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Import Competition and Vertical Integration: Evidence from India

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Abstract

Recent theoretical contributions provide conflicting predictions about the relationship between import competition and firms' organizational choices. This paper uses a rich firm-product panel data set of Indian manufacturing firms to analyze the relationship between foreign competition and vertical integration. Exploiting exogenous variation from changes in India's trade policy, we find that import competition induced by falling output tariffs increases vertical integration by domestic firms. The effects are concentrated in rather homogenous product categories, among firms that mainly operate on the domestic market and in larger firms. The results are robust towards different sub-samples and hold with or without conditioning on various firm- and product-level characteristics including input tariffs and firm-year fixed effects. We also provide evidence that declining output tariffs spur R&D investment by some firms.

JEL codes: *F61, F23, G34, L25, D22, D24*

Keywords: *Trade Liberalization, Competition, Vertical Integration, Prices, Innovation*

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1 Introduction

There has been a long-standing interest in the adjustment of firms to trade liberalization and increasing foreign competition. Seminal theoretical and empirical contributions stress the reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms within industries as a mechanism by which international trade raises industry-level productivity (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Pavcnik, 2002). Over time, the focus has shifted towards analyzing adjustments *within* firms via productivity enhancing investment (see, for instance, Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010) or changes in firms' product mix (Bernard et al., 2012; Eckel and Neary, 2010) as an important component of potential gains from trade.¹ Recently, it has been pointed out that international competition can also affect organizational choices and firm boundaries including firms' propensity of vertical integration (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Alfaro et al., 2016; Aghion et al., 2006; Conconi et al., 2012; Legros and Newman, 2012, 2014). However, the theoretical literature yields mixed predictions regarding the effects of prices and product market competition on domestic firms' organizational choices.² Therefore, the question of how import competition affects domestic firms' vertical integration decisions ultimately boils down to an empirical matter.

An empirical test of this relationship is not only of theoretical interest but also highly relevant for economic policy. There is evidence that vertical integration is often associated with higher productivity, lower prices, and enhanced investment incentives.³ Hence, if competition reduces incentives for vertical integration as argued by recent research (Conconi et al., 2012; Legros and Newman, 2014), policy measures such as deregulation and trade liberalization might have unintended consequences.

This paper provides evidence on the effects of import competition, induced by falling output tariffs, on vertical integration decisions of domestic firms in India's manufacturing industries. The case of India is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, Indian firms have been exposed to a substantial decline in output tariffs. The average most-favored nation tariff across industries, our inverse measure of import competition, fell from more than 100% in 1989 to about 15% towards the end of our sample period and varies substantially across products. Previous empirical evidence shows that variation in this decline of output tariffs across industries has been mostly unaffected by lobbying of domestic firms and displays little correlation with industry performance in years before tariff changes (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2010a; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). Therefore, tariffs

¹See also the survey of related empirical literature in Bernard et al. (2012).

²Another strand of literature analyzes vertical integration and outsourcing of multinational firms in international markets (e.g. Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Antràs, 2013). In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the effects of import competition on *domestic* firms' vertical integration.

³Although vertical integration can have anti-competitive effects via foreclosure, it is often found that the positive effects dominate (e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007).

provide plausibly exogenous variation to the vertical integration decisions of domestic firms in India. In contrast to previous studies that exploit cross-sectional variation in tariffs across industries or industry-country pairs to analyze the relationship between competition and vertical integration, we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and industries within a country. Second, as reported by Alfaro et al. (2016), Indian firms display the highest degree of vertical integration across more than 200 countries.⁴ Previous research has found that the Indian economy has been characterized by substantial misallocation of inputs across firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) and high within-industry dispersion of productivity compared to other countries (see, for instance, Syverson, 2011). Vertical integration is a factor that potentially explains a significant part of this variation in efficiency across firms and time.⁵ Finally, in contrast to most other countries, Indian firms are required by law to report information about their activity at the product-level which is essential for our empirical approach.

To measure vertical integration, we follow previous empirical studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2009; Alfaro et al., 2016) and construct an index based on the products firms produce and input-output tables. Specifically, we measure the fraction of inputs used in the production of a product that can be produced within the firm.⁶ Our results show that this measure is significantly negatively correlated with output tariffs, indicating that foreign competition induces vertical integration by domestic firms. This result is robust towards limiting the analysis to firms' core product or assessing all products a firm produces and towards controlling for firm-product fixed effects, sectoral trends, input tariffs, various other industry- and firm-level control variables and even firm-year fixed effects. This allows us to rule out several alternative explanations for our results which are based on unobservable time-varying factors at the firm or product-level. We also estimate larger effects of tariffs in cases where they should arguably have a higher impact on incumbents' prices and market shares. For instance, our effects are concentrated among firms that sell the majority of their output on the domestic market and in rather homogenous product categories.

Our paper is related to a growing literature that analyzes the impact of market structure on organizational choices in general and on firm boundaries and vertical integration in particular. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of competition on vertical integration is ambiguous and might be non-monotonic (Aghion et al., 2006; Legros and Newman, 2014). For instance, according

⁴Acemoglu et al. (2003) provide a theory to explain that vertical integration is more widespread in countries with high distance from the world technological frontier – which arguably applies to India for most of its manufacturing industries – as these countries focus more on imitation and less on innovation.

⁵Consistent with the view that vertical integration increases productivity, we show that within-firm-product variation in vertical integration is associated with declining marginal costs and increasing markups in our sample.

⁶We focus on backward (rather than forward) vertical integration, i.e. inputs being integrated into downstream production, since previous evidence shows that this is the empirically more important phenomenon (Acemoglu et al., 2010).

to the transaction cost approach, competition reduces asset specificity and therefore the need for vertical integration (Aghion et al., 2006). Acemoglu et al. (2010) find that competition in the form of a higher number of firms producing on the domestic market also decreases incentives for backward vertical integration in a model inspired by property rights theory, because it raises the outside option of suppliers and hence their investment incentives.⁷ Their empirical analysis, based on a cross-section of UK industry-pairs, supports their hypothesis. In contrast, in another version of the property right theory approach by Aghion et al. (2006), a small increase in competition reduces producers' incentives to integrate by raising suppliers innovation incentives while for very high degrees of competition producers might have a high incentive to vertically integrate because independent suppliers can capture most of the post-innovation rents. Aghion et al. (2006) find support for a U-shaped relationship between entry rates and vertical integration using a sample of firms from the UK. They further find that foreign entry via greenfield investment is mainly positively associated with vertical integration. In contrast, McGowan (2015) estimates a negative effect of increasing competition on vertical integration in his study of the US coal mining industry. Buehler and Burghardt (2015) find that the removal of non-tariff barriers in input and output markets reduced the vertical integration propensity of Swiss plants.

