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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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ABSTRACT

The Gender Wage Gap in Europe: Job Preferences, Gender Convergence and Distributional Effects

The gender wage gap has declined in magnitude over time; however, the gap that remains is largely unexplained due to gender convergence in key wage determining characteristics. In this paper we show that the degree of gender convergence differs across countries in Europe. Most, if not all, of the wage gap is unexplained in some countries, predominantly in Eastern Europe, while in some central and peripheral countries, differences between the characteristics of males and females can still explain a relatively large proportion of the wage gap. We investigate whether gender differences relating to job preferences play a role in explaining the gender wage gap. We find that females are more motivated than males to find a job that is closer to home and offers job security, whereas males are motivated by financial gain. The average gender wage differential in Europe is 12.2 percent and gender differences in job preferences are associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the wage gap. We find that preferences explain more of the gender wage gap than the individual components relating to age, tenure and previous employment status. A quantile decomposition reveals that job preferences play a greater role in explaining the wage gap at the top of the wage distribution.

JEL Classification:	J16, J24, J31, J71
Keywords:	gender wage gap, job motives, Oaxaca,
	quantile decomposition

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1. Introduction

Studies of the gender wage gap often apply decomposition techniques to investigate how much of the wage difference is due to differences in observed characteristics of men and women and how much is due to different rates of return for those same characteristics. There has been a general decline in the magnitude of the gender wage gap over time. However, the portion of the gender wage gap explained by differences in characteristics between genders has also declined as a result of gender convergence in wage enhancing characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2006 & 2016; Goldin, 2014; Duraisamy and Duraisamy, 2016; Kassenboehmer and Sinning, 2014).

In light of the declining importance of characteristics such as educational attainment and job tenure in explaining gender wage differentials, recent research has focused on finding other observable factors that could potentially explain some of the remaining wage gap. In this context, the role of compensating differentials may represent one component of the "final chapter" of gender pay equality (Goldin, 2014). Many high paying jobs require individuals to spend long hours in the office. This type of work can be incompatible with family life, especially with young children, thereby forcing individuals who are, or expect to be, caregivers to trade-off job characteristics such as higher earnings for other characteristics that facilitate a more flexible work-family balance. Given that females are still expected to play the primary care giving role in many households (McCrae, 2003), compensating wage differentials may be an important factor in explaining the remaining gender wage gaps observed across countries. Related to this argument, Goldin (2014) suggests that policies which change how jobs are structured, such as greater flexibility, could reduce the gender wage gap.

In this paper we utilise the 2014 European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS) to study the gender wage gap in 28 EU countries. Our research makes three contributions. Firstly, we study the degree of gender convergence in wage enhancing characteristics across Europe and the differing roles played by these characteristics in explaining the gender wage gap. We find that most of the wage gap is unexplained in some countries, predominantly in Eastern Europe, while in some central and peripheral countries, a relatively large proportion of the wage gap is attributed to differences in wage determining characteristics of males and females. Secondly, we contribute to the literature on compensating differentials by examining the role of job motives in explaining the gender wage gap. We find that females place greater value than males on jobs that are close to home and offer good security, and these job motives are associated with lower wages. The average gender wage gap in Europe is 12 percent and gender differences in job motives explain 1.4 percentage points of the gap, which is greater than the explained component relating to previous employment status and job tenure. Our third contribution is to carry out an unconditional quantile decomposition on the gender wage gap for each of the 28 countries using a technique introduced by Firpo et al. (2009). Our quantile analysis reveals a U-shaped wage gap which is high at both the top and bottom of the wage distribution. The quantile decomposition shows that job motives play a relatively strong role in explaining the gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution.

2. Previous Literature

Given the vast literature related to the gender wage gap, relatively few studies have directly measured the role of gender based differences in job motives, presumably driven by a lack of data.

Mas and Pallais (2016) conduct a field experiment to study compensating differentials. They find that females, particularly those with children, are more willing than men to trade off higher wages in order to work from home and to avoid disruptions to their work schedule. While they don't directly investigate the role of compensating differentials on the wage gap, Mas and Pallais (2016) suggest that compensating differentials alone are unlikely to fully explain the gender wage differential. McGuinness et al. (2011) assess the role of motives in explaining the gender wage gap among part-time workers in Ireland. Their data has information on the reasons why people work part-time, due to either; disability, cannot find full-time work, family commitments, financially secure, earn enough working part-time and other reasons. They find a significant difference between the reasons for working part-time between men and women, with most women indicating family commitments and men typically reporting that they cannot find full-time work. Incorporating these motives into a decomposition of the part-time gender wage gap substantially reduces the unexplained component.

Other studies have used motivational values to indirectly approximate the role of decisions around job choice on the gender pay gap. Swaffield (2007) finds that controlling for attitudes relating to work-home orientation, family related labour constraints and labour market aspirations reduces the gender pay gap. However, these are broad attitudinal controls and as such, do not directly relate to an individual's motivations for accepting a job. Similarly, Chevalier (2004) uses a UK dataset which captures information on a person's long-term values, such as career development, job satisfaction, status and respect as well as information on people's self-reported level of ambition and finds that these factors play a role in explaining the gender wage gap. Jung (2017) uses hypothetical lottery questions in Korean labour market surveys to evaluate the role of risk aversion in the gender wage gap. The results indicate that women are more risk averse than men and Jung (2017) indicates that some of the Korean wage gap is attributable to job sorting based on preferences that are influenced by risk attitudes.¹ Earlier work by Filer (1985) uses the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey in the US to investigate the role of compensating differentials in the gender wage gap. Filer (1985) found that some of the wage gap was explained by men and women holding jobs with substantially different working conditions.

It is also worth noting other aspects of the literature that have sought to explore alternative explanations that can potentially account for the unexplained gap in earnings. Some studies suggest women may be less competitive than men and therefore underrepresented in competitive jobs (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) or are less effective at bargaining for higher pay than males (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). However, Manning and Saidi (2010) indicate a limited role for these competition effects in explaining the gender wage gap. In recent work, Quintana-Garcia and Elvira (2017) study the effects of external labour market hiring on the compensation of males and females in management positions. They find that women who are hired externally face a disadvantage in terms of compensation and provide evidence that this disadvantage may be mitigated by having more females in top management positions. However, Abendroth et al. (2017) find that, while having more women in management positions reduces the gender wage gap for jobs requiring low qualifications, it does not reduce the wage gap for jobs with higher qualifications. Huffman et al. (2017) examine the effects of organizational practices which target gender inequality on gender

¹ For example, risk averse individuals may prefer to work for a lower wage in the public sector due to its stability and limited risk relative to the private sector or self-employment.

wage inequality. They find that policies which facilitate a better work-family balance, such as workplace childcare, can help reduce gender wage inequality.

