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Family Structure and the Turnout Gender Gap: Evidence from Italy

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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MARCH 2018

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ABSTRACT

Family Structure and the Turnout Gender Gap: Evidence from Italy

We study the effects of changes in household structure—marriage, divorce, widowhood, and the presence of children of different ages—on individual-level voter turnout. To this end, we assemble a unique voter-level panel dataset spanning four elections in a large Italian municipality. The data merge information from administrative voter rolls, the civil register, and income tax files. Differences-in-differences estimates accounting for voter fixed effects reveal sizable effects of marital status and children on voter participation. Impact estimates are significantly different across genders and are not explained by socio-economic characteristics. To show that changes in voter participation do not predate changes in family structure, we use an event-study approach that is rare in micro-econometric studies of voter turnout. Lastly, we explore possible mechanisms using pooled cross-sectional data from the Italian National Election Studies and the ISTAT Aspects of Daily Life surveys. Our results shed new light on the importance of life-course transitions and their gender-heterogeneous effects as key drivers of voter turnout.

JEL Classification: D1

Keywords: voter turnout, life-cycle transitions, household structure, gender gap

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1 Introduction

As much as several economic outcomes are better understood through the lenses of a life-course and family perspective (e.g., [Browning et al., 2014](#)), political participation and voter turnout are also likely influenced by life-cycle transitions. Marriage, the arrival of children, and the dissolution of couples through divorce and widowhood are, in fact, major breakpoints in life. They can therefore affect political behavior through emotional, relational, and situational channels that plausibly differ across women and men, the more so in gendered societies, where political involvement and the specialization of tasks within households continue to reflect traditional norms of gender-appropriate behavior ([Quaranta, 2015](#); [Sartori et al., 2017](#)).

In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the effects of changes in family structure—and their differences across genders—on voter turnout. We rely on a unique individual-level panel dataset covering four elections in a large Italian municipality, which we build merging three sources of administrative data: voter rolls, the civil register, and income tax files. The quality and type of our data allow sharper causal identification of the family structure parameters than existing empirical studies of voting behavior.

In contrast to the potentially major impact of life-cycle’s critical junctures (i.e., changes in marital status, childbearing) on political behavior, there is a persistent lack of well-identified causal studies on the relationship between family structure and voter participation. For example, political scientists have long speculated that marriage works as a primary source of interpersonal voter mobilization ([Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980](#)). Yet empirical support for this hypothesis remains limited. Using panel survey data from the U.S., [Stoker and Jennings \(1995\)](#) find that, if anything, marriage depresses voter participation. But, consistent with the interpersonal voter mobilization hypothesis, they also find that, after marriage, spouses adjust voter turnout to become more like each other. [Wolfinger and Wolfinger \(2008\)](#) estimate a strong, positive effect of marriage on turnout. However, their cross-sectional analysis lends to limited causal interpretation, as the authors cannot rule out that their impact estimates are confounded by unobservable correlates

of voter participation that differ across married and unmarried voters. More recently, [Hobbs et al. \(2014\)](#) use matching and an event-study approach to show that, as (indirectly) posited by theories of the marital turnout boost, voter participation declines after the death of a spouse. To the best of our knowledge, [Bhatti et al. \(2017\)](#) is the only other paper that uses longitudinal individual-level data to estimate the effect of marital status on voter turnout. Although their paper focuses on the turnout effect of neighborhood ethnic diversity, they find that marriage substantially increases voter participation.

Empirical evidence on the turnout effect of childbearing is even scarcer than in the case of marriage. [Wolfinger and Wolfinger \(2008\)](#)'s cross-sectional impact estimates suggest a positive effect of children on turnout. But the lack of longitudinal data again limits the causal interpretation of their findings. A similar caveat applies to [Arnold \(2013\)](#), who finds a negative effect of children aged 5 or younger on parental turnout using pooled American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data.

Unlike the survey-based data of much of the aforementioned literature, the first important feature of our data is the presence of individual-level turnout information from administrative sources, thus avoiding measurement error and reporting issues that affect surveys and exit polls (e.g., [Gelman et al., 2016](#)). Second, unlike most studies on voter turnout¹, our data report the actual composition of voters' households, including non-voting-eligible members (e.g., children younger than 18). Third, we have information on income at the individual and household levels, measures that are extremely rare in turnout studies (but [Bhatti, 2017](#); [Bhatti et al., 2017](#); [Bellettini et al., 2017](#)) and that likely correlate with life-cycle transitions. Finally, we collect all this information in four consecutive elections, thus building a four-wave panel of eligible voters, which is again rare in individual-level studies of voter participation.

Thanks to our panel data, we identify the effects of family structure through differences-in-differences (DD) designs accounting for unobserved individual effects that, if ignored, would likely cause omitted variable bias. Moreover, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data to test (in-

¹See [Buton et al. \(2012\)](#); [Hobbs et al. \(2014\)](#); [Nickerson \(2008\)](#) for some notable (but possibly partial) exceptions.

directly) the parallel-trend assumption underlying our DD strategy. Specifically, we use event-study graphs to check whether “causes happen before consequences;” that is, we verify that (conditional) changes in voter turnout follow changes in family structure, and not vice versa. To date, event-study graphs have found limited application in micro-level studies of voter behavior, so an additional contribution of our paper is to illustrate this falsification exercise using panel data on individual-level turnout.²

We find sizable and significant effects of marital status and of the presence of children on voter turnout, as well as significant heterogeneity across genders. Our most econometrically demanding DD specification with homogeneous marital status treatments across genders delivers the following findings: (i) the transition from never-married to married has a positive effect on voter turnout (+1 p.p.); (ii) divorce does not affect voter participation (relative to married voters); (iii) and the transition from marriage to widowhood reduces political participation (−2 p.p.). The marriage and widowhood results are broadly in line with recent empirical studies ([Hobbs et al., 2014](#); [Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008](#)). Heterogeneous impact estimates reveal that these effects are highly gendered: the positive effect of marriage is fully driven by male voters, while the widowhood effect is entirely attributable to female voters.

We then examine the effect of children of different ages on parental voter turnout. We uncover highly gendered patterns of turnout effects at different stages of children’s life-courses. Young infants (0-5 years old) induce a sizable and significant drop in maternal turnout (−2 p.p.), leaving paternal turnout unchanged. Thus, young children seem to represent a gender-heterogeneous constraint, reducing their mother’s (but not their fathers’) time available to vote or acquire political information. This is perhaps not completely unexpected, given that Italy is notoriously characterized by the persistence of traditional family norms and by strong gender imbalance in time devoted to household work ([Anxo et al., 2011](#)). Children’s effects change around the time kids begin elementary school, as the effect on paternal turnout becomes positive and maternal turnout returns to pre-motherhood levels. Higher turnout when children go to school may follow higher parental civic

²See [Kleven et al. \(2018\)](#) for a recent application of this approach to the study of how children affect gender inequality in the Danish labor market.

engagement from exposure to the school system (mostly public in our context) or peer pressure, arising from the new social networks established through the child's school (e.g., [Dellavigna et al., 2017](#); [Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008](#)). Whatever the channel, however, higher parental involvement only occurs for fathers. On the contrary, the presence of children of voting age appears to increase both parents' voter turnout. This is possibly explained by parents wishing to act as role models for their children when the latter are eligible to cast their first vote.³

In the last part of the paper, we collect evidence on possible mechanisms leveraging pooled cross-sectional data from the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) and the ISTAT Aspects of Daily Life surveys. First, the ITANES data reveal no association between marriage and political knowledge. Heightened political interest, therefore, does not explain the higher electoral engagement of married men found in our estimates, which is consistent with the hypothesis that marriage simply equalizes men's turnout to the higher pre-marriage voter participation of their spouses ([Stoker and Jennings, 1995](#)). Second, while men with kids appear more politically knowledgeable than their childless counterparts, this is not the case for women. This result lends support to the civic engagement explanation of higher turnout of fathers of school-aged children. The heterogeneous effects of children on political knowledge across genders seem explained by the fact that having children induces men, but not women, to spend more time acquiring political information (e.g., listening to political TV programs and reading newspapers). Third, the ISTAT data confirm that the presence of young children sharply increases the number of total hours worked by women (both in absolute terms and relative to men), boosting the time they dedicate to household work and only partly reducing time of paid labor. Finally, ITANES data show that women hold more left-leaning policy stances than men *irrespective* of their life-course stage. This raises the concern that women's children-induced political disengagement hampers the representativeness of

³Increased parental turnout in presence of cohabiting adult offspring may also be due to contextual effects within the household, as emphasized by the "relational theory" of voting ([Cutts and Fieldhouse, 2009](#); [Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2016](#); [Johnston et al., 2005](#)), where the household is the fundamental context whereby political attitudes and decisions are formed and individual turnout is mainly influenced by that of other voters living under the same roof. [Alesina and Giuliano \(2011\)](#) explore a different channel through which family arrangements may affect political participation, depending on the "strength of family ties;" that is, the extent to which, according to the prevailing culture, family members are closely tied together and care about the family, rather than the society or the polity, when making decisions.

the voting electorate.