Most closely related to our paper is Alfaro et al. (2016) who exploit variation in tariffs across sectors and countries in a cross-section of plants around the world to show that output tariffs and vertical integration are positively correlated. They explain their findings by a theoretical model inspired by the organizational industrial organization literature (Legros and Newman, 2014, forthcoming) in which vertical integration is regarded as productivity enhancing investment. This literature argues that high prices spur the incentives for vertical integration since the benefits from increased productivity increase with the level of prices while costs of vertical integration are independent of price and output levels. However, these studies analyze the impact of prices in a perfectly competitive setting. While the assumption of price-taking firms might be reasonable for some markets, it is unlikely to hold for Indian manufacturing firms which seem to be characterized by considerable market power (De Loecker et al., 2016).

Since vertical integration is often regarded as a productivity enhancing investment, our results are also related to the theoretical and empirical literature which studies the effect of trade and competition on other productivity-enhancing investments such as research and development (R&D) innovation. This literature shows that the relationship between competition and investment is complex in the presence of firm heterogeneity and strategic interaction. On the one hand, competition

⁷See the seminal contributions by Williamson (1975), Williamson (1985) for the transaction cost approach and by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) for the property rights theory approach. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) provide a survey on the general determinants and effects of vertical integration.

reduces profit margins and market shares per firm and thus investment incentives. On the other hand, in an oligopolistic market, a reduction in competition could decrease innovation incentives as it tends to lower the sensitivity of demand to enhanced efficiency (Schmutzler, 2013; Vives, 2008). Competition might also spur innovation when production factors are trapped inside firms and competition lowers the opportunity costs of redeploying these factors towards R&D (Bloom et al., 2016).

The relationship between competition and investment incentives might also be non-linear in the presence of industry leaders and laggards (Aghion et al., 2005). When firms are too different in their performance, they have little incentive to innovate since there is a low chance that laggards catch up with leaders. When competition is too intense, i.e. firms are too similar, post-innovation rents are small and thus investment incentives are low as well. Thus, changes in competition might affect productivity-enhancing investments non-monotonically and have different effects for leaders and laggards in an industry. For instance, larger and more productive firms might be induced to innovate by increased foreign competition, while for smaller firms, import competition might discourage innovation because these firms have no chance to close the productivity gap to foreign competitors (Aghion et al., 2009).

Our results indicate that falling output tariffs in India indeed spurred R&D investments by relatively large firms, while they reduced R&D investment by smaller firms.⁸ We also provide evidence that the positive effects of foreign competition on vertical integration are concentrated in larger firms suggesting that there are similarities between the response of vertical integration and other productivity-enhancing investments to foreign competition. However, we also find differences between the responses of vertical integration and R&D investment. For instance, our results indicate that vertical integration, in contrast to R&D, is negatively related to output tariffs for most subsamples. Further, in line with previous research (Goldberg et al., 2010a), we find that high input tariffs discourage R&D investment by downstream firms, possibly due to complementary access to foreign technologies. In contrast, input tariffs seem to be mostly positively correlated with vertical integration, especially by large firms. This is consistent with imported intermediates being a substitute for domestic in-house production and reducing outside options of domestic suppliers in vertical relations.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data set and construction of variables. The empirical strategy is detailed in section 3, with results discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

⁸For previous empirical studies on international trade and innovation see, for instance, Autor et al. (2016), Bloom et al. (2016), Bustos (2011), Coelli et al. (2016), Lileeva and Treffer (2010).

2 Data and Variables

Our empirical analysis draws from several data sources. Our primary data set is the Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database. We augment this primary data source with a number of additional data sets. We carry out the analysis at the level of National Industrial Classification (NIC) version 2008, and where external data sources use international industrial classifications such as the Harmonised System (HS) codes, we mapped these onto NIC following the concordance tables published by Debroy and Santhanam (1993).

2.1 Firm and Product Level Data

Prowess provides information on company balance sheets and income statements for both publicly listed and unlisted firms across industries in the manufacturing, services, utilities and financial sectors.⁹ These firms account for more than 70% of industrial output from the organised sector, 75% of corporate taxes and 95% of excise taxes collected by the government.

The construction of the vertical integration indices at the firm level requires us to identify the products produced by the firm. By law, Indian firms are required to report product-level data on quantities and values of sales and production.¹⁰ Each product is allocated a twenty-digits code from CMIE's own internal classification of 5908 sub-industries and products. Of these, 4833 products fall under the manufacturing sector.¹¹

We extracted data spanning the period 1989 (the first year firms appear in the database) until 2011 and focus on the manufacturing sector. Hence, we create an unbalanced panel tracking products of each firm every year, mapping the product codes onto India's NIC 2008.¹² In our main estimation sample, we exclude multinational firms since we have no detailed information about the products they produce abroad and these firms may not be affected by import competition in the same way as domestic firms. However, as we discuss in the robustness section, this restriction is not crucial for our results.

⁹This database has been used in a number of recent papers, e.g. Goldberg et al. (2009, 2010a,b); De Loecker et al. (2016).

¹⁰This is a requirement of the 1956 Companies Act.

¹¹CMIE's own classification is largely based on the Indian National Industrial Classification (NIC) and the HS schedule. Example of products across different industries include shrimps, corned meat, pig iron, sponge iron, pipe fittings, rail coaches. See Goldberg et al. (2010b) for a detailed description of the product-level data in Prowess.

¹²In setting up this firm-product-year panel, we checked and adjusted the CMIE product codes to address a number of instances where the same product code was attributed to different products, or where different product codes were allocated to the same product. In addition, we noticed a number of cases where product names varied in spelling and also noted frequent differences in levels of aggregation for what constitutes a product.

2.2 Vertical Integration Indices

We follow Fan and Lang (2000) and Alfaro et al. (2016) in constructing the vertical integration indices, using input-output (IO) tables published by the Indian Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.¹³ These IO tables report transaction coefficients which measure the rupee value of output from industry i required to produce a rupee's worth of output for industry j . Hence, a transaction coefficient of 0.05 means that 5 Indian rupee cents (paise) worth of output in industry i are required to produce one rupee's worth of products in industry j . We combine information on firms' production activities in the Prowess database with IO tables, and construct a panel of IO transaction coefficients for each product produced in industry j by firm f at year t . We define a firm based on unconsolidated accounts and therefore implicitly treat firms that are part of corporate groups as independent entities. This is consistent with recent evidence that physical input flows between firms of corporate groups are limited (Atalay et al., 2014). However, as we discuss in a robustness section, excluding firms that are part of a corporate group from the estimation sample does not affect our results notably. Although IO coefficients are quite stable across time, it is unlikely that the usual assumption of constant IO coefficients holds within a sample period of more than 20 years. IO tables are published on an interval of roughly about 5 years, and to create the firm-product-year panel of IO transaction coefficients, we use the 1993/94 IO transaction coefficients for years 1988-1997, the 1998/99 IO coefficients for adjacent years 1998-2002, the 2003/2004 IO coefficients for adjacent years 2003-06 and the 2007/08 IO coefficients for the remaining years 2007-11 of our sample.¹⁴ However, we obtain similar results when we use industry-pair specific IO weights that are constant across time for our empirical analysis.

