Binder, Michael; Lieberknecht, Philipp; Quintana, Jorge; Wieland, Volker

Working Paper
Model uncertainty in macroeconomics: On the implications of financial frictions

IMFS Working Paper Series, No. 114

Provided in Cooperation with:
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Goethe University Frankfurt am Main

Suggested Citation: Binder, Michael; Lieberknecht, Philipp; Quintana, Jorge; Wieland, Volker (2017) : Model uncertainty in macroeconomics: On the implications of financial frictions, IMFS Working Paper Series, No. 114, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Frankfurt a. M., http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-431634

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168565

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
MICHAEL BINDER, PHILIPP LIEBERKNECHT,
JORGE QUINTANA, VOLKER WIELAND

Model Uncertainty in Macroeconomics:
On the Implications of Financial Frictions

Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
GOETHE UNIVERSITY FRANKFURT

WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 114 (2017)
This Working Paper is issued under the auspices of the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS). Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IMFS. Research disseminated by the IMFS may include views on policy, but the IMFS itself takes no institutional policy positions.

The Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability aims at raising public awareness of the importance of monetary and financial stability. Its main objective is the implementation of the "Project Monetary and Financial Stability" that is supported by the Foundation of Monetary and Financial Stability. The foundation was established on January 1, 2002 by federal law. Its endowment funds come from the sale of 1 DM gold coins in 2001 that were issued at the occasion of the euro cash introduction in memory of the D-Mark.

The IMFS Working Papers often represent preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to encourage discussion and comment. Citation and use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character.

Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
Goethe University Frankfurt
House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
D-60629 Frankfurt am Main
www.imfs-frankfurt.de | info@imfs-frankfurt.de
Model Uncertainty in Macroeconomics: On the Implications of Financial Frictions

Michael Binder\textsuperscript{a}, Philipp Lieberknecht\textsuperscript{b}, Jorge Quintana\textsuperscript{c} and Volker Wieland\textsuperscript{d}

IMFS and Goethe University Frankfurt

March 31, 2017

Abstract

For some time now, structural macroeconomic models used at central banks have been predominantly New Keynesian DSGE models featuring nominal rigidities and forward-looking decision-making. While these features are widely deemed crucial for policy evaluation exercises, most central banks have added more detailed characterizations of the financial sector to these models following the Great Recession in order to improve their fit to the data and their forecasting performance. We employ a comparative approach to investigate the characteristics of this new generation of New Keynesian DSGE models and document an elevated degree of model uncertainty relative to earlier model generations. Policy transmission is highly heterogeneous across types of financial frictions and monetary policy causes larger effects, on average. The New Keynesian DSGE models we analyze suggest that a simple policy rule robust to model uncertainty involves a weaker response to inflation and the output gap in the presence of financial frictions as compared to earlier generations of such models. Leaning-against-the-wind policies in models of this class estimated for the Euro Area do not lead to substantial gains. With regard to forecasting performance, the inclusion of financial frictions can generate improvements, if conditioned on appropriate data. Looking forward, we argue that model-averaging and embracing alternative modelling paradigms is likely to yield a more robust framework for the conduct of monetary policy.

Keywords: Model uncertainty, model comparison, New Keynesian DSGE, financial frictions, monetary policy transmission, fiscal policy transmission, macroprudential policy transmission, robust monetary policy, forecasting.

This working paper represents a first draft of a chapter for a new Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Central Banking edited by David Mayes, Pierre Siklos and Jan-Egbert Sturm. The research leading to the results in this paper has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement “Integrated Macro-Financial Modelling for Robust Policy Design” (MACFINROBODS, grant no. 612796).

\textsuperscript{a}mbinder@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
\textsuperscript{b}philipp.lieberknecht@econ.uni-frankfurt.de
\textsuperscript{c}jorge.quintana@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
\textsuperscript{d}wieland@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de.
1 Introduction

Quantitative macroeconomic models play an important role in informing policy makers at central banks and other institutions about the consequences of monetary, fiscal and macro-prudential policies. These policies in turn influence the decision making of households and firms, the functioning of economies as well as the macroeconomic outcomes and the economic welfare inherent in these outcomes.

Macroeconomic modelers have, however, been criticized for failing to predict the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, or at least failing to provide adequate warning that global financial disruptions could trigger such a massive contraction. For example, Buiter (2009) and Krugman (2009) have questioned the usefulness of macroeconomic research conducted during three decades preceding the crisis and have blamed academic and central bank researchers’ focus on New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models for misdirecting the attention of policymakers.

Such New Keynesian DSGE models account within an intertemporal optimization-based general equilibrium framework for forward-looking-based expectations formation and decision-making by market participants. At least the latter modelling element is widely deemed crucial for purposes of policy evaluation. In addition, these models typically involve a range of nominal and real rigidities as well as adjustment costs, such as habit formation, investment adjustment costs, capital utilization restrictions, frictions on wage and price adjustments, search in labor markets, etc. Thus, they have already augmented the optimization-based framework with some relevant market imperfections and behavioral assumptions that are commonly associated with behavioral economics. The global financial crisis and ensuing criticism of financial economics and macroeconomics have further inspired researchers to work on better integrating imperfections and risks associated with the financial sector in business cycle analysis.

In this chapter, we review recent developments in integrating more detailed characterizations of the financial sector in New Keynesian models as typically used at central banks and other policy making institutions for evaluating monetary policy. On the basis of this review, we then analyze the implications of these models for the design of monetary policy. To do so, we employ a comparative approach to macroeconomic modelling (Taylor and Wieland, 2012; Wieland et al., 2016) that draws upon a public model archive (www.macromodelbase.com).

Specific questions we address in this chapter include the following: What is the role of the financial sector in these models with regard to policy transmission? Should prescriptions for monetary policy be revised in light of new findings from these models with financial frictions? Should monetary policy actively lean against asset price or credit growth? Has it
been possible to improve model fit and forecasting performance by including more detailed representations of the financial sector in New Keynesian models?

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review some of the recent developments in structural macroeconomic modelling, specifically as have taken place at central banks since the paradigm shift away from Cowles Commission-type macroeconomic models. With Section 3 we turn to the implications for policy transmission of integrating financial frictions into New Keynesian models. We consider the implications for the transmission of monetary policy measures as well as the implications for the interaction of monetary with fiscal and macroprudential policies. Section 4 focusses on the implications of embedding financial frictions in New Keynesian models for the formulation of robust monetary policy rules. So far, there are few studies that aim to identify policies which perform well across a range of relevant models. Yet, it is important to inform policy makers about such robust strategies given the degree of uncertainty inherent to macroeconomic modelling and the prediction of policy effects. In Section 5, we discuss issues of forecasting based on models with and without financial frictions. Section 6 concludes.

2 Macroeconomic Modelling and Central Banks

In this section, we briefly outline some of the history of macroeconomic modelling, with a special focus on structural models, models used at central banks and recent developments in modelling the financial sector.\(^1\) Macroeconomic modelling has a long history. As early as 1936, Jan Tinbergen proposed one of the first mathematical macroeconomic models.\(^2\) This seminal contribution constituted a prelude to the work of the Cowles Commission and Foundation at Chicago and Yale in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1960s, where researchers such as Trygve Haavelmo and Lawrence Klein investigated how to build and estimate structural macroeconomic models and developed cornerstones for the evolution of macroeconomics at large (Haavelmo, 1944; Klein, 1969).

\(^1\)As discussed by Fukac and Pagan (2011), co-existing with structural (“interpretative”) models have been reduced-form (“summative”) models. While one of the main uses of summative models has been the calculation of forecasts, they have also been employed to obtain improved insight on specific aspects of economic theory that are of relevance for central banks. See, for example, Binder et al. (2010) for the use of Global Vector Autoregressions to examine the overshooting of exchange rates in response to unanticipated changes in monetary policy, and Schorfheide et al. (2014) for the use of Bayesian state space models to decompose the origins of risk premia. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, there are useful ongoing debates about the relative merits of different approaches in macroeconomic modelling aiming to strike a good trade-off between consistency with economic theory, adequacy in capturing the data, and relevance for macroeconomic policy (see, for example, Caballero, 2010, Chari et al., 2009, and Pesaran and Smith, 2011).

\(^2\)See Dhaene and Barten (1989) for a detailed review of the Tinbergen model. The model consists of 24 structural equations with Keynesian elements and was built to assess whether the Netherlands should leave the gold standard.
Since then, macroeconomic modelling has been characterized by competition and evolution. Models are continually being revised in light of new findings, both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Particular emphasis has been placed on internal consistency of economy-wide models and the development of suitable empirical benchmarks. Moreover, macroeconomic models have been adapted so as to provide solutions for new challenges faced by policy makers.

In central banking, macroeconomic models were adopted only very gradually; even pioneering central banks such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada started to use macroeconomic models as late as the 1960s. Most of the models employed during this phase featured backward-looking dynamics and various Keynesian elements. Dynamics were imposed using partial adjustment mechanisms and/or error-correction approaches. Expectations were appended using estimated distributed lag structures. Such models shaped the understanding of monetary policy and its effects on the real economy for a long period of time. Such models still played an important role in the late 1990s as evidenced by Svensson (1997a, 1997b), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Ball (1999).

In the 1970s, however, macroeconomic modelling experienced a paradigm shift. The influential critiques by Lucas (1976), Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Sims (1980) constituted a major challenge for the traditional Keynesian-style of modelling that relied on short-run restrictions not derived directly from economic behavior. Eventually, this led to the development of a first generation of New Keynesian models, which incorporated rational expectations with regard to the forward-looking based calculation of market participants’ expectations as well as nominal rigidities such as staggered wage and price contracts (e.g. Anderson and Taylor, 1976, Taylor, 1979, Taylor, 1993b). In those models monetary policy had sustained real effects even if households and firms could anticipate the monetary policy actions. With some lag, models of this nature were adopted by central banks, including the QPM at the Bank of Canada and the FRB/US model at the Federal Reserve Board. Furthermore, the focus on forward-looking and optimizing behavior in modelling put rules rather than discretionary action center stage in policy analysis. Also, research on monetary policy eventually moved from focussing on money growth to interest rate rules, as emphasized by the seminal contribution on interest rate rules by Taylor (1993a).

Parallel to the New Keynesian approach, another strand of literature, building on Lucas

---

3The Bank of Canada adopted the so-called RDX1 model and later versions RDX2 and RDXF (Helliwell et al., 1969), while the Federal Reserve System started using the MPS and the MCM model (De Leeuw and Gramlich, 1968).

4The Bank of Canada replaced the RDXF model in the early 1990s by the QPM (Coletti et al., 1996; Poloz et al., 1994). At the Federal Reserve System, the MPS was replaced by the FRB/US model, an econometric model with explicit treatment of private sector expectations (Brayton et al., 1996).
(1976) and initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1982), led to the development of so-called Real Business Cycle (RBC) Models. These models implemented a general equilibrium framework in which decision rules are derived from constrained intertemporal optimization problems faced by households and firms. However, the absence of nominal rigidities rendered monetary policy analysis obsolete in these models. The New Neoclassical Synthesis, as exemplified in the work of Goodfriend and King (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), brought together New Keynesian modelling and the RBC approach. The combination of nominal rigidities, imperfect competition and the general equilibrium framework produced a second generation of New Keynesian models, including among others McCallum and Nelson (1999), Clarida et al. (1999) and Walsh (2003). In these models, monetary policy is usually described by means of a simple Taylor-type rule relating the central bank nominal policy rate to inflation, economic activity (as measured by output, the output gap or output growth) and possibly other aggregate variables.

The early contributions to the second generation of New Keynesian DSGE models provided an internally-consistent optimizing-behavior-based framework, which allowed for real effects of monetary policy and could be used for analysis of monetary policy strategies. However, these models did not fit the data as well as the first generation of New Keynesian models. Christiano et al. (2005) (henceforth CEE), first proposed to extend such New Keynesian DSGE models with a combination of certain behavioral assumptions and adjustment costs that would allow such medium-size models to better match estimates of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy obtained with Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis.

Such medium-size models from the second New Keynesian generation typically feature physical capital in firms’ production function with variable capital utilization, habit formation in consumption and various frictions such as wage stickiness and investment adjustment costs as well as price and wage indexation. The latter frictions are assumed ad hoc, that is, are not derived themselves from optimizing behavior. As a consequence of these modelling features, medium-size second generation New Keynesian models exhibit not only forward-looking-based expectations but also significant backward-looking dynamics. Thus, they can match VAR-based measures of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks as well as the first generation of New Keynesian models.

This recognition combined with the Bayesian estimation approach proposed and implemented by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) (henceforth SW), who estimated versions of CEE models for the Euro Area and the U.S. economies, led to a rapid popularization of the

---

5 The terminology of model generations used here follows Orphanides and Wieland (2013) and Wieland et al. (2016).

6 Their framework was already widely circulated in working paper format in 2001.
second-generation New Keynesian DSGE framework. Advances in computing technology made it possible to solve many of these models relatively easily and quickly. As evidenced by Coenen et al. (2012) and Vlcek and Roger (2012), variants of this second generation of New Keynesian DSGE models had been added to the modelling toolkit of many central banks and policy institutions prior to the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. Table 1 provides an overview of structural macroeconomic models used at selected central banks since the 1960s.

