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A MANIFESTO ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Foreword

This manifesto challenges a pernicious orthodoxy that has gripped Europe's policy makers. It is that demand- and supply-side policies must have different aims, that a limited number of supply-side policies are to be devoted to fighting unemployment, and that demand management (and particularly monetary policy) is to be devoted solely to fighting inflation. The prevailing orthodoxy also claims that the choice of policy instruments for combating unemployment is a political decision, in which each instrument is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

In what follows, we outline various practical proposals aimed at a prompt reduction of unemployment. We are confident that if the advice is given proper attention by governments and monetary authorities, unemployment can be reduced significantly in a matter of a few years.

We will divide the proposed actions into those bearing on the revival of aggregate demand (demand policies) and those addressed to the reform of the labour and product markets and the system of benefits for the unemployed (supply policies). But we stress from the very beginning that we regard our proposals as strictly complementary with one another. Each proposal, applied in isolation, may produce little or even perverse effects, while the simultaneous application can be counted upon to yield the desired outcome. This holds in particular with respect to the relation between demand and supply policies. The underlying idea is that it is much easier to encourage people to look for jobs if there are jobs to be found and it is much easier to encourage firms to offer more jobs if there are people looking for jobs.
1. The Unemployment Problem

We share the view that at present time unemployment is the most serious and urgent problem facing the European Union (EU). In 1997, the average rate of unemployment in these countries was 11%, (19 million) with peaks of 15-20%, while in the 60's and early 70's it was almost universally well below 3% and nowhere over 5%. Such a huge rate of unemployment results in an immense waste of resources, through loss of output, that can be estimated at some 15% or more, and even larger loss of saving-investment potential. It is degrading and demeaning for the unemployed and with damaging long run consequences, especially for the young that represent, in most countries, the bulk of the unemployment. And it is a source of dangerous social tensions, as has been shown by the recent German elections.

We also share the view that the measures that have been proposed in numerous meetings of representatives of member governments at various levels, including the Amsterdam (June '97) and Luxembourg (November '97) meetings especially devoted to this problem, suggest that many of European leaders have not adequately confronted the nature of the problem. Consequently they have not succeeded in agreeing on politically feasible programs that have a chance of producing an appreciable decline in the current, high unemployment rate in the relevant near future.

2. False and Misleading Explanations for European Unemployment

The widespread acceptance of the timid program agreed so far seems to reflect in part the view, by now common in Europe, that unemployment is a calamity due to causes beyond the capacity of governments to manage, except possibly, by increasing profits and generally increasing income inequalities. And this conclusion has led to a convergence of both the right and the left on the view that the scourge must be bravely endured for fear that any remedy might make matters worse.

Many possible causes have been advanced to account for the high and persistent rate of unemployment in the EU. They vary somewhat along the political spectrum. On the right, it has been argued that EU unemployment is primarily the outcome of (i) the absence of the needed skills (there are jobs but the unemployed are not qualified to fill them), (ii) the large share of long-term unemployed who lack motivation to seek jobs, and (iii) the crushing burden of taxes. All these arguments contain grains of truth, but it easy to be misled by them.

The first argument is supported by the observation that the rise in unemployment has fallen disproportionately on the less skilled and qualified segments of the labour force. But American experience over the past few decades suggests that when unskilled workers are not consigned to an "unemployment trap" through misguided welfare entitlements, then the demand for unskilled labour fluctuates with
the availability of jobs. When available jobs shrink, workers with higher qualifications displace those less qualified, and when demand and job opportunities improve, the unemployment rate of the less qualified declines.

The share of long-term unemployment varies substantially among EU member states; but there is good reason to believe that a large share of long-term unemployment is more the effect than the cause of a high and persisting unemployment.

As for taxes, it is estimated that in 1997, total government levies amounted to about 43% of GDP in the EU versus 31.6% in the US. But these figures fail to distinguish between taxes that pay for government services and Social Security levies, that represent contributions toward pension benefits - i.e. saving - even if compulsory. If one leaves out Social Security contributions, the tax burden (direct plus indirect taxes) drops to 27% in Europe, versus some 23% in the US. The difference in the untaxed share of income - 73% in Europe versus 77% in US - is by no means dramatic and certainly cannot account for the fact that European unemployment is 8% higher than before the early 70's, while that of the US is no higher. If unemployment were so sensitive to small differences in taxation, why is it that Germany - with a tax burden hardly higher than that of the US (23.3%) - has unemployment similar to the rest of the European countries (9.1%), while the UK - with a tax burden 6 percentage points larger than Germany (29.5%) - has much smaller unemployment?

It is of course true that in Europe Social Security levies take a much larger bite from income (16% of GDP versus 9% in US). And of course the average rate of contribution for those workers actually covered by Social Security is much higher than 16%, reaching well over 40% for countries like Italy (44.3%) and France (46.8), where the replacement rate is very high. These high levies, it is said, increase unemployment both by sapping the incentive to work and by raising the cost of labour to employers. But these assertions are fundamentally flawed. Firstly, the higher European levies do not, as is generally supposed, reflect the need to cover the higher costs of a more wasteful and intrusive government. They are instead the result of an explicit social choice of saving (in compulsory form) a larger portion of income in the working years to receive a larger pension in retirement (and to retire earlier). Secondly, social security levies generally have little influence on real labour costs in the long run because they are born primarily by labour, and not by profit earners, whether they are formally collected from the employee nominal compensation or from the employer. (Social security levies may be directly deducted from the take home pay. But even if they are not, say, because they are levied on the employer, they will be tend to be added to nominal labor cost and passed on into higher price – much like an ad valorem tax – thereby reducing the real take home pay by the extent of the levy, at least to a first approximation.) A possible exception may arise for workers on a minimum wage, if that wage is fixed in terms of real take home pay. In that case higher social security levies cannot be shifted to the worker and will instead result in a higher real cost and price and thus higher unemployment. As for the assertion that high social security levies reduce the incentive to find a job by reducing the difference between unemployment compensation and take home pay, the conclusion is obviously valid only if the government pays the social insurance contributions of unemployed workers, or if pensions are independent of the workers’ contributions, which are certainly not the general practice.

On the left side of the political spectrum, European unemployment has been portrayed as the outcome of iv) a crisis of capitalism, v) an excessively rapid rate of technological progress, and vi) competition with low-wage countries. All of these explanations are called into question by a very simple consideration: if they were
valid, they should produce the same high rate of unemployment in all other developed
countries. But in fact the sharp rise in unemployment since the 80’s has no parallel
among other advanced industrial countries. In fact, the unemployment rate of every
OECD country nowadays is below the EU average and only two such countries have
unemployment rates that are even close.

One further and very different line of thought that has supported tolerance
toward the status quo is the argument that the demand - and supply - side factors
above are an inevitable part of European political and social policy and reforms would
be intrinsically undesirable. The restrictive demand-side policies are commonly
viewed as necessary prelude for the further economic and political integration of
Europe; and the restrictive supply-side measures are frequently seen as required to
retain economic equality and social cohesion. It is held that governments must choose
between two disagreeable options: a “flexible” labour market bedeviled by wide
income disparities and an “inflexible” labour market crippled by unemployment. The
“flexible” market, where people's wages reflect their productivity, is allegedly
achieved by reducing job security, restricting unemployment benefits and welfare
entitlements, eliminating minimum wages, bashing the unions, and opting out of the
social chapter. The “inflexible” market, where people's earnings reflect politicians' judgements about fairness and social cohesion, is supposedly achieved by the opposite
policies. This generates the conviction that the ultimate choice, then, is between
inequality and unemployment. In this light, the high level of European
unemployment is sometimes portrayed as a price that must be paid for the
achievement of other important long-term objectives.

