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Take a Chance on ABBA

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 10878

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JULY 2017

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ABSTRACT

Take a Chance on ABBA

The order of actions in contests may generate different psychological effects which, in turn, may influence contestants' probabilities to win. The Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence in which the first 'n' moves is the exact mirror image of the next 'n' moves should theoretically terminate any advantage to any of the contestants in a sequential pair-wise contest. The tennis tiebreak sequence of serves is the closest to the Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence that one can find in real tournament settings. In a tiebreak between two players, A and B, the order of the first two serves (AB) is a mirror image of the next two serves (BA), such that the sequence of the first four serves is ABBA. Then, this sequence is repeated until one player wins the tiebreak. This sequence has been used not only in tennis, but also recently in the US TV presidential debates. In this study we analyse 1,701 men's and 920 women's tiebreak games from top-tier tournaments between the years 2012 to 2015. Using several different strategies to disentangle the effect of serving first from the effect of selection, we find that, for both genders, serving first does not have any significant effect on the winning probabilities of the two players, implying that the ABBA sequence is fair. We thus argue that it might be useful for other sports and contests in general to consider adopting the ABBA sequence in order to improve fairness.

JEL Classification: D00, L00, D20, Z20

Keywords: fairness, performance, contest, sequence, tiebreak, tennis

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1 Introduction

In recent decades, economists have started to pay increased attention to the effect of the order of actions on performance in sequential contests. The importance of this issue is threefold. First, sequential contests have many real-life applications, including R&D races (Harris and Vickers, 1987); job promotions (Rosen, 1986); political campaigns (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006); sports (Szymanski, 2003); and music competitions (Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2003). Second, behavioral insights regarding the effects of psychological motives on players in a competitive environment can be derived from the consequences of the order of actions (Apestequia and Palacios- Huerta, 2010; González-Díaz and Palacios-Huerta, 2016; Cohen-Zada, Krumer and Shtudiner, 2017). Third, an unfair order of actions that provides an ex-post advantage to one of the contestants may harm efficiency by reducing the probability of the ‘better’ contestant to win. This can result in an inefficient economy that operates below the production-possibility frontier.

Many studies have shown that contests with a sequential order of moves may produce an unfair systematic advantage that stems from higher psychological pressure on one of the players. For example, in the pioneering study of Apestequia and Palacios- Huerta (2010), it was found that in soccer penalty shootouts, the team that kicked first had a significant margin of 21 percentage points over the second team. This finding was reproduced in Palacios-Huerta (2014) using a significantly larger sample size. More recently, González-Díaz and Palacios-Huerta (2016) obtained a similar result in a multi-stage chess contest (chess matches) between two players, and found that the player playing with the white pieces in the odd games was much more likely to win the match than the player playing with the white pieces in the even games. Similarly, Magnus and Klaassen (1999) showed that serving first is associated with a higher

probability of winning in the first set of a tennis match (see also Kingston, 1976; Anderson, 1977).¹

In an attempt to find a fairer contest design in which the order of moves may not provide a psychological advantage to any of the players, Palacios-Huerta (2012) proposed the so-called Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence described in Thue (1912). He also provided intuitive arguments for why this sequence may be theoretically fair.² In this sequence, the order of the first n moves is the exact mirror image of the next n moves. Put more simply, if the order between players A and B (assume order AB) provides any kind of advantage to either player, then reversing the order in the next two rounds will mitigate and may even terminate this advantage. An order close to the Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence is the order of serves in tennis tiebreak in which one of the players serves once and then the service alternates every two points between the players. Thus, the order of the first two serves is a mirror image of the next two serves, such that the sequence of the first four serves is $ABBA$, where players A and B are denoted by A and B , respectively.³ In support of this argument, a recent theoretical study by Brams and Ismail (2017) showed that the $ABBA$ sequence is fair and does not provide an advantage to any of the players.

It is of interest that the $ABBA$ sequence is not only applicable to sports competitions. To illustrate, the three 2016 US presidential election debates between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, organized by the Commission on Presidential Debates, also followed the $ABBA$

¹ Based on their analysis of other multi-stage contests with sequential moves, Genakos and Pagliero (2012) and Genakos, Pagliero and Garbi (2015) found consistent evidence that professional weightlifters and divers underperform if they are close to the top of the interim ranking. There is also a large amount of evidence showing that in contests in which participants perform one after the other, the contestants who performed later in the contest had a higher probability to win. Such an advantage was documented for the prestigious Queen Elizabeth music contests (Ginsborough and van Ours, 2003), the popular *Idol* series (Page and Page, 2010), the Eurovision song contests and the World and European figure skating championships (de Bruin, 2005).

² See Allouche and Shallit (1999) for a survey on implications of the Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence.

