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Forecasting distress in European SME portfolios

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Forecasting Distress In European SME Portfolios

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with a preface by Federico Galizia



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Preface

The project “Benchmarking European SME Credit Performance” was launched in 2010 by the EIF with support from the EIB-University Research Sponsorship Programme (EIBURS). With the creation of the EIB Institute in 2012, EIBURS became an integral part of the Knowledge Programme (one of the three flagship programmes of the Institute); this programme aims at channelling support, mainly through grants or sponsorship, to higher education and research activities.

EIBURS provides grants to university research centres working on research topics and themes of major interest to the EIB Group. EIB bursaries, of up to EUR 100,000 per year for a period of three years, are awarded through a competitive process to interested university departments or research centres associated with universities in the EU, Accession or Acceding Countries, with recognised expertise in areas of direct interest to the Bank. The scholarship seeks to enable the chosen centres to expand their activities in these areas.

It is interesting to go back to the text of the original call for expression of interest, which resulted into the selection of the Luxembourg School of Finance:

“There is a limited understanding amongst practitioners of the relationship between SME credit performance on a micro level and the macroeconomic situation they are faced with. The university research centre receiving support under the EIBURS would be expected to set up a research programme focussed on analysing the impact of changes in macroeconomic drivers on key credit performance indicators of SMEs within Europe. Among others, the impact of changes in economic growth locally and globally, interest rates and exchange rates on the delinquency, default, loss and prepayment rates would be investigated also allowing for measurement of contagion between regions, countries and effects of operations in different industries.”

This first paper under the project presents a comprehensive survey of the literature and the methodologies available, and is able to blend firm-level default predictors with aggregate variables to derive a comprehensive default model, covering a large number of European countries. The model addresses many of the areas which were at the core of the original proposal, and in due course should become usable for stress-testing and risk management of SME portfolios across Europe, a feat not yet accomplished either by researchers or supervisors. Its publication at a moment in which policymakers in the European Union have become increasingly aware of the need to constantly take the pulse of SME credit is particularly topical and should receive due attention.

The authors were able to overcome significant difficulties in identifying and selecting data sources, extracting the actual figures and rendering them usable for analytical purposes. The effort needed should not be underestimated, as SMEs across Europe report under different standards, are covered in a variety of ways under the source databases, and furthermore report defaults under different definitions.

We believe that the appearance of this first multi-country analysis will in due course demonstrate the need to make progress in data collection and assembly at a European level. It is no coincidence that the ECB itself has recently sponsored the launch of a loan-level database, the European Datawarehouse. The latter is unfortunately not yet usable for the type of analysis undertaken in this paper, as its historical coverage is just starting.

Federico Galizia

Abstract¹

We develop distress prediction models for non-financial small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) using a dataset from eight European countries over the period 2000-2009. We examine idiosyncratic and systematic covariates and find that macro conditions and bankruptcy codes add predictive power to our models. Moreover, industry effects usually demonstrate significance but provide only small improvements.

The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, using a sample with many micro companies, it offers unique insights into European small businesses. Second, it explores distress in a multi-country setting, allowing for regional and country comparisons. Third, the models can capture changes in overall distress rates and co-movements during economic cycles.

The researchers invite for feedback and comments.

Keywords: credit risk, distress, forecasting, SMEs, discrete time hazard model, multi-period logit model, duration analysis

JEL: C13, C41, C53, G33

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Introduction

SMEs play a crucial role in most economies. In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, SMEs account for 95% of all enterprises and generate two-thirds of employment. In the European Union (EU) in particular, SMEs represent 99% of all enterprises and contribute to more than half of the value-added created by businesses. Despite their importance, SME credit risk remains largely unexplored by the academic literature, mainly due to their information opaqueness and lack of available data.

In this paper, we explore a unique dataset that allows new insights into the European SME sector and its credit risk characteristics:

- First, our sample includes a very high number of micro companies. This focus on the micro sector is important, as nine out of ten European SMEs are micro-enterprises.²
- Second, we include SMEs from eight European economies and examine financial distress³ both within regions and across countries, unlike earlier studies of SME credit risk, which have focused on a single economy.⁴
- Third, we consider systematic factors, such as the macroeconomy, bank lending conditions, and legal aspects. Hence, we are able not only to analyse individual drivers of financial distress, but also to estimate overall distress rates and capture distress spillovers and correlation sources.

Our paper therefore contributes to the overall literature on corporate credit risk, and on SME risk in particular. It is well known that, unlike larger corporations with easier access to capital markets, SMEs offer more challenges in their credit risk modelling.⁵ In fact, widely used structural market-based models for credit evaluation, such as the distance-to-default measure inspired by Merton (1974), cannot be applied in the SME setting. Instead, empirical predictive models such as credit scoring approaches (i.e. Altman, 1968) are the most common. Frame et al. (2001) find that credit scoring lowers information costs between small business borrowers and banks. Similarly, Berger et al. (2005) find evidence in support of the hypothesis that credit scoring increases small business credit availability. Moreover, DeYoung et al. (2010) show that such lending technologies have recently led to increases in small borrower-lender distances. In the early credit rating literature, academics mostly use accounting ratios to predict firm distress.⁶ The first credit scoring study that focuses on small businesses is Edminster (1972), who analyzes nineteen financial ratios and develops a model using multivariate discriminant analysis.

Recently the need for SME-specific research has become pressing, in particular with the implications of Basel's II special treatment requirements for SME exposures and the high numbers of distressed SMEs during the crisis. Berger and Udell (2006) point the need for lending

²Micro-enterprises have fewer than 10 employees and a turnover under EUR 2m.

³We provide the definition of financial distress used for this study in section 3.1. and the definition we adopt for SMEs in section 3.2.

⁴For instance, Altman and Sabato (2007) focus on the US, Carling et al. (2007) on Sweden, Nam et al. (2008) on Korea, and Altman et al. (2010) on the UK.

⁵Dietsch and Petey (2004) explore the differences between SMEs and corporations.

⁶See Altman and Narayanan (1997) and Altman and Saunders (1998) for literature reviews.

technologies specifically designed for SMEs. Beck et al. (2008) find that financing patterns have important differences for SMEs compared to large firms. Similarly, Berger and Schaeck (2010) identify bank financing and venture capital as two of the most important funding sources for these companies. In line with these new concerns, Altman and Sabato (2007) develop a one-year default prediction model for SMEs using only accounting information. They apply panel logit estimation on a sample of around 2,000 US firms over the period 1994-2002 and find that their model outperforms generic corporate models such as Altman's Z"-score (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005).

Moreover, Grunert et al. (2005) and other authors have noted the possibility of using qualitative variables in default prediction models to improve discrimination. Stein (2002) is the first to investigate the importance of "soft" information in borrower-bank relationships. Specifically in the case of SMEs, where there is usually a problem of scarcity of reliable "hard" financial information, such non-financial elements can be very useful in distress prediction. DeYoung et al. (2008) find though that dependence on only "soft" information can increase default events, especially in situations that there is distance between the small business borrower and the bank. Altman et al. (2010) combine both qualitative and financial information in a default prediction model for SMEs. By applying multi-period logit estimation to a large sample of UK SMEs for the period 2000-2007, they find that data relating to legal action by creditors, company filings, and audit report/opinions significantly increase the performance of their model. Such information though is not always available well in advance to predict default in a timely manner.

Another strand of literature, though not focusing on SMEs, analyses the additional benefit of using macroeconomic variables to forecast distress.⁷ Wilson (1997a, 1997b) develops an aggregate credit risk model that explicitly links macroeconomic factors and corporate sector default rates.⁸ Pesaran et al. (2001) links credit risk to changes in equity prices, interest rates, inflation, real money balances, oil prices and output in a Merton-type framework. Likewise, Carling et al. (2007) find that the output gap, the yield curve and consumers' expectation add significant predictive power to distress models. Duffie et al. (2007) incorporate macroeconomic covariates to estimate conditional probabilities of corporate default for a sample of US listed industrial firms. Similarly, Campbell et al. (2008) introduce the macroeconomic environment through financial market variables. Nam et al. (2008) use specifically the volatility of the exchange rate and Koopman et al. (2009) condition on business cycle effects, bank lending conditions and financial market variables. Authors have also noted the importance of industry effects - for instance, Chava and Jarrow (2004) observe improving forecasting performance by including industry groupings in their models.

In an early study, Berger and Udell (1998) discuss the impact of the macroeconomic environment on small firms. Some years later, Glennon and Nigro (2005) and Altman et al. (2010) are the first to examine business cycle effects on SME defaults. Glennon and Nigro (2005), using a dataset of US loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration Scheme, include business cycle dummy variables, the industrial production index growth and rates of regional business bankruptcies to

⁷For a thorough literature review on the incorporation of systemic influences into risk measurements, see Allen and Saunders (2004).

⁸Jacobson et al. (2005) apply a similar framework to default risk of Swedish companies. Bruneau et al. (2012) follow the same approach to study firms' financial fragility in France.

capture regional and industry economic conditions on the default hazard rate. They find that the success or failure of a small loan is closely related to both regional and industrial economic conditions. Altman et al. (2010) use sector-level failure rates and also report a significant relationship with failure probability. Our study differs from the above two since we examine a larger variety of systemic factors, ranging from exchange rates to bank lending conditions, and use a wider sample that includes SMEs from different European countries, allowing for regional models and comparisons.

In line with these findings, our study extensively analyses a large number of idiosyncratic and systemic variables. In addition to determining the importance of indicators of profitability, coverage, leverage and cash flow, we observe that SMEs in urban areas and SMEs with less than three shareholders have higher distress probabilities. We do not find evidence that the legal form of SMEs plays a role in predicting distress. Our results remain robust to the inclusion of size as a predictive variable. We also find that the exchange rate, the economic sentiment, the credit supply and the bankruptcy codes significantly affect distress. We validate the superiority of models that incorporate macroeconomic dependencies, suggested by previous research, also in the case of SMEs. Nevertheless, we do not find strong evidence that industry effects significantly improve prediction accuracy. Moreover, we examine interaction effects between SMEs' size and systemic variables and find that as SMEs become larger, they are less vulnerable to such systemic factors.

We then split our sample into regional groups and find that SMEs across Europe are vulnerable to the same idiosyncratic factors but identify regional variations in the importance of macrovariables. We also split our sample into four rolling window periods (each one lasting five years) and find that whereas sensitivities to idiosyncratic and systemic factors remain relatively stable over time, industry effects give in many cases insignificant and rather unstable coefficients. Finally, we test the performance of our models with a battery of out-of-sample tests.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the methodology and the reasons for its selection. Section 2 describes the dataset, discusses the choice of variables and presents summary statistics. Section 3 presents the models and discusses the estimation results as well as the robustness checks, and Section 4 concludes.

1 The Methodology

Following Shumway's (2001) multi-period logit technique, we apply duration analysis and estimate a discrete-time hazard model with an adjusted standard error structure. A hazard model is a type of survival model, in which the covariates are related to the time that passes before some event, here distress, occurs. We denote time to distress (or survival time) as t . The random variable t follows a probability density function, $f(t, x_i; \beta)$, where β represents a vector of parameters and x_i represents a vector of distress prediction variables (for firm $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$), and has a cumulative probability density function, $\sum_{j < t} f(j, x_i; \beta) = F(t, x_i; \beta)$. The survival function, $S(t, x_i; \beta)$ is the probability that a firm survives until t . Thus:

$$S(t, x_i; \beta) = 1 - F(t, x_i; \beta) \quad (1)$$

The hazard model also incorporates a hazard function $h(t, x_i; \beta)$, that gives the probability of distress at t , given survival until t . Thus, the hazard function is the ratio of the probability density function to the survival function:

$$h(t, x_i; \beta) = \frac{f(t, x_i; \beta)}{S(t, x_i; \beta)}. \quad (2)$$

The most widely used hazard model is Cox's (1972) semi-parametric proportional hazard model:

$$h(t|x_i) = \exp(\beta x_i) * h(t|0), \quad (3)$$

where the first part of the equation represents the firm-specific part which is considered time-invariant (as mentioned above, x_i represents firm-specific covariates for firm $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$) and the second part of the equation represents the baseline hazard function, which is time-dependent. We can extend equation (3) into a more flexible form that allows also for time-varying firm-specific covariates:

$$h(t|x_{i,t}) = \exp(\beta x_{i,t}) * h(t|0), \quad (4)$$

where $h(t|x_{i,t})$ is the probability of distress of firm i at time t and $x_{i,t}$ represents firm-specific covariates for firm i at time t .