2 Research Setting

We study the 2004, 2009 municipal and European elections and the 2008, 2013 national parliamentary elections in the city of Bologna, a municipality of about 370,000 inhabitants in the Center-North of Italy. Voter turnout, though declining over time and higher in national than European and municipal elections, has been historically very high in Bologna. It was above 79% in the four elections we consider and was slightly higher in the 2008 and 2013 national elections.

According to Italian Law, both national and local elections follow 5-year calendars. In practice, however, several factors may shorten the term of local and national legislatures, thus triggering early elections. The four elections we consider all followed the regular 5-year calendar.

Italy features a perfectly bicameral legislature as the Parliament consists of two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, that share the same powers and separately perform identical functions. All Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected on the same day and remain in power until the next election. For the period we consider, members of both Houses were elected using a closed-list proportional system with majority premium (i.e., a guaranteed minimum number of seats allocated to the coalition of parties that received the largest number of votes). The voting age is 18 for the Chamber of Deputies and 25 for the Senate. Only Italian citizens are entitled to vote in political elections.

In municipal elections, voters elect the mayor and the city councilors. Each mayoral candidate must be supported by one or more party lists—that is, rosters of candidates affiliated with national political parties or local civic organizations—running for at-large seats on city councils. In cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, like Bologna, the mayor is elected through a two-round majority system: if no first-round candidate receives an absolute majority of the valid votes, the two most voted candidates run in a runoff election (“ballottaggio”). For the 2009 municipal election, which required a runoff vote, we only consider turnout in the first round. Both Italian and EU citizens 18 or older living in the municipality are eligible to vote in municipal and European elections.

In 2004 and 2009, Bologna’s mayoral race coincided with the election of Italy’s Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). That is, voters who turned out on the 2004 and 2009 Election Days in Bologna received two separate ballots: one for municipal and one for European elections. As reflected in lower turnout rates, European elections are typically considered less salient than municipal elections (Cantoni and Gazzè, 2018). Italy’s MEPs are elected through an open-list proportional system; virtually every party list is affiliated with a national political party.

Based on residential address, voters in Bologna are allocated to 436 voter precincts encompassing geographically close and contiguous areas. In turn, precincts determine assignment to pre-designated polling locations (typically public schools). Voter registration is automatic for Italian citizens. Instead, eligible foreign residents must apply for registration to vote in European or municipal elections. At the end of the voting process, paper ballots are manually counted by election officials. Except for Italians living abroad, there is no absentee or early voting in Italy.

3 Data

This project relies on three sources of data: administrative socio-demographic and voter turnout data at the individual level from the city of Bologna, survey data from the Italian National Election Studies to explore cross-sectional relationships between family structure and information acquisition, and survey data from the Italian National Statistical Agency to test whether changes in family composition are reflected in changes in worked hours.

Our voter-level turnout data cover the universe of the voting-eligible population of the city of Bologna, in northern Italy, in four distinct elections: the 2004 and 2009 European and municipal elections, and the 2008 and 2013 parliamentary elections. The data contain an anonymous, time-invariant voter identifier, which effectively gives us an unbalanced individual-level panel with up to four observations per voter. The data also feature a (possibly time-variant) household identifier.

The turnout data are complemented by detailed administrative socio-demographic information covering *every* resident of Bologna (i.e., including non-voting-eligible residents) updated as of,

approximately, the four Election Days in the sample.⁴ Among others, these data contain: age in years, gender, marital status (i.e., never-married, married, divorced, or widowed), neighborhood, immigration status, position within the household, as well as income and income taxes paid in the year of the election.⁵ The demographic data also contain a variable for counts of household members. In some cases, that variable differs from the number of family members imputable by counting individuals with the same household identifier;⁶ we exclude these cases from all samples. We also exclude 4,999 observations matched to no demographic data, 25 individuals who appear to have changed gender across elections, and six individuals with unknown marital status. Finally, to maintain a consistent sample across elections, we exclude voters who are not Italian citizens; citizens of other EU countries could, in fact, vote in the 2004 and 2009 European and municipal elections, but not in the 2008 and 2013 parliamentary elections.

Although the data do not say explicitly if an individual has children, we impute this information based on household structure. Specifically, one of the possible categories of the variable “position within household” is “Son/daughter of head of household.” Because the demographic data cover the universe of the resident population (i.e., including children of any age), counting the number of individuals in that position gives the head of household’s exact number of cohabiting children. Notice, however, that this imputation only makes sense for heads of households and their spouses; because the variable “position within household” is specified relatively to heads of households, it is complicated or even impossible to accurately determine whether individuals in other positions have children. For this reason, when we examine the effect of children on turnout, we limit the sample to heads of households and their spouses.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the long version of the Bologna data. Columns 1 through

⁴With a few exceptions, the administrative socio-demographic data for the 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2013 elections are updated as of, respectively, 6/4/2004, 3/8/2008, 5/9/2009, and 2/13/2013.

⁵To construct the matched panel dataset with turnout and socio-demographic information, we digitized all Bologna’s voter attendance sheets from the 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2013 elections. We then sent the turnout data to the municipal statistical office, which matched them against administrative socio-demographic records of the resident population. After anonymizing and de-identifying the matched data, the municipality of Bologna sent us four files (i.e., one per election) with the turnout and socio-demographic information.

⁶Most of these inconsistencies are inmates and seniors living in retirement communities. All people living in the same community share the same household ID; but, according to the relevant variable in the demographic data, their households typically consist of one or two individuals.

3 refer to the full sample, which consists of all eligible voters independently of their position within the household. Columns 4 through 6 refer to the household head samples; that is, the subset of eligible voters who are either heads of households or spouses thereof. Consistent with its high level of social capital, Bologna has high but declining voter participation: voter turnout in European elections decreased from 84.3 percent to 79.1 percent from 2004 to 2009, and a similar decline affected higher-salience political elections (from 85.2 percent in 2008 to 80.8 percent in 2013). On average, men are more likely to vote than women by 1-to-3 percentage points, depending on the sample and election year. A majority of eligible voters are married (52.6 percent), while slightly less than a third (31.4 percent) have never been married. The longer life expectancy of women is reflected in their higher mean age (55.8 vs. 51.9 for men) as well as in the noticeable share of widows (18.7 percent). Bologna is a relatively affluent city, which shows in an average income of 25,483 euros and 6,004 euros of income taxes paid across the four elections in the sample.

Our second data source is the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES), which we use to explore (partial) correlations between family status, political knowledge, and information acquisition. By content, structure, and survey sampling strategy, the ITANES data follow the American National Elections Studies (ANES). They are managed and distributed by the Italian research foundation *Istituto Cattaneo*, which, coincidentally, is also based in Bologna. Professional polling companies are in charge of administering the surveys to representative samples of the Italian voting-eligible population in the weeks following national elections. The first ITANES survey dates to 1968 and the most recent one to 2016. A typical ITANES survey asks a battery of socio-demographic questions (gender, age, education, marital status, presence of cohabiting children, etc.), questions on political opinions (e.g., which party the interviewee voted for in the most recent election, opinions on political leaders and policy-relevant issues), questions on information acquisition (e.g., frequency watching TV, reading newspapers), and questions testing factual political knowledge.⁷ For analysis based on ITANES data, we pool information from the 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013 post-electoral surveys. Unfortunately, unlike the matched turnout and socio-demographic data from Bologna, the

⁷See <http://www.itanes.org/en/> for further information about ITANES data and for exact survey questions. Accessed: December 1, 2017.

ITANES data do not track the same respondents over time;⁸ that is, we cannot exploit within-voter variation to estimate the effects of family status on voter information.

