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Immigration, asylum, and gender: Ireland and beyond

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Immigration, Asylum, and Gender: Ireland and Beyond

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Immigration, Asylum, and Gender:
Ireland and Beyond¹

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Mr. Deasy halted, breathing hard and swallowing his breath.

-- *I just wanted to say, he said. Ireland, they say, has the honour of being the only country which never persecuted the Jews. Do you know that? No. And do you know why?* He frowned sternly on the bright air.

-- *Why, sir?* Stephen asked, beginning to smile.

-- *Because she never let them in,* Mr. Deasy said solemnly.

James Joyce, *Ulysses*.

1. Introduction

Until the early 2000s, Ireland was a place of emigration, not immigration, where both the broad contours of and short-term fluctuations in Irish population change were determined more by net migration than by natural increase. It was emigration that made Ireland, uniquely among European countries, lose population for over a century.

Since the beginning of the new millennium there has been a radical shift. In 1991 the number of Irish residents born elsewhere numbered 228,725, or six per cent of the total population, and only 40,341 of those had been born in places other than the United Kingdom and the United States. Two decades later (in 2011) the foreign-born numbered 766,770, or 17 per cent of the total population, and three-fifths of those (or 10.6 per cent of the total population) were from outside the UK. The big rise in the numbers of residents of east European origin—especially from Poland—is often highlighted, but between 2002 and 2011 the number of recorded African-born residents doubled (from 26,515 to 54,419) and that of Asian-born residents almost trebled (from

28,132 to 79,021).² Over the same two decades, the number of Muslim residents—overwhelmingly immigrants or the children of immigrants—rose from 3,873 to 49,204 (or 1.1 per cent of the population). An important characteristic of the recent inflow is its wide reach across the whole country, even to areas formerly associated with large-scale emigration. By 2011 virtually nowhere in Ireland was without its immigrants, with the non-national share of the population ranging from 8.1 per cent in Donegal and 8.8 per cent in Kilkenny to 15.7 per cent in Greater Dublin.

Not only was the influx unprecedented; it was also massive, indeed unique—in relative, if not in absolute terms—by present-day European standards (Figure 1). Then, with the collapse of the Celtic Tiger economy, emigration rose again, peaking in the year ending April 2013 when 89,000 left, nearly three-fifths of them Irish. In the years ending April 2014 and April 2015, as the economy began to recover (Figure 2), 82,000 and 69,000 left, half of them Irish-born, and net emigration dropped from 33,100 in 2012/13 to 11,600 in 2014/15. For more on the background and context see Hughes *et al.* 2007; Fanning 2011.

The shift in the age pattern of the foreign-born between 2006 and 2011—more young children, fewer young adults—is consistent with the impression that many immigrant children followed their parents to Ireland with a lag. In the case of the Polish-born, for example, the share of 0-14 year olds increased from 7.6 per cent in 2006 to 18.1 per cent in 2011. This does not include the Irish-born children of Polish parents. Labour force participation among most migrant groups has been high and

² Ireland's first Polish food shop opened in Naas, about twenty miles from Dublin, in 2003 (Coakley 2010). By 2015 there were well over a hundred such ethnic food shops located all over the island.

welfare dependence rates low (Barrett and McCarthy 2007; Barrett 2012; Barrett, Joyce, and Maître 2013). As for education, most East European migrants had no third-level qualifications, whereas a significant proportion of those from Western Europe and outside Europe had. East Europeans were badly affected by the collapse of the Celtic Tiger in 2007-08 and, hardly surprisingly, were more likely to return home or to try their luck elsewhere 2008 than Africans (Barrett and Kelly 2012; Ó Gráda 2015b).

Only Spain came close to Ireland in terms of inflows relative to population in the 2000s (Figure 1). Interestingly, both countries are among the few in Europe—the list also includes Portugal—where xenophobic political parties of the populist right still command little or no electoral support (O’Malley 2008; Arango 2013; Marchi 2013). In the recent Irish general election (held on 26 February 2016) the issue of immigration was notable for not featuring at all, and in the Portuguese legislative election of October 2015 the anti-immigration *Partido Nacional Renovador*, modelled on France’s *Front National*, obtained only 0.5 per cent of the vote. But that does not mean that anti-immigrant sentiment is absent in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal—far from it.

It would be surprising if Irish attitudes to immigration were impervious to the post-2000 inflow. Part 2 of this paper describes those attitudes in comparative terms, as reflected in the European Social Survey. Part 3 switches the focus to gender differences in attitudes to immigration, and the rest of the paper pays attention to this aspect in discussing asylum (Part 4) and perceptions of size of the immigrant stock in Ireland and in Europe generally (Part 5). Part 6 concludes.

2. Attitudes

To judge by the European Social Survey (ESS)³, attitudes to immigration in Ireland hardened during the post-2008 recession, and have not softened with the recovery of economic growth (Figure 3). By Round 6 of ESS, conducted in 2012, Ireland was halfway down the European league tables in terms of its attitude towards immigration (Table 1). Least supportive of the 29 nationalities surveyed were the Cypriots, the Israelis, and the Hungarians, in that order, whereas residents of the Nordic countries tended to be the least hostile. Attitudes to immigrants in Portugal were less welcoming than in Ireland, those in Spain more so. In 2014-15, represented by Round 7, Ireland was more than halfway down the league table of available countries (which do not yet include Spain or Portugal).

Whether the different ethnic composition of Ireland's foreign-born population affects attitudes to immigration is beyond the scope of this paper. The same holds for response bias (e.g. respondents shying away from awkward questions), which may well have a cultural component, and the related issue of how strongly attitudes, as expressed in surveys, are related to behaviour. A recent analysis based on Swiss data finds that 'the share of respondents who admit having voted for tighter immigration laws is lower in the survey than the ballot box' (Funk 2013).

In this respect, the rather different picture painted by *Eurobarometer*, which regularly surveys public opinion on a range of social and economic issues in EU member states, is worth noting. Its most recent issue, *Eurobarometer 84*, refers to fieldwork carried out in November 2015. Respondents in all twenty-eight member-

³ Data and full documentation are available at: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>.

states were asked to choose two issues of national concern ‘facing our country’ from thirteen proposed by *Eurobarometer*, which range from unemployment and the economic situation to housing and the environment. Given the survey’s timing, immigration was a major preoccupation. It was the most frequently mentioned concern of the thirteen in twelve countries—led by Germany (76%), Malta (65%), Denmark (60%), and Netherlands/Austria (56%)—and the second most frequently mentioned in another four. But in Ireland it featured amongst the top two issues in only 11 per cent of cases, and in Spain and Portugal the percentages were 9 and 5. In Ireland housing (34%) came first, followed by unemployment (32%), and health and social security (29%). In Spain unemployment (69%), the economic situation (29%), and health and social security (12%) were the most mentioned; in Portugal the top three concerns were unemployment (62%), the economic situation (35%), and government debt (22%) (*Eurobarometer 2015*).

Figure 4 describes the trend in attitudes to immigration—as reflected in the percentage of responses that include it as one of two main concerns—in six European countries between 2003 and 2015. Spain stands out for the dominance of immigration as an issue in 2006-07. However, that dominance was short-lived and should be interpreted as a reaction to the massive increase in Spain’s immigrant population from 0.9 million in 2000 to 4.5 million in 2007; Spain’s historically low unemployment rates before the crash of 2007-08 also made more room for immigration as a focus of concern.⁴

The trends in attitudes in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands

⁴ Compare the rise in the percentage including immigration in the two issues that concerned people most in Germany from 8 per cent in May 2012 to 76 per cent in November 2015.

mirror the rise in anti-immigrant political parties in those countries. Cyprus, another place where anti-immigrant populism commands little electoral support, is also interesting in this regard. In recent *Eurobarometer* surveys (2013-15) immigration was listed as one of the top two concerns of Cypriots in only 4 to 5 per cent of cases. Unemployment was by far the greatest worry—71 per cent mention it in the latest survey—but few Cypriots linked it to immigration in their responses. In Cyprus political support for the ultranationalist National Popular Front and the anti-immigrant European Party remains low. Yet Cyprus was amongst the least welcoming towards immigrants of all twenty-nine countries included in Round 6 of ESS.