Shumway (2001) proves that, for a discrete random variable t , a multi-period logit model is equivalent to a discrete-time hazard model with hazard function $h(.) = F(t, x_i; \beta)$ by comparing their likelihood functions.⁹ Therefore, we can easily estimate such a hazard model using the logit technique. In this paper, we follow Shumway (2001) and estimate the probability of distress over the next year using a multi-period logit model. We assume that the marginal probability of distress (or hazard rate) over next year follows a logistic distribution and is given by:

$$h(t|x_{i,t-1}) = P(Y_{i,t} = 1|x_{i,t-1}) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\beta x_{i,t-1} - \gamma y_{t-1})} \quad (5)$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is an indicator that equals one if the firm is distressed in year t , $\beta x_{i,t-1}$ is a function of firm-specific characteristics that includes a vector of firm-specific variables $x_{i,t-1}$ known at the end of the previous year and γy_{t-1} is the baseline hazard function that includes some other time-dependent variables y_{t-1} . The baseline hazard influences similarly all firms in the economy and expresses the hazard rate in the absence of the firm-specific covariates $x_{i,t-1}$. A higher value of $\beta x_{i,t-1} + \gamma y_{t-1}$ implies a higher probability of distress.

⁹Shumway (2001) shows that multi-period logit models are more appropriate to static ones for distress forecasting because they account for the fact that firms' financial conditions change through time (by using samples that include consecutive firm-year observations). In a static single-period model, as in equation (3), one firm-year observation for each healthy firm is randomly selected from the available firm-years, whereas for distressed firms, the firm-year immediately prior to distress is (non-randomly) selected. It is evident that this process introduces a bias. On the other hand, the multi-period logit model of equation (5) is estimated with data on each firm in each available year, as if each firm-year is a separate observation. The dependent variable $Y_{i,t}$ in a multi-period model is set equal to one only in the year in which distress occurs.

However, test statistics produced by the logit program are incorrect because they assume that the number of independent observations is the number of firm-years and ignore the panel structure of the data. Calculating correct test statistics requires adjusting the sample size to account for dependence among firm-year observations. For this reason, we adjust the standard errors of our models for the number of firms in the samples (clustered - corrected standard errors).¹⁰

Concerning the baseline hazard function, there are different specifications we can adopt. Shumway (2001) uses the natural logarithm of the firm's age, defining age as the years of listing in the exchange. By using $\ln(\text{age})$ as the baseline hazard function, he assumes a certain level of homogeneity across firms listed in the same period since they satisfy eligibility criteria at the same point in time. Another way to proxy the baseline hazard is the use of time dummies that indicate the number of zeros that precede the current observation, i.e. if the sample period starts at 2000, a dummy marks the time after 2000, regardless of the time that the firm has been at risk before 2000. This means that true age of the firms is irrelevant and observations are left-censored. Carling et al. (2007) follow this approach. Another solution, followed by Hillegeist et al. (2004), is to use the annual distress rate (the ratio of distressed firms to the total number of firms in the population over the previous year). This is the actual realization of the unconditional baseline hazard rate in the previous period. This approach is preferable to time dummies since dummies have no forecasting power, especially during crises. It though assumes a similar distribution of distress rates from year to year.

Another possible way to specify the baseline hazard function that avoids the problems identified above is to directly account for macroeconomic dependencies. Duffie et al. (2007), Campbell et al. (2008), Nam et al. (2008) and other authors follow this approach, including macroeconomic variables in the baseline hazard rate. A disadvantage of this approach is that the time-span of the data needs to be long enough to capture the impact of the business cycle on distress probabilities. Another limitation is that macroeconomic variables are usually reported at substantial lags. This makes it difficult to predict distress with up-to-date information. Finally, this approach requires to carefully control for any correlation and multicollinearity effects among the macro variables.

In this paper, we proxy the baseline hazard rate using macroeconomic variables, taking into account the above issues. We do not employ time dummies because, as mentioned, they are less effective in capturing economy-wide factors. Moreover, we do not use the annual distress rate since we do not have access to reliable population distress rates for SMEs. Later in the paper we explain the reasons that it is very difficult to properly track the distressed SMEs in the economy. Also, we report results with firm age but we do not introduce it among the main variables since we do not know the date of establishment for all firms in our sample. Another reason that we do not introduce firm age as a main variable is the survivorship bias. SMEs are more likely to be in our sample if they are survivors, consequently, these firms have lower distress probabilities. As a result, the average age of firms tends to falsely give the idea that the time to distress is long, simply because the SMEs that failed quickly are not in the sample and

¹⁰Calculated from Huber/White sandwich covariance matrix; see Froot (1989), White (1994) and Wooldridge (2002).

the importance of older firms is overstated. To correct for that, we introduce one more factor, the “duration” variable that accounts for the “time-at-risk” of firms only during the sample period. This variable is the number of years that a firm stays in the sample and is measured in discrete time units, i.e., if an SME appears in the sample for three years in total, the value of this variable in the first year is one, in the second year two and in the third year three. By censoring the number of years that a firm existed before it joined the sample, we weight all firms on equal terms and account for duration dependence, since we allow the time a firm remains in the sample to directly affect the probability of distress, over and above its accounting data and the systematic factors.¹¹

2 The Data

In order to estimate the multi-period logit model, we need an indicator of financial distress (dependent variable) and a set of predictors (independent variables). We use the Amadeus and Orbis Europe databases (both available from Bureau Van Dijk) to detect the status of each firm in each year and extract the raw data that include financial and qualitative information. Finally, we use the European Statistical Service’s (Eurostat), the European Central Bank’s (ECB), the World Bank and Datastream databases for the systemic variables.

In this section, we first discuss the definition of financial distress that we adopt, we then explain the criteria that need to be met for a company to be included in the sample and finally, we describe the examined predictive variables and the procedure we follow to select the best among them.

2.1 Definition of financial distress

Tracking the status of SMEs properly is a very challenging task. There are many reasons for which an SME can go out of business but owners rarely report these reasons and authorities rarely document them. Watson and Everett (1996) find that small businesses often close for reasons other than financial failure, for example, the owner may close the firm voluntarily to accept employment elsewhere or retire. Headd (2003) finds that only one third of start-ups close under conditions that owners consider unsuccessful. Even when SMEs are financially distressed, they often do not follow formal insolvency proceedings. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) find that, in the US, many corporate filings are missing for bankrupt firms. As a result, when studying SME distress, it is important to distinguish between failure and closure.

Similarly, in our database, we have some incidence of firms that disappear during the sample period without the reason for this being specified. In order to separate closure from distress, we assume that a firm is distressed in the last year it appears in the sample if its equity value is negative.¹² We classify firm-years into two mutually exclusive categories: “healthy” and “distressed”. A firm-year is “distressed” if the following two conditions are both met: (i) it is the

¹¹The “duration” variable is still an imperfect measure though. This approach may create a bias since we can underestimate the lifespan of firms that default in the beginning of the sample period.

¹²To avoid rounding errors, we require the equity to be less than – EUR 5k (credit balance).

last firm-year for which we have available financial statements before the firm leaves the sample; (ii) the firm appears with one of the statuses “defaulted”, “in receivership”, “bankrupt”, “in liquidation” or it has negative equity in the last year that it appears in the sample.¹³ A firm-year is “healthy” in all other cases (i.e. if a firm drops from the sample due to merger). We construct the distress indicator as follows: it equals one for the distressed firm-years and zero for the healthy ones.

From an accounting perspective, negative equity is almost always connected with past losses’ accumulation. From a capital structure point of view, negative equity means that the company’s liabilities are higher than its assets. In both cases, a negative value for equity is a flag of serious financial difficulties. The equity ratio provides information to lenders on the extent to which assets are backed by equity and represents security against default and ability to bear risk. Ross et al. (2010) point out that the definition of financial distress has two bases: a stock-based insolvency and a flow-based insolvency. A stock-based insolvency occurs when a company has negative equity and a flow-based insolvency when a company’s operating cashflow is insufficient to meet current obligations.¹⁴ Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are often used in academic studies as a proxy for cashflow from operations. In our case, we observe that negative equity is two times more likely for firms that drop from the sample than for firms that remain active. Moreover, 61% of the companies that drop from the sample having negative equity, also report negative EBITDA for that year.¹⁵ Given the above, we are confident that negative equity identifies correctly distressed firms among the firms that drop from the sample.

2.2 Sample selection

Our estimation sample consists of 2,721,861 firm-year observations (644,234 firms) out of which 49,355 are distressed. SMEs come from eight European countries, namely Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. We keep a random one tenth of the firms from each country as a hold-out sample. The hold-out sample consists of 304,037 firm-year observations (71,823 firms) out of which 5,487 are distressed. We select the countries mostly due to data availability issues but also because they create a combination that nicely reflects the variability in the importance of SMEs across the EU. Table 1 provides an overview of the key indicators for SMEs in the EU27 and in the countries of our sample. As seen, in Italy, Portugal and Spain, SMEs have larger shares in employment and value added and higher density than in the EU on average. This suggests that SMEs in these economies have a more important role than in most EU countries. On the other hand, for France, Germany

¹³Due to this assumption, we need to exclude year 2010 from the sample. As accounts for SMEs usually become available with a considerable time lag, accounts for 2011 were mostly missing in early 2012, when the database became available to us. As a result, we could not detect distressed firms for 2010, since we do not know which firms drop from the sample in the following year.

¹⁴In our dataset, around 40% of the companies that appear as “defaulted”, “in receivership”, “bankrupt” or “in liquidation” have negative equity on their last year. Also, 64% of the companies with negative equity eventually disappear from the sample.

¹⁵For robustness purposes, we test an alternative assumption. We calculate overall distress rates assuming that firms that drop from the sample having negative EBITDA are distressed and find that results remain substantially similar.

and the UK, these figures are always lower than the EU average. For Czech Republic and Poland, the employment share and value added of SMEs is similar. Czech Republic though has a much higher SME density than Poland, indicating probably the existence of many micro enterprises.

Based on Table 1 and geographical and monetary criteria, we split our sample in three regional subsamples. Group 1 includes France, Germany and the UK, group 2 includes Italy, Portugal and Spain and group 3 includes the Czech Republic and Poland.

Table 1: Key indicators for non-financial SMEs in EU27 and in our sample countries

The role of SMEs varies substantially across the EU. The table gives an overview of SMEs in the EU27 and in the countries of our specific interest. The first column gives the contribution of SMEs to employment, the second the contribution to the value-added in the economy and the third the density of SMEs per 1,000 inhabitants.

	(%) of employment	(%) of value added	Number per 1000 inhabitants
EU27	67.1	57.6	39.9
Italy	81.3	70.9	65.3
Portugal	82.0	67.8	80.5
Spain	78.7	68.5	59.1
France	61.4	54.2	36.3
Germany	60.6	53.2	20.0
United Kingdom	54.0	51.0	25.6
Czech Republic	68.9	56.7	86.0
Poland	69.8	48.4	36.8

Source: European Commission, 2005

Table 2 summarizes the properties of our distress indicator for the overall sample and for the regional subsamples.

