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Handling excess zeros in count models for recreation demand analysis without apology

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Handling excess zeros in count models for recreation demand analysis
without apology

A. Martinez-Cruz

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Economics Working Paper Series
Handling excess zeros in count models for recreation demand analysis without apology

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Abstract

Hurdle and zero-inflated models are the two foremost methods used to deal with excess zeros. However, their reliance on the non-participation assumption is a drawback when applied to recreation demand analysis because there is not a theoretical framework convincingly explaining presence of non-participants. This paper discusses how latent class count models represent a theoretically consistent alternative to handle excess zeros. The theoretical model behind a latent class model does not require the non-participation assumption. Instead, excess zeros is explained as the accumulation of corner solutions from individuals belonging to different classes.

1 Introduction

Excess zeros is an empirical regularity in recreation demand analysis. Because standard count econometric models —i.e. Poisson and negative binomial models— can not adequately handle excess zeros, hurdle and zero-inflated models are widespread used instead. These models assume the existence of non-participants. In this way, a standard count model becomes a two-part model1 in which behavior can be characterized by two data-generating processes: the participation decision and, conditional on participation, the trip demand decision. Accordingly, excess zeros is consequence of

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1This term is borrowed from health economics literature [e.g. Deb and Trivedi (2002)]
a large portion of the population deciding self-exclusion from the recreational market under study.

While the argument behind two-part models is intuitive, since their very seminal applications in recreation demand analysis researchers have apologized for the absence of a formal economic theory argument explaining the presence of non-participants (Gurmu and Trivedi, 1996) and the resulting arbitrariness in the specification of the participation and trip demand equations (Haab and McConnell, 1996). This arbitrariness in distinguishing non-participants from participants ultimately affect public policy recommendations because non-participants are excluded from welfare calculations (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005).

In this paper, latent class count models (LCCM) are shown to be a theoretically supported alternative to handle excess zeros. The theoretical framework supporting LCCM assumes individuals belong to exclusive groups. Groups are associated to an ordinal classification of preferences for trips — an empirically testable assumption. Conditional on membership, individuals maximize their utility function with respect to number of visits to the site under study. Individuals with corner solutions are potentially observed in every class. Large proportion of zeros can be interpreted as the accumulation of corner solutions from individuals belonging to different classes. In constrast to two-part models, LCCM do not require presence of non-participants to accommodate excess zeros, and therefore welfare estimations account for everyone in the sample, avoiding arbitrary exclusions.

Applications of LCCM to recreation demand analysis are very recent and have not yet discussed how LCCM represent a theoretically consistent alternative to two-part models when handling excess zeros.2 English (2008) has proposed a strategy that explicitly incorporates nonparticipation into a behavioral model in the context of nested logit applications. While nested logit specifications have been used to model number of trips [e.g. (von Haefen et al., 2005)], implementation of these specifications requires researchers arbitrarily specify the number of choice occasions the individual faces during the period under study. Specification of choice occasions raises conceptual and practical difficulties when estimating welfare (von Haefen and Phaneuf, 2003a). In constrast to those difficulties, welfare estimates from a LCCM are calculated simply as a weighted sum of groups’ welfare.

Two features from the empirical illustration presented in this paper are

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2See Evans and Herriges (2010); Scarpa et al. (2007); Thiene and Morey (2010).
underlined. First, the latent class specification outperforms two-part models in replicating empirical frequencies. Second, two-part and latent class specifications yield similar welfare estimates.

