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Legal Tender in the Euro Area

Helmut Siekmann

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1 Overview

With the increasing pressure to abolish cash and the moves to restrict its use the regulation of legal tender in the primary law of the EU has gained enhanced attention. The core provision is Article 128 TFEU which contains the rules on the issue of banknotes and coins. It is supplemented by Art. 16 Statute, treating banknotes as well with minor deviations from Article 128 TFEU. It is part of the institutional setup of the monetary authorities and their competences, objectives, tasks, and powers in Articles 127-132, 282-284 TFEU.

Para 1 of Article 128 TFEU governs the issue of euro banknotes and vests in them the status of legal tender within the Union; the only banknotes having this quality (→ para 31-35). It is part of the monetary policy, which has been conferred in total to the Union, Art. 3.1 (c) TFEU. It is the function of para 1 to transfer the competence in view of the issue of euro banknotes within the EU to the European Central Bank (ECB). Both clauses are applicable, however, only for Member States whose currency is the Euro.

Para 2 governs the issue of euro coins. The power to issue coins has remained the sole competence of the Member States (→ para 12, 25). Systematically, this clause has to be interpreted as an exception from the general rule of Article 3.1 (c) TFEU.

1 Parts of the paper are taken from Siekmann (2017a and 2017b) but all are expanded and deepened with enhanced references.
2 For the distinction see Siekmann (2016b). The primary law carefully eschews the term “mandate” which has almost universally suppressed the precise and differentiating statutory terminology.
2 Foundations

2.1 Currency, money, cash, and legal tender

The terms currency, money, cash, and legal tender have different meanings and have to be distinguished in a legal context\(^4\) even if their usage in economics or politics is much more blurred.

An official definition of the term **currency** by the Eurosystem does not exist. Here it shall be understood as the object produced by the monetary system of a sovereign entity as designed or adopted by its legal order. In a narrower sense, the monetary instruments issued by such a system, like notes and coins, are called currency as well.\(^5\) As they are not produced or backed by a (monetary) authority, and definitely not seeking it, “digital currencies” (cybercurrencies” or “cryptocurrencies”), e.g. bitcoin, ripple, Ethereum, or IOTA, are no currencies in the legal sense of the word.\(^6\) They were distinctively designed as a private, decentralized alternative aloof from any (central) authority. If they are considered to be money is a different question (→ para 6).\(^7\)


\(^5\) Kien-Meng Ly (2014), p. 589, however without clear delineation; for different definitions see Herrmann (2010a), p. 73 et seq.


\(^7\) In some respects they function like cash, see Kaplanov (2012), p. 173.
The term **money** is widely used for anything that is generally accepted as money or somewhat more specific: everything that fulfils the functions **means of payment**, **unit of account**, and **store of value**. This might be practical for economic analysis but is neither consistent with the evolution of money nor with the treatment of monetary claims in most private law codifications. Both the **origins of coins** in the 7th century B.C. and of **banknotes** in the 17th century point to the acts of sovereigns. Even the hypothesis that their **origin** is at least as much the resolution from a religious or societal obligation (guilt, wergeld, bridewealth) is now increasingly accepted. Even the “pre-coins” or “tool-coins”

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8 Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), p. 12; in favour of a merely functional view of money also from a legal perspective Simitis (1960-1961), p. 416, 427, emphasizing the characteristic of money as value in itself Simitis (1960-1961), p. 414 et seq.; in this direction also Connors/Davies (2016), p. xxi: “... two salient facts: “one, that money is not just a means of exchange but has commodity value and is of intrinsic value in itself, and, two, that money does not have to be made up of anything of value, in that accepting it has value in itself is enough for the money to be used in exchange for goods”.

9 See e.g. Mishkin (2016), p. 96-98; Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1998), p. 172 et seq. The legal system does not provide a uniform term of money, see Simitis (1960-1961), p. 408, also contradicting **Mann**, who differentiates between the abstract term of money and a concrete species of money (p. 409).

10 In-depth analysis by Grierson (1998), p. 9-11, 23: Both the medium of exchange function and the measure of value have to be judged as decisive but not the function store of value. Unless the commodities used for exchange bear a fixed relationship to a standard we would, however, still only deal with barter. He considers the standard of value function as the decisive criterion for money (p. 13, 15, 20). In China “pre-coins” of base metal were used much earlier but “round” coins evolved there probably at the same time as in Asia Minor, see Davies (2002), p. 57, 59.

11 Martin (1996); Laum (1924), p. 3 et seq.; Grierson (1978), p. 2; accepted in modern legal publications, see e.g. Herrmann (2010a), p. 11 et seq.; Omlor (2015), p. 2297 et seq.


14 Mitchel Innes (1913), p. 397 et seq., who considered coins at their origin to be mainly tokens or tallies in the hand of a creditor to prove a debt, for example of a buyer who had received a good in a sale (p. 395 et seq.; Laum (1924), p. 3 et seq.; distinctively Grierson (1978), p. 7, 12-19: “notion of value”, elaborating extensively the legal, linguistic and ethnological foundations, basically to prevent retaliation and bloodfeud or to compensate for a loss; Martin (1996),
were “state authenticated” by an inscription they wore.\textsuperscript{15} In the beginning, also bank-
notes were not generally accepted means of payment; at least not until this was ordered
by the government. They were predominantly considered an instrument to raise cheap
credit; mainly for the sovereign.\textsuperscript{16} It was also the ruler who stipulated that contributions
and taxes were discharged using papers that had been issued by the authorities, and not
only gold or silver coins.\textsuperscript{17} At this stage, monetary instruments, which were accepted by
cashiers of the state, can be denoted as money in the legal sense of the word. However,
private persons were not legally obliged to accept them. At a later stage, when they had
been given the status of legal tender, they had to be accepted for transactions among
private persons to disburse monetary claims (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} para 28 et seq.).\textsuperscript{18} Keeping this in mind,
\textit{Knapp} was right in stating that “money is a creation of the legal system”.\textsuperscript{19} This position

\begin{itemize}
\item p. 264, 270, 273, stressing the fulfilment of fiscal needs of the polis due to the lacking of “a cen-
tral authority to compel contributions or labour through the threat of force”; Davies (2002),
p. 1, 88.
\item Davies (2002), p. 57; Connors/Davies (2016), p. 58 et seq.
\item Siekmann (2016a), p. 500, 513 et seq.
\item See for Germany Siekmann (2016a), p. 503; for the United States Mitchel Innes (1913), p. 402,
who already emphasized that “money, then, is credit and nothing but credit”.
\item Siekmann (2016a), p. 506-508.
\item Knapp (1905), p. 1: “\textit{Das Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung; es ist im Laufe der Ge-
schichte in den verschiedensten Formen aufgetreten: eine Theorie des Geldes kann daher nur
rechtsgeschichtlich sein.}” [Money is a creation of the legal system; it has appeared in history in
various forms: a theory of money can therefore only be a work of legal history.]. It was, how-
ever, a now almost forgotten German law professor - at that time in Basel - who had made the
same discovery using partially the same wording decades before Knapp. For the sake of aca-
demic and historical truth, it is G. Hartmann who should be credited with the “State Theory of
Money”, Hartmann (1868), p. 4, 7, 12, 48; (critical) review by Karlowa (1869), p. 526, but agree-
ing that the recognition by the legal system is essential for the virtue of being money (at 536 et
seq.); see already before him: Ravit (1862), p. 12, but less clear.
\end{itemize}
has been challenged many times\textsuperscript{20} without convincing reasons.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, money in a legal sense of the word has to be equated with legal tender (\(\rightarrow\) para 28 et seq.).\textsuperscript{22} In this sense “digital currencies” are not money.\textsuperscript{23} Nobody is obliged to accept them and their function as unit of account and store of value is highly questionable.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Legal tender} is the formal qualification of an instrument of payment by an act of the competent sovereign which has to be accepted both by government entities and private persons to discharge monetary claims. The recent drive to inhibit its use or to curtail its function is highly questionable from a legal point of view (\(\rightarrow\) para 36-46).

The term \textbf{cash} is generally used for (domestic) banknotes and coins.\textsuperscript{25} The exact delineation is increasingly blurred by electronic substitutes; but as long as they are not issued or endorsed by a monetary authority, they cannot be judged as cash even if they are named


\textsuperscript{21} See Siekmann (2016a), p. 500-504, 508-511; ibid (2017a), p. 158 et seq. This result is also backed by numismatic research, see Grierson (1978), p. 5 et seq., 10, 19, 23: “legal status” as the “essential quality of coin”.

\textsuperscript{22} Kien-Meng Ly (2014), p. 589; Siekmann (2016a), p. 511; ibid (2017a), p. 160, with further references; most recently accepted by Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 1; disagreeing Simitis (1960-1961), p. 410, 435, 465. A different question is, however, whether the term money is compellingly tied to a tangible object, denied by ibid., p. 412, 416, 431 et seq. with the main argument that “book money” cannot be counterfeit and the risk of insolvency of the issuer of “book money” is negligible. This was before the legislation on “bail-in”.


\textsuperscript{25} Freimuth, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 128 TFEU para 5; Siekmann (2017a), p. 160.
“cash-card” or the like. As long as coins and banknotes are – the only – legal tender the terms are equivalent.

2.2 Introduction of the euro

With the beginning of the year 1999, the last, irrevocable step towards the implementation of the monetary union had been taken.26 The European Monetary Union entered its third stage and the euro became the official currency of the Union. The exchange rates of the old currencies towards the euro were irrevocably fixed and the euro was officially introduced in the eleven Member States which had been admitted to the euro.27 Until euro banknotes and euro coins were introduced, the euro was only used as “book-money” parallel with the old currencies. Euro banknotes and euro coins were actually issued on 1 January 2002.28 The Member States were allowed to use their national banknotes and coins for a transition period of six months as legal tender parallel to the new currency. Those national banknotes and coins were considered sub-entities of the euro.29 Following Art. 49 Statute, the ESCB has to guarantee that the citizen of a (new) euro area can change their old currency.30 To achieve this objective the national central banks of

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each Member State have to entertain at least one location where this is possible. But also afterwards, the national central banks could exchange national currency for the new tender “according with their laws and practices”. This is done free of charge by the Bundesbank. The introduction of the euro in non-euro Member States follows basically the same procedure as the initial changeover. A frontloading and sub-frontloading of the new legal tender outside the euro area is possible but has to be settled on a contractual basis as a loan.

