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Do migrants think differently? Evidence from East European and post-Soviet states^{*}.

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Abstract

This research analyzes differences in values and beliefs between individuals in European and post-Soviet states who intend to emigrate and those who do not. In particular, we investigate which political, economic and social values and beliefs are significant determinants of the intention to emigrate, after controlling for relevant socio-economic and demographic confounding factors. The results indicate that self-selection patterns exist in some dimensions, such as evaluation of home country governance and institutions, political participation and trust in other people, while they are absent in other dimensions, such as economic liberalism, views on democracy and free markets. Results also indicate that migrant self-selection patterns are heterogeneous across regions. This analysis aims to improve our understanding of the determinants of emigration, as well as of its possible consequences on the dynamics of governance and institutions.

Keywords: Migration determinants, Culture, transition economies.

JEL codes: P30, F22, F63, F68, Z10.

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1. Introduction

In a world in which institutions and culture vary greatly across countries and regions, emigrating abroad generally implies living in a society with different institutions, values, beliefs and norms. The share of the world population which has taken this step is very small, despite huge potential economic gains from international labor mobility.²This population is generally not randomly selected. Migrants are often referred to as the best and brightest, most effort-driven, ambitious and courageous share of the their origin countries' population, for having been willing and able to overcome important economic, legal as well as cultural barriers to migration. Therefore they are also expected to be different from the rest of the population in terms of their values, beliefs and attitudes.

Discussions about governance and institutions in developing and transition countries as drivers of international migration and its consequences on origin and host societies continue gaining importance in academic and policy circles. However, the question whether migrants represent a particular sample of the population in terms of their political, economic and social values and beliefs has so far largely been omitted in those discussions. This question is relevant for a number of reasons.

From a policy perspective it provides useful insights for anticipating possible political effects of international migration. Migrants' self-selection patterns in terms of political, economic or moral world views may in the long run affect political constituencies in both origin and destination countries. For example, if more liberal individuals are more likely to leave the country, high emigration may lead, all else equal, to a more conservative political constituency in origin countries. The effects on destination countries would depend on whether immigrants are on average more or less liberal than locals, as well as on integration policies and voting rights awarded to migrants. Likewise, if individuals who attach more importance to democracy and political accountability are more likely to emigrate from countries with poorly functioning institutions then emigration may reduce the demand for democratic improvement and political accountability. Such institutional effects would depend on the size and duration of migration, as well as on the extent to which migrants maintain links with their origin countries, including voting rights for expatriated citizens.

From an academic point of view such analyses would enrich discussion of the determinants of international migration and provide useful inputs for the rapidly growing literature on social remittances. This literature analyzes the transmission of ideas, values and norms across countries through migrants. Discussions in these studies largely focus on endogeneity of migration, i.e. the possibility that migrants differ from non-migrants in terms of values, ideas and norms even before

²The share of the world population living outside their country of birth was 3.3% in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). For example, Clemens (2011) discusses orders of magnitude of economic gains from migration.

migration takes place. Robust empirical evidence on cultural self-selection patterns of migrants would constitute a valuable input for these discussions.

Most existing studies of the determinants of international migration are based on macro level data. Caramera et al (2000) analyze determinants of migration to North America. They find that population, economic growth, improvements in political freedom in origin countries are strongly associated with increase in migration flows to North America. Hatton and Williamson (2003) analyze determinants of emigration for African countries and find that growth in the cohort of young people, population pressure on the resource base and poor economic performance are the main driving forces of emigration. Mayda (2010) examines determinants of migration inflows to OECD countries per country of origin between 1980 and 1995. She finds that destination country per worker GDP, distance and the share of young population in the country of origin are the most important predictors of bilateral migration flows. GDP per capita in the origin country is not a significant predictor of migration, and neither are common language and colonial ties, which are used as proxies for cultural distance between countries. Artuc et al (2015) also include non-OECD destinations and propose separate estimations of migration flows per education level and gender. Contrary to Mayda (2010), they find that common language and colonial ties are significant predictors of bilateral migration flows, the former being more important for highly skilled migration and the latter for low skilled migration. Docquier et al (2012) document differences in push factors between male and female migrants. Docquier et al (2014) analyze cross country determinants of potential and actual migration flows, where potential flows are calculated based on surveys questions on desired migration. They find that potential migration flows are determined by income and employment probability at destination, as well as previous migration networks. College education increases actual migration because of higher expected gains from migration, rather than higher willingness to emigrate. Ariu et al. (2014) analyzed the impact of governance quality on the size and educational structure of bilateral migration flows. They find that better governance is associated with higher net migration inflows and that low skilled migration is more responsive to governance quality than high skilled migration.

A smaller number of studies use micro-level data for analyzing determinants of actual or planned migration. Nivalainen (2004) investigate the role of family ties and family life-cycle for family migration decisions in Finland. Gibson and McKenzie (2011) tracked the best and brightest students from three Pacific countries in order to determine their migration and return decisions. They find that for highly skilled individuals migration decisions are strongly associated with risk aversion and patience and the choice of subjects in high school, while the return decisions are most explained by family and lifestyle reasons. Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) examine the impact of perceived gender discrimination on female willingness to emigrate using Gallup Polls data for 150 countries between 2009 and 2013. They find that perceived gender discrimination is a strong and robust incentive to emigrate.

This study contributes to the literature on migration determinants by focusing on individual values and beliefs, that have largely been neglected by the literature so far. We use micro-level data from 34 European and post-Soviet states to examine differences in values and beliefs between individuals who intend to emigrate and those who do not . Our approach is closest to Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) in a sense that we use individual level survey data from a several different countries and regions and our outcome of interest is the intention to migrate and not actual migration. The inclusion of countries and regions with different economic, cultural and geopolitical characteristics allows us to test for heterogeneity of migrant self-selection patterns across regions. One advantage of analyzing migration intentions instead of actual migration is that the former is less subject to reverse causality, since actual migration experience is expected to affect individual values and beliefs. The differences with Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) is that instead of focusing on the effects of perceived gender discrimination on women's emigration intentions, we analyze the effects of broad range of political, economic and social values and beliefs on migration intentions for both men and women. Moreover, our geographic focus is on East European (both EU and non-EU) and post-Soviet states. A complementary study based on the same database as the one used in this paper, has recently analyzed the effects of life satisfaction on emigration intentions for European and Central Asian countries (Ivlevs 2016).

This paper also relates to the literature on culture and economics, analyzing the effect of cultural traits on economic, social and political outcomes. One of the pioneers of this literature is Weber which posited (1930), who proposed his famous "protestant ethic" thesis, that protestantism was conducive to capitalist development due to its emphasis on thrift, hard work, and human capital accumulation (Andersen et al., 2013). Later additional cultural determinants of various socio-economic outcomes have been suggested in the literature, such as trust affects trade and investment, long-term orientation affects investment in physical, health, and human capital, risk-aversion affects investment and adoption of new technologies, individualism affects innovation and so on (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2010, 2014; Galor and Ozak, 2016, Giuliano, 2007; Guiso et al., 2006, 2009; Harutyunyan and Ozak, 2016, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Our paper analyzes the effect of culture on intentions to emigrate and is the first paper in this literature focusing on that outcome. The regional focus of this paper is also in the interest of this literature, which is trying to find out the nature of cultural traits prevailing in the region due to former soviet rule and the cultural change caused by transition to market based open economies. The results of the paper provide insights for the possible dynamics of the prevailing cultural traits in the region shaped by emigration.