The different perspectives of *Eurobarometer* and ESS are striking, and summary data from the former seem to be better predictors of support for anti-immigrant politics—and therefore the depth of feelings on the issue.⁵ However, here we rely on ESS, with its much richer individual-level data.

The ESS has proven a popular guide to attitudes on immigration.⁶ As a descriptive tool, it is very rich, but as a means of explaining attitudes it is problematic, not only for the reasons mentioned, but because of the potential endogeneity of several likely explanatory variables. For example, while racial stereotyping might be expected to influence attitudes to immigration, a reverse causation is also possible. Similarly, interacting socially with immigrants might be expected to increase empathy for them, but hostility to immigrants might equally entail an unwillingness to interact

⁵ Violence against immigrants, including murder, offers an interesting, if extreme, measure of anti-immigrant attitudes, but comprehensive comparative data are lacking. For what is available see OSCE/ODIHR *Hate Crime Reporting* [hatecrime.osce.org].

⁶ See e.g. Dustman *et al.* 2005; Sides and Citrin 2007; Dustman and Preston 2008; Héricourt and Spielvogel 2010; Markaki and Longhi 2013; Betz and Simpson 2013; Hatton 2015; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2015.

in the first place. It could be countered that because attitudes to issues such as ethnicity and race are slow to change (compare Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) proxies for them can be treated as exogenous. Be that as it may, OLS and probit regressions featuring such proxies are common in the literature.⁷ Still, it is best to treat the outcome of such regressions as more descriptive than predictive.

Ireland is a particularly interesting case study, given its attractiveness to immigrants and its shifting economic fortunes since the early 2000s. ESS has already been invoked to describe Irish attitudes to immigration in comparative and inter-temporal contexts (Hughes *et al.* 2007; McGinnity *et al.* 2013; Turner and Cross 2015). Denny and Ó Gráda (2014, 2016), using Rounds 1 to 7 of the ESS, examine Irish attitudes to immigration before (Rounds 1 and 2), during (Rounds 3 and 4), and after the downturn of 2007-08 (Rounds 5 to 7). Their findings may be briefly summarized as follows. They find that, first, after several other likely factors are taken into account, Irish females tend to be more hostile to immigration throughout than Irish males. Second, in Ireland older people tended to be more anti-immigration in the early 2000s, though not thereafter. Third, being well educated and living in a big city are associated with being more pro-immigrant, and increasingly so over time. Education might be interpreted as a proxy for work skills, and to that extent its impact on attitudes is in line with trade-theoretic presumptions (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006). But more direct measures of such an impact like being unemployed or being low-income pack little punch (compare Hainmueller *et al.* 2015). Fourth, certain attitudinal variables were associated with being pro-immigration: being positive about the state of the economy, being socially liberal (as reflected in attitudes to

⁷ E.g. Mayda 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hatton 2015.

homosexuality), being on the left politically, and not being religious.⁸ The coefficients on the pro-gay variable are sizeable in the first and third period, indicating that the stance on gay and lesbian rights did not affect attitudes to immigration during the recession but was associated with more favourable attitudes during the boom and recovery. Having difficulty in making ends meet did not impact on attitudes before the crisis, but did both in its wake and in the recovery period. Whether this implies a ratchet effect in attitudes is too soon to say. Another interesting feature of this variable is how the coefficients are significantly higher when immigrants and non-citizens are excluded.

Fifth, declaring difficulty in making ends meet had little impact on attitudes to immigration during the boom, but it was associated with negative attitudes toward immigration in the second and third periods. This may indicate that a by-product of the downturn was the persistence of negative attitudes to immigration acquired during it. Being unemployed was associated with being more anti-immigrant in the middle period, but not otherwise. Finally, being born outside Ireland was associated with being more pro-immigration, an effect that has become stronger over time.

How do these findings compare to elsewhere in Europe? For an answer we focus here on Round 7, describing the situation in 2014. Table 2 offers a comparative perspective on variables linked to attitudes to immigration in Ireland and in the fifteen countries included so far in Round 7. We focus on three measures of attitudes towards immigration. Two, reflecting the economic and cultural aspects, are in ESS; the third is a synthetic measure of whether people are for or against immigrants and

⁸ These are *FREEHMS*, *LRSCALE*, and *RLGDGR*, respectively.

immigration generally, generated by a principal components analysis of replies to the six measures in ESS.⁹ The aim of this exercise is descriptive rather than causal, since some of the variables one would like to include such as attitudes to risk and residence are lacking in ESS.

All the variables in the database are as explained in Appendix 1. In estimating, we removed interviewees who ‘refused to answer’ or ‘don’t know’. We capped years of education at 23 years, since some older respondents seem to have misinterpreted the question as referring to the age at quitting education. In addition we estimated a measure of personal satisfaction based on an average of the six satisfaction-related variables in Round 7.¹⁰

We use replies to the statement ‘Allow many or few Jews to come and live in country’ as a measure of ‘pure’ racism or xenophobia as distinct from hostility to immigration, since neither Ireland nor any the other countries surveyed has experienced significant Jewish immigration since early in the last century nor is such immigration in prospect. Moreover, history highlights the persistence of anti-Semitism (compare Voigtländer and Voth 2012). However, Round 7’s measure of anti-Semitism may also be contaminated by attitudes to immigration, because it is highly correlated with analogous variables relating to Jews and gypsies both at national and aggregate level.¹¹

⁹ These are *IMGBECO*, *IMUECLT*, and *ATTIM*. We constructed *ATTIM* by extracting the first principal component of the six questions treating them as continuous. This accounts for 65 per cent of the variation. The factor loadings all have the expected sign. We normalize it to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

¹⁰ This is the variable *SATISFIED*, based on *STFLIFE*, *STFECO*, *STFGOV*, *STFEDU*, and *STFHEALTH*. We normalized, setting the mean at zero and the standard deviation at 1.

¹¹ *ALJEWLV* is the anti-Semitism variable, with answers ranging from 1 [‘Many’] to 4 [‘None’]. *ALMUSLV* and *ALGYPLV*, referring to Muslims and gypsies, are defined in the same way.

Table 2 suggests that in several respects, Ireland behaves like the rest of Europe. The coefficients on a variable representing satisfaction with the way things are and on our proxy for racism are substantial in all cases, and similar in Ireland to Europe as a whole (as represented by the data so far). However, gender, education, and being socially liberal seem to matter more in Ireland. In the regressions using the most economically focused of the three dependent variables¹², Irishwomen are significantly more sceptical of the economic value of immigration. Being afraid of venturing out after dark and being suspicious of others¹³ count for less. Believing that ‘some races/ethnic groups are born less intelligent’¹⁴, that ‘some cultures are much better than others’), and one’s position on the left-right political scale also count for less in Ireland than in the 15-country sample.

As noted earlier, the new question in ESS Round 7 about allowing ‘many or few Jews/Muslims/Gypsies to come and live in country’ is an attempt at addressing the distinction between being anti-immigration and xenophobia. Note that refugees from the Middle East were already arriving in Europe in 2014 when the fieldwork for ESS Round 7 was being conducted, but not in the numbers reached in 2015. Replies to the question—which may well be subject to response bias—are ordered from 1 (‘Many’) to 4 (‘None’). Summary data on all of the countries supplying data so far are reported in Table 2. These imply that in Europe at present hostility to both Muslims and Roma far exceeds hostility to Jews. The Roma are the least favoured of the three in all countries except Poland, where Muslims edge it (although they represent only 0.4 per cent of

¹² This is *IMBGECO* in the ESS dataset.

¹³ As reflected in the coefficients on *AESFDRK* and *PPLFAIR*.

¹⁴ Note that for this variable, *SMEGBLI*, a higher value corresponds to rejecting this statement so it is an indicator of lack of racism. The other variables here are *SMCTMBE* and *LRSCALE*.

the population). By this reckoning (see Table 3) Czechs are the most xenophobic of the fifteen nationalities, Swedes the least so, both by a significant margin.