Table 1: Macroeconomic Models in Selected Policy Institutions Before 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Model Name</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Keynesian-Style Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Canada</td>
<td>RDX1/RDX2/RDXF</td>
<td>Helliwell et al. (1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>Area Wide Model (AWM)</td>
<td>Dieppe et al. (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve System</td>
<td>MIT-PENN-SSRC Model (MPS)</td>
<td>De Leeuw and Gramlich (1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st-Generation New Keynesian Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd-Generation New Keynesian Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Japan</td>
<td>Japanese Economic Model (JEM)</td>
<td>Fujiwara et al. (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve System</td>
<td>SIGMA</td>
<td>Erceg et al. (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve System</td>
<td>EDO Model</td>
<td>Edge et al. (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>New Area Wide Model (NAWM)</td>
<td>Christoffel et al. (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norges Bank</td>
<td>NEMO</td>
<td>Brubakk et. al. (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sveriges Riksbank</td>
<td>RAMSES</td>
<td>Adolfson et. al. (2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many macroeconomists see great benefit from using a model that consistently relies on deriving the whole system of equations from optimizing behavior. In the words of Negro and Schorfheide (2013),

“*the benefit of building empirical models on sound theoretical foundations is that the model delivers an internally consistent interpretation of the current state and future trajectories of the economy and enables a sound analysis of policy scenarios.*” (p. 61).
Though, in our view, this should not mean that other approaches to structural macroeconomic modelling ought to be considered "unsound" thereby creating an environment that is hostile to a pluralism of macroeconomic modelling paradigms. Following the financial crisis and recession of 2008/09, an important criticism of second generation New Keynesian models was that these models failed to capture the importance of the financial sector for the development of real economic activity. Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the assumptions of frictionless and complete financial markets and the absence of financial risk in these models seemed untenable. In the words of Blanchard et al. (2010), a key lesson for economists from the global financial crisis is that "financial intermediation matters." Hence, researchers aimed to explore a variety of new modelling approaches to investigate the role of credit channels, of bank and household balance sheets as well as of asset prices for the business cycle, for policy transmission mechanisms and for forecasting performance.

It is a welcome development that there is again a pluralism of structural macroeconomic modelling approaches. For example, new macro-finance models in the spirit of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) advocate strong endogenous feedback loops between financial and goods markets. However, these models have not yet been brought to the data to the same extent as common in the New Keynesian literature. Another approach is agent-based modelling (ABM). ABM models also feature a detailed modelling of financial markets, inter alia studying the interaction among traders from a granular perspective. In recent years, researchers have begun to investigate in more depth how to estimate such models (Alfarano et al., 2005; Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012) and how to use them for economic policy design (Dawid et al., 2014; Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015). Other approaches such as network models are also used to model the interactions between financial sector agents in more detail, in particular the relationships between financial institutions, with a focus on systemic risk (compare Aldasoro et al., 2015; Gai et al., 2011).

Most notably, however, the criticism of macroeconomic modelling spurred many new approaches to integrate more detailed characterizations of the financial sector into New Keynesian DSGE models. In other words, the financial crisis led to the development of a third generation of New Keynesian (DSGE) models featuring financial frictions. Despite the increased plurality in structural modelling paradigms, New Keynesian models continue to be the main structural modelling tool at central banks. Before documenting this prevalence of new New Keynesian models in central banks in more detail, we discuss various approaches to integrating financial sector characterizations and associated frictions in the New Keynesian framework.

The most prominent type of financial frictions currently employed is the one proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG from hereon). Even before the financial crisis, De Graeve
(2008) already incorporated this financial accelerator in a medium-size second-generation New Keynesian model. Following BGG, entrepreneurs need to obtain loans to purchase physical capital as they do not have sufficiently high own net worth. However, in the spirit of Townsend (1979), their idiosyncratic returns are observable by the entrepreneurs themselves only. By contrast, lenders, which are assumed to be perfectly competitive financial intermediaries or banks (and thus appear only implicitly in the model), need to pay a fixed auditing cost in order to observe the returns. The resulting risky debt contract between lenders and entrepreneurs ties the external finance premium – the expected return on capital minus the risk-free rate – to the entrepreneur’s net worth position. A higher entrepreneur’s net worth lowers the implied probability of their default and thus decreases the required external finance premium. As entrepreneurial net worth is pro-cyclical, this gives rise to a counter-cyclical external finance premium. This interaction works as an amplifying mechanism over business cycles – the so-called financial accelerator mechanism. The BGG financial accelerator can be integrated in a New Keynesian model while leaving the core second-generation model block intact. The result is a third-generation New Keynesian DSGE model with all of the second generation features and additional financial frictions.

There are different possibilities for better integrating the financial sector in New Keynesian DSGE models. Some of them extend the BGG framework but keep the focus on financial frictions between firms and banks linked to firms’ net worth. For example, Christensen and Dib (2008) consider a debt contract à la BGG written in terms of the nominal interest rate. This gives rise to an additional debt-deflation channel in the model. Carlstrom et al. (2014) consider a privately optimal contract variant which is indexed to the aggregate return on capital. Christiano et al. (2014) propose an extension of the BGG framework by introducing risk shocks, i.e., shocks to the standard deviation of firms’ idiosyncratic returns.

By contrast, other approaches emphasize bank balance sheets, household balance sheets or asset prices as important drivers of financial sector risk. Among them, models which explicitly characterize the behavior of financial intermediaries in the New Keynesian DSGE framework have attracted a lot of attention. In light of the financial crisis, key ideas from Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) were resuscitated: the notion that balance sheets of financial intermediaries - or more specifically, bank net worth - are crucial for business cycle dynamics and policy transmission (Gambacorta and Mizen, 2017). The resulting strand of literature aiming to incorporate banks into New Keynesian DSGE models is too rich to discuss it fully in this chapter. Notably, despite these new developments

---

7 Alternative means to incorporate financial frictions are borrowing constraints faced by households or including the financial accelerator mechanism in housing markets. For a combination of both of these, see for example Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Quint and Rabanal (2014).
in characterizing banks’ interaction with the overall economy, there is no consensus yet as to how to incorporate banks into New Keynesian DSGE models. In the following, we list some prominent examples.

Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) propose a New Keynesian DSGE framework in which information asymmetries exist between banks and households. These asymmetries create a moral hazard problem. In each period, bankers are able to divert a certain fraction of household deposits. An incentive compatibility constraint rules out such behavior and gives rise to an endogenous leverage constraint linking the volume of intermediated loans to bank net worth. As bank net worth is pro-cyclical, commercial bank intermediation of loans is pro-cyclical as well, leading to an amplification of business cycles. In similar fashion, Meh and Moran (2010) propose a framework in which bank capital is crucial to mitigate informational asymmetries in the banking sector. They assume a double moral hazard problem between banks, entrepreneurs and households in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). As a result, the capital position of the bank governs its ability to obtain deposits, such that the bank capital channel amplifies business cycles.

Other authors highlight the importance of the structure of the banking market and regulatory capital requirements. Gerali et al. (2010) and Dib (2010) depart from the assumption of perfect competition in the banking sector. Banks possess some market power and act as price setters on loan rates. However, banks are also subject to regulatory loan-to-deposit ratios or capital requirements, linking the loan rate to bank balance sheet conditions. In these models, the financial sector has an attenuating effect on shocks that impact on the economy via a change in real rates or in the value of collateral. In similar fashion, Afanasyeva and Güntner (2015) reverse the bargaining power in the traditional BGG setup. In their model, an expansionary monetary policy shock increases the leverage ratio and bank net worth, and accordingly also bank lending. This gives rise to a risk-taking channel in the transmission of monetary policy. Here, bank market power does not lead to an attenuating effect of the financial sector, but preserves the financial accelerator mechanism of BGG.

Overall, it is noteworthy that central banks have included New Keynesian models with financial frictions rather quickly in their toolkit. Table 2 provides an overview of structural macroeconomic models currently used at selected central banks and international organizations.8

New Keynesian models remain the central modelling tool used at policy institutions. Nominal rigidities, forward-looking based decision rules and the mixture of other frictions

---

8We draw on published research papers, working papers or other publicly available documentation. In particular, the table is based on Wieland et al. (2016, 2012), Coenen et al. (2012), Kilponen et al. (2015) and Lindé et al. (2016), who provide discussions of models used at policy institutions that complement our discussion here. By no means do we claim to provide a complete overview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Model Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Financial Frictions</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Canada</td>
<td>BoC-GEM-Fin</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG + banks</td>
<td>Lalonde and Muir (2007), de Resende et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Canada</td>
<td>ToTEM II</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Murchison and Rennison (2006), Dorich et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of England</td>
<td>COMPASS</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Burgess et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Federal Reserve System</td>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Chung et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundesbank</td>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Stähler, Gadschat and Hauzenberger (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundesbank</td>
<td>BBK-Model</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Buzaushina et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago</td>
<td>Chigaco Fed DGSE</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Brave et al. (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of NY</td>
<td>FRBNY - DSGE</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Del Negro et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>NAWM</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Christof et al. (2008), Lombardo and McAdam (21012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Christiano et al. (2010, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>NMCN</td>
<td>NK&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dieppe et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>EAGLE-FLI</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Gomes et al. (2012), Bokan et al. (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>QUEST III</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Ratto, Roeger and in't Veld (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>GIMF - BGG</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Anderson et al. (2013), Andrele et al. (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>GIMF - BANKS</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG + banks</td>
<td>Andrele et al. (2015), Benes and Kumhof (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banco de Portugal</td>
<td>PESSOA</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Almeida, Castro, Felix, Julio and Mario (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norges Bank</td>
<td>NEMO</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG + banks</td>
<td>Brubakk et al. (2006), Brubakk and Gelain (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>OECD Fiscal</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Furceri and Muroguiane (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banco de Espanã</td>
<td>FiMod</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Stähler and Thomas (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sveriges Riksbank</td>
<td>RAMSES</td>
<td>NK-DSGE</td>
<td>BGG</td>
<td>Adolfsen et al. (2007, 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *NK-DSGE* is “New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium”, *PAC* is “Polynomial Adjustment Cost” framework, *BGG* denotes the financial accelerator by Bernanke et al. (1999), *RP* means some other form of (ad-hoc) risk premium.

<sup>a</sup>The model assumes that agents don’t know the full structure and parameter values of the model. This bounded rationality constitutes a major departure from the usual DSGE framework. The authors describe their model as an “optimising agent - new keynesian model”.


are still considered crucial for policy evaluation. By now, most central banks have variants of those models available to include some form of financial frictions. In our categorization, these are considered third generation New Keynesian models. As shown in Table 2, in many cases, as for example in the Fed’s EDO model or the Bundesbank GEAR model, the financial sector is modelled in a reduced-form way as a time-varying risk premium over some risk-free interest rate, where the latter is usually assumed to be in control of the central bank. Except for a reduced-form risk premium, the most common specification for financial frictions is the financial accelerator of BGG. Central bank models using this approach include models from the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank (ECB) and Sveriges Riksbank.

Only few central banks and other international organizations have so far incorporated banking sectors into their structural models used for regular policy analysis. Notable exceptions are models used at the Bank of Canada (BoC-GEM-Fin), the ECB (EAGLE-FLI) and Norges Bank (NEMO). Of course, this should not be interpreted as an indication that central bankers disregard the role of the banking sector for business cycles. Most of the macro-banking models have been developed and proposed by researchers working at central banks. In the words of Vlcek and Roger (2012), they can be interpreted as satellite models for central banks. While their exact mechanisms are not yet included in core models used for regular policy analysis, they may still shape the discussion and thinking of policymakers at central banks. In other words, their influence on policy discussions is rather indirect and goes beyond what is suggested by looking exclusively at central banks’ flagship models.

A key lesson we draw from this survey is that the Great Recession led to a substantial attempt to improve the modelling of the financial sector and associated frictions in New Keynesian DSGE models. To date, there are many competing modelling approaches. While there is not yet a workhorse macroeconomic model including financial frictions, the most popular approach is the firm-based financial accelerator mechanism of BGG. Many central banks have incorporated this channel or reduced-form variants thereof in their policy models, thus moving from the second to the third generation of New Keynesian DSGE models. However, this is only a start and other financial sector imperfections need to be considered.

The core structure of New Keynesian DSGE models as represented by the second generation variant à la CEE and SW has been widely used for monetary policy analysis. However, the relatively new and rich strand of macro-financial models represents an increased degree of model uncertainty for policy makers. There is modelling uncertainty regarding the most important financial frictions and their implications for transmission mechanisms, optimal monetary policy and forecasting performance. Model uncertainty itself is a possible expla-

---

9For example, the publication list of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System staff in 2015-2016 includes many research papers dealing with financial sector issues.
nation why there is an implementation lag regarding those models used regularly for policy analysis at central banks. At this point, comparative analysis can be very useful. Policy making institutions need to compare old and new models and need to evaluate the impact and interaction of policy instruments in order to design effective and robust policy strategies. In fact, macroeconomic model comparison has a long tradition in the fields of monetary and fiscal policy analysis. In the words of Wieland et al. (2016),

“[c]entral banks and international organizations have made much use of academic research on macroeconomic modelling, and they have invested staff resources in practical policy applications in large-scale comparison exercises.” (p. 1).

Yet, as the strand of research on financial sector modelling in New Keynesian models is relatively young, there have been few comparative studies. Thus, in the following sections, we review and investigate some key issues regarding the transmission channels and the impact of monetary policy, fiscal policy and macroprudential policy in these third-generation New Keynesian models relative to earlier generations. We also discuss whether model fit and forecasting performance have improved by including more detailed representations of the financial sector in such economy-wide models.

3 Policy Transmission in Models With and Without Financial Frictions

First, we employ a comparative approach to analyze the implications of financial frictions for policy transmission. This approach makes use of an archive of macroeconomic models (www.macromodelbase.com) that includes many novel contributions. It builds on and extends recent work on model comparison by Taylor and Wieland (2012), Wieland et al. (2012), Schmidt and Wieland (2013) and Wieland et al. (2016). We investigate to what extent assessments of the impact of monetary policy on the real economy have changed with third-generation New Keynesian models relative to earlier ones. Specifically, the role of the financial sector and associated frictions is explored.

Our focus on New Keynesian models should not be interpreted as an exclusive preference for this modelling approach. Rather, much can be learned from rigorous comparison between competing modelling paradigms. Yet, to make progress, models need to be useful for providing answers to the very questions that policy makers ask. This is the case for New

\[10^{th}\] For a detailed review of the history of macroeconomic model comparison, see Wieland et al. (2016) and the references therein.
Keynesian DSGE models. At the same time, there is criticism of DSGE models as expressed by Blanchard (2016) and Romer (2016) and alternative modelling approaches are under development. The comparative approach pursued in the following would be very suitable to explore differences and similarities with regards to the impact of policy measures with those models in the future.

