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**Working Paper**

## Immigration Enforcement and Foster Care Placements

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 10850

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina; Arenas-Arroyo, Esther (2017) : Immigration Enforcement and Foster Care Placements, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 10850, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170834>

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 10850

**Immigration Enforcement  
and Foster Care Placements**

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JUNE 2017

## DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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# Immigration Enforcement and Foster Care Placements

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## ABSTRACT

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# Immigration Enforcement and Foster Care Placements<sup>1</sup>

Tougher immigration enforcement has been responsible for approximately 1.8 million deportations between 2009 and 2013 alone. Children enter the foster care system when their parents are apprehended, deported and unable to care for them. We find that the average increase in interior immigration enforcement over the 2001 through 2015 period contributed to raising the share of Hispanic children in foster care anywhere between 15 and 21 percent. The effects appear to be driven by the implementation of police-based local initiatives linked to deportations, as in the case of the Secure Communities program. Given the revival of police-based immigration enforcement by President Donald Trump, further analyses of its consequences on families are well warranted.

**JEL Classification:** J13, J15, K37

**Keywords:** immigration enforcement, unauthorized immigration, foster care, United States

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<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to participants at the 2017 Population Association of American meetings and to Zovanga Kone, Susan Pozo and Bernhard Schmidpeter for comments to an earlier draft.

““It was a hard case. Everybody was against me,” Mr. Cedillo said. “They said the children couldn’t come here because they didn’t speak Spanish, they were coming to a culture that was very different.”“ [Elisabeth Malkin, May 20, 2017, “Pain of Deportations Swell When Children Are Left Behind”, *The New York Times*.

## **1. Introduction**

Intensified immigration enforcement, particularly at the local and state levels, has been responsible for roughly 1.8 million deportations between 2009 and 2013 alone (Vaughan 2013). Deportations have broken up households and changed the structure of many families headed by an unauthorized parent –typically through the deportation of fathers (Capps *et al.* 2016). In some instances, the children enter the foster care system when their parents, or single parents, are detained by Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the children are left alone. Supporting these concerns, data from the national Adoption and Foster Case Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) Foster Care files reveal a distinct trend of Hispanic and white non-Hispanic children entering foster care during much of the period of intensified enforcement. Specifically, while the number of Hispanic youth foster care placements rose by a factor of 845 percent between 2004 and 2015, it decreased by 66 percent among white non-Hispanic youth over the same period. These are worrisome statistics. Hispanic children with likely undocumented parents represent almost the 8 percent of the total children in the United States (Passel *et al.* 2014). Without a doubt, these children will have a say in the future of the country. In 2016, the second generation of Hispanic immigrants accounted for one-third (32 percent) of Hispanic eligible voters, up from 27 percent in 2008 and 26 percent in 2000.<sup>2</sup> Aside from the average cost of \$26,000/year of fostering a child, foster care children are at high risk for severe emotional, behavioural and

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/01/19/looking-forward-to-2016-the-changing-latino-electorate/>

developmental problems (American Academia of Pediatrics 2000). Children in foster care are significantly more likely to be afflicted by mental and physical health problems, to receive welfare assistance, to engage in substance abuse and to become homeless (Clausen *et al.* 1998; Dworsky and Courtney, n.d.; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Administration on Children Youth and Families 1999; Vinnerljung *et al.* 2006). Burt *et al.* (1999) report that almost 20 percent of young prison inmates and 28 percent of homeless individuals spent some time in foster care when they were kids. Hence, it is not surprising they also have worse and fewer labor market opportunities (Doyle 2007). They are also three times more likely to commit a crime than of children who were not placed in foster care (Doyle 2008). Thus, gaining a better understanding of the impacts of intensified immigration enforcement is not only imperative given the consequences on these children, all of them U.S. citizens, but also in light of the strengthening of immigration enforcement (see Figure 1).<sup>34</sup>

Given these facts, our aim is to assess how the escalation of immigration enforcement that has taken place at the local and state levels since the early 2000s might have contributed to the growing number of Hispanic youth in foster care. To that end, we combine state-level data on foster care placements from the 2001-2015 AFCARS Foster Care files, and detailed information on the intensification of immigration enforcement at the state level.<sup>5</sup> Due to the lack of information on the parents' immigration status, which would enable us to explore how immigration enforcement impacts the foster care placement of each individual child according to her/his parents' characteristics, we focus instead on assessing the potential role that intensified immigration enforcement might have played on the growing share of Hispanic youth in foster care. Because the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are Hispanic

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<sup>3</sup>The budget for immigration enforcement planned for 2018, it is a 25 percent more than previous year.

<sup>4</sup>Between January 22 and April 29, ICE conducted around 10,800 “non-criminal arrests,” compared to just 4,200 in 2016—an increase of more than 150 percent(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2017a).

<sup>5</sup> Given confidentially reasons, county information is only available when caseloads exceed 1,000.

(Passel and Cohn 2009), the focus on this group is important, especially given the unique increase in their foster care placements in areas with intensified immigration enforcement, as we shall discuss. Overall, the analysis will provide us with a lower bound estimate of the true effect of immigration enforcement on mixed-status families.

We exploit the temporal and geographic variation in interior immigration enforcement policies and find that the average increase in interior immigration enforcement during the 2001 through 2015 period contributed to raising the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system anywhere between 15 and 21 percent. The effect was particularly acute in states that are stricter in their implementation of interior immigration enforcement measures, as is the case of states without a Trust Act.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it appears to have been driven by the adoption of police-based immigration enforcement initiatives linked to the growing number of deportations over that time period, as was the case with the Secure Communities program.

To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how immigration enforcement might have contributed to foster care admissions among Hispanic youth. Aside from adding to a literature exploring the reasons behind recent increases in foster caseloads (*e.g.* Swann and Sylvester 2006, Cunningham and Finlay 2013), this analysis enhances our understanding of the consequences of immigration policy on undocumented immigrants and their often mixed-status families (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2016, Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo 2017, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez 2017, Watson 2014). Given the promised increase in deportations by President Donald Trump and the swift implementation of executive orders that revive police-based immigration enforcement, gaining an understanding of how the latter is likely affecting American children is imperative.

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<sup>6</sup> Trust Acts are adopted with the purpose of increasing trust and community cooperation with the police. The latter became a concern in many communities following the prior implementation of deportation programs and the sharing of information between local, state, and federal government agencies.