Table 4 presents some more detailed data on this set of questions from Ireland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic (where the foreign-born represent less than five per cent of the population), and from the 15-country group supplying data so far. Note how in Ireland gypsies (i.e. Roma) were least welcome by a wide margin; note too the huge gap between Swedes, who are the most tolerant, well ahead of Germans and Norwegians, and Czechs. Czechs and Swedes are also at opposite ends of the spectrum in their attitudes to the proposal that ‘government should be generous judging applications for refugee status’ (results not reported here).¹⁵

3. Are Women Different?

A growing economics literature highlights gender differences in behaviour and attitudes. There is evidence that men and women differ in their attitudes to religiosity, politics¹⁶, charity, and economic policy.¹⁷ Research in experimental economics points to greater risk aversion among women and also finds that they are

¹⁵ Details and summary statistics of the ESS variables are given in an appendix and in footnotes. To make it easier on the reader, references to acronyms are kept to a minimum in the text.

¹⁶ It is well known that women differ systematically in their voting preferences from men. In 2015 in Great Britain men and women were equally likely to vote Conservative but women were a little more likely to vote Labour and less likely to vote UKIP. Young women aged 18-24 were more likely to vote Labour by a margin of 20 per cent whereas the Conservatives had an 18 per cent lead among women aged over 55 [<https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3575/How-Britain-voted-in-2015.aspx?view=wide>]. In the US women in recent years have been much more likely to vote for the Democratic Party than men.

¹⁷ See e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Della Vigna et al. 2013; Booth and Nolen 2012; Funk and Gathmann 2015.

less competitive because they are less confident of their abilities than men.¹⁸ It has been shown that women are more hostile to free trade and trade liberalization than men and, as we have seen, they also tend to be more hostile to immigration.¹⁹ De Bromhead (2015) highlights how the hostility to trade liberalization dates back at least as far as the interwar years.

However, the reasons for this gender gap in attitudes towards the freer movement of goods and people are not well understood. De Bromhead (2015) surmises that it may be due to ‘differences that are not controlled for in conventional survey analysis, such as differences in risk aversion between men and women’. Perhaps, although why that should be so remains unclear. In any case, ESS contains many other variables worth investigating. The rest of this paper focuses on three immigration-related areas. The first is attitudes to immigration, as discussed above. The second is sympathy for asylum seekers, as captured by (‘Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status’²⁰ in Round 7. The third relates to differing perceptions of the size of the immigrant share of the population.²¹ In each case female and male replies are analysed separately, using the same range of variables, and the coefficients on the variables then compared. Since this comparison is about differences it is perhaps less vulnerable to complaints about endogeneity than comparisons of levels.

¹⁸ Croson and Gneezy 2009; Kuhn and Villeval 2013; Niederle 2014.

¹⁹ Compare O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Blonigen 2011; Jones 2003; Valentova and Berzosa 2010; Héricourt and Spielvogel 2010; Markaki and Longhi 2013.

²⁰ This is the ESS variable *GVRFGAP*.

²¹ As captured by *NOIMBRO* (‘Of every 100 people how many born outside country’)

The results reported in Table 2 suggest that women were more hostile to immigration than men. Tables 5a and 5c report the same regression separately for males and females, both for Ireland and for the 15-country sample, in order to investigate whether variables differ by gender in their impact on attitudes. It turns out that education has a bigger effect on women than on men in Ireland; being socially liberal mattered more for women in Ireland but for males in the pooled sample. Being able to determine one’s work schedule was more likely to make males pro-immigration than females. Life satisfaction and health matter more for women in both, though the effect is not strong. Table 5b reports the summary outcome of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the variables linked to *ATTIM*.²² Most of the (relatively small) gap between males and females is explained by coefficients rather than endowments, i.e. it is due to differential responses to variables rather than differences in the endowments of those same variables.

4. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Gender

According to ESS, relative to Europeans generally, Irish people today are more tolerant towards asylum-seekers than towards immigrants.²³ Early in the millennium,

²² The decomposition is based on OLS estimation. The next draft will report a decomposition using ordered logistic regression. In the meantime, we note that using ordered logit on the underlying equation produced very similar results to OLS in terms of signs, relative size, and statistical significance.

²³ The averages are given below. Note that values of *GVRGAP* (‘Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status’) and *ATTIM* (our synthetic measure of attitudes towards immigrants) fall from 5 (‘agree strongly’) to 1 (‘disagree strongly’) while the pro-immigration measures rise with pro-immigrant sentiment:

	Ireland	All
<i>GVRGAP</i>	2.56	2.85
<i>ATTIM</i>	-.157	0

when total applications for asylum exceeded ten thousand per annum, asylum was a much bigger issue in Ireland than it is now. The numbers seeking asylum then dropped sharply, after a constitutional amendment passed by referendum in 2002 closed a controversial loophole exploited by a relatively small number of asylum seekers,²⁴ followed by legislation directed at reducing illegal immigration in 2003, which placed several deterrents in the path of would-be applicants, including fingerprinting, carrier liability, and a closer scrutiny of conditions in countries of origin. The uncanny similarity between trends in Ireland and in Britain in the 2000s (see Figure 5) suggests that it would be incorrect to link the subsequent decline too closely to the outcome of the referendum vote.

Had all asylum applicants between 2000 and 2014 been accepted they would have added two per cent to the country's population; however, the percentage of applications deemed genuine was always small, and presumably the low acceptance rate acted as a deterrent. The percentage granted asylum rose for a few years after 2003 (4 per cent in 2000-03, 7.8 per cent in 2004-07) before plummeting again in 2008-12, but it reached an all-time high of about 11 per cent in 2013-2015.

Hatton (2011) has analysed the responses to questions on refugees and asylum-seekers in Round I of ESS. Coming in the wake of a big increase in the numbers seeking asylum in Europe, attitudes in the early 2000s tended to be unwelcoming and suspicious. Hatton's analysis, using country-level fixed effects, revealed that the more educated were, broadly speaking, more sympathetic, as were women, though by a

IMBGECO

4.97

5.01

²⁴ Appendix 2 describes the controversy leading up to the constitutional referendum and presents some new data that sheds light on the issue.

small margin. The replies also showed that negative attitudes towards asylum seekers were linked to xenophobia, as proxied by a preference for white asylum seekers.

As noted, Round 7 also contains a variable measuring sympathy towards refugees. First we model this variable as a function of a range of variables for Ireland, Germany, and the 15-country sample. The outcome is reported in Table 6, which shows older people and women to be more supportive of refugees, as are less educated people. The implication that women are less sympathetic to migrants but more sympathetic to asylum seekers is an interesting one, even if the differences are small. Being on the left politically and being tolerant towards gays and minorities are also linked to being well disposed towards refugees, as are the personal attributes of being satisfied with life and not being afraid of venturing out at night. Those who trust in politicians and in people generally are more positive, as are those who have contact with non-nationals. Religiosity and being a native of the country means less sympathy. The coefficients on the variable intended to capture xenophobia are the biggest of all, indicating that xenophobia is strongly linked to lack of sympathy towards asylum seekers. These results are broadly in line with Hatton (2011).

Table 7 reports separately for males and females. Whereas the patterns are broadly similar, some gender differences emerge. Political stance, as reflected in respondents' self-declared location on a left-right scale and on government spending²⁵, has more of an effect on males than on females, as does religiosity; and social interactions with immigrants affect female attitudes more. Interestingly, the

²⁵ *LRSCALE* and *GINCDIF*.

coefficients on our xenophobia variable do not differ much by gender, although male xenophobia plays a somewhat stronger role than female xenophobia in Ireland.

5. Perceptions

A variable included in Rounds 1 and 7²⁶ of ESS seeks to measure how accurately respondents perceive the immigrant percentage of the population. In all fifteen countries included so far in 2014 the average percentage is higher than the actual percentage (Figure 6). This is not a new finding.²⁷ In analyses of this variable in Round 1 of ESS Sides and Citrin (2007b) link what they dub ‘innumeracy’ regarding the immigrant population to educational level and living where the immigrant population is large, whereas Herda (2010) finds that ‘respondents who are female, less educated, married, younger, ethnic minorities, or manual laborers display greater innumeracy.’ Binder (2015) finds that the variation in what he dubs ‘imagined immigration’ is highly correlated with preferences for reduced immigration.

