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Perishable state-making: Vegetable trade between self-governance and ethnic entitlement in Jigjiga, Ethiopia

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**PERISHABLE STATE-MAKING: VEGETABLE TRADE
BETWEEN SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ETHNIC
ENTITLEMENT IN JIGJIGA, ETHIOPIA**

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ABSTRACT

This working paper, based on a study of the vegetable trade in Jigjiga, the capital of Ethiopia's Somali region, argues that in the absence of the state a market can be self-governing with norms being established through long years of practice and interaction. Wholesalers located in Jigjiga hold the legitimate governing authority in this self-governing trade that comes with bearing most of the risk. The vegetable trade encompasses a range of actors that includes agents at sites of production, transporters, wholesalers and retailers of various scales. The state makes only minimal interventions in this trade. My findings indicate that state effects of trade are contingent on the nature of the commodity in question. Durability versus perishability of (agricultural) produce as well as its monetary value invite different degrees of state intervention. A range of practical norms guide vegetable trading. Some are borne out of the instrumental role of ethnicity in Ethiopia's and, more importantly, in Somali region's economic and political landscapes, with others are governed by the material conditions of vegetables. The pattern of accumulation indicates ethnic stratification. Oromo women from adjacent highlands and widowed Somali women dominate the lowest rungs of the ladder. Retailers, mainly using trust-based exchange with wholesalers, come from Amhara, Oromo and Somali backgrounds. As one ascends the capital ladder in local vegetable trading, particularly among wholesalers, the Somalis dominate. This paper thus argues that vegetable trade's state effects are impacted by the material conditions imposed by the commodity, and have differentiated consequences following the role ethnicity plays in Ethiopia's politics of entitlement.

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia's Somali region is among the 'last frontiers' to be brought under the effective governance of the Ethiopian state (Markakis 2011). Its history since incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire at the close of the 19th century has been dominated by (state) violence and lack of proper state governance (Samatar 2004; Hagmann 2014). The ethnolinguistic federalisation of the country and the creation of a separate and 'autonomous' regional state in 1991 did not change this pattern. Indeed what relatively scant literature does exist on the region has focused on this troubled political reality (see Samatar 2004; Hagmann 2005; 2014; Abdiwasa 2015). The Somali region features among those territories where the Ethiopian state's 'empirical statehood' (Jackson 1990) is severely restricted and qualifies as an 'area of limited statehood', characterised by 'lack [of] capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force' (Risse 2011: 2). If we imagine a continuum with consolidated states at one end and areas of limited statehood at the other, of all Ethiopia's regions, the Somali region would be at the furthest extreme. Relying on the non-normative position that the concept of limited statehood offers and understanding that such features can be permanent, i.e. that processes of statebuilding do not eliminate them (Risse 2011), this working paper aims to examine governance of a particular economic sector, the vegetable trade, in an urban setting in the Somali region. In addition, the paper looks into the state effects of this trade.

It is worth pausing here to justify the choice of the vegetable trade, despite the fact that pastoralism and thus livestock trade dominates the region (Devereux 2006; Yacob & Catley 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Eid 2014). Moreover, the formal and informal export trade is dominated by *Khat* (*Catha edulis*, a mild stimulant widely used in this part of Ethiopia and in other Somali territories in the Horn of Africa), while clothes, electronics and processed foodstuffs dominate the import trade (Habtamu et al. 2014).¹ The following five factors explain this decision. First, a focus on livestock or *Khat* trade would bypass important economic activities in the urban areas. Vegetable consumption is mainly an urban phenomenon, and while the rate of consumption in Ethiopia is among the lowest in the world, even by African standards (Wiersinga & de Jager 2009), vegetables are becoming a necessity in the urban diet where consumption is going up as incomes increase. The 'explosion' of Jigjiga's population over the past decade (Emmenegger 2013; Zerihun 2013) makes it worth investigating how vegetable trading is governed.² Second, except for a few mid-altitude and irrigable riverine areas, the region's climate and agroecology is better suited for pastoralism. This makes Jigjiga's residents depend on producers (and agents) located 'deeper' into Ethiopia, which gives rise to a need for governance of transportation and trade in vegetables. Third, if considered as a category, horticulture (fruit and vegetables) ranks among Ethiopia's top foreign currency earners, particularly towards neighbouring states with significant Somali territories in the Horn of Africa.³ In fact, based on National Bank of Ethiopia figures for export to neighbouring countries with Somali territories (Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya) during 1998–2014 fruit and vegetables contributed to 66.65% of earnings, while live animals contributed 25.56% and *Khat* only

6.28%. Of the total earnings, most came from Somalia (90.21%), and the remainder from Djibouti (9.56%) and Kenya (0.23%) (Habtamu et al. 2014).⁴ Fourth, unlike the trade in *Khat* or livestock, the vegetable trade centre in Jigjiga, *Kudra Terra*,⁵ is faced with a sanitation problem due to the high level of organic waste produced and the concentration of the town's market in a limited area. This calls for a particular mode of urban governance. Fifth, while the cross-border livestock trade relies on clan networks and social capital (Majid 2010; Pavanello 2010), non-Somali traders dominate the vegetable trade in Jigjiga. As these traders operate within a politicised social environment fostered by the ethnolinguistic federalisation of the country, I assumed that the vegetable trade would have characteristics that are different from livestock or other forms of contraband trade in the region.

This working paper draws upon the framework developed by Hagmann and Stepputat (2016) and relies on an inductive exploratory strategy, building on emerging anthropological approaches and political sociology (Migdal & Schlichte 2005; Olivier de Sardan 2008). The analytical framework relies on three concepts: agents of regulation, practical norms and patterns of accumulation (see Hagmann & Stepputat 2016). The aim of this paper is to examine everyday practices in the governance of the vegetable trade in *Kudra Terra* (and beyond), and to analyse the possible 'state effects' that result from vegetable trading (Mitchell 1999).⁶

Empirically, the working paper is informed by three weeks of intensive fieldwork in Jigjiga carried out in July, 2017 and a review of the available literature. I conducted interviews with 14 key informants: seven experts from the region's various state bureaus, namely Trade and Investment (#3), Revenue (#2), Agriculture (#1) and Finance and Economic Development (#1) and with seven vegetable traders. Two focus group discussions were also conducted: one with three traders and the second with five men working as drivers and *Hamals*.⁷ This work also benefitted from data available from the Jigjiga branch of the Ethiopia Customs and Revenue Authority (ERCA), online data available from the International Trade Centre, and various reports and documents gathered from the relevant bureaus.

The paper consists of seven sections, including this introduction. Based on the available secondary literature, section two gives a brief history of Jigjiga town, focusing on its political history and interaction between Somalis and 'Habeshi', the generic term used to label other Ethiopians. Section three highlights the importance of the vegetable trade along the cross-border corridor that links Jigjiga to Hargeisa and the port of Berbera in Somaliland, the specificities of the trade as it relates to the materialities of vegetables, and the implications of this for governance. Section four explains the actors involved in regulating the vegetable trade in *Kudra Terra*. Section five presents the practical norms governing the trade, while section six focuses on patterns of accumulation, suggesting a stratification of the traders and their strategies of accumulation. The last section concludes with a focus on the state effects of the vegetable trade.

STATE-SOCIETY AND SOMALI-HABESHI INTERACTIONS (1890s–2010s)⁸

Markakis (2011: 53) describes Jijiga zone as ‘an elevated corridor’ linking Shinille (formerly Siti) zone located in the Great Rift Valley in the north of the region with the plain to the east. The zone’s elevation gently drops from about 1,600 metres above sea level close to Oromia to only 500 metres as one gets closer to the border with Somaliland.⁹ The rainfall in the higher altitude areas is about 600 mm annually, which makes rainfed agriculture possible, unlike in other parts of the region where pastoralism and agro-pastoralism reign.¹⁰ In addition, the Jijiga plain is served by two seasonal rivers, the Jerer and the Fafen (Markakis 2011: 54–55). This ‘quality’ of the plains made them attractive to the Ethiopian imperial forces. Thus Jijiga became one of the few garrison posts where the soldiery settled and others started farming.¹¹ From these garrisons, pacification and ‘tax collection’ campaigns were launched deep into the Ogaden (Tibebe 1994; 2014). Due to the resistance by Somali clans, it was not until 1891 that Jijiga was established as an administrative centre (Tibebe 2014). Trade and the prospect of the sale of land are credited as factors that attracted settlers to the town (ibid).

The emperors recognised Jijiga’s trade potential and assigned merchants to serve as governors (Markakis 2011: 141). For Tibebe (1994: 73) this move, as well as the knowledge of the Somali cultural milieu that these merchant-cum-governors commanded, explains Jijiga’s ‘transform[ation] from a mere garrison post to a very important market centre in the Ogaden.’¹² Tibebe (2014) further makes the case that, given its weak integration into the feudal system and location along the route to the Indian Ocean, Teferi took the town with the intention of experimenting with new forms of administration, including by Tekle Hawariyat (1917–1920). Tibebe (2014: 25) concludes that:

It would not be an exaggeration to say that if Abdella Taha gave the first impulse of urban life to Jijiga, then it was Tekle Hawariyat who kept the momentum going. Abdella Taha's Jijiga still bore traces of its garrison-like background. With the bureaucracy and urban design that Tekle Hawariyat introduced, Jijiga shed its garrison-like features and assumed a genuinely urban character. Under Tekle Hawariyat, Jijiga was unrivalled as a leading center of modern civilian administration in the entire region of Hararaghe. Jijiga is one of the few towns in Ethiopia whose pattern of growth was planned at an early stage of its evolution.