³ This order remains until the end of the tiebreak such that this is also the sequence of serves 5-8, 9-12 and so on.

structure. In each of the three debates each segment started with a two-minute speech by one candidate followed by a two-minute speech by the other candidate, after which there was an open discussion for the rest of each segment. The identity of the first speaker in the first segment was determined according to a coin toss and then, similarly to the sequence in tennis tiebreak, in each segment the order of the first two speeches was reversed. For example, in the final TV debates the order of the two-minute speeches was as follows: Clinton, Trump, Trump, Clinton, Clinton, Trump, and so on.⁴

Obviously, examining the fairness of the *ABBA* sequence based on data from presidential TV debates is unfeasible, mainly because the outcome of any specific debate is ambiguous and mostly unobserved. Also, the number of observations is far from sufficient. However, since a similar order is also played in tennis competitions, where both the outcome and the players' characteristics are perfectly observed, it is only natural to exploit this setting in order to empirically test whether the *ABBA* order of serves in tennis tiebreak affects the players' probability to win. This is the purpose of this study.

Applying data from professional sports where contestants have strong incentives to win has several advantages. First, it eliminates any possible scepticism about applying behavioral insights obtained in a laboratory to real-life situations (Hart, 2005; Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009). Second, sports contests involve high-stake decisions that are familiar to agents. Third, it provides a unique opportunity to observe and measure performance as a function of variables such as heterogeneity in abilities and prizes. Indeed, as Kahn (2000) argues, sports data are very

⁴ Full transcripts of the three debates can be found on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/26/the-first-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.86b72435f17f , <http://fortune.com/2016/10/09/presidential-debate-read-transcript-donald-trump-hillary-clinton/> and https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-final-trump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.11a8d5572ec8 . Last accessed on 16/12/2016.

unique in that they embody a large amount of detailed information that can be applied for research purposes.

In this paper we utilize data on all the tiebreaks in the first sets of all four top-tier tournaments in professional tennis that took place between the years 2012 to 2015 (in the data section we justify why we concentrate only on the first set of each match). Based on the analysis of 1,701 men's and 920 women's tiebreak games from 72 men's and 135 women's tournaments, we find no significant effect of the order of serves. This finding is obtained for both genders. In other words, a player who serves first in a tiebreak has the same probability to win as his opponent does. As expected, the most important factor that affects the probability to win is a player's ability, as measured by his or her world rankings or betting odds. This result is in line with González-Díaz, Gossner and Rogers (2012) who showed that higher ranked players perform better in the most important points of the match.

Since the order of serves in tiebreak games is not determined randomly, we use several different strategies to disentangle the effect of serving first from the effect of selection. First, to control for unobserved factors that may affect the probability to win a tiebreak, we gathered data on the betting odds of the players. These odds capture many factors that are unobserved for researchers. The second strategy is based on a study by Oster (2016) which assesses the size of the selection bias and the bias-adjusted treatment effect under the assumption that the relationship between the treatment and the unobservables can be recovered from the relationship between the treatment and the observables. These assessments are done by explicitly linking the size of the bias to coefficient and R-squared stability. In the third strategy, we estimate the average treatment effect of serving first by using the distance-weighted radius matching approach with bias adjustments suggested by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2011). This

approach has been shown to have superior finite sample properties relative to a broad range of propensity score-based estimators (Huber, Lechner and Wunsch, 2013). Furthermore, it is particularly robust when the propensity score is functionally misspecified.⁵ Our fourth strategy is to utilize fixed effect estimations in which we exploit variation only within a group of matches where the pre-match betting odds for the players are kept constant. Thus, because within each fixed effect we hold the relative strength of the two players fixed, the coefficient of serving first can be interpreted as causal more convincingly. All these different strategies yield the same conclusion: the *ABBA* sequence does not embrace any advantage to any of the players. This finding is robust to different tournament types and for both genders. Thus, our empirical finding together with Brams and Ismail's (2017) theoretical result on the fairness of the *ABBA* sequence suggest that we can conclude with a high level of confidence that the serve order in tiebreak games does not provide an advantage to any of the players.

Our findings support the IFAB's (the body that determines the rules of soccer) decision to implement the *ABBA* sequence in various trials before eventually replacing the current *ABAB* sequence.⁶ Similarly, FIDE, the governing body of chess, has also recognised the existence of asymmetric psychological pressure that stems from the *ABAB* order and thus recently has changed the rules and regulations for the FIDE World Chess Championship. According to the new rules, the sequence of players who play with white pieces is reversed at the half-way and

⁵ See also Huber, Lechner and Steinmayr (2015) who describe in detail this approach and its implementation in different software packages such as Gauss, Stata and R.