Our results confirm that there is self-selection, which is however is not spread to many dimensions where self-selection might be expected, particularly, views on markets, competition, inequality, government ownership of business and willingness to pay taxes for public goods do not differ significantly from the average. Attitudes towards democracy and cheating are also not different from the average. At the same time we find that the individuals who intend to emigrate are more tolerant, measured by their declared trust in other religions and nationalities. They are significantly

less satisfied with governance and institutions in their countries of origin. They are more likely to believe that dishonest behavior is necessary for success in their home country and less likely to believe that authorities deserve more respect.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 3 concludes. Additional results and supporting material are presented in the appendix.

2. Data and Empirical Strategy

The analyses are based on the data provided by the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) jointly collected by the EBRD and the World Bank in 2010 for around 39000 households from 34 countries.

2.1. Dependent variable

Our dependent variable is respondents answer to the question: "Do you intend to emigrate abroad in the following 12 months?". We created a dummy variable migrate, taking the value one for respondents who answered yes and zero for those who answered no. Overall, 4.8% of respondents



Figure 1. Percentage of the respondents in each country intending to emigrate in the next 12 months (LITS, 2010).

declare they intend to emigrate in the next 12 months and a huge variation exists between the countries, as illustrated in the Figure 1.

2.2. Independent variables of interest

The survey provides rich information on respondents' attitudes, values and norms on political, social and moral issues. We selected a number of explanatory variables of interest based on insights from research on culture and economics and social remittances. In particular, we included variables measuring respondents' attitudes towards democracy, free markets and economic liberalism, law obedience, cheating, trust, tolerance towards certain social groups, as well as their evaluation of the functioning of democracy and bureaucracy in their home countries. Appendix 3 provides a detailed description of the construction of all variables.

2.3. Control variables

We control for a wide range of socio-economic variables which are likely to affect both world views and migration decisions, in particular gender, age, revenue and education. Additional to that we control for marital status, presence of children in the family, employment and the possible existence if migrants network. Please, see Appendix 3 for detail description how these variables have been constructed. We also control for country fixed effects to remove all country-specific determinants of both migration intentions and values.

2.4. Methodology

Since the dependent variable is binary, we use logistic regression to estimate the probability of emigration intentions as a function of values and norms and control variables. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the locality (village/ town/ city) level in all estimations, additionally country fixed effects are included. Individuals older than 64 are excluded from the analysis, since they have very low propensities to migrate.

We first estimate the model pooling all the countries together. Then we allow the self-selection coefficients to vary between countries by estimating a regression per country. Finally, we allow for self-selection coefficients to vary per region, by estimating a separate regression equation for each of the following geo-political regions:

- Post-Soviet region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Mongolia.
- Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
- South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey.
- Western Europe: France, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Germany.

Additional to these geopolitical groups we also consider alternative four other groups based on their institutional quality measured using World Bank Governance Indicators:

- Low-quality institutions: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
- Lower middle-quality institutions: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia, Kosovo
- Upper middle-quality institutions: Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Montenegro
- High-quality institutions: Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Great Britain

3. The Empirical Findings

3.1. Baseline Results

Baseline results are presented in Table 1. It pools together 29 countries covering Eastern and Southeastern Europe, former Soviet republics and Mongolia.

Column (1) includes three explanatory variables measuring respondents' perceptions of the functioning of governance and institutions in their country: existence of democratic institutions (free and fair elections, freedom of speech, independent press, fair court system, minority rights, etc.); importance of clout for influencing decisions in various situations (jobs, official papers, settling disputes, admission to universities) and necessity to have political connections or break the law in order to be successful in the country.

Evaluation of democratic institutions appears with a negative and strongly significant coefficient, indicating that individuals with more positive perceptions of the quality of democratic institutions in their home country are less likely to emigrate. This result has two possible interpretations. The first and most straightforward one is that poor democratic institutions are a significant push factor for emigration from Eastern Europe, South European and post-Soviet states. When citizens cannot improve democratic institutions at home through voting, civic engagement or other instruments, they may choose to 'vote with their feet' by emigrating to countries with better democratic institutions. An alternative explanation for the observed coefficient may be the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, individuals are motivated to interpret the information to which they are exposed in a way which minimizes unpleasant discrepancy between their beliefs, attitudes and actions (Festinger, 1957). In presence of such effects, individuals who have no intention to emigrate, due to a lack of will or capacity to do so, may choose to have more positive views of their home country.

Foot voting and cognitive dissonance are also applicable for explaining the positive and significant coefficient of "success is not acquired honestly". Individuals who believe that success in their home country requires political connections or breaking the law may be more motivated to emigrate. But individuals who have decided to emigrate for this or any other reason may become more inclined to believe that success in

their home country cannot be acquired honestly and give more weight to information confirming such beliefs.

While our data does not allow to discriminate between foot voting and cognitive dissonance as explanations for the observed effects, the lack of significance for the variable measuring perceived necessity of clout to influence decisions may be an indication that cognitive dissonance is not the main mechanism. If cognitive dissonance was the main mechanism driving the results, one should also observe a positive and significant coefficient for the clout variable: individuals who have decided to emigrate should start perceiving their country as more corrupt and less fair. The clout variable is however not significant, possibly suggesting that the significant effects of evaluation of democracy and success is acquired dishonestly are not solely driven by cognitive dissonance effects.³

Note that since all regressions include country fixed-effects, the effects discussed above are not driven by country-level differences in institutions and norms, but by individual perceptions of these norms and institutions.

Column (2) includes a list of individual values and beliefs about politics, economics, other people's trustworthiness and morality as explanatory variables. For a number of reasons, one may expect migrants to have different values and beliefs. To the extent that economic outcomes are not the sole reason for emigrating, one may expect individuals who think differently from the norm in their home country to be more inclined to emigrate. For example, individuals with liberal values living in a relatively conservative society may have more incentives to emigrate to a country with more liberal values and norms. Likewise, individuals with higher disutility for cheating or corruption who live in highly corrupt societies may have more incentives to emigrate to a country with more honest social norms of behavior and less corruption. Even when economic outcomes are the main emigration motive, international migrants are regularly described as more driven, ambitious and courageous than average. One might therefore expect them to also be more economically liberal. However, our results show that on most of these issues, potential emigrants do not think differently. No significant differences are found for migrants' views on markets, competition, inequality, government ownership of business and willingness to pay for public goods. No differences are found for the moral justification of cheating and for viewing democracy as the best political system.

The two categories of values where significant differences appear are generalized trust and the belief that authorities deserve more respect. Individuals who believe that most people can be trusted are less likely to emigrate. The same is true of individuals who believe that authorities deserve more respect. These two effects may be explained by a self-selection of emigrants among those most disappointed with society and governance in their origin country. Cognitive bias is another possible explanation of these effects, whereby once the emigration decision has been taken, co-nationals are starting to be viewed as less trustworthy and national authorities are viewed as less deserving of respect. ⁴ Cognitive biases should however also imply some correlation between the emigration decision and trust in neighborhood, as well as and trust in other religions and nationalities. In order to reduce cognitive dissonance, future emigrants should have higher

³ The variable remains insignificant even when evaluation of democracy at home and success is dishonest are not included among explanatory variables. Thus its lack of significance is not due to correlation with the other two measures of perceived institutional quality.

⁴ The questions on whether most people can be trusted and whether authorities deserve more respect, based on which the variables generalized trust and authorities deserve respect were constructed, do not specify whether they refers to citizens and authorities from the respondent's country, but seems to be the most probable interpretation of the question.

trust in other religions or nationalities, while non-migrants should have higher trust in their neighborhood. Such effects are however not observed, possibly suggesting that cognitive bias is not the main explanation for the observed significant effects.