Tables 8 and 9 report the results of modelling *DEV*, a variable defined as the proportionate difference between the ESS measure and the actual immigrant percentage of the population, as a function of several variables for the sample as a

²⁶ *NOIMBRO* measures responses to ‘of every 100 people in country how many born outside country’.

²⁷ Compare Dustman and Christian 2005: 58; Gomellini and Ó Gráda 2012; Sides and Citrin 2007b; Herda 2010; Binder 2015.

whole and for each of the fifteen countries separately. A striking feature of Table 8 is how females are more likely to over-estimate the immigrant share of the population (see too Figure 7). This proneness to exaggeration is also linked to low educational levels, religiosity, being politically conservative (in the sense of self-identifying as right-wing), being xenophobic, being unhappy, unsatisfied with life, and unhealthy, and not believing that immigration is culturally enriching. Curiously, perhaps, those who are more socially liberal, as reflected in higher stated tolerance towards gay people, are also more likely to over-estimate the immigrant share. One way of thinking about why some groups get it right more than others is that they have a greater motivation or opportunity to get accurate information. So socially conservative individuals, anxious about the effects of immigration on society, put more efforts into finding out the facts. The politically conservative, on the other hand, are perhaps more ideologically motivated and perceive the facts to be consistent with their concerns—a form of cognitive dissonance. But such an interpretation is necessarily ad-hoc.

Table 9 describes the range of responses across the pooled sample. The coefficients capturing age, gender and educational level are broadly similar across countries. Being unemployed ‘matters’ only in Belgium, while the coefficient on our xenophobia variable is sizeable and statistically significant in only Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium. Coefficients reflecting the extent of interaction with immigrants are generally negative, if often weakly determined, while those on the variables capturing racial superiority and the actual immigrant presence are positive.²⁸ Being dissatisfied with life is associated with exaggerating the presence of immigrants,

²⁸ The variables in question are *SMEGBLI*, *DFEGCG*, and *ACETALV*.

as is being politically on the right and not being a native of the country. Ireland does not stand out in any way.

Table 10 reports the outcome of regressing *DEV* for males and females separately on potential correlates, for both Ireland and for the 15-country sample. Several gender differences emerge. Female years of education had more of an impact on *DEV* in both Ireland and in the 15-country sample than male years. Females who were content with their lot and who had a social life exaggerated less than males; religion was associated with women exaggerating the presence of immigrants, while being on the left politically did the opposite. While household income had a much bigger impact on male proneness to exaggerate, the xenophobia variable had a much bigger impact on females. Finally, Table 11 reports the summary outcome of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the variables linked to *DEV*, using the pooled sample. The predicted difference is significant: 5.12. Most of it (4.33/5.12) is explained by inherent characteristics rather than by endowments (0.60/5.12), while the interaction effect is negligible (0.19/5.12). A detailed listing of the coefficients (not reported here) shows that, for example, the gap in educational endowments accounts for only 0.10/5.12 of the gap while the gap in how attitudes respond to any given level of education accounts for 1.63/5.12. The outcome for Ireland only (not reported here) is very similar, though less robust; of the predicted gap of 4.59, [4.19/4.59] is explained by the coefficients and only [0.16/4.59] by endowments. In this context, as in our earlier account of attitudes to immigration, women seem to be ‘different’.

6. Final Comments

In Europe human migration on a mass scale is one of the defining issues of the day, with real or perceived threats to security and public order associated with radicalized immigrant minorities skewing both popular sentiment and political responses. Hardening attitudes in receiving countries sit uneasily with the prospect of even greater flows in the future, particularly if global warming does its worst. In a fraught atmosphere in which attitudes towards migration are the product of a combination of genuine and exaggerated fears, the need for more research into evolving attitudes is pressing. This paper has focused on the Irish case, Ireland being a country with little historical experience of immigration, but that rapidly absorbed a significant influx of immigrants without major social upheaval and without the rise of a significant anti-immigrant movement.

Since the mid-2000s the European Social Survey has been enriching research into attitudes to immigration. This paper has focused mainly on some new elements in Round 7 of ESS for insight into two aspects of this topic. First of all, it places attitudes to immigration and asylum in Ireland in comparative focus. Noting that current Irish attitudes to immigration as revealed by ESS are less favourable than the European average, while attitudes to asylum are more favourable than the average, it explores which variables in ESS best explain variations in these attitudes across individuals and economies.

The second contribution of the paper is its attention to gender differences in attitudes towards immigration and asylum. Although males and females do not differ greatly in their attitudes to either—an implication of Round 7 data is that while females are slightly more hostile to immigration than males, they are marginally less so to refugees—we show that some of the factors associated with those attitudes differ

by gender. And these differences seem to stem more from inherent characteristics than acquired endowments.

Finally, we describe how public perceptions tend to over-estimate of the true level of immigration and we search for patterns that might account for such ‘innumeracy’. Some of the exaggeration seems related to individuals’ anxiety about immigration, but it defies any simple explanation in terms of vested economic interest. We also draw attention to the universal tendency of females to exaggerate the immigrant presence more than males.

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


Figure 1. Immigration to Ireland since 2002 in Comparative Perspective




Figure 2. The Irish Economy: Migration, GDP, and Unemployment




Figure 3. Shifting attitudes towards immigration (*ATTIM*) in Ireland and Europe

On *ATTIM* see text.




Figure 4. Immigration and Public Opinion: *Eurobarometer*

Source:

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2212&nationID=10,&startdate=2003.11&enddate=2015.05




Figure 5. Asylum Seekers, Ireland and the UK




Figure 6. Immigrants as Percentage of Population: Perceived and Actual




Figure 7. Male and Female Perceptions of the Immigrant Share

Table 1. Irish Attitudes in Comparative Perspective: ESS Rounds 6 and 7				
	<i>Allow many/few immigrants from different race/ethnic group from majority</i>	<i>Immigrants make country better or worse place to live in</i>	<i>Country's culture is undermined by immigrants</i>	<i>Immigration is bad/good for country's economy</i>
ESS Round 6 [n=29]				
1	Sweden	Iceland	Finland	Switzerland
2	Iceland	Sweden	Sweden	Norway
3	Norway	Denmark	Iceland	Iceland
27	<i>Hungary</i>	<i>Portugal</i>	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>
28	<i>Israel</i>	<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Russia</i>
29	<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Cyprus</i>
Ireland	18	10	15	15
Portugal	26	27	20	23
Spain	8	12	7	11
ESS Round 7 [n=15]				
1	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	Switzerland
2	Norway	Denmark	Finland	Sweden
3	Denmark	Norway	Denmark	Denmark
13	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
14	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>
15	<i>Czech R</i>	<i>Czech R</i>	<i>Czech R</i>	<i>Czech R</i>
Ireland	12	8	12	6

Note: the numbers in the first column refer to the top 3 and bottom 3 countries in Rounds 6 and 7. Ireland's, Spain's, and Portugal's positions are also shown.

Table 2. Accounting for Attitudes to Immigration: Round 7						
	Ireland	All	Ireland	All	Ireland	All
	<i>IMBGECO</i>		<i>IMUECLT</i>		<i>ATTIM</i>	
<i>AGE</i>	.010	.010	.015	.006	.144	-.063
<i>WOMAN</i>	-.294	-.183	-.109	.183	-8.07	2.47
<i>EDUYRS</i>	.105	.078	.095	.080	3.91	2.77
<i>UEMPLI</i>	-.163	.201	.125	.316	-3.07	5.94
<i>WKDCORGA</i>	.068	.019	.035	.018	2.77	.661
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	-.002	.025	.006	.011	.173	.499
<i>AESFDRK</i>	.034	-.180	-.163	-.226	-4.25	-9.50
<i>SATISFIED</i>	.060	.055	.054	.051	2.11	1.93
<i>HEALTH</i>	-.096	-.037	-.269	-.062	-1.51	-1.52
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	.047	.081	.047	.094	2.43	3.46
<i>GINCDIF</i>	.084	.018	.165	-.058	.946	-1.86
<i>LRSCALE</i>	-.033	-.086	-.033	-.135	-1.62	-5.56
<i>FREEHMS</i>	-.132	-.104	-.359	-.232	-10.14	-8.24
<i>ACETALV</i>	-.102	.012	-.103	.049	-5.33	1.68
<i>DFEGCON</i>	.021	.041	-.009	.051	.543	1.52
<i>DGFEGCF</i>	-.383	-.264	-.453	-.329	-20.74	-14.27
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	.583	.280	.232	.184	18.00	8.26
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	-.693	-.744	-.642	-.645	-52.84	-49.72
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	.300	.413	.332	.413	12.5	18.02
<i>SMCTMBE</i>	.039	.297	.004	.411	2.07	14.48
<i>Constant</i>	2.49	2.38	4.64	3.89	8.88	0.07
N	1,212	17,659	1,202	17,623	1,170	17,186
RsqAdj	.278	.339	.280	.376	.513	.554

Note: italicized coefficients are not statistically significant at 5 per cent. Regional fixed effects. For a description of the variables see Appendix 1.