Our third and last source of data is the annual survey administered by the Italian National Statistical Agency (ISTAT) to collect information on salient aspects of Italian households' daily lives and behaviors. To construct the so-called AVQ data (from the Italian acronym for *Aspects of Daily Life*), each year, ISTAT interviews a nationally representative sample of approximately 20,000 households and 50,000 people. We construct a pooled cross-sectional dataset using the 2005 through 2012 waves of the ISTAT AVQ data. Next to the respondents' basic socio-demographic information, we are interested in the number of hours of domestic and paid work, which we use to explore relations between family status and the allocation of labor across the two genders.

4 Effects of Marital Status and Children on Voter Turnout

4.1 Marriage Increases Voter Turnout

Table 2 presents estimates of the turnout effect of marital status from DD regressions of the following form:

$$voted_{it} = \beta^m married_{it} + \beta^d divorced_{it} + \beta^w widowed_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + age_{it}^{sex} + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where $voted_{it}$ is a dummy for whether voter i turned out to vote in election t ; $married_{it}$, $divorced_{it}$, and $widowed_{it}$ are mutually exclusive dummies for whether voter i 's marital status as of Election Day t was, respectively, married, divorced, or widowed;⁹ α_i , δ_t , and age_{it}^{sex} denote full sets of voter, election, and age in years-by-gender fixed effects, respectively; X_{it} is a set of controlling covariates.¹⁰ Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household. Voter-level clustering

⁸There are some exceptions, though. In some years, the *Istituto Cattaneo* administered both a pre- and a post-electoral survey to the sample. However, the time that separates pre- and post-electoral surveys is typically too small (a few months, at most) to observe meaningful variation in family status.

⁹That is, the omitted category of marital status is "never married".

¹⁰We interact gender with age-in-years fixed effects for two reasons. First, transitions in marital status and birth of children typically occur at different ages for men and women. For example, female (resp. male) voters in our sample who have just switched from "never married" to "married" are 36.5 (resp. 38.5) years old, on average. Second, women

accounts for potential serial correlation of regression residuals within voters (Bertrand et al., 2004); household-level clustering accounts for the marriage treatment simultaneously affecting couples of voters within the same household.

Marriage increases voter turnout by .7 to 1 percentage point relative to never-married voters. This estimate is significant at conventional levels and is virtually unaffected by controlling for neighborhood (column 2)¹¹ and family characteristics (column 3), earned income and income taxes paid during the year of the election (column 4), and separate gender-specific dummies for the presence of cohabiting children of the following ages: 0–5, 6–11, 12–17, 18 or more (column 5).

Due to the lower number of voters switching to or out of these marital statuses, turnout effects of divorce and widowhood are estimated less precisely. With this caveat in mind, divorced voters appear .8-to-1.1 percentage points more likely to vote than their never-married counterparts. Since that is also the magnitude of the marriage effect, this finding is consistent with the marriage-to-divorce transition inducing no change in voter participation. By contrast, widowhood reduces voter participation by .9 to 1.3 percentage points relative to never-married voters. Consequently, the marriage-to-widowhood transition appears to induce a 2-percentage point drop in voter participation (i.e., $\beta^w - \beta^m \approx -.02$).

4.2 Marriage Increases Men’s Voter Turnout, Leaves Women’s Unchanged

The turnout effects of changes in marital status could differ across genders for at least two reasons. First, marital status could create different “situational constraints” for female and male voters. That is, transitions across marital statuses could induce gender-specific changes in the time voters have to cast their ballots or to follow the political discourse. Second, marital status could differentially affect the level of civic engagement of voters of the two genders. For example, if

and men of the same age may have different turnout rates, even in absence of any treatment. For example, due to their longer life expectancy, elderly women may be in better health than men of the same age. If better health translates to higher turnout, we may expect old women to turn out at higher rates than same-aged men. Accounting for these differences seems important to avoid omitted variable bias as we explore heterogeneous effects by gender, which we do in Subsection 4.2.

¹¹Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and neighborhood-by-year fixed effects.

single women and men tend to vote at different rates, marriage could equalize turnout by inducing the two spouses to vote (or abstain) together.

We explore heterogeneous effects by gender using DD regressions of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} voted_{it} = & female_i \times \left(\beta^{m,female} married_{it} + \beta^{d,female} divorced_{it} + \beta^{w,female} widowed_{it} \right) + \\ & male_i \times \left(\beta^{m,male} married_{it} + \beta^{d,male} divorced_{it} + \beta^{w,male} widowed_{it} \right) + \\ & \alpha_i + \delta_t + age_{it}^{sex} + X_{it}'\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 augments regression 1 with gender-specific treatments. Table 3 reports estimated effects for female and male voters, along with female-minus-male differences in impact estimates.

The positive effect of marriage on turnout is concentrated entirely on male voters, ranging from 1.6 to 2 percentage points. By contrast, estimated effects on women are tightly centered around zero and insignificant across all specifications. Gender differences in impact estimates (i.e., $\beta^{m,female} - \beta^{m,male}$) range from -1.4 to -2.1 percentage points and are significant at the 1-percent level. That is, the never married-to-married transition increases men's turnout by 1.4 to 2.1 percentage points relative to females undergoing the same change in marital status.

Gender heterogeneity in marriage effects exactly offsets differences in turnout between never-married men and women (see bottom of the table for summary statistics). Although not definitive, this is consistent with the notion that marriage equalizes voter participation across spouses by lifting men's turnout to the higher pre-marriage level as their wives'. While divorce induces indistinguishable positive effects on male and female voters, transitions into widowhood appear to significantly reduce women's turnout with no effect on men's.

Since models 1 and 2 control for voter fixed effects, resulting estimates are free from omitted variable bias due to time-invariant individual characteristics that potentially correlate with family status. However, causal identification of family structure parameters hinges on a "parallel-trend" assumption. That is, voters who get married in the sample period (i.e., treated voters) would, absent changes in marital status, experience identical over-time changes in turnout as voters who

do not change marital status (i.e., control voters). As the parallel-trend assumption is a statement on counterfactual outcomes—that is, unobservable changes in voter turnout of treated voters in absence of treatment—it cannot be tested directly. Yet, it can be tested indirectly in the spirit of [Granger \(1969\)](#). The idea is to check that causes happen before consequences, and not vice versa. To this end, Figure 1a plots estimates of $\beta_{\tau}^{m,female}$ ’s (in orange), $\beta_{\tau}^{m,male}$ ’s (in blue), and corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals from the following event-study specification:

$$voted_{it} = \sum_{\tau} married_{it\tau} \times \left(\beta_{\tau}^{m,female} female_i + \beta_{\tau}^{m,male} male_i \right) + \alpha_i + \delta_t + age_{it}^{sex} + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where $married_{it\tau}$ is a dummy equal to 1 if election t occurs τ elections since the first election voter i ’s marital status was “married”.¹² Because our data span four elections, τ ranges between -3 and 2 . The coefficients of interest are the $\beta_{\tau}^{m,sex}$ ’s, which measure the difference in turnout, conditional on controls, between married and control voters τ elections before ($\tau < 0$) or after ($\tau \geq 0$) marriage. All coefficients are normalized relative to $\tau = -1$; that is, the last election before marriage. The vector X_{it} includes all controls from the most demanding specification reported in Table 3 (i.e., column 5).

Reassuringly for our DD identification assumption, treated and control men share statistically indistinguishable voter turnout in pre-marriage elections (i.e., $\tau < 0$). In contrast, married men’s turnout increases after marriage (i.e., $\tau \geq 0$) by a significant 2 percentage points, a magnitude which is consistent with the findings from Table 3. Similarly, there are no obvious pre-trends in married women’s voter turnout. At the same time, there is no noticeable change in turnout after marriage, with the possible exception of a marginally significant increase after three elections (i.e., at $\tau = 2$). Again, this finding supports the zero effect of marriage on women’s turnout documented in Table 3.

Figure 1b plots female-minus-male differences in marriage-induced turnout effects (i.e., $\beta_{\tau}^{m,female} - \beta_{\tau}^{m,male}$), along with corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals. Upholding the validity of the parallel-trends assumption, pre-marriage gender differences are centered around zero and insignif-

¹²Recall that we observe voters’ marital status as of Election Day, but we do not observe the exact date of marriage.

icant. By contrast, in post-marriage elections, married women’s turnout decreases by 1-to-2 percentage points relative to married men’s, which is again in line with estimates of gender differences from Table 3.