Column (3) includes two measures of political participation as explanatory variables: vote participation in past elections and political activism in lawful demonstrations, strikes, petitions and political parties. These variables are interesting for two reasons. First, if the most politically active citizens are the ones most likely to emigrate, it is expected that in the long run emigration will reduce democratic participation, demand for political accountability and overall quality of institutions in origin countries. Second, empirical evidence of migrant self-selection in these dimensions may provide useful inputs for studies analyzing social remittances. These studies have largely focused on political activism transmitted by migrants from Western democracies to their origin developing countries (Pfutze 2012, Chauvet and Mercier 2014, Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2009, Batista and Vicente 2011). Potential migrant self-selection occupy an important part in the discussions in studies documenting causal effects of emigration on political participation. However, empirical evidence regarding the existence of such self-selection patterns in practice is scarce, especially for the part of the world on which this paper is focused. Our results suggest that for Eastern and Southeastern European and for Post-Soviet states, potential emigrants are not necessarily the most active ones. If anything, they are less active in politics, as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient of the vote participation variable. This negative coefficient may be explained by individuals who have lost trust in voting as an effective mechanism for positive change, being both more likely to intend to emigrate and less likely to show up for voting. An alternative explanation may be that for many migrants to be, the intention to emigrate had been taken prior last elections took place, and an individual not intending to remain in the country may have less incentives to vote.

Column (4) includes all explanatory variables in one model. This reduces the number of observations. Most coefficients remain unchanged, with two exceptions. The coefficient of trust in other religions and nationalities becomes positive and significant, while vote participation becomes insignificant. As there are no multicollinearity issues for the variables included in the model, this change in significance is imputed to the difference is samples across models (1) to (4). The loss of observation is because some variables are missing for a number of countries. If migrant self-selection patterns significantly differ across countries, then excluding or including some countries from the sample may affect the sign and significance of pooled regression coefficients. Differences in coefficients across regions are discussed in detail in the following section.

As far as control variables are concerned, men, younger individuals and respondents with a migrant network are more likely to intend to emigrate, all three variables are significant at the 1% level. These results are in line with previous studies on migration determinants. Younger individuals have higher expected benefits from migration, while those with migrant networks abroad face lower costs of migration. Married individuals are less likely to emigrate and the effect is significant at the 1% level. Perhaps surprisingly, emigration intentions are not correlated with education or employment status, and only marginally (negatively) correlated with income. This suggests that there are no expected brain drain effects in the near future for migration of individuals from Eastern and Southeastern Europe and post-Soviet states.

3.2. Regressions by geo-political regions

Table 2 shows the regression results for the following geo-political regions: post-Soviet region (non-EU), Eastern Europe (EU), South Eastern (non-EU) region and Western Europe (EU). As it can be seen, self-selection patterns of potential migrants differ across these regions. Table 2 reveals that the negative and significant effect of evaluation of democracy in pooled regressions is mainly driven by potential emigrants from non-EU countries, both post-Soviet and Southeastern European countries. No correlation between emigration intentions and evaluation of democracy is found for Eastern and Western EU citizens. People in the post-Soviet region intending to emigrate are also more likely to believe that democracy is the best political system compared the ones who do not intend to emigrate. Interestingly, the same coefficient has a reverse sign for the Western European and post-Soviet states. Generalized trust is lower among the Southeastern European potential emigrants. People intending to emigrate from the post-soviet region are less likely to participate in the elections, however they are more politically active than the ones not intending emigrate. This may indicate that potential migrants from this region have lost faith in elections, but have more faith in civic engagement as mechanisms for change.

As with the pooled regressions, any significant differences between people who intend to emigrate and people who do not have two possible interpretations: either they are different from each other in some dimensions (self-selection), or the intention to emigrate affects values, believes and norms (cognitive dissonance). Regional differences in coefficients suggest that it is more likely the self-selection than the cognitive bias driving the results. There is indeed no obvious reason why cognitive biases should operate differently across regions. For example, if individuals become more tolerant towards other religions and nationalities once the migration decision has been taken, this should apply equally to EU and non-EU citizens. However we only observe significant correlations for Eastern European and post-Soviet States, suggesting that most tolerant individuals are the ones most likely to emigrate. In the long run and in the presence of high emigration rates, this may change the political equilibrium towards more protectionist policies in those regions.

As far as control variables are concerned, younger individuals are in general more likely to emigrate, however this is not necessary the case in the post-Soviet region. Western EU migrants positively self-select in terms of education and migrants from Eastern EU member states negatively self-select in terms of income. No skill or income self-selection seems to exist among respondents in non-EU member states.

3.3. Regressions by institutional quality

Table 3 presents the results of the regressions for groups of countries defined by their institutional quality.

As expected, the dissatisfaction of democracy is a highly significant predictor of emigration for the countries with low institutional quality. Potential emigrants from the countries with low institutional quality are also more likely to think that success in their home country is acquired dishonestly. They are however less likely to declare that clout is necessary for influencing decisions in various situations. This result is counter intuitive and seems inconsistent with the previous results. One possible explanation may be that respondents who do not have clout to influence decisions in their favor are the ones most likely to have experienced the consequences of not having connections and thus declare that clout is often necessary, but they may also

lack the capacity to emigrate abroad even if they desire to do.⁵ Future emigrants are also more tolerant in terms of trust towards other religions and nationalities and more politically active, though with less participation in voting. It may be the case that voting is not viewed as an effective mechanism for change, while other forms of political participation are still considered effective. The same patterns are not present in the countries with higher levels of institutional quality. These results suggest that improvement of the political institutions in the countries with low institutional quality will also shrink the number of people intending to leave those countries.

3.4. Robustness checks

Table 4 in the Appendix 1 includes alternative measures of individual attitudes of home country institutions: trust in governmental institutions and trust in non-governmental institutions. While these results should be interpreted with caution, because the number of observations is drastically reduced, they are in line with baseline results, indicating that disappointment with governmental institutions is a significant driver of emigration.

Table 5, column (1) presents regression coefficients when all non-significant variables have been left out, which allows us to increase the number of observations. All results remain valid. In column (2) we use an alternative measure for education, a dummy variable for tertiary education instead of the seven point scale variable. Results remain unchanged: education does not predict emigration intentions in our sample. In column (3) we interact the tertiary education dummy with evaluation of democracy at home in order to test whether more educated individuals are more responsive to institutional quality when deciding to emigrate. Results indicate that this is not the case. The coefficient of evaluation of democracy at home interacted with tertiary education is not statistically significant.

4. Conclusion

This paper investigates whether individual values and beliefs about politics, economics and society are significant predictors of emigration intentions for respondents from 34 European and post-Soviet countries. We find that respondents with firm emigration intentions think differently in some but not all dimensions in which differences may be expected. We also find that self-selection patterns of emigrants based on world views are heterogeneous across regions.

The analysis shows that respondents who intend to emigrate are significantly less satisfied with governance and institutions in their countries of origin. They assign worse evaluations to democratic institutions in their home country, they are more likely to believe that dishonest behavior is necessary for success and less likely to believe that authorities deserve more respect, they have lower trust in governmental institutions and are less likely to show up for voting. These

⁵ Note: the immigration question based on which the dependent variable is constructed refers to the intention to emigrate and not to the desire to do so.

results consistently show that poor quality governance and institutions are significant drivers of emigration, consistent with the foot voting hypothesis and with empirical results based on macro level data obtained in Ariu et al (2014). Contrarily to Ariu et al (2014), however, we do not find significant differences between educated and non-educated individuals in terms of the effects of perceived quality of democratic institutions on emigration intentions.

Respondents who intend to emigrate have lower levels of generalized trust, but higher levels of trust in other religions and nationalities. These correlations may be explained by self-selection of emigrants among those most disappointed by society in their home country and most open towards other cultures and societies. Alternatively, they may be explained by cognitive dissonance, whereby the migration decision changes individual views on home and foreign societies even before migration itself takes place.