As already mentioned, there is a bias due to the fact that in the beginning of the period (2000-2001), most firms in the database are survivors. It is immediately apparent that Eurozone distress rates are heightened in 2002-2003, are lower in 2004-2006 and are elevated again from 2007 onwards. This evidence is in accordance with the gloomy business climate in the early years of the last decade, which was followed by an impressive boom of the European economy in 2004-2006 and the subsequent slowdown that started in 2007.¹⁶ The figures are somewhat different for group 3, which consists of two non-Eurozone members. This may be attributed to the fact that the credit supply by banks did not shrink in these countries in the years 2002-2003, as it did in most of the Eurozone countries. The distressed SMEs are 1.81% of all observations in the overall sample. Group 3 has the highest distress rate (2.4% of all firm-years).

¹⁶The Eurozone insolvency index reported by Euler Hermes displays similar trends.

Table 2: Distressed SMEs as percentage of total SMEs

The table summarizes the properties of our distress indicator for the overall sample and for the regional subsamples. It gives the number of total SMEs in the beginning of the year, the number of distressed SMEs during the year and the distress rate per year.

	Overall			Group 1			Group 2			Group 3		
Year	Total	Distressed	(%)	Total	Distressed	(%)	Total	Distressed	(%)	Total	Distressed	(%)
2000	149,023	0	0.00	82,666	0	0.00	65,576	0	0.00	781	0	0.00
2001	176,351	192	0.11	92,348	185	0.20	81,782	6	0.01	2,221	1	0.05
2002	204,531	3,802	1.86	99,815	2,125	2.13	100,466	1,649	1.64	4,250	28	0.66
2003	194,768	5,961	3.06	91,761	4,003	4.36	94,857	1,935	2.04	8,150	23	0.28
2004	146,877	1,250	0.85	52,031	865	1.66	81,727	331	0.41	13,119	54	0.41
2005	167,837	1,403	0.84	53,609	822	1.53	99,053	377	0.38	15,175	204	1.34
2006	256,732	1,873	0.73	70,242	902	1.28	164,105	734	0.45	22,385	237	1.06
2007	463,732	8,134	1.75	95,393	1,600	1.68	331,731	5,932	1.79	36,608	602	1.64
2008	498,358	9,194	1.84	88,606	1,427	1.61	369,487	6,977	1.89	40,265	790	1.96
2009	463,652	17,546	3.78	75,065	2,248	2.99	352,923	12,959	3.67	35,664	2,339	6.56
Obser.	2,721,861	49,355	1.81	801,536	14,177	1.77	1,741,707	30,900	1.77	178,618	4,278	2.40

Source: Authors

We should note that we follow Shumway (2001) and other authors and exclude financial firms from the sample (NACE¹⁷ rev.2 codes from 64 to 68) due to the fact that financial firms have reporting practices that preclude combining them with other firms in models using financial information.

Because of the European focus of the study, we adopt the European Commission's definition for SMEs, instead of the more generic one of the Basel Committee, previously applied by Altman et al. (2010). We extract companies that meet the following requirements: (i) they have less than 250 employees and either annual turnover up to EUR 50m or total assets up to EUR 43m, for all available years;¹⁸ (ii) there is no company with more than 25% participation in them; (iii) they do not have subsidiaries; (iv) they have up to ten shareholders; (v) they have at least two years of data available.

We need criteria (ii)-(iv) to ensure that the companies are independent.¹⁹ Specifically, since we cannot track the subsidiaries and check if the companies still satisfy the SMEs criteria once we account for the subsidiaries' items, we need to exclude companies that have subsidiaries. Concerning criterion (iv), since the average number of shareholders in our sample is two, we exclude companies with more than ten shareholders as possible outliers. As to the last criterion, we keep companies with at least two years of data in order to be able to lag variables, calculate growth ratios and study the evolution of distress risk.

After the initial extraction, we apply standard filtering and data cleaning techniques. We first check if missing values can be deduced from other items (i.e. if total assets are missing but fixed and current assets are available, we simply replace total assets with their sum). If the above method does not work, we exclude companies with missing values. We also exclude companies with errors in the data entered (i.e. companies that violate accounting identities).²⁰

2.3 Variables selection

The factors that can lead SMEs to financial distress vary from firm-specific characteristics such as high debt to industry specific characteristics and macroeconomic effects such as high interest rates. To select among these factors, we consider a wide range of variables and identify those

¹⁷NACE stands for "Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne".

¹⁸ The size requirements may introduce some bias since it is possible that in years prior to distress turnover, total assets and employees are declining. Still though, we doubt that there is a better way to identify SMEs.

¹⁹Altman et al. (2010) do not take into account the independence requirement when selecting their sample but try to control for it using a subsidiary dummy. They find that subsidiaries are less risky than non-subsidiaries. Small entities which are subsidiaries of large groups though can be very different from SMEs, especially when assessing their probability of default. For example, Becchetti and Sierra (2003) find that group membership is inversely related to the probability of default. Subsidiaries have access to financial, and other, resources of the group and can survive while experiencing poor financial performance. Moreover, the group may have reasons to support a subsidiary. Finally a subsidiary may be in distress as a result of group-wide distress.

²⁰Data availability problems limit our initial dataset by around 25% and may also introduce some bias since distressed firms can have worse data quality than healthy ones. Given our sample size though, we are confident that our final dataset is representative of the SME population in the countries examined.

that do the best overall job, taking into account the models' stability, fit and parsimony as well as the statistical significance of the coefficients as described below.

2.3.1 Idiosyncratic variables

Concerning the accounting data, we calculate financial ratios from nine categories: liquidity, profitability, interest coverage, leverage, activity, cash flow, growth (i.e. in sales or profits), asset utilization and employees efficiency. We choose the ratios mainly based on suggestions from past literature but we also test less established ones. We do not examine ratios that have equity as one component because we characterize firms with negative equity that drop from the sample as distressed and in some cases such ratios have no economic meaning (i.e. equity to profits, when both equity and profits are negative). We need to note though that a distressed firm has negative equity in its latest balance sheet before leaving the sample, whereas in our models, we use accounting data lagged by one year. The total number of ratios examined is 70. A list is available upon request.

For the calculations, when denominators have zero values, we replace them with low values of EUR 10 so that the ratios maintain their interpretation. Additionally, to ensure that statistical results are not heavily influenced by outliers, we set the bottom one percent to the first percentile and the top one percent to the ninety-ninth percentile.²¹ Finally, as annual reports for SMEs become available with a significant time delay, we lag all ratios by one year in the estimations. This means that we assume that data for year t become available at the end of year $t + 1$.

After we calculate the 70 candidate ratios, we follow a standard three-step procedure to select the best for our models. First, we follow Altman and Sabato's (2007) approach and find the AUC for each ratio, applying univariate analysis and keeping those with an AUC above 0.65. Second, we perform correlation analysis of these ratios to avoid multicollinearity problems. When the correlation between two ratios is above 0.6, we keep the ratio with the highest AUC. If the difference in the AUC is small, we keep the ratio that was found to be significant in previous studies. Finally, we apply a forward stepwise selection procedure of the remaining ratios. Under this procedure, we start with no variables in the model, trying out the variables one by one and including them if they are statistically significant. We set the significance level at 10% and perform the likelihood ratio test which is more accurate than the standard Wald test.

Interestingly, after separately fitting the overall sample as well as the three regional subsamples, we end up with the same five ratios for each of the models. These ratios belong to the profitability, interest coverage, leverage, cash flow and activity categories. Surprisingly, we do not find liquidity ratios among the best. A logical explanation is that information contained in these ratios is proxied by others, i.e., as shown in Table 3, where ratios' properties are summarized, current liabilities to total assets are identified as important in predicting distress. This is an indication that SMEs rely more on short-term borrowing than

²¹This popular technique is known as truncating or winsorizing and it is widely used in the literature to avoid problems with outliers.

cash holdings to finance their operational needs during the years of the study.

A comparison of panels B and C in Table 3 reveals the differences of distressed SMEs. Earnings before taxes to total assets differ substantially across the two groups suggesting the dominance of unprofitable SMEs in the distressed group. Another striking difference is that the distressed firm-years have on average around 130 times lower interest coverage compared to healthy firm-years. Short-term borrowing is also much higher in the case of distressed SMEs. Similarly, turnover to total liabilities ratio is around 180% higher in the healthy firm-years. Finally, the gap between distressed and healthy firm-years in the cash flow ratios indicates the importance of having high cash flows relative to current liabilities.

When we look at panels D, E and F, we see that, on average, SMEs in group 1 (France, Germany, UK) have better ratios compared to group 2 (Italy, Spain, Portugal). SMEs in group 3 (Czech Republic, Poland) have higher cash flow and turnover compared to those in group 1 and 2, and around the same profitability and leverage levels with group 1, but pay a higher percentage of their EBITDA in interest expenses. Unreported country-specific statistics exhibit analogous patterns, since we base our group formation on the similarities among countries.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

The table reports summary statistics for all of the accounting ratios used to forecast distress in our model specifications. Each observation represents a particular firm in a particular year. Panel A describes the distributions of the ratios in all firm-years, Panel B describes the sample of healthy years, and Panel C describes the distressed years. Panels D, E and F describe the distributions for Groups 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The sample period is from 2000 to 2009. All ratios are truncated at the ninety-ninth and first percentiles, so the reported minimum and maximum values are those percentiles.

	Earnings before taxes to total assets	EBITDA to interest expenses	Current liabilities to total assets	Cash flow to current liabilities	Turnover to total liabilities
Panel A: Entire data set					
Mean	0.05	687.28	0.61	0.31	3.60
Median	0.04	7.00	0.59	0.12	2.57
Std.Dev.	0.17	2,927.14	0.34	0.86	4.13
Min	-0.85	-2,600.00	0.00	-1.17	0.09
Max	0.63	21,200.00	2.27	7.00	30.59
N: 2,721,861					
Panel B: Healthy Group					
Mean	0.05	699.87	0.60	0.31	3.63
Median	0.04	7.29	0.59	0.13	2.59
Std.Dev.	0.17	2,945.99	0.33	0.86	4.15
N: 2,672,506					
Panel C: Distressed Group					
Mean	-0.13	5.39	1.02	-0.01	2.04
Median	-0.04	0.65	0.92	0.00	1.42
Std.Dev.	0.29	1,448.37	0.56	0.59	2.50
N: 49,355					
Panel D: Group 1					
Mean	0.08	1,064.80	0.61	0.32	3.76
Median	0.06	12.75	0.60	0.16	3.18
Std.Dev.	0.17	3,682.35	0.29	0.79	2.86
N: 801,536					
Panel E: Group 2					
Mean	0.03	493.67	0.61	0.28	3.25
Median	0.03	5.18	0.60	0.10	2.10
Std.Dev.	0.17	2,426.19	0.35	0.85	4.22
N: 1,741,707					
Panel F: Group 3					
Mean	0.09	881.04	0.58	0.55	6.32
Median	0.07	13.00	0.53	0.20	4.31
Std.Dev.	0.23	3,357.95	0.41	1.19	6.39
N: 178,618					

Source: Authors

Recent studies though (Grunert et al., 2004; Altman et al., 2010) find that accounting ratios are not sufficient to predict SME distress risk and that including firm size and qualitative variables can improve predictive power. For this reason, we also account for size, industry type, number of shareholders, location, legal form and age.

The European Commission classifies SMEs into three groups based on their number of employees and turnover or total assets: medium-sized enterprises, small enterprises, and micro enterprises. As indicated in panel A of Table 4, our sample is dominated by micro enterprises. In the sixth column of panel A, the relationship between size and distress risk appears to be non-monotonic, with distress risk relatively stable for medium and small companies and higher for micro companies. This means that micro companies have less healthy years on average compared to small and medium companies, thus they survive for shorter periods. This finding is consistent with other studies such as Dietsch and Petey (2004) and is also in line with the argument that smaller companies are more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. In our empirical models, we follow Altman et al. (2010) and employ the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. We also test for other specifications of size, such as the total turnover and the number of employees. Additionally, we examine interaction effects between size and the systemic variables that we introduce in the next subsection. For this purpose we use three size dummies (medium, small, micro) and combine them with the systemic variables to test the impact of the macro-economy on different size groups.