3.1 Interest Rate Policy

It is natural to start with a comparison of the impact of interest rate shocks in traditional Keynesian-style models versus New Keynesian models. For example, the model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) (RS99), which consists of a backward-looking IS curve, an accelerationist Phillips curve (with adaptive expectations) and an interest rate rule, constitutes such a traditional model. The models of Taylor (1993b) (TAY93), Fuhrer and Moore (1995) (FM95) and Coenen et al. (2004) (COW04) belong to the first generation of New Keynesian models, featuring nominal rigidities and forward-looking rational expectations. In all models, we implement the monetary policy rule by Gerdesmeier et al. (2004) to eliminate differences stemming from model-specific rules and isolate the effect of differences in core model structures. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses following an expansionary monetary policy shock, that is, a decrease of the nominal interest rate by 1 percentage point.

Figure 1: Monetary Policy Shock in Traditional Keynesian-Style Models and First Generation New Keynesian Models

(a) Output

(b) Inflation

(c) Interest Rate

Note: Impulse responses following a decrease in the gross annualized nominal interest rate of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The rule by Gerdesmeier et al. (2004) is used as a common monetary policy rule.

In all four models, such an interest rate cut induces a hump-shaped response of output. The peak response in first-generation New Keynesian models occurs after two to three quarters. TAY93 and COW04 indicate quite similar magnitudes. The FM95 model features a
smaller somewhat longer response. In contrast, the largest and longest-lasting output effects occur in the traditional Keynesian-style RS99 model. This is due to the pronounced backward-looking dynamics of that model. A similar picture emerges with respect to inflation - the traditional Keynesian-style model features notably large and persistent increases in inflation following expansionary monetary policy shocks. Considering both generations of models, there is substantial model uncertainty, yet less so within the class of first-generation New Keynesian models.

In contrast, the second generation of New Keynesian DSGE models displays quite large variance in the quantitative effects of monetary policy shocks. Figure 2 compares the impact of such shocks across four different models of this generation. Early models are represented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) (RW97) and Ireland (2004) (IH04), later variants by Altig et al. (2005) (ACEL05) and Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW07). The first two models are calibrated versions of the canonical small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with just a few equations (Euler equation, forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve, a monetary policy rule, and money demand in IH04). The latter two models additionally include capital, habit formation and various frictions such as investment adjustment costs.

Figure 2: Monetary Policy Shock in Second-Generation Models

(a) Output  (b) Inflation  (c) Interest Rate

Note: Impulse responses following a decrease in the gross annualized nominal interest rate of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The rule by Gerdesmeier et al. (2004) is used as a common monetary policy rule.

The smaller-scale models of this generation feature large responses of output and inflation on impact, where the magnitude is a multiple of the effect in models of the second generation shown in Figure 1. Moreover, the impulse responses peak on impact, returning only slowly to their non-stochastic steady state values afterwards. As shown by CEE, this is at odds with empirical VAR evidence, which suggests that both output and inflation exhibit a hump-shaped response to a monetary policy shock. Medium-size DSGE models of the second generation induce such hump-shaped impulse responses by adding capital in the
production function, investment adjustment costs and other frictions in addition to nominal price rigidities. The assumption of habit formation can generate a hump-shaped response in consumption by adding backward-looking components similar to the traditional Keynesian-style models and the first-generation New Keynesian models. The presence of investment adjustment costs helps to dampen the strong initial decrease of investment. Overall, the picture emerging from this analysis suggests that monetary policy transmission works very differently in the medium-size second-generation New Keynesian models.

As noted in the previous section, many central banks included such second-generation New Keynesian models in their suite of models prior to the Great Recession, mainly due to the improved empirical fit of these models relative to the early small scale models. As found by Taylor and Wieland (2012), these estimated second-generation models tend to display impulse responses following monetary policy shocks that are strikingly similar to first-generation models such as Taylor (1993b). We replicate this result in Figure 3, adding further model variants. We compare the models by Taylor (1993b) (TAY93), SW07, Altig et al. (2005) with original model assumptions (ACEL05) and assumptions following SW (ACEL05sw) as well as Cogan et al. (2010) (CCTW10). For the TAY93 model, Taylor and Wieland (2012) show that it exhibits properties very similar to those of second-generation models. The ACEL model is the CEE framework with two additional shocks and assumes that firms have to borrow working capital to pay the wage bill. The resulting so-called cost channel is not present in SW07. CCTW is the SW07 model with rule-of-thumb consumers re-estimated on U.S. data. The rule by SW07 is used as a common monetary policy rule.

**Figure 3: Monetary Policy Transmission in Medium-Sized Models**

(a) Output  (b) Inflation  (c) Interest Rate

Note: Impulse responses following a decrease in the gross annualized nominal interest rate of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The rule by Smets and Wouters (2007) is used as a common monetary policy rule.

As is evident in Figure 3, monetary policy shocks imply very similar transmissions to the real economy in these five models. In particular, the peak output responses are quantitatively
almost identical. The speed of transition back to steady state is only somewhat larger in Altig et al. (2005). For inflation, there is some disagreement among the models regarding the timing of the peak response, but overall the picture emerging from these models is broadly in line with empirical results.

Next, we investigate whether different approaches to modelling the financial sector in New Keynesian DSGE models implies different transmission mechanisms. To this end, we compare seven third-generation models. Out of these, De Graeve (2008) (DG08), Christiano et al. (2010) (CMR10) and Christiano et al. (2014) (CMR14) feature the canonical BGG financial accelerator. CMR10 additionally includes a bank-funding channel. Banks are also modelled in Gerali et al. (2010) (GNSS10, monopolistic competition), Meh and Moran (2010) (MM10, double-sided moral hazard) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) (GK11, moral hazard between depositors and banks). Iacoviello and Neri (2010) (IN10) incorporate frictions in the housing market via household collateral constraints related to housing value. The SW model serves as a representative second-generation benchmark. Figure 4 shows the transmission of a monetary policy shock in these models.

**Figure 4: Monetary Policy Transmission in Third-Generation Models**

(a) Output  (b) Inflation  (c) Interest Rate

![Graphs showing monetary policy transmission](image)

Note: Impulse responses following a decrease in the gross annualized nominal interest rate of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The rule by Smets and Wouters (2007) is used a common monetary policy rule.

Third-generation models exhibit substantial quantitative differences regarding the transmissions of monetary policy shocks to the real economy. Medium-size models using the canonical financial accelerator mechanism display similar peak responses to output, but longer lasting real effects and less overshooting of inflation than the SW07 model. Gerke et al. (2013) document similar findings for five third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models used by central banks in the Eurosystem. For the model by Christiano et al. (2014),

---

11In their model, the bank optimization problem implies a link between bank lending to the conditions faced in the market for funding, which in turn depend on households’ liquidity demand.
Wieland et al. (2016) show that this results stems from the interaction of wage stickiness and financial frictions and conclude that additional research is warranted to investigate whether monetary policy shocks indeed induce longer lasting effects on the real economy than previously thought. Another explanation centers on the capital-accumulation channel as emphasized by Carrillo and Poilly (2013). Following a decrease in the nominal interest rate, the real interest decreases as well such that households want to increase consumption. Higher aggregate demand triggers a higher demand for capital, thus increasing the price for capital. This increases the value of firm collateral and corresponds to a decrease in leverage and the external finance premium. This, in turn, leads to higher investment and an increase of capital, giving rise to a feedback loop resulting in more persistent output effects.

In stark contrast, the models by Gerali et al. (2010) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) feature a peak output and inflation response on impact, similar to early small-scale models of the second generation – despite including all of the CEE features originally intended to match VAR-based impulse responses. Finally, the banking models by Meh and Moran (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) imply similar output responses as the SW model. However, the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model has an even stronger peak effect for inflation.

The differences between the second and the third generation of New Keynesian models are thus at least as pronounced as the ones between small-scale and medium-size variants of the second generation. The implications stemming from third-generation models incorporating the canonical financial accelerator mechanism seem to be broadly the same, in that they imply more persistent effects of monetary policy shocks. The models with bank-based frictions, in turn, imply stronger peak responses. Overall, the third-generation models all indicate either an immediate acceleration and/or a more persistent effect of monetary policy shocks on the real economy.

The heterogeneity in estimated impacts of monetary policy shocks in these models indicates a new degree of model uncertainty in the third generation of New Keynesian DSGE models. Policy makers using this new set of models in policy design inherently face different implications depending on what (subset of) model(s) they are using. An important question is how to adjust monetary policy in the presence of such model uncertainty. In Section 4, we will therefore investigate what monetary policy rules would be robust in the sense of performing fairly well across a range of models with financial frictions, and whether these are different from rules performing well across a range of first- and second-generation models. Before doing so, we turn our attention to unconventional, that is, quantitative monetary policy, fiscal policy and macroprudential policy, and their interaction with interest rate policy.
3.2 The Zero Lower Bound and Unconventional Monetary Policy

Expansionary monetary policy does not need to end when interest rates reach a lower bound near or below zero. This is of particular importance in the post-financial crisis world of near zero interest rates. Thus, Ball et al. (2016) state in the 2016 Geneva Report that

“Short term interest rates have been near zero in advanced economies since 2009, making it difficult for central banks to cut rates further and provide needed economic stimulus. There is reason to believe that this lower bound problem will be common in years to come.” (p. xix).

Yet, it should be acknowledged that the zero lower bound – which arises from the presence of cash which offers a zero-nominal-interest investment option to savers – was studied by central bank researchers long before the global financial crisis. It was already the focus of research in the mid to late 1990s, especially once the Japanese economy started exhibiting very low interest rates starting in 1995. For example, researchers at the Federal Reserve such as Fuhrer and Madigan (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998) already evaluated the effects of the lower-bound constraint on monetary policy in first-generation New Keynesian models.

Similarly, Krugman (1998) employed a simple macroeconomic model with temporarily fixed price level to investigate causes and consequences of the zero lower bound. Other contributions on the zero bound using first-generation New Keynesian models included Coenen and Wieland (2003, 2004) and Coenen et al. (2004). They showed that a sequence of negative demand and deflationary shocks can lead to a more pronounced recession and a prolonged period of deflation when the zero lower bound is taken into account. Subsequent work using second-generation New Keynesian models also investigated the consequences of an occasionally binding zero lower bound for optimal monetary policy (compare e.g., Adam and Billi, 2007, Nakov, 2008 and Schmidt, 2013).

Against the backdrop of Japan prolonged period near the zero lower bound in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, macroeconomic research already explored remaining policy options aside from interest rate policy, today broadly speaking called unconventional monetary policy. One of these options is quantitative easing (QE), i.e. an expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet and the monetary base by means of central bank asset purchases. In doing so the objective is the same as with interest rate cuts, namely to increase aggregate demand and inflation. The Bank of Japan started making use of quantitative easing in 2001. Other major central banks, including the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank have engaged in massive quantitative easing in the aftermath of the Great Recession. To give an example, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet rose such that the
As such, both the zero lower bound and QE have been investigated extensively already prior to the Great Recession. However, third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models which incorporate financial market imperfections offer new microeconomic foundations for analyzing how quantitative easing works through the financial sector on the overall economy. They allow for jointly modelling the zero lower bound, financial frictions and large-scale central bank asset purchases. By doing so, it is possible to investigate and separate out different transmission channels of unconventional policies deployed after the Great Recession more effectively than in earlier New Keynesian models.\footnote{The suitability of models with financial frictions to explain the post Great Recession period is also supported by the somewhat improved empirical fit, as documented by Del Negro et al. (2015), Villa (2016), Lindé et al. (2016) and others, a point to which we will return in Section 5.}

Thus, it is not surprising that in particular third-generation New Keynesian models with banking frictions have been used to study QE. However, there is considerable heterogeneity with respect to the particular modelling approach. Most contributions focus on the portfolio balance effect by distinguishing short- and long-term rates, with the latter being affected by central bank asset purchases (see for example Chen et al., 2012, Ellison and Tischbirek, 2014 and Carlstrom et al., 2014). In such models, the central bank is able to reduce long-term yields by increasing demand for long-term bonds. In turn, this causes crowding-out of saving and an increase in consumption, with expansionary effects on output and inflationary pres-
sure as a final result. A complementary approach is to assume that QE directly affects or attenuates the modelled financial frictions. As an example, Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013) and Kühl (2016) model QE as a way of circumventing the moral hazard problem inherently existing between depositors and banks (as described above in Section 2) by providing additional financial intermediation not subject to the financial friction. As an illustrative example, we replicate some key findings of Gertler and Karadi (2013) by considering large-scale asset purchases similar to the quantitative easing programs pursed by the Federal Reserve, shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Quantitative Easing in Gertler and Karadi (2013)**

(a) QE  (b) Output  (c) Inflation  (d) Nom. Interest

(e) Real Interest  (f) Asset Price  (g) Bank Net Worth  (h) EFP

Note: Government bond purchases (QE) by the central bank in the model by Gertler and Karadi (2013). Purchases are calibrated to a peak effect of 2.5 percent of GDP. Interest rates are kept unchanged for four periods in the zero lower bound scenario (black line). EFP is the external finance premium $E[R_{t+1}^{E} - R_{t+1}]$.

Under a binding zero lower bound (mimicked by constant interest rates for 4 quarters), the central bank asset purchases cause a decline in long-term bond rates and the external finance premium. The combination of a binding zero lower bound and inflationary pressure reduces the real interest rates, in turn leading to crowding-in of consumption, while the resulting increase in the asset price stimulates investment. Overall, the QE program is expansionary with the peak increase in output being about 1 percent. The particular relevance of QE at the zero lower bound is visible from its expansionary effect relative to a situation without a zero lower bound. In such a scenario, the output effect is weaker, owing to an increase in real interest rates leading to a crowding-out of consumption which counteracts the increase in investment.
Despite the more detailed characterization of the financial sector, most third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models do not explicitly model household money holdings and the monetary base. As such, the financing of QE is usually and necessarily assumed to occur through lump-sum taxes or distortionary taxes instead of money creation. As a consequence, some aspects of QE such as the real balance channel can only be captured indirectly, in contrast to earlier models such as Orphanides and Wieland (2000). There are some advances in explicitly modelling money creation in such models, but to date without explicit ties to QE (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015).