Finally, in terms of distributional impacts, it is worth noting that more than one unconditional quantile decomposition method exists, such as that of Machado and Mata (2005). However, an advantage of the Firpo et al. (2009) method is that it allows us to carry out detailed decompositions to examine the role of each variable individually. An application of the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition which is related to our current paper is Arulampalam et al. (2007), who decompose the wage gap in eleven pre-enlargement European countries (before the admission of 10 new countries in 2004). Arulampalam et al. (2007) find the wage gap typically widened at the top of the wage distribution and, in some cases, also widened at the bottom.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the methodology and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

3. Data and descriptive statistics

The data used in this study comes from the 2014 European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS) and contains information on 48,000 adult employees (aged 24 to 65) in 28 EU member states. The sample for the study is restricted to full-time employees in employment. It was financed and developed by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), in collaboration with a network of experts on skills, the OECD and Eurofound (Cedefop, 2015). Respondent information is collected on a range of human capital attributes (including education levels and job tenure), personal characteristics (including gender, age and sector) as well as wage data. Exact wage data is provided for 70 percent of the sample. Some individuals did not give precise wage data, so the remaining 30 percent of individuals. However, we verify the robustness of our results using only the 70 percent who reported exact wages. Ten of the countries in the sample do not use the euro currency. For these countries, we converted wages to euros using exchange rates from the 7th of March 2014, which coincides with the data collection time frame.

In terms of the key information reflecting job motives, the survey asks individuals to rank the importance of the following nine job-related characteristics on their decision to accept their current job;² 1. the job suited your qualifications and skills, 2. you wanted to gain some work experience, 3. the job provided security, 4. the job offered good career progression/career development, 5. the company/organisation was well known/respected in its field, 6. the pay and package of benefits (e.g. health insurance, bonuses, company car etc.) was good, 7. the job was close to home, 8. you were interested in the nature of the work itself, 9. the job had a good work-life balance. Individuals rank the importance of each job motive on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being most important. The questions are not mutually exclusive and respondents are asked to provide a rating for each job motive.

² The actual question that appears in the survey is: *Before you started working for your current employer, how important, if at all, were the following factors in your decision to accept the job? Please use a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means not at all important, 5 means moderately important and 10 means essential.*

At a descriptive level there are gender differences in the motives reported by individuals for accepting their current jobs. Table 1 below uses two statistics to show the differences between males and females for each of the nine job motives. The first shows the mean score for males and females for each motive. For example, on average, males assign a score of 6.64 (out of 10) to pay and benefits, whereas for females this is 6.40. The second statistic involves calculating a person's relative score for each motive; a person's overall mean ranking for the nine motives is calculated and this is subtracted from the score given to the individual motive. Therefore, a positive number indicates that a person values the motive above average and vice versa. The average relative score for males and females is then calculated. Again taking pay and benefits as an example, while on average both males and females assign a below average score to benefits and pay, it is clear that this factor is a more important consideration for males when choosing a job; the score given to benefits and pay for males is 0.39 below their average score for all motives, whereas for females it is 0.78 below average. The data suggests that males place greater importance on career progression and the reputation of the organisation, with the latter being of above average importance to men but below average for women. These descriptive statistics are consistent with the findings of Chevalier (2004) who shows that that males are typically more self-orientated and career driven than women. Job attributes such as job security, being close to home, gaining work experience and work-life balance are more important for women than men when it comes to choosing a job.

	Av	verage sco	re	Re	ative score	9
Motive	Female	Male	Diff	Female	Male	Diff
Benefits	6.40	6.64	***	-0.78	-0.39	***
Security	7.98	7.61	***	0.78	0.56	***
Experience	7.18	6.78	***	-0.01	-0.25	***
Career	6.67	6.71		-0.49	-0.32	***
Reputation	7.14	7.15		-0.05	0.12	***
Close to home	6.58	6.32	***	-0.61	-0.69	***
Work-life	7.50	7.23	***	0.30	0.20	***
Suits skills	7.40	7.21	***	0.20	0.16	*
Like the work	7.86	7.68	***	0.66	0.63	*

Table 1: Motivations for accepting a job

Note: The stars in the Diff column indicate whether the difference in average motives between males and females is statistically significant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The averages of key wage determining characteristics such as educational attainment, age and job tenure are reported for males and females in Table 2. The results in Table 2 are broadly supportive of the gender convergence phenomenon highlighted by Blau and Kahn (2006 & 2016) and Goldin (2014). Male and female full-time employees look similar in relation to their age, job tenure and previous labour status. The reversal in the gender education gap is apparent, given that average educational attainment of females is higher; 53 percent of females are educated to tertiary level compared to 43 percent of males. Gender differences remain when it comes to the percentage of employees working in the private sector (56 percent for females versus 70 percent for males).

Table 2: Characteristics of males and females					
	Female	Male			
Age	41.51	42.57			
Educational attainment					
Low	0.09	0.14			
Medium	0.38	0.43			
High	0.53	0.43			
Job-related					
Job tenure	10.13	10.85			
Private sector	0.56	0.70			
Previous status					
Employed	0.59	0.64			
Self employed	0.03	0.04			
In education	0.20	0.18			
Unemployed	0.13	0.12			
Other	0.05	0.02			

4. Methodology

Our analysis is based on the following wage regression,

$$\ln Wage_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 H_{i,j} + \beta_2 M_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$
⁽²⁾

where the log hourly wage of individual *i* in country *j* is regressed on a vector of personal and human capital variables $(H_{i,j})$, including; gender, age, education level, job tenure, previous employment status (employed, self-employed, in education or unemployed) and sector (public or private). $M_{i,j}$ is a vector of the nine job motive attributes outlined above. The coefficient on gender from an OLS regression of equation (2) gives an estimate of the gender wage gap, controlling for other personal and human capital characteristics and job motives. Our baseline specification does not include occupation controls as these will be correlated with education, however, as a robustness check we also report the results from a specification which includes occupation throughout the paper, showing that it does not change our main results.