These presumptions are reflected in much of the European Union's policy
approach to unemployment. The Luxembourg communiqué and those issued on
earlier occasions restrict their purview to a very limited timid set of supply-side
policies and do not even mention the possible role of demand management policy, and
monetary policy in particular, in affecting unemployment. Furthermore, they stress
that unemployment is a problem that can and must be solved within each country,
without explicit co-ordination of policies between EU countries even though, in
joining the EURO system, the member countries renounce the possibility of
independent demand management policy, monetary or fiscal, and come into close
competition on supply-side policies.

By contrast, we believe that the bulk of European unemployment serves no
useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, it is overtly harmful to the achievement
of the objectives that have been used to rationalize the problem. Since work is the
major avenue whereby people are able to claw their way out of poverty and overcome
economic disadvantage, high levels of unemployment - particularly long-term
unemployment - are deleterious to social cohesion and economic integration.

We call for rejecting the powerful pernicious myth, that blinds policy makers
to unemployment policies that could reduce unemployment without widening the gap
between the rich and poor. Thus it is important to expose the myth and get on with the
urgent business of fundamental policy reform. The trick is to recognise that much of
the current employment policy is responsible for the disagreeable choice between
unemployment and inequality. The current system of unemployment benefits and
taxes is a good example. When unemployed people find jobs, their unemployment
benefits are removed and taxes are imposed. Not surprisingly, this policy discourages
the unemployed from seeking work. Within this misguided system, a policy of
restricting the benefits will reduce unemployment but create more inequality. What
usually gets overlooked is that this unemployment-inequality trade-off is largely the
outcome of the tax-benefit system. If we changed the system, we could free ourselves of the disagreeable trade-off.

For example, generous unemployment benefits - along with the taxes to finance them - help sustain the jobless, but only at the cost of diminishing employers' incentives to create jobs and employees' incentives to accept them.

It is thus extremely important to differentiate carefully between the genuinely promising policy proposals and those that are unpromising in the sense that they may reasonably be expected to turn out ineffective or counter-productive. Making this distinction is not easy because many of the policies that influence unemployment are highly complimentary with one another. This means that potentially enlightened policy initiatives are often ineffective when implemented in isolation from one another. Employment-promoting supply-side policies frequently enhance the effectiveness of employment-promoting demand-side policies, and vice versa. Furthermore, counter-productive policies often emasculate the influence of enlightened policy measures. In the domain of unemployment policy, bad measures drive out the good, and good measures reinforce one another.

In the next section we review several of the major “conventional” policies which have been implemented or proposed and show that they belong to the “unpromising” set and are, in the end, an important source of European unemployment.

3. Misguided Policies as a Cause of High Unemployment

We hold the view that the European unemployment is, in important part, the result of policy errors. These errors involve both a mismanagement of aggregate demand (demand policies) and an unimaginative approach to the supply side of the economy. We are confident that these errors can be corrected promptly, putting an end to the unremitting longer-run growth of European unemployment.

3.1 Errors in Demand Management

The words aggregate demand policy have become familiar to economists ever since Keynes used it to provide an understanding of the Great Depression and the role played in that episode by central banks. Yet at present the concept has become taboo among many European central bankers and political leaders, even though there is plenty of evidence that, in recent years, it plays a significant role in accounting for the rising [changes in] unemployment.

A first suggestive piece of evidence is provided by the observation made earlier that double digit unemployment is common only in Europe - or more specifically among the countries that are in (or are candidates for) the EURO. In fact, the European countries not in the EURO have substantially lower unemployment rates: in Norway the rate is 4%, in Switzerland 5.5%, and in the UK 5.8%.

This observation has some powerful implications. It suggests that in order to gain insight into the constellation of causes responsible for EU unemployment, it is important to identify factors that are shared by most EU member states but are not in evidence in non-EU countries.

On the demand side one experience that the EURO countries have shared in common in the last few years and, generally not shared with others, has been the very restrictive aggregate demand policies, both fiscal and monetary. They have been
forced to pursue these policies as a result of their common endeavour to join the EU. The common fiscal policy was the result of the Maastricht parameters and it was very restrictive in the light of the huge unemployment and resulting depressed government revenues, and of the tight monetary policy. One by-product of this policy has been the slow down of public sector infrastructure that is complementary with private sector investment. Similarly, monetary policy was made uniform by the fact that exchange rates were to be kept narrowly fixed while all restrictions on the free movement of capital were eliminated. Under these conditions, interest rates had to be the same for all the candidate countries and there was no room for the national banks to pursue an independent monetary policy. And the common monetary policy appears to have been also much too tight, especially in the light of the tightening of fiscal policy, resulting in a long period of excessively high real interest rates that have discouraged investment and swollen unemployment.

The relation between unemployment and the demand for labour provides further evidence. Since the beginning of the oil crisis, in 1973, the rate of growth of demand has fallen considerably below that of capacity output -- the sum of productivity and labour force growth. In fact the growth of demand has been roughly the same as that of productivity. Thus demand could be satisfied without a significant increase in jobs and the growth in the labour force of around 2% went to swell the ranks of the unemployed. This process of jobs falling relatively to the labour force is confirmed by direct information on the available jobs, the sum of employment and vacancies. In most EU countries, the number of jobs offered in each year as a percentage of the country's labour force has tended to fall.

For example in France in 1973 there were 101 jobs offered for every 100 persons in the labour force, but by 1993 the jobs available had shrunk to 89. As one would expect, unemployment moved inversely to job availability: as jobs kept shrinking well below the people seeking them, vacancies dwindled from 4% of the labour force in 1973 to a mere 1% in 1986; search time for an unemployed person grew longer and thus unemployment rose from 2.7 to 11.6%. There was only a short span of years, between 1986 and 1990, when demand rose temporarily somewhat faster than productivity, jobs increased from 90.7 to 92.7, and unemployment promptly fell from 10.9 to 8.1%. A similar story may be told of other EU member states.

We believe that one reason for the drastic European decline in the demand for labour relative to its available supply - and the resulting rise in unemployment - has been a decline in investment relative to full-capacity output. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the difference between the growth of unemployment since the early 70's in Europe (8.5%) versus the US (0%) occurs mostly in two episodes since 1982. Up to that year joblessness had increased sharply on both continents as consequence of a restrictive monetary policy and resulting fall in investment, which was unavoidable to halt an inflationary spiral, ignited by the two oil crises. But after 1982 the shortfall and unemployment continued to rise in Europe till 1986, whereas in the US, both fell promptly and significantly. The second episode begins in 1992 and extends to the present. In both these episodes, the investment rose relative to full capacity in the US but remained stagnant at peak levels in Europe.

