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Working Paper

Dismantling the "Jungle": Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France

CESifo Working Paper, No. 6927

Provided in Cooperation with:

Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Suggested Citation: Vertier, Paul; Viskanic, Max (2018) : Dismantling the "Jungle": Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France, CESifo Working Paper, No. 6927, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich

This Version is available at:

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Impressum:

CESifo Working Papers

ISSN 2364-1428 (electronic version)

Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH

The international platform of Ludwigs-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the ifo Institute

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Abstract

Can a small scale inflow of migrants affect electoral outcomes? We study whether the relocation of migrants from the Calais “Jungle” to temporary migrant-centers (CAOs) in France affected the results of the 2017 presidential election. Using an instrumental variables approach that relies on the size of holiday villages present in municipalities, we find that the presence of a CAO reduced the vote share increase of the far-right party (Front National) by about 15.7 percent. These effects, which dissipate spatially and depend on city characteristics and on the size of the inflow, point towards the contact hypothesis ([Allport \(1954\)](#)).

JEL-Codes: C360, D720, J150, P160, R230.

Keywords: political economy, voting, migration, EU, France, migrants.

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This version: January 9, 2018

First version: May 5, 2017

This work is supported by a public grant overseen by the French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the Investissements d’Avenir program LIEPP (ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02). We thank Yann Algan, Diane Bolet, Julia Cagé, Guillaume Chapelle, Jean-Benoît Eyméoud, Roberto Galbiati, Matteo Gamalerio, Ian Gordon, Sergei Guriev, Emeric Henry, Ilyana Kuziemko, Mario Luca, David Strömberg, Simon Weber, as well as participants at the Sciences Po Lunch Seminar, the CEPII Conference on Immigration in OECD countries, the 11th Cesifo Workshop in Political Economy and the Graduate Conference on Populism at the LSE for useful comments.

1 Introduction and Background

Is there a link between the recent migrant crisis and the rise of far-right votes in Europe? In the last years, the number of asylum applications in the European Union increased dramatically, from 431 thousand in 2013, to 627 thousand in 2014 and close to 1.3 million in 2015. Arguably this influx, which is double the amount of the peak asylum application in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian conflict in the 1990s ([Eurostat \(2016\)](#)), had electoral repercussions in numerous European countries. Recent literature in the context of large immigration inflows has documented that large flows of immigrants have led to increases in radical votes and especially far-right votes (represented by parties such as FPÖ (Austria), AfD (Germany) or Lega Nord (Italy)). On the other hand little is known regarding the impact of *small scale* migrant inflows and their electoral repercussions.

In this paper we try to fill this gap by examining as an event study the dismantlement of the Calais “Jungle”, an encampment just outside the city of Calais, in the North of France. During the migrant crisis this illegal squatter camp, increased in population reaching nearly 6,400 inhabitants in October 2016 ([Le Monde \(2016\)](#)), shortly before it was closed and the inhabitants, mostly migrants, relocated. Those migrants were relocated to about 200 to 400 temporary migrant centres called *Centres d’Accueil et d’Orientation* (CAOs) all over the country. We link municipality level variation in the exposure to small numbers of migrants to electoral outcomes. We focus specifically on the vote share of the Front National (National Front), the major far-right wing party in France. During the campaign prior to the presidential election in May 2017 the Front National’s rhetoric was generally anti-immigrant, which brought the migrant crisis at the heart of the presidential debate. This was demonstrated most prominently in the general media, but also on the party’s social media, their public gatherings as well as election manifesto.¹

In order to achieve exogenous variation in the exposure of French municipalities to relocated migrants we instrument the presence of a CAO with the presence and size of holiday villages in the same municipality. The reason why we expect a high positive correlation between the presence of the CAO and the holiday villages is the fact that one of the many criteria of the location of the CAOs was potential additional space in those holiday villages, given that the resolution of the “Jungle” took place mostly in October 2016. The holiday villages would be unoccupied at that time and could thus be used as temporary shelters for migrants. At the same time the stock of holiday villages is determined much before the current migrant surge that led to the creation of the CAOs. Thus our exclusion restriction is likely warranted and we are thus able to estimate the causal effect of the migrant relocation on votes in favour of the Front National. Carrying

¹See for example [La Croix \(2017\)](#), [BBC \(2017\)](#) and [Le Monde \(2017\)](#) amongst others.

out our empirical analysis, we find the presence of a CAO to have a negative effect on the vote share of the Front National. The gain in vote share of the Front National is decreased by 15.7 percent (about two percentage points) in those municipalities. These results point towards direct effects of exposure to migrants consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport (1954)). Indeed, migrants were meant to stay for a short period of time (typically less than three months), and they were also unlikely to affect the local economy for several reasons. First, the cost of relocation was fully taken charge of by the government. Secondly, they did not have the right to work and received no financial transfers. In fact, we show that their arrival does not seem to have impacted local economic activity.

Our main interpretation of our findings is that citizens developed a greater degree of acceptance towards migrants and hence were less likely to vote for the Front National. These results seem to be confirmed by the fact that we observe an increase in the share of votes received by the far-left party *Front de Gauche*, which has a more open stance towards migrants, but similar political platform on other issues. Furthermore, we find spillover effects of the presence of the CAOs on neighbouring municipalities. Municipalities within a five km radius decrease their support for the Front National by around 1.8 percent. Overall, we also find a stronger decrease of vote shares of the Front National in more diverse municipalities with a larger share of younger people. On the other hand effects are dampened in municipalities which were exposed to more migrants and where the mayors volunteered to welcome them. Importantly our calculations suggest that in municipalities that had over 39 beds per 1000 inhabitants the impact on the Front National vote outcome is positive. This finding reconciles the fact that large inflows of immigrants contributed to the rise of Right wing parties as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

We add to the literature in two ways. First of all, this paper is part of a large strand of literature documenting the electoral repercussions of immigration. Whereas most of the literature has focused on large and long-lasting impacts of immigrants on voting behavior, little is known about the effects of short and small-scale exposure to migrants. Studies examining large inflows of immigrants have generally found a positive impact on far-right votes (Barone et al. (2016), Halla et al. (forthcoming), Harmon (forthcoming), Otto and Steinhardt (2014), Mendez and Cutillas (2014), Brunner and Kuhn (2014), Becker and Fetzer (2016), Viskanic (2017)). Most of those papers rely to some degree on the instrument proposed by Card (2001) which uses the prior allocation of immigrants as way to obtain exogenous variation in immigrant allocation and thus solve the issue of geographical selection.