2.3 Qualification of the euro

It is a mainly theoretical question whether the euro is the currency of the EU or of the combined Member States whose currency is the euro. It is true that the primary law does not use the term common currency but it demands in Art. 3.4 TEU that the “Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.” Since the economic and monetary union is not an entity by itself but an integral part of the EU (→ para 50-52), the euro has to be judged as the currency of the Union.

33 Guideline ECB/2006/9 of 14 July 2006 on certain preparations for the euro cash changeover and on frontloading and sub-frontloading of euro banknotes and coins outside the euro area, O.J. L 207/39 (2006); Guideline ECB/2008/4 of 19 June 2008 amending Guideline ECB/2006/9 on certain preparations for the euro cash changeover and on frontloading and sub-frontloading of euro banknotes and coins outside the euro area, O.J. L 176/16 (2008).
36 Hahn/Häde (2010), section 23 para 59; consenting Freimuth, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 128 TFEU para 4; Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 2, but inconsistent in differentiating between banknotes and coins.
In addition, from the evolution of Article 128 TFEU and Article 16 Statute can be derived that, in contrast to the original drafts, the euro was eventually designed as a common currency with only one institution governing it. At least since the treaty of Lisbon no doubt is possible that the ECB is an institution of the EU and not of the Member States or a separate institution by itself. The exclusive competence of the EU in monetary policy (Art. 3.1 lit. c TFEU) also speaks against the interpretation as a combination of national currencies. This is also the opinion expressed by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its decision on the Maastricht Treaty, where it clearly sees the roots of the common currency in the European Union.

2.4 Distribution of competences

The ECB has not been conferred the exclusive right to issue euro banknotes. They may and are issued by national central banks but need authorization by the ECB, Article 128.1 sentence 1 and 2 TFEU. The competence for issuing euro coins has remained with the Member States but the volume of the issue is subject to the approval of the ECB, Article 128.2 sentence 1. The difference in content and wording is telling despite Art. 282.3 sentence 2 TFEU which states: “It [the ECB] alone may authorise the issue of the euro.” This clause can only refer to banknotes. Otherwise it would overrule the considerably more detailed regulation in Art. 128 TFEU. In addition, it is only part of a more general description of tasks of the ECB. As the influence of the ECB on the issue of euro coins is

37 Article 13.1 (2) TEU.

38 Kempen, in Streinz (2012), Art. 282 AEUV para 3; Häde, in Calliess & Ruffert (2016), Art. 282 AEUV para 38; see also case C-11/00 and C-15/00 Commission vs. ECB [OLAF] (ECJ 10.7.2003) para 92, 135 et seq.

39 German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 2 BvR 1877/97 and 50/98 (31 March 1998), BVerfGE 97, 350 (372).

40 Lost in the (questionable) German version, Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 24 footnote 60.
explicitly limited to its volume, it has to be derived that it is \textit{unlimited} in the process of authorizing the issue of banknotes.\footnote{Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 5.} But also regarding the issue of euro coins, specifications may be enacted by the EU, Art. 128.2 sentence 3 TFEU. Otherwise, the cross-border use as a means of payment would be jeopardized (→ para 26).

The relevant \textit{secondary law} of the EU was partially enacted by the \textbf{Commission}, and partially by the \textbf{ECB}. The principles governing the division are not altogether translucent.\footnote{Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 3.} From para 2 of Article 128 TFEU can be derived that the (technical) specifications of the coins issued by the Member States have to be regulated by the Commission.

In respect to euro banknotes, the ECB is in principle competent to regulate details (→ para 12). There is, however, a discrepancy as to the extent of this competence. Pursuant the wording of Article 132.1 TFEU first indent, the competence of the ECB is restricted to make regulations enacting legal acts issued by the Council referred to in Article 129.14. In Article 34.1 of the Statute it has the competence “enacting regulations” of the Council \textit{and} in general to the extent necessary to implement its tasks defined in the TFEU and the Statute. The German version of these clauses does not show this discrepancy. Unmistakably, both confer a general competence to make regulations to fulfil its tasks and not only to enact legal acts of the Council. In any case, the ECB is in principle bound to follow the legal acts of the EU, however with the reservation that they may not interfere with its capacity to discharge independently its tasks conferred by the primary law.\footnote{Case C-11/00 and C-15/00 \textit{Commission vs. ECB [OLAF]} (ECJ 10.7.2003) para 137 et seq.}

In regard to its exclusive competence to authorize the \textit{issuance} of euro banknotes it also...
has the priority to enact rules on denomination and technical details of those notes. The withdrawal and exchange is covered by this competence as well.

3 The euro area

In effect, 19 of the 28 Member States have introduced the euro by now. The initial participating countries were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece was admitted a year before the introduction of euro notes and coins on 1 January 2002. Slovenia followed in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in 2014. The last country to be admitted was Lithuania on 1 January 2015. The United Kingdom and Denmark.

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47 Council decision 2000/427/EC in accordance with Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the adoption by Greece of the single currency on 1 January 2001, O.J. L 167/19 (2000); Council Regulation (EC) No 2169/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro, O.J. L 346/1 (2005); for the legislative history cf. EU Bulletin 5 – 2000, point 1.3.5: 3 May 2000: “the Commission adopts a proposal for a Council decision aiming the adoption by Greece of the single currency on 1 January 2001. On the basis of the report of the European Central Bank (adopted on 27 April 2000) and of its own 2000 convergence report, the Commission has concluded that Greece fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency and is proposing a Council decision abrogating Greece’s derogation from its obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union. The derogation would be abrogated with effect from 1 January 2001. The report (document COM(2000) 274 final) was endorsed by the European Parliament on 18 May”.

48 Protocol (No 15) on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, O.J. C 326/284 (2010): “1. Unless the United Kingdom notifies the Council that it intends to adopt the euro, it shall be under no obligation to do so. (...) 3. The United Kingdom shall retain its powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law.”

49 The exemption had the effect that all Articles and provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of ECSB/ECB referring to a “derogation” should be applicable to Denmark. The admission procedure of Article 140 TFEU should only be initiated at the request of Denmark, No 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 16) on certain provisions relating to Denmark, O.J. C 326/287 (2010).
did not adopt the euro in accordance with the exemptions granted to them. Sweden refrained from continuing the process of introducing the euro, although it would - on closer scrutiny - have fulfilled all the admittance requirements if it had adopted the due legislative acts. This has been judged a breach of EU-law. The other Member States which have not introduced the euro so far did not meet the necessary conditions for entry to the euro area, but have committed to joining as and when they meet them.

As a result, the following Member States of the EU have not introduced the single European currency to date: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. They are the now called “Member States with a derogation”, Art. 139(1) TFEU.

The term euro area describes the Member States in which the euro is legal tender. In addition to those Member States, the euro is used as legal tender in four other European

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50 Automatic consequence of the decision of the EU Council of 3 May 1998 and Article 121 para 1 phrase 3 TEC.

51 It is not fully clear whether Sweden, a country without a derogation, does not fulfil the convergence criteria of Article 140(1) TFEU or intentionally avoids to take the next steps for introducing the euro. This issue is kept at low key but may be judged as “illegal”, see e.g. Hartley (2014), p. 8 at footnote 33. The Commission in its Convergence Report 2000 indicates that “Greece has achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence justifying the abrogation of its... derogation.” It notes, on the other hand, that there are “no grounds for changing the current status of Sweden.” COM(2000) 274 final of 3 May 2000, p. 2. In its Convergence Report on Sweden 2002, the Commission noted that “the legislation in this field in Sweden is assessed not to be compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute”. The deficit in view of the Swedish Central Bank was confirmed in the Convergence Report 2016, p. 115.


53 Most provisions regulating the Monetary Union are not applicable to them, Article 139.2 – 4 TFEU, and do not confer any rights or impose any obligations on them, Article 42.1 Statute. The “Member States with a derogation” (and their national central banks) are almost completely excluded from the decision-making process concerning the euro and the actions taken by the ECB, Art. 139.3 and 4 TFEU, Art. 42.3. and 42.4. Statute.
countries on the basis of a **formal agreement** following Article 219.3 TFEU. These agreements allow them to issue euro coins: San Marino\(^{54}\), Monaco\(^{55}\), the Vatican\(^{56}\), and Andorra\(^{57}\) with their own design of one side of the coins. The right to mint euro coins is for them an important source of revenue for their budgets. Moreover, the euro is used in a number of **overseas departments, territories and islands** which are either part of euro area **Member States** or are associated with the EU. A complex interaction between national (constitutional) law and EU law, mainly Art. 52 TEU, Art. 349, and 355 TFEU on the territorial scope of the Treaties, determines whether the euro is used in such a territory or not; partially with exemptions in the primary law\(^{58}\) and separate agreements with the respective Member States acting on behalf of those territories.\(^{59}\)

In some **third countries** the euro has been introduced *unilaterally* as legal tender.\(^{60}\) In other countries it is used only *de facto* as currency without being legal tender.\(^{61}\) Quite often countries issue their own currency but **peg** them to the euro;\(^{62}\) in Europe: Bulgaria...
Denmark, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina (indirectly via the former Deutsche Mark)\textsuperscript{63}; in Africa: Morocco, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Comores, and all countries using the CFA; in the South Pacific the islands using the CFP. The euro is, however, not legal tender there.\textsuperscript{64} All these practices are consistent with the law of nations since no rule exists which interdicts the use of one sovereign’s currency by another sovereign or foreigners outside its jurisdiction. Neither the EU as a whole nor the ECB has the right to interfere. Art. 128 TFEU may not serve as basis for requiring a (prior) consent.\textsuperscript{65}

4 Euro banknotes

As has already been said (→ para 12), the ECB has not been granted the exclusive right to issue euro banknotes. They may also be issued by the national central banks of Member States whose currency is the euro, Art. 128.1 sentence 2 TFEU. These central banks constitute, together with the ECB, the Eurosystem.\textsuperscript{66} They are the only institutions which command the right to issue euro banknotes. This way a monopoly for the members of the Eurosystem has been established. No other entity of the EU nor of the Member States is allowed to issue euro banknotes.