Another policy option that has been advanced as a suitable tool for managing expectations near the lower bound is so-called forward guidance. Technically, there are two types of forward guidance. One type consists simply of providing more information about the likely path of future policy rates conditional on the central bank’s forecast of macroeconomic developments and a reaction function that characterizes past systematic central bank reactions to these developments reasonably well. Some central banks have been publishing such forecasts for some time, in particular, the central bank of Norway. Other central banks such as the ECB have explained their forward guidance in the same manner. The other type of forward guidance can be characterized as a public commitment concerning future policy rates that constitutes a deviation from the reaction function or policy rule. In practice, these two approaches are difficult to separate empirically.

Owing to the explicit modelling of forward-looking behavior, New Keynesian models are a suitable framework to analyze the macroeconomic effects of such policies, as evident by some early contributions prior to the Great Recession by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), among others. Such analyses have shown that it can be beneficial to announce that the central bank will keep interest rates lower for longer in the aftermath of a period at the zero bound than would be anticipated based on a central bank reaction that characterizes policy in normal times. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve made use of qualitative announcements regarding its anticipated future path of the federal funds rate. For example, in January 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee stated that it “[...] anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for at least [...] late 2014.” The effects of such actions are investigated by Campbell et al. (2012).

Using a third-generation New Keynesian model, Giannoni et al. (2016) document that the assumption of rational expectations and full information that typically governs forward-looking behavior in these models implies large real effects of forward guidance well in excess of empirical estimates. A number of contributions have aimed to make these models con-
sistent with weaker effects of forward guidance. Examples of such modifications include higher discounting of the future (Giannoni et al., 2016), heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints (McKay et al., 2016), and heterogeneous beliefs (Gaballo et al., 2016). Of course, the strong expectational channel of monetary policy (announcements) has also been a feature of earlier New Keynesian models. For example, Coenen and Wieland (2004) have shown that the effectiveness of price-level targeting is substantially reduced when the central bank’s target is not credible and market participants are learning from the data.

Overall, it can be argued that the macro-financial models of the third New Keynesian generation can be quite useful to analyze unconventional monetary policy transmission through financial markets and bank balance sheets, while accounting for occasionally binding lower bounds on nominal interest rates. Many of them, however, are missing an explicit modelling of household money holdings and the relationship to the monetary base. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in modelling approaches suggests that it would be urgent to compare the effects of quantitative easing across models and study what strategies would be robust to the elevated degree of model uncertainty.

### 3.3 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction

When central bank rates reach a lower bound at zero or small negative values, it is often argued that it would be best to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand. Indeed, this holds in traditional Keynesian models without forward-looking behavior and fixed prices, where fiscal stimulus has particular strong effects when policy rates remain constant. Research with real-business-cycle models and first-generation New Keynesian models instead studied fiscal policy under rational expectations and optimizing behavior. The resulting literature in the 1980s and 1990s concluded that discretionary fiscal stimulus is largely crowding out private spending and that fiscal policy best focuses on automatic stabilizers such as progressive taxes and unemployment benefits at business cycle frequencies (Taylor, 2000).

The advent of zero interest rates in 2008 launched a new debate on the effects of discretionary fiscal stimulus. Structural analysis focused on second-generation New Keynesian DSGE models could easily be extended with a more detailed fiscal sector. Cogan et al. (2010) and Cwik and Wieland (2011) found multipliers below unity in normal times, whereas a binding zero lower bound for two years led to a moderate increase just above unity.\(^\text{13}\) The degree of model uncertainty about the effects of fiscal stimulus triggered some large-scale model comparison exercises by Coenen et al. (2012) and Kilponen et al. (2015) who also used var-

\(^{13}\)Cogan et al. (2010) uses the SW model and includes rule-of-thumb consumers, while Cwik and Wieland (2011) compares the SW03 model to Taylor (1993b), the ECB’s Are–Wide model, the EU-QUEST III model and a small-scale model developed at the IMF.
ious policy institutions’ models. As many of these models do not feature financial frictions (or at least did not at that time), the authors did not specifically investigate the impact of financial frictions on fiscal multipliers. Coenen et al. (2012) report a government consumption multiplier of 0.8 to 0.9 after one year for the Euro Area, which increases to an average of 1.5 under a binding zero lower bound. Kilponen et al. (2015) focus on models employed by the Euro Area central banks and find a multiplier between 0.7 and 0.9, while a two-year zero lower bound generates a multiplier of 1.3 in the Euro Area.

Among others, Eggertsson (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010) have provided analysis indicating that the fiscal multiplier might be substantially higher in the presence of financial frictions, in particular when the zero lower bound is binding. Financial frictions may accelerate the impact of government spending on the real economy. The issue of fiscal multipliers in third-generation of New Keynesian DSGE models deserves further investigation. Carrillo and Poilly (2013) argue that the financial accelerator mechanism of BGG implies a capital-accumulation channel, which significantly amplifies output effects of stimulus. In their calibrated model, they find an initial multiplier of 1.28 relative to 1.04 in a model variant without financial frictions. They emphasize, however, that the effect of financial frictions is particularly large in times of a binding zero lower bound. As prevailing downward pressure on inflation and output prevents the central bank from increasing policy rates and thus eliminates the usual crowding-out of consumption and investment, the positive feedback loop between aggregate demand and the external finance premium is unmitigated and leads to large and persistent effects on output. Under a binding zero lower bound for six quarters, Carrillo and Poilly (2013) find an initial multiplier of 2.9, whereas the long-run multiplier is even larger. Of course, this capital-accumulation channel also influences the impact of other shocks affecting the demand for capital.

Uncertainty regarding the effects of fiscal policy in macro-financial models remains large. There is a multiplicity of modelling approaches regarding the financial sector with differing results on amplification mechanisms. To the extent that such models have been used to assess fiscal policy, they have usually featured a skeleton fiscal sector such as exogenous government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. By contrast, the second generation New Keynesian models used in Coenen et al. (2012) and Kilponen et al. (2015) featured a rich representation of the fiscal sector. Another source of uncertainty, as outlined by Bletzinger and Lalik (2017), is that the size of fiscal multipliers depends crucially on the modelling approach chosen for the zero lower bound.

For third-generation New Keynesian models, Binder et al. (2016) show that fiscal multipliers are not only sensitive to the specification of financial frictions and the assumed length

\[14\] The calibration follows Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2011).
of monetary policy accommodation in the form a binding zero lower bound. Rather, fiscal multipliers also crucially depend on the monetary policy rule followed after the period at the lower bound ends. Here, we illustrate the findings of Binder et al. (2016) with some simulations. We consider the models by De Graeve (2008) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) as two examples featuring different types of financial frictions (BGG and bank moral hazard). In doing so, we apply estimates of the structural parameters obtained with Euro Area data from Gelain (2010a) and Villa (2016), respectively.

The simulated fiscal stimulus is an exogenous marginal increase in government consumption for six periods, with a zero lower bound binding for six periods as well. As policy rule after the period of a binding lower bound, we use three different specifications: the canonical rule by Taylor (1993a), a variant with interest rate smoothing and a response to output gap growth, as well as one with a higher coefficient on inflation. Figure 6 reports the impulse responses for a shock to government purchases relative to a scenario without fiscal stimulus.

**Figure 6: Fiscal Policy Shocks in Third-Generation Models**

(a) Output  
(b) Inflation  
(c) Interest Rate

Note: Partial impulse responses following an increase in government consumption by 1 percent of its non-stochastic steady state value. A binding zero lower bound for six periods is generated by an exogenous contractionary shock. All impulse responses are in percentage point deviations relative to a scenario with the contractionary shock only (i.e., without fiscal stimulus).

---

15 The increase in government consumption is unanticipated by agents, but the time path of fiscal stimulus is fully revealed upon implementation in the initial period.

16 Considering a marginal increase in government consumption ensures that the length of the zero lower bound phase is not altered.

17 The policy rules used are $i_t = 1.5\pi^Q_t + 0.5 \cdot 4y_t$, $i_t = 0.8\pi^Q_t + (1-0.8)\pi^Q_t + (1-0.8) \cdot 0.5 \cdot 4(y_t - y_{t-1})$ and $i_t = 10\pi^Q_t$, respectively. $i$ is the quarterly annualized nominal interest rate, $\pi^Q$ is the quarterly annualized inflation rate, and $y$ is the output gap.

18 Partial impulse responses are defined as $\tilde{x}_t = \tilde{x}^f_t - \tilde{x}^0_t$ with $\tilde{x}^f_t$ being the percent deviation response to the shock that drives the economy to the zero lower bound, combined with fiscal stimulus, while $\tilde{x}^0_t$ is the response to the recessionary shock only. We thus compare the scenario of a binding zero lower bound and accompanied fiscal stimulus to a scenario of a binding zero lower bound only.
These simulations indicate that quantitative and qualitative results for a fiscal policy stimulus are highly sensitive to the choice of the monetary policy rule. If the monetary policy stance after period at the zero lower bound is accommodating, the relatively lower interest rate translates into an acceleration of the capital-accumulation channel and hence higher multipliers. In contrast, if the central bank reacts relatively aggressively to the fiscal stimulus by hiking interest rates, the overall effect is significantly weaker. Quantitatively, there are substantial short- and medium-run differences in the output responses. The impact multipliers range from 0.62 to 1.38, while the first-year effect ranges from -0.37 to 1.57. Even within a given model, the anticipated monetary policy rule has a large effect.

This analysis shows that more comparative research with macro-financial models is needed to investigate the transmission of fiscal measures, possible interactions and trade-offs, as well as the propagation of other shocks possibly hitting the economy. A related matter is the question of fiscal consolidation. Some studies find that fiscal consolidation based on a reduction of government purchases is likely to be associated with substantial contractionary effects (Eggertsson, 2011). However, Binder et al. (2016) show that well-designed fiscal consolidation - consisting of a reduction of government spending coupled with a decrease of distortionary labor taxes - can be effective in mitigating contractionary effects, and even provide positive stimulus while nominal interest rates are at the zero lower bound.

3.4 Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy

The global financial crisis has put financial stability at the forefront of policy makers’ concerns and hastened efforts to put in place new policy instrument that would be effective in containing systemic risk in the financial sector. While banking regulation has always been the first line of defense, there has been a conceptual shift from a “microprudential” to a “macroprudential” approach. Hanson et al. (2011) provide the following definition:

“A micro-prudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions. By contrast, a ‘macro-prudential’ approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole” (p. 1).

Nowadays, policy makers frequently argue that macroprudential policy should actively seek to manage the supply of credit – relative to underlying trends in economic activity – throughout the business cycle so as to reduce its impact on macroeconomic volatility and curb the potential for financial disruptions (see Turner, 2010 and Hanson et al., 2011). The
emphasis on moderating the financial cycle is linked to the view that excessive leverage on part of financial intermediaries not only makes them individually more vulnerable to external shocks, but also raises the risk of a systemic event. In general, intermediaries’ individual contribution to systemic financial risk is thought not to be internalized, thus generating an externality which provides room for policy to play a positive role (see for instance, Schnabel and Faia, 2015). This view has been influential in the set of international reforms that constitute the Basel III framework, which sets out new capital and liquidity standards for financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).

Yet, research on how to best operate with macro-prudential instruments in policy practice is still in its infancy, at least compared to the huge literature on the effects of monetary and fiscal policy and the design of appropriate policy rules in those areas. A consensus has yet to emerge in terms of operational objectives, target variables, instruments, transmission mechanisms and institutional structures. There is still no generally agreed upon definition of financial stability, much less a consensus around how to measure it (Borio et al., 2011). No single target variable has been widely accepted as essential for ensuring the operational effectiveness of macroprudential policy (Angelini et al., 2011). There is still relatively little understanding about the effectiveness and precise functioning of macroprudential instruments (Financial Stability Board, 2009). The interactions between macroprudential and monetary policies have yet to be completely worked out (Nier et al., 2013). Moreover, there is no universally appropriate institutional arrangement for financial stability supervision (Brockmeijer et al., 2011). At present, policy makers face the challenge of integrating financial stability concerns into their policy frameworks in an efficient and robust manner. This is greatly complicated by a precarious understanding about the precise relationship between the financial sector and the macroeconomy. Providing a comprehensive account of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.19

At the start of our analysis, it is useful to consider the following key issues concerning the analysis and design of macroprudential policy as laid out in (German Council of Economic Experts, 2014). First, the time dimension – vis à vis the cross-sectional dimension – of financial stability management should be developed further so as to moderate the procyclical, amplifying role of the financial sector in macroeconomic dynamics. Second, bank balance sheets play a central role in managing both financial stability risks and the macroeconomic business cycle, hence there is a need to further develop and deploy instruments that act directly on bank balance sheets. Finally, understanding the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy is of prime importance in designing an efficient policy

---

19 For a detailed account of the relevant literature, we refer the reader to the substantive reviews of Galati and Moessner, 2013, Bank of England, 2011 and German Council of Economic Experts, 2014.
framework.

In line with these observations, we illustrate some of the complications for macroprudential policy that arise from model uncertainty. To this end, we employ three of the third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models presented above. These models are amenable to this type of analysis because they incorporate sufficient detail on financial intermediaries so as to define macroprudential policy in a precise manner. Specifically, we consider regulatory requirements that concern banks’ balance sheets. Furthermore, as DSGE models they account directly for general equilibrium effects present in the interaction between the financial sector, regulatory authorities and the macroeconomy – as emphasized by Hanson et al. (2011). Finally, the definition of macroprudential policy we use accords well with key instruments that have been employed by regulatory authorities and analyzed in the financial literature on macroprudential policy, namely guidelines for and requirements on variables of banks’ and financial institutions’ balance sheets (Financial Stability Board, 2009). Granting direct control over these and other variables to the macroprudential authority allows it to exert a strong influence on factors such as leverage, maturity and liquidity mismatches, concentration of risks, and moral hazard problems – among others.