The rough 100 km Harar–Jijiga road constructed in 1932 is an indication of the attention paid to trade in the area.¹³ Markakis (2011: 102) seems to be of the opinion that the control of Jijiga and the establishment of a fort at Karamara in 1891 was a move to control trade from Berbera and Zeila ports. He stresses that the ‘immediate goal’ of controlling Jijiga ‘was to control the caravan trade that linked the Harar region with the Red Sea’ (ibid). Even in the pre-conquest period and given the proximity of the coast, trade appears to have been the second most important economic activity after pastoralism (Zerihun 2013). Moreover, the Bartire Somali clan used to tax the trade through their territory (Burton 1856, cited in Markakis 2011: 102). Given its more hospitable climate and proximity to Harar, Jijiga and its environs was affected to a greater extent by imperial policies of land alienation and conquest (Tibebe 1994). The relationship between the Ethiopian state and its Somali citizens has been characterised by mutual mistrust and violence for the greater part of the period since incorporation. The permanence of settlements in Jijiga made interaction and relationships stronger, while Ethiopian state officials, at least during

imperial times, only ventured into the lowlands for periodic pacification and taxation campaigns, which often ended up in pillage.¹⁴ Jigjiga's population size has been increasing ever since its foundation while the town's ethnic composition has shifted according to the shifting political context. The very first significant Habeshi migration to and settlement in Jigjiga came from nearby garrison centres (Gursum, Qocher) and Harar. It was not until the end of the 1890s, as the resistance from local Somali clans waned, that settlers started arriving from other parts of the country (Zerihun 2013). In the 1910s most of the town's residents were Somali, as the Habeshi residents were largely the soldiers who were limited in numbers and had to spend time deeper in the Ogaden engaged in pacification campaigns. Following the end of Lij Iyasu's short-lived attempt to take power (1913-1916) and the subsequent tension in Jigjiga, most of the town's Somali residents abandoned it and only about 230 Amhara residents remained, mostly soldiers.¹⁵ In the next decades, the Somali population increased and became the majority (Zerihun 2013).

The rate of growth of the town's Somali population gained momentum after the Italian and British occupation in 1930s and 1940s. The scarce available data shows a more steady population growth from the late 1950s (Tibebe 2014: 67). A census conducted in 1966 as an input for a Master Plan that was prepared at the time found the town's population to be 16,000 with 60% of these being Muslims (Tibebe 2014: 68). The 1984 census put the town's population at 24,716, with more than a third (36.4%) being ethnic Amhara and less than a quarter (24%) Somali. Here again we see the town's Somali population declining, at least in relative terms, due to the violence and military engagements of the 1970s and early 1980s. On top of the loss of life, the misery and the destruction, the 1977/78 Ogaden War, caused displacement of, first, the Habeshi who left the town when Syad Barre's troops took control of Eastern Hararghe, and later the Somalis when the Ethiopian troops, with Cuban and Russian support, retook the town. Until 1991 Somalis were viewed as spies and sympathisers of the Somalia government and as such were not welcomed. Estimates put those fleeing the war at 85,000 and those fleeing the following counter-insurgency at 800,000 (van Brabant 1994). In the 1990s this trend was reversed as the creation of a self-governing Somali region in Ethiopia coincided with the influx of refugees from the civil war and state collapse in neighbouring Somalia (ibid).

In 1994 the town's population had tripled from what it was a decade earlier, reaching 65,765, and the 2007 Population and Housing Census found the town's population to be 125,876, with 57.2% Somali, 21.9% Amhara, 13.7% Oromo and 3.9% Gurage (Zerihun 2013: 2-3). A combination of state collapse in Somalia, which triggered 'return' of Somalis to Jigjiga in the early 1990s, and the relatively peaceful status of the town since then, has contributed to this absolute and relative increase in the proportion of the town's Somali residents. Thus, throughout its history major political-historical events have had an impact on Jigjiga's ethnic composition, and the relations between the two population groups.

Land and religion were at the centre of interactions between the Imperial state and the Somalis in the Jigjiga plains. Practising Islam was not encouraged, and both urban and rural land in the Jigjiga plains was owned predominantly by the Habeshi. Somali property rights were not recognised or were easily revocable to benefit a state representative or any Habeshi. This, among other factors, led the Italian occupiers to distribute land back to the Somalis and to encourage the free practice of Islam (Markakis 2011; Tibebe 2014). The imperial mode of governance and the difficulty of imperial reform, even after the Italian occupation (1935-1936), meant that state-Somali relations remained conflictive during most of the imperial period (Markakis 2011).

Despite its promise, the federal restructuring of the Ethiopian state and the establishment of a Somali region in 1993 did not resolve troubled state–society relations. Political turmoil and insecurity have continued to be hallmarks of the region for most of the past quarter of a century. Initially, elected Somali representatives chose Dire Dawa as the capital of the regional state. When the federal government vetoed this due to concerns over Oromia’s interest in the city,¹⁶ the assembly chose to have the capital in Godey, deep inside Ogaden territory. In all this, Jigjiga was not even on the shortlist (Markakis 2011: 309). It was only after pressure from non-Ogadeni clans, threats from the federal government, and a change of regional leadership that Jigjiga claimed its place as capital of the region in March 1996 (Markakis 2011: 311–313).

Led by security considerations, the influence of the federal government in the region’s neo-patrimonial and clan politics has been huge (Hagmann 2005). Rapid turnover of administrations, the activities of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), particularly the 2007 attack on a Chinese oilfield in Abole some 120 km from Jigjiga, and the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts and later *al-Shabaab* in neighbouring Somalia negatively affected stability, development and peace in the region. Security considerations outweighed socio-economic ones to the detriment of the Somali population for most of the post-1991 period (Hagmann 2014). The relative stability and better functioning of Somaliland’s government and economy in this period led to strengthened ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland, in particular around the development of the corridor to Berbera port.

A number of factors bred mistrust and cautious relations between the Habeshi and the Ethiopian-Somali. According to Zerihun (2013: 160), ‘the conflict between Amhara and Somali people of Jigjiga was sowed by [Italian and British] colonial powers (from 1890s to 1940s); watered by pan-Somali nationalistic and political groups (from 1950s to 1960s); grown by Ethiopian governments (from 1960s to 1970s); and finally reaped by the local people of Somali and Amhara settlers to the present day.’ But one can also consider the ‘seeds’ of the conflict to lie in the representational role the ‘Amhara’ played. The ‘Amhara’ came mainly as soldiers or were attracted by land gifts at the end of the 19th and the early 20th centuries. As such, they represented an imperial state that had perpetrated violence on the Somali population of the town and the region for the past century.¹⁷ Initially, social interactions between the ‘Amhara’ and the Somalis emerged in the garrison posts Gursum, Qocher and Jigjiga through the exchange of goods produced by Somali pastoralists for those produced by ‘Amhara’ farmers (Zerihun 2013).¹⁸ The marked difference in main livelihood strategy between the two groups increased interdependence. The ‘Amhara’ bought livestock and livestock products (except camels) from Somali pastoralists for consumption as well as sale in larger towns like Harar and Dire Dawa. Relations between the Ethiopian-Somalis and the traders were especially good, as they exchanged livestock products for ‘salt, sugar, varieties of clothes and spices, paraffin and other household products’ or for grain (Zerihun 2013: 20). A more symbiotic cultural relationship developed with the inclusion of non-Somalis in the ‘Sedqo institution’ in Jigjiga, Qocher and Gursum:

The Somali also had a system of allowing aliens to be considered as part of the whole group on a reciprocal basis. The alien was adopted as a son or a family member, enjoying whatever privileges were due to him as such. As a son, he was also expected to meet certain obligations. Based on this tradition, the *Sedqo* institution was forged between the Somali and the new settlers. The settlers, particularly those engaged in

farming, whether they lived in the town or in the countryside, successfully entered into a specific *dia-paying* group by being collectively adopted as sons of that group. (...) The symbiotic relationship thus established through the institution of *Sedqo* had a very long history in Jijiga, Gursum, and Qochar. It had really served as the most important basis upon which a deep bonding, marked by interdependence, was established between the indigenous people and the newcomers (Tibebe 2014: 43).

The Ethiopian-Somalis took 'agricultural lessons' from the Habeshi farming community. The wars of the 1960s and 1970s indirectly created a networking platform for the Habeshi and Somali by fostering a lucrative contraband trade based on Habeshi capital and the Somali's intimate knowledge of the environment and trading routes. The market for *Khat* and its trade made another positive contribution to interaction, cultural exchange and social networking between the two groups. State action was not the primary contributor to cultural exchange, rather exchanges on both sides occurred through daily interactions between ordinary individuals on the ground: the Somalis appropriated Habeshi techniques of home construction, food preparation, language and, in a few cases, religion, while the Habeshi adopted the Somali language and *Khat* chewing culture.¹⁹ This is basically in line with what Levine (2000[1974]) describes in 'Greater Ethiopia' – the amalgamation of different 'ethnic' cultures and lifestyles within the Ethiopian empire, particularly in cities. Therefore, relations between Somalis and 'Amhara' in eastern Ethiopia were not only conflictive as often declared by politicians and scholars; rather there was economic interdependence and cultural exchange. Such peaceful interactions were often interrupted by violent episodes, only to be re-established afterwards. Of particular mention is the devastating impact that the Italians and British had on ethnic partnership. They 'tacitly encouraged' discord and open fighting between the Ethiopian-Somali and the Habeshi (Tibebe 2014).

VEGETABLE EXPORT AND THE STATE IN ETHIOPIA'S SOMALI REGION

Given its geographic proximity to the Middle East and Europe, its agro-ecology and its large areas suitable for vegetable production, Ethiopia holds significant potential to develop its horticultural sector to meet the country's food and nutritional needs, as well as to generate foreign currency. This potential has not yet been effectively realised. A recent study by the Agricultural Transformation Agency (cited in MoANR 2017) concluded that there is a significant room for Ethiopia to be an active player in the global value chains of horticultural crops.²⁰ Using lessons from Brazil and Kenya, the National Horticulture Development and Marketing Strategy document identifies current trends in Ethiopian horticulture production and marketing, strategic bottlenecks, and possible solutions. At national level, over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in land under production of fruit and root crops as well as in the number of smallholders engaged in this sector. There is no consistent increase in productivity though, yet there is a significant increase in total production at national level. Data from ERCA shows that the volume of vegetables exported and revenue generated thereof is increasing too. The government values the horticultural sector because of its labour intensive nature, its contribution to food and nutrition security, and its capacity for generating foreign currency (MoANR 2017).

When it comes to the marketing side, 99.7% of the vegetables are for domestic consumption, according to data from the Central Statistical Agency and Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (cited in MoANR 2017). Import of fresh horticultural crops is on the rise, costing the country a total of US \$8.9 million in 2011/12 (for fresh and processed vegetables), increasing to US \$28.7 million five years later in 2015/16 (MoANR 2017), which 'consumes' most of the foreign currency that the sector generates. Although small compared to the domestic vegetable market, the very fact that the majority of Ethiopia's vegetable exports reach Somali territories is interesting. Firstly, some 95.5% is exported to neighbouring countries, i.e. Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, with only 3.9% and 0.6% reaching Europe and the Middle East for the five-year period 2011/12–2015/16. These three main export destinations are 'preferred markets' mainly because the vegetables for these markets only have to go through a limited process of sorting. Otherwise they are of the same quality as the vegetables traded in domestic markets. The difficulty of penetrating European high value markets reflects serious market failures, ranging from logistics and infrastructure to bio-safety controls and low quality of produce, which eliminate any competitive edge. The sector also faces a persistently high post-harvest loss, ranging between a quarter and two-fifths, depending on the type of vegetable (MoANR 2017).