Based on our wage regression, we carry out an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on the difference in the average wage of males and females. For ease of exposition, let $X_{i,j}$ be a vector which includes both personal and human capital variables $(H_{i,j})$ and job-related motives $(M_{i,j})$. The Oaxaca decomposition yields,

$$\overline{W}_m - \overline{W}_f = \left(\overline{X}_m - \overline{X}_f\right)\hat{\beta}_{1m} + \left(\hat{\beta}_{1m} - \hat{\beta}_{1f}\right)\overline{X}_f \tag{3}$$

where the average wage difference between men and women ($\overline{W_m} - \overline{W_f}$) is decomposed into an

explained part due to differences in characteristics, $(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)\hat{\beta}_{1m}$, and an unexplained part due to differences in coefficients, $(\hat{\beta}_{1m} - \hat{\beta}_{1f})\bar{X}_f$. In addition to decomposing the average differential into an explained and unexplained component, we present detailed results showing the contribution of each individual covariate. This allows us to establish which of the independent variables, including the nine job motives, may be most important in explaining the observed gender wage gap.

We decompose the gender wage gap using the entire sample of full-time workers from all 28 countries, before proceeding to decompose the wage gap for each country individually. It is important to note that the raw wage differential $\overline{W}_m - \overline{W}_f$ from the full sample can be influenced by distributional differences in the sampling of males and females across countries with different wage structures. To see this, consider a scenario where we have one high wage country (H) and one low wage country (L). Suppose we survey 10 males and 10 females from country H and find that everybody earns €10.00 per hour. In country L, we survey 10 males and 20 females, each of which earns €1.00 per hour. Clearly, there is no gender wage gap but because there is a relatively large number of females from the low income country, this will drag down the average female wage, so that the average male wage is €5.50 but the average female wage is €4.00. As such the raw wage differential is €1.50. However, when decomposing the wage differential using the entire sample, we include country dummy variables in our wage regression. The endowment effect associated with the country dummy variables captures the component of the raw differential that is due to this type of sampling issue. For example, let D be a dummy variable indicating the low wage country. The endowment effect associated with this variable is $(\overline{D}_m - \overline{D}_f)\hat{\beta}_m$. Relating this to our hypothetical example, assuming the only independent variable is the country dummy, gives $(\overline{D}_m - \overline{D}_f)\hat{eta}_m =$ $\left(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{2}{2}\right)(-9.00) = -1.50$. Therefore, the endowment effect of the country dummies captures the component of the raw gap that is explained by differences in the distribution of males and females across countries. As such, when reporting the raw wage differential from the full sample, we adjust it by subtracting the endowment effects from the country dummy variables. This pooled approach ensures that the reported raw wage gap is a true reflection of the wage gap across the 28 countries. This approach is equivalent to estimating country specific decompositions and averaging the results. Including all countries in this way allows us to utilise our full sample. However, in addition to the pooled analysis, we also decompose the wage gap separately for each country in the sample.

While the Oaxaca technique allows us to decompose the gender wage gap at the mean, it does not allow us to assess the degree to which the gender pay gap, or the factors that determine it, vary across the wage distribution. A priori we might expect that the cost of trading off high wages for other job characteristics becomes more substantial for more highly educated and skilled females who are typically located in the upper quantiles of the earnings distribution. For example, a very low paid female, such as a minimum wage worker, is on a very low wage to begin with and therefore is not in a position to trade off some of her wages against other job characteristics. Highly educated and highly paid females, on the other hand, are in a position to trade off some of this higher pay for other characteristics.

To address this issue we employ a technique proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) that allows us to decompose the wage gap across the entire wage distribution. In a standard OLS regression, the β coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of a change in x on the unconditional mean of y. As such, OLS regressions can be used in the Oaxaca decomposition to examine the unconditional mean difference in gender wages. However, the β coefficient from a quantile regression of y on x gives the

effect of a change in x on the conditional quantile³, not the unconditional quantile, thereby making the unconditional quantile decomposition less straightforward than a standard Oaxaca decomposition of the unconditional mean. The method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) overcomes this difficulty. The technique can be outlined in three stages. The first stage involves calculating the recentered influence function (RIF) of the unconditional quantile of the dependent variable. Denoting q_{τ} as the τ th quantile of interest, the RIF is derived by first calculating the influence function (IF) as follows,

$$IF = (\tau - 1\{Y \le q_\tau\})/f_Y(q_\tau)$$

where Y denotes the dependent variable, in our case log wages, $f_Y(q_\tau)$ is the density at point q_τ and $1\{Y \le q_\tau\}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether Y is less than or equal to q_τ . To get the RIF, one adds back the quantile to the IF, such that, $RIF = q_\tau + IF$.

In the second stage, the RIF is then used as a dependent variable in the wage regression, instead of $InWage_{i,j}$. The resulting β from the RIF regression captures the marginal effect of a change in x on the unconditional quantile of y. Finally, in the third stage, a standard Oaxaca decomposition is carried out on the RIF regression, which yields the unconditional quantile decomposition. While other quantile decomposition techniques exist, an advantage of the Firpo et al. (2009) technique is that it allows for a detailed decomposition to be carried out in a straightforward way. For a detailed explanation of decomposition methods, see Fortin et al. (2011).

5. Results

The results from an OLS regression of equation (2), including country dummy variables, are shown in Table 3. The model is well specified and all the coefficients behave as expected. The coefficient on the male variable is the estimate of the gender wage gap, indicating that the hourly wage of males is 12.5 percent higher than females with comparable characteristics. Age, education and job tenure, measured as the number of years the individual has been working for their current employer, all have positive, statistically significant effects on wages. A one year increase in age and tenure are associated with an increase in wages of approximately 3 percent and 1 percent respectively. Having a high level of education is associated with a 43 percent increase in wages; relative to a low education.⁴ Previous employment status before the current job also affects wages; relative to being previously in employment, being previously unemployed, in education or "other" is associated with a reduction in wages of approximately 13 percent, 3 percent and 8 percent respectively. Being previously self-employed (relative to being employed) has no statistically significant effect.

The OLS regression also shows that there are some earnings impacts associated with individuals' motives for accepting their current jobs. Perhaps not surprisingly, the job motive associated with the largest positive effect on wages is benefits and pay. Career progression and finding a job that suits one's skills are also associated with increased wages, albeit to a lesser extent. However, being

³ That is, a quantile that contains observations that have been ranked on the basis of a defined set of observable characteristics.