Specifically, we incorporate the capital-to-assets (CTA), loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-deposits (LTD) ratios as macroprudential instruments into the models of GNSS10, MM10 and GK11. The CTA ratio is defined as the minimum ratio of capital (net worth) to the real value of assets banks must satisfy. The LTV ratio is the maximum permissible value for the real value of a bank loan divided by the expected real value of the loan’s collateral. Lastly, the LTD ratio is the maximum ratio between banks’ assets and deposits that is allowed. In each case, the macroprudential authority is able to influence the amount of leverage and/or loss-absorbing capacity of the banking sector – and thereby the supply of credit – by varying the instrument in question.20

We consider the effects of a restrictive macroprudential policy shock that aims to reduce the level of credit relative to GDP, i.e., the credit gap. In doing so we assume that the macroprudential authority and the central bank act independently of each other. Figure 7 presents the impulse response functions of output, inflation, the credit gap and the monetary policy rate following a one-percent tightening of the macroprudential instrument indicated in each column; that is, an increase of one percent for the CTA ratio and a decrease of one percent for the LTV and LTD ratios.21 Note that in all cases, this exogenous variation in executive demonstrations of the mechanisms through which these instruments take effect, see Hanson et al. (2011), Bank of England (2011) and Nier et al. (2013); for a precise description how these instruments are incorporated into the models, we refer the reader to Binder et al. (2017).

21In each case, the macroprudential instrument is modelled as an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coefficient equal to 0.9.
policy has the expected – and desired – effect of reducing the credit gap. The magnitude of the fall, however, is highly model-specific. In the case of the CTA ratio, the decrease in the credit gap is fairly modest in GNSS10 and MM10, yet it is substantial for GK11. In the case of the LTV ratio, each model implies a different dynamic response of the credit gap. Finally, for the LTD ratio, it is the MM10 model which stands out and exhibits a strong and long-lived decline in the credit gap following the macroprudential shock.

Figure 7: Macroprudential Policy Shock

Note: Impulse responses following a tightening of the macroprudential instrument (column title) of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The rule by Orphanides and Wieland (2013) is used as a common monetary policy rule. Macroprudential instruments are assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coefficient of 0.9.
The differences in the impulse responses displayed in Figure 7 reflect both the specific parameterization of each model as well as the transmission mechanisms through which policy takes effect. For the GNSS10 model, which features monopolistic competition in the banking sector, the CTA and LTD ratio have little effect because banks are able to fund themselves at very low costs. As a result, there is only a modest pass-through to interest rate spreads. The LTV ratio, on the other hand, has more substantial effects. It directly affects quantities as it links the supply of credit to the value of the investment project. In the case of the MM10 model, all instruments work through their impact on the equilibrium level of market leverage, which results from the double moral hazard problem between households, banks and entrepreneurs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the most powerful macroprudential instrument is the LTD ratio. It affects both sides of the problem: between households and banks, and between banks and entrepreneurs. The CTA and LTV ratios, meanwhile, exhibit less of an impact as they only alter the asymmetry between banks and entrepreneurs. Lastly, recall that the model of GK11 features a moral hazard problem between households and banks. Analogous to the simulation of MM10, it turns out that the more potent instrument in the GK11 model is the LTV ratio, which directly links the supply of credit to the expected value of the investment project. The CTA and LTD ratios have a much milder impact on the credit gap since they do little – at the margin – to alter bankers’ incentive to divert household funds to their personal accounts, thus leaving banks’ cost of funds largely unaffected.

It is clear from Figure 7 that if the macroprudential authority wishes to reduce the credit gap, it is faced with considerable uncertainty concerning the quantitative and qualitative responses following an exogenous change in the policy instrument. Furthermore, the policymaker must take into account the effect its policy will have on overall economic activity. For the GNSS10 and MM10 models, employing the most effective policy instrument (the LTV and LTD ratios, respectively) to restrain the credit gap would also generate significant reductions in output. In the GK11 model, however, the most effective instrument – the LTV ratio – actually increases output in the short run. This is due to a strong initial increase in the value of capital. In this model, the tighter LTV ratio reduces the incentives of bankers to divert funds and makes it more profitable for households to invest through banks. This exerts a positive effect on private investment. Following the LTV ratio shock, it is the latter effect which dominates in the short run.

Next, we consider the perspective of the monetary authority. In all of these simulations, the central bank is assumed to implement the policy rule of Orphanides and Wieland (2013). The resulting policy paths, however, vary significantly across all models for all macroprudential instruments. Not only the response of output to the macro-prudential policy shock, but also the response of inflation differs substantially across models. Macroprudential pol-
icy creates new sources of risk for the central bank and the presence of model uncertainty complicates the conduct of monetary policy—even without assuming that the central bank responds directly to financial stability concerns. This serves to highlight the importance of assessing the complementarity (or substitutability) of monetary and macroprudential policy.

Finally, note that the implications for monetary policy will be different whether the macroprudential authority follows a rules-based framework or whether there is strategic interaction and coordination between the two policy makers. This simple exercise serves to illustrate some of the complexities inherent in designing and implementing an efficient macro-financial stability framework. Given the high degree of model uncertainty, it is key to drawing diverse modelling approaches when analyzing the implications of a greater focus on financial stability in policy making. The third generation of New Keynesian models can play a useful role in this regard.

4 Robust Monetary Policy Rules in Models With and Without Financial Frictions

Clearly, model uncertainty represents a serious challenge for central banks when aiming to identify the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. In this section, we consider one approach for evaluating he implications of model uncertainty for the design of monetary policy. Specifically, a policy rule could be called robust to model uncertainty if it performs well across a range of relevant models McCallum (1988). At the heart of this kind of analysis lies the realization that the uncertainties surrounding the true structure of the economy are substantial. Consequently, the models policy makers can use to design their policies are at best a rough approximation to the true data generating process they face. In response to the challenges faced in understanding causal effects in the economy, coupled with the necessity of forming quantitative predictions about the impact of their actions, policy makers would be well advised to look for guidance from a large set of relevant models; ideally encompassing a range of modelling strategies and paradigms.

Here, we apply this approach to the new generation of financial frictions models. In particular, we analyze whether a direct and systematic response by the central bank to financial sector variables improves performance within a set of models of the Euro Area economy.\textsuperscript{22} The policy maker is assumed to face a finite set of relevant models $M$. One of the models could be treated as the “true model” of the economy, but it is impossible to know \textit{ex ante} which. The models differ in the assumed economic structure, in the estimation method

\textsuperscript{22}We have made all of the models considered available in the Macroeconomic Model Database.
This scenario captures the essence of the practice at policy-making institutions, which rely on a range of models to inform their policy discussions and actions. Adalid et al. (2005), for instance, compare rules optimized in backward-looking models with those from forward-looking models (which comprise models from the first and second New Keynesian DSGE generation) developed by staff of the Eurosystem and find several cases of explosive dynamics. Orphanides and Wieland (2013) consider a set of eleven Euro Area models (including models from all New Keynesian DSGE generations as well as one traditional Keynesian-style model) and find many instances when rules optimized, for example, in a New Keynesian model generate explosive dynamics in a traditional model with primarily backward-looking dynamics. Also, they find that policy rules optimized to perform well in one model may induce multiple equilibria in other models. Earlier studies such as Levin et al. (2003) and Levin and Williams (2003) find similar results for models of the U.S. economy. In sum, a recurrent finding in the literature is that model-specific optimized polices are not robust to model uncertainty and can lead to substantial welfare losses.

In this context, Kuester and Wieland (2010) apply Bayesian Model Averaging as a means of designing policies for the euro area. They find that rules obtained in this manner are fairly robust to model uncertainty. Essentially, the strategy consists in having the policy maker mix the models she considers relevant. This is done by attributing a certain weight to each individual model—which may reflect her subjective beliefs or can be estimated from the data—and finding the common policy rule that minimizes the weighted average of model-specific loss functions.

Formally, the model-averaging rule is obtained by choosing the parameters of the rule \( \{\rho, \alpha, \beta, \bar{\beta}, h\} \) such that they solve the following optimization problem:

\[
\min_{\{\rho, \alpha, \beta, \bar{\beta}, h\}} L = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \omega_m \left[ Var_m(\pi) + Var_m(y) + Var_m(\Delta i) \right]
\]

\[
s.t. \quad i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + \alpha E_t(\pi_{t+h}) + \beta E_t(y_{t+h}) + \bar{\beta} E_t(y_{t+h} - y_{t+h-4})
\]

\[
0 = E_t\left[f_m(z_t, x_t^m, x_{t+1}^m, x_{t-1}^m, \theta^m)\right] \quad \forall m \in M
\]

23 For simplicity, we abstract from uncertainty due to mismeasurement of macroeconomic variables. For a treatment of this issue within the current framework, see Orphanides and Wieland (2013).

24 Specifically, the forward-looking models considered in this study are Coenen and Wieland (2005) from the first generation and SW from the second generation.

25 For algorithms aimed at an optimal choice of weights, see Kuester and Wieland (2010) and Del Negro et al. (2016).
and there exists a unique and stable equilibrium $\forall m \in M$.\textsuperscript{26}

The variables in the policy rule are expressed in percent deviations from their non-stochastic steady state values: $i$ denotes the quarterly annualized nominal interest rate, $\pi$ annual inflation, $y$ the output gap and $h \in \{0, 2, 4\}$ denotes the central bank’s forecast horizon. The last line denotes the structure of each model $m \in M$, which is a function of the each model’s parameters, $\theta^m$, model-specific variables, $x^m$, and variables common across all models, $z$.\textsuperscript{27}

Note that the central bank must take the models (including parameter values) as given. They serve as constraints. This specification follows Orphanides and Wieland (2013) in considering policies under commitment to a simple rule while abstracting from the zero lower bound constraint. The class of rules that is considered here has been found to be more robust under model uncertainty than more complicated rules that respond to a greater number of variables (Levin et al., 1999). Furthermore, such simple rules are transparent and easily explained to the public.\textsuperscript{28} The values $\omega_m \geq 0$ are the weights associated with each model. We consider only rules that induce a unique and stable equilibrium because we think both unstable and multiple equilibria are undesirable from a policy perspective. The first case necessarily violates the central bank’s mandate of price stability and the second gives rise to sunspot shocks which are unrelated to economic fundamentals, thus generating additional volatility in macroeconomic variables.\textsuperscript{29}

The performance criterion is an \textit{ad hoc} loss function in the tradition of Tinbergen (1952) and Theil (1958) that relates closely to standard central bank mandates and policy practices. It depends on the variances of annual inflation, the output gap and the change in the interest rate. This is different from studies such as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) which emphasize the direct use of households’ utility in policy-evaluation exercises. However, in the context of model uncertainty, there exist good reasons for keeping the performance criteria constant across all models. Firstly, not all models admit a utility-based loss function as they may not be derived from microeconomic optimization problems. Secondly, as Wieland et al. (2013) point out,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“a utility-based welfare-function can be extremely model specific. Paez-Farrell}\
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{26}For a full description of the numerical strategy employed to solve this problem, see Afanasyeva et al. (2016).

\textsuperscript{27}Note that we include the annualized nominal interest rate, annual inflation, and the output gap in the common variables.

\textsuperscript{28}Additionally, this class of rules contains several benchmark rules as special cases. For the performance of benchmarks such as the Taylor rule, the Gerdesmeier et al. (2004) rule and the $1^{st}$-difference rule of Orphanides and Wieland (2013), see Afanasyeva et al. (2016).

\textsuperscript{29}Since we work with the first-order approximation of each model, multiple equilibria and indeterminacy are equivalent terms in our application.
(2014) shows that different theories of inflation persistence can result in an observationally equivalent Phillips curve, but imply different loss functions and lead to different policy prescriptions. Therefore, optimal simple rules based on structural loss functions are not robust to model uncertainty.” (p. 310)\textsuperscript{30}

Lastly, Blanchard et al. (2016) provide additional arguments for giving more weight to ad hoc loss functions when evaluating policies. Most relevant to our analysis is their observation that the assumptions of models similar to SW (that is, models in which that households perfectly share consumption risk and in which all variations in labor take place at the intensive margin) are likely to underestimate the costs of large output gaps, so that the structural utility functions in these models may not give sufficient weight to such costs.

As a baseline, we use equal weights on the different models.\textsuperscript{31} Concerning the components of the loss function, the following comments are in order. Following Woodford (2011), the objective function of the representative household in the basic New Keynesian DSGE model can be approximated with a quadratic function of inflation and the output gap, where the relative weights are determined by the structure of the model. We set the weight on the output gap equal to the weight on inflation following the analysis of Debortoli et al. (2016), who show that for a standard second-generation model\textsuperscript{32} this loss function approximates the representative household’s objective function, conditional on the central bank behaving optimally. The change in the policy instrument is included following Kuester and Wieland (2010) so as to rule out policies that would imply frequent and large changes that differ greatly from typically policy making practice.\textsuperscript{33}

Previous work concerning robust policies with Euro Area models, has found that models with predominantly backward-looking elements (in which inflation tends to be very persistent) tend to favor rules which are forecast-based with high response coefficients on inflation and moderate inertia in the policy rate. Forward-looking models, in contrast, tend to favor outcome-based rules with more inertia and more moderate reactions to inflation (see Adalid et al., 2005 and Orphanides and Wieland, 2013). Levin et al. (2003) derive a robust benchmark rule for the U.S. economy which features a unity coefficient on the interest rate lag and moderate responses to the forecast for one-year-ahead inflation and the current output gap.