Event-study estimates of the turnout effects of divorce and widowhood (resp. on gender differences in impact estimates) are plotted, respectively, in Appendix Figures A1a and A2a (resp. A1b and A2b). Event-study plots for divorce support the findings from Table 3. For example, Figure A1a shows no change in turnout after divorce, which is consistent with the marriage-to-divorce transition inducing no change in voter participation. As for widowhood, Figure A2a reveals a significant decline in turnout that predates widowhood. A possible explanation is that the deterioration of a spouse’s health—which likely precedes widowhood—progressively reduces the surviving spouse’s turnout (e.g., because the growing attention required by the dying spouse reduces the time available to follow politics and to vote). Interestingly, gender differences in widowhood effects are driven by differences in pre-widowhood turnout (rather than by differential changes in men’s and women’s participation after widowhood), particularly so at $\tau = -3$.

4.3 Children 0–5 Decrease Women’s Turnout, but not Men’s; Children 5–15 Increase Men’s Turnout, but not Women’s

In Table 3, the gender difference in the effect of marriage on turnout shrinks by a third from column 2 ($\beta^{m,female} - \beta^{m,male} = -.021$) to column 5 ($\beta^{m,female} - \beta^{m,male} = -.014$). Unlike other specifications, column 5 controls for interactions between gender and dummies for the presence of kids in the household, thus suggesting that children affect at least one of their parents’ turnout. We explore this possibility in two steps. First, we estimate the average effect of children on parental turnout. Second, we test for differences in the effect of children on maternal vs. paternal turnout. Formally, we start with the following DD specification:

$$voted_{it} = \beta^{0to5} kids0to5_{it} + \beta^{6to11} kids6to11_{it} + \beta^{12to17} kids12to17_{it} + \beta^{18+} kids18+_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + age_{it}^{sex} + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

which, relative to equation 1, replaces dummies for marital status with controls for the presence of kids aged 0–5, 6–11, 12–17, and 18 or more. Table 4 reports the results.¹³

Children aged 0 to 5 reduce parental turnout by .7 to 1 percentage point, an effect that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance across all specifications. Conversely, children aged 6–11, 12–17, and 18 or older *increase* voter turnout by .4–.7, .6–.9, and 1.1–1.2 percentage points, respectively. This pattern of effects—that increase with children’s age—is consistent with younger children posing a situational constraint to parental electoral participation; for instance, due to the logistical difficulty of reaching one’s polling location in presence of young children or to the limited time available to acquire information about the election. As children grow, this situational constraint dissipates or is offset by increasing political engagement, so that the net effect of children on political participation reverses sign and becomes positive. By the time children reach voting age, this positive effect becomes substantial (+1.1 percentage points), possibly because parents receive positive turnout spillovers from their children’s voting eligibility (e.g., because parents accompany their children to vote for the first time).

Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of children on maternal vs. paternal turnout and reveals that the negative effect of young children on political participation reported in Table 4 was driven by females voters. In fact, the presence of children aged 0 to 5 significantly reduces women’s turnout, leaving men’s participation unaffected. The difference between the negative effect on women and the zero effect on men is around 2 percentage points and is significant at the 1-percent level. While older children (aged 6 to 11 and 12 to 17) do not depress maternal turnout, they do increase paternal participation by approximately 1 percentage point. Only when children reach voting age (18 years), this heterogeneity dissipates, and both men’s and women’s turnout increases by around 1 percentage point relative to childless voters.¹⁴ In other words, after a long break induced by motherhood, women resume their involvement in politics only around the time their

¹³Remember that we can accurately determine whether a voter has children only if that person is the head of household or her/his spouse. Thus, unlike Tables 2 and 3, whose estimation sample include all eligible voters, the sample for children regressions is limited to the subset of voters whose position within the household is “head of household” or “spouse/partner of head of household.”

¹⁴In Appendix Tables A1 and A2, we show that estimates of the turnout effects of children are virtually unchanged (and, if anything, are slightly more precise) when we further restrict the sample to married voters.

children are themselves called to vote.

To further investigate the pattern of children’s effects, Figure 2a plots estimates of the turnout effects of children of specific ages. That is, the underlying regression controls for the same covariates as Table 5, column 5, but uses dummies based on 1-year age intervals for children’s age (i.e., 0-year-olds, 1-year-olds, etc.) instead of four, broader intervals (i.e., 0–5, 6–11, 12–17, and 18+). The plot reveals that the negative effect of children on maternal turnout vanishes when children turn five. By contrast, 0-to-5-year-olds have no effect on paternal turnout (with the possible exception of 2-year-olds), while older kids increase fathers’ turnout. The ensuing gender difference is sizable (about 1 percentage point) and stable for children aged 5 through 15 (Figure 2b). When kids turn 16, this heterogeneity disappears.

Figure 3a plots event-study coefficients of the effect of children on maternal (in orange) and paternal turnout (in blue). The underlying regression controls for the full set of covariates used for Table 4, column 5. Like in prior event-study plots, $\tau = 0$ denotes the first election a treated voter (i.e., a voter who switches from having no kids to having kids) is observed having at least one child. Analogously, $\tau = -1$ denotes the last election without kids, $\tau = +1$ is the second election with kids, etc..

There are no pre-trends in voter turnout; that is, treated and control voters have identical (conditional) turnout in pre-children elections. Corroborating the gender-heterogeneity documented in Table 5, treated women’s turnout falls sharply (relative to control women) in the first election with children ($\tau = 0$), while treated men witness no drop in turnout. By the third election with children ($\tau = 2$), women’s turnout recovers to pre-treatment levels and men’s increases by approximately 2 percentage points.

Figure 3b plots female-minus-male differences in event-study coefficients (i.e., $\beta_{\tau}^{m,female} - \beta_{\tau}^{m,male}$). Bolstering the causal interpretation of our findings, *treated* men and women share identical (conditional) turnout in pre-children years; that is, there is no pre-trend in the effect of children on the turnout gender gap, and all variation in said gap materializes suddenly and persistently in post-children elections.

5 Exploring Possible Mechanisms

We now explore the drivers of gender differences in turnout effects, using pooled cross-sectional data from ITANES and ISTAT. Specifically, we focus on the following three facts documented earlier in the paper: (i) the negative (resp. zero) effect of children aged 0–5 on maternal (resp. paternal) turnout, (ii) the positive (resp. zero) effect of children aged 6+ on paternal (resp. maternal) turnout, (iii) the positive (resp. zero) effect of marriage on men’s (resp. women’s) turnout.¹⁵

5.1 Civic Involvement and Political Knowledge

One mechanism by which having children may increase voter turnout is by stimulating parental civic involvement ([Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008](#)). To test for this mechanism, we check whether turnout effects are paralleled by similar patterns of correlations between the presence of children and political knowledge. For example, if higher civic engagement underlies the positive effect of children on paternal turnout, men with children should be more knowledgeable about politics than men without kids. Alternatively, children may raise paternal turnout through peer pressure (e.g., increasing the probability that, say, other parents will ask about one’s turnout; [Dellavigna et al., 2017](#)). If peer pressure alone explains the positive effect of children on paternal turnout, then men with and without kids may be expected to display indistinguishable levels of political information.

We use 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013 ITANES pooled cross-sectional survey data. On one hand, these data lack of a longitudinal dimension, which rules out the possibility of exploiting within-individual, across-time variation in family structure. On the other hand, the data offer a rich set of socio-demographic controls (e.g., education, employment status, religiosity), which may attenuate the omitted variable bias that likely affects cross-sectional estimates of the effect of family structure on political knowledge. On the whole, estimates from ITANES data should be interpreted as suggestive, rather than definitive, and they do not allow us to estimate effects of children of different

¹⁵Because transitions to marriage provide cleaner evidence of heterogeneous effects than transitions to divorce and widowhood, in the interest of space this section does not discuss estimates for divorce and widowhood. These estimates are, however, available upon request.

ages.

The first six columns of Table 6 report estimates from regressions of dummy variables identifying correct responses to survey questions on factual political knowledge.¹⁶ Following Kling et al. (2007), the outcome for column 7 is a summary index of political knowledge, defined as the equally weighted average of the z-scores of the outcomes from columns 1–6. All regressions use survey weights and control for age (alone and interacted by gender),¹⁷ gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood, survey year and wave, as well as indicators for size of the city of residence, region of residence, education, father’s education, employment status, and intensity of religious beliefs.

Men with kids are indeed more politically knowledgeable than their childless counterparts. They are significantly more likely to know who elects the President of the Republic and to recall the names of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and of the Prime Minister. The higher z-score of men with children also confirms their better political knowledge. Conversely, and perhaps unsurprising in view of the zero effect of children aged 5–16 on mothers’ turnout (and the negative effect of younger children), the presence of children does not correlate with mothers’ political knowledge.