## **2. Interior Immigration Enforcement and the Foster Care System**

Deportations from the interior of the United States have been at an all-time high during much of the past decade. Most of those deported were men, many of them fathers of U.S.-born children. An estimated 5.5 million children in the United States have an undocumented parent, and approximately 4.5 million of those children are U.S.-born (Passel and Cohn 2009). There are various ways in which these children may enter the foster care system that differ according to whether Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Child Protective Services (CPS) get involved simultaneously or at distinct stages:

1. *Straight Path:* The most common case is when parents are arrested by local law enforcement agencies, held in detention by ICE until their case is heard and, typically, deported. In those cases, CPS might step in and assume the custody of the children.
2. *Parallel Path:* Alternatively, an allegation of child maltreatment might bring a family to the attention of both CPS and ICE. What might have been a normal CPS case likely ending with a prompt reunification results, instead, in parental detention and extended family separation. Detained parents might be unable to advocate for themselves in juvenile court and family reunification might prove challenging.
3. *Interrupted Path:* CPS might have already been involved when ICE intervenes. In those cases, the detention of the parents by ICE interrupts, sometimes irreparably, the process of family reunification.

In all the aforementioned instances, the apprehension, detention and eventual deportation of the main household earner might lead to a precipitous drop in household income, as well as to food and housing insecurity. CPS might interpret the children have been left alone, abandoned and/or neglected. CPS will start investigating the case. If it determines that the children are at risk, it will file a petition to a juvenile dependency court to remove the child from the household. If the juvenile dependency court agrees to the removal



of the child from the home, an alternative placement with other family members will be sought after. Unfortunately, in the case of undocumented parents, the latter might not be a possibility, in which case the children might be placed in foster care. CPS will notify all relatives of the removal and will create a so-called *permanency plan*. In most instances, the ultimate objective of such a plan is to reunite the family. For that to happen, parents have to complete and fulfil a number of tasks specified in the plan to reunite with their children.

Within a year after the child is placed in foster care, the juvenile dependency court holds a *permanency hearing* to determine whether reasonable efforts were made by the parents and, accordingly, whether reunification or another plan, such as permanent custody with a relative or long-term foster care, should be pursued. Once the child has been in foster care for 15 of the past 22 months, the state's child welfare department can petition the court to terminate parental rights according to the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) (P.L. 105-89).<sup>7</sup> If the court agrees to it, adoption becomes another possibility; however, the termination of parental rights does not automatically lead to adoption. In many instances, the children remain in long-term foster care.

Because undocumented immigrants' detention often times takes place in centers that are more than 300 miles away from the home where the children reside, the parents face chronic barriers to comply with the permanency plan set up by the court, as well as to attend dependency hearings (Wessler 2011). These challenges only deepen once the parents have been deported. Even though CPS is supposed to conduct a diligent investigation to locate deported parents by contacting the consulates of the undocumented migrant's country of origin, the information provided to the consulate –typically the first name and last name, is not enough to locate the parents. As a result, CPS might seek to terminate parental rights to “free” the child for adoption.

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<sup>7</sup> The 1997 ASFA established shorter timelines and less stringent conditions for seeking termination of parental rights. Following its enactment, the number of adoptions of children in foster care rose, in just one year, from 1998 to 1999, by 28 percent (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000).

### **3. Data and Descriptive Statistics**

#### **3.1 Data**

##### **3.1.1. Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS)**

We use the national data set on state-level child abuse and neglect information (NCANDS). In 1988, under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services created NCANDS. Every year, data on foster care and adoption records are submitted by the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. NCANDS consists of two separate data files –one for foster care and one for adoption records. We use the Adoption and Foster Case Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) Foster Care files for the period 2001-2015.

The AFCARS foster care files contain information on each child in foster care in a particular year, the date a child first and last entered foster care, as well as basic demographic data, *e.g.* child's age, gender, race and ethnicity. Additionally, AFCARS gathers information about the removal reason, which we use in order to focus on those cases more likely linked to parental detentions and deportations –namely: parental incarceration, caretaker inability cope, abandonment, relinquishment, or inadequate housing.<sup>8</sup> The data are representative at the state level; therefore, we exploit the data at that geographic level.

Prior studies have used the AFCARS data to explore interesting policy questions. For example, Cunningham and Finlay (2013) use data from the AFCARS for the 1995-1999 period to study the causal effect of parental methamphetamine on foster care admissions at the state level. They exploit two supply-side interventions in meth markets from the late 1990s for identification, and find that a 1 percent increase in whites' meth use is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in white foster care admissions. In, yet, another policy paper, Swann and Sylvester (2006) argue that increases in female incarcerations and reductions in

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<sup>8</sup> Other reasons identified in the data include physical abuse, sex abuse, neglect, alcohol abuse or drug abuse, child related problems and parental death.

cash welfare benefits played dominant roles in explaining the growth in foster care caseloads per state over the period 1985 to 2000. They weight their results by the number of children in each state to give more weight to states with more children and, in addition to their key state-level regressors, control for a number of child-level characteristics.

As prior analyses, we look at changes in caseloads at the state level. As noted earlier, AFCARS does not contain information on the immigration or citizenship statuses of either children or their parents. Therefore, we are unable to identify children with undocumented parents. Hence, we focus on state-level caseloads of Hispanic youth ages 0-17 who were removed from their families between 2001 and 2015. As we noted earlier on, this is a demographic more likely to have been exposed, directly or indirectly, to the hardships of intensified immigration enforcement that took place during that period. Additionally, our emphasis is on foster care caseloads for reasons more likely to be indicated as the motive for the child's placement in foster care following the apprehension, detention and deportation of a parent, such as parental incarceration, caretaker inability to cope, abandonment, relinquishment and inadequate housing.

Importantly, our aim is not to assess a child's likelihood to be placed in foster care as immigration enforcement toughened as we lack critical information on the immigration status of the parents. Rather, we aim to understand the contribution, if any, of interior immigration enforcement to the growing number of Hispanic youth foster care caseloads, especially in areas where enforcement has escalated. To that end, our dependent variable is the share of Hispanic children in foster care for the aforementioned reasons per 1,000 Hispanic kids. Finally, to learn about any differential contributions of tougher enforcement on the foster care caseloads of states with a larger population of undocumented immigrants, we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to construct a share of *likely* undocumented

migrants in the state, which we interact with our proxy for the intensity of immigration enforcement in the state.<sup>9</sup>

### 3.1.2 Enforcement Data

Since 9/11, the United States has witnessed an escalation of immigration enforcement aimed at identifying undocumented immigrants for removal. The policies have ranged from worksite enforcement and work eligibility verification, to the engagement of local and state law enforcement personnel in the implementation of immigration policy, leading to the removal of more than 4.5 million undocumented immigrants since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (Bergeron and Hipsman 2014).