We also control for industry conditions using sector dummies. To construct our dummies, we use the NACE codes, which group industries into 21 major sectors. For estimation purposes though, this classification is too fine. The difficulty here relates to the grouping of sectors into wide sector classes in order to achieve an appropriate degree of homogeneity. It is true that such groupings can always be subject to a certain degree of arbitrariness. In our case, we follow an approach similar to Chava and Jarrow (2004) and form six wide sectors: (i) Sector 1: Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing, (ii) Sector 2: Transportation, Communication and Utilities, (iii) Sector 3: Construction, (iv) Sector 4: Trade, (v) Sector 5: Accommodation and Food, and (vi) Sector 6: Other services. We select these wide sectors based on different regulatory environments, competition levels and product structures. We also test for alternative groupings but mostly get insignificant results for more detailed industry classifications.²² Panel B of Table 4 shows the partitioning based on these wide sectors. Accommodation and Food has the highest distress rate and Transportation, Communication and Utilities the lowest.

²² I.e., we test for a more detailed classification of ten wide sectors, instead of six: 1. Agriculture; 2. Mining; 3. Manufacturing; 4. Utilities; 5. Construction; 6. Trade; 7. Accommodation and Food; 8. Transportation (and Storage); 9. Communication (and Information); 10. Other services. Our findings are not influenced and model performance remains the same.

Table 4: SMEs by size and industry**Panel A: Size classification**

The panel shows the classification of SMEs by size. The first column shows the size classes. The second column shows the firms available in each class, the third column shows the percentage of firms available in each class, the fourth column shows the number of firm-years available in each class and the fifth column shows the distressed firm-years available in each class. Finally the sixth column shows the distress rate as a percentage of total firm-years in each class.

Size				Firms	(%) firms	Firm-years	Distressed	(%) distressed
Cat.	Employees	Turnover	or Assets					
Medium	< 250	≤ EUR 50 m	≤ EUR 43m	21,408	3.32	123,123	1,815	1.47
Small	< 50	≤ EUR 10 m	≤ EUR 10 m	167,381	25.98	906,392	13,183	1.45
Micro	< 10	≤ EUR 2 m	≤ EUR 2 m	455,445	70.70	1,692,346	34,357	2.03
Total				644,234	100.00	2,721,861	49,355	1.81

Panel B: Industry classification (wide sectors)

The panel shows the classification of SMEs by wide industry sectors. The first column shows the sectors. The second column shows the firms available in each sector, the third column shows the percentage of firms available in each sector, the fourth column shows the number of firm-years available in each sector and the fifth column shows the distressed firm-years available in each sector. Finally the sixth column shows the distress rate as a percentage of total firm-years in each sector.

Sector	Firms	(%) firms	Firm-years	Distressed	(%) distressed
1. Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing	133,746	20.76	608,696	9,815	1.61
2. Transportation, Communication and Utilities	45,413	7.05	182,180	2,827	1.55
3. Construction	113,147	17.56	482,031	9,170	1.90
4. Trade	214,061	33.23	946,368	16,291	1.72
5. Accommodation and Food	36,235	5.62	128,225	3,691	2.88
6. Other services	101,632	15.78	374,361	7,561	2.02
Total	644,234	100.00	2,721,861	49,355	1.81

Source: Authors

Additionally, we include a shareholders dummy (equal to one if the shareholders are more than two), a location dummy (equal to one if the SME is located in an urban area) and three legal form dummies in our models (for limited, unlimited and other legal forms). The average number of shareholders in our sample is two but 24% of SMEs have between three and ten shareholders. 14% of SMEs are located in big cities. 92% of SMEs have limited legal forms and few SMEs are cooperatives or partnerships. Generally, we expect SMEs with more shareholders to receive more capital injections in difficult times, thus have lower distress probabilities. Moreover, we expect SMEs in urban areas to be riskier due to high fixed costs (i.e. rent) and high competition among them. The intuition behind testing for the legal form of SMEs is that limited partners may be less interested to monitor firm performance compared to unlimited partners, leading limited SMEs more frequently to distress.²³ Whereas, as we show in the results section, we find support for our hypotheses concerning the number of shareholders and the location of SMEs, the coefficients of the legal dummies are statistically insignificant. Thus, we do not include them when reporting the results.

²³SMEs with unlimited partners can also proxy for family-owned firms, which are generally thought to be safer than other firms.

We lastly examine age for a smaller sample for which we have the date of establishment available. Hudson (1987) finds that companies less than ten years old form most of the distressed firms. In our sample, the average age at the time of distress is 11.9 years, whereas the average age for healthy firm-years is 15 years. We report results with age in subsection 4.1. but we do not consider age as one of the main variables in all of our models for the reasons described in the methodology section.

2.3.2 Systemic variables

In order to construct the systemic dependencies, we use data publicly available from Eurostat, the ECB, the World Bank and Datastream. We use country-specific values and examine business cycle variables, bank lending conditions, the financial market and insolvency codes measures. Since these variables are usually reported with a higher than annual frequency (quarterly, monthly or daily), we need to annualize or take averages in some cases.

In our models, most of these variables enter with lags, in order to avoid causality considerations and because they are available for forecasting purposes with a time delay. So, we always use past realizations of systematic variables rather than expected values, assuming that these realizations are the best prediction we can have for the future. This is more appropriate for forecasting purposes since our objective is to predict distress at a certain point in time, given the definite information that we have available at this point. Another reason we use past realizations instead of predictions is that it is difficult to get reliable estimations for some systemic variables (i.e. FX rate or credit supply) and these estimations usually differ among the various sources. In section 6.1 of the annex we present the variables examined and describe their calculation methods and number of lags, when applied.²⁴

In order to find among the systemic variables, the ones that significantly influence the probability of distress for SMEs, we follow a standard procedure. First, we fit the models using only accounting information as described in subsection 3.3.1.²⁵ Then, we run models that include the ratios and only one systemic variable at a time. We calculate the AUC for each of these models for the overall sample and for the subsamples and keep the systemic variables that result in models with the highest AUCs. At this point, we need to account for correlation between the systemic variables. Correlations in this kind of variable are often high and lead to unreasonable signs of the estimated coefficients and to large changes in the values of these coefficients in response to small changes in the models' specifications. For this reason,

²⁴We always test for different lags taking into account the economic rationale and the timing that the variables become available.

²⁵In advanced top-down credit risk frameworks such as McKinsey and Co.'s CreditPortfolioView (Wilson 1997a and 1997b), macroeconomic factors are first fitted to aggregate distress rates and then the evolution of distress rates is simulated over time by generating macroeconomic shocks to the system. These simulated future distress rates, in turn, make it possible to obtain estimates of expected and unexpected losses for a credit portfolio, conditional on the current macroeconomic conditions. In this paper, our focus is the micro-level (individual SMEs) since we do not have long enough time-series of historical distress rates to adopt a top-down approach. Finally, we acknowledge that there are feedback effects between the firm-specific factors and the macroeconomy but these effects are beyond the scope of the study.

between two systematic variables that have a correlation higher than 0.6, we keep the one that results in the model with the highest AUC. We do not keep more than five systemic variables for each sample for reasons of parsimony. Finally, we also form and examine interaction effects between industry dummies and systemic variables and firms' size and systemic variables.

3 The results

In this section, we present empirical results and robustness checks. We first use the overall sample, then we split this sample into regional groups for the purpose of regional comparisons and finally we split it into six rolling window periods (each one lasting five years) to identify differences in coefficient estimates and performance over time.

3.1 Overall sample

We estimate five models for the period 2000-2009. Model I includes only the idiosyncratic variables described in subsection 3.3.1 (accounting ratios, size, dummy for SMEs with more than two shareholders and dummy for SMEs in urban areas), model II includes both the idiosyncratic and the systemic variables described in subsection 3.3.2, model III includes additionally the industry dummies, model IV includes some interaction terms, and, finally, model V includes age (available for a smaller sample). All models control for the duration effect, which is the "time at risk" of each firm in the sample.

3.1.1 Empirical results

Panel A of Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients and chi-squared values for the five alternative model specifications. In model I, all firm-specific variables are significant and have the expected signs. Specifically, the probability of distress is negatively related to profitability (earnings before taxes to total assets), interest coverage (EBITDA to interest expenses), cash flow (cash flow to current liabilities) and activity (turnover to total liabilities) and positively related to leverage (current liabilities to total assets). The probability of distress is a decreasing function of the firm size (natural logarithm of total assets), indicating that as the firms become larger, they are less likely to undergo financial distress (see also Carling et al., 2007).²⁶ Two additional interesting findings are that SMEs with less than three shareholders and SMEs in urban areas are riskier on average. The vast majority of SMEs have less than three shareholders (in our sample the percentage is 77%) but it seems that SMEs with more shareholders receive higher capital support in difficult times. This effect dominates the higher administrative costs that the

²⁶As an alternative specification, we use the natural logarithm of total turnover as well as the number of employees to proxy for size. These variables also yield negative coefficients but we report the natural logarithm of total assets since it offers a better fit. In unreported results, we also test for the nonlinear effects of size, by introducing the natural logarithm of squared total assets. We find a positive coefficient, indicating that for the very large SMEs distress risk starts to increase, probably because these companies are more likely to be pursued in liquidation process by their creditors.

existence of more shareholders may entail. A possible explanation for the higher risk of SMEs in urban areas is that these companies face higher competition (due to geographical proximity) and pay higher rents than their counterparts in the countryside. Another reason may be that owners of urban SMEs are less interested in supporting their enterprises in times of difficulties, since it is easier for them to shut down the business and find employment elsewhere. These effects seem to dominate the larger customer base available for urban SMEs.

In model II, the firm-specific variables retain their significance and signs once the systemic variables are added. We identify five systemic variables as doing the best overall job in predicting distress, namely the FX rate change, the unemployment, the economic sentiment indicator, and the change in bank lending. All systemic variables have significant coefficients and the expected signs. Specifically, an appreciation of the currency, an increase in the economic sentiment indicator and an increase in the lending by banks result in lower distress rates whereas an increase in unemployment and in the years to resolve insolvency result in higher distress rates.

The effect of currency appreciation can be explained since European SMEs are mainly local market players and most often import raw materials and other supplies instead of exporting goods. Also, stronger currencies tend to accompany stronger economies. Thus, an appreciation of the local currency makes these imports cheaper. Concerning the economic sentiment indicator, it reflects current conditions across the business sectors of the local economy. Since an increase in the indicator means better economic climate, it is negatively related to the distress rate. A similar logic holds for bank lending. An increase in bank lending growth means better access to finance for SMEs. The importance of the banking system has also been noted by Beck et al. (2008) who find that financial systems with low transaction costs and less informational barriers are crucial to the growth of very small companies. Such systems can channel easier funds to small businesses. Concerning unemployment, an increase in its rate signals a worsening economy and is positively related to distress.

At this point, we need to elaborate on the effect of the bankruptcy laws on distress risk. The World Bank measures the efficiency of insolvency codes in different countries based on the achieved recovery rate, which is the average percentage that claimants recover from an insolvent firm in this country. The recovery rate depends on many factors such as the time it takes to resolve insolvency proceedings, costs and the outcome of the process. Generally, fast, low-cost proceedings leading to the continuation of viable businesses characterize the economies with the highest recovery rates.

In our regressions, we initially use the recovery rate to proxy for the complexity of the insolvency regime and find a negative relation with distress risk. Thus, in countries with high recovery rates, distress probabilities are lower. In the results that we report, we proxy the complexity of the regime with the years it takes to resolve insolvency proceedings, because this variable performs better in terms of predictive power in our models. We find a positive relation between the length of proceedings and distress risk. The more years it takes to resolve an insolvency case, the less friendly the code is supposed to be and the less likely for the firm to survive during the process. This finding is in accordance with evidence from the World Bank that longer proceedings are usually associated with higher costs and reduce creditors' chances of recovering outstanding debt.