\textsuperscript{30}See Levin and Williams (2003) for a similar argument.

\textsuperscript{31}Afanasyeva et al. (2016) show that the results presented here continue to hold under a set of different weights.

\textsuperscript{32}Specifically, the model used in their analysis is the SW model.

\textsuperscript{33}Alternatively, one could eliminate the $Var_m(\Delta i)$ term from the loss function and add a restriction that $Var_m(\Delta i) \leq \sigma^2$, where the latter term is the variance observed in the data. This specification would yield similar results, as shown for example in Wieland et al. (2013), but carries computational disadvantages.
Here, we focus on the implications of new macro-financial models and compare them to models where financial frictions are not of great relevance for the macroeconomy. Thus, we ask: What does the relevance of third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models – *vis à vis* earlier generations – imply for robust policies in the Euro Area?

A thorough analysis of this issue is provided in Afanasyeva et al. (2016), who employ a large set of macroeconomic models estimated for the Euro Area. This set of models is presented in Table 3, along with the corresponding reference papers and the policy-making institutions where they were developed or those to which the authors had a close affiliation at the time of publication. The set of models considered in Afanasyeva et al. (2016) encompasses several generations of New Keynesian models and could be thought to capture the degree of model uncertainty present in the Euro Area. All models are estimated. They cover a broad range of frictions proposed in the literature.\(^{34}\)

Table 4 reports the model-averaging rules computed with this set of models.\(^{35}\) The macroeconomic models with financial frictions considered prescribe a notably weaker response to both inflation and the output gap than do earlier-generation models. The response to output gap growth, on the other hand, is stronger relative to the earlier-generation models. The smoothing parameter is close to unity in all cases. Finally, while the model-averaging policy for models with financial frictions models is outcome/nowcast-based, it is forecast-based for the earlier-generation models. While we have just considered one set of rules, these characteristics survive changes in the loss function weights, changes in the model weights, changes in the model set, and a reduction in the number of policy parameters. That said, the most fundamental difference between both sets of models concerns their prescribed responses to inflation and the output gap. This difference carries over to the model-averaging policy obtained from the full model set. Thus, the new models with financial frictions matter even if models from all generations and prior to the financial crisis are taken into account.

Figure 8 provides an indication for the reasons underlying this finding. It reports the average impulse response functions of inflation and the output gap across models given a one-percentage-point monetary policy shock. To this end, common policy rules are used in each model. We consider two different rules that have been found to provide a good description

---

\(^{34}\)Most of the third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models in the set, as well as the SW model have been described in Section 2. For brevity of exposition we refer the reader to Afanasyeva et al. (2016) for a description of the remaining models and for a presentation of the Euro Area estimation of all the versions of the EA CFOP14 model, which the authors estimate.

\(^{35}\)Specifically, the table reproduces the “Normalized Loss Bayesian Rules” in Afanasyeva et al. (2016). In deriving these rules the weights in the policy maker’s problem have been set such that the minimum level of each model’s loss function is normalized to unity. This choice of weights avoids “loss outliers” from over-influencing the results (a problem identified in Kuester and Wieland, 2010 and Adalid et al., 2005) and results in a flatter distribution of model loss increases.
Table 3: Set of Euro Area Models from Afanasyeva et al. (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Early Generations Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EA_AWM05</td>
<td>Dieppe et al. (2005)</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EA_CW05fm</td>
<td>Coenen and Wieland (2005),</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuhrer-Moore-staggered contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EA_CW05ta</td>
<td>Coenen and Wieland (2005),</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taylor-staggered contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>G3_CW03</td>
<td>Coenen and Wieland (2003)</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EA_SW03</td>
<td>Smets and Wouters (2003)</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EA_QUEST3</td>
<td>Ratto et al. (2009)</td>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Third Generation Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EA_GE10</td>
<td>Gelain (2010a)</td>
<td>ECB(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EA_GNSS10</td>
<td>Gerali et al. (2010)</td>
<td>Banca d’Italia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>EA_QR14</td>
<td>Quint and Rabanal (2014)</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>EA_CFOP14poc</td>
<td>Carlstrom et al. (2014),</td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>privately optimal contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EA_CFOP14bgg</td>
<td>Carlstrom et al. (2014),</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bernanke et al. (1999) contract</td>
<td>System(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>EA_CFOP14cd</td>
<td>Carlstrom et al. (2014),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christensen and Dib (2008) contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)For the ECB working paper version of Gelain (2010a) see Gerali (2010b).

\(^b\)For the estimation of these models using Euro Area data, see Afanasyeva et al. (2016).

of the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro Area before the Great Recession, namely, the
dules of Gerdesmeier et al. (2004) and Orphanides and Wieland (2013). The panels show
that on average, monetary policy causes notably larger effects in the models with financial
frictions than in earlier-generation models; consistent with the finding from Section 3. For
a one-percentage point unanticipated increase in the monetary policy rate, the reduction in
the output gap and inflation is roughly twice as large on impact in the financial frictions
group than in the earlier-generations models. The greater effects of monetary policy can be
traced back to the amplification resulting from the financial accelerator mechanism. It is
present in five of the six third-generation models in the set considered.

Due to the greater effectiveness of monetary policy (on average) in the models with
financial frictions, the systematic response policy to inflation and the output gap need not be
as pronounced as in the earlier-generation models, lest it risk destabilizing the macroeconomy.
Similarly, a monetary policy causing larger effects – all else equal – leads to less persistent
inflation dynamics (also visible in the panel), which in turn allow for more moderate and less pre-emptive actions by the central bank. By contrast, the backward-looking dynamics in some of the earlier-generation models tend to favor forward-looking policies with a strong reaction to inflation (on this point, see Adalid et al. (2005) and Orphanides and Wieland (2013)). In sum, including the models with financial frictions in the policy maker’s model set has important implications for the model-averaging policies that would tend to deliver more robust performance under model uncertainty about the Euro Area economy.

It has been argued for some time, that monetary policy should work to reduce the risk of economy-wide fluctuations that emanate from the financial sector. The findings discussed so far, suggest that this would require a stronger policy response to output growth. However, it would seem natural to respond directly to financial variables such as credit growth or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Interest lag ($\rho$)</th>
<th>Inflation ($\alpha$)</th>
<th>Output gap ($\beta$)</th>
<th>Output gap growth ($\tilde{\beta}$)</th>
<th>$h$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All models</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Generations</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>1.158</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Generation</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock of One Percentage Point

Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) Rule

Orphanides and Wieland (2008) Rule

Note: Average impulse response following a tightening of the monetary policy rate of one percent. All impulse responses are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, one period is a quarter and inflation is the annual inflation rate. The column titles indicate the monetary policy rules assumed in each case.
asset price growth. A policy that incorporates such a direct response to financial variables is often referred to with the term “leaning-against-the-wind” (LAW). The 3rd generation New Keynesian models provide a natural environment for testing the implications of such policies, because they incorporate financial market imperfections and financial variables such as credit and asset prices. Afanasyeva et al. (2016) define a set of financial variables common across all the models considered. The central banks’ optimization problem under model averaging is then written as:

$$\min_{\{\rho, \alpha, \beta, h, j\}} L_m = \text{Var}_m(\pi) + \text{Var}_m(y) + \text{Var}_m(\Delta i)$$

s.t. $$i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + \alpha E_t(\pi_{t+h}) + \beta E_t(y_{t+h}) + \hat{\beta} E_t(g^j_{t+h})$$

$$0 = E_t[f_m(z_t, x^m_t, x^m_{t+1}, x^m_{t-1}, \theta)] \quad \forall m \in M$$

where the variables are as in problem (1), $g^j$ is the $j^{th}$ element of

$$g = \begin{bmatrix} \text{real credit} \\ \text{real credit growth} \\ \text{real credit / GDP} \\ \text{external finance premium} \\ \text{leverage} \\ \text{asset prices} \end{bmatrix},$$

and there exists a unique and stable equilibrium.\textsuperscript{36}

Note that relative to problem (1) the monetary policy rule has been restricted by eliminating output gap growth (i.e., $\hat{\beta} = 0$) from the rule. This restriction yields significant computational advantages, because otherwise the number of policy coefficients would increase and thereby increase the computation time. Furthermore, rules that only respond to inflation gap and the output gap perform substantially worse than rules that also include output growth. Thus, restricting the output growth coefficient to zero enhances the possibility of beneficial stabilization effects from LAW, because a response to credit growth or asset price growth may make up for the lacking response to output growth.

This analysis has substantial value added because the LAW literature mostly focuses on calibrated models, shock-specific analyses or analyses that concentrate on just one financial variable. In our analysis, all models have been estimated on Euro Area data, the class of rules considered assumes full commitment (that is, it must hold under all shocks) and the policy maker can choose which financial variable to react to.

The results are reported in Table 5. Columns 4 to 8 show the optimal policy rule coef-
ficients and forecast horizons under LAW and no LAW (i.e., $\hat{\beta} = 0$). Additionally, Column 3 reports the percent-reduction in the loss function and the implied inflation premium (IIP) achieved by LAW relative to no-LAW, while Column 2 reports the percent-reduction in the loss function relative to the rules that include output growth.\textsuperscript{37} Note that the value of the loss function under LAW cannot be higher than under no-LAW. This is because the no-LAW policy rule is nested in the LAW rule. In other words, under LAW the central bank can always choose to set the LAW coefficient, $\hat{\beta}$, equal to zero and thus cannot be worse off than under no-LAW. The IIP is defined as the reduction in the standard deviation of inflation under the no-LAW policy that is necessary to match the loss achieved under LAW.\textsuperscript{38} Finally, note that the IIP measure assumes that all of the reduction in the loss function under LAW is due to more stable inflation dynamics. As this is not actually the case, this statistic represents an upper bound on the potentially accessible gains in price stability from LAW.

The main message that emerges from Table 5 is that including one of the financial variables in the rule with lagged interest rate, inflation and the output gap, only reduces the loss function a little. In other words, the LAW policy rule does not improve stability very much relative to the No-LAW policy. This is not for lack of possibility for improvement. Indeed, adding output growth to the No-LAW policy, would substantially improve performance. This can be seen from column which indicates substantial percent increases in loss when comparing the LAW policy rule to the (non-nested) rule with output growth in addition to output gap and inflation. If the rule with output growth would be extended to include financial rules the potential for performance improvement would not be larger than in the LAW/no-LAW comparison reported here. The optimized coefficients on the financial variables in the LAW policy rules are typically very small.

Even so, this message need not be taken as a mortal blow to the concern about credit and asset price booms and the recommendations for a leaning-against-asset-price- or -credit-growth monetary policy. Rather, it could also be taken as an indication that the modelling assumptions of the models with financial frictions need to be revisited. First, the greater effectiveness of monetary policy with financial frictions seems somewhat at odds with the experience of the financial crisis. It was not the case that central banks were able to jump-start the economy with rapid interest rate cuts. The recession has had lasting effects. Second, the assumption of fully credible commitment to the policy rule together with rational and

\textsuperscript{37}There is no general agreement on whether rules are best evaluated through absolute or percent changes in models’ loss functions. Here, we present both statistics since we think their implications coincide; which allows us to avoid taking a stand on this issue. For a discussion, see Kuester and Wieland (2010) and Levin and Williams (2003).

\textsuperscript{38}For the general definition and justification of this concept, see Kuester and Wieland (2010).
Table 5: Model-Specific LAW Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model, Law</th>
<th>Gain wrt output gap growth rule (%)</th>
<th>Gain (%)</th>
<th>Interest lag (ρ)</th>
<th>Inflation (α)</th>
<th>Output gap (β)</th>
<th>LAW coefficient</th>
<th>h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EA_GE10 with LAW</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0836</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.0829</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>(Real Credit)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA_GNSS10 with LAW</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3251</td>
<td>0.9218</td>
<td>0.4035</td>
<td>0.0442</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.2216</td>
<td>0.8205</td>
<td>0.3678</td>
<td>(Real Credit)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA_QR14 with LAW</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1275</td>
<td>1.1977</td>
<td>0.6135</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.1211</td>
<td>1.1933</td>
<td>0.6123</td>
<td>(Leverage)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA_CFOP14poc with LAW</td>
<td>-19.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8130</td>
<td>0.2416</td>
<td>0.0965</td>
<td>0.1477</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.8659</td>
<td>0.2269</td>
<td>0.1885</td>
<td>(Credit Growth)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA_CFOP14bgg with LAW</td>
<td>-20.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8087</td>
<td>0.2384</td>
<td>0.0819</td>
<td>0.1567</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-21.2</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.8644</td>
<td>0.2307</td>
<td>0.1837</td>
<td>(Credit Growth)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA_CFOP14cd with LAW</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8042</td>
<td>0.2415</td>
<td>0.0798</td>
<td>0.1630</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without LAW</td>
<td>-22.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.8609</td>
<td>0.2358</td>
<td>0.1845</td>
<td>(Credit Growth)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

homogeneous expectations formation by market participants may attribute too many self-stabilizing properties to the macroeconomy. In other words, the expectations channel in these models may overstate the extent of control central banks can exert over aggregate demand. In this regard, one could adapt the models for analysis under learning and imperfect credibility or heterogeneous expectations formation and revisit the question of LAW versus no-LAW. Third, it may be important to consider nonlinearities in the financial cycle. For example, Filardo and Rungcharoenkitkul (2016) suggests that leaning against-the-wind policies may deliver greater performance improvements in a model in which the financial cycle is modelled as a nonlinear Markov regime-switching process.

Having previously argued against the use of model-specific policy rules, we take up the issue of model averaging next. The model averaging rule\(^{39}\) under LAW is given by Equation (2) below:

\[
i_t = 1.0708 \ i_{t-1} + 0.0141 \ \pi_t + 0.0455 \ \ y_t - 0.0009 \ real \ credit_t
\] (2)

In this rule, the LAW coefficient goes to zero. The smoothing parameter is close to unity, the coefficients on inflation and the output gap are quite small and the rule responds to current outcomes. This is all similar to the third generation model-averaging rule reported

\(^{39}\)In deriving this rule, we set equal weights on all models.
in Table 4, except that output growth is missing from the rule. In the absence of a significant response to output growth, this model averaging policy would not be very robust relative to performance in earlier generations models.