3.2 Misguided Supply Policies

The measures to combat unemployment that have been suggested do not, in our opinion, reflect the best options available from the potential portfolio of feasible
policy choices. One important source of the European unemployment problem are the misguided conventional policies that have been put into place to support the unemployed and protect the employed from job loss. The following provide three important examples.

**Minimum Wage Legislation**

Minimum wages are widespread in Europe and are potentially an important source of unemployment by excluding from work persons whose contributions to output is less than the minimum wage or by raising the real cost of production and hence reducing the demand for domestic output. To decree that a worker cannot accept a job for less than X is a misguided wrong approach since it will leave unemployed anyone who can contribute less than X to production. Despite numerous studies attempting to measure the influence of minimum wage legislation on unemployment, to date there is little consensus even about the direction of the influence. It is safe to say, however, that the implementation of minimum real wage legislation is unable to play a major role in reducing European unemployment. Although empirical studies have shown that relatively modest increases in the minimum wage may not raise unemployment, there is widespread agreement that large minimum wage hikes - wage increases sufficient to eliminate the major income inequalities between mainstream employees and workers marginally attached to the labour market - would have such an effect. To deny this would be tantamount of maintaining that labour demand is unaffected by any changes in real labour costs. (In fact, if substantial rises in the minimum wage led to increases in labour supply, then labour demand would have to rise in order for unemployment to remain unchanged.)

One further negative impact of minimum wages comes from their interaction with high social security levies. In so far as the minimum wage aims at assuring a minimum real take home pay, higher levies cannot be shifted to the employee: an increase in compulsory saving will be borne by the employer and raise the cost of the employee. This is one of the important factors that make a minimum wage so high in Europe, discouraging the employment of less skilled labour.

**Job Security Legislation**

Some commentators have maintained that job security legislation helps reduce unemployment. The underlying argument is that such legislation reduces both firing (by making it more costly for employers to dismiss their employees) and hiring (by discouraging employers from taking on new recruits who may have to be dismissed in the future). But at given real wages, the firing costs generated by job security legislation discourage firing more than they discourage hiring, since firms that fire must pay the firing costs now, whereas firms that hire may have to pay the firing costs at some point in the future.

However, this argument rests on tenuous foundations. In the first place, even though firms may initially find it economical to employ more people than would be optimal in the absence of constraint, they eventually will find it advantageous to shrink their labour force, at least through attrition and aging and also rely more on overtime. Second, and far more serious, the slow down in the flow of hiring greatly
reduces the chance of outsiders and particularly young people to find a job and is a major cause for the high, in some cases almost unbelievably high, incidence of unemployment among young people. This high rate is particularly striking in countries where no unemployment benefits are provided for people that have never held a job. In addition, a rise in firing costs cannot be expected to leave real wages unchanged. On the contrary, the greater the firing costs, the greater will be the market power of the incumbent employees (insiders) and thus the higher the wages these workers can achieve. Taking further into account the fact that the high cost of firing will add to labour costs both directly and through redundancy, we can expect a lower demand for labour, at least in an open economy. On the whole, job security legislation must be regarded a major negative influence on unemployment especially youth unemployment, even if it might have desirable effects in other directions. Consequently, the lower will be the demand for labour. For these various reasons, increasing job security is far more likely to eventually decrease jobs and employment rather than the reverse.

**Worksharing and Early Retirement**

There can be no objection to people reducing their work week or retiring early if they are prepared to accept the corresponding reduction in weekly pay, but we hold that there is no justification for the government to provide incentives for people to work shorter hours or retire earlier. The logic underlying work-sharing and early retirement is of course elementary. If there is a fixed amount of paid work to be done in the economy, and if this work falls very unequally across the population - with a majority of people enjoying full-time employment while a minority is saddled with long periods of unemployment - then considerations of equity and social cohesion make it reasonable to seek policies that share the burden of unemployment more democratically. In short, if the pain and impoverishment of unemployment are inevitable, it may the best to spread the misery as evenly as possible.

The problem with this approach is that the underlying premise is false. We do not believe that the European unemployment problem is unavoidable. The amount of work to be done in the economy is not fixed. When the economy is in recession, an increase in production and employment - in response, for instance, to a rise in export demand or on private investment - will lead to a rise in purchasing power and thereby generate a further increase in production and employment. In this sense, unemployment is not inevitable. Policy makers who see it as such are being unduly defeatist; they should spend more thought on bringing unemployment down rather than on spreading it more thinly.

We therefore agree that those measures are not appropriate as the central pillar of a policy strategy to reduce unemployment. In fact, they pose some dangers of becoming counter-productive in the sense they might reduce the total number of hours worked in the economy even if they succeeded in increasing the number or people working. It has proved very difficult to implement them without raising non-wage labour costs (particularly costs of hiring and training) and thereby discouraging firms from creating more jobs. Furthermore, by diminishing the number of people competing for jobs, these measures may indirectly put upward pressure on wages and thereby on prices. Governments or monetary authorities may then feel called upon to
dampen inflation through contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, thereby generating further unemployment.

The push for shorter work week as a device to reduce unemployment by work sharing has taken recently a dangerous turn when some of its sponsors, in an effort to gain popular support for the measure, have proposed that the reduction from 40 to 35 hours should be accompanied by an unchanged weekly pay. We regard this version as little more than demagogy. It would compound the difficulties already encountered in reducing individual hours while maintaining the hours worked by the firm, by imposing a rise in hourly wages by 5/35 or nearly 15%. The effect could not but be disruptive. The increase in labour costs could hardly be expected to come out of profits but could be expected, instead, to be passed along in higher output prices. This would result in a weekly real wage equivalent to 35 hours and/or in successful demands for higher nominal wages, initiating a wage-price spiral. But with fixed exchanges or a single currency, the rising prices would also reduce the share of the country's foreign and domestic markets and prove a new source of unemployment. This effect might be mitigated if all countries undertook the measure simultaneously, but the inflationary spiral would be reinforced.

4. Proposed Policies for a Timely Reduction of Unemployment

In what follows, we set forth a number of practical proposals aimed at a prompt reduction of unemployment. We are quite confident that if the advice is given proper attention by governments and monetary authorities, unemployment can be reduced by 4 or 5 percentage points in a matter of a few years and without compromising the recent gain in subduing inflation.

Our proposals cover both demand- and supply-side policies. We wish to emphasize that these policies are not to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Our recommended policy package is not to be viewed as a portfolio of independent measures, from which policy makers can pick and choose. Rather, as noted at the beginning of the Manifesto, we regard the policies as complementary to one another, with the demand-side policies creating a need for the new jobs that the supply-side policies make available.

The failure to exploit policy complementarities may be an important reason why so many of the partial, piecemeal labour market reforms implemented in EU member states have done little to reduce Europe's unemployment problem. In Spain, for example, a labour market reform has been introduced in 1984, whose main aim was to achieve a greater flexibility in labour contracts. Among other things, this reform introduced fixed-term labour contracts with low firing costs. As a result, fixed-term labour contracts have grown quickly and Spanish firms have used them to buffer fluctuations in demand by changing the number of fixed-term employees. But, at the same time, this policy reduced the risk of unemployment for workers with permanent contracts, which reinforced the bargaining strength of the insiders. Since wage bargaining agreements mainly reflect the interests of the latter, this reform has turned out to cause more rigidity rather than more flexibility of the wage rate. To mitigate this unwanted effect, Spain has recently reintroduced some restrictions on fixed term contracts and has reduced firing costs for all workers.