⁴ High education relates to tertiary education, medium education to upper secondary or post-secondary (including vocational) but not tertiary.

motivated to accept a job that is close to home, offers good security or for the purposes of gaining work experience is associated with lower wages. Job choices that are motivated by a good work-life balance and finding work that is intrinsically desirable are both associated with a small positive effect on wages, while the motive relating to the reputation of the organisation has no effect. Therefore, while the marginal effects associated with the motives for accepting jobs are lower than those related to human capital endowments, they do influence earnings. Nevertheless, the results related to potential areas where females are more likely to compromise on job choice are somewhat mixed. While decisions to accept jobs for reasons of job security and proximity to home have negative earnings effects, jobs that were chosen to facilitate increased work life balance have a positive, albeit small, impact on pay.

The second column in Table 3 includes occupational controls. The estimate of the gender wage gap remains relatively unchanged, going from 12.5 percent to 12.1 percent. The reference occupation category in specification (2) is agriculture. The highest paid occupations are managers, professionals and associate professionals and, relative to agriculture, the wages for these occupations are higher by 49, 40 and 32 percent respectively. Being employed in a sales, clerical, building or machine operative occupation is also associated with higher wages, relative to agriculture, while there is no statistically significant effect for workers in elementary occupations. The other coefficients remain broadly similar to the first specification. However, the coefficients on education are lower in the specification with occupational controls, which is reflective of lower educated individuals being employed in lower paid occupations.

Tuble 51 Wuge		, 2014
VARIABLES	(1) Without	(2) With
	occupation	occupation
Male	0.125***	0.121***
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age	0.033***	0.029***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Medium education	0.182***	0.119***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
High education	0.431***	0.264***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Job tenure	0.009***	0.008***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Private sector	0.011	0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Previous status		
Self employed	-0.000	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.016)
In education	-0.030***	-0.032***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployed	-0.126***	-0.107***
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Other	-0.083***	-0.072***
	(0.018)	(0.017)

Table 3: Wage Regression: EU-28, 2014

Job motives		
Suit skills	0.010***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gain experience	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Security	-0.009***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Career progression	0.014***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Reputation of firm	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Benefits and pay	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Close to home	-0.015***	-0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Like the work	0.004**	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Work-life balance	0.004**	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Occupations		
Managers		0.485***
		(0.037)
Professionals		0.397***
		(0.036)
Associate professionals		0.319***
		(0.036)
Sales		0.070*
		(0.036)
Clerical		0.234***
		(0.036)
Building		0.150***
		(0.037)
Machine operatives		0.171***
		(0.037)
Elementary		0.037
		(0.038)
Caratast	A F A F ¥ ¥ *	~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Constant	1.545***	1.477***
	(0.066)	(0.073)
Country EE	Voc	Yes
Country FE Observations	Yes 29,181	29,181
R-squared	0.639	0.655
	ors in narenthese	

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.1 Oaxaca decomposition

The summary of the Oaxaca decomposition for the full sample is shown in Table 4. The raw differential indicates that average male wages are 12.2 percent higher than average female wages for full-time workers in Europe. In both specifications, the overall explained component is small. This is consistent with previous work by Christofides et al. (2013) who, using 2007 EU-SILC data, find that most, if not all, of the average gender wage gap in Europe is unexplained. However, while the Oaxaca decomposition shown in Table 4 shows overall net explained and unexplained components, a detailed decomposition, as shown in Table 5, is necessary to gain information on the relative importance of individual covariates. Even though the overall explained component is small, or zero, some variables may be increasing the gap while others are decreasing the gap. The top half of the table groups the variables into categories including age, education, tenure, public / private sector, previous employment status, job motives, occupation and country effects. The endowment and coefficient effects, reported as percentage point contributions to the overall wage gap, are shown for each group of variables. Below this is a disaggregated decomposition showing the endowment and coefficient effects for each individual job motive.

The detailed decomposition provides some insights as to the low overall explained component of the gender wage gap. While gender differences in characteristics relating to job motives, age, previous employment status, tenure and sector (public / private) increase the wage gap, differences in educational attainment between genders offsets some of this by reducing the wage gap. The explained component relating to education is relatively large and reflects the fact that female educational attainment is generally greater than male attainment, and higher education is associated with higher wages. This is consistent with Blau and Kahn (2016) who document a reversal in the gender education gap since the 1980's.

Table 4: Oaxaca decomposition					
	(1) Without	(2) With			
	occupation	occupation			
Raw Differential*	12.2	12.2			
Explained	-0.2	0.4			
Unexplained					
Due to coefficients	0.4	1.4			
Due to shift coefficient	12.0	10.4			

Note: Occupational controls are included in Spec (2).

(1) Without occupation (2) With occupation						
Categories	Explained	Unexplained	Explained	Unexplained		
Age & age squared	0.5	-3.7	0.5	-0.7		
Education	-3.4	-0.6	-1.9	-0.4		
Job tenure	0.8	2.4	0.7	2.9		
Private sector	0.3	1.9	0.3	1.3		
Prev employment status	0.3	-1.4	0.3	-1.2		
Job motives	1.3	-1.4	1.2	-0.4		
Occupation	-	-	-0.7	-2.1		
Country effects	-	3.2	-	2.0		
Total	-0.2	0.4	0.4	1.4		
Job Motives	Explained	Unexplained	Explained	Unexplained		
Suits skills	-0.2	2.7	-0.1	3.6		
Gain experience	0.3	-2.4	0.4	-2.9		
Security	0.5	-6.7	0.3	-5.9		
Career progression	0	-0.1	0	-0.1		
Reputation of firm	0	0	0	-0.7		
Benefits and pay	0.5	3.6	0.5	3.3		
Close to home	0.4	-0.8	0.3	-0.4		
Likes the work	-0.1	-0.6	0	-0.7		
Work-life balance	-0.1	2.9	-0.2	3.4		

Table 5: Detailed Oaxaca decomposition

Note: Occupational controls are included in Spec (2).

Differences in job motives between males and females explain 1.3 percentage points of the gender wage gap, which equates to approximately 11 percent of the total raw gender pay differential. This is relatively large compared to the explained component of other variables, such as tenure (0.8 percentage points), sector (0.3 percentage points), age (0.5 percentage points) and previous employment status (0.3 percentage points). This result is robust to the inclusion of occupational controls. Job motives relating to benefits and pay, being close to home, job security and work experience are of particular importance, with these four motives alone contributing 1.7 percentage points to the wage gap. This reflects the fact that females, on average, place greater importance on being close to home, gaining work experience and job security, all of which are negatively associated with wages. Differences in job motives related to intrinsically liking the work, accepting a job that suits one's skills and work-life balance, negatively contribute, i.e., lowers the wage gap, by 0.4 percentage points. The endowment effect relating to educational attainment of females in the sample is higher than that for males, and higher education is associated with higher pay.⁵ The

⁵ When occupational controls are included, the explained component relating to education is smaller at 1.9 percentage points. The average education characteristics for males and females remain unchanged, however, as noted, when occupation controls are included, the coefficients related to education become smaller. As such, the endowment effect, $(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)\hat{\beta}_{1m}$, is smaller.

endowment effect relating to occupational tenure is relatively small, explaining just 0.8 percentage points of the wage gap. This may suggest that female employees included in the sample do not appear to be taking large periods of time out of the labour market and subsequently occupationally downgrading due to family or child-rearing obligations. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Table 2 which showed that average occupational tenure of males and females was quite similar (10.13 years for females versus 10.85 years for males).