One of the first aforementioned measures were the **287(g) agreements**, which evolved from the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). State and local law enforcement entities would sign an agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that deputized local law enforcement and enabled state and local officers to interrogate immigrants, arrest them without warrant and begin the process of their removal when appropriate. As noted in Table A1 in the Appendix, there were three types of 287(g) agreements: “task force”, “jail enforcement” and a “hybrid”. The “task force” became the most controversial of all programs, as it allowed local and state officers to interrogate and arrest non-citizens during their regular duties of law enforcement operations. Accusations of racial profiling quickly emerged and contributed to the design of its successor –the Secure Communities program. The “jail enforcement” model permitted local officers to interrogate immigrants arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status. Between 2006 and 2015, approximately 402,079 potentially removable

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<sup>9</sup> Detailed information on how we construct that share is presented in Section 4.

aliens were identified, mostly at local jails, and more than 1,675 state and local officers have been trained and certified by ICE to enforce immigration law (ICE 2016).

As noted earlier, the **Secure Communities** (SC) program was designed to prioritize the use of enforcement resources to target non-citizens who have committed serious crimes, and to substitute the highly controversial 287(g) ‘task force’ agreements, at the same time that cut the costs of 287(g), which required the training of local and state law enforcement. Instead of training and deputizing local and state law enforcement, SC allowed for the checking of arrestees’ fingerprints against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dataset for criminal arrest and convictions, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dataset that tracks their immigration history. In this manner, serious criminal were identified. The program, which started in 2008, expanded quickly. Between 2009 and 2011, the number of fingerprints submitted grew from 828,119 to 6.9 million (Meissner *et al.* 2013). SC reached nationwide coverage by the end of 2014. In July 2015, it became the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) (ICE 2017). However, SC has been recently revived by President Donald Trump.

In addition to the aforementioned police-based initiatives, all of them sponsored by ICE, some states enacted **omnibus immigration laws** that regulated a number of ways in which the state would enforce immigration policy. In that regard, Arizona and Alabama enacted laws with provisions that allowed state and local enforcement officers to check an individual’s immigration status during a “lawful stop” if there was suspicion of the person being an undocumented immigrant –the so-called “show me your papers” clause. In the case of Alabama, the law also required schools to record and report students’ immigration status. Arizona was the first state to enact this kind of law in 2010 (SB1070). Other states quickly followed in 2011, namely: Alabama (HB56), Georgia (HB87), Indiana (SB590), South Carolina (S20) and Utah (H116, H466, H469, and H497).

Lastly, in addition to the three aforementioned types of immigration enforcement measures, all of which rely on local or state law enforcement for the implementation of immigration law, a number of states mandated the use of electronic programs to check the work eligibility of new employees –also known as **E-Verify mandates**. Unlike the prior measures (*i.e.* 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities and omnibus immigration laws), E-verify does not directly involve the local and state law enforcement personnel. Rather, employers, who screen newly hired workers for work eligibility, implement it. The system examines the information in the dataset from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and determines whether the worker is eligible to work in the United States. E-Verify mandates expanded rapidly, with enrolments rising by more 400 percent from 1,064 in 2001 to 482,692 by 2014 (DHS 2014). Overall, the program has been credited with restricting the employment choices and incomes of undocumented immigrants (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2016).

We gather historical and current data on all the aforementioned policies.<sup>10</sup> Data on the implementation of 287(g) agreements at the state level is gathered for the 2001 through 2015 period from the Immigration Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) 287(g) Fact Sheet website, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014), and Kostandini *et al.* (2013). Since the ICE website contains only a list of the current active agreements, we review old websites and prior research using these agreements to ensemble a complete dataset spanning from 2001 to 2015. Once we have the start date of each 287(g) agreement, we calculate the period of time during which these agreements have been in place. Data on the rolling of the Secure Communities (SC) program is available at the county level from 2008 to 2013 using ICE’s Activated Jurisdictions document (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2017). This document

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<sup>10</sup> See Table A1 in the Appendix for a description of each measure.

contains the expansion of the SC program at the county level. Data on state level initiatives, such as omnibus immigration laws (OILs) and employment verification (E-Verify) mandates, is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislature’s Omnibus Laws document (Legislatures 2017) and the National Conference State’s website (Legislatures 2017) respectively. These sources allow us identify the date and states adopting OILs or E-verify mandates.

Subsequently, we construct an index that allows us to capture the *intensity* of immigration enforcement to which families are exposed. Using that measure, we exploit the geographic and temporal variation in the exposure to tougher immigration enforcement.<sup>11</sup> From the onset, it is worth noting that our index can only be viewed as a proxy for the *intensity* of immigration enforcement. After all, the same measure can be applied more or less strictly in distinct locations depending on the authorities in charge of its implementation. In addition, since the geographic scope of many of the aforementioned enforcement initiatives is the county, it might be the case that one policy is activated in only one county in the state, but not in others. To proxy for the enforcement intensity to which children living in state  $s$  in year  $t$  might be exposed to, we calculate the following population-weighted index for each enforcement initiative  $k$ :

$$(1) \quad EI_{st}^k = \frac{1}{N_{2000}} \sum_{a \in s} \frac{1}{12} \sum_{m=1}^{12} \mathbf{1}(E_{t,a}) P_{a,2000}$$

where  $\mathbf{1}(E_{t,a})$  is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in county  $a$  during a particular number of months  $m$  in a given year. Note that the above index takes into account: (1) the number of months during which a particular policy has been in place in any given year, as well as (2) the population of the counties in question. Specifically, the summation over the 12 months in the year captures the share of months during which the measure was in place in any given year. To weigh it population-wise, we

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<sup>11</sup> Later on, we also experiment with separating or distinguishing among the various enforcement measure in the empirical analysis.

use the term:  $P_{a,2000}$  –namely, the population of county  $a$  according to the 2000 Census (prior to the rolling of any of the enforcement initiatives being considered), and  $N$  –the total population in state  $s$ .

Hence, the overall enforcement to which children living in state  $s$  and year  $t$  are exposed to is computed as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (state, year) level:<sup>12</sup>

$$(2) \quad Total\ Enforcement_{s,t} = \sum_{k \in K} EI_{s,t}^k$$

As shown in Table 1, the immigration enforcement index, which can vary between 0 and 5, averaged around 0.564 for the time period under consideration. Figure 2 illustrates the ample temporal and geographic variation accompanying the expansion in interior immigration enforcement –crucial in identifying its impact on our outcome of interest.