In the wake of the migrant crisis, recent contributions analyzed the effects of exposure to migrants on voting behaviors and attitudes toward migrants, with diverging results.

More specifically, [Hangartner et al. \(2017a\)](#) and [Hangartner et al. \(2017b\)](#) found that voters on Greek Islands which were more exposed to large inflows of migrants were more likely to develop hostility towards them, and to vote for the Golden Dawn party, one of the major far-right parties in Greece. Conversely, [Steinmayr \(2016\)](#) shows that municipalities of Upper Austria which received migrants were less likely to vote for far-right parties. On the other hand [Dustmann et al. \(2016\)](#) show that the effects of exogenous migrant relocation on voting behavior in Denmark are heterogeneous and depend crucially on the characteristics of the localities: in particular, while positive effects on anti-immigration parties are found in rural areas, this effect is reversed in urban areas. These results highlight the importance of taking into account both municipality characteristics and the intensive margin of exposure to migrants.

Our paper combines these approaches by focusing on the electoral effects of receiving a small number of migrants (typically a few dozens), conditionally on long-term exposure to immigrants. Furthermore, our rich dataset allows us to explore how the results vary at the intensive margin (number of migrants) and depending on the characteristics of the population. From this point of view, the threshold effect that we find (above 39 migrants per 1000 inhabitants, the Front National vote increases), reconciles it with findings on large inflows of migrants.

Secondly, our framework allows us to isolate a direct effect of migrant relocation on voting behavior, which is unlikely to occur through intermediary variables. A large literature in economics has considered the links between immigration and the labour market ([Card \(1990\)](#), [Altonji and Card \(1991\)](#), [Borjas \(2003\)](#), [Ortega and Peri \(2009\)](#), [Ottaviano and Peri \(2012\)](#), [Guriev and Vakulenko \(2002\)](#), among others), public finance ([Gott and Johnstone \(2002\)](#), [OECD, \(2015\)](#), [Vargas-Silva \(2015\)](#)) or crime ([Moehling and Piehl \(2009\)](#), [Bianchi et al. \(2012\)](#), [Mastruboni and Pinotti \(2016\)](#)), which in turn are likely to affect electoral outcomes. In particular, variations on the labour market affect extreme votes, notably through trade shocks ([Autor et al. \(2016\)](#), [Malgouyres \(2017\)](#), [Dippel et al. \(2017\)](#)), or unemployment ([Algan et al. \(2017\)](#)). In this paper, we argue that our results are not affected by variations on the labour market or in local public finance. Overall, while national exposure to immigration shapes attitudes towards migrants ([Hainmueller and Hopkins \(2014\)](#)), we show that small-scale contacts are also likely to play an important role.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional framework and data description, section 3 presents the empirical specification and identification, Section 4 presents the main results on the allocation of the migrants together with the main results on the vote share of the Front National, Section 5 provides some heterogeneous effects, robustness checks as well as falsification exercises can be found in section 6, whereas

section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Framework and Data

In the following subsections we first provide qualitative and quantitative details on the Calais Camp and its dismantlement. Then we outline the functioning of the French presidential elections and outline our various data sources used and controls employed.

2.1 Migrants and the Calais “Jungle”

The Calais “Jungle” was an informal migrant camp, which first took form in the late 1990s, was progressively extended during the 2000s, and grew massively following the European migrant crisis in 2014-2015, reaching a peak of more than 7,000 inhabitants in late 2015 (Figure 2). Following this massive inflation of the “Jungle”, the government decided to progressively dismantle the camp starting from October 2015, through the creation of CAOs (*Centres d’Accueil et d’Orientation*). These centres, whose creation was ordered on October 27th 2015, aim at receiving migrants who have not yet started any procedure to obtain migrant status. Migrants allocated to the CAOs are thus meant to stay only for a short period of time, typically for less than three months. During this period, they are offered administrative assistance and bed and board, but they do not receive any financial allocation (nor do they have the right to work legally). The average cost of a day in a CAO is about 25 euros. However, it is the government and not the municipalities which pay for it ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)). The migrants who have started a procedure to obtain a migrant status are redirected to the CADA (*Centres d’Accueil pour Demandeurs d’Asile*), which also offers bed and board together with administrative assistance, while awaiting decision. The first of these centres were created in the 1970s, and could host up to 25,000 migrants as of 2015. ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)). Between 2015 and 2017, the number of places in CADA increased to around 40,000 places ([La Cimade \(2017\)](#)). Although the network of CADAs is the largest structure used to host asylum-seekers, other structures were created over time, such as the AT-SA (*Accueil Temporaire du Service de l’Asile* - 6,000 places as of 2017), the HUDA (*Hebergement d’Urgence des Demandeurs d’Asile* - 15,000 places as of 2017), the CPH (*Centre Provisoire d’Hebergement* - 2,300 places as of 2017), and PRAHDA (*Programme d’Accueil et d’Hebergement des Demandeurs d’Asile* - 5,351 as of 2017) ([La Cimade \(2017\)](#)).

[Figure 2 about here]

The dismantling of the Calais camp occurred in several stages from October 2015 to October 2016. Overall, the government reports having relocated 13,366 migrants since October 2015, and more than 7,000 inhabitants during the sole dismantling of October 2016. This event received considerable media attention, as we can see from Figure 3, showing the number of Google searches for “Jungle de Calais” (“Jungle of Calais”) over time.