According to data from the International Trade Centre,²¹ as shown in table 1, at least as far as official statistics can be trusted in this part of the world, vegetables export revenue has reached around US \$200 million every year since 2010. What is more interesting is that vegetable exports to Somalia have generated more than three times the revenue generated by livestock exports since 2008. However, this partly reflects the fact that a significant proportion of the livestock reared in Ethiopia's Somali Region is sold informally across the border, bypassing regulation and taxation by Ethiopian authorities (Eid 2014).

Table 1: Export and import relationships between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the world (in US\$)

1.1 Ethiopian exports to Somalia									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
All products	76,916	134,713	224,122	243,311	256,093	319,844	330,363	303,581	271,215
Live animals	3,706	10,717	30,458	45,319	48,752	72,017	66,385	68,489	39,717
Edible vegetables (incl. roots & tubers)	49,323	123,761	192,425	194,901	206,245	244,039	256,630	226,572	224,972
Change in edible vegetables (%)		150.92	55.48	1.29	5.82	18.32	5.16	-11.7	-0.71
Vegetable prop to total (%)	64.13	91.87	85.86	80.10	80.54	76.3	77.68	74.63	82.95
Live animal prop to vegetable (%)	7.51	8.66	15.83	23.25	23.64	29.51	25.87	30.23	17.65
1.2 Somalia imports from the world									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
All products	948,401	810,647	918,816	1,196,332	2,163,013	2,488,842	2,332,192	2,340,888	1,977,920
Live animals	3,786	10,863	30,458	46,372	49,057	72,023	66,867	69,302	39,733
Edible vegetables (incl. roots & tubers)	77,533	126,470	209,514	208,669	217,367	246,394	265,330	234,375	236,226
% vegetable from Ethiopia	63.62	97.86	91.84	93.40	94.88	99.04	96.72	96.67	95.24
% live animal from Ethiopia	97.89	98.66	100	97.73	99.38	99.99	99.28	98.83	99.96
1.3 Ethiopian exports to the world									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
All products	1,601,835	1,618,166	2,329,793	2,614,892	2,741,298	2,591,042	2,977,916	2,697,080	2,615,931
Live animals	46425	62032	132424	190357	179414	180,761	169,281	160,447	90,743
Edible vegetables (incl. roots & tubers)	223747	294025	408822	416667	481694	540,112	566,364	496,282	526,952
% vegetable to Somalia	22.044	42.092	47.068	46.776	42.817	45.18	45.31	45.65	42.69
% live animal to Somalia	7.98	17.28	23	23.81	27.17	39.84	39.22	42.69	43.77

Source: ITC (various years), own computation

Similarly, table 1 also indicates that more than 97% of Somalia's live animal imports were from Ethiopia after 2001. Vegetable imports from Ethiopia gained significance after 2008. From 2009 on Somalia received more than 90% of its imports from Ethiopia. On the other hand, we see that in 2009 and thereafter more than 40% of Ethiopia's vegetable exports reached Somalia and, starting from a very small base, live animal exports from Ethiopia to Somalia reached a similar level only after 2013. This tells us that while there is a significant interdependence, Somalia is more reliant on Ethiopia in terms of vegetable (and live animal) trade. We should note here that the available literature considers the vegetable trade in the Somali territories only tangentially (Hagmann & Khalif 2005; Devereux 2006; Life and Peace Institute 2015), even though the significant majority of Ethiopia's exports transit through these territories with the implications that entails for state formation in the Somali territories.

Table 2 further zooms in on the Harar–Jigjiga–Tog’Wajaale trade corridor, which forms part of the Berbera corridor. Again, the contribution of vegetable exports shows a persistent increase over the past decade, from generating only US \$604,000 in 2008/09 to more than US \$41 million in 2016/17. In addition to this, the contribution of vegetable exports to Ethiopia’s total formal export earnings from the corridor also spikes: from less than 0.5% in 2008/09 to more than 15% in 2016/17. From the three (groups of) primary export commodities, i.e. *Khat*, livestock and vegetables, it appears that the contribution of livestock does not show a consistent trend, but that of *Khat*, although the single most important source of export earnings for the corridor, was declining relative to vegetable exports.

Table 2: Export earnings (US\$) at Jigjiga branch of ERCA from *Khat*, livestock and vegetables

Fiscal year	Total formal exports	<i>Khat</i> sub-total	Livestock & livestock products sub-total	Vegetable sub-total
2008/09	88,976,933.41	84,376,315 (94.83%)	4,600,618.41 (5.17%)	no information
2009/10	160,056,711.21	142,579,745 (89.08%)	16,805,229.12 (10.50%)	604,018.84 (0.38%)
2010/11	206,916,644.14	162,696,105 (78.28%)	35,764,061.29 (17.28%)	8,217,480.79 (3.97%)
2011/12	234,305,509	168,779,560 (72.03%)	49,146,988 (20.98%)	15,761,495 (6.73%)
2012/13	262,954,162.39	196,474,975 (74.72%)	46,197,127.40 (17.57%)	19,100,822.26 (7.26%)
2013/14	325,088,715.61	215,725,885 (66.36%)	85,169,715.65 (26.20%)	21,931,256.31 (6.75%)
2014/15	260,730,029	205,176,950 (78.69%)	28,243,001 (10.83%)	24,476,492 (9.39%)
2015/16	277,435,561.53	195,539,725 (70.48%)	50,891,612.33 (18.34%)	28,739,975.82 (10.36%)
2016/17	266,672,347.84	204,210,145 (76.58%)	17,622,484.96 (6.61%)	41,659,430.18 (15.62%)

Source: Annual reports, Jigjiga branch of ERCA

Khat has a higher value than vegetables in relation to weight and volume and it requires fewer vehicles to transport a certain volume than for vegetables of comparable value. This implies that for a similar level of foreign currency generation, vegetables require a more intense traffic than *Khat*. On the one hand, and despite its lower value, vegetable transport calls for more state attention and governance. On the other hand, the ‘return’, in terms of revenue, on the governance that the state ‘invests’ in low value commodities is low compared to a similar levels of governance of a high-value commodity. This leads state agents to focus on governing commodities of higher value, which offer higher chances of increasing state revenue both from taxation of the formal trade and control over the illegal trade. In addition, the chance of generating bribes is also higher. This explains the higher attention that government agents pay to governing and controlling the *Khat* trade compared to the vegetable trade.²²

The higher profit margin for trade in *Khat* vis-à-vis vegetables has implications for the vertical integration of the market. Speed and extent of accumulation from the vegetable trade, thus, is much lower than for *Khat*. In comparative terms, the capital costs and threshold for entering the market are lower in the vegetable trade, but control of the market is less rewarding. This leads to creation of an oligarchic market structure in the *Khat* trade, with fewer but wealthier traders compared to vegetables.²³ Moreover, as I will show below, when vegetable traders ascend the accumulation ladder²⁴ they diversify into other sectors, rather than re-investing and controlling a greater share of the vegetable market.²⁵

Differences in market structure for certain commodities (oligopoly or not) in turn translate into differentiated state effects. While the *Khat* trade involves fewer and much wealthier traders dealing with ‘more senior’ state officials, the petty trade in vegetables does not attract the attention of senior politicians and state representatives. Compared to vegetable traders, *Khat* traders have more elbow room for facilitating trade by bribing higher levels of government.²⁶

Vegetable trade is the quintessential petty trade conducted with little state involvement across Africa (Robertson 1997; Clark 2014). The lower unit value of vegetables and their bulky nature also have implications for informal trade: it reduces the ‘attractiveness’ of engaging in the trade given the trouble of evading state authorities. This is a partial explanation for the low contribution of vegetables to the total value of contraband seized by ERCA authorities in Jigjiga.²⁷ As table 3 demonstrates, the share of vegetables to the total value of seized contraband by Ethiopian customs officials in the corridor is very low, particularly when compared to the share of vegetables in formal trade (see table 2).

Table 3: Importance of vegetable in outgoing contraband (in ETB)²⁸

	Fiscal Year				
	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Total outgoing contraband	8,194,000	6,820,390.36	86,424,848.4	7,559,358	11,363,333
Vegetables	2,458.2	318,512.23	1,071,668.12	200,323	10,227
Share of vegetables (%)	0.03	4.67	1.24	2.65	0.09

Source: Annual reports, Jigjiga branch of ERCA

In addition to the inhibiting qualities of the petty nature of the trade, the fact that vegetables constitute basic ingredients of daily consumption, for the poor and wealthy alike, also influences trade. If a truckload of tomatoes, onions or potatoes is captured en route to Tog’Wajaale without the proper paperwork required for export, there is a good chance that it will not be seized by the authorities, but only be ordered back to the central vegetable market in Jigjiga.²⁹

The material characteristics of the commodity influence this move by the authorities. As Hagmann and Stepputat (2016: 33) argue, the materialities of commodities shape the type of governance deployed. In contexts of contract farming and globalisation, authors have stressed that commodity-specific characteristics shape the labour regime and business structure of the market (see Little & Watts 1994; Collins 2000; Little & Dolan 2000; Guthmann 2008; Topik 2008). The perishability and bulkiness of vegetables make them less likely to be seized, stored and sold at a later point by customs officials. This is for example what happens to livestock as well as cereals and spices.³⁰ Although also perishable, the expensive and ‘luxury’ nature of *Khat* makes it attractive for traders to smuggle and for authorities to control. The materiality of vegetables also has implications for the types of vegetables that are confiscated – mainly potatoes and onions,³¹ which are less perishable than the more expensive tomatoes.

Moreover, the very basic importance of vegetables for nutrition sets limits to what state regulatory authorities can do. It would be quite immoral if they let seized vegetables go to waste while knowing too well that pastoral areas are affected by low nutritional diversity,³² an indicator of nutrition security (Villa, Barrett & Just 2011).³³ Given that most of the pastoralist diet is composed of milk and that the carbohydrates they consume come from the conversion of milk-

to-grain, it is logical that most pastoral households do not have a market advantage in converting milk-to-vegetables (i.e. as vegetables fetch significantly higher prices compared to grain). Therefore, most of the vegetable consumption in pastoral areas is limited to urban residents, Somali and non-Somali, inhabiting the towns along the trade corridors.³⁴ This is in line with the general observation of the MoANR (2017) that in recent years fruits and vegetables have become basic requirements of the urban diet in Ethiopia.