In France, several acts have been passed aimed at introducing a greater flexibility in the labour market and at preventing the negative effects of both minimum wages and the highest payroll taxes among OECD countries. Moreover, restrictions on part-time work have been eased, and work-sharing has been
encouraged. But nothing has been done in this country to reduce the stringency of job protection legislation and the bargaining power of insiders.

In Italy, a reform of the labour market was first passed in 1991, which allowed small and medium size firms to dismiss redundant workers, but only with the agreement of the unions. The so-called "mobilità lunga" (long mobility) was also introduced, which consists in the possibility to put the unwanted workers in the social security system (thus aggravating its operating costs) before giving these workers the right to definitely retire. A second reform has been recently introduced in 1997, which permits firms to hire workers temporarily from appropriate employment agencies (But in a typical display of Italian partisan economic obtuseness, it has been suggested that the people to be rented out on a part time basis, should be hired by the agency on a permanent basis!).

Also in Sweden, some reforms have been approved in order to increase labour market flexibility. In this country, unemployment benefits are of comparatively short duration, but the replacement ratios (the ratios of unemployment benefits to wages) are high. Thus, jobless people can move from unemployment benefits to training programs and back, while generous welfare state entitlements encourage leisure relative to employment. In general, the welfare benefits in this country are so generous to render the condition of inactivity, especially for medium aged people, more appealing than employment.

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the only two European countries that have witnessed appreciable reductions in unemployment from their labour market reforms over the last two decades. These successes may well be due to the broad-based nature of their reforms, enabling them to exploit significant policy complementarities. The UK, for instance, introduced legislation restricting strikes and secondary picketing, decentralising wage bargaining, liberalising hiring and firing restrictions, reducing the duration of unemployment benefits and tightening the associated eligibility criteria. Moreover, minimum wages have been abolished (soon to be reintroduced by the current Labour government) and unemployment benefits have been reduced, and, at the same time, new procedures have been implemented in order to facilitate the search for a job for the unemployed people. These reforms, together with the decision to opt out from the European Monetary Union, at least in the initial stage, have spared this country the need to adopt restrictive aggregate demand policies and have greatly contributed to the fall in the UK unemployment rate from 10.5% in the 1993 (approximately equal to the EU average) to less than 6% in 1997. This result, moreover, has been achieved without substantially changing other welfare state entitlements, such as housing benefits, or by a thoroughgoing drive to improve education and training systems.

The experience of the UK and the Netherlands also highlights the dangers of leaving particular policy complementarities unexploited. In both countries the tightening of the unemployment benefit system was not matched by a correspondingly fundamental reform of the sickness and incapacity benefit systems. Consequently budgetary pressures have shifted from unemployment benefits to sickness and incapacity benefits. Since the latter have a longer duration than unemployment benefits, the shift created more serious conditions of dependency from publicly provided income support than unemployment insurance. Thus in the Netherlands, which has one of the most generous disability benefits systems among the OECD countries, the percentage of persons directly involved in social benefits reaches 17%.

In sum, European countries have not, on the whole, sought to reduce unemployment by implementing a coherent strategy of fundamental reforms across a
broad range of complementary policies. In the main, these countries have adopted a number of \textit{ad hoc} measures that attempt marginal corrections to the most egregious distortions stemming from existing labour market policies or regulations. We argue that, since only marginal, piece meal changes have been implemented, existing restrictive institutions and regulations that are complementary to each other continue to interact, blocking the effectiveness of the recent reforms and prolonging unemployment.

Accordingly, our recommended policy strategy is a) to implement a broad spectrum of supply-side policy reforms that give employers a greater incentive to create jobs in response increases in demand and give employees a greater incentive to accept these jobs, and (b) to implement demand-side policies that enable the European economies to raise their growth rates of capital formation and productivity, and to use the productive potential that has been released through the supply-side reforms.

\subsection*{4.1 Aggregate Demand Policies}

We believe that the demand-side strategy for reducing EU unemployment should involve policies that stimulate a broad revival of investment activity, taking care not to ignite inflationary pressures or increase the size of the national debt relative to national assets. The process of stimulating investment is, to a very considerable extent, self reinforcing, because of a well established mechanism, known as the accelerator effect. As investment rises, increasing employment and output, the initially existing excess productive capacity will become more fully utilised and there will soon be a need for additional capacity, which will require new investment.

It is generally agreed that labour and capital are often complementary in the production process, so that an increase in the capital stock usually leads to a rise in labour productivity. Provided that the economy is kept out of recession - so that the danger is avoided that firms employ as little labour as possible to meet a given, deficient product demand - and provided that there are sufficient supply incentives in place to encourage employers and potential employees to exploit profitable job opportunities, increases in labour productivity will generally lead to increases in labour demand and consequent reductions in unemployment.

The endeavour to expand the rate of investment need not, and should not, be limited to private investment. The constraints on public investment are currently felt with particular stringency because of the large public-sector debt existing in many European countries, and because of the consequent limitations on fiscal deficit imposed by the Maastricht parameters, together with the unfortunate circumstance that, in computing the deficit, all expenditures, whether on current account or for investment, are treated identically. Under these conditions, governments have frequently found it expedient to cut investments, even if highly desirable, rather than cut the budget for public employment (e.g., by reducing the number of employees). Given the prospective difficulties many EU member states face in satisfying the Maastricht criteria, this under-investment is likely to continue.

In order for an expansion of public investment to produce the same beneficial effects on unemployment as private investment, it is necessary that it should be financed neither by cutting other expenditure - except for transfer payments whenever it is possible - nor by raising taxes (which at present would be practically impossible.
anyway). This means that the additional investments must be financed, for most of the countries, in just the same way as private investments are typically financed, namely by raising the money in the capital markets in the form of debt or equity. Private-sector finance of public investment, along the lines currently being explored in some EU countries such as the UK, needs to be expanded as well.

In this context, it would be important to introduce a distinction, long overdue, between the current and the capital account deficit, and to redefine the budget deficit, for the purpose of the Maastricht agreement and the later stability pact, as consisting of the current account deficit only. The Current Account Budget should include all current expenditures and receipts (expenditures that benefit those present and receipts collected from them) and it is appropriate to require that this budget be balanced, as this places the cost of current expenditure on the current beneficiaries.

The amount of public capital expenditures, on the other hand, should be primarily limited by the requirement that each project should have a return over its life at least as competitive as market returns (with proper adjustment for taxes). However the difference, if any, between the cash receipts and the annual cost of providing the services, including the interest cost, and the depreciation, would be charged to the Current Account as a current expense (if negative) or treated as a current income (if positive).

Of course deficit financing of government expenditure, when there is no room for an expansion of employment, tends to crowd out private investment, and thus burden future generations by depriving them of the return on crowded out capital. But we hold that the program of government investment we advocate will not harm and may even improve the lot of future generations. In the first place, when there is an enormous reserve of unemployed resources, investment will increase income and thus saving, at least to the extent of financing the investment without any crowding out. In the second place, infrastructural investment increases the marginal product of both capital and labour in the private sector, which will have expansionary effects. Finally, we agree that debt financing of capital expenditures satisfying the above criteria, unlike that financing a current account deficit, would not be harmful to future generations, even if it displaced an equal amount of private investment, because its return would at least compensate for the return lost on private investment.