Country	Muslims	Gypsies	Jews
Austria	2.66	2.76	2.30
Belgium	2.56	2.84	2.30
Switzerland	2.45	2.66	2.10
Czech Rep.	3.42	3.52	2.66
Germany	2.16	2.39	1.72
Denmark	2.41	2.78	1.94
Estonia	3.11	3.34	2.29
Finland	2.69	2.84	2.29
France	2.34	2.60	2.09
Ireland	2.74	3.13	2.41
Netherlands	2.47	2.60	2.11
Norway	2.24	2.60	1.93
Poland	2.96	2.87	2.44
Sweden	1.84	1.90	1.61
Silesia	2.57	2.85	2.43

Note: the variables are explained in the text and defined in the appendix.

Values range from 1 (allow many) to 4 (allow none).

Table 4. Some Replies to 'Allow many or few Muslims/Gypsies/Jews to come and live in country'						
	ALL			IRELAND		
ALLOW:	Jews	Muslims	Gypsies	Jews	Muslims	Gypsies
Many	23.38	13.56	11.01	16.31	10.79	5.72
Some	45.02	36.01	28.62	38.28	30.13	20.37
Few	23.49	29.50	31.48	33.97	33.71	29.43
None	8.11	20.93	28.90	11.44	25.37	44.48
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	SWEDEN			CZECH REPUBLIC		
ALLOW:	Jews	Muslims	Gypsies	Jews	Muslims	Gypsies
Many	48.04	38.57	37.56	9.2	1.48	1.38
Some	44.02	42.72	40.44	34.67	12.13	9.34
Few	6.90	14.91	16.42	37.14	28.84	25.06
None	1.04	3.8	5.59	18.98	57.55	64.22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5a. Attitudes to Immigration [ATTIM] and Gender				
	All		Ireland	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
AGE	.095	.048	.248	.194
EDUYRS	2.69	2.78	2.79	5.36
UEMPLI	7.95	1.79	-.483	-4.12
WKDCORGA	.767	.571	3.12	2.51
HINCTNTA	.882	.103	-1.87	1.57
AESFDRK	-10.04	-9.32	-10.38	3.27
SATIZFIEDZ	1.91	1.99	2.02	2.33
HEALTH	-1.95	-1.34	-5.61	-.916
PPLFAIR	3.58	3.26	1.33	3.20
GINCDIF	-1.40	-2.38	.081	-.151
LRSCALE	-5.64	-5.52	.856	-4.62
FREEHMS	-9.18	-6.90	-8.11	-13.20
ACETALV	1.49	2.19	-2.94	-6.80
DFEGCON	2.20	.752	2.51	-1.76
DGFEGCF	-13.33	-14.96	-22.39	-20.35
BRNCNTR	11.01	5.73	30.26	9.14
ALJEWLV	-49.01	-50.07	-50.38	-54.57
SMEGBLI	19.27	17.53	14.11	16.11
SMCTMBE	13.33	15.66	.938	1.72
Constant	-10.71	12.05	9.28	-13.64
N	8,709	8,483	573	597
RsqAdj	.545	.566	.506	.538

Note: see Table 1.

Table 5b. A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for ATTIM (pooled sample)		
Differential	Coefficient	s.e.
Prediction_1	.100	.010
Prediction_2	.115	.011
Difference	-.014	.015
<i>Decomposition</i>		
Endowments	.010	.012
Coefficients	-.028	.012
Interaction	.004	.007

Note: fixed country effects, yields (with 1: woman = 0; 2: woman = 1)

Table 5c. Attitudes to Immigration [<i>IMBGECO</i>] and Gender				
	All		Ireland	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
<i>AGE</i>	.009	.010	.007	.016
<i>EDUYRS</i>	.075	.079	.065	.158
<i>UEMPLI</i>	.378	.005	.386	-.580
<i>WKDCORGA</i>	.033	.007	.114	.032
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	.035	.015	-.048	.025
<i>AESFDRK</i>	-.220	-.147	-.128	.277
<i>SATIZFIEDZ</i>	.054	.057	.057	.063
<i>HEALTH</i>	-.007	-.068	-.149	-.135
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	.089	.075	.054	.041
<i>GINCDIF</i>	.049	-.022	.043	.076
<i>LRSCALE</i>	-.078	-.097	.004	-.088
<i>FREEHMS</i>	-.142	-.052	-.066	-.197
<i>ACETALV</i>	-.004	.036	.062	-.227
<i>DFEGCON</i>	.060	.023	.078	-.041
<i>DGFEGCF</i>	-.234	-.289	-.386	-.353
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	.410	.167	.967	.274
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	-.768	-.710	-.687	-.667
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	.463	.376	.261	.480
<i>SMCTMBE</i>	.271	.332	-.117	.094
<i>Constant</i>	1.97	2.53	2.71	1.44
N	8,883	8,673	595	617
RsqAdj	.341	.344	.290	.291

Note: see Table 4

Table 6. Attitudes to asylum				
	<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>Germany</i>
<i>AGE</i>	-.004	-.005	-.007	-.005
<i>WOMAN</i>	-.128	-.134	-.070	-.177
<i>EDYRS</i>	-.007	-.008	-.045	-.025
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	.015	.018	.052	-.004
<i>AESFDRK</i>	.124	.114	.017	.132
<i>UNHEALTHY</i>	.052	.056	-.067	.104
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	-.051	-.051	-.047	-.061
<i>TRSTPLT</i>	-.013	-.013	-.008	-.022
<i>RELGDGR</i>	-.043	-.040	-.062	-.038
<i>SATISFIED</i>	-.194	-.198	-.098	-.228
<i>FRGNMEAN</i>	-.012	-.034	.622	-.131
<i>BIGCITY</i>	-.081	-.113	-.047	-.129
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	-.192	-.193	-.248	-.278
<i>ACETALV</i>	-.051	-.052	-.008	-.011
<i>LRSCALE</i>	.136	.136	.075	.165
<i>GINCDIF</i>	.175	.172	.075	.129
<i>FREEHMS</i>	.108	.103	.277	.053
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	.634	.644	.590	.678
<i>DFEGCF</i>	.216	.213	.110	.224
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	-.280	-.286	.101	-.119
Fixed effects	Country	Region	Region	Region
N	19,116	19,116	1,340	2,499
Rsquadj	.091	.097	.057	.084

Note: italicized coefficients are not statistically significant at 5 per cent. The dependent variable is *GVRFGAP*. Estimation by ordered logistic regression.

