effects of public housing construction programs on the existing stock of houses cannot easily be reversed, except if the demolition of houses is considered, which may be quite costly and politically unfeasible.

We conclude our paper by illustrating two sets of extensions of our work. A first possible set of extensions concerns the underlying housing market model in which investors switch between extrapolative and regressive expectation rules with respect to current market circumstances. A question requiring investigation is whether the simple public housing construction programs we discuss in our paper may appear in a more (or even less) favorable light if investors rely on alternative expectation rules and/or switch-
ing motives. For instance, one may study the effects of these programs in a setup in which investors explicitly extrapolate past price changes and/or select expectation rules according to their past performance. Relatedly, one may assume that private housing constructors are able to learn, e.g. by forming expectations that are more sophisticated than those assumed in Dieci and Westerhoff (2016). Although we carried out a number of robustness checks, a second possible set of extensions may consider policymakers applying more complicated intervention policies, depending, for instance, on the housing market’s price-rent level or other early warning indicators that may signal the possibility of the onset of a new housing market bubble. To sum up, research in this area, despite its obvious relevance, is surprisingly scant so far. We hope that our paper stimulates more work in this important direction.
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