Because of the positive effect on fathers and the zero effect on mothers, children seem to differentially affect men’s and women’s political information. For two out of eight outcomes reported in Table 6, impact estimates on men are significantly larger than corresponding estimates on women, and a third difference is marginally significant. Conversely, marital status does not correlate with better political knowledge, which is possibly consistent with marriage “leveling up” men’s turnout to the higher level of participation of their wives without affecting either spouse’s civic involve-

¹⁶The six questions are: “Do you know who elects the President of the Republic?”, “At the time of the last election, can you tell me the name of the Minister of External Affairs?”, “Do you know the name of the President of the Chamber of Deputies in charge during the last elections?”, “Do you know, approximately, how many representatives sit in the Chamber of Deputies?”, “Do you know the name of the President of the Council in charge during the last elections?”, “How many years does the President of the Republic stay in office?”. The exact wording of the original questions (in Italian) features minor differences across survey years.

¹⁷We demean age by gender, so the coefficient on female should be interpreted as the (conditional) difference in outcomes between average-aged women and men.

ment.¹⁸

What information channels drive gender differences in political knowledge? To answer this question, Table 7 explores correlations between family structure and the self-reported use of different media channels to obtain information on the most recent political election. We distinguish between channels that plausibly require more (“hard info”) vs. less (“easy info”) time and effort by voters. Hard-info channels are: internet, radio, TV programs and news, newspapers, and participation in campaign meetings. We classify the following as easy-info channels: TV ads, campaign leaflets, and campaign posters/signs.

Men with children are significantly more likely than men without children to acquire political information from hard-info channels like TV programs and newspapers, while women with and without children are equally likely to seek hard info. Though at the limit of statistical significance, the ensuing gender differences (i.e., $\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$) suggest that having children induces men, but not women, to spend more time listening to political TV programs and reading newspapers, a fact that possibly explains the heterogeneous effects in political knowledge documented in Table 6.

Overall, children seem to induce women to acquire more information on political campaigns. However, unlike men, women with children appear to rely on uninformative channels like TV ads, campaign leaflets, and campaign posters. Again supporting the hypothesis that marriage merely equalizes turnout across the two spouses without affecting their levels of political interest, virtually all correlations between marital status and information acquisition fall short of statistical significance.

In Section 4.3, we showed that children aged 0–5 reduce maternal but not paternal voter turnout. Unfortunately, the ITANES data do not contain information on the age of children, so we cannot test directly if younger children also depress maternal political knowledge. We can, however, limit the sample to relatively young respondents, who are more likely to be new parents. We take this approach in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, which replicate prior results restricting the sample to

¹⁸Yet, it is striking that, even controlling for the rich set of covariates included in these regressions, (average-aged) women are less knowledgeable than men.

respondents aged 40 or younger. Although low statistical power rules out clear-cut conclusions (and the evidence from Table A4 is nuanced), estimates from Table A3 are broadly in line with the gender heterogeneity documented in the case of turnout. That is, younger kids seem to reduce their mothers’ political knowledge, but not their fathers’.

5.2 Hours Worked

Another way family structure may differentially affect men’s and women’s voter turnout is by inducing heterogeneous effects on the quantity and type of time available to follow politics. For example, young children may require a disproportionate amount of maternal attention, leaving new moms with little time for political participation (i.e., a “maternal time-constraint” effect). But children may also induce a “specialization effect”, whereby fathers increase paid labor while mothers specialize in housework. If social interactions in the workplace spur greater interest in politics than those occurring during housework, then the specialization effect could help explain the heterogeneous impact of children on parental turnout.

We explore correlations between family status and hours worked using 2005–2012 pooled cross-sectional data from the Italian National Statistical Agency. The so-called ISTAT AVQ data have similar shortcomings and strengths as the ITANES data. That is, they lack a panel dimension—which rules out DD specifications—but they contain detailed socio-demographic controls—which mitigate concerns about omitted variable bias. For this reason, the caveat remains the same, in that we treat evidence from ISTAT AVQ data as suggestive. Relative to the ITANES data, however, the ISTAT data have the advantage of providing the approximate age of cohabiting children.¹⁹ We can therefore directly compare impact estimates on worked time by age of children with the corresponding turnout effects.

Table 8 reports estimates from three separate regressions. The outcomes for columns 1 and 2 are hours worked at home and hours of paid work, respectively. The outcome for column 3 is total worked hours; that is, hours worked at home plus hours of paid work. All regressions control for

¹⁹Specifically, the raw data contain counts of children in the following age ranges: 0–5, 6–13, 14–17, and 18+.

education, region of residence, year of interview, as well as gender-specific dummies for age,²⁰ divorce, and widowhood.²¹

Women with children report more hours of domestic work and less paid work than women without children. The net impact on female total hours of work is positive, particularly in presence of kids aged 0–5 (+7.01 hours). Children 0–13 also appear to increase male domestic workload, but to a much lesser extent than they increase women’s. The presence of older children (ages 14–17 and 18+) does not correlate, or even correlates negatively, with male domestic work. Finally, men with children of any age report more hours of paid work than their childless counterparts.

Gender differences in correlational estimates point to children inducing a disproportionate increase in the total hours worked by women, an increase that is particularly marked for children aged 0–5 ($\beta^{0to5,female} - \beta^{0to5,male} = 2.21$ hours). This finding corroborates, at least partly, the hypotheses that younger children limit the amount of time their mothers have to follow politics and to vote.

Neither the “maternal time-constraint” nor the “specialization” effects can, however, fully account for gender differences in turnout effects. In fact, like children, marriage also appears to disproportionately affect women, by increasing the number of hours worked at home and reducing those of paid labor. But Table 3 showed that marriage does not affect female turnout; if anything, it merely increased men’s voter participation to the pre-marriage voter turnout of their wives.

5.3 Gender Differences in Political Preferences

To what extent do gender differences in turnout effects matter for electoral outcomes? Do children or marital status also impact political preferences? After all, if Italian men and women share similar political preferences and family status does not affect political leanings, the differential effect of children on maternal vs. paternal political participation does not pose concerns about the representativeness of the voting electorate.

²⁰The exact respondent’s age is not reported in the data. It is instead binned in the following intervals: 18–19, 20–24, 25–29, ..., 60–64, 65–74, 75+.

²¹Though the data contain employment status, we opted to exclude that control from these regressions. It seems indeed very likely that changes in worked hours are largely driven by changes in employment status.

To shed light on these questions we return to the ITANES survey data. Our outcomes are seven measures of political preferences, which we regress on the usual variables representing family status and the same controls used in previous regressions based on ITANES data. Specifically, the independent variables are an index of political ideology (ranging from 1–left–to 10–right), a dummy for having voted for a party in Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition in the most recent political election, and the level of agreement with the following five statements: “Abortion should be harder to get,” “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women,” “Drug users should not be punished,” “Firms should be freer to hire and fire,” and “Immigrants threaten natives’ employment.” Table 9 reports the results.

Mirroring gender differences that have been documented for other democracies (e.g., Kittilson, 2016), Italian women appear more leftist than men. They are significantly more likely to self-identify as left-leaning, 8.2 percentage points less likely to have voted for Berlusconi, and marginally more likely to disagree with the notion that firms should be freer to hire and fire.²² Finally, women are less likely to agree with the statement that “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”²³

Neither the presence of children nor marriage seem systematically related to political leanings.²⁴ This suggests that, even if changes in family status may not affect voters’ political preferences directly, they may still shift the political composition of the *active* electorate (e.g., by mobilizing relatively right-leaning men upon marriage or by demobilizing relatively left-leaning women when they give birth to children).

²²Recall that all regressions control for (demeaned) age interacted with gender. Thus, the coefficient on 1(*Female*) should be interpreted as the (conditional) difference in political leaning between an average-aged woman and an average-aged man. In practice, though, we obtain substantively identical results controlling for age instead of age interacted with gender (results available upon request).

²³Although, surprisingly, average-aged women are as likely as average-aged men to agree with the statement that “Abortion should be harder to get.”

²⁴With the possible exception of voting for Berlusconi, which is positively correlated with marriage in the case of women, and negatively for men.

6 Conclusion


This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the socio-economic determinants of political participation and voter turnout by highlighting the important role of life-cycle transitions (marriage, arrival of children, divorce, widowhood). To this end, we assemble and use a unique panel dataset that covers four elections in a large Italian municipality and merges information on about 370,000 individuals coming from administrative voter rolls, the civil register, and income tax files.