GOVERNING THE VEGETABLE MARKET IN JIGJIGA'S *KUDRA TERRA*

In addition to the spatial limitations to statehood in Ethiopia's Somali region, there are also sectoral areas of limited statehood.³⁵ Vegetables and fruit market/trading makes up one such sector where state capacity to implement and enforce regulation on behalf of the public is limited. This indeed is not the case in Somali territories only. Even at national level the horticulture value chain has been criticised for being traditional, poorly integrated and managed by 'illegal brokers who do not add any value' (MoANR 2017: 26). Furthermore, reports suggest that public authorities should improve the compilation of market information, provide support for post-harvest handling of produce, and in general be better at providing coordinated support for producers and traders (ibid). But again, the lack of recognition of the vegetable trade, the ultimate African petty trade, means that state involvement is low.

Jigjiga's central vegetable market, *Kudra Terra*, is located in the older, central part of the town.³⁶ A dense traffic of traders, customers, *Hamals*, motorised vehicles – rickshaws and Isuzu FSR trucks – and non-motorised transportation powered by draught animals on the muddy road, is the first impression one gets of *Kudra Terra*.³⁷ Although vegetables dominate the market, other commodities, particularly salt, clothing and other smaller goods, are on display alongside the roads leading to and within the market. The roadsides are covered with organic waste, including discarded low quality vegetables. Traders of the lowest rungs of the ladder have taken sections of the road on both sides as 'market spaces', while others put their commodities on wheelbarrows, which contribute to the congestion of the market area. On top of this, there is also noise coming from every quarter. The first impression of the market is thus chaos, and absence of logic and regulation. This is not the case however, as there is order, with logic, rationality and agreed-upon norms and practices beneath the apparent chaos and disarray of the everyday life of the market.³⁸

Most of the traders in *Kudra Terra* are women, especially those at the lowest capital levels, while the producers, agents and transporters are predominantly men. Men are better represented in the wholesaler category, but very rarely work as retailers. This is not unique to Jigjiga; it is true in other African countries as well (Clark 2014; Little & de Coloane 1992; Robertson 1997). Generally, as one goes up the accumulation ladder or as the value of the traded commodity increases, men are likely to oust women (Little 2013).

Traders at different levels, and in particular the wholesalers, provide order and regulation. Public authorities are largely absent from the market. They fail to provide logistical or technological support for the trade, such as a well-constructed market space, storage or transportation facilities. However, experience elsewhere shows that even when the state provides such facilities, many traders are unwilling to use the facilities for a fee as costs at the end of the day are transferred into higher prices for the same commodity.³⁹ Regional public authorities only attempt to regulate the trading in vegetables after the produce reaches the market, through license provision and control, collecting revenue, keeping prices low, and working towards having a cleaner market space by establishing a cooperative and making traders pay for the services.⁴⁰

Unlike the livestock trade, which is governed by kinship groups in each territory the livestock are trekked or trucked through (Eid 2014), there is no organised socio-political group that provides governance in the vegetable market. As the kinship group is more adapted to the pastoral production system, it does not lend regulation to vegetable production and marketing. The

prevalent social norm among pastoralists disregards this livelihood, let alone promoting and governing it. Nevertheless, the absence of any organised, central, governance does not translate into a total absence of regulation.

Figure 1: Map of the *Kudra Terra* vegetable market in Jijiga



NB: The approximate geographical perimeter of *Kudra Terra* (see red circle) is indicated relative to Bade Hotel and Mohammed Abdullah Hassan Square

In the present case study, the ‘agents of regulation’ — a ‘concept [that] encompasses all actors involved in making and breaking the rules that govern the flows of goods, people and services. ... [and] seek the capacity to define conditions of access, exchange relations, and the distribution of risk and profit’ (Hagmann & Stepputat 2016: 3) — are the vegetable traders themselves. Setting of, adherence to, and enforcement of, governance norms takes place through social interactions extending from agents in the production areas to wholesalers and retailers in Jijiga. The smaller a trader’s daily volume of vegetable sales, the less influence the trader has over the governance mechanisms that regulate the trade, making smaller traders subject to governance by norms and practices set by the wholesalers.

In effect, the vegetable market in *Kudra Terra* is self-governing, and is undergirded by practices and norms of interaction and exchange that have developed between the actors over decades. In most cases traders who have the capacity to serve as wholesalers have more than one decade of experience, through which they have moved up from the lowest market entry levels, mainly beginning as retailers and sometimes working as unpaid apprentices too. It is through these long-term interactions that governing norms and practices are established and adjusted and new operators ‘learn’ these norms and practices. As I argue here the *Kudra Terra* is mainly a self-governing market, where traders, agents, transporters and store owners have developed a complex set of norms and sanctioned practices that facilitate the market’s everyday functioning.

Although the sector is becoming more competitive, partly due to an increase in the number of traders, cooperation and self-governance are still required on the part of the traders in the *Kudra Terra*. Competition for moving up the accumulation ladder happens within a context dominated by cooperation and interdependence in terms of governing the sector as a whole.

Here one can draw a parallel between the self-governing nature of the vegetable market and what is called 'community of practice' in studies of collective learning (Barton & Tusting 2005). Wenger (1998 cited in Barton & Tusting 2005) takes 'mutual engagement', 'joint enterprise' and 'shared repertoire' as interrelated terms constituting such a community.⁴¹ Norms are established and trust and relationships built through social and economic practice. This leads to accumulation of social capital, a crucial component of petty trading (Mbisso 2011). In due course, such interactions create a common sense of identity and 'destiny', shared enterprise, and of being bound together through ties that are created by past engagements and which undergo constant de- and re-construction. To further strengthen the shared enterprise, a community of practice also produces resources, a shared repertoire 'of common resources of language, styles and routines by means of which they express their identities as members of the group' and (literal and symbolic) meanings (Barton & Tusting 2005: 2).

A complex network of interdependent and collaborative relationships constitutes this community of practice of which Jigjiga's *Kudra Terra* constitutes a major node. At one end of the trade network we find the agents in the production areas — key operators in the vegetable trade whose function is discussed below.⁴² One agent serves as many traders as he possibly can,⁴³ and his responsibility is to discuss with the vegetable trader, negotiate on her behalf with the producer, facilitate the harvest, hire a vehicle for transportation (sometimes with the help of a broker), and organise the loading. The agent assumes the responsibility of sending a good quality harvest, of ensuring that the sacks (or crates for tomatoes) are well filled, of arranging for a vehicle in good shape and with a capable driver, and of ensuring that the vegetable reaches the market very early in the morning.⁴⁴ Mistakes committed at any stage, for example a low quality harvest, filling sacks or crates below the average level, or hiring an incapable transporter, will not directly, or immediately, affect the agent. It is the wholesaler in Jigjiga who bears these financial risks, with the agent in the worst scenario agreeing to forfeit the fee he took for that job (500 Birr per truck) and promising to compensate by sending better quality and filled trucks in the future.⁴⁵ If judged intentional by the wholesalers, such failings can cause loss of trust in the agent and damage his business relations with traders in the *Kudra Terra*.⁴⁶


A vegetable trader will have at least two agents in each production area. This helps traders deal with risks of reliability and access. Not all agents are reliable at all times. Thus, having a second agent gives traders the possibility of cross checking market conditions in the production area, if they doubt the information from the first. Moreover, the social and economic position of an agent determines his access to vegetables produced in his area. Therefore, having two agents gives the trader a more assured access to the required vegetables.⁴⁷

The traders rely on the judgment of agents who, for a commission of about 500 Birr per load (about US \$20), are operating in remote locations that the traders might not know personally. One exception is the business model of the only formally recognised vegetable trader cooperative in Jigjiga that trades exclusively in tomatoes.⁴⁸ Of its 43 members, some reside in Adama and Meki in Oromia region, closer to the production area but hundreds of kilometres from Jigjiga (see figure

2), and serve their cooperative by working with an agent to send tomatoes – at least three truckloads per day – to Jijiga.⁴⁹ This is partly done to manage the higher risk of trading this more perishable kind of vegetable.

Except for this specialised cooperative, traders do not have a preference for specific vegetables. They trade mainly in larger volumes of potatoes, tomatoes and onions, and in smaller volumes of cabbage, garlic and beetroot. As vegetable production depends on the climate and soil of a given area, these traders are forced to have agents in different parts of the country. Therefore, a typical vegetable wholesaler in Jijiga will have a pair of agents in Kelafo (for onions), east Hararghe (for potatoes and cabbages) and Meki (for tomatoes). The production areas from where vegetables are sourced change with seasons and weather conditions. In times of drought, for example as in 2016 and 2017, onions have been brought from first Kelafo, then Meki, then Assela, then Ginchi (all in central Oromia), and then from Dessie and Alamata (adjacent areas of north Amhara and south Tigray), before extending westwards to Gonder and Metema, before bringing in vegetables from Sudan. In each of these shifts, traders negotiated a delicate balance with agents and transporters, while transportation and other costs increased with the distance.⁵⁰ It is unlikely that a very formalized type of trade governance would have adapted so quickly to these temporal changes.⁵¹

Figure 2: Location of major vegetable-producing areas.



Map prepared by Zeleke Kebebew on author's request.