We propose to concentrate public investment on specific infrastructures capable of giving returns in the short run. To finance these investments we propose that the existing European Structural Funds should be more used than in the past. Such funds, already considerable (153 billions of ECU's for the period 1994-99), should be enlarged and their regulations should be re-negotiated, especially with regard to the procedure to spend them, since in the future they could become the main financial instrument of the European strategy to cure unemployment and promote growth. Today these funds can be spent only if the State using them provides simultaneously an equal amount of funds. This regulation is wise, but an interval should be granted when there is a proper guarantee. Moreover, to avoid delays, a particular care should be devoted to the organisation of the structures in charge of the projects. In countries like Italy, in which it is particularly important to keep at a low level the public deficit, recently achieved after a long and costly effort, it would be advisable to partly finance the infrastructural investments by also using a share of the receipts obtained from the privatisation of public enterprises.

But, the success of the operation requires a revision of the principle that has emerged from the meetings in Amsterdam and Luxembourg, namely that the solution of the unemployment problem is not a collective responsibility but a task to be tackled
by each country on its own. This approach is mistaken and will make a prompt solution very unlike. It springs from the view that unemployment is mainly due only to the malfunctioning of the labour market. But while we all concur that labour relations greatly contribute to the problem, we also share the view that demand plays a major role, relying on the evidence presented above as well as other evidence and reasoning. But the agreements of the two recent summits actually hamper the exercise of demand policy, because, after assigning to the individual states the task of reducing unemployment, they deprive them of all the classical tools of demand management: i) monetary policy, because individual central banks have already little control over interest rates and will have, gradually, even less; ii) fiscal policy, because of the rigid constraint on fiscal deficit; and iii) exchange rate policy. And the European Union, besides being exonerated of any responsibility, has no tools either: the Brussels Commission has no resources to spend, and the European Central Bank (ECB) is to concern itself exclusively with price stability.

The solution we are advocating, by contrast, requires co-ordination of policies of EU member states. Indeed, if any country were to engage in a demand-side expansion alone, then, as is well-known, its effect on unemployment would be much smaller than under a co-ordinated policy approach, because much of its beneficial impact would be lost to it and would spill over to others, through higher imports. The resulting deterioration of the current account could be so severe as to make the expansion inadvisable. But when the expansion is simultaneous and symmetric, then the increased imports will be offset by an increase in exports resulting from the increased imports of the other countries, and this will both help the current account balance and restore the potency of the expansion of investment. In short, in a simultaneous expansion, countries would be helping each other.

**The role of the European Central Bank**

In addition to the supply side measures illustrated in Section 4.2 below, our proposed plan advocates a significant revival of aggregate demand and that revival in turn is expected to come from a strong and long lasting inversion of the persistently declining or stagnant trend of private investment activity. We expect that some of this inversion may come from the supply measures below; but most of it, especially in the early stages, must come from the long acknowledged, classical tool of investment control: monetary policy. But this policy is the prerogative of the Central Banks, which, hereafter, means essentially the new European Central Bank.

This has one very basic implication: if Europe really intends to achieve a rapid reduction in unemployment, it is necessary to give a broader and more constructive interpretation to the statutes that define the role of the Central Bank than that which is currently widely accepted. According to that interpretation, the bank has but one target (one single front on which to do battle), namely preventing inflation. We urge a fundamental broadening of that interpretation – analogous to that of the U.S Federal Reserve - to include, on an equal footing, another target: keeping unemployment under control. And we are confident that it can do so without renouncing or sacrificing its commitment against inflation.

There are three major considerations that support this view of the proper role of the Central Bank on the path of return to high employment. In the first place, making price stability the overriding target at this time is much like using all your military budget to fight the last war, an enemy that is no longer there. Inflation has been a most serious problem because of, and during, the two oil crisis and their aftermath (including German reunification). But since 1991 inflation has been falling
steadily for the group as a whole, and within each country, with hardly any exception. It is now around 2%, clearly a small number especially when taking into account the unquestionable upward bias of all inflation indices.

In summary, the perils of inflation as a result of a revival of investments are negligible at the present time. And that danger will be further reduced by applying several of the supply measures advocated below, which will increase the incentives to accept jobs as they become available. We submit therefore that, under present conditions, assigning the ECB the single task of fighting inflation should not be acceptable. It leaves it far too much unnecessary leeway, e.g. given that wages are rigid, it can satisfy that target by a prudential policy of raising interest rates ad lib, reducing investment and raising unemployment further.

A second reason why the ECB should not make price stability its single, overriding focus is that, realistically, it has very limited control over the price level, at least in the short run. Indeed, its policy instruments – the money supply or interest rate policy – do not directly affect prices when there is slack in the labor market. Given large-scale unemployment, they can affect prices only indirectly by affecting the rate of economic activity, and hence the rate of unemployment (and utilization of capacity) and thereby the growth of wages and finally prices. But unemployment is not a very potent instrument to control inflation when there is already plenty of slack while it has a major impact on society’s welfare.

The third and crucial reason for the central role of the ECB in the program of investment expansion is that, as control over monetary policy shifts from the states to the ECB, the latter becomes the only institution that has substantial power to influence investments. The other possible approach to stimulate investments could be through fiscal measures (subsidies, tax rebates, tax credits), but such measures cannot play a significant role at this time in view of the severe fiscal squeeze resulting from the Maastricht parameters.

One can think of various objections to this reinterpretation of the role and responsibilities of the ECB. One is that the Bank lacks the power to stimulate investment. This objection is especially popular among Central Bankers. But this argument is disingenuous. How can a Central Bank claim that it can control prices if it cannot control demand and how can it control demand if it has no control at all over investment? Another objection is that the Euro needs to establish itself as a prestigious, credible currency in the world capital markets. To satisfy this need what is required is a policy that will be viewed as continuation of the though policies of the Bundesbank, involving high interest rates that will attract capital and help to support high exchange rates, especially with respect to the dollar, seen as the major competing world currency. We believe that it would be a deadly mistake for the ECB to focus on a competitive struggle with the dollar, fought through the escalation of interest rates, and at the expense of an economic revival. The high value of the dollar is the result of the strength of the American economy achieved through a policy of full employment pursued with “benign neglect” of the international “pecking order”. The ECB must adopt the same attitude of independence aiming at fostering an economy as vigorous and prosperous as the American economy.

The awesome responsibility of the ECB for maintaining high growth in Europe have become even more serious with tragic events of the last few week in Asia, and Russia and the sharp set backs in the equity markets. It is up to the ECB and to Europe with its still sound fundamentals to engage in a policy of supporting domestic investment and demand offsetting the expected decline in net exports.
4.2 Supply-Side Measures

We do not believe that a widespread liberalisation of the labour market in Europe, along the lines of that existing in the American or Japanese labour markets, is advisable, even if it were feasible. It is important to keep in mind that the present European welfare systems spring from different cultures and from different ways to interpret the solidarity and equality principles. However, we think that, in order to fight unemployment, it is necessary and feasible to introduce a substantially higher degree of flexibility in the European labour and product markets including, where necessary, a relaxation of job security legislation, a reduction in the coverage of collective bargaining agreements, and a reduction of barriers to entry of firms and of barriers to geographic mobility of labour. We believe that if such measures are combined with the reform strategy outlined below, both the efficiency and equity of European labour markets can be improved. The economic instruments now available in many European countries to pursue these efficiency and equity goals are insufficient. The portfolio of policy instruments needs to be expanded, along the lines suggested hereafter.