5 Forecasting Performance of Models With and Without Financial Frictions

Finally, we turn our attention to another central use of macroeconomic modelling at central banks: forecasting.40 As policy makers aim to achieve their mandate, which make include stable price, stable growth and employment and even financial stability, they need to obtain an assessment of the likely course of macroeconomic developments. Any action they will take is predicated on a view of the way events will unfold as a response to their actions – or inaction. In this regard, macroeconomic models are an essential ingredient of the policy maker’s toolbox. They can provide quantitative measures of the likely effects of changes in policy. Similarly, policy makers must constantly confront the challenge of responding to a changing economic environment. Thus, they need models to construct a probability distribution for the future path of relevant economic variables in order to react in timely fashion to the perceived balance of risks.41

While both structural and non-structural macroeconomic models can be used for forecasting, policy makers by no means use them in a “mechanical” way. Rather, model-based forecasts represent key inputs in a collaborative process taking place within established organizational frameworks. As Wieland et al. (2013) state:42

“[A central bank’s] staff forecast is a judgmental projection that is derived from quantitative data, qualitative information, different economic models, and various forecasting techniques. The forecast does not result from a mechanical run of any large-scale macroeconometric model; nor is it derived directly by add-factoring any such model. Instead, it relies heavily on the expertise of sector specialists and senior advisers.” (p. 254).

The forecasts resulting from such analysis are best understood as expert, rather than model-based, forecasts. While central banks typically have flagship structural models such

---

40For brevity of exposition we do not deal with the methodological aspects of the topic but focus instead on one issue: financial frictions models’ contribution to forecasting performance. The reader is referred to Wieland et al. (2013) and Negro and Schorfheide (2013) for thorough expositions on the subject.

41For empirical evidence documenting that policymakers do indeed adjust their policies in response to economic forecasts, see Wieland et al. (2013).

42The original text deals with the Federal Reserve’s forecasts, but the statement holds true for other central banks as well.
as the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model or the Bank of Canada’s ToTEM II model. By contrast, non-structural models are employed as “satellite models” which serve to cross-check and adjust the main model’s forecast, particularly in areas where it is most likely to be deficient. Sims (2002), for instance, surveys the forecasting practices at four major central banks,\textsuperscript{43} and concludes that “[s]ome [satellite] models produce regular forecasts that are seen by those involved in the policy process, but none except the primary model have regular well-defined roles in the process.” (p. 3). As an illustration of the relationship between central banks’ main (structural) models and satellite (typically non-structural) models, Table 6 presents two well-documented examples of forecasting analyses carried out at major central banks.\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Framework / Economic Report</th>
<th>Central Model</th>
<th>Satellite Models</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Broad Macroeconomic</td>
<td>NAWM</td>
<td>GVAR, DFM, VECM, ARIMA,</td>
<td>ECB (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Projection Exercise</td>
<td>Bottom-up (ADL-based) model,</td>
<td>Modified COMPASS models,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macroeconomic</td>
<td>NMCM</td>
<td>SVAR, BVAR, VECM,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Projection Exercise</td>
<td>mixed-frequency models</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoE</td>
<td>Inflation Report</td>
<td>COMPASS</td>
<td>ARMA, PTM, BSM,</td>
<td>Burgess et al. (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>DSGE, and a suite of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“statistical” models</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: SVAR denotes structural VAR, BVAR denotes Bayesian VAR, GVAR denotes Global VAR, DFM denotes Dynamic Factor Model, VECM denotes Vector Error Correction Model, AR(I)MA denotes Autoregressive (Integrated) Moving Average model, ADL denotes Autoregressive Distributed Lag model, ALI denotes Area-wide Leading Indicator, PTM denotes Post-Transformation Model, and BSM Balance Sheet Model.

Central banks can use structural models also to develop a clear economic narrative associated with their medium-run outlook. These models bring to bear an explicit account of market participants’ forward-looking expectations and how they influence their decision making in response to changes in policy. They allow for obtaining economic interpretations

\textsuperscript{43}Specifically, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England and the Riksbank.

\textsuperscript{44}In contrast to central banks’ flagship models, descriptions of satellite models are typically not available to the general public.
of macroeconomic fluctuations, as well as welfare-based evaluation and optimal design of policies.\textsuperscript{45}

Here, we focus on structural models’ forecasting performance and review some of the evidence supporting the contribution of financial frictions to the empirical fit of macroeconomic models. In particular, we comment on their contribution to macroeconomic models’ forecasting performance in light of the recent financial crisis.\textsuperscript{46} In contrast to the previous section, we study models of the U.S. economy, in part as many articles on forecast evaluation have used U.S. data.\textsuperscript{47}

We aim to make five main points: (i) model-based forecasts, if conditioned on appropriate data, are competitive with respect to professional forecasts, (ii) model uncertainty implies that there is no single, preferred model in terms of forecasting performance, (iii) the empirical fit of second-generation New Keynesian DSGE models used at central banks can be improved by extending them with explicit financial frictions, (iv) evidence on the forecasting performance of models with financial frictions relative to second-generation models supports the view that these frictions can play an important role in generating accurate forecasts, and (v) looking forward, central banks are likely to improve forecasting performance by addressing model uncertainty through some form of model averaging. The first three issues relate to point forecasts. In practice however, central banks may be interested in using distribution forecasts from several models. This dimension of forecasting practices is considered in the final two points, which are developed below.

With regard to the first point, Wieland and Wolters (2011) provide a systematic comparison of forecasting performance for a set of six macroeconomic models relative to “expert” or “professional” forecasts (as proxied by the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook) over the previous five U.S. recessions. The set of models includes a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) with three observables, a small-scale New Keynesian model with predominantly backward-looking elements and four New Keynesian models encompassing the first and second generations, varying in size from three to eleven observables. Wieland and Wolters (2011) work with historical data vintages to ensure comparability between model forecasts. They show that although model-based forecasts are produced with a markedly smaller information set than that of the professional forecasters, their root mean squared errors (RMSE) are very similar when model forecasts are initialized at expert nowcasts.

\textsuperscript{45}For specific expositions on these issues, see European Central Bank (2016), Burgess et al. (2013) and Alessi et al. (2014).

\textsuperscript{46}For applications to fiscal policy, see Coenen et al. (2012) and Wieland et al. (2013).

\textsuperscript{47}For papers dealing with real-time forecasting in the context of the Euro Area, see Coenen et al. (2005), Christoffel et al. (2010) and Smets et al. (2014).
Concerning the issue of model uncertainty, point (ii), two results are worth stressing. Firstly, Wieland and Wolters (2011) document a substantial degree of heterogeneity between the model-based forecasts, which varies over time and is roughly equal to that present in expert forecasts. They conclude that model uncertainty, as measured by their set of models, can account for the diversity of forecasts within expert forecasters:

“[...][w]hile we can only speculate about the sources of disagreement among expert forecasters, the extent of disagreement among our six model forecasts can be traced to differences in modelling assumptions, different data coverage and different estimation methods. These three sources of disagreement are found to be sufficient to generate an extent of heterogeneity that is similar to the heterogeneity observed among expert forecasts. [...] As a consequence of these findings, we would argue that it is not necessary to take recourse to irrational behavior or perverse incentives in order to explain the dynamics of expert forecast diversity. Rather, this diversity may largely be due to model uncertainty and belief updating in a world where the length of useful data series is limited by structural breaks” (p. 275).

Secondly, the authors find that no single model consistently outperforms the group, but that the models’ mean forecast actually tends to outperform all individual models. Viewed through the lens of Bayesian Model Averaging, this result should not come as a surprise. When every model is misspecified, no single model can be expected to systematically dominate the others; provided every model in the set is sufficiently detailed. Rather, different models will prevail in forecasting performance depending on the relative importance of the frictions affecting the economy, which may vary over time, and each model’s ability to capture them and correctly identify the relevant shocks. This suggests that in forecasting, as in policy robustness, the policymaker may also find it beneficial to make use of a range of models; a point to which we will come back to below.

Regarding the improved fit of models with financial sector frictions, point (iii), following the work of BGG several contributions documented that models with a financial accelerator mechanism appear to better fit the U.S. data. De Graeve (2008) uses Bayesian methods to estimate a medium-scale DSGE model similar to CEE and SW, but extended with a financial accelerator as in BGG. He shows that the extended version achieves a significantly better fit compared to the core model. Similarly, Christensen and Dib (2008) use maximum likelihood methods to show that their model specification with financial frictions is favored by the data, relative to the counterpart without financial frictions. For the Euro Area, analogous results can be found in Gelain (2010a) and Villa (2016). Gelain (2010a) extends the SW model by
appending the BGG framework and employs Bayesian methods to show the superior fit of the extended model. Villa (2016), on the other hand, also works with the core SW model but finds on the basis of Bayesian factor analysis that the best fit is achieved by incorporating a financial sector as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) – even improving on the SW plus BGG specification. There are other studies explore alternative specifications. In sum, there is quite some empirical evidence that financial frictions improve the fit of medium-scale structural models on U.S. and Euro Area data in recent history. Yet, in reviewing these results, it is worth noting that the above-cited studies were carried out employing exclusively non-financial data in model estimation. Thus, the improved fit of models with financial frictions cannot be attributed to additional shocks and/or observables.

Regarding the issue of financial frictions models’ forecasting performance (point iv), it is worth noting the findings of De Graeve (2008) and Christensen and Dib (2008) were available to the central banking community well before the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Thus, their implications could be taken into account. Yet, Lindé et al. (2016) argue that such models were not used in the routine conduct of monetary policy: “Pre-crisis DSGE models typically neglected the role of financial frictions. This additional transmission mechanism was considered non-vital for forecasting output and inflation during the great moderation period, and by Occam’s razor arguments this mechanism was typically left out.” (p. 52)

However, as is well known by now, the baseline pre-crisis New Keynesian DSGE models failed to predict the large contraction in GDP and the fall in inflation which took place at the end of 2008. In Figure 9, we have reproduced Figures 2.13 and 2.14 from Negro and Schorfheide (2013), which show that the 2008Q4 realizations of output and inflation (black dashed lines) fall outside the predictive density (blue bands) generated by the SW model. This is often considered a significant failure of the workhorse DSGE model in its usefulness for the conduct of monetary policy. Note, that the average Blue Chip forecast (blue diamonds) comes much closer to the actual data. Though, this may well be due to the larger information set available to the Blue Chip reporting forecasters.

So, how well could the financial frictions version of a medium-size New Keynesian DSGE model such as the CEE and SW models have fared in this context? This question is addressed by Negro and Schorfheide (2013). They conduct the following counterfactual exercise: they estimate a version of the SW model with financial frictions as in BGG (SW+BGG from hereon) with historical data vintages and conditioning the 2008Q4 forecast on current information about the Baa-10 year treasury spread (which is taken to be the empirical counterpart

---

48 The data of publication for some of the cited papers is misleading since they had been circulated in working paper version earlier.

49 See Wieland et al. (2013), Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Lindé et al. (2016).
Figure 9: 2008Q4 SW Predictive Density

Note: Figure reproduces Figures 2.13 and 2.14 from Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013), which shows the predictive density for 2008Q4 U.S. GDP and inflation (blue bands) generated by the SW model, the realization of output and inflation (black dashed lines), and the corresponding average Blue Chip forecast (blue diamonds). All variables are in percent.

of the external finance premium) and the federal fund’s rate. Recall that Blue Chip forecasts for fourth-quarter GDP are produced in the month of January, at the end of which the advance release of Q4 GDP is published. By then the full fourth-quarter trajectory of the spread has already been observed. This timing allows for the model forecasts of all other variables to be conditioned on the realized level of the spread, as well as the policy interest rate. Importantly, the models and methods used in this exercise were available to central banks before the Great Recession. The result is striking and is presented in Figure 10, which reproduces the same figures from Negro and Schorfheide (2013) as before. It is clear that model forecasts for both output and inflation come much closer to the actual realization, with output falling inside the predictive density.\footnote{In subsequent work, the authors show the third-generation model’s forecast can be improved even further; see Del Negro et al. (2015)}

In the words of Negro and Schorfheide (2013):

“The [SW+BGG] model produces about the same forecast as Blue Chip for 2008:Q4. Unlike Blue Chip forecasters, the agents in the laboratory DSGE economy have not seen the Fed Chairman and the Treasury Secretary on television painting a dramatically bleak picture of the U.S. economy. Thus, we regard it as a significant achievement that the DSGE model forecasts and the Blue Chip forecasts are both around -1.3%. More importantly, we find this to be convincing evidence on the importance of using appropriate information in forecasting with structural models.” (p. 275).

This result demonstrates the superior forecasting performance of the SW+BGG model, relative to the SW model, during the Great Financial Crisis. It supports financial frictions...
as a feature that contributes positively to the forecasting performance of structural models. Note, however, that conditioning on the Baa-10 year treasury spread is crucial in generating this forecast. Figure 11 plots the spread from 1988 to 2010 with the NBER-dated recessions marked in gray. The graph shows that the spread peaks at an extraordinarily high level in 2008Q4. Thus, conditioning on this variable serves to incorporate into the information set of the model the level of financial market distress that hit the economy following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September of 2008. This allows the model to correctly interpret the configuration of data as foreshadowing a deep contraction in economic activity due to binding financial constraints. The standard SW model, in contrast, is unable to accurately forecast the economic contraction of 2008Q4 because it omits variables and shocks related to financial frictions.