Facilitated by agents, the vegetable transporter links the high production areas with Jijiga's *Kudra Terra*, but has limited agency in the trading network. He 'juggles' between the needs and requirements of three power centres: the owner of the vehicle, the agent, and the wholesaler in Jijiga. His role primarily lies in dealing with bribes to be paid to police officers (traffic, regional or Special Police) or customs officers, in managing the vehicle, in keeping the load safe, and in reaching the market in the shortest possible time. As such, transporters are not involved in the governance of the vegetable market *per se*. But they play a crucial role in keeping pace with the

material requirements of the vegetable and the marketing needs of the traders in Jigjiga. These tasks have become less burdensome as roads have improved, in particular with the asphaltting of the roads between Jigjiga and Harar and Jigjiga and Kelafo. This, coupled with the utilisation of newer FSR ISUZU trucks, which are faster, safer and can carry heavier loads, has facilitated vegetable trading over the past decade.⁵²

After the vegetable reaches the *Kudra Terra*, the governing role of the wholesalers becomes more pronounced, as the following description of the market routine highlights. In the early morning (4 am), the narrow roads leading to the *Kudra Terra* are lined with vehicles. Following an agreed norm of 'first come, first to unload', trucks are emptied at the 'gates' of the wholesaler's stores. If the load is shared, usually by three wholesalers, the truck unloads at the gate serving each trader's store.⁵³

After unloading, the wholesalers distribute the vegetables to the retailers. Some retailers take one or more bags of vegetables, while others take only a few kilograms at a time. The majority of retailers buy on the basis of credit. They pay no interest, but the wholesalers visit them later in the day to assess the market situation and collect the money owed.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the exchange until this point is based on trust, both regarding the quality of the vegetable and the weight. If the retailer discovers that the total weight is lower or the share of low quality unsellable vegetables is higher than expected, she will re-negotiate the terms of the trade with the wholesaler. Thus, the risk falls on the wholesalers, hence the rationale for their greater role in trade governance.⁵⁵ Contrary to trade dynamics documented by Little (2013) in Maputo, in Jigjiga there is no attempt on the part of wholesalers to determine the price retailers sell at. Vegetable retailers are autonomous actors, and they do not have an 'employee-like' relation with the wholesalers. Again unlike the experience of petty traders in Maputo (Little 2013), retailers in *Kudra Terra* have the option of being supplied by different wholesalers. It is in fact the wholesalers who compete over retailers.

Therefore, the 'self-governance' of the *Kudra Terra* market relies primarily on wholesalers who can afford to buy directly from the production areas, either by partnering up or on their own. Furthermore, wholesalers also interact with storeowners, the government (prices, tax, and sanitation), and with each other. In this complex and time-sensitive market local state officials note the number of vehicles unloaded per day, check that prices are fair and that sanitation fees are paid.⁵⁶ State representatives also intervene if disputes, particularly between the formal (i.e. licensed and tax paying) and informal traders, break out. However, such cases are often resolved in favour of the 'illegal traders' who are more likely to pay 'informal tax', i.e., bribes, and to sell at lower prices.⁵⁷

The absence of contract-based deals between producers and traders in end markets generates the need for agents. Agents do not add any value in the chain, but they are indispensable as they play a crucial role in linking the producer to the trader and saving a lot of time for the wholesaler.⁵⁸ For only 500 Birr per truck, the agent makes decisions in production areas on behalf of the trader in *Kudra Terra*. The cost of wrong decisions by agents – purchasing low quality produce or not ensuring that sacks and crates are full – is transferred to the traders, at times with devastating effects. Despite this high risk, there is no way of formalising the relationship between the trader and the agent, nor does the agent cover any risks realised by the wholesaler in Jigjiga. Rather, the trade from the very first to the very last step is trust-based, which may be attributed to the high

social capital inherent in such petty trading (Mbisso 2011). When trust in an agent is broken a wholesaler will start using another one. The incentive for the agent to remain trustworthy and truthful is the risk of losing his business when wholesalers, acting in unison, stop working with him. As such, the price of exposing the wholesaler to avoidable risks can be very high for the agent.⁵⁹

The relationship between the wholesaler and retailers is also trust-based. The retailer does not weigh the sack or crate of vegetables she buys, nor does she pay upfront or check the quality of the vegetables in the sacks and crates. It is only when she starts selling the vegetable that she might discover that the containers were not well filled, or contained low quality vegetables. The retailer, however, does not bear the financial consequences of engaging in such a trust-based exchange, as she has the option to renegotiate and seek compensation for her losses. Risk is further minimised by keeping exchanges between wholesalers and retailers within family circles. The inclination towards trading within a family can be understood as a mechanism for coping with a lack of skills and capital (Dasgupta 1990).

Moreover, wholesalers visit retailers who received credit to see how much they have sold, collect the money owed, check quality and deal with complaints (if any), and supply additional bags and crates of vegetables on credit if the retailer is running out.⁶⁰ As such, the likelihood of the trust being broken is low and the cost for the retailer of breaking the trust is very high, since no other wholesaler will work with her if she is deemed untrustworthy.⁶¹ Despite the small likelihood of trust being broken, the risks mentioned here are concentrated on wholesalers. This partly explains their central role in the governance of the otherwise self-regulated vegetable trade in eastern Ethiopia. On the other hand, wholesalers also stand to get a greater share of the final price compared to retailers and producers (Mengesha 2015)—explaining the risk they take and central role they adopt in governing the trade.

PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL NORMS IN VEGETABLE TRADING

Olivier de Sardan (2008: 18) coined the term 'practical norm', and advanced it with the recognition that:

(...) it is not analytical. It gives no specific substantive content to the phenomena it describes, nor does it define a particular interpretative model. (...) it is an *exploratory concept*. It serves simply to draw attention, in a research process, to the variety of social regulation methods and real governance patterns, without prematurely grouping them into a single model or organising them into *a priori* types.

Formal norms, both official and social, 'prescribe and legitimise, (...) and are present in rhetoric and are taught to people ...' and '*practical norms [...] are informal, because they are absent from the public discourse, absent from the official moral rhetoric and absent from the teaching*' (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 15, *emphasis in original*). While the former justify and legitimise, the latter are tactics and manoeuvres to circumvent or bypass the former if complying with the formal norms is difficult or inefficient (see Olivier de Sardan 2008). Practical norms exist in professional, public and social spheres, and are different from social norms (ibid).

Practical norms are widely visible in Jigjiga's *Kudra Terra* and along the routes linking it to production areas. Before delving into the most important practical norms, we need to look into a pervasively held formal norm, official or not, which looms large in the background of the practical norms at work in the vegetable market in Jigjiga. According to this norm the entitlements of Ethiopian-Somalis trump those of the Habeshi in regard to anything of economic or political importance.⁶² One can argue that the Ethiopian constitution, laws and policies do not officially prescribe ethnic entitlements and that such entitlements are only practical norms, as Emmenegger (2013) appears to suggest. However, if we consider the differences between formal and practical norms as summarised in the preceding paragraph, it becomes clear that ethnic entitlement, at least in the case of the Somali region, is not an operational issue employed to bypass, circumvent or manage formal norms. It is an offshoot of the official norm and practice of ethnic federalism, a legitimising and prescribing norm.

One example of this norm is property restitution in post-1991 Jigjiga. Rony Emmenegger (2013:9) focuses on the central role of Ethiopian-Somali identity in restitution claims in Jigjiga, and goes on to conclude that:

Somali identity, history and belonging have been interwoven in a 'practical norm' that has regulated and structured government officials' practices. To be precise, this practical norm is not an 'unofficial' norm, but appears as a situated structure that is produced in the negotiation of the 'official' rules and legal citizenship categories.

A similar politics of entitlement was instrumentalised when the ownership of stores changed in *Kudra Terra*, a process that played a central role in the accumulation process in this market. In the 1990s many stores changed hands from Habashis to Ethiopian-Somalis. Ethiopian-Somalis justified this with the oft-repeated claim that military officers and the 'Amhara' had taken the stores from Somali owners when the latter fled the military atrocities that followed the recapture of Jigjiga at the end of the 1977/78 Ogaden war. At times, this happened without any proper legal

documentation.⁶³ The logic appeared to be that ‘The Somali is always right in property claims’. This however does not mean that some Somali traders had no claim to these houses or stores: there are cases of property owners fleeing to Somalia in 1978, while others were victims of the 1975 ‘extra-house’ nationalisation scheme of the Derg. Those who took the small compensation money at the time forfeited the right to reclaim their houses. The bottom line is that in the 1990s the law was applied in a very lax manner to the Ethiopian-Somali, and the regional justice system and city administrators sided with the Ethiopian-Somalis, while the Habeshi had no fair recourse to contest the legality of the process. There was an extra-legal coercion under the cloak of legal procedures in the transfer of the properties to Somalis.

This is one expression of the ‘secondary citizenship’ of the Habeshi in Ethiopia’s Somali regional state, a situation ethnic federalism created across the country. As a social norm, the second citizenship of the Habeshi is articulated in various social, political and legal contexts. Practical norms, which entail the primacy of ethnic Somalis as right bearers in the Somali regional state, include the strategic inclusion of Ethiopian-Somalis in the vegetable and other trading. In the following I provide three examples.

First, as mentioned above, the only formally recognised cooperative in the *Kudra Terra* specialises in tomatoes and has 43 members of whom 11, at the time of fieldwork, are Ethiopian-Somali.⁶⁴ They all have roles to play: some reside in tomato production areas and work with agents, while others, younger and more capable men, deal with the unloading and wholesaling after trucks reach the *Kudra Terra*. This is a laborious activity, which is carried out between early morning and midday (ca. 4.00 to 11.00 am). Other members, mainly older women, work as cashiers and in the retailing of tomatoes. When needed, the cooperative also employs wage labourers. However, the Somali members are nowhere to be seen in these daily activities.⁶⁵ According to their fellow cooperative members, they play the crucial role of ‘smoothing’ and facilitating interactions with officials of the regional government and the city administration, using the most important resource they bring to the table, i.e. their Ethiopian-Somali identity.⁶⁶ One might identify a subtle division of labour here, with the physical labour being handled by non-Somalis and the ‘political’ labour of managing relations being shouldered by the Somalis.⁶⁷ Thus, we do not necessarily see the Somali cooperative members at the market site. The good business skills that Somalis are credited for elsewhere, for example in Eastleigh, Nairobi where they are transforming the local economy and integrating it into the global one despite resistance and mistrust from the Kenyan government (see Carrier & Lochery 2013), are not on display in *Kudra Terra*. This might be attributed to the high value of the traded items in Eastleigh (electronics) and is realised through the political work of smoothing.