Our findings point to the relevance of life-cycle transitions as key determinants of voting behavior. Using a voter-level DD strategy that controls for individual and age-by-gender fixed effects, we estimate a positive effect of marriage on male turnout, and a negative effect of widowhood on female turnout. We also show that the presence of young infants (0-5 years old) decreases maternal turnout, while children of voting age seem to increase both parents' turnout. We then use a variety of survey data to show that the estimated turnout effects are paralleled by similar patterns of gender-heterogeneous correlations between family structure, political knowledge, and time spent doing family chores.

Our heterogeneous turnout effects have potentially important policy implications. Although our survey data reveal that political leanings are (partially) uncorrelated with family status, changes in family structure may still alter the political composition of the active electorate; for example, by mobilizing relatively right-leaning men upon marriage and by demobilizing relatively left-leaning women when they give birth to children. Although we cannot investigate such implications in our existing data, the resulting imbalance in political representation could in turn affect implemented policies. For example, under-representation of mothers of young children may reduce support for public expenditure on child-care, with possible self-reinforcing negative effects on women's political participation.

Figure 1: Marriage Event Study

(a) Orange = Wife, Blue = Husband



(b) Marriage-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout




Figure 2: Effects of Children on Turnout by Children's Age






Figure 3: Children Event Study

(a) Orange = Mother, Blue = Father



(b) Children-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout




Table 1: Summary Statistics of Bologna Socio-Demographic and Turnout Data

	Full Sample			Children Sample		
	All (1)	Women (2)	Men (3)	All (4)	Women (5)	Men (6)
Voted in year...						
2004	.843	.831	.856	.847	.833	.863
2008	.852	.846	.860	.858	.849	.868
2009	.791	.783	.800	.797	.787	.809
2013	.808	.794	.823	.813	.796	.833
Marital status:						
Never married	.314	.278	.357	.208	.186	.235
Married	.526	.489	.569	.615	.559	.683
Divorced	.039	.046	.031	.040	.048	.030
Widowed	.121	.187	.043	.137	.207	.051
Cohabiting kids aged...						
aged 0-5	-	-	-	.071	.068	.074
6-11	-	-	-	.073	.071	.074
12-17	-	-	-	.072	.072	.072
18+	-	-	-	.204	.217	.189
Age	54.0 (19.1)	55.8 (19.5)	51.9 (18.4)	57.7 (17.5)	59.0 (17.8)	56.1 (17.0)
Income (2010€)	25,483 (39,248)	19,851 (21,653)	31,907 (51,817)	26,681 (41,117)	20,373 (22,007)	34,192 (54,984)
Income taxes (2010€)	6,004 (15,790)	3,974 (7,950)	8,320 (21,249)	6,377 (16,610)	4,114 (8,094)	9,071 (22,650)
N	1,163,355	628,043	535,312	953,710	527,955	425,755
N voters	381,257	202,345	178,912	318,741	172,149	146,592

Notes: The table reports sample means and standard deviations in parentheses. Each children sample is a subsample of the corresponding full sample; specifically, children samples are limited to voters whose position within the household is either "Head of Household" or "Spouse of Head of Household".

Table 2: Turnout Effect of Marital Status

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout									
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
1(Married)	.010	**	.010	**	.009	**	.007	*	.010	**
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Divorced)	.011	~	.011	~	.011	~	.008		.011	~
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)	
1(Widowed)	-.009	~	-.009	~	-.011	*	-.013	*	-.010	*
	(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓		✓	
Children×Gender FEs									✓	
Never married \bar{Y}	.800		.800		.817		.823		.823	
N	1,084,202		1,084,202		1,040,398		947,548		947,548	

Notes: Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Children FEs are four dummies indicating presence of one or more children of the following ages: 0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 18+. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 3: Turnout Effect of Marital Status by Voter's Gender

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout									
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
1(Married female)	-.001 (.005)		-.001 (.005)		-.001 (.005)		-.003 (.005)		.002 (.005)	
1(Married male)	.020 (.004)	**	.020 (.004)	**	.018 (.004)	**	.016 (.004)	**	.016 (.004)	**
1(Divorced female)	.008 (.008)		.008 (.008)		.010 (.008)		.007 (.008)		.012 (.008)	
1(Divorced male)	.011 (.008)		.011 (.008)		.009 (.008)		.006 (.008)		.007 (.008)	
1(Widowed female)	-.021 (.006)	**	-.021 (.006)	**	-.021 (.006)	**	-.024 (.006)	**	-.018 (.007)	**
1(Widowed male)	.003 (.007)		.003 (.007)		.000 (.007)		-.001 (.007)		-.001 (.008)	
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.021 (.006)	**	-.021 (.006)	**	-.019 (.006)	**	-.019 (.006)	**	-.014 (.006)	*
$\beta^{\text{divorced female}} - \beta^{\text{divorced male}}$	-.003 (.011)		-.003 (.011)		.000 (.011)		.001 (.011)		.005 (.011)	
$\beta^{\text{widowed female}} - \beta^{\text{widowed male}}$	-.024 (.009)	**	-.024 (.009)	**	-.022 (.009)	*	-.022 (.010)	*	-.017 (.010)	~
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓		✓	
Children×Gender FEs									✓	
Never-married female \bar{Y}	.813		.813		.827		.830		.830	
Never-married male \bar{Y}	.787		.787		.807		.816		.816	
N	1,084,202		1,084,202		1,040,398		947,548		947,548	

Notes: Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Children FEs are four dummies indicating presence of one or more children of the following ages: 0-5, 6-11, 12,-17, 18+. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table 4: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout									
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
1(Children aged 0-5)	-.008	**	-.007	**	-.010	**	-.009	**	-.009	**
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Children aged 6-11)	.007	**	.007	**	.005	*	.004	~	.004	~
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
1(Children aged 12-17)	.009	**	.009	**	.007	**	.006	**	.006	**
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
1(Children aged 18+)	.012	**	.012	**	.011	**	.011	**	.011	**
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs									✓	
No kids \bar{Y}	.819		.819		.832		.834		.834	
N	883,208		883,208		844,111		802,567		802,567	

Notes: Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ~ $p < 0.10$

Table 5: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout									
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
1(Female w/ children aged 0-5)	-.019 **		-.019 **		-.020 **		-.020 **		-.019 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Male w/ children aged 0-5)	.003		.004		.001		.001		-.000	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Female w/ children aged 6-11)	.002		.002		.000		-.002		-.001	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Male w/ children aged 6-11)	.011 **		.011 **		.009 **		.009 **		.008 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Female w/ children aged 12-17)	.004		.004		.002		.001		.001	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Male w/ children aged 12-17)	.014 **		.013 **		.011 **		.011 **		.010 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Female w/ children aged 18+)	.013 **		.013 **		.012 **		.011 **		.011 **	
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
1(Male w/ children aged 18+)	.012 **		.012 **		.010 **		.009 **		.009 **	
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
$\beta^{0-5 \text{ female}} - \beta^{0-5 \text{ male}}$	-.022 **		-.022 **		-.021 **		-.021 **		-.019 **	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
$\beta^{6-11 \text{ female}} - \beta^{6-11 \text{ male}}$	-.010 **		-.010 **		-.009 *		-.011 **		-.010 **	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
$\beta^{12-17 \text{ female}} - \beta^{12-17 \text{ male}}$	-.009 **		-.009 **		-.008 *		-.010 **		-.009 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
$\beta^{18+ \text{ female}} - \beta^{18+ \text{ male}}$.001		.001		.002		.002		.002	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs									✓	
Female w/o kids \bar{Y}	.808		.808		.816		.818		.818	
Male w/o kids \bar{Y}	.833		.833		.852		.854		.854	
N	883,208		883,208		844,111		802,567		802,567	