⁶ From: <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/uefa-penalty-shooutout-rules-system-new-trial-a7715026.html>. Last accessed on 19/06/2017. This change is in line with Palacios-Huerta (2014) who conducted an experiment in which professional soccer players competed in penalty shootouts both in the *ABBA* and *ABAB* sequences and found that the *ABBA* sequence is much fairer. A similar result was theoretically shown in Echenique (2017).

thus resembles the symmetric *ABBA* structure.⁷ Our finding regarding the fairness of the *ABBA* structure suggests that it should be considered seriously for any sequential contest in order to mitigate or even eliminate possible advantages to any of the players.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the tiebreak setting. The data and descriptive results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy. In Section 5 we present the empirical evidence. Finally, in Section 6 we offer concluding remarks.

2 Description of the tiebreak game in tennis

A tennis match is played by two players. One player is designated as the server and the other as the receiver. The identity of the first server is decided in the following way. A winner of a coin toss (racquet spin) chooses to serve or receive in the first game of the match. In this case the opponent has to choose the end of the court for the first game of the match. However, a winner of a coin toss can also have the option to choose the end of the court in which case the opponent will choose whether to serve or receive in the first game of the match.

Service alternates game by game between the two players. Typically, a player wins a set by winning at least six games and at least two games more than the opponent. If one player has won six games and the opponent five, an additional game is played. If the player who was in the lead wins that game, he wins the set 7:5. However, if the player who was trailing wins the game, a tiebreaker is played.

⁷ To illustrate, in the 2016 World Chess Championship between Magnus Carlsen and Sergey Karjakin, the colors were reversed halfway through. In the first six games Carlsen played with the white pieces in the odd games, whereas in the last six games, the order was changed such that Karjakin played with the white pieces in the odd numbered games. From section 3.4.1 of the rules and regulations for the 2016 World Championship match, available at: https://www.fide.com/FIDE/handbook/regulations_match_2016.pdf. Last accessed on 15/12/2016.

Unlike a regular game in which only one player serves and the other always receives, in a tiebreak the first server of the set begins to serve and serves one point. After this point, the serve changes to the other player. Each player then serves two consecutive points for the remainder of the tiebreak. Thus, if *Player A* serves first the sequence will be *ABBA*, and then this sequence is repeated *ABBAABBA*... until the tiebreak is decided when one player wins at least seven points and at least two points more than his opponent.

3 Data and variables

3.1 Data

Our data is derived from the Jeff Sackmann's dataset who scraped point-by-point data for tens of thousands of professional tennis matches. In addition, he validated all match scores to eliminate obvious errors in the source data. According to Sackmann, the coverage is very good for ATP and WTA tour-level main draw events since 2012.⁸ Thus, we collected data on all tiebreak games that occurred in the first set of every match in top tier tournaments between the years 2012 to 2015 for the men's Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) and the Women's Tennis Association (WTA). We checked the correctness of data by comparing it to the information on each match available on www.tennisbetsite.com. We chose only the first set to avoid possible asymmetry in the ensuing sets that may stem from different winner-loser effects

⁸ Sackmann's data is licensed under "Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License", and is available on https://github.com/JeffSackmann/tennis_pointbypoint. Last accessed on 19/05/2017.

(for evidence on winner-loser effects see Malueg and Yates, 2010; Gauriot and Page, 2014; Cohen-Zada, Krumer and Shtudiner, 2017; Page and Coates, 2017).⁹

For men, we used data on the two most prestigious tournaments: the Grand Slam tournaments (ATP 2000) and the ATP World Tour Masters 1000 (ATP 1000). In addition, we collected data on two less important tournaments, the ATP World Tour 500 (ATP 500) and the ATP World Tour 250 (ATP 250). For women, we used data on the two most prestigious tournaments, namely the Grand Slam tournaments (WTA 2000) and the WTA Premier Mandatory (WTA 1000). We also collected data on the WTA Premier Series (WTA 900 and 470) and the WTA International (WTA 280).¹⁰ In sum, our dataset includes matches from 72 men's and 135 women's tournaments.

For every match we have information available regarding the names of the players, the identity of the first server in each tiebreak, players' height, weight and body mass index (BMI),¹¹ the round of the match in the tournament, the total number of rounds in the tournament, the surface of the courts and the players' 52-week world ranking prior to the beginning of the tournament.¹² This ranking takes into account all of the results for professional tournaments played over the past 52 weeks and is used as a measure of the players' abilities. Another measure that relates to players' abilities is the betting odds of each match, derived from the betting

⁹ See Cohen-Zada et al. (2017) who also used only the first set of tennis matches for investigating gender differences in choking under pressure.

¹⁰ In each type of tournament the number represents the ranking points for the winner.

¹¹ The body mass index is a measure of human body fat based on height and weight. The BMI is defined as the body mass divided by the square of the body height.

¹² The data on the players' characteristics and the tournament's structure were collected from www.atpworldtour.com and www.wtatennis.com. The data on players' rankings prior to the beginning of each tournament were collected from www.tennisexplorer.com.

market. This data is available from www.tennis-data.co.uk and includes several betting companies. We follow Malueg and Yates (2010) and use the betting odds from bet365.com. Obviously, our odds are highly correlated to odds from other sites.