Some self-selection patterns are region specific. Negative evaluation of democratic institutions at home is a significant emigration driver only for individuals from non-EU states, both post-Soviet and Southeastern European. An alternative classification of regions shows that this factor only matters for countries with low or low-middle institutional quality. The same is true for the perception that success cannot be acquired honestly, which is only correlated with emigration intentions in countries with low quality institutions. For post-soviet States and countries with the lowest institutional quality, future emigrants are the most politically active in terms of participation in strikes, demonstrations or petitions, but the least active in terms of voting. These results suggest that citizens who have lost trust in elections as an effective mechanism for change are more likely to choose emigration and other forms of political participation as alternative strategies.

Lack of generalized trust is only correlated with emigration decisions for Southern European (non-EU) countries, while trust in other religions and nationalities only matters for Eastern (EU and post-Soviet) individuals. Note that Post-Soviet and Eastern European countries are the regions with the lowest average trust in other religions and nationalities (Appendix 2).

Perhaps surprisingly, emigrants, sometimes described as the most driven, ambitious and risk-taking individuals, are not more economically liberal than non-migrants. Their views on markets, competition, inequality, government ownership of business and willingness to pay taxes for public goods do not differ significantly from the average, suggesting that emigration should not affect the left-right political constituency in origin countries. Trust in democracy as the best political system and views on how acceptable cheating is also do not differ significantly for emigrants.

Men are more likely to emigrate from Southeastern European and post-soviet (non-EU) states. Younger individuals are more likely to emigrate, except for post-Soviet countries. Surprisingly, education is only significant for determining emigration intentions in Western Europe, suggesting that future emigration from the other regions should not lead to brain drain concerns. Income generally does not matter, except for individuals from Eastern European countries, where individuals from the lowest income categories are more likely to emigrate. Marital status and migrant networks matter, particularly for Eastern European and post-Soviet states. Surprisingly, employment status and children are not correlated with emigration intentions.

Overall, our results indicate that non-economic factors, and in particular disappointment with governance and institutions in home countries are a non-negligible driver of international migration from European and post-Soviet countries with lower quality institutions. Extending the analysis of cultural self-selection patterns of migrants to other measures of values and beliefs and to other parts of the world is a promising avenue for future research with a potential to enrich discussions on globalization, migration and culture.

Table 1: Baseline regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Evaluation of democracy at home	-0.186***			-0.215***
	(0.063)			(0.074)
Clout necessary	-0.049			-0.020
	(0.048)			(0.057)
Success is not acquired honestly	0.194**			0.255**
	(0.089)			(0.108)
Most people can be trusted		-0.137***		-0.135***
		(0.042)		(0.050)
Inequality is necessary		0.014		0.013
		(0.014)		(0.017)
Competition is harmful		0.029*		0.025
		(0.017)		(0.020)
Authorities deserve respect		-0.036**		-0.038*
		(0.018)		(0.022)
Government ownership of business		-0.009		0.011
		(0.015)		(0.018)
Democracy best political system		0.106		0.095
		(0.089)		(0.108)
Market based economic system		0.033		0.090
		(0.088)		(0.108)
Willingess to pay for public goods		-0.019		-0.016
		(0.025)		(0.032)
Trust in family and neighbourhood		-0.092		0.028
		(0.0/1)		(0.090)
Trust in other religions or nationalities		0.067		0.126**
		(0.043)		(0.054)
Cheating is unacceptable		0.033		0.078
V-tti-iti		(0.077)	0 125***	(0.093)
vote participation			-0.125****	-0.043
Political activism			(0.030)	(0.042)
i olidear activism			(0.020)	-0.019
Gender	0 /00***	0 547***	(0.020)	(0.020)
Gender	(0.975)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.040)
Δœ	-0.246***	-0.284***	-0.233***	-0.236***
ngo	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.040)
Education	0.045	0.031	0.033	0.042
Education	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.037)
Income	-0.050*	-0.035	-0.034	-0.067*
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Married	-0.457***	-0.357***	-0.363***	-0.427***
	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.079)	(0.121)
Rural	-0.019	-0.014	-0.080	0.016
	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.119)
Children	0.008	0.068	0.012	0.097
	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.102)
Employment	-0.091	0.030	0.010	-0.051
	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.094)
Migrant network	0.382***	0.405***	0.361***	0.309***
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.115)
Chi2	591.29	716.68	711.61	541.57
r N	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
11	17,402	17,000	,)1	11,000

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regression with country fixed effects; robust standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses. Western EU iexcluded from observations. Data on evaluation of democracy at home and political activism is not available for Uzbekistan. Data on vote activity is not available for Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Latvia.

Table 2: Regression per region (geo-political classification)

	Eastern EU	Post-Soviet	South East	Western EU
Evaluation of democracy at home	0.193	-0.315**	-0.254***	0.714
	(0.184)	(0.145)	(0.095)	(0.670)
Clout necessary	0.024	-0.089	-0.009	0.709*
	(0.154)	(0.104)	(0.075)	(0.374)
Success is not acquired honestly	0.305	0.244	0.211	
	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.145)	
Most people can be trusted	-0.178	-0.039	-0.162**	0.181
	(0.121)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.365)
Inequality is necessary	0.006	0.006	0.017	-0.213
	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.174)
Competition is harmful	0.008	0.047	0.032	-0.073
	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.094)
Authorities deserve respect	-0.030	-0.024	-0.050	0.062
	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.144)
Government ownership of business	-0.014	-0.014	0.028	0.395
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.241)
Democracy best political system	0.203	0.356*	-0.034	-2.106**
	(0.250)	(0.185)	(0.152)	(0.984)
Market based economic system	-0.062	0.240	0.042	0.527
W/illia and a second a such lie and a	(0.290)	(0.188)	(0.148)	(0.736)
willingness to pay for public goods	-0.076	0.035	-0.036	-0.100
Trust in family and asighbourhood	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.215)
Trust in family and heighbourhood	-0.100	-0.039	(0.101	-0.160
Trust in other religions, or nationalities	(0.171)	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.391)
Trust in other religions of nationalities	(0.128)	(0.088)	(0.034	(0.300)
Cheating is unaccentable	-0.140	(0.000)	0.198	-0.790
cheating is unacceptable	(0.194)	(0.157)	(0.133)	-0.750
Vote participation	(0.1)4)	-0.129**	0.072	0.023
vote participation	(0.085)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.400)
Political activism	-0.030	0.099**	-0.049	-0.228
	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.155)
Gender	0.196	0.030)	0.490***	0.386
Conder	(0.212)	(0.187)	(0.126)	(0.535)
Age	-0.576***	-0.024	-0.270***	-0.777**
8-	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.347)
Education	-0.055	0.009	0.089*	0.800**
	(0.094)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.385)
Income	-0.193***	-0.039	-0.038	-0.141
	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.340)
Married	-0.308	-0.884***	-0.171	-1.475
	(0.254)	(0.181)	(0.190)	(0.932)
Rural	-0.277	-0.118	0.163	-1.915
	(0.317)	(0.196)	(0.161)	(1.222)
Children	0.363	0.128	-0.032	0.087
	(0.263)	(0.163)	(0.145)	(0.611)
Employment	0.108	0.005	-0.153	-0.714
	(0.265)	(0.179)	(0.124)	(0.704)
Migrant network	0.651***	0.373*	0.196	0.952
	(0.251)	(0.212)	(0.153)	(1.124)
Chi2	244.81	184.58	336.08	208.99
Р	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ν	2,678	4,079	4,896	765

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Logistic regression with country fixed effects; robust standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses.