2 Optimization framework

2.1 Homogeneous individuals

The optimization framework for the homogeneous case was first presented by Hellerstein and Mendelsohn (1993). Assume individuals choose number of trips, \( T \), and a vector of other goods, \( C \). \( T \in I \) for \( I = 0, 1, ... \); and \( C \) is a vector of goods that can be acquired in continuous quantities. The maximization problem is expressed as

\[
\max_{T \in I} \left\{ \max_C U \left[ (T, C, \epsilon; \beta) \middle| P_C C = Y - P_T T \right] \right\}
\]

(1)

where \( P_k \) is the price of good of type \( k = T, C \); \( Y \) is income; \( \beta \) is a vector of preference parameters; and \( \epsilon \) stands for randomness specific to each individual. Optimization of (1) yields the marshallian demand for trips,

\[
T^* = T(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon, \beta)
\]

(2)

\( T^* \) could be inferred if repeated observations on a single individual were available. Instead, only price variation across individuals is available. Thus conditional probabilities of observing a level of demand are estimated. A probability density function summarizing these probabilities is required. Given the nonnegative, integer nature of trips, the Poisson distribution is a natural candidate to summarize these probabilities.

In a Poisson regression, the expected value of the dependent variable is modeled as a function of prices, income, and other observable variables. Assuming an exponential form to keep the nonnegativity,

\[
E(T^*) = \lambda = exp(\beta_0 + P_k \beta P_k + \beta_Y Y)
\]

(3)

Given (3) and a change in \( P_T \) from \( P_T^a \) to the choke price, \( \bar{P}_T \), expected value of the consumer surplus is estimated as

\[
E_\epsilon [CS(T)] = \int_{\epsilon} \int_{P_T^a}^{\bar{P}_T} T(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon; \beta)dpf(\epsilon)d\epsilon
\]
\[ = \int_{P_T}^{P_T} \int_{\epsilon}^{\epsilon} T(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon; \beta) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon dp \]
\[ = \int_{P_T}^{P_T} \lambda(P_T, P_C, Y; \beta) dp = CS[E_\epsilon(T)] \]  

(4)

As pointed out by Hellerstein (1991), reversal of integration in (4) is correct as long as estimation of \( E[T] \) is unbiased. Unbiasness implies that demand function must be independent of the error term. Independence between demand function and errors is guaranteed when errors only reflect individual white noise. Thus \( E[CS(T)] = CS[E(T)] \) as long as there is a non-systematic component in the error term.

2.2 Heterogeneous individuals

Suppose individuals belong exclusively to one of \( G \) groups, \( g = 1, \ldots, G \). Groups are assumed associated to an ordinal classification of preferences for trips, such that individuals in group \( g \) take more average trips than individuals in group \( \mu \). This assumption can be tested by comparing average trips across groups once the empirical model has been estimated, and groups have been indexed accordingly. Conditional on being member of group \( g \), optimization of (1) yields

\[ T^*_g = T_g(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon, \beta) \] 

(5)

and expected consumer surplus for group \( g \) is calculated as

\[ E_\epsilon[CS_g(T_g)] = \int_{\epsilon}^{\epsilon} \int_{P_T}^{P_T} T_g(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon; \beta) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon dp \]
\[ = \int_{P_T}^{P_T} \int_{\epsilon}^{\epsilon} T_g(P_T, P_C, Y, \epsilon; \beta) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon dp \]
\[ = \int_{P_T}^{P_T} \lambda_g(P_T, P_C, Y; \beta) dp = CS_g[E_\epsilon(T_g)] \] 

(6)

where \( \hat{P}_{g} \) is the choke price for group \( g \). For given relative size of groups, \( \pi_g \) for \( g = 1, \ldots, G \), expected consumer surplus for the entire population is

\[ E_\epsilon[CS(T)] = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g E_\epsilon[CS_g(T_g)] = \]
\[ \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g \int_{P_T}^{P_T} \lambda_g(P_T, P_C, Y; \beta) dp = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g CS_g[E_\epsilon(T_g)] \] 