We construct vertical integration indices at the level of the firm as well as the firm-product level. At the product/industry level, the IO transaction coefficients, IO_{fijt} follow the identity $IO_{fijt} \equiv IO_{ijt} * I_{fijt}$, where IO_{ijt} is the input-output coefficient for product-industry pair (i, j) at time t and I_{fijt} is an indicator variable that equals one if and only if the firm manufactures products in both product-groups i and j at time t . If a firm produces in both industries i and j , it will be assumed to supply itself with all the i that is needed to produce j . Hence, a higher IO_{fijt} means that the firm's production in industry i will be measured as being more integrated in the production of products in sector j .

The firm's vertical integration index for a product produced in industry j is the sum of IO coefficients across all industries in which it is active:

¹³See <http://www.mospi.gov.in> accessed on 25 November 2016

¹⁴At the time of writing this draft, IO 1989-90 tables, which we could have used for years 1988-1992, are not available to us.

$$v_{fjt} = \sum_i IO_{fijt} \quad (1)$$

At the firm level, its vertical integration index is as per equation (1), but calculated for its main industry of activity j only.¹⁵ Figure 1 shows the distribution of the vertical integration indices constructed for our sample. Our measure reveals that most firms produce only a small share of their inputs in house - the median vertical integration index is 0.116 and the mean is 0.134.

2.3 Tariffs

Tariffs data were sourced from World Integrated Trade Services (WITS). Following Alfaro et al. (2016) we use applied MFN tariff rates.¹⁶ We select the tariffs data reported at 6 digits HS codes, and map these to NIC codes following the concordance tables published by Debroy and Santhanam (1993).¹⁷ We construct simple averages of MFN tariff rates aggregating from six digits HS codes to 3 digits NIC 2008 codes.

We also construct a measure of tariffs applied to imported inputs, which simply weighs the applied MFN tariffs using normalised IO coefficients as weights.

$$inptariff_{jt} = \sum_i tariff_{ijt} * IO_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

where $tariff_{ijt}$ are MFN tariff rates and IO_{ijt} represents the IO transaction coefficients.

2.4 Further Variables

We construct a number of supplementary variables which we use as additional control variables or to measure heterogenous effects where relevant. These include two measures of technological intensity: *investment intensity*, measured as firm investment over sales and *R&D intensity*, measured as firm R&D relative to sales. Both variables are averaged at the industry level. Another industry-level measure is average *size* of firms within an industry measured by the log of sales. At

¹⁵Hence, for multi-product firms, we consider their main product, i.e. the product with the highest revenue share.

¹⁶Tariffs data were missing for years 1989,1991,1993,1994,1995,1998. We interpolate to fill in the missing values.

¹⁷The tariffs data were brought to the common HS 1992 codes and from there on mapped onto NIC 2008 codes.

the firm-level we construct *exports* and *imports* measured relative to sales. A firm’s size is captured by $\log(\text{sales})$. $\log(\text{R\&D})$ denotes the $\log(\text{research and development expenditure} + 1)$. *homogenous good* is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the product belongs to a category defined as homogenous and 0 if differentiated. The classification of product categories as differentiated or homogenous follows Rauch (1999).¹⁸

markup is a product-level markup calculated following the methodology of De Loecker et al. (2016).¹⁹ *marginal cost* is calculated by dividing observed prices (unit values) by estimated markups.

2.5 Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main variables of interest. As mentioned earlier, most firms produce relatively few inputs inhouse, as evidenced by a vertical integration index with a mean of 0.134 and median of 0.116. Around 45% of the products considered in our data set are classified as being homogenous goods. The average markup of 2.82 seems quite high, but the median markup is 1.33 for the whole sample. These figures are similar to those obtained by De Loecker et al. (2016) who estimate a markup distribution for Indian manufacturing over an earlier time period, reporting an average of 2.70 and a median of 1.34. On average, exports make up about 10% of production.

Table 2 reports the yearly evolution of output and input tariffs data over the period of our analysis. Average output tariffs fell at a rapid pace in the earlier years around the 1991 reforms and slowed down in later years. A similar observation can be made for input tariffs.

2.6 Exogeneity of Trade Policy

A particular concern around the use of a trade policy measure such as tariffs is the possible endogeneity of this variable. For instance, governments might perceive that specific domestic industries are not sufficiently mature to face import competition, and would seek to protect them. Similarly, inefficient domestic industries might lobby for higher protection from foreign competition. Labour or trade union groups may have concerns around the employment and welfare effects of trade liberalisation and will likely lobby authorities in an attempt to steer the magnitude and pace of trade liberalisation. A number of studies have argued that the 1991 trade reforms that arose from the external crisis were drastic and unexpected (e.g., Hasan et al., 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). Yet, as Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) points out, variations in trade policy across industries could

¹⁸For details on the Rauch classification, see http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/rauch_classification.html, accessed on February 28, 2017.

¹⁹see also Stiebale and Vencappa (2016) for details on the construction of product level markup and marginal cost using the same data set as this paper.

confound inference if it is induced by previous industry performance. The authors argue and provide evidence that this might have been the case for more recent trade liberalization episodes in India.

In contrast to Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), our paper uses MFN tariffs and we argue that these can be assumed to be exogenous to vertical integration. As Alfaro et al. (2016) point out, MFN tariffs are agreed following long rounds of multilateral trade negotiations at the end of which every member commits to not exceed agreed tariff bounds. Failure to respect this commitment entitles the affected parties to take matters to the dispute settlement body of the WTO. Once agreed, the tariff rates must be applied in a non-discriminatory way to imports from all WTO members.²⁰ Pressure for protection from lobby groups is unlikely to be directed to MFN tariffs; governments can instead focus on alternative measures such as antidumping measures and countervailing duties. MFN tariffs are also persistent and vary little over time.

Although the above are strong arguments for MFN tariff rates being exogenous, we follow Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and run a variety of checks prior to estimating a causal link of tariffs on our outcome variables. Firstly, we use industry level data from various issues of the Annual Survey of Industries²¹ to run regressions of changes in trade policy measures (output and input tariffs) on lagged industrial characteristics for each distinct time period corresponding to India’s five-year plans as well as the whole sample period from 1989-2012.²² Industry performance indicators include employment, output, average wage, concentration, share of skilled workers and the growth of industry output and employment. Specifically, we run the following regressions:

$$tariff_{jt} - tariff_{j0} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 x_{j0} + u_j \quad (3)$$

where $tariff_{jt}$ is either input or output tariff in industry j at time t , and x_{j0} is each of a set of industrial characteristics measured at the beginning of each 5-year time period.