Notes: Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

Table 6: Factual Political Knowledge by Gender and Family Status

	Correctly Names...							Sum of z-scores
	How President Is Elected	Minister of Foreign Affairs	President of Chamber of Deputies	Number of Deputies	Prime Minister	President's Term Length		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
1(Female)	-.115 ** (.021)	-.136 ** (.023)	-.141 ** (.023)	-.103 ** (.021)	-.135 ** (.024)	-.023 (.060)	-1.080 ** (.134)	
1(Has kids & female)	.006 (.017)	-.036 ~ (.020)	.011 (.020)	-.005 (.014)	.003 (.022)	-.026 (.038)	-.079 (.099)	
1(Has kids & male)	.047 ** (.016)	.053 * (.022)	.047 * (.021)	-.022 (.017)	.047 * (.019)	.028 (.035)	.290 ** (.099)	
1(Married & female)	-.035 (.022)	.015 (.024)	-.021 (.024)	.000 (.018)	.022 (.027)	.016 (.049)	-.035 (.129)	
1(Married & male)	-.031 (.021)	.009 (.026)	.015 (.025)	.004 (.023)	-.020 (.022)	.057 (.048)	-.023 (.133)	
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.041 ~ (.024)	-.088 ** (.030)	-.036 (.029)	.016 (.022)	-.044 (.029)	-.055 (.052)	-.369 ** (.139)	
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.004 (.030)	.006 (.035)	-.036 (.035)	-.004 (.029)	.042 (.035)	-.040 (.067)	-.012 (.184)	
\bar{Y}	.616	.474	.520	.169	.769	.718	-.000	
N	11,701	10,209	10,209	8,709	7,217	1,492	11,701	

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table 7: Acquisition of Political Information by Gender and Family Status

	Info from Internet	Info from Radio	Info from TV	Info from News- papers	Info from Campaign Meetings	Sum of z-scores (Hard Info)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(Female)	-.024 (.015)	-.044 * (.022)	-.069 ** (.022)	-.081 ** (.024)	-.059 ** (.017)	-.675 ** (.149)
1(Has kids & female)	-.001 (.012)	-.012 (.019)	.037 (.023)	.028 (.022)	-.003 (.014)	.101 (.132)
1(Has kids & male)	.022 (.016)	-.005 (.024)	.066 ** (.021)	.090 ** (.023)	.025 (.019)	.471 ** (.155)
1(Married & female)	-.042 ** (.016)	-.020 (.023)	-.018 (.027)	-.050 ~ (.027)	-.021 (.017)	-.393 * (.162)
1(Married & male)	-.015 (.019)	.051 ~ (.027)	-.011 (.024)	-.013 (.027)	-.006 (.023)	.000 (.183)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.024 (.020)	-.007 (.030)	-.029 (.031)	-.062 ~ (.032)	-.029 (.024)	-.370 ~ (.203)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.028 (.025)	-.072 * (.035)	-.007 (.035)	-.037 (.038)	-.015 (.028)	-.393 (.244)
\bar{Y}	.100	.245	.765	.541	.142	.000
N	9,581	9,581	9,581	9,581	9,581	9,581
	Info from TV ads	Info from Campaign Leaflets	Info from Campaign Posters	Sum of z-scores (Easy Info)		Sum of z-scores (All Info)
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		(11)
1(Female)	-.088 * (.039)	-.089 * (.042)	-.115 ** (.039)	-.616 ** (.193)		-.892 ** (.181)
1(Has kids & female)	.069 ~ (.039)	.083 * (.038)	.110 ** (.040)	.552 ** (.190)		.375 * (.181)
1(Has kids & male)	.024 (.038)	.044 (.041)	.044 (.039)	.233 (.183)		.559 ** (.185)
1(Married & female)	-.038 (.044)	.022 (.046)	-.086 ~ (.047)	-.217 (.222)		-.516 * (.211)
1(Married & male)	-.035 (.043)	.013 (.048)	-.066 (.043)	-.186 (.208)		-.082 (.216)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$.046 (.054)	.039 (.056)	.066 (.056)	.318 (.262)		-.184 (.258)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.003 (.062)	.008 (.066)	-.020 (.063)	-.031 (.303)		-.434 (.300)
\bar{Y}	.683	.628	.654	.000		.000
N	3,201	3,201	3,201	3,201		9,581

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table 8: Children, Marital Status and Hours Worked

	Hours Worked at Home (1)		Hours of Paid Work (2)		Total Hours Worked (3)	
1(Female)	8.14 ** (.26)		-1.69 ** (.37)		6.46 ** (.43)	
1(Female w/ children aged 0-5)	11.58 ** (.50)		-4.58 ** (.38)		7.01 ** (.50)	
1(Male w/ children aged 0-5)	3.67 ** (.25)		1.13 ** (.34)		4.80 ** (.38)	
1(Female w/ children aged 6-13)	5.97 ** (.34)		-3.79 ** (.29)		2.18 ** (.36)	
1(Male w/ children aged 6-13)	.68 ** (.16)		1.27 ** (.27)		1.95 ** (.29)	
1(Female w/ children aged 14-17)	4.45 ** (.68)		-2.01 ** (.59)		2.43 ** (.72)	
1(Male w/ children aged 14-17)	-.37 (.33)		.91 (.61)		.54 (.64)	
1(Female w/ children aged 18+)	3.91 ** (.23)		-1.00 ** (.20)		2.90 ** (.24)	
1(Male w/ children aged 18+)	-1.43 ** (.12)		2.75 ** (.24)		1.32 ** (.24)	
1(Married & female)	14.01 ** (.15)		-4.59 ** (.16)		9.42 ** (.19)	
1(Married & male)	-.37 ** (.09)		5.36 ** (.16)		4.99 ** (.18)	
$\beta^{0-5 \text{ female}} - \beta^{0-5 \text{ male}}$	7.92 ** (.53)		-5.71 ** (.51)		2.21 ** (.55)	
$\beta^{6-13 \text{ female}} - \beta^{6-13 \text{ male}}$	5.29 ** (.36)		-5.06 ** (.39)		.23 (.42)	
$\beta^{14-17 \text{ female}} - \beta^{14-17 \text{ male}}$	4.82 ** (.74)		-2.93 ** (.82)		1.89 * (.84)	
$\beta^{18+ \text{ female}} - \beta^{18+ \text{ male}}$	5.34 ** (.25)		-3.75 ** (.30)		1.58 ** (.32)	
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	14.37 ** (.17)		-9.95 ** (.22)		4.42 ** (.24)	
\bar{Y}	16.12		19.88		36.00	
N	269,030		269,030		269,030	

Notes: All regressions control for education, region of residence, year of interview, as well as gender-specific dummies for age, divorce, and widowhood. Standard errors clustered by household are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table 9: Political Views by Gender and Family Status


	1 = Completely Disagree; 4 = Completely Agree						
	Abortion Should Be Harder to Get (1)	If Jobs Are Scarce Men Should Have Priority (2)	Drug Users Shouldn't Be Punished (3)	Firms Should Be Freer to Hire, Fire (4)	Immigrants Threaten Natives' Employment (5)	1-to-10 Left-Right Index (6)	Voted Berlusconi in Last Election (7)
1(Female)	-.018 (.054)	-.159 ** (.061)	-.073 (.063)	-.099 ~ (.053)	.021 (.051)	-.286 * (.132)	-.082 ** (.021)
1(Has kids & female)	.014 (.045)	.027 (.056)	.013 (.059)	-.009 (.052)	.032 (.048)	.072 (.109)	.013 (.015)
1(Has kids & male)	.074 (.045)	.151 * (.061)	.025 (.067)	.011 (.057)	.062 (.053)	.088 (.107)	.029 ~ (.015)
1(Married & female)	-.073 (.055)	.092 (.066)	-.030 (.068)	.097 (.061)	.064 (.057)	.011 (.133)	.035 ~ (.020)
1(Married & male)	-.049 (.058)	-.063 (.070)	-.105 (.078)	-.015 (.064)	-.038 (.060)	-.129 (.134)	-.047 * (.020)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.060 (.064)	-.124 (.083)	-.012 (.088)	-.020 (.077)	-.030 (.071)	-.016 (.153)	-.016 (.021)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.024 (.079)	.155 (.095)	.075 (.103)	.111 (.087)	.102 (.082)	.140 (.187)	.082 ** (.028)
\bar{Y}	2.309	2.636	1.871	2.278	2.418	5.306	.283
N	8,891	6,501	6,376	9,004	9,371	9,522	11,701

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Figure A1: Divorce Event Study

(a) Orange = Men, Blue = Women



(b) Divorce-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout





Figure A2: Widowhood Event Study

(a) Orange = Widow, Blue = Widower



(b) Widowhood-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout




Table A1: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age: Married Couples Only

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
1(Children aged 0-5)	-.012	**	-.012	**	-.013	**	-.011	**
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Children aged 6-11)	.004		.004		.003		.002	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Children aged 12-17)	.007	**	.007	**	.006	*	.005	*
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
1(Children aged 18+)	.013	**	.013	**	.012	**	.011	**
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓	
No kids \bar{Y}	.872		.872		.878		.883	
N	543,705		543,705		532,684		495,762	