\textsuperscript{62} Bam i.e. convertible Mark.

\textsuperscript{64} For more details see: Monetary and exchange rate arrangements of the euro area with selected third countries and territories, European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 2006, p. 87; European Commission (2008), p. 122. Special rules apply to some overseas territories of Member States which are not part of the territory of the EU, Article 355 TFEU; more in-depth treatment by: Krauskopf & Steven (1999), p. 651 et seq. specifically for the CFP, p. 653 et seq. specifically for the CFA; Hafke (2000), p. 28-36; de Sèze et al. (2011), p. 99 et seq. for the CFP.

\textsuperscript{65} Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 9; see also Freimuth, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 128 para 16; unclear Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 50, 52. The ECB, however, “considers that a third country should only introduce the euro following agreement with the Community”, ECB opinion (CON/2004/12) of 1 April 2004.

\textsuperscript{66} Since the Treaty of Lisbon “Eurosystem” is defined by the primary law as the “European Central Bank, together with the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro”, Art. 282.1 sentence 2 TFEU.
Since the ECB has the exclusive right to authorize the issue of such banknotes, Art. 128.1 sentence 1 TFEU, it has the exclusive competence to effectively control not only the volume but also all details of the issuance, the technical specifications of its quality and appearance, even if the notes are printed and issued, in fact, by national central banks (→ para 12, 14). In exercising this competence, the ECB has set in force several acts to regulate the details in view of euro banknotes. As a result, all euro banknotes are identical and have to be this way, no matter where they have been produced or issued. Moreover, unlike euro coins (→ para 26), euro banknotes do not contain any reference to their issuing country since unlike the coins they do not have a nationally designed backside. The issuing country can, however, be identified to some extent by the letter preceding the serial number of the first series of notes. The following letters have been assigned:


69 Bartzsch et al. (2013), p. 395: “The code letter in the serial number (for example “X” for Germany) only identifies the national central bank which has ordered the printing of the banknote. For example, a banknote with the code letter “X” could have been printed by a printing press in France on behalf of the Deutsche Bundesbank and been issued by the Bank of Greece.”
Belgium Z, Cyprus G, Finland L, France U, E, Germany X, W, R, Greece Y, Ireland T, Italy S, Malta F, Netherlands P, Poland D, Portugal M, Spain V, United Kingdom H, J. 70 In the second series the first letter preceding the series number discloses the place of print. 71 The authorization precedes the actual issue of the banknotes 72 and helps the ESCB to conduct a stability oriented monetary policy. 73

In general, 8% of the banknotes are issued by the ECB and the rest by the national central banks according to their share of the capital of the ECB. 74 The banknotes issued by the ECB are physically disseminated by national central banks since the ECB does not have an infrastructure of its own to perform this function. The tasks in producing, dispersing, and controlling the banknotes are distributed among the various national central banks but it is the exclusive competence of the ECB to set the rules (→ para 12, 14, 20). This has been achieved by enacting a detailed legal framework (→ para 20). 75 In practice, certain quotas of specific denomination of the notes have been attributed to specific national central banks (e.g. part of the ten euro bills to Greece). In case a bank overdrafts its quota, the amount is debited to its account within the TARGET II system. More in-depth research shows that about 70% of the cash issued in Germany is held abroad. “Of this the lion’s share, 45% ... is in non-euro-area countries, with the remainder, 25%, in other euro-area-countries”. 76 The most recent analysis confirms these results. Euro banknotes emitted by

71 Ibid., p. 40.
72 Freimuth, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 128 AEUV para 23.
76 Bartzsch et al. (2013), p. 400, pointing out that this “corresponds” well with the estimated figures for D-Mark banknotes before euro cash was introduced. Despite the less important international orientation of the U.S. economy similar patterns can be found for the U.S. dollar, see Judson (2012), p. 85, 92, 103. Remarkable is the pattern of demand for cash relative to political and economic events. Considerably lower shares are estimated by Feige (2012), p. 146, stating a “currency enigma” as domestic citizens admit holding a lower amount of cash per capita (p. 122).
the German Bundesbank have almost doubled between end of 2009 and end of 2017: from 348 billion euro to 635 billion euro, an annual growth rate of 7.8% on the average.  

The procurement follows in principle national rules but the Eurosystem has set a framework: Single Eurosystem Tender Procedure — SETP. Costs incurred in connection with the issue of banknotes and gains are consolidated within the procedure to calculate the monetary income of the national central banks, Art. 32.4 (2) Statute. In case of an unforeseen demand for cash, the lacking amount of banknotes is transported to the place of demand under the direction of the ECB - similar to any other monetary system. This has happened during the Greek crisis when large amounts of cash were flown to the country. These transactions are also balanced within TARGET II.

The notes do not acquire the legal quality as euro banknotes from the beginning of their physical existence. An additional, sovereign legal act is required. They have to be given willingly within the prescribed procedure into circulation by the issuing entity (“dedication”) (→ para 28). Correspondingly, a euro banknote loses this quality when it is withdrawn from circulation by the Eurosystem. The withdrawal of coins falls into the competence of the Member States. The withdrawal is also sovereign legal act, no matter who is physically performing it. The legal acts of “dedication” and “withdrawal” are important in case notes get lost or stolen before issuance or after they have been withdrawn, but also for the accounting of the Eurosystem. As such an act of withdrawal is missing, euro banknotes which have been damaged in an attack of mental illness do not

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77 Deutsche Bundesbank (2018b), p. 37 et seq.,
78 Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 13, with further details.
82 For more details see Krauskopf (2005).
lose their quality as legal tender and have to be exchanged. The claim to “exchange damaged genuine euro banknotes” has to be based on Art. 3.1 Decision 2013/10 of the ECB which is pursuant Art. 288.4 sentence 1 TFEU binding and does not only serve internal purposes. The Deutsche Bundesbank is obliged to reimburse the mutilated banknotes also in view of Art. 3.3 lit. a ECB/2013/10 which does not give a claim in case of knowing and wilful damage but foresees an exception for acting bona fide. The Bundesbank interpretation that wilful damaging excludes this exception could not be upheld.

On the other hand, banknotes which have been cast in acrylic after withdrawal from circulation and have been sold at the ECB’s Information Centre & Bookshop as collector’s item do not have to be considered to be euro banknotes – exchangeable at the Eurosystem – anymore. Special rules have been set up for safeguarding the quality and authenticity of the notes in circulation (→ para 75-80). They are essential for securing the trust in the currency. The prescribed controls of the national central banks fulfil a public task.

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83 Superior Administrative Court of Hesse (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen), 6 A 682/15 (23 March 2016); see
85 Superior Administrative Court of Hesse (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen), 6 A 682/15 (23 March 2016).
87 Superior Administrative Court of Hesse (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen), 6 A 682/15 (23 March 2016).
88 Only as a result also the Administrative Court of Frankfurt am Main (Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main), 1 E 2589/06 (8 March 2007). Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Rechtssprechungs-Report, p. 1119, underpinning its decision by the lack of a statutory basis for such a claim due to the repeal of section 14.3 Bundesbank Act (Bundesbankgesetz). This argumentation cannot be upheld in view of the following judgment of the Superior Administrative Court of Hesse (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen), 6 A 682/15 (23 March 2016).
The banknotes issued by the system are copyrighted. This is considered to be compatible with their legal function but would need closer scrutiny.

5 Euro coins

The term “coin” has to be thoroughly distinguished from the term “money” (→ para 6) and its underlying concept. Coins may be defined “as pieces of metal stamped, usually on both sides, with devices which relate them to the monetary units [‘currency’] named in verbal or written transactions, so that they represent these for all legal purposes”. In the beginning, they did not serve the functions of money (→ para 6) – or at least not all of them – and thus cannot be explained as the product of (predominantly) economic needs or practical purposes. The value of early coins was “far too valuable to have been used in the petty commerce of daily life”. Often they had a symbolic function or simply spared the more difficult task of measuring the objects of wealth by counting standardized tokens. It was the “imposition of a recognizable mark that transforms a piece of metal into a specific unit of currency”. On the other hand, using coins eased the way to fraud and


91 Weenink (2003).

92 Inserted by the author.


96 Grierson (1978), p. 3, emphasizing that this disqualifies unstamped ingots, also found in hoards, as coin.
corruption as debasing a coin (or bullion) was much easier than debasing any other instrument of exchange like e.g. oxen. It is still a much-debated question whether debasement was in fact an instrument for financing government, a crude form of taxation, or if it were the result of other causes, like over-supply of coins, adjustment to changing real prices, or rising scarcity of silver (i.e. rising relative price). Crucial from a functional point of view seems not be not so much the varying content of precious metal but fluctuating buying power jeopardizing its function as time consistent yardstick. For over 500 years the coins of Rome, coins carried an image of the ruler in power and thus spread the information about who was sovereign and what his aims were. This had an augmented significance in times when the ruler was worshipped as God or godlike, e.g. during the time of Augustus. In any case, modern numismatic research shows that coins had close ties to the legal system from their origin on (→ para 6).