In all, our data cover 1,718 men's and 954 women's matches. However, for 12 men's and 30 women's matches there is no information on the physical characteristics of one of the players. In addition, for five men's and four women's matches there was no data on betting odds. Eliminating these problematic matches leaves us with a total of 1,701 men's and 920 women's tiebreak games.

The descriptive statistics of our dataset are presented in Table 1. It shows that, on average, the player who serves first has a higher probability to win, a better betting odds and a lower ranking index which is associated with a higher ability. Thus, in order to obtain the causal effect of serving first, we will use several estimation strategies that control for the positive selection into treatment (serving first). We discuss these strategies in Section 4.

3.2 Variables

For each match in our dataset, we randomly picked one of the players and denoted him as *Player A* and the other player as *Player B*. Thus, our outcome variable gets the value of one if *Player A* won the tiebreak and zero otherwise. In Table 2 we can see that *Player A* won 50% of the tiebreaks among men and 50.7% among women.

To estimate the effect of the order of serves, i.e., serving first or second, on performance, we coded a dummy variable that equals one if *Player A* served first in the tiebreak and zero otherwise. Table 2 shows that *Player A* served first in 49.9% of cases both among men and women.

Our set of controls includes players' individual characteristics as well as features of matches and tournaments. In order to control for players' abilities, based on Klaassen and Magnus (2001), we use the $\log_2(rank)$ of players A ($RankA$) and B ($RankB$), where $Rank$ is the most current world ranking of the respective player. We also control for several additional factors that may be important for winning a point on serve, such as height and BMI (Kramer, Rosenboim and Shapir, 2016) as well as one of the players having a home advantage (Koning, 2011). The variable that indicates having a home advantage by $Player A$ gets the value of one if $Player A$ competes at home and $Player B$ does not. Similarly, the variable that indicates having a home advantage by $Player B$ gets the value of one if he competes at home and $Player A$ does not. In addition, we also control for type of tournament, surface and the ratio between the round of the match in the tournament and the total number of rounds.

As we randomized the identity of players A and B , they are not expected to be different in any of their characteristics. Table 2 compares the means of each characteristic of the two players and tests whether the difference between them is significant by estimating a univariate regression of each characteristic as a dependent variable on a dummy variable representing whether the player is $Player A$. In Column 3 of Table 2, we report the coefficients of these regressions, where robust standard errors are in parentheses. We can see that players A and B indeed do not differ in any of their characteristics, implying that the randomization process was successful. Obviously, although the identity of $Player A$ is determined randomly, the process which determines which of the players will serve first in the tiebreak is totally non-random. As we will show in the next section, due to positive selection into the treatment, serving first is associated with having better characteristics.

4 Estimation strategy

Studying whether serving first in tiebreak gives an advantage to any of the players is a challenging task. A naïve approach of correlating a dummy variable for serving first with the probability to win a tiebreak will yield biased and inconsistent estimates because the identity of the player who serves first is not determined at random. Rather, as mentioned earlier, the winner of a coin toss gets the privilege to choose whether to serve first or not and his choice may be based on unobserved characteristics of the two players. Furthermore, isolating an exogenous source of variation in serving first by using an instrumental variable approach seems unfeasible because any factor that might be associated with the decision to serve first is also likely to affect the probability to win the tiebreak.

In the absence of a valid instrument, we will use several alternative strategies to control for the endogenous choice to serve first. First, we will reduce the amount of selection by adding to a wide set of controls the probability that gamblers assign to *Player A* to win the match as reflected in the betting odds. This is an effective way to reduce selection concerns because many factors that are unobserved by the researcher are in fact observed by gamblers and are thus captured in the betting odds. For example, a gambler almost certainly observes factors such as the specific matchup between the two players, the power of serve, fatigue due to previous competitions, recent performance, and even weather and temperature conditions.

Second, we utilize fixed effect estimations in which we exploit variation only within a group of matches where the pre-match betting odds of *Player A* to win the match are identical. Thus, within each fixed effect, the relative strength of the two players are kept constant, and thus the coefficient of serving first can more convincingly be interpreted as causal rather than reflecting spurious correlations due to omitted factors.

Third, we exploit a new methodology that was recently proposed by Oster (2016) for obtaining a bias-adjusted treatment effect when selection is involved. This methodology follows Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and assesses the bias-adjusted treatment effect under the assumptions that the amount of selection on unobservables is not greater than the amount of selection on observables, and that selection on unobservables acts in the same direction as selection on observables. Thus, if adding the entire set of observed controls to the estimation moves the coefficient of the treatment variable towards zero then the unobservables will further push it in this direction. Similarly, if the entire set of observed controls move the coefficient of interest away from zero then the unobservables are expected to move it even further from zero. Furthermore, this methodology also extends that of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) because it offers a closed-form estimator of bias under less restrictive assumptions.