[Figure 3 about here]

Focusing on the dismantling of the “Jungle” raises different challenges. First of all, the criteria of allocation of the CAOs have not been clearly defined, which makes the use of an instrument for its assignment mandatory. During the final dismantling of October 2016, even though the government announced that the allocation of CAOs across regions would be based on “socio-demographic criteria” ([Ministère de l’Intérieur \(2017\)](#)), no comprehensive list of factors was provided. Therefore our paper will also be devoted to documenting, on observables, which municipalities were chosen to host migrants. The only indication that was given was that the Parisian agglomeration (Ile-de-France) and Corsica would not be considered. Those two regions are thus excluded from our analysis and Corsica will be used as an additional robustness check in section 6. Since no migrants were allocated to Corsica, if our instrument is valid, then holiday villages in Corsica should not be systematically related to any political outcomes. Another issue to consider is the extent to which the mayors of concerned municipalities were involved in the process of the allocation of the CAOs. Although many mayors were contacted to receive migrants ([Le Monde \(2015\)](#), [Association des Maires de France \(2016\)](#)), during the final dismantling, the Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, entrusted the final decision to the local representatives of the government i.e. the *préfets*.² The *préfets* would first identify suitable premises without prior consultation of the concerned municipalities, and then negotiate with the mayors. In our analysis, even though the compliance of mayors is not generally observed, we exploit additional information about a list of mayors who publicly declared, in September 2015, their willingness to welcome migrants. We do this in order to investigate whether the effects are stronger in those municipalities.

[Figure 4 about here]

²The *préfets* have authority at the provincial level of the *département*.

2.2 French Presidential Elections

French presidential elections are held every five years since 2002, using a two-round majoritarian system. After the first round, if no candidate received more than 50% of the expressed votes, a second round is held between the two candidates with the largest vote share. We collect the vote shares of all the candidates in the presidential elections in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017, for each French municipality.

Our main outcome of interest is the share of votes received by the Front National candidates in the first round of the presidential election. The candidates from this party over the last three decades were all members of the Le Pen family: Jean-Marie Le Pen (founder of the Front National) was candidate from 1988 to 2007, while his daughter Marine Le Pen was candidate in 2012 and 2017.³ Figure 1 shows the geographic repartition of FN voters in the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 in France. The Front National's strongholds are located in the south-eastern and north-eastern parts of France, where more than 30% of the population voted in favour of Marine Le Pen both in 2012 and 2017. As indicated by the common scale of colours used for both maps, the Front National vote increased substantially between 2012 and 2017 (by 20% on average).

[Figure 1 about here]

2.3 Data Description

In order to conduct our empirical analysis we use multiple data sources. Presidential election results in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 at the municipality level are taken from the Ministry of Interior. In each of those elections the vote share of the Front National is expressed in percentage points. The location and size of holiday villages is taken from the 2016 survey of tourism capacity at the municipal level carried out by the French national statistical institute (INSEE). From the same data source we also collect the number of hotel beds per municipality, which we introduce as a control in order to filter out the component in migrant relocation not related to tourism.

Holiday villages are defined as individual or collective housing, with common sports and entertainment facilities, dedicated to host leisure stays for a fixed fee. Our dataset

³The Front National was not the only far-right party represented in these elections. Other conservative candidates, sharing some of the rhetoric of the Front National were also represented in the 2007 election (Philippe de Villiers), as well as in the 2012 and 2017 elections (Nicolas Dupont-Aignan).

lists the number of holiday villages and how many beds they contain per municipality in 2016.

In order to proxy the compliance of French mayors in the implementation of the CAOs we use a list of mayors who declared to being willing to welcome migrants as of September 2015. This dataset, which is taken from the National French Television ([France Télévision \(2015\)](#)), is neither official nor exhaustive, but contains 417 municipalities.

We use the 2013 French Census from the INSEE, which is the most recent one available. In particular, we consider the total population, the share of vacant housing, of home owners and social housing for each municipality. We also collect the share of individuals aged between 15 and 29, 30 and 44, 45 and 59, 60 and 74, or over 75 respectively per municipality. We consider the share (among the population above 15 years-old) of individuals belonging to each of the eight official socio-professional categories (farmers, independent, white collars, intermediary professions, employees, blue collars, retired and inactive). Similarly, we consider the share of unemployment among the population aged between 15 and 64. Finally, we also report the share of migrants within the total population of the municipality, where migrants are defined as individuals who are foreign-born but live in France. From the 2013 version of the INSEE file on disposable income, we also collect information on the median disposable income by consumption unit in Euros at the municipality level. Those are available only for municipalities of more than 50 inhabitants. All the aforementioned variables in this paragraph are also collected for 2006 and we use the variation over time as controls as well as the stock in 2013 in our regressions in order to capture the evolution of municipalities post the major 2008 financial crisis as well as current economic conditions.

From the INSEE, we also collect information about the type of each municipality, which can be either central, suburban, independent or rural.

All the aforementioned socio-economic characteristics are part of the controls in our regressions. In order to extensively control for political characteristics of the municipalities in question, we collect background information on the mayors, using the *Repertoire National des Elus* from the Ministry of Interior. This dataset provides information on the occupation of the mayor i.e. if she is a private employee or a civil servant, a teacher, a farmer, or an individual working in an industrial or liberal occupation. It also indicates the age of the mayor, and her party affiliation which we reclassify in 5 categories: left wing, right wing, extreme left, extreme right or others.

Since the French government did not provide official information on the location of the CAOs, we use a non-official dataset. Our preferred dataset is from the *CIMADE* - a French association working with migrants - which, based on local media and associations, indicated the location of 203 CAOs by late October 2016. Such a figure is much lower

than the one provided by the Government, which is of 374 as of February 2017 ([Ministère de l'Intérieur \(2017\)](#)). However, the number of available beds in CAOs reported by the *CIMADE* (7,585) roughly corresponds to the number of migrants who were relocated during the dismantling of October 2016. Importantly, the data from the *CIMADE* reports simultaneously CAOs that were created before the final dismantlement, and those that were created between September and October 2016. We therefore broadly interpret the CAOs contained in the *CIMADE* dataset as centres which received migrants any time between October 2015 and October 2016. Importantly, this source also indicates the capacity of the centres as of October 2016. Since the *CIMADE* data is not official, it is likely that some existing CAOs were not reported. Since it assigns some treated municipalities into the control group, it therefore artificially reduces the observed differences between treated and non-treated municipalities. Thus our results are likely to represent a lower bound of the true effect of migrant relocation. In Section 6, we use an alternative source of data from *InfoCAO*,⁴ a website from two associations assisting the Calais migrants (*L'Auberge des Migrants* and *Utopia 56*), which reports the location of 375 CAOs in France. Even though this dataset reports twice as many CAOs as the one from the *CIMADE*, it does not report the size of the centres. Yet, using this dataset yields very similar results for our main specification.