The labour market flexibility policies, unlike the macroeconomic management, cannot be uniformly adopted by all the European countries; on the contrary, they should be adapted to the different situations of each country and region.

We begin by recalling that an important aspect of European unemployment is found in the regional differences that characterize this phenomenon. We believe that one important source of differential unemployment within countries is the uniformity of wages imposed by unions or custom in national negotiations, disregarding the glaring fact of important regional differences in productivity. We are in agreement that to remedy this problem requires recognizing the need for regional differentiation in labor cost per hour reflecting regional differences in productivity. But in order for these reforms to obtain a large social consensus, it is necessary that they be accompanied by measures that compensate for their negative effects on income distribution. In fact, it is evident that fundamental labour market reforms are very difficult to implement because usually, while they have readily identifiable distributional consequences for specific groups of people, it is not always easy to readily see their advantages for everybody. For this reason, it is likely that the most radical components of the reform packages will probably face strong opposition from the groups most affected by such reforms. Compensating the prospective losers is important to mitigate this difficulty. With respect to the realignment of labor in line with productivity one basic approach is not to put all the emphasis on reducing wages but on reducing cost to the firm through appropriate subsidies. Some suggestions for accomplishing this task efficiently are suggested below (see e.g. the section on the BTP).

There is also evidence that the lower productivity and higher unemployment in some regions, like the South of France Italy and Spain, reflects a paucity of entrepreneurs. We share the opinion that in these less developed regions, more active policies are needed in order to encourage new firms and help small and medium-size firms, whose growth can be accelerated by some appropriate measures. For example, Italy has had some success with industrial districts. By industrial districts we mean here some horizontal aggregations of small and medium size firms, where each firm operates in an autonomous way from the others, but whose production is in fact coordinated with others in the district, with resulting external economies.

A successful example of regional development pushed on by the diffusion of
industrial districts is the functional integration of small and medium size firms that occurred in many Italian regions like Toscana, Marche, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna. But, for the regional development to further proceed by the implementation of this model, we need to introduce some reforms of the industrial districts, so as to reinforce them and make them more effective and dynamic. Such measures should aim primarily at creating advisory institutions in the field of bureaucratic, fiscal, financial and technological matters. As for the new technologies, it is fitting to emphasize the importance of the re-organization and the expansion of institutions for labour training and of the relations between firms and Universities and other research institutions.

Another characteristic common to many underdeveloped regions is the rationing and high cost of credit, which affects new and small firms in general, reflecting both the cost of processing small loans, their risk, as well as the monopolistic power (and sometime the inefficiency) of the local banks. In these regions the spread between lending and borrowing rates has been huge and nearly prohibitive, discouraging small firms and new initiative. In some countries like Italy a great improvement in the availability and cost of loans has been obtained through the formation of cooperative of borrowers. The members of the cooperative, in exchange for the availability and lower cost of credit, must be willing to assume some personal responsibility to guarantee the repayment of the overall obligation assumed by the cooperative, something they are willing to do because of personal knowledge and trust of those who are admitted to the cooperative. In addition local governments (regional or subregional) typically have provided a rotating fund which also serves to increase the guarantee offered to the banks.

We advocate, where necessary, a broad supply-side reform package that includes the following well-known elements:

- **Job creation policies and product market reform** to reduce barriers to employment creation.
  Examples of such policies include tax reform or relaxation of regulations restricting the entry of firms, restrictions on land use, regulations limited product market competition, as well as measures to avoid penalizing flexible time schedules and part-time work. Measures to encourage part-time leasing of workers may help not only to provide currently unemployed workers with a stepping stone into the world of work, but also help firms restructure their organization of production and work in accordance with the new advances in information technology and flexible manufacturing.

  The tight regulation of the atypical working contracts now existing in many European countries deserves special attention in formulating labour market reforms. The abolition of the minimum wages regulations, at least in some works, and an extension and generalization of part-time jobs could favor youngsters and women, whose possibility to work is often tied to these more flexible kinds of contracts. Usually, on the contrary, the existing laws favor only long term labour contracts, which are much less flexible.

- **Reform of job security legislation policies** to reduce the ratio of firing costs of average wages:
  We have criticized earlier the policies that have pushed job protection, to the point where firing of workers was a nearly impossible task. Although the situation has generally improved, there seems little question that the present institutions in many European countries still contribute to the unemployment problem by discouraging firms from hiring permanent employees even in the presence of a
We therefore share the view that the reforms needed to reduce unemployment must include substantial reforms of the job security provisions.

We do not believe that it would be possible or advisable to push reforms as far as the American system, where job security provisions are largely absent. But there must be a marked liberalisation of the ability of firms to eliminate surplus labour, and some with respect to dismissal of individual workers for cause. This is particularly important in order to deal with youth unemployment, which is a serious problem in many European countries.

However we recommend that these reforms be postponed to a more suitable time. To carry them out now, when the demand is greatly depressed and there is plenty of unemployment, probably a good deal of redundant labour in many firms and few vacancies, would have simply the effect of condemning many workers to join the rank of the unemployed, initially reducing instead of increasing employment. It would therefore meet with an understandably bitter opposition of union and workers who might well succeed in maintaining the status quo. In our view, therefore, the reforms should be postponed until, and made conditional upon, the realisation of more favourable labour market conditions, which should hopefully not take very long if our program is pursued. But it would seem feasible and desirable to spell out promptly the conditions for proceeding with the reforms, e.g. when unemployment first reaches 7%. Furthermore, the content of these reforms should be agreed upon promptly. This two stage approach should make the reforms far more palatable to labour while at the same time encouraging employers to assume more labour as the demand expands in the expectation that, if eventually the new employee assumed should prove redundant, they would be able to scale down their labour force.

- **Search promoting policies** to reduce labour market search costs, such as job counselling, information provision to unemployed workers and firms with vacancies. The UK experience with its Restart Programme and its counselling initiatives associated with the Welfare to Work policy indicates that such search promoting policies have an important role to play in enhancing the effectiveness of other employment creation measures, such as employment vouchers and training initiatives. These latter measures are likely to have a strong influence only if the currently unemployed workers are aware of them and help to make use of them as part of explicitly formulated strategies of gaining long-term employment in accordance with their idiosyncratic abilities.