Last, we use propensity score matching in which we set the characteristics of the player who serves first to be equal to the characteristics of the player who receives first. Thus, under the assumption that the two players are also equal in their unobserved characteristics, the effect of serving first can be interpreted as causal.

5 Results

5.1 Basic results

We first utilize a cross-section analysis of all the tiebreaks in our dataset in order to separately estimate by gender a naïve logit model of the probability of *Player A* to win the tiebreak as a function of whether or not he/she serves first. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results, where Panel A and Panel B report the average marginal effects for men and women,

respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The results show that serving first is associated with a 5.1 percentage points higher probability to win the tiebreak among men. Among women, there is no positive association between serving first and the probability to win the tiebreak.

However, the causal interpretation of these estimates relies on the assumption that the players who serve first are, on average, similar in their observed and unobserved characteristics to the players who receive first, which is unlikely to hold because, as mentioned earlier, serving first is not determined randomly but rather by choice. Furthermore, selection is also likely to exist because the performance of the players during the set determines whether at all the set will reach the tiebreak stage. To provide evidence on the existence of selection, we conduct a balance test in which, for each gender, we compare the two players in terms of their observed characteristics. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 report the summary statistics of the player who serves first and the player who receives first, respectively. It can be observed that both among men and women serving first is positively associated with being the favorite player and having a lower ranking index (indicating a better player). It is also associated with having a higher height (which is a clear advantage in tennis), and having a higher pre-match probability to win the match based on betting odds. In order to examine whether the differences between the two players are significant we measure the correlation between the serving first variable and each of our observed controls. Formally, for each of our controls we report the estimate of δ_1 obtained from the following model:

$$X_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \cdot SF_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where X_i is each of our observed characteristics and SF_i is a dummy variable that gets the value of one if the player serves first, and zero otherwise. The results reported in Column 6 of Table 2 indicate that for both genders the two players differ substantially and significantly in many observed characteristics. In addition, for men, the player who serves first is associated with having more favorable characteristics. Thus, since selection into serving first is positive, the estimates of serving first, presented in Column 1 of Table 3, are likely to be upward-biased. Indeed, Column 2 indicates that when our set of basic controls is added to the equation, the coefficient of serving first decreases to 0.027 and becomes insignificant. Among women, the estimate becomes more negative but is still negligible and very insignificant.

Because these naïve estimates suffer from selection, in the next sections we use the four different strategies mentioned earlier in order to isolate the pure effect of serving first.

5.2 Controlling for betting odds

In order to reduce the selection concern, in Column 3 of Table 3 we add to our basic set of controls the probability that *Player A* wins the match according to the betting odds. In this way, we are able to control for many factors that are unobserved to the researcher but still observed to gamblers. As the table indicates, the results show that adding the betting probability to the estimation hardly has any effect on the coefficient of serving first. This implies that, conditional on our initial wide set of basic controls, serving first is quite orthogonal to the winning probabilities that are based on betting odds.

We also check the sensitivity of our estimates to using a linear probability model instead of logit. The results of these estimations, presented in Columns 4-6, are almost identical to those in Columns 1-3. In addition, in Table 4, we provide estimates by tournament type, which show that

for both men and for women, and for all tournament types, the order of actions in tiebreak does not provide an advantage to any of the players.

5.3 Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect

Next, in order to isolate the selection bias and obtain the bias-adjusted treatment effect of serving first, we use a formula suggested by Oster (2016), which calculates the bias-adjusted treatment effect, β^* , as follows:

$$\beta^* = \tilde{\beta} - \delta[\beta^0 - \tilde{\beta}] \cdot (R_{\max} - \tilde{R}) / (\tilde{R} - R^0)$$

where $\tilde{\beta}$ and β^0 are the coefficients of serving first in regressions with and without observed controls, respectively, and \tilde{R} and R^0 are the R-squared values of these regressions, respectively. The bias-adjusted treatment effect calculated above is conditional on the size of two parameters: 1) the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved variables (δ) and (2) the R-squared from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved controls, R_{\max} . Like Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), Oster (2016) suggests that $\delta = 1$ may be an appropriate upper bound on δ . In addition, based on a sample of randomized papers from top journals, Oster determines that $R_{\max} = 1.3\tilde{R}$ may be a sufficient upper bound on R_{\max} . This criterion would allow at least 90% of randomized results to survive. We follow the bounds on δ and R_{\max} that Oster suggests, and present in Column 7 of Table 3 the bias-adjusted treatment effect of serving first. The results show that among men the estimated causal effect (0.019) is even closer to zero and very insignificant. Among women, the causal effect moves further from zero but still remains negligible in size and highly insignificant.