From the *Cimade*, we also collect information on the presence of other types of migrant centres (as of July 2017), including CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH and PRAHDA. The data is most detailed for the CADA, where we are able to obtain the number of places between 2012 and 2016 on a yearly basis. This allows us to compute the evolution of the number of places in the CADA at the municipality level during this period. Combining all this information with a GIS dataset of French municipalities (provided by the French national geographic institute (IGN)), we are able to compute, for each municipality, the distance to each of these centres i.e. the distance to the closest centre among all CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH and PRAHDA. Furthermore, we also use this GIS data to compute, for each municipality, the distance to the closest CAO, which is used to estimate spillover effects.

Finally, in order to identify whether our results can be attributed to a variation of economic activity at the local level, we use a dataset of from [Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi \(2017\)](#), which reports job destructions and creations at the municipal level in France between January 2009 and June 2017. This dataset has the advantage of providing a measure of local employment dynamics at the municipal level with higher frequency than traditional indicators. However, in the context of our study, it might suffer from two drawbacks. First, since it is based on monitoring, it might only

⁴<http://www.infocao.net/>

cover job destructions and creations that are of a magnitude to be actually mentioned in local media (for example local newspapers). Furthermore, this data is likely to be more accurate in depicting labor markets at the level of the employment zone than at the level of the municipality, which is the administrative unit of interest in this paper. We therefore do not include this data in our main analysis, but we investigate their relationship to migrants inflows in Section 5.3.

3 Empirical Specification and Instrumental Variable Approach

We estimate the effect of temporary migrant centres on the evolution of FN vote between 2012 and 2017. Because of data limitations we only know the presence of a CAO and how many sleeping places this CAO contains per municipality, but not how many migrants were finally moved there. We therefore estimate the following equation:

$$\Delta FN \equiv \log(FN_{2017})_i - \log(FN_{2012})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CAO_i + \beta_k \Omega_k + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where $\log(FN_{2017})_i - \log(FN_{2012})_i$ is the difference of log voting shares for the Front National in 2017 and 2012; CAO_i is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality has a CAO and 0 otherwise, while Ω_k are control variables, which were outlined in the data description. Particularly we use all the socio-economic controls (notably the evolution between 2013 and 2006), the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant centre, the evolution in the number of CADA places between 2012 and 2016, the log of hotel rooms, as well as political and administrative characteristics of the municipality and demographics of the mayors. All the regressions include provincial (*département*) fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

However, the assignment of the CAOs is not random, and is likely to be endogenous to political outcomes. First of all, as we show in the next section, municipalities which volunteered to receive migrants were also more likely to eventually receive a CAO. Since this measure is only an imperfect measure of municipality compliance, and as we do not observe the bargaining which might have taken place between municipalities and the government, simple OLS estimates are likely to be biased towards zero, given that citizens of volunteering cities are arguably more tolerant toward migrants and less likely to be affected by the presence of a CAO. Furthermore, many CAOs were established in vacant buildings owned or rented by the state such as for example old military bases or hospitals, and as we show in the next section, they were also more likely to be located in places with a higher number of vacant housing units and in rural areas. Simple OLS

estimations might therefore capture part of these effects which are likely to be factors increasing the share of votes in favour of the Front National over time.

Consequently, in order to circumvent these potential biases, we propose to instrument the probability of location of a CAO with the number of beds available in the “Village Vacances” (VV) i.e. the aforementioned holiday villages, as of 2016.⁵ Even though several types of venues were considered by the government, a strong emphasis was put on holiday villages (and especially the ones belonging to companies such as *La Poste* or *EDF*) ([Libération \(2016\)](#)). We argue that, controlling for overall tourism (i.e. the number of sleeping places in hotels), holiday villages provide a good instrument to achieve exogenous variation in the assignment of migrants. The residency in those holiday villages is seasonal rather than permanent and thus most likely not associated with any political characteristic of a municipality. What re-enforces this argument is that the holiday villages were established historically in the past and certainly not for the purpose of hosting migrants. In fact, the stock of beds in holiday villages seems to be very stable over time: for example, the correlation coefficient between the number of beds in a municipality in 2014 and in 2016 is equal to 0.98. On the other hand ancient military bases or hospitals as well as total vacant units might indicate a progressive isolation of the municipality. We therefore think that holiday villages can capture exactly this exogenous variation in migrant allocation that we are looking for.

Since our first stage is a Probit, we posit that the more beds in a certain “Village Vacances”, the higher the probability of a migrant centre being located there. Therefore our first stage can be written as:

$$Pr(CAO_i) = \Phi(\log(1 + bedsVV)_i, \Omega_k) \quad (2)$$

Where $\log(1 + bedsVV)_i$ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of beds provided in the “Village Vacances”.

To confirm the validity of this instrumentation strategy, we run several tests in Section 6. In particular, we show that before the dismantling of the Calais camp, municipalities with a CAO did not seem to be on different electoral pre-trends than municipalities without a CAO, and that controlling for past evolutions of FN vote does not affect our results. We also show our results are unaffected by instrumenting with the number of beds in holiday villages in 2014. Finally, we run a falsification test using the particular case of Corsica: while this region has several holiday villages, it did not receive any CAOs. Yet, in this region, we do not find that municipalities with a greater number of beds in holiday villages had different trends of vote for the Front National between 2012 and 2017.⁶

⁵Using as instrument the mere presence of a “Village Vacances” also gives a very strong first stage.

⁶In fact, in the general case, we do not find any significant correlation between the number of beds

Finally, we investigate the presence of spillover effects of migrant relocation by estimating the effect of distance to the closest CAO (using radiuses of 5km, 10km and 15km). In order to estimate spillovers we have to assume that the decision to create a CAO in a given municipality is unrelated to politics in localities in the radius of 5km, 10km and 15km. This assumption seems warranted given the high number of observations and is reinforced when looking at our empirical results: the estimate of β_1 is affected only slightly when spatial dummies are introduced.

4 Empirical Results

In the following sections, we first show the main drivers behind the migrant relocation. We then show the main estimates of the migrant relocation on voting shares of the Front National in the 2017 presidential election.

4.1 Where were the migrants relocated?

In this subsection, we examine our rich dataset to document the characteristics of municipalities which received migrants in CAOs between October 2015 and October 2016.