This is also obvious in section 6.2 of the annex. Countries where the insolvency process takes longer to be resolved, such as Czech Republic and Poland, score very low in the percentage of recovered amounts. The opposite is true for countries with fast proceedings such as UK and Germany. We should note though that we do not find this variable to add predictive power in the regional models that we discuss later in the paper. This can partly be due to the fact that the regional groups are relatively homogeneous with respect to their insolvency regimes.

To assess the usefulness of the systemic variables, we perform a likelihood ratio test for the nested models I and II. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of these variables are jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected, as indicated in Table 5.

Moving to model III, the firm-specific and systemic variables retain both their signs and significance and all industry dummies, except for industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)²⁷, enter with significant coefficients. Concerning the signs of the industry dummy coefficients, industries 2 (Utilities, Transportation, Communication) and 4 (Trade) are negatively related to distress and industry 3 (Construction) and 5 (Accommodation and Food) positively related to distress. From the sizes of the estimated coefficients, we rank the industries according to their estimated probability of distress (from largest to smallest) as follows: industry 5 (Accommodation and Food), industry 3 (Construction), industry 6 (Other services), industry 4 (Trade), industry 2 (Utilities, Transportation, Communication). This evidence is somewhat different from the distress rates by industry found in Table 4, probably due to the fact that the systemic factors influence different industries in different ways. To assess the usefulness of the industry dummies, we perform a likelihood ratio test for the nested models II and III. The null hypothesis is again rejected.

In model IV, we report results with interaction effects, in addition to the variables of model III. Specifically, we first test interaction effects between systemic variables and industry dummies, between systemic variables and size, and finally, between industry dummies and size. We find that the interaction effects that are most important in terms of performance improvement are between systemic variables and size dummies and report only these results for reasons of parsimony. When we add these interaction effects, we observe some changes in the behaviour of industry dummies. Particularly, industry 2 (Utilities, Transformation, Communication) and industry 4 (Trade) lose their significance and for this reason, we do not include them here. Interestingly, industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing) becomes significant. Finally, the constant decreases in size.

²⁷We need to interpret this result with caution since the insignificant coefficient may result from the support packages provided under the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy during the period of the study.

Table 5: Overall sample (8 countries

Panel A: Estimation results

The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. The data set includes SMEs from eight European economies. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-squared values in parentheses.

	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV		Model V	
Earnings before taxes to total	-0.755***	(-15.65)	-0.770***	(-15.89)	-0.763***	(-15.53)	-0.779***	(-15.99)	-0.777***	(-14.92)
EBITDA to interest expenses	0.0000453***	(-14.98)	-0.0000450***	(-14.49)	-0.0000451***	(-14.58)	-0.0000441***	(-14.38)	-0.000045***	(-14.20)
Current liabilities to total assets	1.381***	(101.27)	1.420***	(103.81)	1.417***	(102.97)	1.409***	(101.04)	1.38***	(95.92)
Cash flow to current liabilities	-0.480***	(-8.99)	-0.485***	(-9.14)	-0.491***	(-9.16)	-0.475***	(-9.00)	-0.517***	(-9.22)
Turnover to total liabilities	-0.182***	(-36.96)	-0.177***	(-36.08)	-0.176***	(-35.56)	-0.182***	(-35.56)	-0.187***	(-35.64)
Size (ln(total assets))	-0.127***	(-30.88)	-0.0940***	(-22.95)	-0.0913***	(-22.14)	-0.109***	(-23.13)	-0.097***	(-20.18)
Dummy equal to 1 if # of	-0.291***	(-23.53)	-0.274***	(-21.99)	-0.272***	(-21.76)	-0.270***	(-21.50)	-0.225***	(-17.54)
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is	0.132***	(10.24)	0.141***	(10.85)	0.144***	(11.01)	0.153***	(11.54)	0.175***	(13.01)
Duration	0.264***	(145.44)	0.227***	(108.52)	0.228***	(108.86)	0.229***	(107.87)	0.284***	(117.75)
FX rate (% change)			-1,686.8***	(-59.04)	-1,689.9***	(-59.01)	-2,627.20***	(-68.63)	-2,695.82***	(-69.51)
Unemployment			1.883***	(12.39)	1.914***	(12.58)	4.802***	(28.84)	4.345***	(25.82)
Economic sentiment indicator			-0.0259***	(-35.03)	-0.0258***	(-34.90)	-0.0388***	(-48.72)	-0.0386***	(-46.76)
Loans granted to non-financial			-4.414***	(-58.29)	-4.407***	(-58.07)	-5.246***	(-53.94)	-5.226***	(-54.84)
Years to resolve insolvency			0.0949***	(27.40)	0.0958***	(27.57)	0.1211***	(25.80)	0.1209***	(25.75)
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining,							0.0442***	(3.48)	0.0938***	(7.26)
Industry 2 (Utilities,					-0.0762***	(-3.56)				
Industry 3 (Construction)					0.0798***	(5.84)	0.1035***	(8.06)	0.0782***	(6.01)
Industry 4 (Trade)					-0.0295*	(-2.50)				
Industry 5 (Accommodation and					0.212***	(10.18)	0.251***	(12.25)	0.3169***	(15.49)
Small firm* FX rate (% change)							1,796.63***	(35.16)	1,737.00***	(33.17)
Small firm* unemployment							-10.495***	(-37.76)	-10.591***	(-37.41)
Small firm* economic sentiment							0.0146***	(30.15)	0.0151***	(30.47)
Small firm* loans to non-							1.771***	(10.93)	1.639***	(10.24)
Small firm* years to resolve							-0.0493***	(-6.79)	-0.0673***	(-8.95)
Medium firm* FX rate (% change)							1,936.71***	(20.51)	1,975.46***	(19.98)
Medium firm* unemployment							-11.241***	(-15.40)	-12.091***	(-15.97)
Medium firm* economic							0.0174***	(16.96)	0.0196***	(18.36)
Medium firm* loans to non-							4.084***	(14.02)	3.766***	(12.94)
Medium firm* years to resolve							-0.1392***	(-9.81)	-0.1605***	(-10.94)
Age									-0.0133***	(-17.30)
Age (3-9)									0.5501***	(43.76)
Constant	-4.675***	(-140.65)	-2.479***	(-29.79)	-2.523***	(-30.26)	-1.6732***	(-19.07)	-1.9558***	(-21.45)

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***

Table 5 continued:

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Firm-year observations	2,721,861	2,721,861	2,721,861	2,721,861	2,652,157
Firms	644,234	644,234	644,234	644,234	620,872
Distressed firms	49,355	49,355	49,355	49,355	47,841
Pseudo R-squared	0.147	0.171	0.171	0.178	0.187
Log likelihood	-210,601.30	-204,638.50	-204,538.30	202,880.11	194,837.44
Wald test	78,110.8***	84,259.5***	84,526.8***	85,305.9	81,789.3***
Likelihood ratio test		11,925.57***	200.45***	3,316.36	16,085.34***
Panel B: In-sample prediction					
Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 49,355 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.					
Decile					
1 to 5	11.38%	11.09%	10.96%	10.67%	10.24%
6	5.28%	5.16%	5.09%	5.01%	5.27%
7	7.50%	7.15%	7.28%	7.27%	7.33%
8	11.20%	11.16%	11.25%	10.91%	10.33%
9	17.46%	17.86%	17.84%	17.83%	17.34%
10	47.17%	47.58%	47.57%	48.32%	49.49%
8 to 10	75.83%	76.59%	76.66%	77.06%	77.16%
9 to 10	64.63%	65.44%	65.41%	66.15%	66.83%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8241	0.8382	0.8386	0.8431	0.8571
Panel C: Out-of-sample					
A hold-out sample of 71,823 European SMEs (304,037 firm-year observations) is used.					
Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 5,487 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.					
Decile					
1 to 5	11.46%	11.35%	11.26%	10.30%	10.15%
6	5.41%	4.76%	4.59%	5.41%	5.39%
7	7.58%	7.62%	7.91%	6.74%	7.63%
8	11.24%	10.53%	10.66%	11.45%	10.71%
9	17.51%	18.70%	18.53%	18.15%	17.16%
10	46.78%	47.04%	47.04%	47.95%	48.95%
8 to 10	75.54%	76.27%	76.23%	77.55%	76.82%
9 to 10	64.30%	65.74%	65.57%	66.10%	66.11%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8234	0.8369	0.8373	0.8437	0.8472

Source: Authors

From the coefficients of the interaction effects it is obvious that the distress probability of relatively large SMEs (small and medium firms) is less sensitive to the systemic factors than the distress probability of the smallest SMEs (micro firms).²⁸ I.e. let us look how the effect of a bank lending change differs for the small and medium firms compared to micro firms. When we introduce interaction effects, the negative coefficient of the bank lending change increases in absolute size, demonstrating the increased sensitivity of micro firms to such a change. On the other hand, the additional effect of the bank lending change for small firms is positive (but still lower in absolute terms), and even more positive for medium firms. Thus, for the relatively large SMEs, the same change in bank lending influences their distress probability less (but in the same direction) compared to micro firms. All other interaction effects display similar patterns with the exception of unemployment. Interestingly, the additional effect of unemployment for small and medium firms is of higher magnitude (-10.495 and -11.241 respectively) in absolute terms than the unemployment's coefficient for micro firms (4.802). Thus, an increase in unemployment is positively related to the distress probability of micro firms but negatively related to the distress probability of small and medium firms. This may be due to the fact that in times of difficulty larger SMEs are more likely to fire employees in order to avoid bankruptcy and still be operational with fewer employees. Micro firms may not have such flexibility.

In model V, we introduce firm age and test its effect on distress probability for a slightly smaller sample for which we have available data on age. We find, in accordance with previous literature, that older firms are safer. Also, we follow Altman et al. (2010) and examine a non-monotonic effect of age. Specifically, Hudson (1987) finds evidence that start-ups are likely to have a "honeymoon" period of around three years before facing difficulties, provided they survive at the very beginning. To test this finding, Altman et al. (2010) introduce two dummy variables, one for firms from one to three years old and one for firms between three and nine years old. They find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the second dummy, exactly as in our case. We do not check the effect of the first dummy though because, in our case, we keep in the sample companies of at least two years due to the lags we apply.

At this point, we should clarify the role of the duration variable which controls for the survivorship bias described in section 2. Its sign remains positive throughout the models mainly due to the bias in our sample, especially in the first two years. Particularly in 2000, which is the first year of our sample period, most firms that are present in the database are survivors. This happens because 2000 is the year that our database becomes more complete. As firms enter the database later on, they are always survivors in the first year of their existence in the sample (firms that fail quickly simply are never included in the sample). But as the "time-at-risk", the duration of these companies in the sample increases, the distress probability increases as well. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, when we include firm age in model V, we find that older firms are more well-established and have lower probabilities to undergo financial distress. In our sample, the average age at the time of distress is 11.9 years, whereas in the overall sample the average age is 15 years. This further explains the positive sign of the duration variable. Since our sample period is 10 years, the maximum duration is 10, which is lower than the average age at distress.

²⁸Table 4, panel A provides details on the size classifications used here.

Lastly, we notice that the pseudo- R^2 (McFadden's R^2) is increasing through the different model specifications, indicating a better fit as we add more variables. The pseudo- R^2 values may look low when compared to R^2 values of linear regression models, but such low values are normal in logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow; 2000).

3.1.2 Robustness checks

In order to evaluate the performance of our models, we perform in-sample and out-of-sample testing. We employ two widely used measures, the Hosmer and Lemeshow grouping based on estimated distress probabilities and the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.