The job motive results are in line with the theory of compensating differentials, with females placing greater value on finding jobs that are close to home, provide good security and offer work experience. The result relating to job security has support in the field experiment carried out by Mas and Pallais (2016), who found that females were willing to trade off higher pay for a more secure working schedule. Males on the other hand, are more motivated by benefits and pay.

Overall, the unexplained components (the coefficient effects) from the various explanatory variables increase the wage gap by 0.4 percentage points. In addition, the difference between the shift coefficients amounts to 12 percentage points, giving an overall wage gap of 12.2 percent. The unexplained components (the coefficient effects) relating to the job motives suggest the costs of trading off pay for other characteristics tend to be lower for females than males. For example, the unexplained component relating to both job security and being close to home are negative. This is due to the fact that, while both factors are associated with lower wages for both genders, the negative wage effect for males is more pronounced than females. Conversely, the job attributes that tend to boost earnings such as pay and benefits, skills suitability and work life balance are associated with higher returns for males. There is also a sizeable unexplained component associated with job-related covariates that also work to the benefit of male employees; differences between genders in the wage returns relating to employment tenure and working in the private sector increase the wage gap by 2.4 and 1.9 percentage points respectively.

While the analysis so far has been useful in understanding the gender wage gap across the full sample of countries, there is variation between countries that can only be explored by focusing on each country individually. In Appendix Table A1 we show the results of Oaxaca decompositions for every country in the sample, along with a detailed decomposition similar to that shown in Table 5. Estonia has the highest raw gender wage differential in the EU at 33.4 percent. This is consistent with previous work by Osila (2015) who examines the gender wage gap in Europe using EU-LFS data. Other countries with above average raw gender wage differentials include Latvia (25%), Czech Republic (21%), Luxembourg (20.5%), Austria (20.3%), Finland (18.6%), Ireland (17.6%), Portugal (16.1%), Hungary (15.3%), Slovakia (15.3%), Bulgaria (15%), Germany (14%) and Belgium (13.4%). While most of the gender wage gap remains unexplained across countries, a sizeable percentage of the gap is explained in countries such as Sweden (77%), Austria (45%), Ireland (34%), Belgium (29%) and the Netherlands (29%). Figure 1 shows the percentage of the gender wage gap explained in each of the countries in the sample.

To the extent that a zero or negative explained component is consistent with the notion of gender convergence, the results would suggest that this has occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in Eastern European countries. For example, in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Croatia, the explained component is either very close to zero or negative. Therefore, in these countries, the male gender wage premium cannot be explained by females

having lower levels of wage enhancing characteristics compared to males. However, the explained component is larger in countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland and Austria, which indicates that in these countries, females and males are still quite different in their wage enhancing characteristics and this can explain some of the gender wage gap. This is highlighted further in Table 6 which ranks gender differences in job tenure across countries, showing that gender convergence in Europe appears to have occurred at different rates in different regions. In countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Italy and Ireland, where a relatively large proportion of the wage gap is explained, the tenure gap between males and females is relatively high. However in countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary, where the wage gap is unexplained, we observe a very low, or even negative tenure gap, with average job tenure of females exceeding that of males. The fact that tenure appears to play such a large role suggests that gender convergence is lower in countries where females have an increased tendency to exit the labour market for more extended periods. International variations in affordable childcare or parental leave are possible explanations for the observed patterns.




Figure 1: Explained component of the gender wage gap across countries

The results in Appendix Table A1 show the role of job motives in explaining the gender wage gap varies across countries. Expressed as a percentage of the raw wage gap, job motives explain approximately 10 percent, on average, of the raw wage differential. Job motives play a particularly strong role in explaining the gender wage gap in countries with an above average pay gap. For example, job motives expressed as a percentage of the raw wage differential are larger in Hungary (17%), Czech Republic (15%), Portugal (14%) and Ireland (12%). However, job motives also play a role

in explaining the gender wage gap in countries with lower raw wage differentials such as France (11%), Poland (10%), Cyprus (10%), Sweden (9%), Croatia (9%) and Italy (8%). The explained component relating to job motives is negative in five of the fifteen countries with below average gender wage gaps; UK, Netherlands, Greece, Romania and Slovenia. It should be noted that Slovenia is also the only country in the sample with a negative wage gap, with average female wages 3.4 percent higher than male wages.

Country	Male	Female	Diff
Netherlands	13.63	9.36	4.27
Austria	12.43	9.44	2.99
Belgium	12.90	10.66	2.24
Italy	12.99	11.32	1.67
Finland	12.13	10.66	1.47
United Kingdom	9.88	8.51	1.37
Sweden	11.23	9.90	1.32
Germany	12.38	11.09	1.29
Ireland	11.44	10.16	1.28
Spain	11.45	10.17	1.28
Greece	10.14	9.14	1.00
France	12.87	11.94	0.93
Cyprus	11.75	11.03	0.71
Luxembourg	12.08	11.41	0.67
Croatia	12.02	11.36	0.66
Malta	12.57	12.01	0.55
Slovenia	11.48	11.34	0.14
Czech Republic	8.69	8.74	-0.06
Romania	7.76	7.93	-0.16
Poland	8.42	8.88	-0.46
Slovakia	8.70	9.24	-0.54
Estonia	7.72	8.83	-1.11
Hungary	8.60	9.71	-1.11
Denmark	10.16	11.28	-1.12
Portugal	11.87	13.13	-1.25
Bulgaria	6.80	8.13	-1.33
Lithuania	7.84	9.52	-1.69
Latvia	8.05	10.46	-2.41
Total	10.85	10.13	0.71

Table 6: Gender differences in job-tenure across countries

5.2 Quantile decomposition

We carry out quantile analysis for each decile in the wage distribution. The results of the RIF quantile regressions, described in Section 3, are shown in Appendix Table A2. The estimates show the effect of a change in each covariate on the unconditional decile of the wage distribution. In terms of the

estimate of the gender wage gap (the *male* coefficient), this takes a U shape across the distribution, starting off high at the lower end of the distribution (21%) before decreasing and reaching its lowest point at the median (9%), and increasing again at the higher end of the distribution (13%). The job motive estimates show that assigning a high level of importance to benefits and pay and career progression is associated with a strong positive effect on wages across the entire distribution, while being close to home has a consistently negative effect. Being motivated by job security is negatively associated with wages at the middle and upper end of the wage distribution. Being motivated by gaining work experience is negatively associated with wages, especially around the median, while being motivated to find a job that suits one's skills is associated with higher wages, especially at the lower end of the wage distribution.