(7)
Knowing individual’s membership is a non-essential assumption. Let membership be unobserved. Because membership systematically explains number of trips, missing membership introduces a systematic component into the error term. Let $\eta$ be the systematic error term, and $\epsilon$ remain as the white noise. In this case, welfare estimation is calculated as follows

$$E_{\eta,\epsilon}[CS(T)] = E_{\eta,\epsilon}\left[\int_{P_T} T(P_T, P_C, Y, \eta, \epsilon; \beta)dp\right]$$

$$= \int_{\eta} \int_{P_T} \int_{\epsilon} [T(P_T, P_C, Y, \eta, \epsilon; \beta)f(\epsilon)d\epsilon] dP_T d\eta$$

$$= \int_{\eta} \int_{P_T} \lambda(P_T, P_C, Y, \eta; \beta)dP_T d\eta$$

$$= \int_{\eta} CS[E_\epsilon(T)] = E_\eta CS[E_\epsilon(T)] \quad (8)$$

As in the homogeneous case, reversal of integration with respect to the white noise integral is correct. However, $\eta$ represents a systematic error term which makes $E(T)$ biased.\(^3\) Thus reversal of integration with respect to the systematic error would be inconsistent.

Expressions (7) and (8) show that, in the heterogeneous case, welfare is measured as the expected consumer surplus of the expected trips. Preference parameters in a heterogeneous scenario can be recovered using a latent class count specification, as explained in the next section.

### 3 Latent class count models

Let $d_i = (d_{i1}, ..., d_{iG})$ be an indicator matrix such that $d_{ig} = 1$ if $T_i$ is drawn from the $g^{th}$ group for $i = 1, ..., n$, and $\sum_g d_{ig} = 1$. Estimation of latent class specifications is carry out by treating membership, $d_{ij}$, as missing data which is consistent with the theoretical framework explained in section 2.2.\(^4\)

#### 3.1 Model

Derivation of a latent class model starts by assuming a complete-data scenario where $V_i = (T_i, d_i)$. $T_i$ is the observed number of trips and $d_i$ is the

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\(3\)See Mullahy (1997) for a mathematical proof.

\(4\)Detailed explanation of latent class models as incomplete-data problem is presented in Cameron and Trivedi (1998); McLachlan and Peel (2000).
membership matrix. Under a complete-data scenario, \((T_i|d_i, \beta)\) is distributed with density

\[
f(T_i|d_i, \beta) = \sum_{g=1}^{G} d_{ig} f(T_i|\beta_g) = \prod_{g=1}^{G} f(T_i|\beta_g)^{d_{ij}}
\]

(9)

where \(\beta = [\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_G]\), and \(f(T_i|\beta_g)\) is a count density, usually Poisson or negative binomial.

In this complete-data scenario, \((d_{ij}|\pi)\) are assumed iid with multinomial distribution

\[
\prod_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g^{d_{ig}}, \quad 0 < \pi_g < 1, \quad \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g = 1
\]

(10)

where \(\pi' = [\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_G]\). Expressions (9) and (10) together provide the distribution of the complete-data:

\[
(T_i|\pi, \beta) \overset{iid}{\sim} \sum_{g=1}^{G} d_{ig} f_g(T; \beta_g), \quad 0 < \pi_g < 1, \quad \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g = 1
\]

(11)

which is the canonical expression of a latent class model describing \(T_i\) as drawn from group \(g\) with probability \(\pi_g\). The consequent likelihood function is

\[
L(\beta, \pi|T) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g^{d_{ig}} [f_g(T; \beta_g)]^{d_{ig}}
\]

(12)

While several approaches can be used in maximization of (12) (Bohning, 1995), explanation of the EM algorithm provides a neat description of how the incomplete-data problem is handled.

### 3.2 Estimation through the EM algorithm

The EM algorithm is an iterative algorithm that carries out two steps in each iteration: the expectation step (E-step) and the maximization step (M-step). The EM algorithm computes the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of an incomplete-data problem by formulating an associated complete-data problem, and exploiting the simplicity of the latter’s MLE to compute the former’s MLE (Ng et al., 2004). Both E- and M-steps have simple forms when the density functions belong to the exponential family (Ng et al., 2004) which is the case for the most common count distributions,
Poisson and negative binomial.\textsuperscript{5} This simplicity relies on the linearity of the complete-data log likelihood with respect to the unobservable data.