According to the Hosmer and Lemeshow method, the estimated distress probabilities for each year are ranked and divided into deciles. Out of the ten groups created (each one containing 1/10 of the firms in that year), the first group has the smallest average estimated distress probability and the last the largest. Next, we aggregate the number of distressed firms in each decile for each year over 2000-2009 and calculate the corresponding percentages of the distressed firms in each decile.

The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is constructed from the estimated distress probabilities versus the actual status of the firms in each year for all possible cut-off probability values. Specifically, the curve plots the ratio of correctly classified distressed firms to actual distressed firms (sensitivity) and the ratio of wrongly classified healthy firms to actual healthy firms (1 - specificity) for all possible cut-offs. The AUC ranges from zero to one. A model with an AUC close to 0.5 is considered a random model with no discriminatory power. An AUC of 0.7 to 0.8 represents good discriminatory power, an AUC of 0.8 to 0.9 very good discriminatory power and an AUC over 0.9 is exceptional and extremely unusual. The AUC criterion is an improvement to the traditional classification tables that rely on a single cut-off point to classify distressed and healthy firms.²⁹ We should note at this point that the Hosmer and Lemeshow method assesses mainly calibration and the AUC assesses discrimination. We believe that our models' accuracy should be evaluated by considering both calibration and discrimination and for this reason we employ both tests.

Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of the in-sample tests. According to the Hosmer - Lemeshow grouping, the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases from model I to model II (75.83% to 76.59%). Also, the percentage of distressed firms in the first five deciles drops (11.38% to 11.09%). These show that adding the systemic variables improves performance both in terms of an increase in the correct classification of distressed firms and a decrease in the incorrect classification of healthy firms. AUC also increases from 0.8241 to

²⁹Several statistics are equivalent to the AUC. The accuracy ratio (AR) can be derived from the AUC via a linear transformation ($AUC = 2AR + 1$) and, thus, contains exactly the same information (Engelmann et al., 2003). The Gini coefficient, when defined with respect to the ROC curve, is identical in value to the AR, and, hence, also carries the same information. Finally, for continuous data, the AUC is equivalent to the Mann-Whitney U test (also known as Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon or Wilcoxon rank-sum test).

0.8382. This result is better than those achieved by previous studies in the literature. Specifically in Altman et al. (2010) this figure ranges between 0.78 and 0.80. When it comes to model III, it only modestly outperforms model II. Specifically, by taking industry effects into account, the AUC remains almost the same and the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases slightly (76.59% to 76.66%). Given these results, controlling for industry effects improves performance only marginally, once we have already accounted for systemic factors. When we add interaction effects between size and systemic factors, we notice a further increase in the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles (76.66% to 77.06%). AUC also increases from 0.8386 to 0.8431. Thus, once again, the involvement of systemic variables improves prediction accuracy. Moving to model V, it seems that age also helps slightly. We cannot though directly compare model IV to model V since model V is estimated with a smaller sample.

Panel C of Table 5 presents the results of the out-of-sample tests. Out-of-sample testing is required since improvements in the in-sample fit can be a result of over-fitting of the original data. We retain a random hold-out sample of 71,823 firms (304,037 firm-year observations), out of which 5,487 distressed, from the period 2000-2009 to perform out - of - sample validation (these numbers are a bit lower for model V). We use the coefficient estimates from the original models to predict distress for the hold-out sample. The percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles follows the same pattern as before, increasing from model I to model II (75.54% to 76.27%), slightly decreasing from model II to model III (76.27% to 76.23%) and increasing again for models IV and V (up to 77.16%). The AUC finally increases monotonically along the five different model specifications, reaching the very satisfactory value of 0.8472.

The robustness checks provide evidence that the systemic variables and their interaction effects with size capture distress more successfully compared to the industry effects that help only marginally. To test this finding, we run a model where we include only firm-specific information (model I) and the industry dummies. As expected, this model performs worse than model II, which includes firm-specific information and the systemic factors. Moreover, to exclude the possibility that the lower performance is due to inappropriate use of industry dummies, we use alternative industry classifications to construct our dummies and, still, get lower prediction power compared to model II. Finally, instead of negative equity, we use negative EBITDA to identify distressed firms. This alternative definition gives lower performance but the same coefficient signs. The findings remain substantially similar under all tests and are available upon request.

3.2 Regional subsamples

In addition to the overall sample, we estimate fitted models for the three subsamples presented in subsection 3.2. As explained, countries within the same group share common SME characteristics, thus, we examine each group separately.³⁰ We estimate three models for the period 2000-2009 for each group. Model I includes only the idiosyncratic variables described in subsection 3.3.1, model II includes both the idiosyncratic and the systemic variables described in subsection 3.3.2, and model III includes additionally the industry dummies. We do not report

³⁰We do not include country dummies in the regional models because such dummies do not have forecasting power. Instead, we estimate separate models for each country, but since findings are similar to the ones presented in this section, results are available upon request.

results with interaction variables and age for the sake of brevity. Results with these variables display similar patterns as those described above. Interestingly, as noted in subsection 3.3, we find that the firm-specific variables identified as the most important in predicting distress are exactly the same as for the overall sample. This is evidence that SMEs across Europe are sensitive to the same idiosyncratic factors. Concerning the systemic variables, there are regional variations in the vulnerabilities to systemic factors.

3.2.1 Empirical results

Panel A of Table 6 presents the estimation results of the three models for group 1 (France, Germany, UK). The models are estimated from a sample of 165,786 SMEs (801,536 firm-year observations), which include 14,177 distressed SMEs. Again, all firm-specific variables are significant and have the expected signs. In group 1 model II, we find the bank lending and the GDP growth as the most useful macroeconomic variables in predicting distress.

We do not include other systemic variables in the model because, due to the high correlation effects among them, we sometimes get either puzzling signs or insignificant coefficients when more of these variables are added. In some other cases, even when more variables are added, the performance does not improve further. Both the bank lending and the GDP growth have significant coefficients and are, as expected, negatively related to the distress rate. Lower GDP growth means lower growth in sales of firms and thus an increased distress probability. Finally, in group 1 model III, four industry dummies have significant coefficients, namely industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing), industry 2 (Transportation, Communication, Utilities), industry 3 (Construction) and industry 5 (Accommodation and Food). In contrast with the overall model III, here the construction industry is negatively related to distress. This can be a result of the economic stimulus packages geared to the construction sector from 2008 onwards, especially in France. Also projects that were commissioned during economic booms, may not be easy to cancel. Thus, we should be careful about its interpretation for forecasting purposes.

Panel A of Table 7 presents the estimation results for group 2 (Italy, Portugal, Spain). The models are estimated from a sample of 429,978 SMEs (1,741,707 firm-year observations), which include 30,900 distressed SMEs. Again, the firm-specific variables are significant and have the expected signs, with small variations in the size of the coefficients from the coefficients of the overall models. In group 2 model II, we find five systemic factors as the most useful in predicting distress. The FX rate change, the bank lending change, the economic sentiment indicator and the balance of payments (as a percentage of the GDP) are negatively related to distress. On the other hand, the unemployment level is positively related to distress.

It is interesting to note that group 2 is vulnerable to more macroeconomic factors compared to group 1. The reason for this can be the generally worse economic climate in the economies of group 2 (Italy, Portugal, Spain) during the years of the study. Finally, in group 2 model III, all industry dummies that enter with significant coefficients are riskier compared to industry 6 (Other services).

Panel A of Table 8 presents the estimation results for group 3 (Czech Republic, Poland). The models are estimated from a sample of 48,470 SMEs (178,618 firm-year observations), which include 4,278 distressed SMEs. In group 3 model II, we find the FX volatility, the 10-year government bond yield and the GDP growth as the most useful systemic variables in predicting distress. With respect to the volatility of the exchange rate, both a depreciation and an appreciation of the local currency may have negative effects on the distress rate. A depreciation of the currency makes imports more expensive whereas an appreciation makes exports less competitive. As a result higher volatility in both directions is positively related to distress (see also Nam et al., 2008).

Interestingly, it seems that for the non- Eurozone countries of group 3, the stability of their national currencies plays a crucial role in the solvency of SMEs. This is presumably due to the fact that a very volatile FX rate increases instability, thus, uncertainty about future conditions of the economy and reduces investment. Concerning the 10-year government bond yield, it enters group 3 model II with a positive coefficient. Thus, a higher interest rate is positively related to distress. Government bond yields are systematically higher in the countries of group 3 compared to the rest of the sample for the years of the study, indicating the higher sovereign risk (country premium) and maybe higher inflation expectations for these economies. As before, GDP growth is negatively related to distress. Finally, in group 3 model III, all industry dummies that enter with significant coefficients are again riskier compared to industry 6 (Other services).

Table 6: Group 1 (France, Germany, United Kingdom)

Panel A: Estimation results

The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. The data set is limited to non-financial French, German and British SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-squared values in parentheses. There are 165,786 firms in the sample (801,536 firm-year observations) out of which 14,177 are distressed.

	Group 1 Model I	Group 1 Model II	Group 1 Model III
Earnings before taxes to total assets	-1.081*** (-15.45)	-1.077*** (-15.54)	-1.053*** (-14.69)
EBITDA to interest expenses	-0.0000482*** (-11.49)	-0.0000483*** (-11.31)	-0.0000462*** (-10.81)
Current liabilities to total assets	1.863*** (70.42)	1.916*** (72.99)	1.913*** (73.20)
Cash flow to current liabilities	-0.173** (-2.69)	-0.196** (-3.16)	-0.225*** (-3.42)
Turnover to total liabilities	-0.104*** (-14.23)	-0.101*** (-14.07)	-0.0946*** (-13.45)
Size (ln(total assets))	-0.0345*** (-4.54)	-0.00559 (-0.75)	-0.00853 (-1.15)
Dummy equal to 1 if # of shareholders is more than 2	-0.0880*** (-3.94)	-0.0812*** (-3.62)	-0.0759*** (-3.38)
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban area	0.184*** (5.96)	0.174*** (5.68)	0.163*** (5.29)
Duration	0.189*** (59.93)	0.168*** (43.20)	0.170*** (43.54)
Loans granted to non-financial sector (% change)		-4.611*** (-25.53)	-4.610*** (-25.43)
GDP growth (% change)		-5.595*** (-9.44)	-5.573*** (-9.36)
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)			0.161*** (6.80)
Industry 2 (Transportation, Communication, Utilities)			-0.133** (-3.21)
Industry 3 (Construction)			-0.145*** (-5.86)
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food)			0.447*** (11.37)
Constant	-5.499*** (-82.31)	-5.293*** (-80.04)	-5.317*** (-79.90)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			
Firm-year observations	801,536	801,536	801,536
Firms	165,786	165,786	165,786
Distressed firms	14,177	14,177	14,177
Pseudo R-squared	0.136	0.150	0.152
Log likelihood	-61,573.5	-60,538.7	-60,408.4
Wald test	17,957.5***	20,225.9***	20,614.9***
Likelihood ratio test		2,069.68***	260.58***

Panel B: In-sample prediction tests

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 14,177 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	13.74%	13.85%	13.66%
8	9.46%	9.47%	8.90%
9	13.80%	14.02%	14.24%
10	50.55%	50.67%	51.08%
8 to 10	73.82%	74.16%	74.22%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8118	0.8254	0.8268

Panel C: Out-of-sample prediction tests

A hold-out sample of 18449 French, German and British SMEs (88957 firm-year observations) is used.

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 1,626 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	13.59%	13.47%	13.47%
8	9.41%	8.79%	9.23%
9	14.21%	15.01%	15.19%
10	48.89%	48.95%	49.38%
8 to 10	72.51%	72.76%	73.80%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8056	0.8236	0.8261

Source: Authors

Table 7: Group 2 (Italy, Portugal, Spain)

Panel A: Estimation results

The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. The data set is limited to non-financial Italian, Portuguese and Spanish SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-squared values in parentheses. There are 429,978 firms in the sample (1,741,707 firm-year observations) out of which 30,900 are distressed.