We examine differences in job motives between males and females across the wage distribution by calculating the average job motive rankings of males and females in each decile. Table A3 shows the percentage difference between males and females for each motive in each decile, with a positive figure indicating that males rank a motive higher than females. The ranking of job motives across the distribution are in line with the averages presented in Table 1. For example, males tend to be more motivated by benefits and pay across the entire distribution; males in the bottom decile assign a ranking to this motive which is 2.4 percent higher than females and 5 percent higher in the top decile. Females place more importance on motives such as being close to home, job security and gaining work experience.

The RIF quantile decomposition results are shown in Table A4. For each decile, we show the raw gender wage differential and how much of this differential can be explained by differences in endowments and how much is unexplained. As with the Oaxaca decomposition, the overall explained component is low. Gender differences relating to job motives, age, previous employment status, tenure and sector (public / private) increase the wage gap, however, differences in educational attainment between genders offset this by reducing the gap. Detailed decomposition results are shown for the explained component, in terms of the percentage point contribution to the raw differential. While the raw wage differential is relatively high at both the very bottom and top of the wage distribution, the differential is generally smaller in the top half of the distribution. However, even though the raw differential becomes smaller, the explained component, including that relating to job motives, becomes larger. Expressed as a percentage of the raw differential, differences in job motives explain approximately 7 percent of the wage gap in the bottom half of the distribution and 13 percent in the top half. Most of the overall job motive effect is driven by four of the nine motives; benefits and pay, being close to home, gaining work experience and job security. Benefits and pay and being close to home have a strong effect across the wage distribution, adding approximately one percentage point to the raw wage gap. Motives relating to job security and work experience have a particularly large effect at the top of the wage distribution; in decile 9, gender differences in these two job motives add approximately 1.5 percentage points to the wage gap. The results indicate that differences in motives account for a non-trivial proportion of the raw gender pay gap and become increasingly important in the upper segments of the wage distribution.

6. Conclusion

The magnitude of the gender wage gap has declined gradually over time. This is partly attributable to a gender convergence in areas such as education, with females catching up with, and often overtaking, males with respect to educational attainment. Goldin describes this as a grand gender convergence (2014). However, despite this gender convergence in human capital related characteristics, a gender wage gap persists and remains largely unexplained. Compensating differentials have been suggested as a potential explanation for the remaining wage gap. High paying jobs may be inflexible, requiring employees to work long and fixed hours. If females trade off higher pay for other characteristics such as greater flexibility, job security or being close to home, this may explain some of the wage gap. However, measuring and quantifying compensating differentials is a difficult task and as such, little empirical evidence exists which investigates this issue.

By exploiting data relating to job motives contained in the European Skills and Jobs Survey, we have attempted to address this gap in the literature by examining whether job motives can explain some of the gender wage gap in Europe. Firstly, we observe that gender convergence is not a universal phenomenon with differences in observable characteristics still playing a role in explaining the raw wage gap in many central and peripheral European countries. However, gender convergence does appear more prominent within eastern European countries, with the result being that within these countries, the raw gender wage differential remains entirely unexplained as males and females are comparable with respect to wage increasing characteristics. Our results provide some support for the theory of compensating differentials. We find that males are more likely to accept jobs that have good financial benefits and pay, whereas females are more likely to be motivated to accept jobs that have other job attributes such as being close to home and job security. Our analysis of full-time employees in Europe indicates that males are paid, on average, 12.2 percent more than females and differences in job motives between males and females increases the wage gap by 1.3 percentage points, accounting for over 10 per cent of the raw differential. This is primarily driven by differences in four job motives; benefits and pay, being close to home, job security and gaining work experience. The explained component relating to job motives is greater than the individual components relating to age, tenure and previous employment status, indicating that motives are an important consideration in the analysis of the gender wage gap. Our quantile analysis revealed that while the raw wage gap generally gets smaller as we move up the wage distribution, the explained component relating to job motives gets larger. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that motives for accepting jobs may themselves be a function of more wider societal factors, whereby females are still expected to fulfil the role of primary care givers and, consequently, many of the wage trade-offs we observe are unlikely to be fully voluntary.

The variation in gender convergence across Europe may reflect cross-country differences in policies which impact the ability of females to combine work and family obligations. For example, we saw a lot of variation in the gender gap in job tenure, whereby in some countries average male tenure is far above that of females, whereas in other countries it is close to zero or even negative. While a detailed investigation into the causal effects of these types of policies on gender convergence across countries is beyond the scope of this paper, the European Parliament's recent bulletin on parental policies provides some informative statistics relating to this topic. The country with the most generous paternity leave policy in 2015 was Slovenia, where fathers get 15 days paid paternity leave

and 75 days 'non-paid' leave, during which the state pays social security contributions based on the minimum salary, which equates to approximately €174 per month. In our data, Slovenia was the only country of the 28 countries studied that recorded a negative raw wage gap, with females earning, on average, 3.4 percent more than males. In addition, there is virtually no difference in average job tenure of males and females in Slovenia. Other countries with relatively generous (4 weeks fully paid) paternal leave policies include Lithuania and Portugal, which are also examples of countries where gender convergence in wage enhancing characteristics appears to have taken place. Establishing a link between these types of policies and gender convergence requires a more detailed study and presents a potential avenue for future research in this area.