A first important question is related to the magnitude of the inflows in each of the 203 municipalities for which we observe a CAO. First of all, based on the data provided by the *CIMADE*, we find that a municipality which received migrants in CAOs had on average 36 beds (standard deviation of 26, the minimum being equal to 2 and the maximum being equal to 150). These municipalities had on average 17 beds per 1000 inhabitants (standard deviation of 36, with a minimum of 0.06 and a maximum of 251).

In Tables 1 and 2 we report the characteristics of municipalities with and without CAOs. They differ in many observable characteristics. Importantly for our identification strategy, municipalities with CAOs include many more beds in holiday resorts than other municipalities. They are also more likely to be among the municipalities whose mayor publicly mentioned to be willing to welcome migrants, and they had a lower share of Front National vote in 2012. We also find that these municipalities are larger, closer to other migrant centres, with more hotel rooms and vacant housing units. Their population, which has lower median income and a higher share of unemployment, is also younger, includes more migrants, and hosts more beneficiaries of social housing. migrants seem to have been relocated evenly between municipalities at the centre of urban units, suburban cities and rural municipalities. Most of these municipalities had right-wing or left-wing mayors, who were also slightly younger, more likely to work in liberal occupations and less likely to be retired.

in holiday villages and the evolution of Front National vote between 2017 and 2012.

However, these effects are largely driven by composition effects. Indeed, if we regress the probability of having a CAO on these variables as well as *département* fixed-effects in a Probit model, only a few variables are found to significantly affect the probability of having a CAO. Overall, the only significant variables at the 5% level are: the number of beds in holiday villages, the distance to the closest permanent migrant centre, the willingness to receive migrants, the share of farmers and the dummy indicating that the municipality is rural. Two additional variables are significant at the 10% level: the number of housing units and the share of individuals age between 15 and 29 in 2013. Interestingly, once all these factors are controlled for, the presence of a CAO is uncorrelated to the share of FN vote in 2012.⁷

[Table 1 about here]

[Table 2 about here]

4.2 Main Results

In Table 3 one can see that while the coefficient of the instrument is slightly affected by the presence of controls, the magnitude and significance still remain important. Our first stage is very strong, the F-Statistic for the excluded instrument with controls is over 15, which is much higher than the customary value of 10 and the weak instrument guidelines given in Stock and Yogo (2005). We observe a negative correlation between the presence of a CAO and the evolution of Front National voting shares when looking at the OLS regression (Column (3)). When we use our instrumental variables approach, the effect is more negative and highly significant. As we previously discussed, not instrumenting the allocation of CAOs biases our estimates towards zero. The presence of a CAO decreases the progression of Front National votes by 15.7 percent (Column (4)). This specification controls for the type of the city, as well as provincial (*Département*) fixed-effects, many locality level covariates (political, socio-economic) and the log of hotel beds in the municipality.⁸ Considering spillover effects we can see that localities in a five km radius

⁷Results of this regression are available upon request.

⁸A full list of controls is outlined in the data description.

also experience negative impact on the Front National vote, but not as strongly as the municipalities that actually have a CAO. This effect dissipates spatially.

[Table 3 about here]

5 Further Analysis of the Effects of Migrant Relocation

In the following sections we estimate heterogeneous effects of migrant relocation in order to determine particular factors that are driving our results. We also estimate the impact on other electoral outcomes, particularly the impact of votes on the extreme left. Lastly, we analyse whether our results could be driven by enhanced economic activity brought by migrants or whether evidence rather points towards the contact hypothesis

5.1 Heterogeneous Effects of Migrant Relocation

As part of our main analysis we conduct regressions showing heterogeneous effects in Table 4. We interact our prediction from the first stage with various indicators provided at the micro level to instrument for the interaction terms outlined in Table 4. We want to test whether communities with certain characteristics respond in differing ways to migrants. First, we try to see whether migrants have a stronger effect on communities when there are already many immigrants to begin with. In column (1) we can see that the decrease of votes of the Front National is more pronounced in places with a higher share of immigrants. This could be the case as already pre-existing communities from the same country of origin of the migrants could facilitate initial contact. We also find a stronger decrease in municipalities with a larger share of younger inhabitants (column (2)). This could be due to the fact that younger people have less fortified opinions towards migrants and thus might be more willing to get in touch with the new people joining their municipality. Furthermore, we find a smaller decrease in municipalities in which mayors publicly volunteered to welcome migrants (column (3)): this might be due to the fact that citizens living in volunteering cities are also less likely to be prejudiced against migrants, so that actual contact with them is less likely to affect their political choices. However, we do not find that the treatment effect is different in places where the FN vote was historically low (column (4)). Finally, the decrease seems to be higher in larger municipalities (column (5)), even though the point estimate is not significant.

The analysis of the intensive margin yields important results for the understanding of electoral reaction to migrant inflows. We indeed find that the negative effect on FN vote is stronger in municipalities with fewer beds per inhabitant (column (6)). Based on this heterogeneity analysis, we estimate that municipalities which decreased their FN vote upon receiving migrants were those that had less than 39 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Above this threshold, the effect of CAO on FN vote seems to be positive. This is in line with a large literature on the impacts of large inflows of immigrants on political outcomes.

Overall, combining all these effects together (column (7)) it appears that the most significant margin of heterogeneity is related to whether mayors were voluntary to receive migrants: municipalities where the FN vote decreased the most in relative terms are those whose mayor did not explicitly call to receive migrants.

[Table 4 about here]

5.2 Other Election Results

In this subsection, we refine our analysis by investigating what impact the relocation of migrants had on abstention and votes on the extreme left-wing political spectrum. In Table 5 we can see that the location of a CAO is associated with a slightly lower abstention, therefore a higher turnout. There seems to be some evidence that migrants have causally increased turnout in those municipalities. Controlling for the change in abstention, we can see that the electoral effects on the vote of the *Front National* are unaffected (Column(3)). Though CAOs are located in municipalities with a slightly higher share of votes for the *Front de Gauche*. After instrumenting, we find a pronounced effect in favour of votes of the *Front de Gauche*, which is similar in magnitude to the negative effect on the votes of the *Front National*.⁹ Therefore we can establish that the causal impact of migrant relocation has led to a decrease in votes of the *Front National* and an increase in both turnout and votes in favour of the major left-wing pro-immigrant party. The next section will outline and discuss two potential mechanisms behind those findings.