Notes: The sample is limited to married individuals. Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ~ $p < 0.10$

Table A2: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender: Married Couples Only

	Outcome: Voter-Level Turnout							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
1(Female w/ children aged 0-5)	-.020 **		-.020 **		-.022 **		-.020 **	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
1(Male w/ children aged 0-5)	-.004		-.004		-.006		-.004	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
1(Female w/ children aged 6-11)	-.001		-.001		-.002		-.003	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Male w/ children aged 6-11)	.009 **		.009 **		.008 *		.007 *	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Female w/ children aged 12-17)	.003		.003		.002		-.000	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Male w/ children aged 12-17)	.011 **		.011 **		.009 **		.009 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
1(Female w/ children aged 18+)	.013 **		.013 **		.013 **		.012 **	
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
1(Male w/ children aged 18+)	.012 **		.012 **		.011 **		.010 **	
	(.002)		(.002)		(.002)		(.002)	
$\beta^{0-5 \text{ female}} - \beta^{0-5 \text{ male}}$	-.016 **		-.016 **		-.016 **		-.016 **	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
$\beta^{6-11 \text{ female}} - \beta^{6-11 \text{ male}}$	-.010 **		-.010 **		-.010 **		-.011 **	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
$\beta^{12-17 \text{ female}} - \beta^{12-17 \text{ male}}$	-.008 *		-.008 *		-.008 *		-.009 **	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
$\beta^{18+ \text{ female}} - \beta^{18+ \text{ male}}$.001		.001		.002		.002	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.003)		(.003)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls			✓		✓		✓	
Household controls					✓		✓	
Income and taxes paid							✓	
Female w/o kids \bar{Y}	.866		.866		.871		.880	
Male w/o kids \bar{Y}	.878		.878		.885		.886	
N	543,705		543,705		532,684		495,762	

Notes: The sample is limited to married individuals. Neighborhood controls are: precinct-year average age, income, and income taxes paid, as well as shares of female and Italian residence, and city neighborhood-by-year fixed effects. Household controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, average income across adult household members, and average income taxes paid. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table A3: Factual Political Knowledge by Gender and Family Status: Respondents 40 or Younger

	Correctly Names...						Sum of z-scores
	How President Is Elected	Minister of Foreign Affairs	President of Chamber of Deputies	Number of Deputies	Prime Minister	President's Term Length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Female)	-.060 (.067)	-.155 * (.072)	-.144 * (.069)	-.003 (.065)	.016 (.065)	-.057 (.190)	-.755 ~ (.401)
1(Has kids & female)	-.043 (.030)	-.067 ~ (.036)	-.068 ~ (.035)	-.052 * (.025)	-.087 ** (.034)	-.129 ~ (.066)	-.386 * (.172)
1(Has kids & male)	-.002 (.028)	-.007 (.040)	-.024 (.036)	-.049 ~ (.028)	.004 (.033)	.027 (.063)	-.211 (.172)
1(Married & female)	-.059 ~ (.033)	-.039 (.037)	-.041 (.035)	-.023 (.027)	.008 (.034)	.067 (.078)	-.437 * (.186)
1(Married & male)	-.040 (.030)	-.013 (.040)	.010 (.037)	.028 (.032)	.009 (.033)	.019 (.075)	-.025 (.200)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.041 (.038)	-.060 (.053)	-.044 (.049)	-.002 (.035)	-.091 ~ (.046)	-.155 ~ (.090)	-.175 (.228)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.019 (.044)	-.026 (.054)	-.052 (.051)	-.050 (.041)	-.001 (.047)	.048 (.105)	-.412 (.266)
\bar{Y}	.622	.428	.479	.182	.747	.688	-.157
N	4,294	3,800	3,800	3,323	2,829	494	4,294

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table A4: Acquisition of Political Information by Gender and Family Status: Respondents 40 or Younger

	Info from Internet	Info from Radio	Info from TV	Info from News- papers	Info from Campaign Meetings	Sum of z-scores (Hard Info)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(Female)	-.047 (.056)	-.138 * (.068)	-.129 ~ (.070)	-.153 ~ (.079)	-.018 (.062)	-1.141 * (.524)
1(Has kids & female)	-.018 (.027)	-.012 (.033)	-.020 (.038)	-.063 (.041)	-.057 * (.027)	-.424 (.262)
1(Has kids & male)	.066 * (.033)	-.093 * (.043)	.009 (.038)	.021 (.042)	-.029 (.037)	-.016 (.313)
1(Married & female)	-.042 (.031)	-.029 (.034)	.012 (.039)	-.015 (.043)	-.037 (.030)	-.316 (.284)
1(Married & male)	-.054 (.033)	.063 (.043)	-.001 (.037)	-.024 (.042)	.011 (.037)	-.050 (.319)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.084 * (.042)	.081 (.054)	-.029 (.054)	-.085 (.059)	-.028 (.046)	-.409 (.405)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$.011 (.045)	-.092 ~ (.055)	.013 (.054)	.009 (.060)	-.048 (.048)	-.266 (.428)
\bar{Y}	.159	.247	.768	.574	.164	.335
N	3,561	3,561	3,561	3,561	3,561	3,561
	Info from TV ads	Info from Campaign Leaflets	Info from Campaign Posters	Sum of z-scores (Easy Info)		Sum of z-scores (All Info)
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		(11)
1(Female)	-.153 (.126)	.053 (.132)	-.097 (.124)	-.421 (.594)		-1.332 * (.622)
1(Has kids & female)	-.024 (.058)	.002 (.063)	.076 (.063)	.111 (.298)		-.387 (.329)
1(Has kids & male)	-.029 (.062)	.023 (.068)	-.061 (.061)	-.143 (.284)		-.090 (.363)
1(Married & female)	.006 (.058)	.039 (.064)	-.101 (.065)	-.119 (.296)		-.358 (.350)
1(Married & male)	-.030 (.060)	.014 (.068)	.010 (.060)	-.015 (.281)		-.056 (.370)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$.005 (.084)	-.021 (.092)	.136 (.087)	.254 (.409)		-.297 (.485)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$.036 (.084)	.025 (.093)	-.111 (.088)	-.104 (.409)		-.302 (.508)
\bar{Y}	.730	.653	.705	.260		.431
N	1,316	1,316	1,316	1,316		3,561

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

Table A5: Political Views by Gender and Family Status: Respondents 40 or Younger

	1 = Completely Disagree; 4 = Completely Agree						
	Abortion Should Be Harder to Get (1)	If Jobs Are Scarce Men Should Have Priority (2)	Drug Users Shouldn't Be Punished (3)	Firms Should Be Freer to Hire, Fire (4)	Immigrants Threaten Natives' Employment (5)	1-to-10 Left-Right Index (7)	Voted Berlusconi in Last Election (7)
1(Female)	-.352 * (.179)	-.172 (.191)	.088 (.190)	-.067 (.181)	.032 (.172)	-.971 * (.425)	-.101 (.066)
1(Has kids & female)	.083 (.071)	.231 ** (.089)	-.099 (.095)	.033 (.091)	.242 ** (.082)	.191 (.166)	.068 ** (.025)
1(Has kids & male)	.172 * (.080)	.111 (.099)	.021 (.106)	.139 (.103)	.108 (.094)	-.052 (.189)	.038 (.026)
1(Married & female)	.087 (.081)	-.002 (.089)	-.003 (.097)	.024 (.095)	.010 (.083)	.145 (.184)	.024 (.030)
1(Married & male)	-.066 (.086)	-.023 (.099)	-.062 (.104)	-.103 (.099)	.037 (.092)	.079 (.214)	-.031 (.031)
$\beta^{\text{female w/ kids}} - \beta^{\text{male w/ kids}}$	-.089 (.100)	.119 (.131)	-.120 (.141)	-.106 (.136)	.134 (.123)	.243 (.238)	.029 (.035)
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$.153 (.116)	.021 (.133)	.059 (.142)	.127 (.137)	-.027 (.124)	.066 (.276)	.055 (.042)
\bar{Y}	2.178	2.498	1.957	2.247	2.379	5.424	.295
N	3,313	2,562	2,516	3,447	3,510	3,614	4,294

Notes: All regressions also control for age (alone and interacted with gender) and dummies for size of city of residence, region of residence, education, father's education, intensity of religious beliefs, survey year and wave, as well as gender-specific dummies for divorce and widowhood. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10

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