	Group 2 Model I	Group 2 Model II	Group 2 Model III
Earnings before taxes to total assets	-0.704*** (-11.06)	-0.677*** (-10.61)	-0.688*** (-10.68)
EBITDA to interest expenses	-0.0000485*** (-9.87)	-0.0000468*** (-9.82)	-0.0000460*** (-9.71)
Current liabilities to total assets	1.162*** (66.78)	1.217*** (69.66)	1.210*** (68.46)
Cash flow to current liabilities	-0.620*** (-8.96)	-0.650*** (-9.43)	-0.633*** (-9.10)
Turnover to total liabilities	-0.272*** (-32.51)	-0.249*** (-30.41)	-0.249*** (-30.08)
Size (ln(total assets))	-0.180*** (-32.85)	-0.107*** (-17.72)	-0.111*** (-18.02)
Dummy equal to 1 if # of shareholders is more than 2	-0.387*** (-24.19)	-0.324*** (-19.96)	-0.316*** (-19.41)
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban area	0.0776*** (4.94)	0.101*** (6.43)	0.120*** (7.49)
Duration	0.305*** (128.02)	0.206*** (67.49)	0.207*** (68.14)
FX rate (% change)		-2276.6*** (-44.99)	-2,277.3*** (-44.86)
Unemployment		6.176*** (24.91)	6.058*** (24.41)
Loans granted to non-financial sector (% change)		-3.378*** (-30.14)	-3.422*** (-30.47)
Economic sentiment		-0.0256*** (-21.08)	-0.0257*** (-21.14)
Balance of payments (% of GDP)		-4.208*** (-16.28)	-4.192*** (-16.12)
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)			0.0933*** (4.61)
Industry 3 (Construction)			0.293*** (14.54)
Industry 4 (Trade)			0.0466* (2.51)
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food)			0.292*** (10.76)
Constant	-4.230*** (-99.51)	-2.921*** (-19.57)	-2.982*** (-20.00)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			
Firm-year observations	1,741,707	1,741,707	1,741,707
Firms	429,978	429,978	429,978
Distressed firms	30,900	30,900	30,900
Pseudo R-squared	0.153	0.177	0.179
Log likelihood	-131,451.70	-127,673.50	-127,499.20
Wald test	49,903.0***	55,783.8***	56,016.4***
Likelihood ratio test		7,556.43***	348.68***

Panel B: In-sample prediction tests

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 30,900 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	9.70%	9.17%	9.04%
8	12.06%	11.86%	11.80%
9	19.54%	18.67%	18.79%
10	46.33%	47.01%	47.02%
8 to 10	77.93%	77.54%	77.61%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8336	0.8482	0.8491

Panel C: Out-of-sample prediction tests

A hold-out sample of 48,034 Italian, Portuguese and Spanish SMEs (195,236 firm-year observations) is used.

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 3,434 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	9.55%	9.11%	8.74%
8	11.68%	10.80%	10.05%
9	19.60%	19.57%	20.38%
10	46.48%	47.38%	47.00%
8 to 10	77.75%	77.75%	77.43%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8367	0.8497	0.8506

Source: Authors

Table 8: Group 3 (Czech Republic, Poland)

Panel A: Estimation results

The models are estimated for 2000-2009 data with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. The data set is limited to non-financial Czech and Polish SMEs. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-squared values in parentheses. There are 48,470 firms in the sample (178,618 firm-year observations) out of which 4,278 are distressed.

	Group 3 Model I	Group 3 Model II	Group 3 Model III
Earnings before taxes to total assets	-0.537*** (-4.68)	-0.547*** (-4.68)	-0.536*** (-4.59)
EBITDA to interest expenses	-0.0000483*** (-4.46)	-0.0000509*** (-4.55)	-0.0000489*** (-4.42)
Current liabilities to total assets	1.312*** (31.47)	1.397*** (32.84)	1.377*** (32.14)
Cash flow to current liabilities	-0.315** (-2.59)	-0.314** (-2.64)	-0.309** (-2.62)
Turnover to total liabilities	-0.183*** (-13.57)	-0.175*** (-13.28)	-0.176*** (-13.40)
Size (ln(total assets))	-0.120*** (-10.16)	-0.0754*** (-6.04)	-0.0832*** (-6.57)
Dummy equal to 1 if # of shareholders is more than 2	-0.314*** (-6.97)	-0.347*** (-7.53)	-0.349*** (-7.56)
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban area	0.319*** (9.08)	0.358*** (9.92)	0.361*** (9.83)
Duration	0.363*** (45.04)	0.244*** (25.89)	0.244*** (25.79)
FX rate volatility		122.6*** (12.11)	123.1*** (12.14)
10-year government bond yield		25.43*** (14.63)	25.30*** (14.48)
GDP growth (% change)		-11.62*** (-22.52)	-11.65*** (-22.57)
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)			0.200*** (3.97)
Industry 2 (Transportation, Communication)			0.164* (2.37)
Industry 4 (Trade)			0.253*** (5.86)
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food)			0.351*** (4.37)
Constant	-4.487*** (-43.64)	-6.275*** (-45.81)	-6.383*** (-46.43)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			
Firm-year observations	178,618	178,618	178,618
Firms	48,470	48,470	48,470
Distressed firms	4,278	4,278	4,278
Pseudo R-squared	0.214	0.250	0.251
Log likelihood	-15,878.4	-15,147.9	-15,125.8
Wald test	8,206.4***	8,083.9***	8,061.7***
Likelihood ratio test		1,460.92***	44.18***

Panel B: In-sample prediction tests

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 4,278 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	7.62%	7.22%	6.99%
8	10.14%	9.70%	9.82%
9	18.35%	17.16%	17.63%
10	52.06%	55.68%	55.52%
8 to 10	80.55%	82.54%	82.96%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8653	0.8749	0.8756

Panel C: Out-of-sample prediction tests

A hold-out sample of 5,340 Czech and Polish SMEs (19,844 firm-year observations) is used.

Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the 427 distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.

Decile			
1 to 5	8.67%	7.73%	7.03%
8	11.24%	8.90%	8.43%
9	15.46%	16.63%	17.10%
10	55.97%	58.08%	57.14%
8 to 10	82.67%	83.61%	82.67%
Area under the ROC curve	0.8632	0.868	0.8682

Source: Authors

3.2.2 Robustness checks

Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of the in-sample tests for group 1. The systemic factors improve performance (group 1 model II) since the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases from group 1 model I to group 1 model II (73.82% to 74.16%) and the AUC increases (0.8118 to 0.8254). The inclusion of the industry dummies (group 1 model III) further slightly improves performance. The out-of-sample results are presented in panel C of Table 6. There are 18,449 SMEs (88,957 firm-year observations, out of which 1,626 are distressed) in the hold-out sample. Performance improvements are similar across the three different model specifications as in the case of in-sample results.

Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of the in-sample tests for group 2. Here, the inclusion of the systemic factors improves performance in terms of discriminatory power as the AUC increases from 0.8336 to 0.8482, but in terms of calibration, results are more confusing. Specifically, the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles slightly drops from group 2 model I to group 2 model II but the percentage of distressed firms in the last decile increases (46.33% to 47.01%). Group 2 model III performs slightly better than group 2 model II with respect to both measures. The out-of-sample results are presented in panel C of Table 7. There are 48,034 SMEs (195,236 firm-year observations, out of which 3,334 are distressed) in the hold-out sample. According to the out-of-sample tests, group 2 model II outperforms group 2 model I (the percentage of distressed firms in the last two deciles increases from 66.07% to 66.95% and the AUC increases from 0.8367 to 0.8497). Finally, group 2 model III provides a slight improvement to group 2 model II. These results support our previous findings that industry effects do not offer much in explaining distress variation over and above the macroeconomic dependencies.

Finally, panel B of Table 8 presents the results of the in-sample tests for group 3. According to the Hosmer-Lemeshow grouping, the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases from group 3 model I to group 3 model II by 2% (80.55% to 82.54%). Also, the percentage of distressed firms in the first five deciles drops (7.62% to 7.22%). AUC also increases (0.8653 to 0.8749). Clearly, the systemic variables help in capturing distress risk compared to using only idiosyncratic information. Again, inclusion of the industry dummies in group 3 model III slightly improves model accuracy. The out-of-sample results presented in panel C of Table 8 give a more complete picture. There are 5,340 SMEs (19,844 firm-year observations, out of which 427 are distressed) in the hold-out sample. Again group 3 model II outperforms group 3 model I (the percentage of distressed firms in the last three deciles increases from 82.67% to 83.61% and the AUC increases from 0.8632 to 0.8680). Nevertheless, group 3 model III does not outperform group 3 model I, but on the contrary, results with the inclusion of industry effects look slightly worse.

3.3 Subperiods' analysis

Here, we estimate model III of section 3.1, which includes idiosyncratic and systemic variables as well as industry dummies, over different subperiods. Specifically, we estimate the model over four rolling windows, each five years long during the period 2002-2009. We start our rolling windows

from 2002 onwards because for a five-year estimation period, which is rather short, the survivorship bias of years 2000-2001 may contaminate results. We perform this analysis for two reasons, first, in order to examine the stability of coefficients through time, and, secondly, to further test performance. We select not to examine a model that includes more variables, such as interaction effects and age, for reasons of parsimony. This time, we evaluate predictive power only out-of-the-sample. Particularly, we calculate the Hosmer-Lemeshow deciles and the AUC over exactly the next year following each model's estimation period as well as over the last year of our sample (2009).

3.3.1 Empirical results

Panel A of Table 9 presents the estimation results of the four rolling windows over the period 2002-2009, as well as of the overall sample (model III of section 3.1.) for comparison purposes. Coefficients of firm-specific variables are always significant and keep the same signs along the different windows, but there is relative variation in their magnitudes. The only puzzling result is the positive coefficient of size in the 2004-2008 window, but it seems that this result is sample specific. Coefficients of systemic variables follow the same patterns but display a slightly higher volatility, presumably as a result of the changing economic conditions during the period of the study. Unemployment has a negative coefficient in the 2003-2007 rolling window but it is insignificant. Similarly, the years to resolve insolvency are negatively related to distress in the 2002-2006 window but this is probably also sample specific since distress rates are increasing quite impressively from 2002 to 2003 (Table 2) but the insolvency regimes remain stable or improve. Finally, when it comes to industry dummies, they often change signs, indicating changing prevailing industry conditions. Often though, their coefficients are insignificant. Only industry 5 (Accommodation and Food) is always positively and significantly related to distress.

3.3.2 Robustness checks

Panels B and C of Table 9 present the out-of-the-sample performance of the estimated rolling windows. Specifically, panel B presents performance over the next year following the estimation period and panel C presents performance over the last sample year (2009). For this reason, we do not report results for the last two models, which include year 2009 in the estimation sample. In panel A, the percentage of distressed SMEs in the last three deciles ranges from 72.93% - 78.15% and AUC ranges from 0.7825 – 0.8177. Similarly, in panel B, the percentage of distressed SMEs in the last three deciles ranges from 71.93% - 72.93% and AUC ranges from 0.7795 – 0.7963. The 2002-2006 window performs quite well predicting distress in year 2009, since, despite the three-year gap between the end of the estimation period and the prediction year, it still classifies 70.65% of the distressed SMEs in the last three deciles and gives an AUC of 0.7795. Finally, the 2004-2008 window also has very good performance since the model manages to capture on a satisfactory level the extreme outbreak of distressed SMEs in 2009, classifying 72.93% of the distressed SMEs in the last three deciles and giving an AUC of 0.7963.