Table 3 reports results of these simple regressions. While for some variables and some time periods, tariff changes appear to be correlated with industry characteristics, most of these correlations are small and – with the exception of average wage levels – statistically insignificant or weakly significant. All in all, there is no evidence that policy makers systematically adjusted tariffs to previous industry performance.

We also follow Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) in a second set of regressions to check whether

²⁰Exceptions to this rule are when WTO members form part of a preferential trade agreement, in which case members are allowed to discriminate between members inside and outside the preferential trade agreement.

²¹See <http://www.mospi.nic.in> accessed on 17 February 2017

²²Over the period 1989-2012 India delivered its 7th to 11th five-year plans for the periods 1985-1990, 1992-1997, 1997-2002, 2002-2007 and 2007-2012.

policy makers adjusted tariffs in response to industry productivity shocks and regress each of the trade policy measures on a one-year lagged industry productivity measure:

$$tariff_{jt} = \zeta TFP_{j,t-1} + \mu_t + a_j + u_{jt} \quad (4)$$

where TFP_{jt} denotes average log total factor productivity, estimated using the methodology proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).²³ The industry-level measure is constructed as a sales-weighted average of (absolute) firm-level TFP.

Table 4 reports the results of these regressions for different time periods with output tariffs in Panel A and input tariffs depicted in Panel B. Coefficients are small and statistically insignificant for the sample period as a whole and insignificant or weakly significant for the different sub-samples. Even the highest coefficient, the correlation between TFP_{t-1} and output tariffs within the time period 1997-2002 suggest that a 10% increase in total factor productivity is associated with only 0.64 percentage points higher output tariffs and has the opposite sign that we would expect when policy makers try to protect low-productivity industries with high tariffs. Taken together, the results from tables 3 and 4 suggest that potential endogeneity concerns around our tariffs variables are mitigated.

3 Empirical Method

The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the effects of tariffs on vertical integration. We exploit variation in most-favored nation tariffs across products and years within and between firms. For this purpose, we start with the following regression at the firm-level:

$$v_{f(j)t} = \beta tariff_{jt} + X'_{f(j)t}\Pi + \alpha_f + \eta_{kt} + \epsilon_{f(j)t} \quad (5)$$

where $v_{f(j)t}$ denotes the vertical integration index of firm f with main activity in product/industry j in year t . $tariff_{jt}$ denotes the tariff rate applied to industry j at time t and $X_{f(j)t}$ is a vector of firm- and product specific control variables. The firm fixed effect α_f captures permanent differences among firms including location (which might affect the supply of intermediate inputs), managerial ability and corporate culture. η_{kt} are time dummies which control for changes in market conditions and technology common to all firms which we allow to vary across 2-digit industries (k) in most specifications. Finally, $\epsilon_{f(j)t}$ is an error term.

²³We use sales as a measure of output and material costs, wage bill and fixed assets to measure inputs.

In a second step, we move the analysis to the firm-product-level and consider all products produced by firms, not only their core product. Therefore, equation 5 becomes:

$$v_{fjt} = \theta \text{tariff}_{fjt} + X'_{jt}\Theta + \alpha_{fp} + \eta_{kt} + \epsilon_{fjt} \quad (6)$$

where v_{fjt} denotes the vertical integration index of product in industry j produced by firm f in year t and α_{fp} is a firm-product specific fixed effect which captures permanent differences in technology and product characteristics. Since tariffs vary across industries within multi-product firm-years, we control additionally for firm-year fixed effects, φ_{ft} , in a further amplification of the model:

$$v_{fjt} = \gamma \text{tariff}_{fjt} + X'_{jt}\Gamma + \alpha_{fj} + \varphi_{ft} + \eta_{kt} + \epsilon_{fjt} \quad (7)$$

An advantage of controlling for firm-year fixed effects is that we can control for time-varying adjustments within firms such as changes in management, corporate culture, liquidity, profitability and technology (as long as these changes are not firm-product-year specific). Firm-year fixed effects also control for the effects of product-specific tariffs that affect a firm as a whole, for instance via liquidity and credit constraints. A disadvantage of this approach is that we can only run this regression on a selected sample of multi-product (multi-industry) firms which are arguably not a random sample from the population.

Our main identifying assumption is that $E[\epsilon_{fjt} | \text{tariff}_{fjt}, X_{jt}, \alpha_{fj}, \varphi_{ft}, \eta_{kt}] = 0$. Hence, we assume that unobservables affecting vertical integration decisions which are not captured by firm-year, firm-product or sector-year fixed effects are uncorrelated with variations in tariffs across time within industries. To assess the validity, of this approach, we include a set of control variables in X_{ijt} which are potentially correlated with both vertical integration and tariff rates. A potentially important control variable are input tariffs which can affect producers' vertical integration decisions via prices and competition in upstream markets (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Alfaro et al., 2016). These are computed by passing tariff rates through India's input-output matrix. Further, technological characteristics might determine the degree of relation-specificity and investment incentives (Acemoglu et al., 2010). To capture changes in technological characteristics across industries and time, we control for the average of the R&D to sales ratio and the level of investment relative to sales across firms within industries. We also control for variation in average firm size (measured by log sales) to capture general changes in technology. At the firm-level, we control for the ratio of export to sales and imports to sales to account for the fact that firms with access to foreign markets might react differently to changes in import competition. We refrain from controlling for further firm-level variables such as productivity, size, capital or R&D since these variables might be affected by firms'

vertical integration choices. However, these variables are implicitly controlled for using firm-year fixed effects in our product-level specifications.

Since firms are arguably more affected by output tariffs if they mainly operate on the domestic market, we follow Alfaro et al. (2016) and also test for heterogeneous effects using the following specification:

$$v_{fjt} = \nu_1 \text{tariff}_{jt} + \nu_2 \text{tariff}_{jt} \times \text{domestic}_f + X'_{jt}\Psi + \alpha_{fj} + \varphi_{ft} + \eta_{kt} + \epsilon_{fjt} \quad (8)$$

where domestic_f takes on a value of one for firms that export less than half of their output throughout our sample period.²⁴ We also test for further heterogeneous effects in alternative specifications in which we replace domestic_f by an indicator of firm size or a variable that distinguishes between differentiated and homogenous goods based on the Rauch (1999) classification.