Minting coins has been one of the oldest sovereign rights of states and existed long before banknotes came into use. This might be one the reasons why the competence for issuing coins in the euro area has been retained by the Member States (→ para 12). It is highly questionable whether the decision to split the competence for issuing legal tender between different institutions can still be justified. Economic reasons are not apparent; leaving aside mere fiscal greed since profits from minting coins go directly into the coffers


98 See for details Butcher (2015), p. 185 et seq., tending to the latter (p. 201).

99 For details of the Augustan monetary system with almost pure gold and silver coins which functioned effectively for almost two centuries see Davies (2002), p. 95 et seq.; Connors/Davies (2016), p. 98 et seq. Against the long-term common conviction Butcher and Ponting explicate the proposition that the monetary reforms of Trajan and Nero were not adulterations of the Augustan system but were both attempts to establish a stable currency (2015), p. 21 et seq., 41: “recycling of old coinage” by Trajan not in connection with debasement.


of the sovereign.\textsuperscript{103} Maybe symbolic reasons have not yet been overcome as well. In a common currency area with one monetary policy it is, however, indispensable that the \textbf{volume} of coin issuance has to be set by the same authority which is competent for conducting the monetary policy. As a consequence, the primary law requires the \textbf{approval} of the \textbf{ECB}, Art. 128.2 sentence 1 TFEU. This decision can be exercised by the ECB at \textbf{discretion}. Only cases of abuse or transgression of its limit will be controlled by the judiciary.\textsuperscript{104}

Regarding the \textbf{harmonisation} of the \textbf{unitisation} and \textbf{technical specifications} of the coins the primary law empowers the \textbf{Council}, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, to adopt the suitable measures, however, limited to the extent necessary to permit the smooth circulation of the coins within the Union, Art. 128.2 sentence 2 TFEU. The rules have to be based upon this clause\textsuperscript{105} as it has priority over Article 133 TFEU\textsuperscript{106} as more specific even if Art. 133 TFEU has a wide enough scope since the Treaty of Lisbon and could (potentially) serve as basis as well.\textsuperscript{107} The EU Council has passed the measures considered to be necessary.\textsuperscript{108} If they all stay within its range of the competence may be called into question. As a result,

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\textsuperscript{103} Siekmann, in Siekmann (2013), Einführung [introduction], para 135, pointing out that this reservation in favour of the government had already been abolished by the allied powers in Germany after World War II as a wholly rational decision and was re-introduced when establishing the Bundesbank in 1957; uncritical Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 12.

\textsuperscript{104} Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 24.

\textsuperscript{105} Unclear Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 27.


\textsuperscript{107} See for details, Selmayr, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 133 AEUV para 5, 7, who considers this article as a basis for a comprehensive “euro currency law” (para 1, 5); less wide Becker, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 133 AEUV.

one side of the coins is uniform and the other side bears a national design. Collector’s coins or commemorative coins may be entirely designed by the Member States as long as they follow the technical specifications allowing them to circulate freely. If they deviate from these standards the coins cannot be legal tender, also not in the respective Member State.\textsuperscript{109} The volume of the issuance of the various coins has been set by the ECB.\textsuperscript{110}

Not only the volume, unitisation, and technical specifications for euro coins are set by institutions of the EU, but also their status as legal tender (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} para 31). In contrast to euro banknotes this has not been done by the primary law. Rules have been enacted to secure the authenticity and quality of the coins (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} para 81).\textsuperscript{111}

6 Legal tender

The public law, the \textit{lex monetae}\textsuperscript{112} of a country, determines which monetary signs (tokens) have to be treated as legal tender.\textsuperscript{111} The private law follows, like in France and Germany. A concrete species of such a token acquires the property of legal tender through an act of dedication by the competent authority (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} para 23). When the private law has to decide what has to be treated as money or what instruments can be used to

\textsuperscript{109} Disagreeing: Hahn & Häde (2010), § 23 para 25; Manger-Nestler, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Art. 128 AEUV para 14, ignoring that Art. 128.2 is an exception from the transfer of all competences in monetary policy to the EU (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} para 3).

\textsuperscript{110} This has been done on a regular basis, most recently: Decision of the European Central Bank of 8 December 2017, ECB/2017/2443, \textit{on the approval of the volume of coin issuance in 2018 (ECB/2017/40)}, O.J. L 344/61 (2017).

\textsuperscript{111} See for more details Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 28-33.


settle monetary claims, the result follows from the determination of legal tender. In history, legislation creating e.g. the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) did not regulate how to discharge monetary claims as the public law already provided a currency order. Another question would be whether legislation could alter the system. In the euro area the jus monetae has been completely transferred to the EU with the result that the concerned Member States lost their power to define legal tender, Art. 3.1 (c) TFEU.115

6.1 Main features

The primary law does not contain a definition of legal tender. From the historic development follows that the principal virtue of legal tender is (i) that it has to be accepted for settlement of any kind of monetary obligation – private or public. In contrast to all other monetary instruments, (ii) the creditor is held to accept legal tender at full face value if it is offered to her or him. Complementing this characteristic, (iii) the creditor of a monetary obligation only has a claim for legal tender. The courts117 and the legal literature118 have

116 Mitchell Innes pointed out as early as 1913 that the debased coins in the late Roman time could only be considered to be tokens but nevertheless they always kept their quality as legal tender and it was an “offense to refuse them”, p. 382, 384 (draconian punishments for refusing coins of the Franconian king); for the modern literature see e.g. Grothe (1999), p. 42; Krauskopf (2005), p. 246–248; Siekmann (2016a), p. 507.
117 See e.g. Supreme Civil Court of the German Reich (Reichsgericht), III 363/30 (3 July 1931), RGZ 133, 249 (253 et seq.); ibid., IX 241/31 (14 October 1931), RGZ 134, 73 (76); German Federal Supreme Civil Court (Bundesgerichtshof), V ZR 92/51 (13 March 1953), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1953), p. 897 et seq; ibid. VI ZR 209/61 (10 July 1962), LM BGB § 362 Nr. 7; ibid., V ZR 168/81 (25 March 1983), BGHZ 87, 156 (162 et seq.); ibid., Xa ZR 68/09 (20 May 2010), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2010), p. 2719 (2720 para 29); Superior Court of Hamm (Oberlandesgericht Hamm), 10 UF 266/87 (13 November 1987), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1988), p. 2115 (2116); Superior Court of Frankfurt am Main (OLG Frankfurt), “Ws (B) 151/86 (22 September 1986), Juristen Zeitung (1986), p. 1072; for the legal consequences of crediting a bank transfer to an account of a failing account holder see German Federal Supreme Civil Court (Bundesgerichtshof), VIII ZR 152/70 (2 February 1972, BGHZ 58, 108 (109).
118 Mitchell Innes (1913), p. 405, already emphasizing that lawful money had to be accepted “at the value officially put upon them”, no matter what intrinsic value it has; Fögen (1969), p. 7;
adhered to these principles. They also hold for payments made to or from a government entity, authority or agency.\textsuperscript{119} These were also the main findings of the \textit{Euro Legal Tender Expert Group – ELTEG} instituted by the Commission.\textsuperscript{120} In 2010, the EU Commission explicitly accepted the three traits stated above: The creditor of a payment obligation may not refuse euro banknotes and coins unless the parties have agreed on other means of payment.\textsuperscript{121}

This recommendation leaves it to the national legal systems, whether \textit{private parties} may agree to follow different rules. It is a question how far the autonomy of private persons is respected by the legal system.\textsuperscript{122} In some countries, like France, such an agreement would not be viable as it is still a criminal offence there not to accept legal tender.\textsuperscript{123} In others, like in Germany, it is in principle admitted if a \textit{prior consensus} among the parties has been reached beforehand.\textsuperscript{124} It has to be questioned, however, that private persons

\textsuperscript{119} Supreme Civil Court of the German Reich (Reichsgericht), III 363/30 (3 July 1931), RGZ 133, 249 (254).

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Euro Legal Tender Expert Group – ELTEG} (2010), p. 4.


\textsuperscript{122} Comprehensive overview by \textit{Euro Legal Tender Expert Group – ELTEG} (2010), Annex, Table 1, p. 23 et seqq.

\textsuperscript{123} As long as it is the exact amount due, see Angel and Margerite (2009), p. 588, referring also to Italy, Cyprus, and Slovenia; Kleiner (2010), p. 67, 146.; ibid. (2009), p. 565.

\textsuperscript{124} German Federal Supreme Civil Court (Bundesgerichtshof), V ZR 92/51 (13 March 1953), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1953), p. 897 et seq; ibid., Xa ZR 68/09 (20 May 2010), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2010), p. 2719 (2720 para 29); ibid., V ZR 168/81 (25 March 1983), 1605 (1606).
with dominating market powers may suppress partially or in total money issued by the sovereign which would lose as a result one of its main functions. Public sector entities are completely barred from such an agreement as the monetary obligation follows directly from statutory rules. They are - directly or indirectly - part of the sovereign and have to accept its legal tender. It would be a contradiction in itself and undermine the confidence in a currency without any intrinsic value ("fiat money") aside from the legitimate expectation that it will be accepted as means of payment (→ para 40) if a government entity were allowed to refuse accepting the money the sovereign has created. This has been grossly neglected by the court judgments on the special contributions financing the state broadcasting system in Germany.

6.2 Euro banknotes and coins

The primary law has given the euro banknotes the status of legal tender, Art. 128.1 sentence 3 TFEU. Such a clause is lacking for euro coins but this gap has been supplemented by an act of secondary law. Art. 11 sentence 2 of Council Regulation 974/98 decrees that all coins issued by the participating Member States denominated in euro or in cent and complying with the denominations and technical specifications set by the Council “shall be the only coins which have the status of legal tender in all these Member States”.

125 Clearly expressed for the Federal Reserve System of the U.S.; 12 USC Chapter 3 Sub-Chapter XII section 411: “The said notes shall be obligations of the United States and shall be receivable by all national and member banks and Federal reserve banks and for all taxes, customs, and other public dues.”

126 Superior Administrative Court for the State of Hesse (Hessischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof), 10 A 2929/16 and 10 A 116/17 (13 February 2018); Administrative Court of Munich (Verwaltungsgericht München), M 6 K 15.5638 (1 June 2016), BeckRS 2016, p. 50215; Administrative Court of Frankfurt am Main (Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main), 1 K 2903/15F (31 October 2016), Kommunikation und Recht - K & R 2017, p. 142, with critical annotation by Beck & König (2017): not tenable (“dogmatisch wie systematisch nicht haltbar”).

6.3 Substitutes

From this follows that no other instrument of payment or other substitutes of cash may be treated as legal tender in the euro area. This holds no matter how widely such a substitute is spread, how generally it is accepted, and how much pressure of government entities or privates is exerted not to use them. All attempts to hinder the use of legal tender are highly questionable in view of the EU regulations (see more → para 36-46).