A second example of the practical norm that derives from Somali-Ethiopians’ primary citizenship rights are the Somali ‘replacement drivers’ known as *Shefagns*. The vegetables to *Kudra Terra* start pouring in from different production areas in the early morning hours. Particularly for tomatoes and other vegetables that are brought in from central parts of the country, this entails that the transporters drive in the evening (*Katira*). Once they reach the *Kudra Terra*, they take an ‘extended nap’ before heading back to the central parts of the country with loads of the region’s livestock, onions or imported manufactured goods.⁶⁸ The hiring of a ‘replacement driver’, *Shefagn*, serves not only the purpose of allowing the ‘principal’ driver to sleep and rest. If this were the case, a driver from any ethnic background could be hired, but most ‘replacement drivers’ are ethnic Somalis. These men are able to broker and negotiate good terms on goods to be transported back

to the central parts of the country, as well as to manage dealings with the city's policemen. The intention behind hiring Somalis as drivers is to deal with the high rate and frequency of 'informal tax' in Jigjiga, as the onus of covering bribes is on vehicle drivers (i.e. the wholesaler will only reimburse documented expenses).⁶⁹

The principal drivers are left with the option of avoiding main roads, where policemen roam, or using *Shefagns*. The 'replacement' also drives the truck through the Karamara checkpoint, beyond which the regional police no longer represents a problem for the 'principal' driver. Karamara checkpoint, where the formal taxes are collected by regional customs officials, is also an inescapable post for collecting 'informal taxes'. The employment of a *Shefagn* is mainly done to evade 'informal taxes' and to deal with the dreaded interactions with Somali regional authorities. Again, this is a practical norm of the vegetable trade, aiming at circumventing the challenges that non-Somali Ethiopians encounter in the region.

A third example brings us back to the tomato cooperative's placement of some of its members as agents in the production areas. In addition to the need to manage the delicate nature of the crop, this placement also squares with an interest in accumulation on the part of these 'agents' who tend to own vegetable farms in Meki. Moreover, this practice facilitates the movement of capital to a safer political environment. It appears that Habeshi members of the cooperative have one foot in Jigjiga and the other in Adama. Given that the unstable and 'hostile' political environment in Jigjiga is not conducive for business in the longer term, many Habeshi cooperative members send their spouses and children to Adama, making frequent trips to visit them. Thus, here again, we have a practical norm aimed at dealing with the current social norms that shape business Jigjiga. Habeshi cooperative members thus diversify their financial and political risks by relocating their families, or rather by being present in multiple locations simultaneously.⁷⁰

Other practical norms are unrelated to the primary citizenship rights that Ethiopian-Somalis enjoy in their regional state. I will mention four such examples. The first relates to the material conditions of the vegetables, particularly tomatoes. Tomatoes are more perishable and require more careful handling. Transporters have to avoid heat and keep the time spent en route as short as possible. This requirement 'forces' transporters to travel at night (*Katira*) and at speeds that exceed legal limits.⁷¹ Were there logistical support for refrigerated trucks, for growing tomatoes suited for Somali region's climate, or for the enforcement of official traffic norms at night, the tomato trade would look very different. This practical norm thus has its roots in the need to cope with the state's limited ability to provide logistical support and to circumvent official traffic laws. This practical norm also comes at some cost to human life and property, as trucks carrying tomatoes are more likely to incur accidents on their way to Jigjiga.⁷²

The second example relates to *Kebele* officials – the lowest administrative level in Ethiopia – who receive their share of 'informal taxes' mainly from illegal traders on the lowest rungs of the accumulation ladder as well as the 'sell and run' traders. Traders with the necessary papers and longest experience are relatively safe from extra-legal payments to *Kebele* officials. However, *Kebele* officials frequently extract bribes from the poorest traders, who do not have papers or licensed selling spaces. But these traders are often allowed to return to the same, unlicensed selling spot. Some more experienced vegetable traders sell directly without having licenses from trucks for a commission (not paying upfront for the vegetables as wholesalers do). When the 'legal' traders complain, *Kebele* officials do pass by in the market. But these traders sell at lower

prices⁷³ and can give higher bribes.⁷⁴ Thus, officials allow sellers to continue under the small condition that these 'traders' have a rented license from one of the formal traders in the *Kudra Terra*.

The third practical norm concerns transportation, particularly ownership of trucks. After an individual enters the vegetable trade, moves up the accumulation ladder and becomes a wholesaler, there is little scope for ascending further for a variety of reasons. Thus, after passing a certain capital threshold most traders will end up buying an ISUZU truck. This not only allows them to diversify their accumulation interests, it also enables the trader to escape the challenging business and political environment created by the 'primacy of the Somali' social norm. The practical norm related to this accumulation strategy is the preference for renting trucks owned by fellow vegetable traders, further increasing interdependence.

The final example of a practical norm relates to sanitation. Compared to the situation some ten years ago, many stress that the *Kudra Terra* is currently very clean. What has changed is that the regional government established a micro-enterprise of young individuals willing to collect (vegetable) waste from the market and made licensed traders pay them a small fee of 3 Birr per day. At the time of the research the fee had increased to 5 Birr per day, and everyone agreed that the market and its roads are very clean. However, many traders complained that the established enterprises are not cleaning the market area, and that traders themselves have to dispose of the waste generated from their business – for a fee – by the trucks that collect waste from adjoining residential and office areas. Despite paying the micro-enterprise, they have to make additional 'off the books' payments to waste collectors from adjacent areas to keep the marketplace clean. This exemplifies the problem with the micro- and small enterprise sector in urban Ethiopia, i.e. they are politically protected from competition. If and when they expand, they do so because of the political support and the rents they receive from relevant authorities rather than as a result of the efficient implementation of their activities (Di Nunzio 2015).

PATTERNS OF ACCUMULATION: ECONOMIC AND ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN KUDRA TERRA

Vegetable traders in Jigjiga's *Kudra Terra* can be distinguished according to five steps on the ladder of accumulation, which to some extent also reflect ethnic identities.⁷⁵ In the wealthiest category we have Ethiopian-Somali traders, in particular one Somali woman who has been engaged in vegetable trading sector for more than four decades. Of all the vegetable traders in the *Kudra Terra*, she is the only one who owns a store. Moreover, she is the only trader who can compete in open bids with traders coming from other parts of the country to supply vegetables, for example to Jigjiga University. At the time of research, she mainly sold onions – largely from Kelafo – to the university, to the regional Teachers Training Institute and to exporters. She had diversified her accumulation strategy by buying and operating trucks and by constructing a three-storey building nearby *Kudra Terra*. Furthermore, she made active use of loans and other financial services, unlike traders in the other categories. In addition to owning farms, she also engaged in contract farming with farmers in Kelafo.⁷⁶

The second category is very broad, but the chief characteristic of this group of wholesalers is their capacity to have vegetables supplied from producer areas directly. They do not own stores in *Kudra Terra*, but rent space from (mainly Ethiopian-Somali) owners. The rent depends on how much they sell in a particular month as the owner estimates the volume the traders put on the market on a daily basis. They share a store with three or more traders of a similar category or with retailers with whom they usually have close trade and family relations.⁷⁷ Traders in this category pass the vegetables on to retailers who operate with smaller profit margins, in addition to selling the produce directly to consumers. Unlike the retailers, however, individuals in this second category also sell to some government institutions (hospitals, prisons, the Special Police camp, etc.), hotels and NGOs. They also used to supply exporters, but lost this opportunity when exporters started buying directly from production areas.

Traders in this second category are the 'nerve centre' of the *Kudra Terra*. At one extreme, we find wholesalers who do not have enough capital to buy a full truckload of a vegetable but share with other traders. They have the capacity to do so only two or three times a week. At the other extreme, we have traders who can afford to bring in one or more truckloads of vegetables daily. These traders have accumulated well and usually diversified into buying and operating their own trucks or renting them out when they do not need them. To a trader at this end of the continuum the ownership of a truck(s) can be a more assured way of accumulating. Although Habeshi (Amhara, Gurage and Oromo) dominate the wholesaler category as a whole, the proportion of Somali traders increases towards the wealthier end of the continuum.⁷⁸ These traders have spent years in the vegetable trade and have accumulated enough, often with covert or overt political assistance.⁷⁹ In this second category of vegetable wholesalers and traders we also find the particular case of the above mentioned 'official' cooperative that specializes in tomato marketing. The members established the cooperative after feeling exploited by a Somali woman, who had recruited them for a commission, although they had their licenses and had been engaged in the sector for many years.⁸⁰ Some left the cooperative, as they received no special support and because working independently gave them more freedom. The main comparative advantage of membership in the cooperative appears to be the sharing of risk. Many members have trucks, which they rent out to the cooperative, while the members who are posted in the tomato-producing areas probably have farms there. Furthermore, many members of the cooperative,

especially the men, have relocated their families to Adama, a large city equidistant to both Addis Ababa and tomato-producing areas.⁸¹

Below the wholesalers we have a third category, the retailers. They buy their vegetables on credit, sometimes in cash, from the wholesalers, with whom they share strong social bonds, sometimes being close relatives. Most share a store with wholesalers or other retailers, using the wide, open spaces in front of the store as selling space. These retailers can be new entrants to the sector. However, they usually have some years of experience of working as (un)paid labourers for wholesalers, or as assistants to wholesalers who are their friends, neighbours or family. In this period the new entrants go through a form of apprenticeship, learning the vegetable trade and the norms governing it. Retailers do not hire any help, and do everything themselves. With good skills and a good social network, they can become wholesalers after some time. In recent years, the time they needed to accumulate sufficiently to become wholesalers has been reduced as the turnover and scale of the trade has increased significantly.⁸²

Traders in the fourth category share many of the characteristics possessed by retailers in the third category, but unlike them, they operate illegally, i.e. without licenses or proper selling space. They sell produce on the roadside or from wheelbarrows in the general market area. The sales volume is much smaller than the retailers' and they usually continue to operate in 'off-peak hours' of the market, for example in late afternoons. Moreover, they have their own ways of acquiring the vegetables they sell. They rarely engage in credit-based purchasing as their social capital is very low and cash purchase very small amounts from wholesalers. Wholesalers and retailers accuse them of stealing from their displays for consumers, and of selling discarded or low-quality vegetables. They sell at low prices and their customers are poorer households. These traders have a troubled relation with formal *Kebele* authorities as they are often 'hunted' for conducting business illegally, only to be freed after paying small bribes. Poor Oromo, or sometimes Ethiopian-Somali, women dominate this forth category of vegetable traders. They find it easy to enter the trade, but difficult to climb the ladder. These traders easily enter and leave the market, depending on their economic/social circumstances.⁸³ Following the 'cleansing' of the Oromo in Somali region and Jigjiga in late 2017 in the wake of Oromo-Somali ethno-political tensions, Oromo traders in this category have been replaced by Somali women.⁸⁴

There is a fifth category of traders who do not engage in the vegetable trade on a daily basis or as a group. These traders have experience of working for wholesalers, but eventually opt to become 'freelancers' who sell directly from trucks for a commission when they get the opportunity. In this case, an individual in the production areas rents and sends a truckload of vegetables to the eastern parts of the country. The final destination of the load might even be undecided when it leaves the production area. After making calls to contacts in major market areas, for example in Dire Dawa, Harar and Jigjiga, the individual decides where the truck will go and arranges for a commissioned individual to do the selling. The 'freelancer' will then 'rent' a license from one of the wholesalers, and sell directly from the truck. Complaints by legal traders are easily warded off with the use of the 'rented' license and a little 'pocket money' paid to *Kebele* officials. Moreover, these 'freelance traders' make the case that they are selling at a lower price and are more caring towards the population, an argument that *Kebele* officials quickly buy.⁸⁵ This is not a practice in which the freelancers engage on a daily basis, neither can their activities be seen as forming part of an accumulation process. For the commissioned agents in Jigjiga this is simply an opportunistic

trading activity, while for the senders in the production areas it may be seen as forming part of an accumulation strategy.