<i>Table 7. Attitudes to Asylum and Gender</i>				
	All		Ireland	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
<i>AGE</i>	-.004	-.004	-.010	-.004
<i>EDYRS</i>	-.008	-.006	-.029	-.067
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	.015	.013	.064	.038
<i>AESFDRK</i>	.106	.150	.048	-.020
<i>HEALTH</i>	.062	.042	-.062	.182
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	-.045	-.055	-.039	-.044
<i>TRSTPLT</i>	-.017	-.011	-.017	-.000
<i>RLGDGR</i>	-.046	-.038	-.088	-.024
<i>SATISFIED</i>	-.196	-.189	-.102	-.118
<i>FRGNMEAN</i>	-.008	-.016	.010	-.023
<i>BIGCITY</i>	-.055	-.106	.160	-.120
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	-.328	-.064	-.570	.028
<i>ACETLAV</i>	-.004	-.095	.211	-.099
<i>LRSCALE</i>	.151	.117	.108	.042
<i>GINCDIF</i>	.190	.156	.062	.117
<i>FREEHMS</i>	.128	.084	.350	.276
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	.611	.657	.583	.543
<i>DFEGCF</i>	.178	.254	.070	.176
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	-.364	-.178	-.315	.381
Fixed effects	Country		None	
N	9,563	9,560	635	705
Rsquadj	.087	.096	.060	.046
Note: see Table 6				

Table 8. Modelling <i>DEV</i> : the 15-country sample			
	[1]	[2]	[3]
<i>AGE</i>	-.087	-.091	-.091
<i>WOMAN</i>	3.91	4.39	4.44
<i>EDYRS</i>	-.414	-.487	-.490
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	-.115	-.293	-.300
<i>UEMPLI</i>	2.53	1.93	1.89
<i>AESFDRK</i>	1.35	.803	.821
<i>DEPRESS</i>	1.59	1.34	1.28
<i>HAPPY</i>	.528	.403	.418
<i>HEALTH</i>	1.00	.374	.318
<i>SATISFIEDZ</i>	-1.69	-1.30	-1.30
<i>SCLMEET</i>	-.028	-.218	-.237
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	-.496	-.487	-.465
<i>RELGDGR</i>	.247	.184	.188
<i>GINCDIF</i>	-.430	-.406	-.421
<i>LRSCALE</i>	.185	.211	.218
<i>FREEHMS</i>	-.265	.120	.115
<i>ACETALV</i>	1.64	1.77	1.71
<i>FRGNMEAN</i>	.024	.156	.
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	2.62	2.26	2.34
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	.493	.542	.568
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	-1.50	-1.77	-1.78
<i>SMCTMBE</i>	1.77	.896	.769
<i>IMUECLT</i>	-.373	-.399	-.396
<i>DFEGCF</i>	-.553	.450	-.397
<i>Constant</i>	7.10	13.01	14.81
Fixed effects	None	Country	Region
N	17,828	17,828	17,828
Rsqadj	.124	.200	.207

Table 9. DEV BY COUNTRY

	IRL	FR	AUT	BEL	NL	CZ	DE	DK
AGE	-.143	-.114	-.028	-.193	-.066	-.071	-.087	-.079
WOMAN	4.32	6.08	1.21	5.67	4.57	2.26	4.60	3.08
EDYRS	-.508	-.738	-.356	-.727	-.455	-.317	-.554	-.236
HINCTNTA	-.649	-.534	.155	-.856	-.144	-.187	-.258	-.232
UEMPLI	-2.53	1.56	-4.50	7.63	1.32	-3.09	4.67	-3.42
AESFDRK	-.394	.974	-.767	1.10	1.79	-.254	.921	.429
DEPRESS	.492	1.76	2.08	1.96	1.23	-.262	.537	2.94
HAPPY	.108	.320	.108	.316	1.01	-.200	.263	-.056
SATISFIED	.022	-.429	-.879	-2.84	-3.32	-1.20	-1.32	-.240
HEALTH	.788	-.364	.167	.988	.680	.940	.270	.069
SCLMEET	-.455	.057	.448	-.946	-.402	.741	-.426	-.438
PPLFAIR	-.640	-.415	-.223	-.104	-.866	.111	-.526	-.488
RLGDGR	.626	.048	.318	.257	.402	.061	.078	.185
GINCDIF	-.808	-.268	-.597	.261	-.721	-.779	.007	-.523
LRSCALE	.065	-.202	.734	.176	.106	.321	-.038	.234
FREEHMS	.206	1.40	-1.49	-.002	-.258	1.36	-.323	.108
ACETALV	2.45	1.44	3.94	2.95	2.28	2.99	1.22	.603
FRGNMEAN	.280	.126	.278	-.027	.149	-.073	.330	.056
BRNCNTR	2.76	.900	.623	2.93	2.74	3.67	1.61	2.31
ALJEWLV	.034	-.074	1.82	1.95	.512	-.557	.706	.368
SMEGBLI	-3.11	-5.39	-1.84	-1.61	-.586	-1.47	-2.75	-1.81
SCMTMBE	.202	.428	-.476	2.84	.513	1.05	.826	1.53
IMUECLT	-.204	-1.02	-.790	-.555	-.493	-.112	-.412	-.226
DFEGCG	-1.77	-.557	-.955	.053	-.104	-.415	.455	-.198
Constant	20.3	36.4	7.3	24.5	8.8	0.8	20.0	15.3
N	1,285	1,476	940	1,510	1,472	1,038	2,355	1,137
Rsquadj	.116	.184	.124	.222	.162	.124	.127	.101

Table 9. *DEV BY COUNTRY*, continued

	<i>CH</i>	<i>FIN</i>	<i>NO</i>	<i>POL</i>	<i>SWE</i>	<i>SI</i>
<i>AGE</i>	-.087	-.062	-.010	-.046	-.067	-.168
<i>WOMAN</i>	4.59	4.38	5.29	1.97	5.25	3.12
<i>EDYRS</i>	-.236	-.469	-.564	-.307	-.525	-.082
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	.072	-.316	-.187	-.364	-.209	-.287
<i>UEMPLI</i>	-.739	1.38	1.77	-3.22	4.35	-5.39
<i>AESFDRK</i>	1.50	.629	.645	1.20	.779	1.41
<i>DEPRESS</i>	2.84	.940	.466	-.148	1.08	2.85
<i>HAPPY</i>	.911	.027	1.26	.279	.754	.449
<i>SATISFIED</i>	-2.47	-.044	-1.87	-.704	-1.00	-2.29
<i>HEALTH</i>	1.40	-.024	.485	-.275	-.387	.198
<i>SCLMEET</i>	-.284	-.225	.671	.257	-.482	-.345
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	-.538	-.473	-.698	-.219	-.720	-.064
<i>RLGDGR</i>	.059	-.260	.365	.228	.227	.191
<i>GINCDIF</i>	-.775	-.511	-.994	-.057	-.083	-1.93
<i>LRSCALE</i>	.502	.499	.557	-.362	.117	.318
<i>FREEHMS</i>	-1.21	.209	.388	.309	.523	1.29
<i>ACETALV</i>	.501	1.12	.867	.888	.488	2.69
<i>FRGNMEAN</i>	.298	-.008	.079	.993	.163	.259
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	3.85	.763	-.457	3.18	2.39	1.55
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	1.50	.419	.487	.138	-1.00	1.87
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	.818	-.107	1.91	1.08	-4.37	-.547
<i>SCMTMBE</i>	.582	.097	1.75	1.06	1.01	-.054
<i>IMUECLT</i>	-.244	.006	-.202	-.024	-.442	-.097
<i>DFEGCG</i>	-.919	-.096	-.150	-.234	-.582	-4.23
<i>Constant</i>	14.1	14.2	6.0	2.6	19.9	9.4
<i>N</i>	1,040	1,664	1,273	613	1,433	592
<i>Rsquadj</i>	.131	.093	.155	.048	.106	.129

	All		Ireland	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
<i>AGE</i>	-.081	-.108	-.104	-.188
<i>EDYRS</i>	-.430	-.607	-.377	-.757
<i>WKDCORGA</i>	.105	.191	.244	.350
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	-.179	-.404	-.596	-1.09
<i>AESFDRK</i>	1.26	.325	-.318	-.938
<i>SATISFIED</i>	-.636	-1.74	.789	-.559
<i>UNHEALTHY</i>	.367	.282	.265	1.38
<i>SCLMEET</i>	-.265	-.112	-.072	-.426
<i>PPLFAIR</i>	-.488	-.364	-.967	-.185
<i>RLGDGR</i>	.148	.283	.624	.756
<i>GINCDIF</i>	-.302	-.569	-.789	-1.25
<i>LRSCALE</i>	.085	.394	-.287	.614
<i>ACETALV</i>	1.41	1.98	2.22	1.99
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	2.69	2.60	1.93	5.63
<i>ALJEWLV</i>	.381	.703	-.204	1.26
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	-1.75	-2.10	-3.36	-3.42
<i>SMCTMBE</i>	1.12	.041	1.58	-2.49
<i>IMUECLT</i>	-.331	-.407	.118	-.163
<i>Constant</i>	27.6	35.28	32.69	40.73
Fixed effects	Region			
N	8,684	8,399	590	611
Rsquadj	.253	.264	.090	.160