Given an initial guess for $\pi$ and $\beta$, $(\pi^0, \beta^0)$, the EM algorithm maximizes expression (12) by treating $d_{ig}$ as missing data. More specifically, the E-step deals with the incomplete-data problem by taking the conditional expectation of the complete-data log likelihood.

If $d_{ig}$ were observable, the complete-data log likelihood would be

$$
\ln L(\beta|T, d_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} d_{ig} \ln f_g(T_i; \beta_g) + \ln \pi_g
$$

(13)

Because the complete-data log likelihood is linear in $d_{ig}$, the E-step replaces $d_{ig}$ by its expected value, $E(d_{ig})$. This strategy yields the expected log likelihood,

$$
E[\ln L(\beta|T, d_i)] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \hat{z}_{ig} \ln f_g(T_i; \beta_g) + \ln \pi_g
$$

(14)

where $E(d_{ig}) = \hat{z}_{ig}$, and $\hat{z}_{ig}$ denotes the posterior probability that observation $T_i$ belongs to the group $g$. Given initial guesses, $(\pi^0, \beta^0)$, and a vector of covariates, $X_i$,

$$
\hat{z}_{ig} = \frac{\pi^0_g f_g(T_i|X_i, \beta^0)}{\sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi^0_g f_g(T_i|X_i, \beta^0)}
$$

(15)

Consistently, the M-step deals with the incomplete-data problem by replacing $d_{ig}$ by its expected value, $\hat{z}_{ig}$, when maximizing the first order conditions of (13).

If $d_{ig}$ were observable, the maximized first order conditions would be

$$
\pi_g - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} d_{ig}}{n} = 0, \quad g = 1, \ldots, G
$$

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} d_{ig} \frac{\partial \ln f_g(T_i; \beta_g)}{\partial \beta_g} = 0
$$

(16)

Instead, the M-step maximizes

$$
\pi_g - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{z}_{ig}}{n} = 0, \quad g = 1, \ldots, G
$$

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \hat{z}_{ig} \frac{\partial \ln f_g(T_i; \beta_g)}{\partial \beta_g} = 0
$$

(17)

\textsuperscript{5}The negative binomial is a member of the exponential family when the overdispersion parameter is treated as known and fixed (Congdon, 2005).
The E- and M-steps are alternated repeatedly until the change in the log likelihood is smaller than a user-defined value. Thus for a given number of groups, $G$, maximization yields probabilities for each individual’s membership to each group, i.e. $N * G$ individual probabilities. Along with this probabilities, the relative size of each group, $\pi_g$, is also obtained. Consequently, the associated $G$ sets of density parameters, $\beta_g$ for $g = 1, ..., G$, are estimated.\(^6\)

Convergence conditions are discussed in Wu (1983). Convergence to a global maximum is not guaranteed. Thus different starting values should be tried to find the global maximum. Peters and Walker (1978) and Redner and Walker (1984) provide regularity conditions in order to find consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal estimates. The form of these conditions suggests they should hold for the distributions in the exponential family (McLachlan and Peel, 2000).

### 3.3 Welfare estimation

For the specific case of the latent class Poisson model, estimates are obtained for

$$f(T_i|P_T, \beta) = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \pi_g \frac{\exp(-\lambda_g)\lambda_g^{T_i}}{T_i!}$$

where

$$\lambda_g = \exp(\beta_{0,g} + \beta_{P_T,g}P_T)$$

With estimated parameters at hand, welfare estimates are carried out as follows

$$\sum_{g=1}^{G} \hat{\pi}_g \int_{P_T} \hat{\lambda}_g(.)dp = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \hat{\pi}_g \int_{P_T} \exp(\hat{\beta}_{0,g} + \hat{\beta}_{P_T,g}P_T)dp$$

$$= E\{CS_g [E(T_g)]\}$$

Expression (20) is the expected consumer surplus of the expected trips, just as in equations (7) and (8).