Figure 11: Baa-10 year Treasury Spread

Note: Figure shows the Baa-10 year treasury spread, from 1987 to 2010, in percent per annum. NBER recession dates are indicated in gray. Data is in quarterly terms.
This misspecification of the SW model is examined in detail by Lindé et al. (2016). In estimating their model, they account explicitly for the zero lower bound on interest rates and derive the shocks implied during the Great Recession. Lindé et al. (2016) conclude that the model necessitates a “cocktail of extremely unlikely shocks” to explain the recession. Further, they show that these shocks – which mainly relate to risk premium and investment-specific technology shocks – are markedly non-Gaussian and highly correlated with the Baa-Aaa and term spreads. This finding lends additional support to the view that financial shocks played an important role during that period.

Lindé et al. (2016) also estimate a version of the SW model with financial frictions as in Christiano et al. (2008). Essentially, this model includes the Christensen and Dib (2008) contract plus a working capital channel as in the CEE model as well as a Markov-switching process which affects the elasticity of the external finance premium to entrepreneurial net worth. Lindé et al. (2016) find that the shocks driving the contraction in output growth, as implied by the extended model, were “huge negative shocks in net worth and/or risk premiums” (p. 55). In line with the findings of Negro and Schorfheide (2013), this version of the model is also able to generate, using the appropriate data vintage, a predictive density for 2008Q4 GDP which encompasses the realized observation.

Thus, it is not surprising that the SW model’s forecasting performance significantly deteriorates during the Great Recession. One might ask why flagship models at central banks did not already give more weight to financial frictions when BGG conceptualized this framework within a New Keynesina model. The reason may simply be the following: although the model with financial frictions outperforms the SW model during the Great Financial Crisis, this is not the case over longer time spans – as we would expect given the findings of Wieland and Wolters (2011) mentioned above.

Figure 12 compares the forecasting performance of four models for two different time periods. Specifically, we recursively estimate three different second-generation New Keynesian DSGE models and a BVAR model over rolling windows of historical data vintages and compute the RMSE from one to eight period-ahead forecasts. The time periods under consideration are 1996-2006 and 2007-2009. The models are the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) (RW97) model, which features no financial frictions, and two versions of the BGG99 model (BGG99 and BGG99+Spread). The first two models and the BVAR have as observ-

---

51 These results are in line with earlier work by Christiano et al. (2014), although the set of financial shocks is different between the models.

52 However, it should be noted that this exercise employs methods not available before the crisis. Interestingly, Lindé et al. (2016) also document that estimating the SW plus financial frictions model with non-linear methods results in higher price-stickiness parameter values and a flatter Phillips curve, which helps account for the sluggishness of inflation during the Great Recession.
ables output, inflation and the federal fund’s rate, while the BBG99+Spread model has the Baa-10 year Treasury spread as an additional observable and incorporates a financial shock. The panels on the right-hand side, which refer to models’ forecasting performance during the Great Financial Crisis, confirm what might be expected after reviewing the results of Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Lindé et al. (2016). Namely, the model which performs best during this period is the BGG99+Spread model (blue line), which achieves the minimum RMSE in both output and inflation for all forecast horizons except for the one-quarter ahead output forecast. Note that we have not exploited the real-time observability of the spread, which would likely increase the model’s performance further. Between the RW97 (black line) and BGG99 (red line) models there is no clear difference in terms of output forecasts, but the RW97 model outperforms with regard to inflation. During this period, the BVAR is the worst-performing model in terms of forecasting output, but is as accurate as the BGG99+Spread model in terms of inflation. Finally, the comparison between BGG99 and BGG99+Spread makes clear that financial frictions do not improve models’ forecasting performance unless they are supplemented with additional shocks/observables. By contrast, the left-hand-side panels in Figure 12 show that both versions of the BGG99 model underperform relative to the RW97 model in the decade leading up to the Great Financial Crisis. The RW97 model, in turn, underperforms relative to the BVAR in terms of output and achieves roughly the same degree of accuracy in terms of inflation.

Thus, the relative performance of the models with and without financial frictions, and relative to non-structural models varies over time. No single model is consistently better than the alternatives. Consequently, each model should be given due consideration in designing and implementing policy. As regards second- and third-generation New Keynesian DSGE models, their relative performance over time is documented by Del Negro et al. (2016). They find that the SW+BGG model outperforms the SW model during the early 2000s dot-com recession and during the Great Recession. During these periods the spread is high relative to previous periods as indicated previously in Figure 8. At other times, the contrary is true, it is the SW model that outperforms.

As to the final point (v), we may surmise from the preceding discussion that incorporating financial frictions into structural models can lead to a better forecasting performance. However, this result is conditional on financial constraints being particularly relevant for macroeconomic dynamics at that time. Thus, third-generation models are unlikely to outperform second-generation models in an unconditional sense. Essentially, the specter of model uncertainty remains present. Dismissing earlier-generation models would be ill advised. Rather, new methods are called for to explicitly address the issue of model uncertainty as it pertains to forecasting. In this regard, the work of Del Negro et al. (2016) – which
Figure 12: RSME Comparison


(a) Output

(b) Output

(c) Inflation

(d) Inflation

Note: Figure shows the root mean squared errors for output and inflation from one to eight period-ahead forecasts for four models: a Bayesian VAR, the RW97 model, and two versions of the BGG99 model (BGG99 and BGG99+Spread). Statistics are computed by recursively estimating the models over rolling windows of historical (quarterly) data vintages. Column titles indicate the sample under consideration in each case.

follows in the spirit of Leamer (1978) and Kapetanios et al. (2006) – offers a promising approach to dealing with model uncertainty. The authors develop a dynamic pooling strategy. This strategy allows the policy maker to mix the predictive densities of two different models by means of weighted averaging. This is similar to Bayesian Model Averaging, but assuming that the model space is incomplete and allowing for the model weights to be data-dependent and time-varying. They show that such a specification is able to perform better on average than either of the individual models, while allowing to increase the weight on the better-performing model quickly in real-time forecasting. This procedure could be extended to a larger set of models. It could incorporate the suggestions of Lindé et al. (2016) on explicitly accounting for non-linearities and including Markov-switching processes for key financial parameters, both of which should lead to more accurate forecasts. Finally, the dynamic pooling strategy could be combined with a dynamic optimization of the central bank’s policy rule as developed in Section 4 to further insure against model uncertainty. If properly implemented, these avenues represent promising tools for dealing with model uncertainty in real-time and could result in an enhanced policy performance going forward.
6 Conclusion

Central banks have a long history of using macroeconomic models. Internally consistent and theoretically anchored structural macroeconomic models that perform reasonably well in matching empirical observations constitute a powerful tool to conduct monetary policy analysis. In particular, such macroeconomic models yield sensible quantitative and qualitative measures of the economy’s current state and likely future outcomes to changes in central bank behavior. During the 2000s, a second-generation of New Keynesian DSGE models was developed that fulfilled these criteria. At the same time methods for model solution and estimation were improved substantially so as to make it easy to estimate such models and use them for real-time forecasting. These models could be used to provide answers to some typical questions of monetary policy makers. As a result, models in the vein of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) were quickly added to the tool kit of central banks for the evaluation of monetary policy.

However, the financial crisis highlighted the need to investigate the role of financial intermediation for business cycles and policy transmission in further detail. Building on earlier research on financial frictions such as Bernanke et al. (1999) New Keynesian DSGE models were quickly extended to account for financial market imperfections. Several new approaches towards integrating more detailed characterizations of the financial sector led to a third generation of New Keynesian DSGE models. While the firm-based financial frictions mechanism in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999) is by now well established, still more work on how to include frictions in the banking sector of macroeconomic models is needed. Central bank modelers have already taken steps to include such models with financial frictions in the policy process.

Model uncertainty remains even more so a key concern for policy making. Comparative analysis of different third generation New Keynesian DSGE models indicates a great deal of heterogeneity. The transmission of monetary and fiscal policy is quite different with models that include different types of financial frictions. Furthermore, there is some evidence that monetary policy has stronger effects in the presence of financial frictions due to the amplification effects. In particular, these models either imply stronger peak responses and/or more persistent effects of monetary policy shocks on the real economy.

Against this background, it is important to compare the implications of different models for policy design and search for policy rules that perform well across a range of models. To this end, we use model averaging techniques, focussing on models estimated for the Euro Area. We find that the models with financial frictions that we consider prescribe a weaker response to both inflation and the output gap, but a stronger response to output gap growth
than earlier-generation models. This is likely due to the stronger effects of monetary policy, on average, in the financial frictions models. They allow the systematic response to inflation and the output gap to be less pronounced. However, we find no strong evidence that reacting to financial sector variables – leaning-against-the-wind – leads to substantial gains in terms of more stable macroeconomic dynamics in the models considered. This finding may well be due to some particular modelling choices. The greater effectiveness of monetary policy with financial frictions seems somewhat at odds with the experience of the financial crisis. It was not the case that central banks were able to jump-start the economy with rapid interest rate cuts. Furthermore, the policy rules we find to perform well, may depend too much on the expectations channel of policy, and thus on fully credible commitment by the policy maker and rational, homogeneous expectations by market participants. It would be useful to revisit the question of leaning-against-the-wind policies under learning and imperfect credibility and with nonlinearity in the financial sector (Filardo and Rungcharoenkitkul (2016)).

Finally, we reviewed the contribution of financial frictions to models’ forecasting performance in light of the recent financial crisis. Previous research showed that the empirical fit of New Keynesian DSGE models can be improved by adding financial frictions. Moreover, conditioning on appropriate data, the addition of financial frictions can play a key role in generating accurate forecasts – in particular, when financial shocks are a key driving force for the business cycle. More specifically, enhancing the Smets and Wouters (2007) model by the financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) and conditioning on the Baa-10 year treasury spread leads to superior forecasting performance during the Great Recession relative to a version without financial frictions. However, no single model variant outperforms in terms of forecasting performance over longer time spans. Against the backdrop of model uncertainty, this suggests that third-generation models are unlikely to outperform second-generation models in an unconditional sense. Some form of model averaging thus represents a promising approach in generating appropriate forecasts.

Looking forward, structural macroeconomic models are likely to remain essential tools for policy makers. However, as in the past, these models need to be constantly adapted in line with observed economic developments in order to better address the challenges policy makers face in an evolving economic environment. As such, the speedy adoption of New Keynesian DSGE models featuring financial frictions in the toolkit of central banks should be acclaimed. Still, central banks would appear well advised to increase the diversity of modelling approaches they employ, and take macroeconomic model competition as well as recent criticisms of the New Keynesian DSGE framework more into account. As such, considering competing modelling paradigms in macroeconomics such as models with heterogeneous agents, agent-based-models or new macro-finance models seems advisable. In combination
with further developments of the New Keynesian DSGE models, such a pluralistic approach to macroeconomic modelling is likely to yield a more robust framework for future monetary policy analysis.
References


51


Turner, A. (2010). What do banks do, what should they do and what public policies are needed to ensure best results for the real economy?


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Mewael F. Tesfaselassie, Maik Wolters</td>
<td>The Impact of Growth on Unemployment in a Low vs. a High Inflation Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Gerhard Rösl, Franz Seitz, Karl-Heinz Tödter</td>
<td>Doing away with cash? The welfare costs of abolishing cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Jinho Yoo</td>
<td>Capital Injection to Banks versus Debt Relief to Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Robert C. M. Beyer, Volker Wieland</td>
<td>Instability, imprecision and inconsistent use of equilibrium real interest rate estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Replacing or Supplementing the Euro in Member States whose Currency is the Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Restricting the Use of Cash in the European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Volker Wieland, Elena Afanasyeva, Meguy Kuete, Jinho Yoo</td>
<td>New Methods for Macro-Financial Model Comparison and Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Konstruktionsfehler bei der Einlagensicherung auf EU-Ebene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Athanasios Orphanides</td>
<td>Fiscal Implications of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Preis- und Finanzstabilität: der Primat der Politik, der rechtliche Rahmen und das „ökonomische Gesetz“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>John B. Taylor, Volker Wieland</td>
<td>Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Tilman Bletzinger, Volker Wieland</td>
<td>Forward guidance and “lower for longer”: The case of the ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahr / Jahrzehnt</td>
<td>Autorinnen/Autoren</td>
<td>Titel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 / 2016</td>
<td>Robert C. M. Beyer</td>
<td>Schätzung des mittelfristigen Gleichgewichtszinses in den Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland und dem Euro-Raum mit der Laubach-Williams-Methode</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 / 2015</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Exit, Exclusion, and Parallel Currencies in the Euro Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 / 2015</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung der Verfassungskommission des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen zur Schuldenbremse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 / 2015</td>
<td>José Maria Liberti</td>
<td>Information, Credit, and Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amit Seru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vikrant Vig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 / 2015</td>
<td>Patrick Tuschl</td>
<td>Rechtsgrundlagen für die Vereinbarkeit von Finanzhilfen für Kreditinstitute mit dem Beihilferecht der EU im Rahmen der Finanzmarktkrise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 / 2015</td>
<td>Athanasios Orphanides</td>
<td>Fear of Liftoff: Uncertainty, Rules and Discretion in Monetary Policy Normalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 / 2015</td>
<td>Bettina Brüggemann</td>
<td>Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Increasing Taxes on Top Income Earners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jinhyuk Yoo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 / 2015</td>
<td>Tobias H. Tröger</td>
<td>Regulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 / 2015</td>
<td>Janis Skrastins</td>
<td>How Organizational Hierarchy Affects Information Production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vikrant Vig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 / 2015</td>
<td>Florian Hoffmann</td>
<td>Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Inderst</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcus Opp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 / 2015</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>The Legality of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the European System of Central Banks (publ. in: Rövekamp / Bälz / Hilpert (eds.), Central Banking and Financial Stability in East Asia, 2015, pp. 101-123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 / 2015</td>
<td>Helmut Siekmann</td>
<td>The Legal Framework for the European System of Central Banks (publ. in: Rövekamp / Bälz / Hilpert (eds.), Central Banking and Financial Stability in East Asia, 2015, pp. 43-86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 / 2015</td>
<td>Florian Deuflhard</td>
<td>Financial Literacy and Savings Account Returns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dimitris Georgarakos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Inderst</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>