<i>Differential</i>	Coefficient	s.e.
Prediction_1	5.68	.148
Prediction_2	10.80	.175
Difference	-5.12	.229
<i>Decomposition</i>		
Endowments	-0.60	.167
Coefficients	-4.33	.239
Interaction	-.190	.190

APPENDIX 1. Definitions of the Variables Used

<i>ACETALV:</i>	People of minority race/ethnic group living in current area (three categories: almost none, some, many)
<i>AESFDRK:</i>	Feeling of safety walking alone in local area after dark (four categories: very unsafe, unsafe, safe, very safe)
<i>AGE:</i>	Age of respondent, calculated
<i>ALMUSLV:</i>	Allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country (four categories: allow many, allow some, allow a few, allow none)
<i>ALJEWLV:</i>	Allow many or few Jews to come and live in country As above
<i>ALGYPLV:</i>	Allow many or few Gypsies to come and live in country As above
<i>ATTIM:</i>	Measure of pro-immigrant attitude, normalized (9,1) see text,
<i>BRNCNTR:</i>	Born in other country
<i>BLGETMG:</i>	Not belonging to minority ethnic group in country
<i>DFEGCON:</i>	Different race of ethnic group: quality of contact with (0=bad, 10=good)
<i>DFEGCF:</i>	Different race or ethnic group: frequency of contact: (Seven categories: never, less than once a month...daily)
<i>EDUYRS:</i>	Years of full-time education completed (capped at 23)
<i>FMEAN:</i>	Foreign born as proportion of population in region
<i>FREEHMS:</i>	Gay and lesbians free to live life as they wish (five categories: agree strongly, agree...disagree strongly)
<i>GINCDIF:</i>	Governments should reduce differences in income levels (five categories: agree strongly, agree...disagree strongly)
<i>GVRFGAP:</i>	Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status (five categories: agree strongly, agree...disagree strongly)
<i>HINCTNTA:</i>	Household's net total income, all sources (ten categories/approximately deciles)
<i>HAPPY:</i>	How happy are you? (0=extremely unhappy; 10=extremely happy)
<i>HEALTH:</i>	Subjective general health (1=very good; 5=very bad)
<i>IMBGECO:</i>	Immigration bad or good for country's economy (0=bad, 10=good)
<i>IMUECLT:</i>	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (0=undermined, 10=enriched).
<i>LRSCALE:</i>	Placement on left to right scale (0=left, 10=right)

- NOIMBRO*: Of every 100 people how many do you think are born outside country?
- PPLFAIR*: Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair (0=try to take advantage. 10=try to be fair)
- RLGDGR*: How religious are you? (0=not at all; 10= extremely religious)
- SATISFIED*: How satisfied with life (see text)
- SCLMEET*: How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues?
(seven categories: never, less than once a month...daily)
- SMCTMBE*: Some cultures are much better than others (0= all equal: 1= all cultures equal)
- SMEGBLI*: Some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent (0=yes,1=no)
- TRSTPLT*: Trust in politicians (0= no trust, 10 = complete trust)
- UEMPLI*: During last 7 days: unemployed, not actively looking for job
- WKDCORGA*: Allowed to decide how daily work is organized (0=no influence, 10=complete control)

Table A1. Summary Statistics Round 7

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
noimbro	26147	20.30065	16.52663	0	100
agea	28165	49.00852	18.65653	14	100
woman	28199	.5200894	.4996051	0	1
eduyrs	27820	13.00881	3.551761	0	23
hinctnta	22450	5.386013	2.766974	1	10
uempli	28221	.0177527	.1320538	0	1
aesfdrk	28031	1.900432	.7534226	1	4
yng_hardship	27783	3.753698	1.145042	1	5
depress	28221	.3607243	.4802192	0	1
happy	28137	7.530583	1.78904	0	10
health	28196	2.14002	.8844422	1	5
sclmeet	28166	4.87705	1.492715	1	7
rlgdgr	28050	4.261818	3.077216	0	10
satisfiedz	28221	5.70e-09	1	-3.309	2.572
foreignmean	28221	10.74865	8.164822	0	40.268
acetalv	28000	1.687536	.6907482	1	3
brncntr	28210	1.10748	.3097275	1	2
blgetmg	27935	1.943512	.2308663	1	2
lrscale	25702	5.076181	2.136074	0	10
freehms	27639	1.934368	1.0955	1	5
gvrfgap	27598	2.850786	1.118509	1	5
almuslv	27420	2.577936	.9663444	1	4
imbgeco	27475	5.007389	2.394908	0	10
imueclt	27571	5.739944	2.473621	0	10
dfegcon	28066	4.544716	2.12021	1	7
dfegcf	28143	2.364282	.7096244	1	3
smegbli	26844	1.847415	.359594	1	2
proimigz	26052	3.01e-09	1	-2.634	2.184
bigcity	28141	.3164777	.46511	0	1
pplfair	28108	6.018536	2.113657	0	10
trstplt	28221	4.829595	9.267161	0	99

APPENDIX 2. Asylum and Ireland in the Early 2000s

Current Irish unease about half a million non-national residents pales into insignificance compared to the panic and consternation caused by one relatively small category of asylum seekers in the early 2000s.²⁹ The perception that some immigrants were abusing Irish welfare and citizenship systems was inextricably linked to the controversy surrounding the 27th referendum on citizenship, voted on in June 2004. The referendum followed ever-louder allegations that immigrant women were engaging in what the Irish Minister of Justice dubbed ‘citizenship tourism’. The women were accused of exploiting a loophole in the constitution, which in effect meant that having children in Ireland guaranteed residence for their families. Press reports highlighted the role of Nigerian mothers-to-be, but pregnant women from elsewhere were also accused of availing of the loophole in increasing numbers. Hospital administrators began to stress the pressure on their resources, noting too that patients sometimes verbally abused staff members, but without providing any statistical details.

A referendum that would restrict the constitutional right to citizenship to those with at least at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen was held on 11 June 2004. The campaign was conducted in an empirical vacuum, as highlighted by a Labour Party poster captioned ‘Facts? No! Figures? No! Reasons? No!’ But the amendment passed by a margin of 4 to 1, with very little variation across the country in the proportions for and against.

How real was ‘citizenship tourism’? Data received from one of Dublin’s three

²⁹ For more on this episode see Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007; Ní Chiosáin 2007; Ó Gráda 2015a, 2015b.

maternity hospitals on mothers' nationalities from the late 1990s to the late 2000s imply that the numbers involved were small but also confirm both the motive for the rise in births up to the 2004 referendum and the effectiveness of the closing the loophole. Here the focus is on the movement in 'late bookings', i.e. the practice of contacting the hospital for the first time not long before giving birth. Figures 4a and 4b present the results of analysing annual data on the intervals between 'booking' or registering with the hospital and giving birth. For convenience we grouped the outcome in intervals of 0-29, 30-59, 60-99, 100-149, 150-99, and 200+ days before birth. For the standpoint of public health, clearly the longer is the notice given by the mother-to-be, the better the quality of antenatal care.

Figure A2.1 describes the pattern yielded by Irish, British, and Chinese-born mothers. The percentage of women notifying the hospital less than sixty days before giving birth was very low throughout. In 1999-2005 in all three cases, the modal interval between notifying the hospital and giving birth was 150-199 days. The modal interval rose to 200+ days in 2006.