Table 3: Regression per region (classification based on Institutional quality)

	Low	Low middle	High middle	High
Evaluation of democracy at home	-0.446**	-0.198**	-0.012	0.079
	(0.208)	(0.089)	(0.159)	(0.381)
Clout necessary	-0.333**	0.040	0.115	-0.106
	(0.152)	(0.071)	(0.134)	(0.272)
Success is not acquired honestly	0.475**	0.153	0.351*	-0.406
	(0.242)	(0.143)	(0.198)	(0.402)
Most people can be trusted	-0.081	-0.096	-0.199*	0.083
	(0.105)	(0.069)	(0.104)	(0.198)
Inequality is necessary	-0.009	0.005	0.041	-0.186**
	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.091)
Competition is harmful	0.031	0.037	0.035	0.006
	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.089)
Authorities deserve respect	0.008	-0.040	-0.064	0.063
	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.091)
Government ownership of business	0.025	0.015	-0.016	0.138
	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.098)
Democracy best political system	0.112	0.003	0.130	-0.511
	(0.234)	(0.148)	(0.220)	(0.528)
Market based economic system	0.080	0.146	-0.126	0.816*
	(0.235)	(0.143)	(0.238)	(0.463)
Willingness to pay for public goods	-0.114	0.002	-0.020	-0.162
8	(0.081)	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.161)
Trust in family and neighbourhood	0.051	0.124	-0.247	-0.076
, ,	(0.214)	(0.118)	(0.167)	(0.297)
Trust in other religions or	0.350***	-0.037	0.339***	0.209
nationalities	(0.107)	(0.050)	(0.100)	(0.07.0)
	(0.107)	(0.068)	(0.122)	(0.276)
Cheating is unacceptable	-0.040	0.210	-0.031	-0.667*
	(0.186)	(0.128)	(0.175)	(0.369)
Vote participation	-0.163**	0.048	-0.028	-0.220
	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.206)
Political activism	0.134*	-0.036	-0.052	-0.110
	(0.070)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.117)
Gender	0.915***	0.520***	0.4//**	0.317
	(0.243)	(0.119)	(0.194)	(0.395)
Age	-0.181*	-0.180***	-0.505***	-0.554***
	(0.101)	(0.051)	(0.089)	(0.1/9)
Education	0.025	0.043	0.079	0.299*
Tu	(0.102)	(0.045)	(0.085)	(0.100)
Income	-0.142^{+}	-0.001	-0.193****	-0.173
	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.189)
Married	-1.050***	-0.219	-0.488**	-1.014*
Devent	(0.260)	(0.177)	(0.214)	(0.528)
Kural	-0.260	0.184	-0.1/1	-2.0/1**
	(0.291)	(0.150)	(0.240)	(0.815)
Children	-0.074	0.091	0.1/3	0.027
	(0.222)	(0.131)	(0.223)	(0.414)
Employment	0.107	-0.1/1	0.182	-0.932**
	(0.240)	(0.118)	(0.220)	(0.394)
Migrant network	0.868***	0.053	0.713***	0.041
	(0.286)	(0.147)	(0.223)	(0.916)
Chi2	169.62	223.91	246.12	474,93
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ν	2,879	4,492	3,356	1,789

p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.05; p<0.01. Logistic regression with country fixed effects; robust standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses.

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Appendix 1: Regression results (robustness checks)