### 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 provides some summary statistics for state-level foster care placements over the 2001-2015 period. The share of Hispanic children in foster care due to reasons more likely to parental incarceration, abandonment, relinquishment, caretaker inability to cope or inadequate housing averaged 1.2 children per one thousand Hispanic children. To put this figure in perspective, Table A2 in the Appendix shows the equivalent value for white non-Hispanics, which averaged 0.8. The relationship between the two shares can be more easily assessed by looking at Figure 3. While the share of white non-Hispanic children in foster care for the aforementioned motives has remained rather stable since the early 2000s, the share of Hispanic children entering the foster care system dropped in the early 2000s, coinciding with the construction boom, which employed many Hispanic immigrants,

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<sup>12</sup> Where  $k$  refers to each policy, *i.e.*: 287(g) local, 287(g) state, secure communities, Omnibus immigration law and E-verify.



particularly undocumented ones.<sup>13</sup> It reached its minimum around the mid-2000s, and progressively climbed up coinciding with the bust of the housing and construction sectors during the Great Recession and, plausibly, the simultaneous rolling of tougher interior immigration enforcement measures. After all, the economic downturn affected all households, whereas intensified enforcement, which was taking off in the mid-2000s, is likely to have made more of a dent among Hispanic households since more than 70 percent of undocumented immigrants are Hispanic (Passel and Cohn 2009).

If tougher immigration enforcement was contributing to the increase of foster care cases among Hispanic youth from 2005 onwards, we would expect to see much of the increase in areas with tougher enforcement, but not necessarily so in other areas. To assess if that was the case from a merely descriptive point of view, Figure 4 displays the trends in the share of Hispanic youth in foster care according to the intensity of immigration enforcement in the state. Although fitting a linear trend to the data can prove somewhat difficult given the significant foster care fluctuations among Hispanics in Figure 3, it seems that the share of foster caseloads of Hispanic children trended upwards in states with tougher immigration enforcement –defined as states with an enforcement index above the national average. In contrast, if anything, foster care placements seemed to trend downwards in states with lesser interior immigration enforcement.

While interesting, Figures 3 and 4 only provide suggestive descriptive evidence as they fail to account for confounding factors potentially responsible for the observed trends. In what follows, we use regression-based analysis to more rigorously assess the link between foster care placements and intensified immigration enforcement after accounting for whether the state has a large concentration of likely undocumented immigrants, as well as for a wide

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<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the share of unauthorized working in the construction sector was about three times the share of native workers (Passel 2005, Passel and Cohn 2016).

range of unobserved state and year fixed-effects, and unobserved time-varying state-specific traits.

#### 4. Methodology

Our aim is to understand how the toughening of immigration enforcement might have contributed to the rise in foster care caseloads among Hispanic youth. As noted earlier, we focus on Hispanic children, as the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are Hispanic (Passel and Cohn 2009). Additionally, we focus on foster case placements for reasons more likely accompanying the detention and deportation of an undocumented parent –namely: parental incarceration, caretaker inability cope, abandonment, relinquishment, or inadequate housing. Then, we estimate the following benchmark specification:

$$(3) \quad y_{s,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 IE_{s,t} + \beta_2 High LU_{s,2000} + \beta_3 IE * High LU_{s,2000} + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_s t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

where  $y_{s,t}$  is our outcome variable – the share Hispanic children in foster care for the aforementioned reasons per 1,000 Hispanic kids in state  $s$  and year  $t$  and  $IE_{s,t}$  is an immigration enforcement index capturing the intensity of enforcement to which individuals living in state  $s$  in year  $t$  are exposed to.

$High LU_{s,2000}$  is the next regressor. It is a dummy variable indicative of whether the state’s share of *likely* undocumented immigrants exceeds the national average.<sup>14</sup> This share is constructed using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and relying on ethnicity and citizenship traits (*e.g.* being a Hispanic non-citizen), which have been shown to be good predictors of immigrants’ undocumented status (Passel and Cohn 2009),<sup>15</sup> as well as on information on the educational attainment and length of residency of the foreign-born in each state. Specifically, we compute the share of Hispanic non-citizens who have less than a

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<sup>14</sup> The national average is calculated in 2000 before any immigration policy was enacted. Results do not change if we consider the median or the 75 percentile.

<sup>15</sup> Examples of works using these predictors include Bohn and Pugatch (2013), Passel and Cohn (2009), Pope (2016), Orrenius and Zavodny (2016), to name a few.

high school education<sup>16</sup> and have resided in the United States for at least 5 years<sup>17</sup> in each state and year. When we use all these traits, along with the weights of the ACS, we obtain an estimated undocumented immigrant population of 12,791,033 individuals –a figure close to the estimated population of 11 to 12 million undocumented immigrants using the residual method over the entire period under consideration.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, to learn about the differential impact of intensified immigration enforcement in states with a higher (vs. lower) concentration of likely undocumented immigrants, we include an interaction term. To conclude, equation (3) incorporates state and year fixed-effects (namely dummies for each state and year), as well as state-specific time trends. The latter allow us to capture unobserved fixed and time-varying traits potentially affecting our outcomes and unaccounted for.<sup>19</sup> We estimate equation (3) by ordinary least squares (OLS). Our estimates are weighted by the number of Hispanic children in the 0-17 age range, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.

What are our main hypotheses? If intensified interior immigration enforcement impacted Hispanic households to a much greater extent due to the higher incidence of deportations among such households, we would expect the mean impact of intensified immigration enforcement, which is given by:  $(\beta_1 + \beta_3 * \mu_{High\ LU})$ ,<sup>20</sup> to be positive and statistically different from zero for the share of Hispanic children in foster care; but not

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<sup>16</sup> This allows us to exclude international students and high-skill migrants with H-1B visas.

<sup>17</sup> This last requirement permits us to exclude low-skill migrants with non-immigrant visas, such as H-2A and H-2B visas, typically of a much shorter duration.

<sup>18</sup> See: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/>. There are other methods to proxy for the likely undocumented status of immigrants. The latter include statistical imputation methods that rely on the availability of a representative data set with information on the immigration status and on the dependent variable of interest (foster care caseloads, in our case) from the same sample universe that allows us to make inferences at the state level (Van Hook *et al.* 2015). There is no such dataset in this particular case. Furthermore, Orrenius and Zavodny (2017) show how the various imputation methods yield similar estimates using flows of undocumented Mexican immigrants as an example. Therefore, we opt for this simpler to replicate proxy.