Oster (2016) also offers an adjusted procedure for evaluating the bias-adjusted treatment effect when some variables are considered as part of the identification strategy and thus appear both in the controlled and uncontrolled regressions. The idea is to assess the amount of selection on the observables conditional on including these variables in the estimation. Because the betting probability of *Player A* to win the match captures many observed and unobserved factors that affect the outcome, it is worthwhile to assess the amount of selection conditional on this variable being included in the estimation as part of our identification strategy. The results, reported in Column 8 of Table 3, show that for both men and women the causal effect moves towards zero and only becomes more insignificant. Thus, all the different specifications in Table 3 indicate that the order of serves in tiebreak does not provide an advantage to any of the players.

5.4 Fixed-effect estimations

To further reduce the concern of selection, we next estimate fixed effect linear probability models (LPM) in which we include in each estimation fixed effects for every group of matches that has the same betting probability of *Player A* to win the match. In this way, since we use variation in serving first only within each fixed effect, where the relative strength of the two players are kept constant, the coefficient of serving first can more convincingly be interpreted as causal. In these fixed-effect estimations we prefer using a linear probability model rather than logit because of three main reasons.

First, while this model uses all of the observations, a fixed effect logit model can only use observations for which the outcome variable varies within each match. Thus, it omits matches in

which the outcome is fixed, which may bias the estimates.¹³ Second, any non-linear estimation such as logit relies on the functional form while in the linear model the fixed effects account for variation in the data in a completely general way. Third, a logit fixed effect model yields consistent estimates only under the stronger assumption of strict exogeneity, while LPM requires exogeneity to hold only within a fixed effect.

The results of these estimations, by tournament type, are reported in Table 5. Similar to the results without fixed effects (Table 4), we can see that for both men and for women and for all types of tournaments, the coefficient of serving first is not significant. Moreover, we also calculated Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effects for the fixed effect estimation that includes all the tournaments and find that serving first is far from significant (see Columns 5 and 10, for men and women, respectively).

5.5 Radius matching analysis

As a last step, we also derive the radius-matching-on-the-propensity-score estimator with bias adjustment (Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2011). Not only was it found to be very competitive among a range of propensity score related estimators, but in a later paper Huber,

¹³ In logit and probit fixed effect models $Pr[\pi A_{win} = 1] = G[\alpha_1 \cdot A_{serve} + \beta x + \mu_m]$ where $G(\cdot)$ is the cumulative density function (CDF) for either the standard normal or the logistic distribution, and μ is a set of fixed effects for every group of matches that has the same betting probability of *Player A* to win the match. It is easy to see that unlike in a linear fixed effect model, because of the function $G(\cdot)$ we cannot eliminate μ_m by using within transformation. Moreover, if we attempt to estimate μ_m directly by adding dummy variables for each match, the estimates of μ_m are inconsistent, and unlike the linear model, the estimate of α_1 becomes inconsistent too. Thus, the only way to obtain a consistent estimate for α_1 is to eliminate μ_m from the equation. In a probit model this is completely impossible. Thus, including fixed effects in a probit model will yield biased estimates due to the well-known incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Greene 2004). Unlike probit models, the logit functional form enables us to eliminate μ_m from the equation but only under the assumption that the dependent variable changes within each fixed effect. For this reason, it drops matches in which the outcome is fixed within a given fixed effect.

Lechner and Wunsch (2013) actually showed its superior finite sample and robustness properties in a large scale empirical Monte Carlo study. The main idea of this estimator is to compare treated and non-treated observations within a specific radius. The first step consists of distance-weighted radius matching on the propensity score. In contrast to standard matching algorithms where controls within the radius obtain the same weight independent of their location, in the radius matching approach, controls within the radius are weighted proportionally to the inverse of their distance to the respective treated observations they are matched to. The second step uses the weights obtained from this matching process in a weighted linear or non-linear regression in order to remove biases due to mismatches. Because this approach uses all comparison observations within a predefined distance around the propensity score, it allows for higher precision than fixed nearest neighbour matching in regions in which many similar comparison observations are available.

We conducted this analysis for two different specifications. In the first specification we control only for the betting odds, and in the second we also include the basic controls. In Table 6, we report the results of the propensity score equation. We can see that winning probabilities based on betting odds are significantly associated with serving first. In addition, selection is also driven by several physical characteristics. In Table 7 we present the results for the radius matching estimator. As can be observed, we find no significant effect of serving first on the probability to win the tiebreak for both men and women. Note that the coefficients and the standard errors presented in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 are generally very similar in size to those presented in Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.

Taken together, all the estimation strategies above yield the same finding that serving first in tennis tiebreak does not provide an advantage to any of the players to win the tiebreak, which implies that the *ABBA* sequence is quite likely to be fair.

6 Conclusion

The order of actions in contests is a potentially important determinant of performance in settings ranging from chess matches, penalty shootouts in soccer, or presidential candidate debates to move into the White House. This paper contributes to the literature by empirically testing whether the *ABBA* sequence is fair.

Using several methods that control for selection, we consistently find that there is no systematic advantage to any player serving first or second in tiebreaks in tennis. In other words, two-equally skilled players who compete in an *ABBA* sequence have the same winning probability. This result applies to both genders and to all types of tournaments.