Table 4: Trust in institutions included among control variables

Trust governmental institutions -0.23^{pers} -0.23^{see} Trust in non-governmental institutions 0.008 -0.019 Evaluation of democracy at home -0.0055 -0.0055 Clott necessary -0.004 -0.0055 Success is not acquired honestly 0.0141 0.004 Most people can be trusted -0.188^{ter} -0.249^{ter} Inequality is necessary 0.0251 0.00251 Competition is harmful 0.01251 0.00251 Authorities deserve respect 0.0031 0.00251 Government ownership of business 0.01201 0.00249 Democracy best political system 0.240^{se} 0.0249 Willingess to pay for public goods 0.01251 0.00251 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.01721 0.0165161 Trust in other religions or nationalities $0.1025161616166666666666666666666666666666$		(1)	(2)
(0.082) (0.115) Trust in non-governmental institutions 0.008 -0.019 (0.072) (0.102) (0.102) Evaluation of democracy at home -0.080 -0.011 Chut necessary -0.040 -0.040 Success is not acquired honestly (0.148) -0.040 Most people can be trusted -0.057 -0.021 Inequality is necessary 0.024 -0.025 Competition is harmful 0.011 -0.025 Authorities deserve respect -0.010 Government ownership of business -0.019 Democracy best political system (0.140) Market based economic system -0.015 Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.116) Trust in stantifies 0.198**** Out51 -0.025 Out62 -0.025 Out63 -0.025 Out64 -0.025 Out65 -0.025 Out66 -0.025 Out67 -0.025	Trust governmental institutions	-0.239***	-0.263**
Trust in non-governmental institutions 0.008 -0.019 Evaluation of democracy at home (0.072) (0.102) Evaluation of democracy at home (0.111) (0.077) Success is not acquired honestly 0.249* Most people can be trusted -0.158*** Inequality is necessary 0.024 Competition is harmful 0.011 Government ownership of business -0.0101 Government ownership of business -0.025 Democracy best political system (0.139) Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.016 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.016 Trust in ther religions or nationalities 0.018**** Gender 0.389**** -0.256**** Out5 (0.033) (0.034) Gender -0.025 -0.005 Income -0.017 (0.127) Vote participation -0.018 (0.014) Guder -0.256**** -0.256**** Income -0.025 -0.0551 <tr< td=""><td></td><td>(0.082)</td><td>(0.115)</td></tr<>		(0.082)	(0.115)
(0.072) (0.102) Evaluation of democracy at home -0.055 (0.111) Clout necessary -0.040 Success is not acquired honestly (0.077) Success is not acquired honestly (0.148) Most people can be trusted -0.058* Inequality is necessary (0.025) Competition is harmful 0.011 Authorities deserve respect -0.010 Government ownership of business -0.019 Democracy best political system (0.031) Democracy best political system (0.139) Willingess to pay for public goods -0.015 Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.116) Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.121) Vote participation -0.025 Political activism -0.033 Gender -0.256**** 0.033) (0.043) Age -0.256**** 0.016 (0.037) Goutard -0.256**** 0.016 (0.037) Goutard -0.256**** 0.016	Trust in non-governmental institutions	0.008	-0.019
Evaluation of democracy at home 0.005 Clout necessary 0.040 Success is not acquired honestly 0.249* Most people can be trusted -0.158*** Inequality is necessary 0.024 Competition is harmful 0.007 Authorities deserve respect 0.031 Government ownership of business 0.025 Ommeter business 0.025 Market based economic system 0.139 Willingess to pay for public goods 0.025 Willingess to pay for public goods 0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Out50 0.0125 Vote participation 0.0501 Political activism 0.0501 Out51 0.0501 Political activism 0.062* Gender 0.0501 Age 0.023 Income 0.023 Quartie 0.0501 Out51 0.0501 Income 0.0511 Quartie 0.0501 Quartie 0.0501		(0.072)	(0.102)
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Most people can be trusted (0.48) Most people can be trusted (0.067) Inequality is necessary 0.024 (0.025) (0.025) Competition is harmful 0.011 Authorities deserve respect -0.010 Government ownership of business -0.019 Democracy best political system (0.024) Market based economic system (0.140) Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.121) Vote participation -0.025 Gender 0.389*** 0.24**** Age -0.25**** -0.236*** Goutar (0.053) (0.043) Gender 0.389*** 0.24**** <td>Success is not acquired honestly</td> <td></td> <td>0.249*</td>	Success is not acquired honestly		0.249*
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Competition is harmful (0.026) Authorities deserve respect -0.010 Government ownership of business (0.024) Democracy best political system (0.140) Market based economic system (0.139) Willingess to pay for public goods -0.019 Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.139) Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.121) Vote participation -0.0127 Vote participation -0.0127 Quart (0.034) Gender 0.389*** (0.034) -0.0127 (0.035) (0.037) Political activism (0.016) Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** (0.037) (0.050) Income (0.037) (0.051) Income (0.037) (0.051) Rural -0.090 0.019 (Dildren (0.161) (0.177) Rural (0.097) (0.250) Rural (0.097) (0.250) Children (0.161) <			(0.025)
Authorities deserve respect -0.010 Government ownership of business -0.019 Government ownership of business -0.019 Democracy best political system 0.0207 Market based economic system 0.196 Willingess to pay for public goods -0.019 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.039 Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198*** Cheating is unacceptable 0.1217 Vote participation -0.004 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** (0.033) 0.0451 Education 0.027 0.016 Income 0.255*** -0.236*** (0.037) (0.050) 0.0114 Age -0.235*** -0.236*** (0.037) (0.051) 0.037) Income -0.25**** -0.236*** (0.037) (0.050) 0.015 Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.161) (0.177) (0.151) Rural 0.097 <td>Competition is harmful</td> <td></td> <td>0.011</td>	Competition is harmful		0.011
Automics deserve respect 40.010 Government ownership of business 0.019 Democracy best political system 0.207 Market based economic system 0.196 Willingess to pay for public goods (0.139) Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.121) Vote participation 0.016 Political activism (0.037) Gender 0.389^{***} (0.037) (0.050) Political activism (0.037) Gender 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) (0.037) (0.050) Income 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.06) (0.17) (0.139) Married 0.097 (0.205) Income (0.072) (0.161) Children 0.097 0.020	Authoritias deserve respect		(0.026)
Government ownership of business -0.019 Democracy best political system 0.207 Market based economic system 0.196 Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198 Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation 0.016 Political activism 0.017 Gender 0.389*** 0.024*** (0.037) (0.050) Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.037) (0.051) Education 0.065* 0.046 (0.037) (0.051) 114) Age -0.023 -0.065 Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.037) (0.051) (0.151) Rural -0.021 -0.055 Married -0.224*** -0.530*** (0.105) (0.107) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.107) (0.139) (0.161) </td <td>Autorite's deserve respect</td> <td></td> <td>(0.031)</td>	Autorite's deserve respect		(0.031)
Democracy best political system (0.024) Market based economic system (0.140) Market based economic system (0.139) Willingess to pay for public goods (0.039) Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.16) Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.172) Cheating is unacceptable (0.121) Vote participation (0.037) Political activism (0.037) Gender (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) Education (0.037) Income (0.033) (0.033) (0.043) Marked (0.337) (0.050) Income (0.037) (0.050) Income (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524*** -0.330*** Narried (0.126) (0.161) Children (0.17) (0.139) Migrant network (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network (0.097) (0.127) P (0.000) (0.017) No (0.160) (0.151)	Government ownership of business		-0.019
Democracy best political system 0.207 Market based economic system 0.196 Market based economic system 0.139 Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.047 Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation 0.016 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.024^{***} 0.037 0.004 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} 0.037 0.050 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} 0.037 0.050 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.236^{***} 0.037 0.050 0.051 Income 0.025^{***} 0.524^{***} 0.106 (0.151) 0.051 Rural 0.097 0.202 (0.107) (0.139) 0.097 (0.097)	L L		(0.024)
Market based economic system (0.140) Market based economic system 0.196 Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.139) Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.16) Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198*** (0.072) (0.121) Vote participation 0.127 Vote participation 0.004 Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** (0.033) (0.114) Age 0.265*** 0.236*** Gondar (0.037) (0.050) Income 0.033) (0.041) Married -0.226*** -0.236*** Married -0.226*** -0.236*** Married -0.023 -0.065 Married -0.524*** -0.530*** Migrant network 0.097 (0.127) Migrant network 0.263** 0.177 N 0.007 (0.129)	Democracy best political system		0.207
Market based economic system 0.196 Willingess to pay for public goods (0.139) Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.198*** Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198*** Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation 0.016 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** Age -0.025*** -0.236*** Income 0.062* 0.046 Married -0.023 -0.051 Married -0.025 -0.025 Children 0.016 0.0151 Married -0.023 -0.050 Married -0.023 -0.051 Children 0.016 0.0151 Children 0.017 (0.139) Married -0.020 0.019 Married 0.007 (0.127) Migrant network 0.027 (0.127) Migrant network 0.263** 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) 0.000 N 13,			(0.140)