Reversion between the price integral and the summation over groups in equation (20) would be inconsistent with theoretical framework explained in section 2.2. Reversal of integration is not correct if variation in choke

\(^6\)Wedel et al. (1993) provides a step-by-step explanation for maximization of a latent class count model.
price systematically depends on variation of the unobserved factors (Haab and McConnell, 1996). This is the case here. To see why, recall that choke price is the minimum price driving an individual to take zero trips, i.e., $T(\bar{P}_T, X, \eta; \beta) = 0$, or $\bar{P}_T = T^{-1}(X, \eta; \beta)$. The order of integration cannot be reversed when the upper bound of integration on the inner integral is a function of the variable of integration for the (discrete version of the) outer integral. In equation (20), choke price varies systematically from one group to other. This variation is driven by the variation in $\beta_{P_T, g}$, such that $\bar{P}_{T,g} = T^{-1}(X; \beta_g)$ for $g = 1, ..., G$. This variation is a direct consequence of membership being missed which is what introduces a systematic error. Because with the noise $-\epsilon$ in section 2.2 does not induce systematic variation, reversal integration with respect to $\epsilon$ is implied in expression (20).

4 Two-part models

Hurdle and zero-inflated models are the two foremost methods used to deal with excess zeros (Hilbe, 2007). Both models assume that some portion of the population self-excludes from the recreational market. Non-participants may permanently not visit the site under study (hurdle model), or may be divided in permanent and temporal non-participants (zero-inflated model). Permanent non-participants will never visit the site under study, no matter how low price could get. Temporal non-participants are currently facing a price at or above their choke price, i.e., they are in a corner solution (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005).\footnote{For detailed description of these models, see Gurmu and Trivedi (1996); Haab and McConnell (1996); Shonkwiler and Shaw (1996). For details on econometric estimation, see Hilbe (2007).}

4.1 Hurdle model

In a hurdle model, trips are positive once a hurdle has been passed. Otherwise, zero trips are observed. This behavior is modeled sequentially. The first model explains why some individuals take positive trips. Conditional on taking positive trips, the second model explains number of trips. Statistically, these processes are modeled by a binary model and a zero-truncated
count model, respectively. Welfare is estimated as

\[
CS[E(T)] = \int_{P_T} P_{\text{Prob}_1(T > 0)} \hat{\lambda}(.) dp = \frac{P_{\text{Prob}_1(T > 0)}}{P_{\text{Prob}_2(T > 0)}} \int_{P_T} \hat{\lambda}(.) dp
\]

where \(P_{\text{Prob}_1(T > 0)}\) is the probability of positive trips according to the binary model, and \(P_{\text{Prob}_2(T > 0)}\) is the probability of positive trips according to the count model.

### 4.2 Zero-inflated model

Unlike a hurdle model, a zero-inflated model allows zero counts be generated by both the binary process and the count process. In this way, zero-inflated models distinguish permanent non-participants — zeros in the binary model — from temporal non-participants — zeros in the count model. A zero-inflated model is a double-hurdle model in the sense that positive trips are observed if the individual overcomes the hurdle modeled by the binary model, and then overcomes the probability of taking zeros under the count model. Because the count model is not truncated, welfare is estimated as

\[
CS[E(T)] = \int_{P_T} P_{\text{Prob}_1(T > 0)} \hat{\lambda}(.) dp = \frac{P_{\text{Prob}_1(T > 0)}}{P_{\text{Prob}_2(T > 0)}} \int_{P_T} \hat{\lambda}(.) dp
\]

### 4.3 Drawbacks

Hurdle models do not explain presence of non-participants. In a hurdle model, the same vector of explanatory variables is included in both parts. In this sense, no specific reason to self-exclusion from the recreational market is offered.