As an additional test, we replace sector-year with product-year fixed effects (measured at the same level as tariffs) which allows identifying the effect of the interaction term $\text{tariff}_{jt} \times \text{domestic}_f$ while controlling for other time-varying market conditions that might be correlated with both tariffs and vertical integration.

$$v_{fjt} = \omega \text{tariff}_{jt} \times \text{domestic}_f + X'_{jt}\Omega + \alpha_{fj} + \varphi_{ft} + \eta_{jt} + \epsilon_{fjt} \quad (9)$$

In all specifications, we use two-way clustered standard errors. First, we cluster at the product-level since our main variable of interest, tariffs, varies at the product-level while the dependent variable is firm-product specific. Second, we cluster at the firm-level since vertical integration decisions might be correlated within firms across products and years.

4 Results

4.1 Main results

Table 5 reports the results our firm-level regressions based on estimation of equation (5). Column (1) shows results of regressions that control for firm fixed effects and year dummies. The coefficient indicates that a 100 percentage point increase in output tariffs is associated with a decline of the vertical integration index by 0.022 which corresponds to about 19% of the median value of the index. While the estimated effect becomes somewhat smaller when we control for sector (2-digit industry)-year fixed effects in columns (2), it increases again once we add further control variables.

²⁴This variable is firm but not firm-product-specific since, unfortunately, our data does not provide a breakdown of firm-level exports by products.

In column (3), we control for input tariffs, while column (4) adds additional control variables at the industry-level to the regression which include investment intensity and R&D intensity as a proxy for technological intensity and average firm size. In column (5), we control for two additional variables at the firm-level, import and export shares. The results for output tariffs remain highly statistically significant and indicate economically important effects as well. According to the coefficient estimates in column (6) and descriptive statistics in Table 1, an increase in output tariffs by one standard deviation decreases the expected vertical integration index by 0.0064 which is about 5.5% of the median vertical integration index. As we discuss below, the effects are even more pronounced for some subsamples. Among the control variables, mainly investment intensity turns out to be significant. This is line with Acemoglu et al. (2010) who argue that technological intensity in the producers' industry increases the incentives for vertical integration. Both input tariffs and R&D intensity are positively associated with changes in vertical integration, but the results are not statistically significant.

Results of firm-product level regressions based on estimation of equation (6) are depicted in Table 6. Column (1) shows results of regressions that control for firm-product fixed effects and year dummies. In column (2), we add sector fixed effects and column (3) controls for input tariffs. The estimated effects are again statistically significant and in absolute terms even somewhat higher than in firm-level regressions. A more restrictive test of the effects of tariffs on vertical integration is whether particular firms are more likely to vertically integrate in products/industries with lower tariff rates. For instance, variation in tariff rates across time and industries might be correlated with unobserved changes in corporate culture or company wide trends in investment and management. To assess this possibility, we add firm-year fixed effects to the model. Identification of the effects of tariffs in this specification is limited to firms that produce in at least two different industries. The estimates become even stronger. For instance, column (4) indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in tariffs is associated with declines in vertical integration of 0.012 which is more than 10% of the median vertical integration index. The results remain significant if we control for sector-year fixed effects and input tariffs in columns (5) and (6). In column (6), the coefficient for input tariffs becomes statistically significant, but this results is not robust across specifications. As we will see below, this is partly due to heterogeneous responses to input tariffs across firms and industries. While the coefficient for input tariffs is in absolute terms much larger than the coefficient for output tariffs, the magnitude of the relative impact is rather similar. A one standard deviation increase in input tariffs increases vertical integration by 0.011.

In Table 7, we present the results of heterogeneous effects of tariffs across homogenous and differentiated goods. The effects of tariffs on domestic firms should be more pronounced in homogenous

product categories where the elasticity of substitution across varieties is arguably higher. This is exactly what we find. Estimates in column (1) indicate that a 100 percentage point increase in output tariffs decrease the vertical integration index of firm-products in homogenous good industries by 0.086, more than 50% of the mean or median vertical integration index in these product categories.²⁵ The coefficient is more than six times higher than the coefficient for differentiated goods industries documented in column (2). When we add firm-year fixed effects to these regressions, the differences across product categories even become more pronounced and the coefficient for differentiated goods loses its significance.

We investigate further heterogeneous effects in Table 8. For instance, the response to import competition might be quite different for industry leaders compared to smaller and less productive firms. Column (1) uses an interaction term between tariffs and a dummy variable which takes on value one when sales exceed those of the median firm within an industry. The results show that the sensitivity of vertical integration decisions to changes in tariffs by relatively large firms is almost twice as high compared to smaller firms. Larger firms also respond to changes in input tariffs significantly. In column (2), we perform a separate regression for firms that export on average more than half of their output within our sample period. If the coefficients for output tariffs reflect a causal effect of import competition on Indian firms, the estimated effects should be much less pronounced for firms with high export shares. The results confirm this hypothesis as the coefficient for output tariffs becomes statistically and economically insignificant. However, exporters seem to respond much more to changes in import tariffs than domestic firms. A possible explanation is that firms with high export shares have better access to foreign input suppliers and use these to substitute domestic in-house production of intermediates.²⁶ We analyze differences in the responses of firms with high export shares and domestic firms in more detail in columns (4) and (5) based on estimation of equations (8) and (9). The estimates confirm that domestic firms' vertical integration propensity significantly decreases with the level of output tariffs. This effect even becomes stronger when we control for product-year fixed effects in column (5).

So far, we have assumed a monotonic relationship between tariffs and vertical integration. However, the effect of tariffs might be non-linear. For instance, Aghion et al. (2006) predict a U-shaped relationship between competition and vertical integration for which they find empirical support. Column (1) of Table 9 shows results of adding a squared term of tariffs to the regression. The coefficients indeed indicate a non-linear relationship where the negative effects of tariffs on vertical

²⁵The average (median) VI index equals 0.160 (0.163) in homogenous and 0.114 (0.093) in differentiated product categories. The average (median) tariff rate equals 0.366 (0.317) in non-differentiated and 0.305 (0.253) in differentiated industries.