[Table 5 about here]

⁹We do not carry out a separate analysis for electoral outcomes in favour of centre-left and centre-right parties, given that the candidacy of Emmanuel Macron, an ex-socialist minister and self-proclaimed centrist, makes it difficult to compare those votes with the election in 2012.

5.3 Mechanism: Local Economic Activity or Contact Hypothesis?

In this section, we analyse a potential alternative mechanism to the contact hypothesis: the effect of migrants on local economic activity. Indeed, while migrants in CAOs do not legally have the right to work on the French territory and do not receive any monetary allocation, their arrival might have an effect on local activity through increased demand in the catering or building sectors. In turn, these potential variations in local economic activity might affect electoral outcomes. To check that these effects are unlikely to drive our results, we use a dataset provided by [Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi \(2017\)](#), which indicates the number of job creations and destructions at the municipality level from January 2009 to June 2017. Using this data, we compute the net job creation per inhabitant at the municipality level for three time periods: from 2012 to 2014, after the beginning of the whole relocation process (from October 2015 to June 2017), and after the beginning of the final step of the dismantling (from October 2016 to June 2017). First, as we showed in [Table 1](#), we find no significant difference of net job creation per inhabitant over the period 2012-2014 between municipalities which eventually received a CAO and those that did not. In [Table 6](#), we estimate whether CAO creations are related to different labor market dynamics in the following months. Whether we consider OLS or IV estimates, controlling for previous net job creation per inhabitant over the period 2012-2014, does not lead to any significant relationship between the presence of CAO and net job creation. Similarly, controlling for net job creation per inhabitant before and after the creation of CAO does not affect our IV estimate of the impact of CAOs on the evolution of FN vote.

[[Table 6](#) about here]

6 Robustness Checks and Falsification Exercises

In the following sections we carry out a battery of robustness checks and falsification exercises. First, we use an alternative dataset from the website *InfoCAO* that enumerates 375 CAOs in France. Then we vary our measure of holiday villages by only including holiday villages in 2014. Lastly we check for political pre-trends in order to make sure that we are not picking up persistent political trends in certain municipalities.

6.1 Alternative Dataset of CAOs

Using the data provided by the website *InfoCAO*, which provides the location of 375 CAOs, we estimate the effects of migrants on the French presidential elections. As we can observe (Table 7, column (1)) the first stage is still highly significant, beds in holiday villages do predict well the assignment of a CAO. CAOs are slightly negatively correlated with electoral outcomes of the *Front National*, but after instrumenting, we find a highly significant negative effect of a magnitude similar to the one found in our main estimation.

[Table 7 about here]

6.2 Alternative Measure of Beds in Holiday Villages

In order to provide more evidence on the robustness of our results, we resort to an alternative measure of beds in holiday villages. In our previous estimation, we used the number of beds in holiday villages for 2016, as it is the most recent measure on the subject. In order to rule out that the presence of migrants might have affected this variable, we carry out the same regressions using observations for the year 2014 (prior to the dismantlement). We can see that both the first stage as well as the coefficient on the *Front National* vote are very similar compared to our previous measure (Table 8).

[Table 8 about here]

6.3 Other Falsification Exercises and Robustness Checks

In this section we conduct a set of falsification exercises as well as robustness checks. First we consider whether we might be picking up a pre-eminent electoral trend in certain municipalities. To do so, we run a panel regression at the municipality level, where we evaluate the effect of CAO presence on various elections between 2007 and 2017 and the dismantling of the Calais camp (namely, the Presidential elections of 2007, the European elections of 2009, the Presidential elections of 2012, the European elections of 2014 and the Presidential election of 2017), controlling for municipality and election fixed-effects.

In Figure 5, where the effect of CAO in the Presidential elections of 2007 is normalized to be zero, the coefficient on CAO is never statistically different from zero except for the 2017 Presidential elections. This gives us some evidence that the treated municipalities were not on different political pre-trends prior to the election.

[Figure 5 about here]

In Table 9 we confirm this result by showing that the presence of CAOs seems to be unrelated to long-run evolutions of FN vote in Presidential elections. In Column (1), (2) and (3) we can see that regressing the variation of log FN vote between the Presidential elections 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2012 on the posterior presence of CAO yields small and insignificant point estimates. In column (4) we can see that the effect of the CAO (instrumented), controlling for said electoral trends, is barely affected (and if anything, our main effect is reinforced).

[Table 9 about here]

As a last check we consider Corsica (Table 10), which represents an interesting indirect test of our exclusion restriction. Indeed, no migrants were relocated to Corsica, but given its appeal as holiday destination, it contains many holiday villages. In order to re-enforce the fact that our regressions are not picking up a pre-eminent trend in very touristic places, we regress our instruments on voting outcomes for the Front National vote in the French Presidential elections. Table 10 shows that no coefficient is significant. These additional regressions additional underline the validity of our instrumental variable approach.¹⁰

[Table 10 about here]

¹⁰Furthermore, for all municipalities, regressing the evolution of log FN votes between 2012 and 2017 on the number of holiday villages yields insignificant point estimates, which reinforces the plausibility of our exclusion restriction.

7 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have tried to answer some important questions regarding both the assignment of migrants subsequent to the dismantlement of the Calais “Jungle” and the impact of the relocation of those migrants on electoral outcomes in the 2017 Presidential election. We find a negative effect on the share of votes for the Front National, which is consistent with the contact hypothesis. We also show heterogeneous effects, as stronger negative effects on the vote share of the Front National occur in municipalities with a younger population and with more migrants. However, in municipalities where the mayor pronounced her willingness to accept migrants in the first place, the decrease is dampened. Finally, the effect is particularly negative for cities which received fewer migrants, and not seem to be driven by potential economic effects. Overall our results suggest that there exists a difference in perceived immigration through the media compared with actual immigration, and that the electoral reaction to actual migration seems to depend crucially on the size of the inflow.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: FN vote shares in the first round of 2012 and 2017 presidential elections




Figure 2: Evolution of the number of migrants in the Calais camp




Figure 3: Google Trends for the expression “Jungle de Calais”



Figure 4: CAOs and density of holiday villages capacity




Figure 5: Absence of Pretrends




Table 1: Characteristics of the municipalities of relocation (Part 1)