Zero-inflated models offer a theoretically arbitrary explanation for non-participation. Unlike the hurdle model, the binary process in a zero-inflated model may include different predictors than in the count model. However, the estimation process typically faces difficulties discriminating between covariates affecting participation from covariates affecting number of trips (Haab and McConnell, 2002). This difficulties arise because of the lack of a theoretical framework guiding researchers in the understanding of how individuals choose to participate in a recreational market. However, a theoretical framework supporting separation of determinants of participation and demand
would need to deal with an inconsistency: separate determinants imply researchers are estimating different preference functions (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005).\footnote{"In a fully consistent model with non-participation, a comparison between the market price and the individual’s reservation price, derived from all arguments in the utility problem, implies an extensive margin of choice between conditional utilities representing participation and non-participation. Importantly, the same factors determine participation and consumption” (Phaneuf and Smith (2005),p. 71).}

The ultimate concern from a public policy perspective is exclusion of the arbitrarily-classified as permanent non-participants from welfare estimations. Permanent non-participants are excluded in two ways. First, estimation of the impact of travel cost on number of trips (price parameter) is based on a subsample that does not include zero counts at all (hurdle model), or includes zero counts from only temporal non-participants (zero-inflated model). Second, welfare estimates are weighted such that only participants (hurdle model) or participants and temporal non-participants (zero-inflated model) are accounted for [see expressions (21) and (22)].

5 Empirical illustration

5.1 Data

Empirical strategies explained in previous sections are applied to recreation data from the 1997 Iowa Wetlands Survey conducted at Iowa State University. This mail survey gathered information from a sample of all Iowa residents on actual and hypothetical use of wetlands in the state. Sociodemographic characteristics and information to calculate travel costs were also collected. Focus in this study is on the actual visitation data, analyzed previously by Phaneuf and Herriges (1999) and von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003b).

From a sample of 6000 Iowa households, 2891 usable surveys were obtained. Individuals were provided with a copy of a map where Iowa was divided into 15 zones. Individuals were asked to record the number of trips made to wetlands in each zone during 1997. This study focuses on zone 11, the zone with the largest dispersion on trips —variance on trips ranges from 2.41 (zone 2) to 23.39 (zone 11). People taking zero trips to zone 11 represent 78.17% of the sample. The mean number of trips is 1.64 trips, with a maximum of 45 trips.
Summary statistics of variables included in econometric specifications are presented in table 1. Travel costs were calculated as the sum of the estimated round trip travel distance multiplied by $0.21 and the estimated travel time valued at one-third the wage rate. For this application, substitute site is the cheapest alternative for each individual.

5.2 Econometric specifications

Table 2 shows estimates from a latent class Poisson model with four classes. This model performs the best among the latent class specifications in terms of likelihood criteria (see table 3). Groups are indexed such that individuals in group $g$ take more average trips than individuals in group $g-1$. According to comparisons presented in table 4, differences in average trips across groups are significant and consistent with the order implied by the index assigned. Table 5 presents distribution of trips inside groups.

Thus the data can be described as a sample from a population that is composed by four groups of visitors. The first group represents 56% of the population and includes very infrequent visitors — most of them take zero trips, with a maximum of 5. The fourth group represents 11% of the population and includes the very frequent visitors — 50% of them take at least 23 trips, with a maximum of 45. Groups 2 and 3 represent 33% of the population together and include two groups of relatively frequent visitors — 50% of visitors in group 2 take at least 4 trips with a maximum of 15, and 50% of visitors in group 3 take at least 10 trips with a maximum of 30.

Table 6 shows hurdle and zero-inflated specifications. In contrast to the hurdle specification, zero-inflated specifications II and III describe trips with two different sets of variables, one for the binary process and other for the count process. The zero-inflated specification performing the best in terms of likelihood criteria is the third one. Both hurdle model specification and zero-inflated III specification perform poorer than latent class poisson specification in terms of likelihood criteria.