Closer scrutiny is, however, warranted regarding the question whether the EU, the ECB, or Member States would be allowed to declare specific electronic instruments legal tender. Simply repealing or modifying Council Regulation 974/98 (→ para 31, 62) would not be sufficient. At least, this could not change the designation of euro banknotes as only legal tender in Art. 128.1 sentence 3 TFEU. Only if the new (electronic) instruments could be judged as banknotes or as coins in the meaning of Art. 128 TFEU this possibility would come close to the range of the legally debatable and the next steps of assessment would come into reach. Following the generally accepted standards of interpretation, this seems hardly possible. The terms “banknote” and “coin” have been established for centuries and possess a clear meaning. Subsuming any kind of electronic instrument would be at its core an act of legislation and not of applying the law.

As the right of the Member States to issue coins appears as a historic reminiscence without economic justification (→ para 25), an electronic euro banknote, authorized by the ECB, would be the only debatable option if at all. For such an interpretation it would be, however, indispensable that the new instrument be functionally 100% equivalent to the existing cash, to say the least. In specific, the following conditions would have to be fulfilled:


129 Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 44, with the argument that the right of the ECB to authorise the issue of coins would otherwise be infringed; in effect also Selmayr, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 133 para 2; sceptical from an economic point of view the president of the Bundesbank, Weidmann, cited in Börsen-Zeitung 15 February 2018, p. 4, seeing an enhanced risk for bank runs.
− Its issuance would have to be authorised by the ECB.
− It would have to be denominated in euro.
− It would have to be useable without disclosing or identifying its owner.
− It would have to be transferable from person to person without using an intermediary and without additional costs.
− It would have to be a permanent storage of value, unlimited in volume.
− It would have to be accepted by all government entities.

By fulfilling these conditions, the pure efficiency gains of digitization could be realized without intruding further into the protected sphere privacy. On the other hand, the (alleged) objective of fighting money laundering peddling, tax evasion, and financing of terrorism (→ para 46), could not be achieved. In any case, (unintended) consequences and side effects would have to be taken into account. They could be staggering: Due to economies of scope and scale, large parts of the present-day payment services would become superfluous and the banking systems would have to undergo additional drastic changes. The result could well be that only one institution would survive – most likely a central bank as a natural monopolist.

6.4 Restrictions of the use of legal tender

6.4.1 The development

Already for quite some time, financial institutions, but also authorities, have exerted pressure on businesses and consumers to refrain from using cash. Even statutory rules have been passed to prohibit the use of cash exceeding a specific, but rather low limit. 130 This

130 See, for example, Angel & Margerit (2009), p. 588; Häring (2016a), p. 29; ibid. (2016b), p. 29-62; Ulrich (2016) for plans in Germany. A detailed overview of the various limits and restrictions for using cash, enacted by several Member States of the EU is given in a paper by the research service of the German federal parliament (Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Deutscher Bundestag Ausarbeitung) WD 4 – 3000 – 043/16, p. 8 et seq. The thresholds range from 1,500 to 15,000 euros or its equivalent for the non-euro states; For more details see Siekmann (2017a), p. 154 et seq. from which parts of the following have been derived.
limit usually varies from country to country with the result that the citizens do not know to which extent the legal tender of the EU may still be useable. Most notorious are the cases where the government broadcasting entities in Germany (Rundfunkanstalten) refuse to accept cash payments for discharging the government-imposed special contributions financing those entities; regardless of the actual use of those entities. The decision of the ECB to end the production and issuance of 500 Euro banknotes is also part of this debate.

These measures have been successful to a varying degree in the Member States of the EU whose currency is the euro. In some countries, they lead to a replacement of cash as a means of payment or storage of value on a large scale. In other Member States, like Austria and Germany, cash is still widely used. In 2017, more than 74% of all transactions in Germany were settled using banknotes and coins. Their share of the turnover fell, however, below 50%. Cash held for transaction purposes has remained almost constant.

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131 Based upon Section 9 para 2 sentence 2 RBStV (Rundfunkgebührenstaatsvertrag) in conjunction with Section 10 para 2 of the by-laws of the respective public law broadcasting institution; critically, see Häring (2015); ibid. (2016b), p. 19-27. Decisions of administrative courts have so far upheld this practice (→ para 30 footnote 126).

132 Press release of 4 May 2016:
The ECB has decided to discontinue production and issuance of 500 € banknote;
Europa series of euro banknotes will not include the 500 €;
500 € banknote remains legal tender and will always retain its value.
The decision was criticized by: the President of the German Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, Handelsblatt, 25 February 2016, p. 30; Daniel Stelter, Börsen-Zeitung, 7 May 2016, p. 4; the member of the German Council of Economic advisers, Volker Wieland, cited in: “Große Bedenken gegen Bargeldobergrenzen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 2016; idem, cited in: Frankfurter Neue Presse, 14 June 2016, p. 4; decidedly in favour of retaining the 500 € banknote, Sebastian Jost, Die Welt, 13 February 2016: “It protects the currency.”


134 Krüger and Seitz (2014), p. 37, 44.
but hoarding has grown by 7 billion euros per year since 2010. Remarkable is the rapid growth of cash held by banks in stock since 2015. Germany’s share of the total cash issuance of the Eurosystem has grown from about 31% to approximately 47% in 2012. But most of it is held abroad (→ para 21).

6.4.2 Conformity with the monetary law of the EU

Restrictions imposed by Member States are often justified with reference to recital 19 of Regulation (EC) 974/98. This recital states that “limitations on payments in notes and coins, established by Member States for public reasons” are not considered to be “incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, provided that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are available”. This line of argumentation is, however, not convincing, mainly for two reasons:

(1) First, it is questionable whether these considerations are compatible with the primary law of the EU. They would allow the (partial) removal of an essential trait of legal tender (→ para 29) by the various Member States although their competence in monetary policy has been transferred in total to the EU, Art. 3.1 (c) TFEU. Especially the expectation that legal tender has to be accepted, namely, by cashiers of government entities, has been considered as a main characteristic of legal tender.

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135 Ibid., p. 50.
136 Ibid., p. 43.
137 Bartzsch et al. (2013), p. 400.
138 See, for example, Napoletano (2005), p. 260; Papapaschalis, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 128 AEUV para 48, seeing only parts of the problems discussed in the following but questioning in effect the legality of some of the measures taken (para 49).
140 Proctor (2012), para 31.10.
This result is backed by the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court. In its judgment on the constitutionality of introducing the euro, the Court considered as an essential trait of legal tender that “money” can be “freely” exchanged into other goods. In this context, it emphasised the special protection of this specific type of legitimate expectation (Einlösungsvertrauen), which it derived from the protection of property by civil rights.\(^{141}\)

(2) The second reason follows from the nature of a recital. Strictly speaking, a recital is not part of the norm. It may give some insight into the motives of the lawmaker and may serve as argument in interpretation, but it is in no way binding. “However, interpretation is only possible if a norm or a clause is open for interpretation and is in need of it; mainly because it is vague, opaque or inconsistent.” In regard to legal tender, such a norm or clause is, however, not in sight. “Moreover, the theme of recital 19 is nowhere to be found in the normative part of the regulation to be expounded. For these reasons, arguments from the recital have to be dismissed. They lack any normative significance for the legal question to be answered here.”\(^{142}\)

In principle, legal tender has to be accepted and may be used at discretion. Only marginal modifications, such as the amount of coins that have to be accepted for a payment and the obligation to change notes in cases in which not the exact amount of the owed sum of money is offered, may be consistent with the quality of legal tender.\(^{143}\) If these rules are not enforced, the credibility of the whole monetary system is at risk and, simultaneously and implicit guarantee for institutions issuing substitutes would come into force.

\(^{141}\) German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 2 BvR 1877/97 and 50/98 (31 March 1998), BVerfGE 97, 350 (371 et seq.); critical Lepsius (2002), p. 318, arguing against the majority of scholars (p. 317).

\(^{142}\) Siekmann (2017a), p. 171.

\(^{143}\) See e.g. Commission Recommendation of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (2010/191/EU), O.J. (2010), L 83/70; doubting the conformity of the restrictions with EU law: Angel and Margerite (2009), p. 588, 590 et seq.
This holds especially for a “fiat” currency, like the euro, which is only based on credibility. The admissible modifications would have to be enacted by the EU as the jus monetae has been transferred to the EU. An exception may exist for rules belonging at its core to private law but must not obstruct the objective of the creation of a single currency, the further integration of the Member States. Euro coins and banknotes are the genuine European instruments of payment.  

It is the task of the issuing authority, the Eurosystem, to enforce the rules regardless of whether Articles 128, 133, and 282.3 sentence 2 TFEU are mainly interpreted as (mere) empowerments. Empowerments may not only be used at will by the beneficiary. In principle, they also contain an obligation for the empowered to realize them. The wording of Article 282 paragraph 4 TFEU confirms this view.

National legislation contrary to these rules is not applicable. But also mere factual pressure to refrain from using legal tender is questionable and undermines substantially the credibility of the system as well. The idea of a “single currency” would be seriously damaged if a multitude of different rules of the Member States on the use of legal tender had to be obeyed.  

The somewhat more lenient view of the ECB in the past when asked for an opinion in the process of consultation has to be questioned and is under scrutiny.

6.4.3 Due process and civil rights

Restricting the use of cash may infringe substantial due process principles, like proportionality, the rule of law, and fundamental rights of citizens and businesses. In addition, the German “social-state” (Sozialstaat) principle is likely to be touched as the poor and

144 Angel and Margerit (2009), p. 591 et seq.

145 In France, the restrictions on using cash in Articles L. 112-5, L. 112-6 and L 112-7 of the French Monetary and Financial Code are treated as a “loi de police” even if it is still a criminal offence to refuse to accept legal tender as long as it is the exact amount due, see Kleiner (2010), p. 67, 146; ibid. (2009), p. 565.