<sup>19</sup> In alternative specifications available from the authors, we experiment with including other controls, such as state's unemployment rates, poverty rates and incarceration rates. They are, nonetheless, collinear with state-specific time trends. Therefore, we opt for the latter as a more comprehensive and broader control for unobserved time-varying state-level factors.

<sup>20</sup> Where:  $\mu_{High\ LU}$  stand for the mean of *High LU*<sub>s,2000</sub>.

necessarily for their white non-Hispanic counterparts. Additionally, we would expect the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the share of Hispanic youth in foster care to be greater in states that likely undocumented immigrants evade, when compared to states that they gravitate to. In other words, we would expect to find that:  $\beta_1 > (\beta_1 + \beta_3)$ . Note that because likely undocumented immigrants are likely to evade unsafe locations, the estimated impact of intensified immigration enforcement in states that likely undocumented immigrants avoid, as captured by a low concentration of likely undocumented immigrants, is likely to be downward biased. This could, in turn, result in a lower-bound estimate of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement. We will return to this challenge later on in the identification checks.

## **5. Foster Care Caseloads of Hispanic Youth and Immigration Enforcement**

Our main aim is to gain a better understanding of the causes behind the rising share of Hispanic children entering the foster care system since the early 2000s in states that have taken a tougher approach on immigration enforcement, as seen in Figure 4. To that end, we estimate a number of model specifications of equation (3). Additionally, as a falsification test, we repeat this exercise for white non-Hispanic children. In this manner, we are able to gauge if the observed impact of intensified immigration enforcement on foster caseloads of Hispanic youth is masking the effect of some macroeconomic shock, like the global economic downturn during part of the period being examined.<sup>21</sup> If that were the case, we should be able to observe a similar result for white non-Hispanic children. Table 2 displays the results from these estimations.

Focusing on the most complete model specification of Panel A, we find that an increase in immigration enforcement equal to its average level over the period under

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<sup>21</sup> At any rate, our results are robust to the exclusion of the recessionary years (2009 and 2010). See Table A3 in the Appendix.

consideration (*i.e.*  $\mu_{IE} = 0.564$ ) raises the share of Hispanic children in foster care by 14.89 percent.<sup>22</sup> The effect is, however, uneven across states. The same increase in immigration enforcement raises the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system by 18.98 percent in states with a lower concentration of likely undocumented immigrants.<sup>23</sup> In contrast, in states with a high concentration of likely undocumented immigrants—states to which likely undocumented gravitate possibly because they feel safer—the same increase in intensified immigration enforcement is associated to a 7.53 percent growth in the share of Hispanic children in foster care.<sup>24</sup> As advanced earlier, the differential impact of intensified immigration enforcement in states with a low vs. a high share of likely undocumented immigrants is to be expected. After all, undocumented immigrants constitute a relatively mobile population likely responsive to intensified enforcement. We would expect likely undocumented parents with children to settle in areas that are lax in their implementation of immigration enforcement and where, consequently, their risk of apprehension might be lower. In those states, the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system due to the implementation of tougher immigration enforcement measures should be lower. We address this potential source of bias in the next section.

At any rate, the first most important robustness check of the results in Panel A, Table 2, is displayed in Panel B of that table. Despite the clear impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the foster care caseloads of Hispanic youth in Table A, we find no evidence whatsoever of a statistically significant link between tougher immigration enforcement and the share of white non-Hispanic youth entering foster care over the same period and

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<sup>22</sup> This effect is computed as:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3 * \mu_{High LU}) * \Delta IE * 100] / \mu_y$ , where:  $\mu_{High LU} = 0.357$ ,  $\Delta IE = \mu_{IE} = 0.564$  and  $\mu_y = 1.21$ .

<sup>23</sup> The impact in states with: *High LU* = 0 is given by:  $[(\beta_1 * \Delta IE * 100) / \mu_y]$ .

<sup>24</sup> In states with *High LU* = 1, this impact is given by:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3) * \Delta IE * 100] / \mu_y$ .

geographic coverage.<sup>25</sup> In other words, the found impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the share of youth in foster care is unique to Hispanic youth.

## 6. Identification Checks

### 6.1 Event Study

The validity of our identification approach relies on a number of assumptions that we explore in what follows. A first assumption is that the impact attributed to the intensification of immigration enforcement did not predate the implementation of the enforcement measures. To assess if that was the case, we estimate equation (3) including a full set of dummies spanning from four years prior to the adoption of any of the interior immigration enforcement initiatives by the state as follows:

$$(4) \quad y_{i,s,t} = \alpha + \sum_{b=-4}^{-1} \delta_b D_b + \beta_1 IE_{s,t} + \beta_2 High\ LU_{s,t} + \beta_3 IE * High\ LU_{s,t} + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_s t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

where  $D_b$  is a dummy for  $b$  years prior to the enforcement index turning positive. Note that because the adoption of these initiatives occurred at different points in time across the states in our sample,  $D_1$  might be equal to 2002 for some states, 2003 for others, and so on.

Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (4) via OLS. According to the most complete model specification in column (3), the increase in the share of Hispanic children in foster care did not pre-date the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures by the states. None of the coefficients for the dummies indicative of the number of years preceding the adoption of tougher enforcement are statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the point estimates on our key regressors continue to be statistically different from zero and of similar magnitude to the ones in Table 2, Panel A.

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<sup>25</sup> Similar results are found when we look at black children. Nevertheless, since the vast majority of Hispanic youth are white, we focus our attention on other white children.

## 6.2 The Endogenous Adoption of Immigration Enforcement

A second concern in most policy assessments refers to the potential endogeneity of the policy itself. While we all agree that the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures is not likely to occur randomly, it needs to be exogenous to the share of Hispanic youth in foster care for inference purposes. To assess if that is likely to have been the case, we examine if the adoption timing of tougher immigration enforcement at the state level is correlated to the share of Hispanic children in foster care in the state *prior* to the adoption of tougher enforcement. To that end, we estimate the following regression using 2000 data from *prior* to the adoption of any interior immigration enforcement measure:

$$(5) \quad EI\ Year_s = \alpha + \beta_1 y_s^{2000} + \beta_2 High\ LU_s^{2000} + \varepsilon_s,$$

where  $EI\ Year_s$  is the year in which state  $s$  enacted its first enforcement measure;  $y_s^{2000}$  is the average share of Hispanic children in foster care in state  $s$  in 2000; and  $High\ LU_s^{2000}$  contains the average share of likely undocumented immigrants in the state, also in 2000.