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Appendix Tables

	Oa	xaca decompos	ition	Detailed decomposition (p.p.'s explained)					
Country	Raw differential	Explained	Unexplained	Age	Education	Tenure & sector	Previous status	Job motives	
Estonia	33.4	-1.4	34.8	1.3	-3.9	0.5	-0.4	1.1	
Latvia	25	1.4	23.6	-0.9	-3.3	1.6	1.3	2.7	
Czech R.	21	4	17	0.7	-1.2	2	-0.6	3.1	
Luxembourg	20.5	2.9	17.6	0.6	1.4	-0.7	-0.2	1.8	
Austria	20.3	9.2	11.1	2.3	0.2	3.9	1.1	1.7	
Finland	18.6	2.9	16.1	1.9	-1.7	1.4	1	0.3	
Ireland	17.6	5.9	11.6	3.3	-2.8	3.1	0.2	2.1	
Portugal	16.1	-5.9	22	-0.1	-4.9	-1.6	-1.5	2.2	
Hungary	15.3	-4.5	19.8	-0.3	-5.9	0.2	-1.1	2.6	
Slovakia	15.3	-2.1	17.4	-0.4	-2.7	-0.3	0	1.3	
Bulgaria	15	-5.8	20.8	0.2	-7.2	0.6	-0.3	0.9	
Germany	14	2.9	11.1	0	0.1	1.8	0.1	0.9	
Belgium	13.4	3.9	9.5	1.1	-4.1	4.9	0.5	1.5	
France	11.3	0.8	10.5	0.8	-2.3	0.8	0.2	1.3	
UK	10.2	-1.8	12	1.3	-3.7	1.3	-0.2	-0.5	
Poland	9.9	-0.8	10.7	0.5	-4.3	0.6	1.4	1	
Cyprus	9.9	2.8	7.1	0.1	-1	1.3	1.3	1.1	
Sweden	8.6	6.6	2	4.1	-0.6	2.9	-0.6	0.8	
Croatia	8.5	0.8	7.7	0.6	-1.6	0.1	-0.4	2.1	
Italy	7.5	1.6	5.9	3.4	-3	0.4	0	0.8	
Netherlands	7.2	2.1	5.1	5.4	-6.2	3	1	-1.1	
Greece	7.1	-0.2	7.3	1.5	-2.9	1.3	0.8	-0.9	
Romania	6.2	-9.3	15.5	0	-6.5	-0.2	-1.2	-1.4	
Denmark	5.8	-2	7.8	-0.6	-3.6	1.9	-0.3	0.6	
Lithuania	5.2	-1.6	6.8	0.8	-4.1	-1	2	0.7	
Malta	2.1	3.5	-1.4	0	-1.4	1.4	0.2	3.3	
Spain	1.3	-2.9	4.2	0.4	-5.4	1	0.5	0.6	
Slovenia	-3.4	-9.3	5.9	0.1	-8.5	0.5	0.3	-1.7	

Table A1: Country Level Oaxaca Decompositions

Age (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) Age 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.016** Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.011*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113** 0.112*** 0.114** 0.11*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.001***				Table A2: RI	F Quantile Reg	ression Results	S			
Male 0.212*** 0.173*** 0.153*** 0.131*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.109*** 0.127*** 0.133** Age 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.0		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012 Age 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.016** Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.011*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009***	VARIABLES	.10	.20	.30	.40	.50	.60	.70	.80	.90
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Age 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.016** (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)		(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011 (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)	Age	. ,		. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,	0.016***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) <t< td=""><td>C C</td><td>(0.007)</td><td>(0.005)</td><td>(0.005)</td><td>(0.005)</td><td>(0.004)</td><td>(0.004)</td><td>(0.003)</td><td>(0.004)</td><td>(0.005)</td></t<>	C C	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
(0.000) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) <t< td=""><td>Age squared</td><td>-0.001***</td><td>-0.001***</td><td>-0.001***</td><td>-0.000***</td><td>-0.000***</td><td>-0.000***</td><td>-0.000***</td><td>-0.000***</td><td>-0.000</td></t<>	Age squared	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
High education(0.027)(0.019)(0.018)(0.021)(0.016)(0.015)(0.013)(0.014)(0.017)High education0.506***0.423***0.458***0.532***0.440***0.438***0.395***0.382***0.416**(0.026)(0.018)(0.018)(0.021)(0.016)(0.015)(0.014)(0.015)(0.019)Job tenure0.014***0.011***0.011***0.011***0.010***0.009***0.008***0.007**(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)Private sector-0.006-0.003-0.029***-0.039***-0.0150.0130.032***0.058***0.072**(0.016)(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)(0.010)(0.009)(0.009)(0.010)(0.021)Previously employed0.133**0.120***0.099***0.086***0.122***0.068***0.047**0.0320.039(0.052)(0.033)(0.031)(0.033)(0.026)(0.024)(0.022)(0.024)(0.029)Previously self employed0.1010.0650.087**0.095**0.117***0.078**0.064**0.067**0.019(0.053)(0.035)(0.033)(0.035)(0.035)(0.032)(0.030)(0.033)(0.041)0.001Previously in education0.0770.081**0.066**0.081**0.116***0.069**0.0340.0040.010 <t< td=""><td></td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td><td>(0.000)</td></t<>		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
High education 0.506*** 0.423*** 0.458*** 0.532*** 0.440*** 0.438*** 0.395*** 0.382*** 0.416** (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) Job tenure 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007** (0.001) (Medium education	0.180***	0.166***	0.192***	0.234***	0.229***	0.211***	0.156***	0.112***	0.130***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) Job tenure 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007** (0.001)		(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Job tenure 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007** (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)	High education	0.506***	0.423***	0.458***	0.532***	0.440***	0.438***	0.395***	0.382***	0.416***
(0.001) (0.001) <t< td=""><td></td><td>(0.026)</td><td>(0.018)</td><td>(0.018)</td><td>(0.021)</td><td>(0.016)</td><td>(0.015)</td><td>(0.014)</td><td>(0.015)</td><td>(0.019)</td></t<>		(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Private sector -0.006 -0.003 -0.029*** -0.015 0.013 0.032*** 0.058*** 0.072** (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) Previously employed 0.133** 0.120*** 0.099** 0.086*** 0.122*** 0.068*** 0.047** 0.032 0.039 Previously employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 (0.066) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041 Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)	Job tenure	0.014***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***	0.009***	0.008***	0.007***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) Previously employed 0.133** 0.120*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.122*** 0.068*** 0.047** 0.032 0.039 Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017***		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Previously employed 0.133** 0.120*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.122*** 0.068*** 0.047** 0.032 0.039 Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 (0.066) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.16*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020***	Private sector	-0.006	-0.003	-0.029***	-0.039***	-0.015	0.013	0.032***	0.058***	0.072***
(0.052) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 (0.066) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)		(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Previously self employed 0.101 0.065 0.087** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.078** 0.064** 0.067** 0.019 (0.066) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.027 (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) <td>Previously employed</td> <td>0.133**</td> <td>0.120***</td> <td>0.099***</td> <td>0.086***</td> <td>0.122***</td> <td>0.068***</td> <td>0.047**</td> <td>0.032</td> <td>0.039</td>	Previously employed	0.133**	0.120***	0.099***	0.086***	0.122***	0.068***	0.047**	0.032	0.039
(0.066) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -		(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Previously in education 0.077 0.081** 0.066** 0.081** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.034 0.004 0.010 (0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013**	Previously self employed	0.101	0.065	0.087**	0.095**	0.117***	0.078**	0.064**	0.067**	0.019
(0.053) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.029** 0.019*** Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013**		(0.066)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Previously unemployed -0.098* -0.039 -0.055* -0.098*** -0.025 -0.046* -0.057** -0.059** -0.022 (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019** Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013**	Previously in education	0.077	0.081**	0.066**	0.081**	0.116***	0.069***	0.034	0.004	0.010
(0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013** Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013** <td></td> <td>(0.053)</td> <td>(0.035)</td> <td>(0.033)</td> <td>(0.035)</td> <td>(0.027)</td> <td>(0.025)</td> <td>(0.024)</td> <td>(0.026)</td> <td>(0.032)</td>		(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Benefits and pay 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019**	Previously unemployed	-0.098*	-0.039	-0.055*	-0.098***	-0.025	-0.046*	-0.057**	-0.059**	-0.022
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) <t< td=""><td></td><td>(0.057)</td><td>(0.036)</td><td>(0.033)</td><td>(0.036)</td><td>(0.028)</td><td>(0.026)</td><td>(0.024)</td><td>(0.026)</td><td>(0.032)</td></t<>		(0.057)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Close to home -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*	Benefits and pay	0.028***	0.023***	0.019***	0.020***	0.017***	0.020***	0.019***	0.020***	0.019***
		(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
	Close to home	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.020***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.013***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Security 0.001 -0.004 -0.005* -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.020*	Security	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005*	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.012***	-0.018***	-0.020***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)