Willingess to pay for public goods .0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood .0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities .0.198*** Cheating is unacceptable .0.127 Cheating is unacceptable .0.127 Vote participation .0.034 Gender .0.389*** .0.236*** Gender .0.389*** .0.236*** (0.037) (0.050) .0.016 Income .0.236*** .0.236*** Income .0.057 .0.051 Income .0.053 .0.004 Married .0.052 .0.045 Children .0.051 .0.524*** O.033) .0.045 .0.051 Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) .0.043 .0.051 Income -0.052 .0.045 (D.160) .0.151 .0.151 Rural .0.051 .0.161 (D.126) .0.161 .0.197 (D.126) .0.161 .0.197 (D.127) .0.207 .0.207 (D.127) <	Market based economic system		0.196
Willingess to pay for public goods -0.025 Trust in family and neighbourhood 0.047 Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198*** Octop 0.072) Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation -0.004 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** (0.037) (0.050) Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389*** 0.294*** (0.037) (0.051) Education 0.062* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.051 Married -0.524*** -0.530*** (0.106) (0.151) Rural (0.067) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 (Diop) (0.122) (0.161) Children 0.097 0.020 (Migrant network 0.263** 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) 0.00 N 13,580 7,609			(0.139)
Trust in family and neighbourhood (0.039) Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.16) Trust in other religions or nationalities (0.072) Cheating is unacceptable (0.121) Vote participation (0.030) Political activism (0.030) Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} Age 0.265^{****} 0.236^{****} Income 0.0037 (0.051) Income 0.0033 0.045 Married -0.023 -0.065 Rural -0.090 0.019 Children 0.067 0.020 Migrant network 0.00 0.00 N 0.000 0.001	Willingess to pay for public goods		-0.025
Trust in think the regionalities 0.07 Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198^{***} Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation -0.004 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} (0.038) (0.114) Age 0.265^{***} -0.236^{***} (0.037) (0.050) Income 0.062^{**} 0.046 (0.037) (0.051) (0.037) (0.051) Income -0.023 -0.665 (0.037) (0.050) (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.655 (0.037) (0.051) 0.043 Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) 0.016 Children 0.051 0.197 (0.077) 0.020 (0.097) 0.020 (0.097) 0.020 (0.097) 0.020 (0.097) 0.020 (0.097) 0.127 Migrant network	Trust in family and neighbourhood		(0.039)
Trust in other religions or nationalities 0.198^{***} Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation 0.004 Political activism 0.006 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} (0.033) 0.0141 Age -0.265^{***} -0.236^{***} Income 0.037 0.051 Income -0.023 -0.064 (0.037) (0.050) 0.046 Income -0.023 -0.065 Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) 0.046 Rural -0.090 0.019 (D.106) (0.151) 0.167 Kural (0.077) (0.151) Rural 0.051 0.197 (D.107) (0.139) 0.139 Employment (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 0.122 0.159 0.00 N 0.00 0.00	Trust in fulling and neighbourhood		(0.116)
Cheating is unacceptable (0.072) Vote participation (0.121) Vote participation 0.004 Political activism 0.016 (0.034) (0.034) Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} (0.037) (0.051) Bedication (0.037) (0.051) Education 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.30^{***} (0.166) (0.151) (0.160) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.160) (0.161) Chiklren 0.051 0.197 (0.020) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 0.00 N	Trust in other religions or nationalities		0.198***
Cheating is unacceptable 0.127 Vote participation 0.004 Political activism 0.016 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} (0.034) (0.034) Gender 0.025^{***} 0.236^{***} 0.025^{***} 0.236^{***} 0.236^{***} 0.038 (0.114) Age 0.062^{**} 0.046 0.037 (0.051) 0.062^{**} 0.046 0.037 (0.050) 0.062^{**} 0.043 Income -0.023 -0.055 Married 0.061 0.019 0.126 0.019 0.019 0.126 0.019 0.019 0.126 0.019 0.019 0.097 0.020 0.019 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097 0.020 0.097	C		(0.072)
Vote participation (0.121) -0.004 (0.050)Political activism (0.121) -0.004 (0.050)Gender 0.389^{***} (0.038)Gender 0.389^{***} (0.038)Age -0.265^{***} (0.037)Education 0.062^* (0.037)Income -0.023 (0.033)Income -0.233 (0.051)Married -0.524^{***} (0.120)Rural -0.524^{***} (0.120)Chikkren 0.051 (0.121)Rural 0.051 (0.120)Migrant network 0.097 (0.127)N Migrant network 0.00 (0.07)P 0.00 (0.07)N N 0.00 N 0.00 N 0.00 N 0.00 N 0.00	Cheating is unacceptable		0.127
Vote participation-0.004 (0.050)Political activism (0.050) Gender 0.389^{***} (0.038) (0.114) Age -0.265^{***} (0.037) (0.051) Education (0.037) (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.023 -0.65 (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network 0.061 0.177 P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$			(0.121)
Political activism (0.050) 0.016 (0.034)Gender 0.389^{***} (0.088) 0.294^{***} (0.088)Age 0.265^{***} (0.037) 0.256^{***} (0.051)Education 0.062^{*} (0.037) 0.051)Income 0.062^{*} (0.033) 0.046 (0.037)Married 0.033 (0.033) 0.043)Married 0.524^{***} (0.106) 0.151)Rural 0.090 (0.126) 0.197 (0.161)Children 0.051 (0.107) 0.197 (0.139)Employment 0.097 (0.027) 0.020 (0.097)Migrant network 0.263^{**} (0.122) 0.159)P 0.00 (0.007) 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Vote participation		-0.004
Found at activisit 0.000 Gender 0.389^{***} 0.294^{***} (0.034) (0.034) Age -0.265^{***} -0.236^{***} (0.037) (0.051) Education 0.062^{*} 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Political activism		(0.050)
Gender (0.001) $0.294***$ $(0.088)(0.114)-0.265***Age-0.265***(0.037)(0.051)(0.051)Education0.062*(0.037)0.046(0.037)Income-0.023(0.033)-0.065(0.033)Married-0.524***(0.106)-0.530***(0.106)Rural-0.090(0.126)(0.161)(0.161)Children0.051(0.107)0.197(0.127)Migrant network0.263**(0.102)0.177(0.129)PN0.00(0.001)0.00N13,5807,609$	1 ondear activishi		(0.034)
Age (0.088) (0.114) Age -0.265^{***} -0.236^{***} (0.037) (0.051) Education 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.127) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Gender	0.389***	0.294***
Age -0.265^{***} -0.236^{***} Education (0.037) (0.051) Education 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) (0.043) Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Chiklren 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$		(0.088)	(0.114)
$ \begin{array}{cccc} & (0.037) & (0.051) \\ 0.062^* & 0.046 \\ (0.037) & (0.050) \\ 0.0037 & (0.050) \\ 0.033 & (0.043) \\ 0.043 & 0.043 \\ 0.033 & (0.043) \\ 0.051 & (0.151) \\ 0.106 & (0.151) \\ 0.106 & (0.151) \\ 0.126 & (0.161) \\ 0.197 & (0.126) & (0.161) \\ 0.097 & 0.020 \\ (0.097) & (0.127) \\ 0.097 & 0.020 \\ (0.097) & (0.127) \\ 0.0127 & (0.127) \\ 0.0127 & (0.127) \\ 0.0263^{**} & 0.177 \\ (0.122) & (0.159) \\ P & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ N & 13,580 & 7,609 \\ \end{array} $	Age	-0.265***	-0.236***
Education 0.062^* 0.046 (0.037)(0.050)Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033)(0.043)Married -0.524^{***} -0.530^{***} (0.106)(0.151)Rural -0.090 0.019(0.126)(0.161)Children0.0510.197(0.107)(0.139)Employment0.0970.020(0.097)(0.127)Migrant network0.263**0.177P0.000.00N13,5807,609		(0.037)	(0.051)
Income (0.037) (0.050) Income -0.023 -0.065 (0.033) (0.043) Married $-0.524***$ $-0.530***$ (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network $0.263**$ 0.177 P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Education	0.062*	0.046
Income -0.025 -0.063 Married (0.033) (0.043) Married $-0.524***$ $-0.530***$ (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network $0.263**$ 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Income	(0.037)	(0.050)
Married (0.033) (0.043) Married $-0.524***$ $-0.530***$ (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Children 0.051 0.197 Children (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network $0.263**$ 0.177 P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Income	-0.023	-0.003
Rural (0.106) (0.151) Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126) (0.161) Chikdren 0.051 0.197 (0.107) (0.139) Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097) (0.127) Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Married	-0.524***	-0.530***
Rural -0.090 0.019 (0.126)(0.161)Children 0.051 0.197 (0.107)(0.139)Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097)(0.127)Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$	Thur to a	(0.106)	(0.151)
$\begin{array}{cccc} & (0.126) & (0.161) \\ 0.051 & 0.197 \\ (0.107) & (0.139) \\ \\ \text{Employment} & 0.097 & 0.020 \\ (0.097) & (0.127) \\ \\ \text{Migrant network} & 0.263^{**} & 0.177 \\ (0.122) & (0.159) \\ \\ P & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ \\ N & 13,580 & 7,609 \end{array}$	Rural	-0.090	0.019
$\begin{array}{cccc} {\rm Children} & 0.051 & 0.197 \\ & (0.107) & (0.139) \\ {\rm Employment} & 0.097 & 0.020 \\ & (0.097) & (0.127) \\ {\rm Migrant network} & 0.263^{**} & 0.177 \\ & (0.122) & (0.159) \\ {\rm P} & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ {\rm N} & 13,580 & 7,609 \\ \end{array}$		(0.126)	(0.161)
$\begin{array}{cccc} (0.107) & (0.139) \\ 0.097 & 0.020 \\ (0.097) & (0.127) \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{cccc} Migrant network & 0.263^{**} & 0.177 \\ (0.122) & (0.159) \\ P & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ N & 13,580 & 7,609 \end{array}$	Children	0.051	0.197
Employment 0.097 0.020 (0.097)(0.127)Migrant network 0.263^{**} 0.177 (0.122)(0.159)P 0.00 0.00 N $13,580$ $7,609$		(0.107)	(0.139)
Migrant network 0.263** 0.177 0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 N 13,580 7,609	Employment	0.097	0.020
Nigrain network 0.205** 0.177 (0.122) (0.159) P 0.00 0.00 N 13,580 7,609	Migrant network	(U.U97) 0.263**	(0.127)
P 0.00 0.00 N 13,580 7,609	Migrain fielwork	(0.122)	(0.159)
N 13,580 7,609	Р	0.00	0.00
	Ν	13,580	7,609