146 See CON/2012/83, CON/2014/4 and CON/2014/37.
not so well educated population tend to depend more on the use of cash than the wealthy and educated. The alleged benefits from suppressing the use of cash are not so apparent that they can be accepted as justification for the constraints and additional burden without differentiation and closer scrutiny. In-depth empirical research does neither confirm the gains in efficiency nor the reduction of costs handling cash, as usually is contended.\textsuperscript{147} Even more important is the lacking empirical evidence for the alleged use of cash for criminal activities, financing terrorism, drug dealing, money laundering, and tax evasion. At least it is not apparent for a large scale use in big crime.\textsuperscript{148} An effect of the restrictions already in force on the crime rates is not visible\textsuperscript{149} and a correlation between the size of the underground economy and the growth of cash is at best unclear.\textsuperscript{150} Not only the necessity of the measures has to be doubted but already their suitability. This would question their compatibility with the substantive due process principle and the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip). It is often disregarded that the majority of empirical studies do not support the supposition that cash is predominantly used for illegal activities. The contrary appears to be true.\textsuperscript{151}

When restrictions are advocated the benefits of using cash are habitually ignored.\textsuperscript{152} Such a constrained perspective does, however, not satisfy the requirements of an in-depth


\textsuperscript{149} Ulrich (2016); p. R86; Bartone (2016), p. 286 et seq., with further references.

\textsuperscript{150} Pickhardt and Sardà (2012), p. 29; Graf (2012), p. 57, 62: “Summing up, the increased use of DM-banknotes and German-issued Euro Banknotes in domestic and international hoards can only to a small part, if at all, be ascribed to motives in connection with shadow economies.”

\textsuperscript{151} Krüger and Seitz (2017), p. 55 et seq.

\textsuperscript{152} Recent exceptions are: Krüger and Seitz (2014); König (2016); Siekmann (2017a), p. 173; Krüger and Seitz (2017).
examination of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense of the word. An ade-
quate scrutiny has to balance costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{153} The benefits of cash are:\textsuperscript{154} It does not
discriminate. It is simple, convenient, and fast. It does not leave traces and is crucial for
protecting privacy.\textsuperscript{155} Cash is in many situations more efficient than any other instrument
payment and is always useable – without special devices and without electricity. It does
not require an internet access. In time of (natural) disaster – like the Tsunami in Japan –
this has proven crucial. The functionality of other instruments of payment is in foreign
countries often dubious, to say the least. Holding cash as a store of value has become
increasingly rational in an environment where deposits are charged with high fees (falsely
labelled “negative interest rates”) and its opportunity costs are almost zero since equally
liquid and safe assets are not available.\textsuperscript{156} Finally it is often forgotten that the use of fi-
nancial instruments other than legal tender implies an additional risk of insolvency. The
intermediary that issues it may become insolvent but not so a central bank. Deposit guar-
antee schemes in the EU are legally and economically insufficient and in addition a bail-
in instrument which can pose a substantial risk for depositors has been installed by the
EU. Already this additional burden in comparison to using cash has to be judged as un-
necessary, and hence as disproportionate. But also in a more general approach, balancing
costs and benefits of restricting the use of cash will regularly lead to the assessment that
the measure is disproportionate and hence unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, an infringe-

\textsuperscript{153}\textsuperscript{153} See for the various factors the arguments of Bacher & Beck (2015).

\textsuperscript{154}\textsuperscript{154} Siekmann (2017a), p. 173; similarly Krüger and Seitz (2017), p. 4 et seq. who, in addition, demonstrate the macro-economic benefits of cash (p. 10-26).

\textsuperscript{155}\textsuperscript{155} Protecting privacy is a legitimate interest and an acknowledged fundamental right of the Eu-
ropean Union and of national constitutional law. The legal aspect corresponds well with the
preferences of the people. The protection of privacy was named as one of the most important
traits of an instrument of payment in a recent survey, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2018a), p. 32.

\textsuperscript{156}\textsuperscript{156} Holding German government bonds implies high costs as well since they also lead to a “nego-
tive” return, in the medium range.

\textsuperscript{157}\textsuperscript{157} The population in Germany also judges the benefits of cash considerably higher than its
ment of the freedom of commerce and the freedom of occupation may have to be assumed in specific situations.\footnote{Bartone (2016), p. 288.} In addition the legitimate expectation that legal tender can be used to settle any kind of monetary claim \(\rightarrow\) para 30, 40) is frustrated. Tinkering with lawful money which is solely based upon confidence is highly \textit{imprudent}. This holds especially for a multinational currency like the euro. Restrictions unnecessarily augment anti-EU sentiments and thus jeopardizes the fundamental goals of the Union.

\section{National currencies within the euro area}
\subsection{Development}

During the Greek crisis (2010, 2012) economists and politicians have keenly proposed that Greece should leave the euro and create a new currency,\footnote{Allegedly a secret plan of the Greek Minister of Finance, \textit{Varoufakis}, see Hirdina (2015), p. 1.} or at least, introduce a parallel currency - be it with or without permission of the Commission. In the course of the political debate in Italy, similar demands were expressed.\footnote{See Belke (2018).}

In the first place, it has to be questioned whether such a move would resolve the underlying problems of the country. All debt would still be denominated in euro\footnote{Scott (1998), p. 223: “Note that if reference was made to EU law as \textit{lex monetae}, (...) re-denomination would be ineffective.” This would be the case as the \textit{lex monetae} is entirely transferred to the EU for the euro area \(\rightarrow\) para 48, 64).} as the \textit{lex monetae} \(\rightarrow\) para 23) resides with the EU for the euro area \(\rightarrow\) para 64) and the aspired increase in competitiveness would have been highly doubtful regarding the unresolved structural and institutional problems of the country.\footnote{See for a calculation of the costs Deo et al. (2011), p. 6 et seq., 11.} National legislation to change this is likely to be void as a result of breaching national and international civil rights statutes. Furthermore, intricate problems of international private law would also have to be
In addition, the population would try to defend itself. Fundamental rights and freedoms would have to be suspended or severely restricted.

### 7.2 Unilateral acts

#### 7.2.1 Exit or withdrawal from the euro

Any unilateral “exit from the euro” would be on its face a breach of EU law. A unilateral declaration or notification to “leave the euro” would be **illegal and void**. This result appears to be consistent also with the judicature of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

#### 7.2.1.1 Lack of an entity to leave

An entity to join or to leave does **not exist**. The primary law consistently only speaks of “economic policy” and of “monetary policy” in the parts where it constitutes the objec-

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165 Siekmann (2017b), p. 773-783 from which parts of the following are taken.

166 The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) mentions in its Maastricht judgment a right or even an obligation to leave the EMU as an ultima ratio, however, only as an obiter dictum without sufficient reasoning, BvR 2134, 2159/92 (2 July 1993), BVerfGE 89, 155 (204). This remark was not resumed in the euro decision, 2 BvR 1877/97, 50/98 (31 March 1998), BVerfGE 97, 350 (376). Moreover, from its Lisbon judgment can be inferred that an exit would not be compatible with German constitutional law, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (11 February 2009), BVerfGE 123, 267 (346 et seq.).
tives, tasks, and functions of the (new) monetary system. The official heading of the relevant title is: “economic and monetary policy” (Part three, Title VIII TFEU). The denomination of the embedded chapters is “economic policy” (Chapter 1) and “monetary policy” (Chapter 2). The term “economic and monetary union” is carefully eschewed. The same is true for the institutional provisions (Part Six, Title I, Section 6 TFEU) which are headlined: “The European Central Bank”.

The term “economic and monetary union” is only sparsely used by the primary law: Art. 3.4 TEU and Articles 66, 121.4 subparagraph 1 sentence 1, 138.1 TFEU. The provisions in the TFEU contain only marginal references to the “function” of the economic and monetary union and do not presume an institution. They ought to be dismissed in the present context. Article 3.4 TEU warrants more attention. It stipulates that an economic and monetary union has to be set up. Although its wording is deviating from the functional view of the other provisions mentioned before, it may not be construed in a way as to set up an entity within the EU. It is a reminiscence of the three-staged introduction of the single European currency following the Treaty of Maastricht and has little legal content after the monetary union has been formed. It does not constitute powers or competences. Specifically, the clause does not supersede the principle of conferral as laid down in Article 5.1 TEU. This limitation is (superfluously) restated in Article 3.6 TEU.

The history of Article 3(4) TEU does not provide evidence in favour of setting up an institution. Its roots reach back to the Single European Act (SEA). In the heading of a new chapter inserted in the primary law of the European Community (EEC Treaty) by Art. 20 SEA the term appears – but only there: “CHAPTER 1. CO-OPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY (ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION)”. The wording of the following

168 “The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.”
169 Siekmann (2017b), p. 775, with more details.
provisions\textsuperscript{171} make it clear that a closer cooperation within the Community and not the creation of a separate body “Economic and Monetary Union” was intended.\textsuperscript{172}

7.2.1.2 No partial exit following Article 50 TEU

According to its clear wording, Article 50 TEU does not grant a right to exit from the economic and monetary union while remaining a Member State of the Union. An analogous application following an argumentum a maiore ad minorem has, however, been proposed: If a complete unilateral exit from the EU is allowed, then an exit from a part of it should be admissible as well.\textsuperscript{173}

This argument is, however, not valid. In the first place the wording of the clause does not allow such an interpretation. Moreover, the exit from the EU is not tied to any material provisions. It can be achieved simply by notifying the European Council, Art. 50.1 and 2 sentence 1 TEU. Any regulation of that kind is missing in regard of the monetary union but could have easily been inserted – if intended by the framers of the Treaty. After the

\textsuperscript{171} Article 102a: 1. In order to ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policies which is necessary for the further development of the Community, Member States shall co-operate in accordance with the objectives of Article 104. In so doing, they shall take account of the experience acquired in co-operation within the framework of the European Monetary System (EMS) and in developing the ECU, and shall respect existing powers in this field.

\textsuperscript{172} Siekmann (2017b), p. 775 et seq.