- **policies to stimulate worker mobility**, such as policies to increase the portability of housing subsidies, as well as the portability of health insurance and pensions between firms; and

- **Unemployment benefit reforms**: Unemployment benefit systems should be reformed in such a way as to give unemployed people appropriate incentives to seek work when jobs are available for them and to support them when such jobs are absent. Accordingly the size of unemployment benefits could be made to depend on the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. The greater the number of vacancies relative to unemployed (in specified skill categories), the lower the unemployment benefits would be (within these categories). This proposal would promote efficiency, since it would give the unemployed a greater incentive to search, the greater is the firms’ demand for their services. It would also help fulfil governments’ equity objectives, since unemployed people are in greatest need of support when they are unable to find
work.
This policy would generate a favourable complementarity between demand-side and supply-side policies. A government stimulus to aggregate demand (and thereby vacancies) could then be financed, partially or wholly, through the associated drop in unemployment benefit payments.

The political economy of unemployment benefit design could be influenced through the device of charging the cost of unemployment compensation to the public in the form of a separate tax. At present, the cost of unemployment, both its social cost and the cash cost of the benefit systems is not well known, because, as has been frequently noted, it typically affects but a small fraction of the population. This has the consequence that, on the one hand, the public does put enough pressure on the government and the Central Bank to correct the situation, and at the same time it makes voters frequently inclined to favour programs that grant excessive unemployment benefits through mechanisms that are economically wasteful. The above segregation would improve voters’ information on this issue and permit them to make better informed policy choices.

Finally, we should like to stress that while the enforcement of specific micro-supply policies is primarily a matter for the individual member governments, all the member states share a common interest in the design of the unemployment policies and in making sure that these policies are forcefully pursued everywhere. This conclusion rests on the consideration that, because of the rising degree of factor mobility within the EU, as well as EU regulations concerning open market access and cross-border competition, the appropriate level of subsidiarity in unemployment policy making does not lie exclusively at the level of the EU member states. In addition, each member state has a very real and tangible interest in the reduction of unemployment in other countries as it contributes to reduce its own. Therefore the European Commission needs to take the lead in providing a legal and institutional framework within which necessary labour market reforms can take place and in making sure that the reforms are promptly carried through.

In addition, we believe that EU governments should also consider some more innovative supply-side policy proposals that are designed to reform the incentives that employers and employees face. Currently EU governments spend massive sums of money on unemployment support, further education, and training. We believe that the question that should be asked is whether these funds could be redirected to create more incentives for employers to generate jobs and workers to become employed. The following are some illustrative policy measures that take this tack.

**Conditional Negative Income Taxes**

This measure may be seen as an alternative to supporting jobless people through unemployment benefits. The conditions attached to the proposed negative income tax would be analogous to those attached to current unemployment benefits. For instance if, under the current unemployment benefit system, people must provide evidence of serious job search in order to qualify for unemployment benefits, then they must also be required to provide such evidence under the proposed conditional negative income tax system; if unemployment benefits decline with unemployment duration under the current benefit system, then so too must the negative income taxes.

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in US belongs to this family of
initiatives. The socially desirable relation between the magnitude of the negative income tax and the individual level of income has yet to be analysed rigorously. The EITC is hump-shaped (so that the magnitude of the negative income tax rises with income at low income levels and then falls toward zero at higher income levels), whereas many of the proposed negative income tax schemes involve a strictly inverse relation between the size of the tax and the income level.

The broad argument in favour of a switch from unemployment benefits to negative income taxes is that this policy could meet the equity and efficiency objectives of current unemployment benefit systems more effectively than the unemployment benefit systems themselves. Although conditional negative income taxes would generate the same type of policy inefficiencies as unemployment benefits, the former would tend to do so to a lesser degree than the latter. For example, negative income taxes may be expected to discourage job search, but by less than unemployment benefits, for when a worker finds a job, he loses all his unemployment benefits, but only a fraction of his negative income taxes.

It is worth noting that a major criticism of the traditional negative income tax schemes - namely, that they make people's material well-being less dependent on employment and thereby discourage employment - obviously doesn't apply to conditional negative income taxes, since these taxes are conditional on the same things as current unemployment benefits.

Furthermore, conditional negative income taxes also tend to be more effective than unemployment benefits in overcoming labour market inefficiencies generated by credit constraints (e.g. people being unable to take enough time to find an appropriate job match or unable to acquire the appropriate amount of training on account of credit constraints), since the presence of these constraints is more closely associated with low incomes than with unemployment.

The Benefit Transfer Program (BTP)

The aim of the Benefit Transfer Program is simply to redirect the funds that the government currently spends on the unemployed - in the form of unemployment benefits, temporary layoff pay, redundancy subsidies, poverty allowances, and more - so as to give firms an incentive to employ these people. The BTP gives the long-term unemployed people the opportunity to redirect some of the benefits to which he is entitled to a voucher that can be turned over to a firm that will hire him.

The magnitude of the vouchers is to be set by the government, and depends on the magnitude of individuals' unemployment benefits (the higher the benefits, the higher the vouchers) and unemployment duration (the longer the unemployment spells, the higher the vouchers). The size of the vouchers is set so as to be financed from the unemployment benefits and other welfare entitlements foregone when people move from unemployment into jobs. Once a person is hired, the voucher gradually declines as the duration of employment proceeds. The vouchers could be given either to the prospective employers or employees. When unemployed people find jobs, they give up their unemployment benefits in exchange for the wage they earn.

The vouchers come in two varieties: “recruitment vouchers” and “training vouchers.” The former are granted solely on the condition that a previously long-term unemployed person is recruited; the latter are conditional on the employer being able to prove that the voucher is spent entirely on training the new recruit at nationally
accredited training schemes. The recruitment and training vouchers both are related in the same way to the duration of a person’s previous unemployment and the duration of that person’s subsequent employment, but the level of the training voucher (other things equal) is higher than that of the recruitment voucher.

Since the BTP is voluntary, it extends the range of choices open to the unemployed and their potential employers. The unemployed will join only if it is to their advantage, i.e. if the wages they would be offered are higher than their unemployment benefits. At the same time, employers will join only if they find it profitable. Once again, many could well do so, since the vouchers could reduce their labour costs. In short, employees may wind up receiving substantially more than their unemployment support, and many employers may find themselves paying substantially less than the prevailing wages. The BTP has the unique capability of making most participants in the labor market better off: the unemployed who earns more, the employer who secures a lower cost, and the government that reduces its expenses incurred for the unemployed. This “free lunch” is possible since the BTP induces people who were previously unemployed to become productive, and the proceeds of the output they generate may be divided among the economic agents above.

The BTP has been implemented in various forms in the UK, the Netherlands, and several other OECD countries. Empirical studies of the program indicate that there are three major obstacles to its effectiveness: (i) displacement of current employees by the targeted groups of workers, (ii) dead-weight (paying vouchers to unemployed people who would have found jobs anyway), and (iii) substitution (the employment of the targeted group rather than unemployed workers outside the targeted group). The first obstacle can by confining the vouchers to firms that increase their total employment relative to their industry average. (The condition must be formulated relative to the industry average, for otherwise the scheme would be less effective in economic downturns – when the need for employment creation is greatest – than in upturns.) The second and third obstacles can be reduced by targeting the employment vouchers at the long-term unemployed (since they have a relatively low probability of finding jobs anyway and are often imperfect substitutes for the short-term unemployed). However, these measures can only reduce, but never completely eliminate displacement, dead-weight and substitution. Nevertheless, evaluations of the program in the UK and the Netherlands have shown that, when the program is appropriately designed, it is able to create significant additional employment without putting upward pressure on wages. Moreover, even if the vouchers lead some firms to substitute their current employees for subsidized workers to be retain the subsidized workers only so long as their vouchers last, the program will still succeed in substituting short-term for long-term unemployment. This would still lead to a fall in aggregate unemployment, since the short-term unemployed have higher chances of employment than the long-term unemployed.