The booking pattern of Nigerian women in the early 2000s (Figure A2.2) reflects the concerns of hospital administrators and led, ultimately, to the 2004 Citizenship referendum. And the referendum put a stop to the practice. The number of Nigerian mothers booking in ten or fewer days before giving birth rose from 21 in 2000 to 44 in 2001, 82 in 2002, and 110 in 2003. It was 102 in 2004, but then plunged to 30 in 2005 and only 14 in 2006. Only 19 per cent of Nigerians giving birth in the hospital in 1999-2004 notified the hospital 150 or more days before birth, but that proportion rose to 55 per cent in 2005-2009. Today the modal interval for Nigerian-born mothers, like that of Irish-born mothers, is 200+ days. Moreover, the number of

Nigerian-born mothers giving birth in the hospital also fell, from an annual average of 424 in 2002-04 to 182 in 2005-07. Such data broadly support the claims of hospital authorities in the period leading up to the 2004 referendum, and explain why in April 2005 the master of the Rotunda was happy to claim that the practice of women arriving without having previously booked had ‘more or less stopped’ (*Irish Times*, 26 April 2005).

Nigerian women were not alone in seeking entry in this way. Comparing the distribution of booking dates before and after the referendum indicates that Russians, Romanians, and ‘Other Africans’ were also wise to the constitutional loophole. But Nigerians were more adept at exploiting the constitutional loophole than any other national group. The outcome of the referendum sundered the link highlighted by Leopold Bloom, whose reply to a question about his nationality—‘Ireland. I was born here. Ireland’—still resonates; but the vote lanced a boil which risked increasing antipathy towards legitimate would-be asylum-seekers and immigrants in general.

Nigerians also featured prominently in the broader history of asylum in Ireland in the 2000s. Early in the decade they accounted for well over one-third of all asylum seekers, a percentage that fell gradually thereafter to about one in twenty today. They were much less likely to be granted asylum than the average, but this was true of Nigerian asylum seekers across the European Union.³⁰

³⁰ ‘Statement by the Minister regarding the real facts about the asylum and deportation systems’, 7 June 2005 [<http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/PR07000171>].




Figure A2.1. Days to Birth by Nationality, 1999-2009: Irish, British, and Chinese



Figure A2.2. Days to Birth by Nationality, 1999-2009: Nigerians and Others

APPENDIX 3. *Modelling over- and under-estimation of the immigrant stock*

Part 5 above focused on the tendency of individuals on average to over-estimate the immigrant presence. However, the data suggest that a significant number under-estimate the total, so in this section we distinguish between these two cases since their determinants may differ. We model the probability of individuals under- and over-estimating the proportion of the population.

To operationalize this one has to define 'over' and 'under'. Since it seems overly demanding to expect individuals to know the true size of the actual immigrant population precisely, we define 'over-estimation' as arising if the estimated proportion is at least 15 per cent larger than the actual proportion. Conversely, under-estimation is defined as occurring if the estimated proportion is at least 15 per cent smaller than the true proportion. These cut-offs are somewhat arbitrary but seem reasonable. By this classification, approximately 26 per cent underestimate the true share, 10 per cent are right and 64 per cent overestimate. Hence we define a categorical variable with three values 'under', 'about right', and 'over' and use multinomial logit to model these with 'about right' as the omitted category.

Table 12 reports estimates of a model for the pooled sample. The choice of specification was largely based on those variables that had featured in the previous tables and some *ad hoc* elimination of variables that appear to play no role. Our criterion for retaining a variable (in both outcomes) was a *t* ratio greater than one for either outcome. There are several questions of interest here. One is whether the same factors predict under- and over-estimation. The second is whether a given variable has a monotonic effect (e.g. leading to a high estimate in general) or an incorrect value (whether under- or over-estimated).

Since the models are logits we report exponentiated coefficients which indicate odds or relative risk ratios (i.e. $\exp(\beta)$ rather than β). Hence a coefficient less than 1 indicates that a variable has a negative effect on the probability of the outcome occurring and vice versa if the coefficient is greater than 1.

For example, one can see that age has a monotonic effect on predicted immigration stocks: older people are more likely to under-estimate and less likely to over-estimate the immigrant population. In general it is much harder to find statistically significant predictors of under-estimation. More educated people are less likely to over-estimate (which seems plausible) but one might also expect this to also reduce under-estimation. However, the evidence for this is at best weak. This suggests the effect of education does not simply reflect some cognitive factor. The negative link between education and over-estimation may also reflect a fear of immigration on the part of the less skilled. But it is also noticeable that our indicator of household net income does not feature.

Psychological factors play a role but not in a straightforward way. Individuals who are afraid being out after dark are more likely to over-estimate immigration. This is unsurprising but harder to explain is the finding that both higher levels of happiness and depression lead to over-estimation. Our satisfaction measure, based on individuals' satisfaction over a range of domains, implies that the disgruntled are more likely to get it wrong. Curiously, individuals who are themselves immigrants are also inclined to over-estimate. Intuitively one might expect them to be more informed but this could arise from their being concentrated in particular neighbourhoods.

An easier to understand finding is that individuals who are broadly sympathetic to immigration³¹ are less likely to over-estimate. There is a potential issue of reverse causality: people who under-estimate immigration may be more sympathetic as a result.

One very interesting result is the large well determined coefficient on *SMEGBLI*. This question asks the respondent whether they think other races are less intelligent and the higher value indicates a 'No' so it is a clear indicator of *a lack of racism*. The results show that not being racist is strongly associated with simply getting it wrong i.e. both under- and over-estimating immigration.

The difference between males and females is striking. Women on average estimate the immigration population by around 4 percentage points higher than men do. To explore this further we estimate our models of under- and over-estimation for women and men separately (Table 13). The broad patterns are the same and it remains difficult to identify factors leading to under-estimation. Some curious patterns emerge: our proxy for fearfulness turns out to be important only for males. For females, higher levels of education is associated with both under- and -over-estimation. Religiosity has a monotonic effect: higher levels corresponding to higher perception of the level of immigration but this effect is only statistically significant for females.

³¹ As marked by our synthetic variable *ATTIM*.

Table A3.1. Under- and Overestimating		
	Under	Over
<i>AGE</i>	1.006 ^{***}	0.996 ^{**}
<i>EDUYRS</i>	1.063	1.707 ^{***}
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	0.986	0.950 ^{***}
<i>UNEMP</i>	1.007	0.985
<i>AESFDRK</i>	0.857	0.992
<i>DEPRESS</i>	1.037	1.142 ^{***}
<i>HAPPY</i>	1.033	1.214 ^{**}
<i>RELDGR</i>	1.032	1.090 ^{***}
<i>SATISFIED</i>	0.979	1.026 ^{**}
<i>ACETALV</i>	0.985	0.796 ^{***}
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	0.951	1.203 ^{***}
<i>LRSCALE</i>	1.020	1.680 ^{***}
<i>ATTIM</i>	0.997	1.025 [*]
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	1.052	0.914 ^{**}
<i>AGE</i>	1.290 ^{**}	1.267 ^{**}
<i>N</i>	18,964	
Exponentiated coefficients; [*] $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$		

Table A3.2. Under-, Overestimating, and Gender				
	Women		Men	
	Under	Over	Under	Over
<i>AGE</i>	1.008 ^{**}	0.997	1.004 [*]	0.996 [*]
<i>EDUYRS</i>	0.975 [*]	0.936 ^{***}	0.994	0.962 ^{***}
<i>HINCTNTA</i>	1.021	0.996	0.998	0.981
<i>UNEMP</i>	0.980	1.021	0.790	0.992
<i>AESFDRK</i>	1.074	1.126 [*]	1.005	1.178 ^{**}
<i>DEPRESS</i>	1.091	1.238 [*]	0.997	1.217 [*]
<i>HAPPY</i>	1.046	1.125 ^{***}	1.024	1.076 ^{***}
<i>RELDGR</i>	0.969 [*]	1.032 [*]	0.988	1.021
<i>SATISFIED</i>	0.945	0.725 ^{***}	1.013	0.848 ^{**}
<i>ACETALV</i>	0.942	1.227 ^{***}	0.958	1.203 ^{**}
<i>BRNCNTR</i>	0.945	1.672 ^{***}	1.085	1.789 ^{***}
<i>LRSCALE</i>	1.003	1.049 [*]	0.992	1.012
<i>ATTIM</i>	1.127 [*]	0.951	1.002	0.884 ^{**}
<i>SMEGBLI</i>	1.332 [*]	1.344 ^{**}	1.265 [*]	1.276 ^{**}
<i>N</i>	9,466		9,492	
Exponentiated coefficients; [*] $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$				

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