CONCLUSION

The vegetable trade in Jigjiga's *Kudra Terra* emerges as 'self-governing' with wholesalers taking a leading role while marketing draws upon norms developed through decades of interaction among many actors. These norms are mainly trust-based, and are influenced by the post-1991 politics of ethnic entitlement as well as by the material conditions of vegetables. Ethnicity appears to be of particular importance among the wholesalers at the higher rungs of the accumulation ladder, where one finds more Somali women. A range of practical norms (Olivier de Sardan 2008) are employed by Habeshi actors to escape these constraints, ranging from diversifying activities by buying and operating vehicles (joining the transportation sector) and spreading risk by relocating parts of the family to other areas of the country. The federal and regional governments have a minimal role in the flourishing vegetable trade in Jigjiga, characteristic of petty trading in Africa at large.

In terms of how the materiality of vegetables impacts upon state effects, the findings show that perishability and low value reduce their attractiveness for state and elite capture and an oligopolistic market. A tentative and matrix (see figure 3) attempts to summarise the state effects of a range of agricultural commodities, proposing a causal relation between the value and durability of a particular commodity on the one hand, and state intervention, capture and attention of and to that commodity on the other hand. The four variants that emerge are thus: low value/high perishability (petty trading in vegetables); low value/high durability (grains); high value/high perishability (*Khat*); and high value/high durability (livestock).

Figure 3: Perishability–value matrix as explanation for different levels of state regulation

		Perishability	
		Perishable	Durable
Value	Low	Ignored by state officials e.g., vegetables petty trading	Low state attention e.g., grains
	High	State capture and regulation e.g., <i>Khat</i>	Difficult/impossible to capture e.g., livestock

Source: author

Trade in bulky perishable items that have low value for volume such as vegetables, is less rewarding for state institutions and officials that seek to regulate, control or seize. Even if bulky, a more durable and storable commodity is more 'worthy' of being regulated; state officials can seize and later sell at auction such bulky and non-perishable items (e.g. grain). On the other hand, despite its perishability, a commodity of high value for volume makes it worthwhile for state institutions and officials to tailor regulations and control. It requires greater and more specific attention to 'capture' this trade by formal and informal means because of the perishability of the commodity (the example here being *Khat*). Even if its value is high, the durability of a commodity gives economic actors the option to bypass state control and capture, which makes the state's attempt to regulate and generate revenue from cross-border trade an uphill battle (the example

here being livestock). While this matrix reflects the nexus between agricultural trading and state behaviour in Ethiopia's Somali region, it lends itself to further development and theorizing across other empirical contexts.

The 'primacy of the Somali' in trading in Jigjiga, and the dominance of Somali traders on the higher rungs of the accumulation ladder, can be attributed to the federal system. This is in line with what Little (1999) argues: that trade dynamics in a particular location depend on the particular 'historical moment', which in the case of Ethiopia translated into post-1991 ethnic federalism. The dominance of Ethiopian-Somali traders in the upper echelons of the *Kudra Terra* is a reflection of the federal arrangement. This is a reversal of roles from previous decades, when the Habeshi clearly enjoyed the support of the Ethiopian state. However, the Ethiopian-Somalis always felt that the Habeshi were on 'Somali land' and that they should behave accordingly; the difference is that the state was not supportive of this norm in the past. The Ethiopian-Somalis can now advance this claim more vocally, citing the social norm of 'Somali region for Somalis'. However, this is not repeated in all the 'emerging regions' in federal Ethiopia, as for example in Gambella where highlanders continue to dominate trade (see Dereje 2011). This is explained by the fact that Gambella is more heterogeneous ethnically, while Ethiopian-Somalis are bound by joint language, sense of 'national' identity, religion etc.

In many respects, my findings are in congruence with observed dynamics of petty vegetable trade elsewhere in Africa, where state involvement is also limited (Robertson 1997; Clark 2014). Another common characteristic is the dominance of women in such trading activities and their ousting by men when the traded commodities are more lucrative and/or when trade requires higher levels of capital (Robertson 1997; Little 1999; Clark 2014). In general men dominate in the transportation sector (Little & de Coloane 1992). The predominance of wholesaler-retailer relations within a family or within the same ethnic group can be understood as a tactic of reducing risk for both wholesalers and retailers. The wholesaler needs to reduce the risks of default payment as much as possible, while the retailer needs an ascertained regular supply of vegetables (see Little & de Coloane 1992). Therefore, be it a marriage of convenience or choice, socio-ethnic affinity often determines wholesaler-retailer relations in small-scale trading (Dasgupta 1990).

Finally, facing high (youth) unemployment and underemployment and with growth schemes that do not necessarily translate into a commensurate increase in employment, the Ethiopian government is forced to focus on self-employment opportunities through the promotion of micro- and small-enterprises (Di Nunzio 2015). Small-scale informal trading in a diverse set of commodities is on the rise, mainly in urban areas. Despite its relatively small scale, the trade activities analysed in this working paper are extremely important for household welfare of poor urbanites. Hence, due attention should be paid to the sector by both researchers and policymakers.

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ENDNOTES

¹ This was confirmed by interviews at the Jijiga branch of ERCA and by the detailed data we received from the branch for formal and informal exports and imports.

² Some words on the 'politics of naming' are necessary here. After 1991, many Ethiopian cities changed names to the locally relevant language. I have used these new names, for example Jijiga rather than Jijiga, Adama rather than Nazreth, except in cases of direct quotation.

³ Habtamu et al. (2014) and International Trade Centre (ITC). ITC figures are based on official statistics from trade partners and retrievable at (http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Product_SelCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|231|||TOTAL|||2|1|1|2|2|1|1|1|1|)

⁴ This statistic does not reflect the fact that most livestock export trading from Ethiopia to its neighbours is not documented.

⁵ *Kudra Terra* refers to a central vegetable market. Likewise, *Autobus Terra* (main long-distance bus terminal), *Beg Terra* (sheep market) and even *Atekilt Terra* (in Addis Ababa, for vegetables, *Atekelit* in Amharic) exist in Addis Ababa. The dictionary developed by the Ethiopian Languages Study and Research Center (2001: 257) defines *Terra* as 'a place where traders engaged in marketing of similar commodities congregate/are found in rows' while *Kudra* means vegetable in Oromiffa.

⁶ For detailed discussion of the conceptual and analytical foundations, see Hagmann & Stepputat (2016).

⁷ These are men engaged in the physically demanding labour of loading and unloading vehicles and assisting customers with large purchases.

⁸ In this section and throughout the paper the reference made to Somalis is only about Ethiopian Somalis.

⁹ The altitude of Jijiga district ranges from 1,000 to 2,300 metres above sea level, while the town is at 1,644 metres above sea level (Tibebe 2014: 1).

¹⁰ Irrigated and rainfed farming is also practiced in the Shebelle-Juba valley (Markakis 2011: 60). For a detailed discussion of pastoralism in the Jijiga area in the 1960s, state intervention and relations between the different clans see Cossins (1971).

¹¹ Gursum, Grawa and Qocher predated Jijiga in serving as garrison outposts for the Ethiopian imperial army. Jijiga replaced Qocher in 1891 (Tibebe, 1994).

¹² Cedric Barnes (cited in Zerihun 2013) stated that trade worth about 2,500 Maria Theresa Thaler passed through Jijiga every month in 1914.

¹³ This road was further improved into an all-weather road by the Italians, who also built a new road linking Jijiga to Mogadishu with the long-term aim of shifting the region's trade from Berbera to Mogadishu (Tibebe 2014: 36).

¹⁴ As Tibebe (1994: 83) concludes, the 'incorporation of the Ogaden was a very slow process spreading out between 1887 and 1931. The method used to bring the Ogaden under the central government was one of periodic campaigns and its continuation in later years was anachronistic. The campaigns, especially the punitive types, ended in pillage. This caused tremendous erosion of confidence and weakened the ties between the state and the local people.'

¹⁵ Tibebe (2014: 22) adds that after the turmoil the only Somalis left in Jijiga were women and children, while 'no more than thirty' Amhara resided in the town when Tekle Hawariyat arrived together with 200 followers.

¹⁶ See Asnake (2014) for a detailed presentation of the contestations over Dire Dawa by Oromia and Somali regions, and their governing parties.

¹⁷ The 'Amhara' do not necessarily have Amhara ethnic origins. In the peripheries, if one speaks Amharic, represents the state and follows Christianity it is easy to be identified as an Amhara. Most 'Amhara' in Jijiga are actually Oromo in terms of ethnic origin.

¹⁸ Most of the immigrating 'Amhara' were either farmers or traders, if they were not soldiers (Zerihun 2013).

¹⁹ According to Zerihun (2013), the Habeshi only traded in *Khat* in earlier years but later, in the 1990s, they became consumers, despite cultural and religious inhibitions.

²⁰ The potential in particular exists for bananas, oranges, mangoes, table grapes and strawberries (of fruits); potatoes (of root crops); and onions, garlic, red and green peppers, hot peppers, snow peas and beans (of vegetables) (MoANR 2017).

²¹ The figures ITC provides are calculations based on data from ERCA (<http://www.erca.gov.et/>) starting from January 2012 and the UN Comtrade Database (<https://comtrade.un.org/>) before then. For Somalia however, as it does not report its trade statistics directly to the UN Comtrade database, ITC data is based on reports by partner countries exporting to and importing from Somalia. As such, the ITC data does not necessarily provide the exact value, but is used here as an indicator for the trade dynamics and exchange between the different countries. If one considers the low level of smuggling, contraband and under-reporting of vegetable trade, for example compared to other commodities like *Khat*, the figures could be more reliable. But ERCA's recording and currency conversion and other procedural issues have their own implications on the 'exactness' of the recorded value. Moreover, compared to the data available at ERCA's website, ITC is a lot easier to access and utilise. Limitations of ITC statistics are set out on pages 103–106 of <http://www.trademap.org/Docs/TradeMap-Userguide-EN.pdf>. As can be seen by comparing figures in tables 1 and 2, trade figures on *Khat*, vegetable and livestock trade have to be understood as indicative rather than as actual reliable data. Livestock is traded more 'informally' and thus less documented in trade statistics, therefore the data for *Khat* and vegetables appear more realistic.