	No CAO	Obs	CAO	CAO	Diff	T-Test
Beds in holiday resorts	6.418	33422	106.734	203	-100.316	-17.471
Log hotel rooms (2016)	0.525	33422	3.845	203	-3.319	-35.881
Share of FN votes (2012)	21.492	33422	17.208	203	4.284	8.534
Log min. distance to migrant center	2.899	33422	1.689	203	1.209	26.219
Evol number places in CADA	0.279	33422	11.990	203	-11.711	-31.754
Voluntary to welcome migrants	0.011	33422	0.266	203	-0.255	-33.283
Net job creation per 1000 inhabitants (2012-2014)	0.229	33422	0.045	203	0.185	0.086
City characteristics - 2013						
Log population (2013)	6.153	33422	8.984	203	-2.831	-31.335
Log vacant housing units (2013)	2.982	33422	5.885	203	-2.903	-32.848
Share 15-29 (2013)	0.166	33422	0.213	203	-0.047	-14.691
Share 30-44 (2013)	0.237	33422	0.216	203	0.021	4.935
Share 45-59 (2013)	0.268	33422	0.241	203	0.027	8.792
Share 60-74 (2013)	0.209	33422	0.195	203	0.014	3.649
Share 75+ (2013)	0.120	33422	0.135	203	-0.015	-4.142
Share farmers (2013)	0.036	33417	0.008	203	0.028	7.495
Share independant (2013)	0.043	33417	0.034	203	0.009	3.646
Share white collars (2013)	0.053	33417	0.066	203	-0.013	-4.049
Share intermediary professions (2013)	0.130	33417	0.127	203	0.002	0.530
Share employees (2013)	0.154	33417	0.161	203	-0.006	-1.534
Share blue collars (2013)	0.156	33417	0.134	203	0.022	4.302
Share retired (2013)	0.308	33417	0.307	203	0.001	0.093
Share inactive (2013)	0.120	33417	0.162	203	-0.043	-10.506
Share unemployed (15-64) (2013)	0.077	33422	0.103	203	-0.027	-11.243
Share of homeowners (2013)	0.786	33422	0.568	203	0.218	29.733
Share of social housing (2013)	0.031	33422	0.157	203	-0.125	-30.544
Log median income (2013)	9.880	30085	9.851	201	0.028	2.613
Share of migrants (2013)	0.039	33422	0.075	203	-0.036	-12.978
City characteristics - Evolution (2006-13)						
Evol share farmers (2006-13)	-0.011	33416	-0.002	203	-0.009	-2.250
Evol share independant (2006-13)	0.004	33416	0.001	203	0.003	1.057
Evol share white collars (2006-13)	0.005	33416	0.006	203	-0.001	-0.167
Evol share intermediary professions (2006-13)	0.011	33416	0.001	203	0.010	2.058
Evol share employees (2006-13)	0.005	33416	-0.005	203	0.010	1.978
Evol share blue collars (2006-13)	-0.009	33416	-0.009	203	0	0.052
Evol share retired (2006-13)	0.017	33416	0.020	203	-0.004	-0.541
Evol share inactive (2006-13)	-0.023	33416	-0.013	203	-0.010	-2.115
Evol share 15-29 (2006-13)	-0.012	33422	-0.013	203	0.001	0.420
Evol share 30-44 (2006-13)	-0.025	33422	-0.021	203	-0.004	-1.179
Evol share 45-59 (2006-13)	-0.001	33422	-0.005	203	0.004	1.152
Evol share 60-74 (2006-13)	0.029	33422	0.024	203	0.005	1.545
Evol share 75+ (2006-13)	0.098	33422	0.075	203	0.023	5.269
Evol share unemployed (15-64) (2006-13)	0.014	33422	0.022	203	-0.008	-3.597
Evol log median income (2006-13)	0.198	27929	0.162	200	0.036	7.415
Evol share migrants (2006-13)	0.002	33422	0.007	203	-0.005	-3.962
Evol share homeowners (2006-13)	0.003	33422	0.002	203	0.001	0.262
Evol share social housing (2006-13)	0.001	33422	-0.002	203	0.002	2.123
Evol log vacant housing units (2006-13)	0.298	33422	0.340	203	-0.042	-1.061
Evol log population (2006-13)	0.053	33422	0.018	203	0.035	4.296

Notes: All shares are expressed in decimals, except for voting shares. Distances are expressed in km.

Table 2: Characteristics of the municipalities of relocation (Part 2)

	No CAO	Obs	CAO	CAO	Diff	T-Test
Type of municipality						
Suburb	0.120	33422	0.276	203	-0.156	-6.796
Center	0.039	33422	0.379	203	-0.340	-24.498
Independant	0.029	33422	0.099	203	-0.069	-5.811
Rural	0.812	33422	0.246	203	0.565	20.521
Mayor party						
Age of mayor (in 2014)	58.703	33341	58.271	203	0.432	0.662
Right-wing Mayor	0.368	33244	0.475	202	-0.107	-3.158
Left-wing Mayor	0.214	33244	0.356	202	-0.143	-4.925
Extreme Right Mayor	0.001	33244	0	202	0.001	0.390
Extreme Left Mayor	0.011	33244	0.059	202	-0.048	-6.356
Mayor occupation						
Farmers	0.141	33339	0.039	203	0.101	4.150
Others	0.030	33339	0.059	203	-0.029	-2.367
Teaching/Education	0.043	33339	0.079	203	-0.036	-2.519
Civil Servants	0.101	33339	0.138	203	-0.036	-1.713
Industrial and Commercial	0.061	33339	0.054	203	0.007	0.398
Liberal Occupations	0.037	33339	0.143	203	-0.106	-7.858
Retired	0.429	33339	0.345	203	0.084	2.416
Private employees	0.157	33339	0.143	203	0.014	0.563
<i>Notes:</i> All shares are expressed in decimals, except for voting shares. Distances are expressed in km.						