²⁶The share of importers among firms which export more than half of their output is almost 90% while it is below 40% for other firms. Unfortunately, our data does not provide detailed information about the goods that firms import which prevents us from analyzing this channel in more detail.

integration is decreasing in the level of tariffs. Since tariffs are an inverse measure of foreign competition, the estimates indicate an inverse U-shaped relationship between import competition and vertical integration. The predicted turning point, where further increases in tariffs have positive effects on vertical integration, is at a tariff rate of 115% percent which approximately equals the 95-percentile of the distribution of tariffs. Hence, the effect of foreign competition seems to be positive for the vast majority of firms in our sample. We also experimented with alternative functional forms for the relationship between tariffs and vertical integration. For instance, following Alfaro et al. (2016), we regress $\ln(v + 1)$ on $\ln(\text{tariff} + 1)$ and $-$ on the subsample of firm-product-years with positive values of vertical integration and tariffs $-$ we relate $\ln(v)$ to $\ln(\text{tariff})$. The results depicted in column (2) and (3) confirm the negative relationship between output tariffs and vertical integration. The specification in column (4) adds a squared value of $\ln(\text{tariff} + 1)$ to the specification. Again, the results indicate a turning point above the 95-percentile of tariffs.²⁷

Since vertical integration is often interpreted as a productivity enhancing investment, it is natural to ask whether it is indeed associated with improved performance in our sample. For this purpose, we regress firm-product-level measures of markups and marginal costs on our vertical integration index controlling for firm-product and year fixed effects.²⁸ Results displayed in column (1) and (2) of Table A1 in the Appendix shows that within-firm-variation in vertical integration is indeed negatively correlated with marginal costs and positively correlated with markups. The coefficients even increase (in absolute terms) when we control for product-year or firm-year fixed effects. Nonetheless, we would like to emphasize that these estimates only identify correlations since vertical integration might be endogenous to costs and markups. Identification of a causal effects of vertical integration on firm performance is beyond the scope of this paper.

Since vertical integration is negatively correlated with marginal costs, it is also natural to ask whether the results of tariffs on vertical integration differ from other (potentially) productivity-enhancing investments, particularly R&D. Since we have no information about the allocation of R&D across product lines, we investigate the effects of tariffs in a firms' main industry on the log of firm-level R&D. Results are displayed in Table 10 with output tariffs in column (1) and a specification with both output and input tariffs in column (2). Both regressions show rather small and statistically insignificant coefficients. However, it is likely that there are varying responses across heterogeneous firms. In particular, larger or more productive firms might increase their R&D investment due to increased foreign competition while smaller firms might be discouraged to invest in innovation (e.g.,

²⁷Since $\ln(\text{tariff})$ is negative for most observations, a squared term of $\ln(\text{tariff})$ is not appropriate for describing a U-shaped relationship. Hence, we do not report the results of such a specification.

²⁸Markups are estimated as the ratio of the material-output elasticity to the cost share of materials, where the material-output elasticity is estimated from a translog production function based on physical units of output. Marginal costs are recovered from dividing estimated markups by observed unit values. See De Loecker et al. (2016) for further details.

Aghion et al., 2005). To allow for these heterogeneous responses, we interact tariffs with a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm’s sales exceed the median within a three-digit industry (on average within the sample period). Column (3) shows results of this specification. In column (4), we additionally add an interaction with input tariffs. The results indicate substantial heterogeneity in responses to import competition. For small firms, output tariffs increase R&D investment, while for large firms, foreign competition spurs R&D. The effects are quantitatively important. For instance, based on estimates in column (4), an increase in tariffs by 10 percentage points decreases R&D expenditures in small firms by more than 2.3% ($10 \cdot \exp(0.213) - 1$) but increases R&D in large firms by about 1.8% ($10 \cdot \exp(0.213 - 0.413) - 1$). The negative relationship between input tariffs and R&D is also concentrated in larger firms which confirms results by Goldberg et al. (2010a) who use the same data base but an earlier estimation sample. In columns (5) and (6), we interact output and input tariffs with dummy variables indicating different quartiles of the size distribution. The results indicate that the negative responses of R&D to tariffs increase with firm size.

All in all, output tariffs have qualitatively similar effects on vertical integration and R&D expenditures in large firms, while the effects seem quite different for smaller firms. A possible explanation is that limited capabilities in small firms play a more important role for innovation activities than for vertical integration. Further, the effect of changes in bargaining power between suppliers and producers induced by competition are likely to matter more for vertical integration than for R&D decisions. As discussed by Legros and Newman (2014, forthcoming), vertical integration might also respond differently to competition because this decision is easier reversible than innovation expenditures. The estimated effects of input tariffs on R&D are very different from those on vertical integration. A likely explanation for these differences is that increased competition from foreign intermediate inputs reduces the bargaining power of non-integrated domestic suppliers and hence the incentives of producers to vertically integrate their suppliers. In contrast, previous research shows that domestic R&D and access to foreign inputs tend to be complements (e.g., Bøler et al., 2015).

4.2 Additional robustness checks

We checked the robustness of our results towards different empirical methods and estimation samples which are documented in the Appendix. Table A2 shows results using alternative estimation methods which account for zero values in the dependent variable. Particularly, we estimate a Tobit model with a censoring point at zero, fractional response Logit and Probit models and a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of an exponential mean model based on a Poisson distribution. Due to the incidental parameters problem and computational difficulties, we cannot control for firm-product fixed effects in these estimations. Instead, we control for industry dummies at the 3-digit level to

ensure that we our estimates identify variation in tariffs and vertical integration within industries across time. Columns (1) to (3) show marginal effects from the Tobit, fractional Logit and fractional Probit estimation respectively. In column (4), coefficients from the exponential mean model, which can be interpreted semi-elasticities, are depicted. All these alternative estimation methods confirm the negative effects of output tariffs on vertical integration.

We performed further robustness checks which relate to the selection of the estimation sample. First, we limited the sample to stand-alone firms since it is not clear whether our vertical integration index describes the production activities of firms within corporate groups accurately. Results, depicted in Table A3, show that excluding firms that are part of corporate groups does not affect our conclusions. In our main estimation sample, we exclude multinational firms since we have no detailed information about their foreign production activity. However, as documented in Table A4, including these firms and their production activities in India in the estimation sample does not affect our main results either. Finally, we checked the robustness towards aggregating all production activities to the 3-digit industry level which corresponds to the level of aggregation of our tariff variables. Results, depicted in Table A5 show very similar coefficients as in the baseline regressions. All in all, the results are robust towards different control variables, functional forms, econometric methods and estimation samples and indicate that there is a strongly significantly negative effect of import competition on the vertical integration propensity of domestic firms.

5 Conclusion

Recent theoretical contributions provide conflicting predictions about the relationship between competition and firms' organizational choices. In this paper, we use a rich firm-product level panel data set of Indian manufacturing firms to analyse the relationship between import competition and vertical integration. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that foreign competition faced by domestic firms increased substantially due to India's trade liberalisation which reduced average MFN output tariffs from more than 100% in 1989 to about 15% in 2011. We provide evidence that variation in the decline of MFN rates across industries is only weakly correlated with lagged industry performance measures such as productivity and output growth indicating that declines in tariffs provide plausibly exogenous variation to the vertical integration decisions of domestic firms in India.

Following previous empirical studies, we construct an index of vertical integration based on firms' products and IO tables, effectively capturing the fraction of inputs used in the production of a product that can be produced inhouse. Relating this measure to output tariff rates, our inverse

measure of import competition, we find a strong and statistically significant negative coefficient, suggesting that foreign competition induces vertical integration by domestic firms. This result holds whether we consider all the products of a firm or focus only on their core product. Our findings are similarly robust to controlling for firm-product fixed effects, sectoral trends, input tariffs, various other industry- and firm-level control variables and even firm-year fixed effects.