Beyond that, the BTP is not be inflationary, since it reduces firms’ labour costs and since the long-term unemployed have no noticeable effect on wage inflation. If designed properly, it costs the government nothing, since the money for the employment vouchers would have been spent on unemployment support anyway.

By offering higher vouchers for training, the Program could become the basis for an effective national training initiative. Clearly, firms will spend the vouchers on training only if they intend to retain their recruits after the subsidies have run out. Thus the training for the unemployed would automatically come with the prospect of long-term employment. This is something that the existing government training
schemes do not offer. Many existing schemes also run the risk of being ill-suited to people's diverse potential job opportunities, whereas under the BTP firms would naturally provide the training most appropriate to the available jobs. And whereas the existing training schemes are costly to run, the BTP is free.

Finally, the BTP could play a vital role in tackling regional unemployment problems. Regions of high unemployment would become areas containing a high proportion of workers with training vouchers, thereby providing an incentive for companies to move there and provide the appropriate training.

**Unemployment and Training Accounts (UTAs)**

Under this proposal - already implemented partially in Chile - every employable person would have an unemployment account to provide support against job loss and a training account to provide funding to acquire new skills. Instead of paying taxes to finance unemployment support, further education and training, employed people would be required to make regular contributions to their UTAs. The mandatory contributions would rise with their incomes. To maintain the living standards of the poor, the government would pay contributions of the lowest income groups, and tax the contributions of the higher income groups. People could also make voluntary contributions in excess of these amounts.

If people become unemployed, they could make limited withdrawals from their unemployment accounts instead of receiving unemployment benefits. If they wished to acquire skills, they could draw on their training accounts instead of receiving government grants, subsidies, and loans. If their UTA balances fell below a specified limit, they would receive public assistance on the same basis as with the conditional negative income tax scheme above. If their UTA balances became sufficiently high, they could use the surplus funds for other purposes. At the end of their working lives, their remaining UTA balances could be used to top up their pensions.

People would be able to borrow money on favourable terms for their training accounts, enabling them to finance their training through their future incomes. Unemployed people who develop promising job market strategies at their Restart interviews could receive government loan guarantees when they borrowed training account money. Employers' contributions to training accounts would receive favourable tax treatment.

People would be free to make withdrawals from their training accounts at any point in their working lifetimes. Those who identify their preferred careers early in their working lives may draw substantially on their accounts soon after leaving secondary school. Those who take longer to find their niche in the labour market, or those who require retraining upon changing occupations, would make significant withdrawals much later in their careers. In this way, the training accounts would enable people to remain employable and adaptable throughout their working lives.

The UTAs would initially be managed largely on a Pay-As-You-Go basis (similar to saving accounts, from which people can make withdrawals even though the banks use most of the money for other purposes). With the passage of time, the UTAs would eventually be turned into a fully funded system, where individuals...
would have discretion over who could manage their UTAs. To guard against bankruptcy, the financial activities of the private-sector UTA fund managers would be regulated, along lines similar to the regulation of commercial banks.

Adopting the UTA system could substantially reduce the level of long-term unemployment and promote skills. In particular, moving from unemployment benefits to unemployment accounts would give people greater incentives to avoid long periods of unemployment. For the longer people remain unemployed, the lower will be their unemployment account balances and consequently the smaller the funds available to them later on. And since the unemployment accounts generate more employment than unemployment benefits, the unemployment account contributions necessary to finance a given level of unemployment support would be lower than the taxes necessary to finance the same level of unemployment benefits.

Furthermore, the training accounts would be better suited than the current education and training programs to ensure people's lifetime employability, since the accounts could be accessed whenever employees and their employers found it maximally worthwhile. In this way, employers and employees stand to gain from the switch to UTAs. Retired people would gain through their ability to use their UTA balances to augment their pensions. And the government would gain, since the removal of the distortions from unemployment benefit system would promote new economic activity and thereby generate increased tax revenue. Beyond that, the UTAs would be more efficient than the current system at redistributing income from rich to poor, since unemployment benefits and training schemes are not targeted exclusively at the poor, whereas government contributions to UTAs would be.

In order to provide additional incentives to find work and acquire the relevant skills, the government would provide subsidies for long-term unemployed people who use their UTAs to provide recruitment vouchers or training vouchers for firms that hire them. The size of each person's voucher would depend on his wages earned over next two years of subsequent employment. The recruitment vouchers would reduce firms' cost of employing the long-term unemployed; the training vouchers would reduce the cost of training them. The subsidies would be set so that they could be financed through the tax revenues from people's first two years of subsequent employment and through the abolition of in-work benefits. I don't know what the underscored words mean.

In short, replacing the current system by UTA would reduce unemployment and simultaneously promote equality. While people are generally resentful of their tax burden and often demeaned by the existing unemployment benefits and training programs, they would be more willing to contribute to personalised accounts for their own purposes. The UTAs would give people more freedom to use unemployment support and training funds to meet their diverse individual needs. It would give them greater latitude to respond to changing job opportunities, finance periods of job search, acquire skills, and provide for retirement. And all this could be done without creating greater inequality or increasing government expenditure.

**Auctioning Off Unemployment Benefits and Employment Vouchers**

Existing unemployment benefit systems could be radically reformed to improve the incentives for job creation and job search without exacerbating disparities in incomes. Auctioning employment vouchers and auctioning unemployment benefits may be useful in this regard.

Regarding the former proposal, the government could auction employment vouchers to the firms. Firms would qualify for a number of vouchers equal to (a) the
number of previously unemployed people they intend to hire minus (b) the number of employees they fire (or separate from).\textsuperscript{1} Firms’ entitlement would also be withdrawn if they used the vouchers to displace current employees. To make this provision credible, employees who believe they have been displaced would have the right of complaint, to be investigated by an independent body. If the complaint is found to have been justified, the firm in question would be fined. (This anti-displacement provision has been successfully tried in Australia). To prevent the short-term unemployed driving the long-term unemployed out of the market, there would be separate options for workers belonging to broad groups with different unemployment durations. Another possibility is for the government to auction employment vouchers to unemployed people.

5. Conclusion

In sum, we believe that the EU unemployment problem needs to be attacked on two fronts: through a broad spectrum of supply-side policies and the demand management policy. The expansion of aggregate demand is necessary to increase both investment and employment. However, unless supply side measures are also taken, demand expansion can result in more inflation instead of more employment, because of the mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. What is important to stress is that both demand and supply side policies must be adopted together by all European countries, in order both to avoid beggar-my-neighbour problems, and, at the same time, to catch all the possible complementary effects of these policies.

\textsuperscript{1} This difference may be adjusted for average changes in employment within that sector. Specifically, if sectoral employment is shrinking (expanding), then firms receive a number of vouchers greater (less) than the difference between the number of unemployed people hired and the number of employees fired. The reason for this adjustment is to avoid the possibility that the effectiveness of the voucher policy may diminish as the sector falls into a recession.