²² Interviews: Bureau of Trade, Revenue Bureau (of Somali Region) and Jigjiga Branch of ERCA.

²³ The *Khat* trade is oligarchic, thus a few major players take a bigger share of the market. This is reflected in the list of 'high tax payers' to the Somali region. While 9 of the 29 exporters are registered in the 'vegetable and fruit' category, only 3 are in livestock trade and 5 are in the *Khat* trade. However, *Khat* traders have a much higher trade volume than vegetable traders. Tibebe (2014: 31) mentions the trader Said Ali who, in the 1920s, had the monopoly rights to export *Khat* to Berbera, Hargeisa, Zeila and Djibouti.

²⁴ Accumulation in this trade has various levels and thresholds. Traders start from the lowest entry level requiring little knowledge and social or financial capital. Over a decade or more they may move up the ladder to become wholesalers. Within this group, even, there are various levels.

²⁵ Dasgupta (1990: 1) argues that 'petty-trading units are viable with scope for capital accumulation, albeit slow (...). Their preference [is] to expand horizontally rather than vertically'.

²⁶ Interviews with regional government officials/experts, ERCA officials and traders, give the impression that the vegetable trade is usually perceived as falling below a threshold for receiving attention from the state.

²⁷ The available data show that livestock represent the largest contribution in this category, not *Khat*.

²⁸ The majority of the outgoing contraband from Ethiopia's side is unprocessed agricultural products, unlike the processed food and manufactured products characteristic of the incoming contraband (Habtamu et al. 2014; data from ERCA, Jigjiga branch, show the same trend).

²⁹ Interview: Experts, Trade Bureau.

³⁰ Interview: Experts, Trade Bureau.

³¹ Unpublished data, value of seized items, Jigjiga branch of ERCA.

³² Interview: Experts, Trade Bureau.

³³ Even at national level, the trend in production and consumption is much lower than the recommended per capita consumption rate of 400g of fruits and vegetables per day. In 2016/17, for example, MoANR (2017) argued that production was only one third of what it should have been to feed the predicted population (4 million tons only, while it should have been 13 million tons).

³⁴ The local dietary preference for pasta and rice with onions, tomatoes (and potatoes) for the sauce translates into higher consumption and demand for these.

³⁵ 'Areas of limited statehood' could be labeled as such based on any combination of territorial, sectorial, social and temporal dimensions in the provision of collective public goods by central authorities (see Risse 2011).

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- ³⁶ The area was first established as a vegetable market in the 1960s. Municipality records reviewed by Tibebe (2014) indicate that there was only one vegetable trader of a total of 445 licensed in July 1961, and 19 out of 845 in 1966 in the town.
- ³⁷ FSR is part of ISUZU's F-series trucks exclusively used for transportation of vegetables from production areas to consumption centres.
- ³⁸ This bears great resemblance to Marchal's (2002: 61–92) description of Mogadishu's Bakaarah market.
- ³⁹ Personal Communication: Peter D. Little (14 December 2017).
- ⁴⁰ Interviews with experts at Bureau of Trade and with vegetable traders.
- ⁴¹ The concept was developed and is predominantly utilised in studies of learning, mainly in organisational settings; there is no literature applying the concept to the governance of trade.
- ⁴² In some cases, the producer himself could act as an agent for those parts of the year when harvest is available from his farm (Interview: wholesaler 1).
- ⁴³ Agents serve traders located in different high consumption centres. For example, an agent in Meki in the central parts of Oromia serves markets in Addis Ababa as well as Jigjiga.
- ⁴⁴ This is more pronounced for tomatoes, as the harvest can easily go to waste if the produce is transported during daytime or if it takes too long to bring it to market (Interview: wholesalers 5 and 6).
- ⁴⁵ Interview: wholesalers 1 and 3.
- ⁴⁶ A similar arrangement involving producers, agents, wholesalers and retailers dominates the vegetable and fruit market in other parts of the country as well (see Mengesha 2015).
- ⁴⁷ Interview: wholesaler 1.
- ⁴⁸ There are two other formally recognised cooperatives functioning in the market, one organised by *Hamals* and another forming a cleaning enterprise.
- ⁴⁹ Interview: wholesalers 4, 5 and 6.
- ⁵⁰ Interview: wholesaler 1.
- ⁵¹ Given the government's failure to support the sector (MoANR 2017) it is conceivable that it found itself unable to adapt to the temporal changes in the production areas for various vegetable crops and to keep sending produce to various consumption centres. Even if the government had a bigger role in the sector, it is only through the seamless interaction and integration with traders that a market can function. This is not the case in Ethiopia's vegetable markets though.
- ⁵² Interview, experts at the Bureau of Trade and various traders; focus group discussion with transporters.
- ⁵³ This is a kind of informal, unrecognised cooperative. The ones sharing such a load are close friends or relatives. They will opt to leave the group if they accumulate enough to work on their own. Thus, these informal cooperatives are, for the most part, consistently used to share risk and reduce post-harvest losses (Interview: wholesaler 1).
- ⁵⁴ Interview: wholesaler 1 and retailer 2. Compared to other cases of consignment (Little & de Coloane 1992), delay is not a significant challenge to wholesalers. Retailers pay what they owe the same day as they have to ensure the continued supply of vegetables. In rare cases, retailers might default due to family or other social problems. In which case the wholesaler bears the cost and hopes that the retailer will manage to pay back in the near future. If, however, failure to repay is done intentionally, the wholesalers cooperate in forcing the retailer to pay back by denying the retailer further supplies.
- ⁵⁵ Conflicts are avoided as trade relations are mainly trust-based and the high social capital accumulated through the years reduces the risk of default. Moreover, the cost of reneging on the promise made is very high for retailers. If a retailer does not pay back the wholesaler no other wholesaler will give her vegetables and continued functioning in the market becomes impossible. Therefore, wholesalers as a group hold the key to the economic survival of both retailers and agents (Interview: wholesaler 1).
- ⁵⁶ There are no strict price controls, but the regional trade bureau checks daily how many trucks of a particular vegetable arrive in *Kudra Terra*. Thus, the interest is mainly to make sure that there are no abrupt increases.
- ⁵⁷ For an explanation of the reasons, see the section on 'patterns of accumulation', the 'sell and run' traders.
- ⁵⁸ But the strategy document aims to exclude brokers from the chain and depicts them as 'rent seekers' (MoANR 2017).
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⁵⁹ Interview: wholesaler 1.

⁶⁰ Interview: wholesaler 1.

⁶¹ Interview: wholesalers 1, 5, and 6.

⁶² For a discussion on politics of ethnic entitlement in Ethiopia's ethnic federal arrangement, and in Somali regional state in particular, see Asnake (2009).

⁶³ Now the circa 50 stores are almost exclusively owned by Ethiopian-Somalis. Even when ownership happens, it remains a secret since changing ownership is prohibited. Informants: wholesalers 1, 4 and 5; retailers 1 and 2.

⁶⁴ The cooperative had 70 members in 2015.

⁶⁵ The hierarchy of Somali clans and the disdain for farming of the Ogadeni/Darood justify their limited engagement in the vegetable sector.

⁶⁶ Interview: wholesalers 2, 4 and 5; focus group discussion with vegetable traders.

⁶⁷ I thank Tobias Hagmann for this insight.

⁶⁸ It takes more than an hour to unload a truck, especially if it is shared by multiple wholesalers as the truck then has to squeeze through the narrow and congested roads of the market.

⁶⁹ This practice is familiar to all car owners and drivers. Usually car owners give their drivers money to pay these bribes, and to cover emergency expenses such as minor car repairs on their way to Jijiga (or other destinations). Despite all these irregularities, drivers want to come to Jijiga as they usually take cheaper edible stuff from Jijiga like pasta, edible oil etc. as well as electronics, like mobile phones on their way back to Addis Ababa or Adama, either for personal use or they sell these items to earn additional income. (Interview: wholesaler 1, focus group discussion with drivers and *Hamals*).

⁷⁰ This can be contrasted with the re-investment of profits made from modern commercial farming in the plains into the hotel sector (including Wabi Shebelle, later Havana, Ganat, Ogaden and Metasebia hotels, and rented houses in the 1960s and early 1970s (Tibebe 2014: 59–60).

⁷¹ Leaving Adama at 10.00/11.00 pm and reaching Jijiga at 4:00/5:00 am, covering a distance of more than 600 km. Similarly, *Khat* is transported in the evening and at high speeds, but from relatively closer production areas.

⁷² Focus group discussion with drivers and loaders/unloaders.

⁷³ This is comparable to the complaints by licensed traders against street traders for 'charging low prices and (...) not pay[ing] market fees or taxes' (Little & de Coloane 1992: 4).

⁷⁴ In his Maputo field notes Little (2013: 52) adds, 'There is no conflict in the business. But there are those that work without a proper license and run the risk of being caught by the police. When this happens they usually pay something and go away without big trouble. Many times these traders know the routes of the police and can go around them and make big money, but there is always a potential risk with this enterprise. There is obviously a potential conflict between those traders paying taxes and those that don't, but the business goes on.'

⁷⁵ This section does not include the exclusively Ethiopian-Somali exporters.

⁷⁶ Interview: wholesaler 1.

⁷⁷ Interview: wholesaler 1.

⁷⁸ In the past the vegetable trade was mainly dominated by Jarso Oromo women from the nearby highlands. The Ethiopian-Somali traders come from different clans and are predominantly women (Interview: wholesaler 5).

⁷⁹ Interview: wholesalers 1 and 3; retailer 2.

⁸⁰ Interview: wholesalers 4 and 5.

⁸¹ Interview: wholesalers 4, 5 and 6.

⁸² Interview: wholesaler 1 and retailers 1 and 2.

⁸³ Interview: wholesaler 1; additional information supplied by research assistant.

⁸⁴ Discussion (phone) with my research assistant, 4 February 2018.

⁸⁵ The 'legal' traders contend that they have to sell at higher prices because they bear the risk and responsibility if something appears to be wrong with the sold produce in the days after the sale, while the commissioned traders only care about the day of the sale.