The results from this exercise are displayed in Table 4. The share of Hispanic youth in foster care in each state *prior* to the adoption of stricter enforcement measures does not seem to help predict the adoption timing of immigration enforcement at the state level. As such, while not random, the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures does not appear to be taking place in response to changes in the share of Hispanic children entering the foster care system.

## 6.3 The Non-random Location of Immigrants

Finally, an important challenge when assessing the impact of tougher immigration enforcement on Hispanic youths' foster care placements is the non-random residential choices made by undocumented immigrants themselves. We would expect undocumented parents to respond to intensified enforcement by choosing to live in states that are friendlier to undocumented immigrants and, therefore, lax in their implementation of immigration

enforcement. In that case, we might not find a significant impact of tougher enforcement on the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system. In other words, the overall impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system might be downward biased.

There are a number of ways in which we can assess if the bias is substantial. One of them is using instrumental variable (IV) methods to instrument for the location of children in our sample using information on the past residential locations of likely undocumented immigrants from the same countries of origin (in the spirit of Bartel 1989, Card 2001, and Cortes and Tessada 2011, among many others). Specifically, we can use ACS data from the year 2000 to construct the share of undocumented immigrants from the same country of origin in each state in order to gauge what their most probable location would have been prior to the implementation of tougher immigration enforcement:

$$(6) \text{ Share of Undocumented Immigrant}_{s,o,2000} = \frac{\text{undocumented immigrants}_{s,o,2000}}{\text{undocumented immigrants}_{o,2000}}$$

Subsequently, to derive an instrument of the enforcement to which each child would have been exposed to had their parents settled in the same locations their countrymen settled *prior* to the rollout of stricter immigration enforcement measures, we interact the share of undocumented immigrants for each state  $s$  with the immigration enforcement for that state in each year  $t$ . We also use the share in equation (6) to derive an instrument for the dummy variable indicative of whether the state is one with a high share of likely undocumented immigrants. Our instrument is a dummy variable equal to one if the share from equation (6) was above that share's national average at the time. Otherwise, it is set equal to zero.<sup>26</sup>

Table 5 shows the IV estimates. The last rows confirm that the two constructed instruments are highly correlated to the instrumented regressors. The F-stats from the first stage regressions are significantly different from zero and large (Sanderson and Windmeijer

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<sup>26</sup> Both instruments are also interacted to serve as instruments for the interaction term in equation (3).



2016). Additionally, the estimated coefficients from the first stage regressions for the intensity of immigration enforcement, as well as for whether the state is one with a high concentration of likely undocumented immigrants, are both positive and statistically different from zero. Those results confirm the entrenched tendency for immigrants to locate in areas with established networks of their countrymen (Bartel 1989 and Card 2001, among others).

Moreover, the same increase in immigration enforcement we considered in Panel A of Table 2 (equivalent to the average immigration enforcement level over the period under consideration, *i.e.*  $\mu_{IE} = 0.564$ ) raises the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system in states with a low share of likely undocumented immigrants by 21.11 percent. The new estimated impact is about 2 percentage points larger than the 18.98 percent estimated impact in Panel A of Table 2.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, the same increase in intensified immigration enforcement in states with a high share of likely undocumented immigrants raises the share of Hispanic children entering the foster care system by 7.66 percent – a higher, yet closer, to the estimated impact of 7.53 percent in Panel A of Table 2.<sup>28</sup> Overall, the increase in immigration enforcement raises the share of Hispanic children in foster care by 20.82 percent,<sup>29</sup> versus the estimated impact of 14.89 percent in Panel A of Table 2 – approximately a 6 percentage point difference. In sum, as predicted, the OLS results from Panel A of Table 2 can be viewed as lower-bound estimates of the effect that enforcement is having on the share of Hispanic youth entering foster care.

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<sup>27</sup> As a reminder, the impact in states with: *High LU* = 0 is given by:  $[(\beta_1 * \Delta IE * 100) / \mu_y]$ .

<sup>28</sup> The impact in states with a high share of likely undocumented immigrants is computed as:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3) * \Delta IE * 100] / \mu_y$ . While  $\beta_3$  is not statistically different from zero, it still needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of intensified immigration enforcement in states with a high concentration of likely undocumented immigrants (Wooldridge 2009).

<sup>29</sup> This effect is computed as:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3 * \mu_{IV \text{ for High LU}}) * \Delta IE * 100] / \mu_y$ , where:  $\mu_{IV \text{ for High LU}} = 0.0214$ ,  $\Delta IE = \mu_{IE} = 0.564$  and  $\mu_y = 1.21$ .

## 7. Understanding the Channels

Thus far, we have shown that the intensification of immigration enforcement appears to have contributed to the growing share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system, while it has had no apparent impact on the shares of their white non-Hispanic counterparts. This finding also appears robust to a number of identification tests. Next, we take a deeper look into the mechanisms potentially at work.

To that end, we first experiment with excluding states that have passed a statewide Trust Act. Trust Acts are adopted with the purpose of increasing community trust and cooperation with the police following the implementation of tougher immigration enforcement measures, such as the 287(g) agreements that promoted information sharing between local, state, and federal government agencies (Skogan and Frydl 2004, Fagan and Meares 2008, Fagan and Tyler 2008, Tyler 2010). We exclude states with a state-wide Trust Act to more accurately capture the impact of intensified immigration enforcement, which should be lax or close to null in those areas. As a result, we would expect the estimated impact of intensified immigration enforcement to be, if anything, greater in magnitude. Table 6 displays the results from this exercise. The mean increase in immigration enforcement over the period under examination (*i.e.*  $\mu_{IE} = 0.564$ ) raises the overall share of Hispanic children entering the foster care system by approximately 17.62 percent.<sup>30</sup> The 18 percent increase from Table 6 is significantly higher than the estimated 15 percent increase in Panel A of Table 2, suggesting that it is the effect of implementing tougher immigration enforcement measures that our estimate is capturing.