\textsuperscript{173} Seidel (2007), p. 617; perhaps also Herdegen, in Maunz Dürig (2010), Art. 88 para 27 at the end of the first paragraph (falsely) labelled as consensual exit; similarly Herrmann (2010a), p. 120; less clear ibid. (2010b), p. 417.
long-lasting debate\footnote{Se e.g. Scott (1998), p. 215; Hofmeister (2010), p. 590 et seq., with the conclusion “the situation regarding unilateral withdrawal was unclear”} which led to the insertion of Art. 50 TEU in the primary law, an unintended gap does not exist.\footnote{Hofmeister (2010), p. 592: “The Lisbon Treaty has finally put an end to this debate by inserting Article 50 into the revised EU Treaty.” See also: Hofmeister (2011), p. 126; Bonk (2010), p. 517; Deo et al. (2011), p. 5; in effect also Diekmann & Bernauer (2012), p. 1173; see for more details Siekmann (2017b), p. 780; disagreeing, but without any legal analysis Horn (2015), p. 354; previously ibid. (2011), p. 1402, but more as political desideratum and without legal reasoning.} In addition, all the specific provisions on derogation would be superfluous if such a solution would be admissible.\footnote{Siekmann (2017b), p. 778}

7.2.1.3 No recourse to the law of nations

A recourse to the rules of the law of nations on the termination of contractual obligations does not provide the legal ground for an exit or withdrawal from the monetary union,\footnote{Kämmerer (2010), p. 166; Kokott, in Streinz (2012), Art. 356 AEUV para 6; Schmalenbach, in Caliess & Ruffert (2016), Art. 356 AEUV para 3; in result also Hanschel (2012), p. 999 et seq., even if not totally excluding the recourse to the law of nations; partially disagreeing: Streinz (2012a), in Streinz (2012), Art. 50 EUV para 13, considering it for an exclusion from the EU (not the EMU!) in “extreme cases”; also Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art 7 EUV para 23 without reasoning; unclear Caliess, in Caliess & Ruffert (2016), Art. 50 AEUV para 17, 21 (advice to withdraw pursuant Article 50 TEU).} mainly for three reasons:

- Neither the general rules of the law of nations nor the special rules on the termination of treaties are applicable in the case of supranational organizations even if they have (not yet) reached the quality of a federal state.
- A special solution for the problem has been inserted in the primary law by the Treaty of Lisbon which is conclusive: Article 50 TEU.
- The specific prerequisites of the provisions on a termination or withdrawal are not fulfilled; particularly not those of the Vienna Convention on Treaties or the clausula rebus sic stantibus.
(1) Partially the law of nations is deemed as being applicable, at least in case no other remedy is available. The European Union has, however, reached a degree of integration and has developed a legal system of its own which have displaced the initial elements of the law of nations. This evolution makes it questionable to apply the law of nations in general, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in specific, on a supranational organization like the EU. It is itself a subject of the law of nations and an organism which follows (internally) its own rules. “With regard to international law it is of an autonomous legal order, distinct either from constitutional law or international law.” The legal system of the EU should be judged as closed towards interferences by the law of nations. It may also not be called on for filling gaps in its regulation. In addition, France has not signed the Convention.

178 Herdegen, in Maunz & Dürig (2010), Art. 88 para 27, second subparagraph, without seeing the problem; Hanschel (2012), p. 999; Horn (2015), p. 356 et seq. with selective references for his view; Häde (2016), in Calliess & Ruffert, Art. 140 AEUV para 52; see for the development of the jurisprudence of the ECJ: Thym (2009), p. 456-460, without a clear position of his own. Whether the Maastricht judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), BvR 2134, 2159/92 (2 July 1993), BVerfGE 89, 155 (204), follows this line of thinking is not clear, as it is only one short remark without any reasoning or justification on which this assumption is based; not resumed in 2 BvR 1877/97, 50/98 (31 March 1998), BVerfGE 97, 350 (376); nevertheless, arguing in this direction e.g. Endler (1997), p. 536; Bonke (2010), p. 518.


180 ECJ, 6/64, Costa vs. ENEL, collection of cases, 1964, 1251 (1268); for details see Hofmeister (2010), p. 595-597.

181 Accepted as starting point by the ECJ, 26/62, van Gend & Loos, p. 12.


(2) Since the Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 50 TEU contains comprehensive, exclusive, and exhaustive rules for the exit problem. After the long debates (→ para 54), it was meant as a final answer to the questions arising from this area.\(^{186}\) As a consequence, Art. 50 TEU has to be judged as being **conclusive**. It does not provide for “leaving the euro” and staying in the EU at the same time. As it is exhaustive it forbids the recourse to the law of nations for the question at debate.\(^{187}\)

(3) The **conditions** of the relevant clauses of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties regulating the termination of a treaty\(^{188}\) are **not met** or may not be invoked because of their **subsidiarity**: Art. 54 of the Convention refers expressly to the provisions of the treaty in question and Art. 56.1 clearly restricts the grounds for the termination of a treaty: “A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless (a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” Both **do not hold** in the case of the European Monetary Union.\(^{189}\) Art. 70.1 of the Convention accordingly ties the release of the parties from any contractual obligation to the **observance of the rules** set up by the Convention.

Since the Treaty of Lisbon, Paragraph 1 of Art. 56 of the Vienna Convention now blocks a Member State’s exit or a withdrawal upon the basis of the Convention. The Treaty of Lisbon has created a provision which explicitly regulates a withdrawal from the Union,

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\(^{186}\) Dörr, in Grabitz, Hilf, Nettesheim (looseleaf, 2011), Art. 50 TEU para 3; Lenaerts & van Nuffel, para 6-015; Siekmann (2012), p. 376; disagreeing Meyer (2013), an economist, presupposing a regulatory gap to be filled - without any legal reasoning and simply declaring the problem to be less a legal than a political question, p. 335. This is not sufficient.

\(^{187}\) For details see Siekman (2017b), p. 780.

\(^{188}\) Section 3: Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties.

\(^{189}\) Siekmann (2017b), p. 781.
but does not provide for an exit solely from the EMU. Therefore, there is no space for the application of Art. 56 of the Convention.\footnote{Siekmann (2017b), p. 780 et seq.; unclear Meyer (2013), p. 340, without legal reason.}

In effect, the provisions on a “fundamental change of circumstances” (Art. 62 of the convention) also do not allow exit or withdrawal from the euro area as an unalienable precondition for re-introducing a national currency and national legal tender.\footnote{Bonke (2010), p. 519 et seq.; Siekmann (2017b), p. 782; unclear Meyer (2013), p. 340, without legal reason.}

7.2.2 Exclusion or revocation of admittance to the euro

An exclusion from the euro area by an act of the EU, of Member States, or of the euro-group is not possible as the needed legal basis for such an onerous measure is not visible. The primary law lacks the statutory basis for such a sanction.\footnote{Lenaerts & van Nuffel (2011), para 6-014; in general, also Calliess, in Calliess & Ruffert (2016), Art. 50 EUV para 12, 13, but conceding an exception for extreme cases.} In particular, Art. 7 TEU could not serve as an instrument for an exclusion.\footnote{For more details see Siekmann (2017b), p. 783 et seq.}

Renouncing the legal acts admitting a country to the euro has also been considered.\footnote{Behrens (2010), p. 121; Herrmann (2010b), p. 417; Meyer (2013), p. 338.} The decision or regulation about the introduction of the single currency in that country (\textit{\rightarrow para 15}) could be amended, regardless of whether those acts were obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. Even if legal acts of the EU might be judged as revocable, this does not hold in the course of introducing the single currency. These acts followed a procedure prescribed in all details and were clearly designed to be complete, unconditional, and irrevocable.\footnote{Dierdorf (1998), p. 3146; Bonke (2010), p. 523; Proctor (2012), para 29.10; as a result also Diekmann & Bernauer (2012), p. 1174; Siekmann (2017b), p. 784; see also Herrmann (2010b), p. 417.}
In the specific case of **Greece**, the decision of the Council of 19 June 2000 ordering that the derogation in favour of Greece shall be abrogated effective 1 January 2000, which in result meant admitting Greece to the euro, may suffer from such a serious legal flaw due to fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Greece that it would be **void** or could be **abolished**. Institutions, like the European Union or its integral part, the Monetary Union, are, however, designed to be stable and permanent and cannot work under the lasting danger of being dismantled because of defects in the founding legal acts. At least the span of time between the disclosure of such a defect and ensuing legal actions has to be limited. This is also the *ratio* of Art. 263.6 TFEU and the proposal to extend its deadline in the case of Greece is arbitrary. Finally, the subsequent behaviour of the victim of fraud or misrepresentation has to be taken into account. Granting financial support for Greece while fully aware of the facts of a misrepresentation ought to remedy the legal defects of the admittance decision.

### 7.2.3 Parallel currency

The introduction of a **national currency** parallel to the euro by a Member State whose currency is the euro would be clearly **incompatible** with primary and secondary law of

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198 Behrens (2010), p. 121.

199 Bonke (2010), p. 522, 525: no renunciation following Art. 60 of the Vienna Convention as sanctions are regulated in detail in the TFEU.


the Union. Euro banknotes and euro coins are the sole legal tender (→ para 31). As the sovereignty in monetary affairs of the Member States whose currency is the euro has been transferred to the Union, Article 3.1 lit.c TFEU, “all national powers of legislation and action in the monetary law field came to an end when the euro was introduced in these states”. 202 The issuance of banknotes or coins in a denomination other than euro would be a breach of EU law. 203 Aside from this, the changeover would be technically difficult, have adverse economic effects and require the infringement of civil rights, like closing the borders. 204

7.3 Consensual arrangements

An exit from the monetary union or the introduction of a parallel currency cannot be justified as an adjustment of the regional extension of the euro area, like in the case of Greenland which was transformed into an associated overseas territory connected with Denmark, 205 or the parts of Germany under communist rule after 1989, as a whole Member State would obtain a derogation from core obligations of the Union, the introduction of the single currency. 206 This can legally only be achieved by an amendment of the primary law. 207 Otherwise, the rules of the primary law granting a derogation to specific Member States would run idle and would be superfluous. 208 An exit or the introduction of a parallel currency may also not be permitted on the basis of Art. 3.1 (c) TFEU. This

204 Already described by Scott (1998), p. 218-220, for the hypothetical case of Italy introducing again its own national currency.
206 See for example Häde (1998), p. 1998; Hofmeister (2011), p. 115, 126-133. referring mainly to Art. 119.2., 140.1 TFEU and Art. 3.4 TEU in addition to the generally accepted tools of interpretation (wording, historical, systematic, and teleological). This obligation is also acknowledged by the EU Commission, see footnote 47.
207 References for the United Kingdom and Denmark in footnotes 48 et seq.
clause does not comprise the power to amend primary law. This power would, however, be indispensable because of Art. 50 TEU, Art. 28.1, and 139 TFEU.