We also find evidence that the responses to import competition vary with firm and industry characteristics. For instance, our results indicate that the effects of tariffs on vertical integration are concentrated in firms that mainly operate on the domestic market, in relatively large firms and in rather homogenous product categories. There is also evidence that higher input tariffs induce vertical integration but these effects are only significant for homogenous products, for firms with high export sales and firms of large size.

From an economic policy point of view, our results indicate that concerns that increased competition may have a negative effect on firm performance via reducing incentives for vertical integration do not seem to be justified, at least in the context of India. This result contrasts with recent empirical evidence and it will be an interesting topic for future research to investigate whether these differences are due to the specificity of an emerging market like India or due to exploiting different sources of variation in import competition.

We also compare the effects of tariffs on vertical integration to those on R&D investment, another potentially productivity-enhancing investment. Our results indicate that R&D investment increases as a response to foreign competition and access to foreign inputs in large firms, but decreases in relatively small firms. Hence, vertical integration seems to adjust to import competition in a similar way as R&D in some firms but not in others. For future research, it would be interesting to develop a theoretical model that predicts how firms adjust various productivity-enhancing investments to foreign competition simultaneously.

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


Figure 1: Vertical Integration Index

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean	Median	Std.dev.
v_{fjt}	vertical integration index	0.134	0.116	0.115
$tariff_{jt}$	most-favored nations (MFN) tariff	0.332	0.297	0.279
$input_tariff_{jt}$	MFN tariffs weighted by IO transaction coefficients	0.084	0.064	0.078
$investment_intensity_{jt}$	investment / sales (average at the industry-level)	0.061	0.057	0.032
$R\&D_intensity_{jt}$	R&D / sales (average at the industry-level)	0.002	0.001	0.002
$industry_size_{jt}$	log(sales), (average at the industry-level)	6.283	6.182	0.720
$homogenous_good_p$	=1 if homogenous good (Rauch 1999 classification)	0.450	0.000	0.497
$exports_{ft}$	export / sales	0.094	0.004	0.195
$imports_{ft}$	imports / input expenditures	0.239	0.093	0.319
log_sales_{ft}	log(sales),	6.477	6.429	2.049
$log_R\&D_{ft}$	log (R&D expenditures + 1)	0.584	0.000	1.273
$markup_{fpt}$	price / marginal cost	2.828	1.339	4.831
$marginal_cost_{fpt}$	marginal cost, deviation from product-year average	0.000	-0.002	149.1

f, p, j denote variable measured at firm, product and industry level respectively. t represents year.

Table 2: Tariffs over time

year	output tariff			input tariff		
	mean	median	sd	mean	median	sd
1989	1.119	1.168	0.485	0.308	0.295	0.186
1990	0.964	0.968	0.387	0.263	0.254	0.154
1991	0.797	0.730	0.289	0.217	0.220	0.121
1992	0.632	0.609	0.220	0.170	0.186	0.089
1993	0.573	0.556	0.213	0.153	0.169	0.081
1994	0.514	0.502	0.202	0.135	0.153	0.072
1995	0.461	0.423	0.212	0.120	0.136	0.063
1996	0.410	0.370	0.227	0.104	0.119	0.055
1997	0.325	0.298	0.188	0.085	0.095	0.044
1998	0.341	0.321	0.180	0.078	0.084	0.044
1999	0.355	0.343	0.166	0.083	0.090	0.047
2000	0.356	0.366	0.133	0.082	0.094	0.047
2001	0.349	0.339	0.149	0.080	0.088	0.044
2002	0.318	0.298	0.140	0.072	0.078	0.042
2003	0.293	0.250	0.140	0.083	0.093	0.047
2004	0.318	0.300	0.139	0.091	0.106	0.051
2005	0.212	0.156	0.170	0.055	0.060	0.034
2006	0.190	0.124	0.178	0.045	0.046	0.029
2007	0.196	0.132	0.173	0.055	0.057	0.034
2008	0.153	0.085	0.173	0.038	0.036	0.030
2009	0.159	0.086	0.185	0.040	0.038	0.030
2010	0.148	0.082	0.172	0.037	0.036	0.029
2011	0.151	0.082	0.180	0.041	0.039	0.030
all	0.329	0.294	0.272	0.085	0.064	0.078

Table 3: Changes in output tariffs and industrial characteristics

Industrial Characteristics	output tariffs										input tariffs				
	1989-1992	1992-1997	1997-2002	2002-2007	2007-2012	1989-2012	1989-1992	1992-1997	1997-2002	2002-2007	2007-2012	1989-2012			
Log average wage	-0.035 (0.113)	-0.104 (0.097)	0.041 (0.045)	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.178* (0.100)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.049*** (0.010)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.166*** (0.037)			
Share of non-production workers	0.574 (0.768)	-0.979 (0.638)	0.581* (0.297)	-0.135 (0.112)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.289 (0.744)	-0.237 (0.179)	-0.230*** (0.085)	-0.049 (0.081)	0.004 (0.074)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.754** (0.311)			
Capital labour ratio	-0.008 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.020)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.046 (0.049)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.011 (0.020)			
Log output	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.022** (0.011)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.022)			
Factory size	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)			
Log employment	0.004 (0.029)	0.003 (0.010)	0.011 (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.028 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.025)			
Growth in output	0.105 (0.250)	-0.180 (0.166)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.020 (0.023)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.115 (0.086)	0.020 (0.022)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.026)			
Growth in employment	-0.537 (0.564)	-0.134 (0.113)	-0.056*** (0.020)	-0.018 (0.021)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.285 (0.244)	-0.002 (0.048)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.056** (0.025)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.027 (0.021)			
Observations	68	68	67	67	66	65	50	50	43	45	45	43			

Bivariate regressions of change in output tariffs on each industry characteristic, weighted by the number of factories in each industry. Apart from growth in output and employment, industrial characteristics are at beginning of period values, i.e. 1989 for period 1989-1992, 1992 for period 1992-1997, etc. Growth in output and employment is lagged relative to sample period, i.e. 1992-1997 for period 1997-2002. Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Tariffs and lagged productivity

	1989-1992	1992-1997	1997-2002	2002-2007	2007-2012	1989-2012
	Panel A: Output tariffs					
TFP_{t-1}	0.066 (0.076)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.064* (0.033)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.011* (0.006)	0.004 (0.013)
	Panel B: Input tariffs					
TFP_{t-1}	0.033 (0.022)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.010)
Observations	132	216	225	222	212	860
Industry fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by industry.

All regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Vertical integration and tariffs, firm-level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
tariff	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.009)
input tariff			0.057 (0.044)	0.047 (0.043)	0.047 (0.043)
Investment intensity				0.164*** (0.047)	0.164*** (0.047)
R&D intensity				0.497 (0.517)	0.498 (0.517)
Industry size				-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Export share					0.001 (0.002)
Import share					-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	66664	66664	66664	66664	66664
Firm fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year fixed effects	yes	no	no	no	no

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{it} , the vertical integration index in a firm's main industry.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Size, Investment and R&D intensity are measured at the industry-level.

Export and import share are measured at the firm-level.

Table 6: Vertical integration and tariffs, firm-product-level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tariff	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.042*** (0.010)
input tariff			0.072 (0.046)			0.138*** (0.049)
Observations	121443	121443	121443	81275	81275	81275
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Firm-year fixed effects	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Year fixed effects	yes	no	no	yes	no	no

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Table 7: Vertical integration and tariffs: differentiated vs. homogenous goods

Product category	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	homogenous	differentiated	homogenous	differentiated
tariff	-0.086*** (0.021)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.112*** (0.028)	-0.009 (0.007)
input tariff	0.488** (0.199)	-0.032 (0.032)	0.956*** (0.245)	-0.061 (0.042)
Observations	55063	65466	32193	38057
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Firm-year fixed effects	no	no	yes	yes

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Differentiated and homogenous are defined according to Rauch (1999)'s liberal classification.

Table 8: Vertical integration and tariffs: heterogeneous responses

Sample	(1) all firms	(2) non-domestic	(3) all firms	(4) all firms
tariff	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	
large firm * tariff	-0.021*** (0.005)			
input tariff	0.042 (0.047)	0.675*** (0.217)	0.675*** (0.212)	
large firm * input tariff	0.078*** (0.019)			
domestic * tariff			-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.046*** (0.016)
domestic * input tariff			-0.614*** (0.204)	0.248*** (0.085)
Observations	121443	6204	121443	121443
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	no
Product-year fixed effects	no	no	no	yes

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

large firm indicates firm with sales above the industry median.

domestic indicates firms with export shares of at most 0.5.

non-domestic indicates firms with export shares of more than 0.5.

large, domestic, and non-domestic are based on firm-specific averages.

Table 9: Vertical integration and tariffs: non-linearities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	v	ln(v)	ln(v+1)	ln(v+1)
tariff	-0.079*** (0.025)			
tariff ²	0.034*** (0.011)			
input tariff	0.401*** (0.088)			
input tariff ²	-0.655*** (0.120)			
ln(tariff)		-0.270*** (0.102)		
ln(input tariff)		0.885*** (0.087)		
ln(tariff+1)			-0.052*** (0.015)	-0.104** (0.045)
ln(input tariff+1)			0.076 (0.048)	0.457*** (0.088)
ln(tariff+1) ²				0.081** (0.036)
ln(input tariff+1) ²				-1.023*** (0.163)
Observations	121443	103149	121443	121443

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable in column (1) is v_{ijt} .

The dependent variable is $\ln(v_{ijt})$ ($\ln(v_{ijt} + 1)$) in column 2 ((3) and (4)).

v_{ijt} is the vertical integration index of a firm-product in year t .

tariff is the MFN tariff rate.

input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Table 10: R&D and tariffs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tariff	0.017 (0.042)	0.026 (0.042)	0.274*** (0.050)	0.213*** (0.044)	0.403*** (0.053)	0.291*** (0.046)
input tariff		-0.115 (0.160)		0.217 (0.136)		0.476*** (0.118)
large firm \times tariff			-0.603*** (0.062)	-0.413*** (0.059)		
large firm \times input tariff				-0.906*** (0.220)		
2nd size quartile \times tariff					-0.215*** (0.027)	-0.120*** (0.028)
3rd size quartile \times tariff					-0.567*** (0.057)	-0.368*** (0.057)
4th size quartile \times tariff					-1.315*** (0.157)	-0.977*** (0.167)
2nd size quartile \times input tariff						-0.450*** (0.108)
3rd size quartile \times input tariff						-0.905*** (0.214)
4th size quartile \times tariff						-1.755*** (0.620)
Observations	62138	62138	62138	62138	62138	62138

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is $\ln(RD + 1)$, the log of R&D expenditures +1 at the firm-level.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

large firm indicates firm with sales above the industry median (sample period average).

2nd (3rd, 4th) size quartile are dummy variables indicating quartiles of sales within industries.

Appendix A: Additional Tables

Table A1: Vertical integration, marginal costs and markups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	marginal cost	markup	marginal cost	markup	marginal cost	markup
vertical integration index	-0.488*** (0.149)	0.292** (0.136)	-1.118*** (0.301)	1.121*** (0.275)	-0.790** (0.336)	0.912*** (0.337)
Observations	94032	94032	94032	94032	82005	82005
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Product-year fixed effects	no	no	yes	yes	no	no
Firm-year fixed effects	no	no	no	no	yes	yes
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	no	no	no	no

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable in columns (1), (3) and (5) is the log of marginal costs at the firm-product-level

The dependent variable in columns (2), (4) and (6) is the log of the markup at the firm-product-level

Table A2: Alternative estimation methods

Method	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Tobit	Fractional Probit	Fractional Logit	Exponential pseudo ML
tariff	-0.076*** (0.002)	-0.091*** (0.003)	-0.090*** (0.003)	-0.721*** (0.025)
input tariff	0.367*** (0.009)	0.456*** (0.012)	0.443*** (0.012)	3.594*** (0.095)
Observations	123340	123340	123340	123340
Industry and year dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes

Numbers are average marginal effects in columns (1)-(3) and coefficients in column (4).

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Table A3: Excluding corporate groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tariff	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.020*** (0.008)	-0.034*** (0.010)
input tariff			0.104* (0.053)			0.132** (0.063)
Observations	81398	81398	81398	51991	51991	51991
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Firm-year fixed effects no	no	yes	no	no	yes	

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Table A4: Including multinationals

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tariff	-0.027** (0.010)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.063*** (0.013)	-0.027*** (0.006)	-0.043*** (0.009)
input tariff						0.103** (0.045)
Observations	148994	148983	148983	103642	103618	103310
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Firm-year fixed effects no	no	yes	no	no	yes	

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.

Table A5: Products aggregated to the 3-digit industry level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tariff	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.056*** (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.040*** (0.009)
input tariff						0.135*** (0.049)
Observations	88523	88508	88508	35360	35276	35163
Firm-product fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sector-year fixed effects no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Firm-year fixed effects no	no	yes	no	no	yes	

Robust standard errors, clustered two-way by firm and industry, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is v_{ijt} , the vertical integration index of a firm-product.

tariff is the MFN tariff rate. input tariff is the weighted tariff rate of supplying industries.