Next, to gain a further understanding of the channels through which the measured impact is taking place, we distinguish among various types of measures. Because most are *police-based* measures that build on the resources of their predecessors –many times

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<sup>30</sup> As a reminder, this effect is computed as:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3 * \mu_{High\ LU}) * \Delta IE * 100] / \mu_y$ , where:  $\mu_{High\ LU} = 0.357$ ,  $\Delta IE = \mu_{IE} = 0.564$  and  $\mu_y = 1.21$ .

measures still in place, the individual impacts of each initiative needs to be interpreted with caution. That said, according to the estimates in Table 7, it appears that Secure Communities was the program that contributed the most to the observed increase in the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system. In particular, the average growth of the program over the period under examination (*i.e.*  $\mu_{Secure\ Communities} = 0.279$ ) raised the share of Hispanic youth in foster care by 21.95 percent.<sup>31</sup> This is not surprising. After all, the Secure Communities program is one of the police-based immigration enforcement measures directly linked to deportations, thus raising the number of Hispanic children in foster care.

## 8. Summary and Conclusions

The past two decades have witnessed an unprecedented increase in interior immigration enforcement, as states and localities started to take immigration matters into their own hands. The fragmented approach to immigration enforcement is having a number of consequences associated with the break-up of households that we are trying to understand. In this paper, we look at one implication of shattered families –namely, the larger share of Hispanic youth entering the foster care system in states with more intensified immigration enforcement.

Using comprehensive data on foster care placements from the 2001 through 2015 Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS), along with detailed information on the implementation of interior immigration enforcement measures, we explore the potential contribution of intensified enforcement to the aforementioned statistic. We find that, unlike for white non-Hispanic children, the intensification of immigration enforcement appears to have significantly contributed to the share of Hispanic youth entering the foster

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<sup>31</sup> This impact is computed as:  $[(\beta_1 + \beta_3 * \mu_{High\ LU}) * \Delta SC * 100] / \mu_y$ , where:  $\mu_{High\ LU} = 0.357$ ,  $\Delta SC = \mu_{Secure\ Communities} = 0.279$  and  $\mu_y = 1.21$ . The estimated impact of the aforementioned increase in intensity of the Secure Communities would accrue the share of Hispanic children in foster care by 14.79 percent in states with a lower concentration of likely undocumented immigrants, and by 14.31 percent in states with a higher share of likely undocumented immigrants.

care system. This is especially true in states that are not lax in their implementation of immigration enforcement, with police-based enforcement and the Secure Communities program in particular, as the most significant contributor.

We are able to shed some light on the role that intensified immigration enforcement might be playing on the growing share of Hispanic youth in foster care. Aside from uncovering the role of intensified immigration enforcement as another factor contributing to the growth in the share of Hispanic youth in foster care, the analysis adds to a broader, fast growing body of work examining the impact of immigration policies on unauthorized immigrants and their families (Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2016, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez 2015). We hope the findings underscore the much-needed collection of detailed data on the parental characteristics and circumstances surrounding their foster care placement in order to gain a better understanding of how these impacts are taking place and, in turn, be able to design policies that tame their incidence and adverse consequences.

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**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Share of Hispanic Children in Foster Care per 1,000 <sup>a</sup>	1.212	2.143	0	41.366	733
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.564	0.826	0	4.077	733
Local 287(g)	0.013	0.039	0	0.281	733
SC	0.279	0.430	0	1	733
State 287(g)	0.080	0.272	0	1	733
OIL	0.042	0.201	0	1	733
E-Verify	0.148	0.356	0	1	733
High Likely Undocumented (LU) Share <sup>b</sup>	0.357	0.480	0	1	733

**Notes:** <sup>(a)</sup> Share of Hispanic children placed in foster care for reasons potentially related to intensified immigration enforcement –namely: parental incarceration, caretaker inability to cope, abandonment, relinquishment or inadequate housing. We thus exclude foster care cases unrelated to immigration enforcement per se, as would be the case of physical or sexual abuse, alcoholism, drug abuse or parental death. <sup>(b)</sup> Equals 1 if the state has a share of likely undocumented immigrants that exceeds the national mean share. Detailed information on how the proxy for population of likely undocumented immigrants is computed can be found in the Data section.

**Table 2: Dependent variable: Share of Children in Foster Care by Parental Reasons per 1,000 Children**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
<b>Panel A: Hispanic Children</b>			
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.4100*** (0.082)	0.2493** (0.104)	<b>0.4071***</b> <b>(0.147)</b>
High LU Share	-0.5241*** (0.138)	-0.1095 (0.123)	-0.0984 (0.174)
IE*High LU Share	-0.0112 (0.103)	-0.1206 (0.088)	<b>-0.2455*</b> <b>(0.141)</b>
Observations	733	733	733
R-squared	0.243	0.752	0.797
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.21	
<b>Panel B: White Non-Hispanic Children</b>			
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.0199 (0.097)	0.1246 (0.119)	0.1084 (0.088)
High LU Share	-0.4730* (0.279)	-0.0551 (0.137)	-0.0595 (0.123)
IE*High LU Share	0.1601 (0.140)	-0.0406 (0.102)	-0.0149 (0.096)
Observations	765	765	765
R-squared	0.059	0.777	0.871
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		0.79	

**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Children between 0 and 17 years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standards errors are clustered at the state level. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**Table 3: Identification Test #1: Event Study**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
One Year Before IE>0	-0.2370* (0.124)	-0.0021 (0.076)	0.0147 (0.083)
Two Years Before IE>0	-0.2655 (0.173)	-0.0484 (0.052)	-0.0508 (0.063)
Three Years Before IE>0	-0.1209 (0.286)	-0.0573 (0.074)	-0.0591 (0.085)
Four Years Before IE>0	0.1279 (0.388)	0.0902 (0.066)	0.0889 (0.080)
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.3774*** (0.096)	0.2457** (0.107)	<b>0.4018**</b> <b>(0.158)</b>
High LU Share	-0.5343*** (0.138)	-0.1202 (0.118)	-0.1186 (0.168)
IE*High LU Share	-0.0061 (0.100)	-0.1203 (0.089)	<b>-0.2429*</b> <b>(0.140)</b>
Observations	733	733	733
R-squared	0.256	0.753	0.798
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.21	

**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Children between 0 and 17 years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standards errors are clustered at the state level. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**Table 4: Identification Test #2: Endogeneity of Immigration Enforcement  
(Dependent Variable: First Year Immigration Enforcement>0)**

<b>Model Specification</b>	
Share of Children in Foster Care per 1,000	26.1294 (26.230)
Constant	1,918.9982*** (89.709)
Observations	49
R-squared	0.014