Suits skills	0.023***	0.017***	0.010***	0.008***	0.008***	0.010***	0.009***	0.006***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Gain experience	-0.003	-0.006***	-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.008***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Career progression	0.017***	0.010***	0.015***	0.021***	0.015***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***	0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Reputation of firm	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Likes the work	-0.007	0.004	0.006**	0.012***	0.008***	0.006**	0.004**	0.006***	0.006*
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Work-life balance	0.006	0.004	0.007***	0.008***	0.004*	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.200	0.309***	0.889***	1.257***	1.723***	1.998***	2.325***	2.334***	2.691***
	(0.168)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.133)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181	29,181
R-squared	0.355	0.467	0.564	0.612	0.576	0.507	0.422	0.318	0.200

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The coefficients represent the marginal effect on the unconditional wage decile.

	Suits							Like the	Work-
Wage percentile	skills	Experience	Security	Career	Reputation	Benefits	Close to home	work	life
0-10	-2.4	-5.7	-6.7	1.8	-2.2	2.4	-6.2	-2.8	-7.1
10-20	0.5	-3.6	-5.8	1.8	-0.4	4.7	-2.7	-2.2	-5.7
20-30	-2.6	-6.8	-8.3	-2.7	-2.2	1.7	-5.2	-3.2	-5.0
30-40	-3.8	-5.9	-5.3	-0.1	-1.2	0.0	-4.2	-1.5	-5.3
40-50	-4.4	-6.1	-4.7	-1.7	1.2	3.8	-2.2	-2.5	-2.2
50-60	-3.7	-5.7	-3.0	0.5	1.6	5.1	-2.5	-2.6	-3.6
60-70	-4.2	-6.4	-3.7	2.0	0.5	2.9	-3.9	-3.3	-3.5
70-80	-5.7	-5.7	-3.3	0.5	0.4	4.3	-2.2	-3.8	-4.3
80-90	-4.8	-8.2	-3.5	-0.6	0.6	2.8	-6.5	-4.1	-2.2
90-100	-1.2	-4.9	-4.2	0.4	0.4	5.0	-3.2	-1.4	-1.7

	1		
Ishio AJ: Dorcontago	dittoropco in avorage	a mativac at man and	lwaman across waga narcantilas
I ADIE AS. FEILEIILARE	unierence in average	e mouves of men and	l women across wage percentiles

Note: A positive number means the average for males is higher than females.

			Table A4: De	cile Decompo	sition				
	Decile 1	Decile 2	Decile 3	Decile 4	Decile 5	Decile 6	Decile 7	Decile 8	Decile 9
Raw differential	18.6	13.7	12.2	16.7	9.8	10.1	10.3	13.2	15.2
Explained (p.p.)	-1.3	-1.2	-1.3	-0.5	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	1.2
Unexplained (p.p.)	19.9	14.9	13.5	17.2	9.9	10	10.1	12.6	14
Catagoriu	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained	Explained
Category	(p.p.) -0.3	(p.p.) -0.1	(p.p.) 0.2	(p.p.) 0.4	(p.p.) 0.4	(p.p.) 0.5	(p.p.) 0.6	(p.p.) 0.8	(p.p.) 1
Age	-0.3 -3.7	-0.1	-3.5	-3.4	-3.1	-3.5	-3.5	-3.4	-3.5
Education Tenure	-3.7	-5	-3.5	0.9	0.8	-3.5	-3.5	-3.4	-3.5
Private sector	0	0.8	-0.3	-0.2	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.0	1.1
Prev employment status	1	-0.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.2
Job motives	0.8	-0.0	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.8
Motives									
Suits skills	-0.45	-0.27	-0.17	-0.17	-0.22	-0.28	-0.26	-0.18	-0.20
Gain experience	0.10	0.29	0.43	0.57	0.40	0.45	0.47	0.42	0.42
Job security	0.18	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.28	0.40	0.58	0.80	1.03
Career progression	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Reputation of firm	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Benefits and pay	0.67	0.56	0.48	0.43	0.44	0.50	0.47	0.45	0.45
Close to home	0.35	0.42	0.49	0.48	0.40	0.45	0.40	0.40	0.35
Likes the work	0.03	-0.13	-0.12	-0.21	-0.09	-0.05	-0.11	-0.20	-0.20
Work-life balance	-0.13	-0.13	-0.09	-0.20	-0.10	-0.09	-0.09	-0.11	-0.05
Total Motives (p.p.)	0.76	1.07	1.10	1.25	1.13	1.40	1.48	1.61	1.81
As % of raw diff	4.15 %	7.81 %	9.02 %	7.49 %	11.53 %	13.86 %	14.37 %	12.20 %	11.91 %