Our findings, along with evidence on the effect of order of moves on performance in a range of other environments, suggests that contest designers of sequential tournaments in the areas of politics, sports, debates, etc., may consider adopting the *ABBA* sequence if fairness is an important goal.

7 References

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable Name	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
	Men				Women			
First Server Wins	0.526	0.499	0.000	1.000	0.499	0.500	0.000	1.000
First Server Probability to Win from Bets	0.518	0.223	0.029	0.971	0.518	0.198	0.042	0.954
First Receiver Probability to Win from Bets	0.482	0.223	0.029	0.971	0.482	0.198	0.046	0.958
First Server Ranking Index : \log_2 (Server Ranking)	5.257	1.652	0.000	9.986	5.306	1.557	0.000	10.187
First Receiver Ranking Index : \log_2 (Receiver Ranking)	5.409	1.473	0.000	10.028	5.450	1.459	0.000	9.972
Home Advantage of First Server	0.145	0.352	0.000	1.000	0.097	0.296	0.000	1.000
Home Advantage of First Receiver	0.131	0.337	0.000	1.000	0.091	0.288	0.000	1.000
BMI of First Server	23.425	1.817	18.391	32.000	20.916	1.395	16.693	24.841
BMI of First Receiver	23.142	1.804	18.391	32.000	21.171	1.364	16.693	26.644
Height of First Server (cm)	188.474	8.080	168.00	211.00	174.570	6.796	155.00	190.00
Height of First Receiver (cm)	187.532	8.103	168.00	211.00	173.722	6.573	155.00	188.00
Grand Slams	0.205	0.404	0.000	1.000	0.202	0.402	0.000	1.000
Mid Tournaments (ATP/WTA 1000)	0.200	0.400	0.000	1.000	0.247	0.431	0.000	1.000
Other Tournaments	0.595	0.491	0.000	1.000	0.551	0.498	0.000	1.000
Grass	0.171	0.377	0.000	1.000	0.147	0.354	0.000	1.000
Clay	0.273	0.446	0.000	1.000	0.251	0.434	0.000	1.000
Hard	0.556	0.497	0.000	1.000	0.602	0.490	0.000	1.000
Relative Round	0.361	0.215	0.143	1.000	0.347	0.213	0.143	1.000
Observations		1701				920		

Table 2: Selection into treatment

	<i>Random Player A</i>	<i>Random Player B</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>First Server</i>	<i>First Receiver</i>	<i>Difference</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Men's tournaments</i>						
Share of Wins	0.500 (0.500)	0.500 (0.500)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.526 (0.499)	0.474 (0.499)	0.051*** (0.017)
Betting Odds (prob. to win)	0.498 (0.224)	0.502 (0.224)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.518 (0.223)	0.482 (0.223)	0.036*** (0.008)
First Server	0.499 (0.500)	0.501 (0.500)	-0.002 (0.017)			
Ranking Index: log ₂ Rank	5.335 (1.530)	5.330 (1.603)	0.005 (0.054)	5.257 (1.652)	5.409 (1.473)	-0.152*** (0.054)
Home Advantage	0.005 (0.465)	-0.005 (0.465)	0.011 (0.016)	0.015 (0.464)	-0.015 (0.464)	0.029* (0.016)
BMI	23.270 (1.777)	23.297 (1.854)	-0.027 (0.062)	23.425 (1.817)	23.142 (1.804)	0.283*** (0.062)
Height	1.878 (0.080)	1.882 (0.082)	-0.003 (0.003)	1.885 (0.081)	1.875 (0.081)	0.009*** (0.003)
Favorite	0.509 (0.500)	0.491 (0.500)	0.017 (0.017)	0.537 (0.499)	0.463 (0.499)	0.073*** (0.017)
<i>Panel B: Women's tournaments</i>						
Share of wins	0.507 (0.500)	0.493 (0.500)	0.013 (0.023)	0.499 (0.500)	0.501 (0.500)	-0.002 (0.023)
Betting Odds (prob. to win)	0.496 (0.198)	0.504 (0.198)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.518 (0.198)	0.482 (0.198)	0.036*** (0.009)
First Server	0.499 (0.500)	0.501 (0.500)	-0.002 (0.023)			
Ranking Index: log ₂ Rank	5.366 (1.514)	5.390 (1.507)	-0.024 (0.070)	5.306 (1.557)	5.450 (1.459)	-0.144** (0.070)
Home Advantage	0.001 (0.408)	-0.001 (0.408)	0.002 (0.019)	0.005 (0.408)	-0.005 (0.408)	0.011 (0.019)
BMI	21.016 (1.387)	21.071 (1.384)	-0.055 (0.065)	20.916 (1.395)	21.171 (1.364)	-0.254*** (0.064)
Height	1.744 (0.066)	1.739 (0.067)	0.005 (0.003)	1.746 (0.068)	1.737 (0.066)	0.008*** (0.003)
Favorite	0.502 (0.500)	0.498 (0.500)	0.004 (0.023)	0.521 (0.500)	0.479 (0.500)	0.041* (0.023)