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Evaluation of democracy at home	-0.189***	-0.190***	-0.166**
·	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Success is not acquired honestly	0.224**	0.227**	0.227**
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Most people can be trusted	-0.112***	-0.111***	-0.110***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Trust in other religions or nationalities	0.148***	0.148***	0.148***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Vote participation	-0.069*	-0.067*	-0.067*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Tertiary education		0.057	0.401
		(0.100)	(0.390)
Tertiary education#Evaluation of democracy at home			-0.120
			(0.132)
Gender	0.564***	0.562***	0.564***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Age	-0.227***	-0.228***	-0.228***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Education	0.039		
	(0.032)		
Income	-0.054*	-0.051*	-0.051*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Married	-0.425***	-0.427***	-0.428***
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Rural	-0.019	-0.028	-0.027
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Children	0.034	0.031	0.031
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Employment	-0.039	-0.024	-0.025
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Migrant network	0.323***	0.319***	0.320***
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Chi2	579.61	580.98	579.01
Р	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ν	15,296	15,296	15,296

Table 5: Non significant variables excluded, alternative measure of education and interactionbetween education and evaluation of democracy

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Logistic regression with country fixed effects; robust standard errors clustered at locality level in parentheses. Western EU excluded from observations.

	Eastern EU	post-Soviet	Southeast	Western EU
Evaluation of democracy at home	3.25	2.97	3.11	3.79
	(0.70)	(0.77)	(0.84)	(0.73)
Clout necessary	2.82	2.78	3.11	2.48
	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.90)	(0.83)
Success is not acquired honestly	0.33	0.20	0.43	0.11
	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.32)
Most people can be trusted	2.94	2.94	2.94	3.13
	(0.93)	(1.10)	(0.99)	(1.05)
Inequality is necessary	4.53	5.13	4.11	4.69
	(2.98)	(3.07)	(2.88)	(2.29)
Competition is harmful	3.62	3.82	3.66	4.20
	(2.43)	(2.66)	(2.51)	(2.31)
Authorities deserve respect	3.68	3.72	3.53	4.49
	(2.48)	(2.76)	(2.56)	(2.31)
Government ownership	5.10	5.49	5.50	5.12
of business	(2.78)	(2.96)	(3.04)	(2.09)
Democracy best	0.50	0.55	0.53	0.80
political system	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.40)
Market based economic system	0.37	0.45	0.38	0.36
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.48)
Willingness to pay for public goods	1.65	2.07	2.36	2.62
	(1.61)	(1.64)	(1.68)	(1.42)
Trust in family and neighbourhood	4.14	4.33	4.33	4.29
	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.65)
Trust in other religions or nationalities	3.09	2.80	3.21	3.47
	(0.86)	(1.09)	(0.96)	(0.88)
Cheating is	3.18	3.03	3.23	3.33
unacceptable	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.47)
Vote participation	1.85	1.95	2.07	2.12
	(1.31)	(1.28)	(1.17)	(1.02)
Political activism	2.43	1.04	2.53	4.32
	(1.87)	(1.59)	(2.14)	(1.92)

Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics (mean, std. deviation in parenthesis for each region).

Appendix 3: Definition and construction of the variables used in the analyses

Explanatory variables:

Evaluation of democracy at home: Respondents were asked to what extent they agree that each of a list of ten democratic institutions exist in their country, from free and fair elections and freedom of speech, to protection of minority rights and freedom to travel abroad on a scale from 1 to 5, where higher values represent higher levels of agreement. A factor analysis was initially run on these ten items, suggesting that they can be represented by one underlying dimension. The variable is the average of all the ten items. Thus higher values represent higher satisfaction with the functioning of democracy at home.

Clout necessary: Respondents were asked how important it is in their country to have the right kind of contacts in order to obtain favorable decisions in certain situations, such as getting into university, settling a dispute with a neighbor, obtaining papers or permits, getting a job in the government sector and in the private sector. The variable is the average of across the answers

Success is not acquired honestly: Respondents were asked which of the following factors is the most important to succeed in life in our country now: effort and hard work, intelligence and skills, political connections, breaking the law or other. The dummy variable takes the value one for respondents who answered either political connections or breaking the law.

Generalized trust: Respondents were asked whether most people can be trusted on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents complete distrust and 5 complete trust. The response to this question is used as a measure of the individual's generalized level of trust.

Inequality is necessary: Respondents were asked to indicate their position on inequality on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for 'incomes should be made more equal' and 10 stands for 'we need income differences as incentives for individual effort'. This response to this variable is used to measure individual's pro-inequality attitudes.

Competition is harmful: Respondents were asked to indicate their position on competition on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for 'competition is good; it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas' and 10 stands for 'competition is harmful; it brings the worst in people'. The response is used to measure individual's anti-competition attitudes.

Authorities deserve respect: Respondents were asked to indicate their position on authority on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for 'as citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of authorities' and 10 stands for 'in our country today we should show more respect for our authorities'. The response is used to measure individual's pro authority attitudes.

Government ownership of business: Respondents were asked to indicate their position on the appropriate role of the government on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for 'private ownership of business and industry should be increased' and 10 stands for 'government ownership of business and industry should be increased'. The response is used to measure individual's pro big government attitudes.

Democracy best political system: This variable takes the value one if the respondent agreed with the statement that "democracy is better than any other political system" and zero otherwise.

Market based economic system: This variable takes the value one if the respondent agreed with the statement that "markets are better than any other economic system" and zero otherwise.

Willingness to pay for public goods: Respondents were asked whether they would be willing to give up part of their income or pay more for improving each of the following 4 items: education, health care, climate change and helping the needy. A scale from 0 to 4 is built for counting the number of public goods for which the respondents is ready to give up some of his income.

Trust in family and neighbourhood: Respondents were asked how much they trust various groups on a scale from 1 to 5, where higher values represent higher levels of trust. For this variables trust in family members and neighbours is averaged.

Trust in other religions or nationalities: Respondents were asked how much they trust a various groups on a scale from 1 to 5, where higher values represent higher levels of trust. For this variables trust in people with other religions and people with other nationalities is averaged.

Cheating is unacceptable: Respondents were asked how wrong they consider behaviors like paying cash in order to avoid taxes, making exaggerated insurance claims, buying a university degree one has not earned, etc. The variable averages the answers.

Vote participation: Respondents were asked whether they voted in the most recent local, parliamentary and presidential elections. A scale between 0 and 3 was built measuring the number of times the respondent voted (never voted, voted in one election, voted in all three elections).

Political activism: Respondents were asked to indicate whether they already have, are likely to or would ever engage in each of the following activities: attend a lawful demonstration, participation in a strike, sign a petition and join a political party. A factor analysis was initially run, suggesting that the four items represent one underlying dimension. A scale based on responses to these four items is created, where higher values represent higher political activism

Trust in governmental and non-governmental institutions: Respondents were asked how much they trust each of a list of governmental and non-governmental institutions including national and local government, parliament, the police, courts, trade unions, NGOs, etc. A factor analysis was run on the 14 items representing trust in a specific institution. The analysis suggested two underlying dimensions. The first dimension (factor) reproduced trust in governmental institutions (the president, the local government, regional government, the parliament, courts, the police, political parties and armed forces) and the second dimension (factor) reproduced trust in non-governmental institutions (banks and the financial system, foreign investors, NGOs, trade unions and religious institutions).

Control Variables:

Gender is a dummy variable, which is coded 1 for Male and 0 for Female.

Age is an ordinal variable that classifies the respondents into six age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64.

Education is an ordinal variable that classifies respondents into the following groups based on their acquired level of education: no education, primary, lower secondary, secondary, post-secondary education, bachelor degree, master or doctoral degree.

Income is an ordinal variable that captures respondents' perception on their position on a ten-step income ladder, where the first (tenth) step captures the poorest (richest) 10% of the country.

Married is a dummy variable, which is equal 1 for married respondents.

Children is a dummy variable, which is equal 1 if respondent has at least one child.

Employment is a dummy variable, that indicates whether the respondent worked for income in the past 12 months or not.

Migrants network is a dummy variable that is equal 1 if respondent's household experienced a crisis related fall in remittances or a household member returned from abroad due to the crisis. It is an indirect measure to find out whether respondents have family or friends connections abroad.