**Notes:** Data are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**Table 5: Identification Test #3: Endogeneity of Immigrant Location**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.3941*** (0.142)	0.2304 (0.173)	<b>0.4529***</b> <b>(0.155)</b>
High LU Share	-0.5735*** (0.157)	-0.5550*** (0.160)	<b>-0.6418***</b> <b>(0.218)</b>
IE*High LU Share	0.0615 (0.173)	0.0258 (0.146)	<b>-0.2885*</b> <b>(0.171)</b>
Observations	733	733	733
R-squared	0.240	0.504	0.743
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.21	
<i>First Stage for 'IE'</i>			
IV			70.260*** (8.013)
R-squared			0.83
Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test			58.88
<i>First Stage for 'High LU Share'</i>			
IV			1.026*** (0.040)
R-squared			0.97
Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test			402.28

**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Children between 0 and 17 years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**Table 6: Robustness Check: Excluding States with State-wide Trust Acts**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.4085*** (0.082)	0.2704** (0.108)	<b>0.3796**</b> <b>(0.142)</b>
High LU Share	-0.5196*** (0.139)	-0.0434 (0.132)	-0.1072 (0.179)
IE*High LU Share	-0.0135 (0.103)	-0.1266 (0.088)	-0.2008 (0.140)
Observations	727	727	727
R-squared	0.237	0.754	0.802
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.21	


**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Children between 0 and 17 years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. We exclude states and years with Trust Acts enacted. Standards errors are clustered at the State level. \*\*\*p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**Table 7: Heterogeneity Analysis – Differentiating by Type of Immigration Enforcement Measure**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
Local 287 (g)	1.9115 (2.374)	0.0386 (1.231)	1.7386 (1.715)
Secure Communities	1.0620*** (0.157)	0.5859** (0.292)	<b>0.6413**</b> <b>(0.295)</b>
State 287(g)	0.4662* (0.246)	0.0835 (0.265)	0.2957 (0.326)
OIL	-0.4100 (0.523)	0.0840 (0.329)	-0.2149 (0.190)
E-Verify	-0.1128 (0.201)	0.0371 (0.173)	0.2392 (0.195)
High LU State	-0.5312*** (0.135)	-0.1029 (0.132)	-0.0793 (0.162)
High LU State*local 287(g)	-1.7768 (2.517)	0.0355 (1.262)	-1.9154 (1.752)
High LU State*SC	-0.3329* (0.175)	-0.3730** (0.168)	<b>-0.4775***</b> <b>(0.159)</b>
High LU State*State 287(g)	-0.2715 (0.256)	-0.0618 (0.290)	-0.2535 (0.375)
High LU State*OIL	0.3502 (0.574)	0.0285 (0.357)	0.5675 (0.390)
High LU State*E-Verify	0.4189 (0.254)	0.1963 (0.190)	0.1634 (0.287)
Observations	733	733	733
R-squared	0.316	0.756	0.802
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.21	

**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Children between 0 and 17 years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. We exclude states and years with Trust Acts enacted. Standards errors are clustered at the State level. \*\*\*p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1


**Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Spending in 2015 Dollars, 2000-2018**



**Notes:** The spending for the fiscal years 2003 to 2016 is obtaining from the budgets of its successor agencies-US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). To obtain the most accurate statistics figures were taken from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Budgets in Brief two years after the application year. The figures for the years 2017 and 2018 are the enacted and budget amount from the last Budget in Brief available (2018). See: <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/fy-2018-budget-brief>




**Figure 2: Temporal and Geographic Variation in the Enforcement Index**




**Notes:** Lighter colours correspond to lower levels of enforcement (captured by the interior immigration enforcement index  $EI_{s,t}$ ) in *STATE*  $c$  in year  $t$ .

**Figure 3**  
**Share of Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Children in Foster Care per 1,000 Hispanic Children**



**Figure 4**  
**Hispanic Youth in Foster Care by Enforcement Intensity**



**Notes:** Low enforcement means a state enforcement less than 1 and high enforcement means a state enforcement greater than 1, with 1 being close to the national average of 1.12.

**APPENDIX**

**Table A1: Description of Enforcement Laws**

<b>Nature of the Law</b>	<b>Law</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Where?</b>	<b>Objective</b>	<b>Who implements it?</b>	<b>Scope</b>	<b>Signed by</b>	<b>What it Consists of:</b>
<b>Police-Based Measures</b>	<b>287(g)</b>	2002-2012	Street/Jail	Make communities safer by the identification and removal of serious criminals	State and local law enforcement entities	State and Local	State and local enforcement entities signed a contract (Memorandum of Agreement - MOA) with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	There are various functions: <b>Task Force:</b> allows local and state officers interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties on law enforcement operations. <b>Jail enforcement</b> permits local officers to question immigrant who have been arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status. <b>Hybrid model:</b> which allow participate in both types of programs.
	<b>SC</b>	2009-2014 2017-	Nation's jail and prisons	Identify noncitizens who have committed serious crime using biometric information	Police	Local	Jurisdictions	The program allows for the submission of biometric information on detainees that is contrasted against records in FBI and DHS databases.
	<b>OILs</b>	2010-	Street/Jail	Identification noncitizen	State and local law enforcement entities	State	State governor	Comprehensive laws that may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A "show me your papers" clause, enabling the police to request proper identification documentation during a lawful stop.</li> <li>• Require that schools report students' legal status.</li> </ul>
<b>Employment-Based Measures</b>	<b>E-Verify</b>	2006-	Firms	Deter the hiring of unauthorized immigrants.	Employer	State	State governor	Electronic program that allows employers to screen newly hired workers for work eligibility.

**Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for White non-Hispanic Children**

<b>Variables Name</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Share of Children in Foster Care per 1,000	0.792	0.804	0.000	4.336	765
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.546	0.819	0.000	4.077	765
High LU Share	0.345	0.476	0.000	1.000	765

**Table A3: Robustness Check: Excluding Recession Years**  
**(Dependent variable: Share of Children in Foster Care by Parental Reasons per 1,000 Children)**

<b>Model Specification</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
<b>Immigration Enforcement (IE)</b>	<b>0.4424***</b> <b>(0.081)</b>	<b>0.2376**</b> <b>(0.100)</b>	<b>0.4940***</b> <b>(0.163)</b>
High LU Share	-0.4346*** (0.129)	-0.0963 (0.109)	0.0017 (0.171)
IE*High LU Share	-0.0901 (0.107)	-0.1576* (0.086)	-0.3717*** (0.133)
Observations	632	632	632
R-squared	0.220	0.745	0.799
Area FE	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Area-Trend	N	N	Y
Mean D.V.		1.14	

**Notes:** *Sample:* Share of Hispanic Children between 0 and 17 years. It excludes year 20009 and 2010. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standards errors are clustered at the state level. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1