Table 3: The effect of serving first on the probability to win the tiebreak

	Logit Regression			LPM			Oster	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Men's tournaments</i>								
Player A Serves First	0.051** (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)	0.051** (0.024)	0.028 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.012 (0.025)
Number of obs.	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
<i>Panel B: Women's tournaments</i>								
Player A Serves First	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.032)
Number of obs.	920	920	920	920	920	920	920	920
Player A prob. to win based on betting odds	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Basic controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: The list of basic controls includes the ranking indexes of players *A* and *B*, whether each of the players has a home advantage, the height and BMI index of each player, the round of the match in the tournament relative to the total number of rounds, as well as type of tournament- and surface-fixed effects. In Column 7 we report Oster's bias-adjusted treatment effect when the amount of selection on unobservables is recovered from the amount of selection on all observables. In Column 8 we treat the betting odds as part of the identification strategy and thus recover the amount of selection on unobservables from the amount of selection on all the other observed characteristics, where the betting odds is included both in the controlled and uncontrolled regressions. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors in columns 7 and 8 are obtained from bootstrapping (500 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.

Table 4:
Logit estimates of the effect of serving first on the probability to win the tiebreak

Variable	Men's tournaments				Women's tournaments			
	Small tourn.	ATP 1000	Grand- Slams	All tourn.	Small tourn.	WTA 1000	Grand- Slams	All tourn.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Player A Serves First	0.028 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.054)	0.053 (0.052)	0.027 (0.024)	0.007 (0.044)	0.000 (0.067)	-0.037 (0.074)	-0.008 (0.033)
Number of Obs.	1,012	341	348	1,701	507	227	186	920

Note: In all the regressions we control for *Player A*'s winning probability based on betting odds, the ranking index of players *A* and *B*, whether each of them has a home advantage, their height and BMI index, the round of the match in the tournament relative to the total number of rounds as well as type of tournament- and surface-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.

Table 5:
Fixed effects estimation of the effect of serving first on the probability to win the tiebreak

Variable	Men's tournaments					Women's tournaments				
	Small tourn.	ATP 1000	Grand- Slams	All tourn.	Oster	Small tourn.	WTA 1000	Grand- Slams	All tourn.	<i>Oster</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Player A Serves First	0.037 (0.034)	0.009 (0.069)	0.059 (0.061)	0.029 (0.024)	0.003 (0.029)	0.042 (0.057)	-0.033 (0.079)	0.007 (0.135)	-0.010 (0.041)	0.013 (0.033)
Number of Obs.	1,012	341	348	1,701	1,701	507	227	186	920	920
Number of Groups	99	81	95	125	125	87	69	81	116	116

Note: In all the regressions we control for *Player A*'s winning probability based on betting odds, the ranking index of players *A* and *B*, whether each of them has a home advantage, their height and BMI index, the round of the match in the tournament relative to the total number of rounds as well as type of tournament- and surface-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors in columns 5 and 10 are obtained from bootstrapping (500 replications). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.

Table 6:
Propensity score estimation

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Men</i>		<i>Women</i>	
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>
Player A Prob. to Win (betting)	0.179*** (0.054)	0.038 (0.094)	0.228*** (0.082)	0.175 (0.139)
log ₂ (Rank Player A)		-0.003 (0.013)		0.001 (0.017)
log ₂ (Rank Player B)		0.017 (0.012)		0.008 (0.017)
Home Adv. Player A		0.020 (0.351)		0.004 (0.055)
Home Adv. Player B		-0.061* (0.036)		-0.078 (0.056)
BMI Player A		0.018** (0.007)		-0.030** (0.012)
BMI Player B		-0.025*** (0.007)		0.027 (0.013)
Height Player A		0.454*** (0.155)		0.333 (0.270)
Height Player B		-0.344** (0.150)		-0.135 (0.258)
Relative Round		0.090 (0.071)		-0.098 (0.089)
Type of Tournament FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Surface FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	1701	1701	920	920

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy of whether *Player A* serves first or not. Average marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.

Table 7:
*Radius matching estimates of the average effect
of serving first on the probability to win the tiebreak*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Men</i>		<i>Women</i>	
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>
Player A Serves First	0.032 (0.024)	0.022 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.034)	0.007 (0.036)
Obs. in Common Support	99%	99%	100%	99%

Note: The average effect of serving first on the winning probability of *Player A* is presented. The results in each column of this table are based on the propensity score estimation presented in the corresponding column in Table 6. Inference for the average treatment effect is based on bootstrapping the t-statistic (500 replications). The standard errors obtained from the bootstraps are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.