Signs of travel cost parameters are theoretically consistent in hurdle, zero-inflated and latent class specifications. However, magnitudes differ. While hurdle and zero-inflated specifications yield own travel cost parameters

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9For further details, see von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003b).

10These comparisons correct for experiment-wise error implied by multiple comparisons, i.e., for the increase in probability of making a type I error when doing multiple comparisons [see Daniel (1990)].
around $-0.18$, latent class specification yields a similar magnitude ($-0.19$) only for the third group which represents 6% of the population. Impact from travel cost is considerable larger in groups 1 and 4 — $-5.52$ and $-7.27$, respectively.

Table 7 provides insights on how each specification replicates the empirical frequencies. The latent class specification outperforms both hurdle and zero-inflated specifications not only on replicating the empirical frequency of zeros but also the empirical frequencies in the upper tail.

5.3 Welfare estimations

Welfare estimations are presented in table 8. Average estimates from hurdle and zero-inflated specifications are larger than estimates from latent class specification. These differences, however, do not hold when confidence intervals are considered. These conclusions remain for intervals at 90% of confidence (not shown).

6 Conclusions and further research

In a latent class specification, corner solutions can potentially be originated in different groups of visitors. In this specific application, corner solutions are originated only in the group of very infrequent visitors.

Latent class specification outperforms two-part models in replicating empirical frequencies. Interestingly, improvement in frequency prediction does not translate into different welfare estimates. Whether this is a general result requires further research. Clearly, even when latent class specifications yield similar welfare estimates, an advantage in using latent class specifications is the chance to provide targeted public policy recommendations. Also, data requirement in a latent class model is smaller than in a zero-inflated model, in the sense that latent class models do not need to explain non-participation with variables different than those included in the count process.

For this specific application, we still can distinguish a tendency in two-part models to yield larger welfare estimates — in addition to larger average estimates, upper bounds in two-part models are larger than the upper bound in latent class specification by at least 34%. This tendency is a consequence of two-part models yielding a travel cost parameter that captures the behavior
of visitors from groups 2 and 3. These visitors obtain the largest per trip consumer surplus.

While this is a single-site application, results are relevant for multi-site applications. For instance, von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003b) find zero-inflated count model and Kuhn-Tucker econometric model yield similar welfare estimates in a multi-site application. Future research will focus on checking whether their result holds when using a latent class specification instead of a zero-inflated model.

References


Table 1: Summary statistics (2891 observations).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trips in 1997</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel cost&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>80.87</td>
<td>54.43</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>486.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to substitute&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>31.08</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>112.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<sup>a</sup> 1997 $; <sup>b</sup> 1 if characteristic is observed; <sup>c</sup> thousands of 1997 $
Table 2: Latent class Poisson specification (4 classes)$^a$

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$^{a}$ Standard errors in parentheses. $^b$ Average value based only on members of the class. Standard deviation in parentheses. $^c$ Scaled by 10. $^d$ Overdispersion parameter in Poisson specifications is restricted to zero. $^e$ Log-likelihood. $^f$ Relative size of groups. P-value $^*<0.10$, $^{**}<0.05$, $^{***}<0.10$. 

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<sup>a</sup> Log-likelihood

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Based on Tukey-Kramer method for multiple comparisons.
Table 5: Distribution of trips inside groups

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$^a$ Standard errors in parentheses. Scaled by $^b$ 10, $^c$ 1000. $^d$ Overdispersion parameter. $^e$ Log-likelihood.
P-value * $< 0.10$, ** $< 0.05$, *** $< 0.10$. 
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<td>-0.03</td>
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</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>HNB</th>
<th>ZINB III</th>
<th>LCPM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.07-1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37-1.63)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.28</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(4.77-5.86)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 4</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.10-0.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37-2.04)</td>
<td>(1.18-1.84)</td>
<td>(0.73-1.37)</td>
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</table>

* a Bootstrapped 95% confidence interval in parantheses (10,000 replications).
* b Weighted sum across groups. Weights are relative size of gropus.
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