Table 3: Main Results on the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1) Pr(CAO)	(2) Pr(CAO)	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}
$\log(1 + VVlit)$	0.155*** (0.017)	0.099*** (0.025)			
CAO			-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.157*** (0.033)	-0.161*** (0.033)
Spillover (5 kms)					-0.018*** (0.006)
Spillover (10 kms)					-0.003 (0.004)
Spillover (15 kms)					-0.003 (0.003)
Regression	Probit	Probit	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33625	26813	27938	26812	26812
Adjusted R^2			0.118	0.114	0.114

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of a first stage probit regression where the dummy variable indicating the presence of a CAO is regressed on the log of 1+the number of beds in holiday villages. Column 1 includes no controls, while column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Column 3 presents the results of an OLS regression where the variation of log shares of FN votes between 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO and the full set of controls. Columns 4 and 5 present the results of IV regressions where the first-stage regression is the one presented in column 2. Both regressions include the set of controls described above, and column 5 adds different of radiuses of distance to the closest CAO. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.071 (0.044)	-0.085* (0.050)	-0.240*** (0.057)	-0.191*** (0.059)	-0.017 (0.101)	-0.154*** (0.032)	-0.100 (0.149)
CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$	-1.542** (0.636)						-1.214 (0.737)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.638** (0.297)					-0.625 (0.576)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.135** (0.051)				0.192** (0.075)
CAO $\times FN_{2007}$				-0.007 (0.008)			-0.004 (0.009)
CAO $\times \log(Population)$					-0.030 (0.019)		-0.011 (0.041)
CAO $\times \frac{CAObeds}{Population} \times 1000$						0.004*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Département Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26812	26812	26812	26812	26812	26812	26812
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.116	0.110	0.113	0.117	0.116	0.114

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the log of beds in holiday villages, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 5: Effect of migrant Relocation on Abstention and Extreme-left wing votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FG}	Δ_{FG}
CAO	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.102*** (0.039)	-0.157*** (0.033)	0.006 (0.009)	0.151*** (0.049)
Δ_{Abst}			0.000 (0.005)		
Regression	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27926	26800	26799	27925	26802
Adjusted R^2	0.062	0.060	0.114	0.060	0.060

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 reports the coefficients of an OLS regression where the variation of abstention rate between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO. Column 2 reports the coefficient of CAO on the variation of abstention after instrumenting it with the number of holiday villages. Column 3 reports the second stage of the main instrumental variable specification, where the outcome variable is the variation of FN log vote shares between 2012 and 2017, but controlling for the variation in the abstention rate. Column 4 reports the CAO coefficient in an OLS regression where the outcome variable is the variation in log vote shares obtained by the *Front de Gauche* between 2012 and 2017. Column 5 reports the estimated effect of CAO on the variation of the Front de Gauche vote share after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 6: Effect of migrant Relocation on Net job creation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	<i>NJC</i>	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
	<i>Post</i> – 10/2015	<i>Post</i> – 10/2016	<i>Post</i> – 10/2015	<i>Post</i> – 10/2016		
CAO	0.899 (2.049)	0.934 (1.494)	-5.015 (3.138)	-1.554 (1.953)	-0.156*** (0.033)	-0.157*** (0.033)
Regression	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control: $NJC_{2012-2014}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control: $NJC_{Post-10/2015}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Control: $NJC_{Post-10/2016}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27940	27940	26813	26813	26812	26812
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.016	0.025	0.016	0.114	0.114

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of an OLS regression where we regress the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2015 (Column 1) and after October 2016 (Column 2) on the presence of a CAO. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients of the same specification where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the log of beds in holiday villages. Columns 5 is an instrumental variable regression where the outcome variable is the variation of log FN vote share between 2012 and 2017, where we control for the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2015. Column 6 is the same specification as Column 5, but controlling for net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2016. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

NJC stands for Net Job Creation (per thousand inhabitants)

Table 7: Effect of migrant Relocation using alternative dataset of CAOs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	CAO_{Alt}	CAO_{Alt}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
$\log(1 + VVlit)$	0.162*** (0.016)	0.099*** (0.021)		
CAO_{Alt}			-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.120*** (0.022)
Regression	Probit	Probit	OLS	IV
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33625	27922	27938	27920
Adjusted R^2			0.118	0.114

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of a first stage probit regression where the dummy variable indicating the presence of a CAO (as measured according to the dataset from *InfoCAO*) is regressed on the log of 1+the number of beds in holiday villages. Column 1 includes no controls, while column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Column 3 presents the results of an OLS regression where the variation of log shares of FN votes between 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO (as measured according to the dataset from *InfoCAO*). Column 4 presents the results of an IV regression where the first-stage regression is the one presented in column 2. Both regressions include the set of controls described above. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 8: Effect of migrant Relocation using Beds in holiday villages in 2014

	(1) CAO	(2) CAO	(3) Δ_{FN}
$\log(1 + VVlit)_{14}$	0.154*** (0.017)	0.101*** (0.024)	
CAO			-0.157*** (0.033)
Observations	33625	26813	26812
Adjusted R^2			0.114
Regression	Probit	Probit	IV
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	33625	26813	26812
Adjusted R^2			0.114

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of a first stage probit regression where the dummy variable indicating the presence of a CAO is regressed on the log of 1+the number of beds in holiday villages (as of 2014). Column 1 includes no controls, while column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Column 3 presents the results of an IV regression where the first-stage regression is the one presented in column 2. and includes the set of controls described above. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 9: Pre-Trends: CAO coefficients on past Presidential Elections.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	$\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	$\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	$\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$
CAO	0.017 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.178*** (0.034)
Regression	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	No	No	No	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	No	No	No	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	No	No	No	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27898	27924	27932	26766
Adjusted R^2	0.191	0.254	0.142	0.199

Columns 1 to 2 report the results of OLS regressions where the outcome variable is the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 1995 and 2002 (Column 1), 2002 and 2007 (Column 2) and 2007 and 2012 (Column 3). The reported coefficient is the effect of the presence of a CAO between October 2015 and October 2016. Column 4 reports the results of an instrumental variable regression of the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 on the presence of a CAO, where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the log of beds in holiday villages. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics, and *département* fixed effects. Column 4 also controls for past variations of log FN vote between the presidential elections of 1995 and 2002, 2002 and 2007, as well as 2002 and 2007. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 10: No link between holiday villages and FN trend in Corsica

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FN}
$\log(1 + bedsVV)$	-0.005	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Regression	OLS	OLS	OLS
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	352	199	199
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	0.151	0.202

Columns 1 to 2 report the results of OLS regressions of the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 on the log of beds in holiday vilages. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Column 3 controls for *département* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.