Table 9: Subperiods' analysis (8 countries)

Panel A: Estimation results

The models are estimated over different subperiods (five-year rolling windows for 2002-2009 data) with yearly observations using the multi-period logit technique. Estimation results for the overall sample are also provided in the last two columns for comparison purposes (2000-2009 data). All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. The data set includes SMEs from eight European economies. Parameter estimates are given first followed by chi-squared values in parentheses.

	2002-2006	2003-2007	2004-2008	2005-2009	Model III, section 3.1.
Earnings before taxes to total assets	-0.819*** (-9.21)	-0.764*** (-9.02)	-0.824*** (-11.07)	-0.757*** (-)	-0.763*** (-15.53)
EBITDA to interest expenses	- (-5.91)	- (-9.78)	- (-12.25)	- (-)	- (-14.58)
Current liabilities to total assets	1.789*** (68.72)	1.684*** (74.63)	1.530*** (75.25)	1.379*** (92.63)	1.417*** (102.97)
Cash flow to current liabilities	-0.557*** (-5.66)	-0.635*** (-6.49)	-0.493*** (-5.87)	-0.523*** (-9.10)	-0.491*** (-9.16)
Turnover to total liabilities	-0.0900*** (-13.08)	-0.0983*** (-14.83)	-0.118*** (-18.17)	-0.169*** (-)	-0.176*** (-35.56)
Size (ln(total assets))	-0.0980*** (-13.25)	-0.0316*** (-4.85)	0.0446*** (7.34)	-0.0188*** (-4.01)	-0.0913*** (-22.14)
Dummy equal to 1 if # of shareholders is more	-0.245*** (-11.31)	-0.279*** (-15.03)	-0.246*** (-14.68)	-0.277*** (-)	-0.272*** (-21.76)
Dummy equal to 1 if SME is located in an urban	0.125*** (4.93)	0.0757*** (3.53)	0.0959*** (5.24)	0.141*** (10.26)	0.144*** (11.01)
Duration	0.358*** (59.17)	0.334*** (86.41)	0.238*** (78.84)	0.172*** (75.43)	0.228*** (108.86)
FX rate (% change)	-1,421.8*** (-29.32)	-1,452.5*** (-33.02)	-478.9*** (-13.02)	-541.8*** (-)	-1,689.9*** (-59.01)
Unemployment	2.117*** (4.38)	-0.462 (-0.97)	2.082*** (6.89)	4.423*** (28.04)	1.914*** (12.58)
Economic sentiment indicator	-0.0169*** (-7.70)	-0.0368*** (-20.08)	-0.0106*** (-10.39)	-0.00570*** (-6.75)	-0.0258*** (-34.90)
Loans granted to non-financial sector (% change)	-6.238*** (-50.60)	-5.288*** (-48.89)	-2.347*** (-20.75)	-4.202*** (-)	-4.407*** (-58.07)
Years to resolve insolvency proceedings	-0.0497*** (-5.03)	0.0520*** (8.94)	0.0981*** (23.87)	0.157*** (46.05)	0.0958*** (27.57)
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing)	0.0628* (2.06)	0.0211 (0.80)	0.0915*** (3.75)	0.0712*** (3.82)	
Industry 2 (Utilities, Transportation,	-0.186*** (-4.13)	-0.0976** (-2.65)	0.0245 (0.75)	0.0112 (0.46)	-0.0762*** (-3.56)
Industry 3 (Construction)	-0.193*** (-6.07)	-0.0267 (-0.99)	0.179*** (7.32)	0.218*** (11.78)	0.0798*** (5.84)
Industry 4 (Trade)	-0.0571* (-1.99)	-0.113*** (-4.56)	-0.0202 (-0.88)	0.0265 (1.56)	-0.0295* (-2.50)
Industry 5 (Accommodation and Food)	0.264*** (5.57)	0.156*** (4.06)	0.190*** (5.82)	0.226*** (9.57)	0.212*** (10.18)
Constant	-3.896*** (-16.69)	-1.952*** (-9.26)	-5.317*** (-42.28)	-4.978*** (-)	-2.523*** (-30.26)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					
Firm-year observations	1,079,429	1,367,406	1,704,810	2,056,890	2,721,861
Firms	385,546	637,299	646,812	636,008	644,234
Distressed firms	15,914	20,665	24,276	42,351	49,355
Pseudo R-squared	0.200	0.158	0.150	0.125	0.171
Log likelihood	-58,989.5	-69,826.7	-91,025.0	-111,420.9	-204,538.30
Wald test	23,784.5***	31,818.7***	39,646.7***	68,451.6***	84,526.8***

Table 9 continued:

	2002-2006	2003-2007	2004-2008	2005-2009	2000-2009
Panel B: Performance over next year					
Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.					
Decile					
1 to 5	8.05%	11.84%	11.94%	-	-
6	4.96%	5.25%	6.12%	-	-
7	8.83%	8.71%	9.01%	-	-
8	14.43%	17.56%	13.18%	-	-
9	19.67%	20.34%	18.99%	-	-
10	44.06%	36.30%	40.75%	-	-
8 to 10	78.15%	74.20%	72.93%	-	-
9 to 10	0.8177	0.7825	0.7963	-	-
Area under the ROC curve				-	-
Panel C: Performance over last year (2009)					
Hosmer-Lemeshow test: Percentage of the distressed firms predicted in each decile in the year of their distress.					
Decile					
1 to 5	12.80%	12.25%	11.94%	-	-
6	6.27%	6.20%	6.12%	-	-
7	10.28%	9.63%	9.01%	-	-
8	16.34%	16.19%	13.18%	-	-
9	18.45%	18.91%	18.99%	-	-
10	35.86%	36.82%	40.75%	-	-
8 to 10	70.65%	71.93%	72.93%	-	-
9 to 10	0.7795	0.7852	0.7963	-	-
Area under the ROC curve				-	-

Source: Authors

4 Conclusions

The paper explores the performance of distress prediction hazard models for non-financial SMEs using a dataset from eight European countries over the ten-year period 2000-2009. The panel structure of the dataset allows us to exploit both the time-series and the cross-sectional dimension and differentiate between firm-specific, macroeconomic and industry effects.

We find that, in addition to financial indicators, whose importance has also been noted in past studies, SMEs in urban areas and SMEs with less than three shareholders have higher distress probabilities. We explore potential performance improvements reached by including systemic patterns and industry effects, in addition to firm-specific variables, to the distress prediction models and find that the exchange rate change, the economic sentiment, the bank lending conditions and the bankruptcy codes are important distress determinants. We validate the superiority of models that incorporate macroeconomic dependencies, suggested by previous research, also in the case of SMEs but do not find strong evidence that industry effects significantly improve prediction accuracy. We also examine interaction effects between SMEs' size and systemic variables and find that as SMEs become larger, they are less vulnerable to the macroeconomy. When we split our sample into regional groups, we identify regional variations in the importance of macrovariables. Finally, we perform a rolling window analysis and find that whereas sensitivities to idiosyncratic and systemic factors remain relatively stable over time, industry effects give in many cases insignificant and rather unstable coefficients.

The paper's contribution to the field of distress prediction is multiple-fold. First, by using a dataset that includes a very high number of micro companies, we offer a better understanding of the European SME sector. Secondly, to our knowledge, we are the first to examine distress in a multi-country setting, allowing for cross-region and cross-country comparisons. Finally, by considering systemic factors such as the macroeconomy, bank lending conditions and legal aspects, we uncover the main system-wide vulnerabilities of SMEs, both within Europe and among regions and countries.

5 Annex

5.1 List of systematic variables

Variables	Calculation
10-year government bond yield change	Raw data are monthly. We take the annualized 10-year government bond yield (Maastricht definition) of the closing month. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: Eurostat.
Appreciation/Depreciation of the exchange rate	Raw data are daily. We calculate the average daily change of the USD/EURO (for Eurozone members) and of USD/national currency (for non-Eurozone members) for the year before the closing. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: OANDA.
Balance of payments as a percentage of the GDP	Raw data are quarterly. We take the average percentage over a four quarter period before the closing. We lag this variable by two quarters to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
Bank lending to the non-financial sector	Raw data are monthly. We take the percentage change between the closing month and the corresponding month of the previous year. We lag this variable by one month to ensure data availability. Source: Datastream.
Debt as a percentage of the GDP	Raw data are quarterly. We take the average percentage over a four quarter period before the closing. We lag this variable by two quarters to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
Disposable income growth	Raw data are quarterly. We take the disposable income change between the four quarters before the closing and the corresponding four quarters of the previous year. We lag this variable by one quarter to ensure data availability. In the Eurostat data, year 2005 is used as the reference to measure disposable income at constant prices. Figures are also seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. Source: Eurostat.
Economic sentiment	Raw data are monthly. This indicator is calculated by the Directorate General of Financial Affairs of the European Commission. It is calculated as an index with a mean value of 100, from answers to surveys conducted under the Joint Harmonized EU Programme. We take the average of the twelve months before the closing. We lag this variable by one month to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
GDP growth	Raw data are quarterly. We take the GDP percentage change between the four quarters before the closing and the corresponding four quarters of the previous year. We lag this variable by one quarter to ensure data availability. In the Eurostat data, year 2005 is used as the reference to measure GDP at constant prices. Figures are also seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. Source: Eurostat.
Inflation	Raw data are monthly. We take the annual rate of change of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Specifically, we calculate the change of the index between the closing month and the corresponding month of the previous year. We lag this variable by one month to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
Oil price	Raw data are monthly (historical close). We take average of the one month forward prices of brent crude oil for the twelve months before the closing. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: ECB.
Recovery rate	Raw data are annual. This indicator is calculated by the World Bank under the Doing Business project and measures the percentage that claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm for each country. We lag this variable by one year to ensure data availability. Source: World Bank.
Stock index return	Raw data are monthly. We take the one year return of the national stock market index (change between the closing month and the corresponding month of the previous year). We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: Eurostat.

Surplus/deficit as a percentage of the GDP	Raw data are quarterly. We take the average percentage over a four quarter period before the closing. We lag this variable by two quarters to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
Time to resolve insolvency proceedings	Raw data are annual. This indicator is calculated by the World Bank under the Doing Business project and measures the number of years from the filing for insolvency in court until the resolution of distressed assets for each country. We lag this variable by one year to ensure data availability. Source: World Bank.
Unemployment	Raw data are monthly. We take the average harmonized unemployment rate (International Labor Organization definition) over a twelve month period before the closing. We lag this variable by one month to ensure data availability. Source: Eurostat.
Volatility of the exchange rate	Raw data are daily. We calculate the volatility of the daily change of the USD/EUR (for Eurozone members) and of USD/national currency (for non-Eurozone members) for the year before the closing. We do not lag this variable as data are accessible on real time. Source: OANDA.

5.2 Insolvency regimes³¹

	Recovery rate (%)	Years to resolve insolvency	Recovery rate per year (%)
Italy	48.22	1.80	26.79
Portugal	73.23	2.00	36.62
Spain	72.90	1.50	48.60
France	46.19	1.90	24.31
Germany	82.32	1.20	68.60
United Kingdom	85.31	1.00	85.31
Czech Republic	17.23	8.39	2.05
Poland	32.31	3.00	10.77

Source: World Bank and authors

³¹The table provides an overview of the insolvency regimes in the countries of our study. The first column gives the average percentage that claimants recover from an insolvent firm in the years 2000-2009, the second columns measures the average years from the insolvency filing until the resolution of assets in the same period and the third column is the ratio of the two previous columns.

5.3 List of acronyms

- AR: Accuracy Ratio
- AUC: Area Under the ROC curve
- EBITDA: Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization
- ECB: European Central Bank
- EIB: European Investment Bank
- EIBURS: EIB University Research Sponsorship
- EIF: European Investment Fund
- EU: European Union
- FX: Foreign Exchange
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product
- HICP: Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
- LSF: Luxembourg School of Finance
- NACE: Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne
- OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristic
- SME: Small and Medium sized Enterprise
- UK: United Kingdom
- US: United States

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