It would also be legally impossible to empower Member States whose currency is the euro to define legal tender and issue their own currency on the basis of Article 2.1 TFEU. Although this clause allows in principle to “empower” Member States to act within the domain of exclusive competences of the Union, this does not hold for core competences, like the creation of legal tender as prescribed by Art. 128 TFEU.

As a viable path to a new national currency has also been deliberated to exit the EU on the basis of Art. 50 TEU and re-enter it immediately with a derogation. Occasionally, a “regressive differentiation” is also proposed as a possible way to allow the exit from the euro area without leaving the EU. It is envisaged as the result of the negotiation following an exit from the EU pursuant Article 50.2 TEU. In effect, both proposals would have to be judged as a circumvention of Art. 50 & 128 TFEU, and of the rules for a Treaty change as prescribed by Art. 48 TEU.

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8 Abolition of cash

8.1 Advocates

Macroeconomists, like Lawrence Summers, Kenneth Rogoff, and Peter Bofinger, have explicitly demanded an outright abolition of cash. They argue that only this way the monetary policy of the central banks in mature economies can re-establish the effectiveness of their instruments. Otherwise, in a world of zero or negative nominal interest rates, they would rapidly become helpless. The existence of cash might create an effective zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This lower bound might even be a few basis points negative, as there are costs of holding cash. In addition, the arguments in favour of restricting the use of cash (→ para 46) are presented in favour of an abolition as well. In the real world, impediments and onerous downsides have to be taken into account. The vast majority of the population is strictly against an abolition.

8.2 Consequence: Restricting the possession of precious metals or foreign currency

Experience shows that severe restrictions on the use of cash or its abolition would probably not be the last step. At least in some Member States chances are high that the population would try to protect itself and use other commodities as a means of payment or store of value: rare seashells, old paintings, cigarettes, liquor, precious metals, jewels, vouchers, special drawing rights, foreign currency, just to name a few. In essence, any tangible object which is relatively rare and cannot be produced without an input of resources may serve.

217 Rogoff (2014); Summers (2016); Bofinger (2015), p. 56; disagreeing Thiele (2015), p. 3; see also Siekmann (2017a), p. 155 et seq. from which parts of the following are taken.

218 See Bartone (2016), p. 286.

219 A recent representative survey shows only minimal - and dwindling - support for such an endeavour in Germany, Splendid Research (2018), p. 16: in favour only 12.9%. vs. 14.2% in 2016. According to Deutsche Bundesbank (2018a), p. 9, 88% are against an abolition of cash or restrictions of its use.
As consequence, the possession and the use of precious metals as bullion or coins was interdicted in the past, regularly in combination with the threat of draconian punishments in case of disobedience. The same was true for the possession or use of foreign currency. Two well-known examples from the 20\textsuperscript{th} century may be given for the United States and Germany:

(1) The possession of gold coins, gold bullion, and gold certificates within the continental United States exceeding 5 ounces was made a criminal offense for all private persons from 1 May 1933 on by Executive Order 6102 signed by President Roosevelt on April 5, 1933.\textsuperscript{220} Immediately thereafter the U.S. dollar was substantially depreciated against the price of gold. In effect, this was an (indirect) expropriation of savings.

(2) In Germany, all foreign currency (and all financial instruments denominated in foreign currency) was confiscated during the hyperinflation of 1923. The regulation of 25 August 1933 was based on Article 48 of the constitution.\textsuperscript{221} Earlier, the \textit{Reichsbank} had been granted power to require under certain circumstances the exchange of foreign currencies or precious metals into – at that time already almost worthless – domestic currency, section 9 of the regulation of 8 May 1923.\textsuperscript{222}

8.3 Legality

The primary law does not explicitly guarantee the existence of legal tender.\textsuperscript{223} Art. 128.1 sentence 2 TFEU only states that the “European Central Bank and the national central banks may [emphasis added] issue such notes” (i.e., euro banknotes). For coins issued by the Member States, subject to approval by the ECB, the wording is similar in paragraph 2

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{220} Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{223} See for details Siekmann (2017a), p. 162 et seq.
\end{flushright}
of this article; but not identical (→ para 12). In addition, this language is reiterated in
Art. 282.3 sentence 2 TFEU. Art. 128.1 sentence 3 TFEU decrees, however, that “the
banknotes issued by the European Central Bank and the national central banks shall be
the only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Union”. From this it
follows that the primary law pre-supposes the existence of legal tender, banknotes and
of coins denominated in euro.

As the Member States may only issue euro coins subject to approval by the ECB
(→ para 12, 25-27) and as they are barred from issuing any substitutes to euro banknotes
(→ para 34) as legal tender it is in effect only the ECB which has control over the existence
of legal tender. The issuing of “paper money” was, from the beginning, considered one
of the characteristic tasks of central banks, 224 including the newly created ECB. If it re-
frained from issuing this money, it would be defective in fulfilling one of its principle tasks.

A legal obligation to issue banknotes as legal tender or to authorise their issuance has to
be acknowledged. It may be called an “institutional guarantee” of legal tender. The argu-
ments against such a guarantee are either erroneous or not relevant. 225 The potentially
lacking demand for legal tender is no argument against an obligation to provide it and
the interpretation of Art. 127.2 4th indent TFEU is not decisive as Art. 128.1 TFEU would
reach further being lex specialis. As a result, an abolition of cash would not be compatible
with the primary law of the Union. 226 The attempts to equate bank based money (“book
money”) with legal tender 227 are futile as they disregard the additional insolvency risk con-

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224 See Goodhard (1988), p. 20-23 & 123, however, with an underlying sympathy for “free” ban-
ing; Proctor (2012), para 1.36-1.38; Siekmann (2016), p. 506-508.

225 Submitted by Omlor (2015), p. 2299

226 Freimuth, in Siekmann (2013), Art. 128 TFEU para 30; Siekmann (2017a), p. 169; disagreeing
Omlor (2015), p. 2299, who acknowledges, however, an obligation to issue legal tender based
on Art. 10 sentence 1 und Art. 11 sentence 1 of Council Regulation (EC) 974/98 of 3 May 1998
on the introduction of the euro, O.J. L 139/1 (1998).

227 Recently warmed up by Omlor (2015), p. 2302 et seq., with one sided focus on some older
private law sources and disregarding the dominant public law quality of legal tender and the
majority of younger court decisions and law review articles in Germany (→ para 23).
nected with its use. Similarly to the assessment of restrictions to the use of cash its abo-
lation would be even more inconsistent fundamental principles of constitutional law and
a breach of civil rights (→ para 45 et seq.). Moreover, it would allow indiscriminately a
total control over all payments and thus of all activities of the people as long as they have
the faintest financial implications. This would be an infringement of the protection of pri-
vacy (Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung) and the general personality right
(Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) protected by Art. 2.1 in conjunction with Art. 1.1 of the
German Federal Constitution which can be justified only under very narrow conditions.228
Balancing costs and benefits of an abolition would therefore even more clearly lead to a
verdict than mere restrictions.229

9 Fighting counterfeit
9.1 Administrative procedures

The EU takes considerable effort to fight counterfeiting euro banknotes and euro coins.
National authorities in EU countries, the Commission, the European Central Bank, non-
EU countries and international organisations join in a multidisciplinary cooperation in the
fight against counterfeiting.230 A multitude of legal acts has been passed to achieve this
goal.231

230 See for the demarcation of competences between European and national institutions in the
fight against counterfeiting Weenink (2004), p. 277-279, resuming a “shared competence”
(p. 277).
231 These acts have been set in force:

− Council Regulation (EC) 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, O.J. L 139/1
  (1998)
− Decision 2001/887/JHA on protecting the euro against counterfeiting in connection with
  the introduction of the euro, O.J. L 329/1 (2001)
− Council Decision (EC) 2003/861/ of 8 December 2003 concerning analysis and coopera-
  tion with regard to counterfeit euro coins, O.J. L 325/44 (2003)
The legal tender in circulation is constantly **analysed, identified, and withdrawn**, if necessary. Banks and other credit institutions must **check the authenticity** of all euro notes and coins that they intend to put back into circulation.\(^{232}\)

All authorities in Member States must **send** counterfeit notes and coins to their national analysis centres for analysis and identification. Credit institutions have to withdraw from circulation all euro notes and coins which they suspect to be counterfeit and hand them over to the respective national authorities as well.\(^{233}\)

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9.2 Training programme

An exchange, assistance and training programme for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting named “Pericles 2020” has been set up. For the period 2014-2020, Regulation (EU) No 331/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council serves as legal basis.234

9.3 Repression

Law enforcement is the main objective of Directive 2014/62/EU235 which replaces Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA.236 The Directive further enhances the implementation of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the suppression of counterfeiting. In the beginning, criminal sanctions were mainly reserved to the national level and only a minimum harmonization was secured by the Union.237 The new measure is an upgrade to the Union level enabled by Art. 83.1or 2 TFEU introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.238 It includes tougher sanctions for criminals and improved tools for cross-border investigation. It shall protect the euro against counterfeiting by criminal law measures.

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The Directive obliges Member States to punish:

- fraudulent making or altering of currency
- distribution of counterfeit currency
- making and possessing counterfeiting equipment
- fraudulent making of notes and coins not yet issued.

**9.4 Reports**

The Commission delivers reports on the increasing protections against counterfeiting.\(^{239}\)

The majority concerns only euro coins. The latest is from 2015\(^{240}\) and is based on Art. 12.4 of Regulation 1210/2010.\(^{241}\)

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\(^{239}\) At first: Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council’s framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro COM(2001) 771 final.


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