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# **ADBI Working Paper Series**

# POVERTY AND ETHNICITY IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

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**Asian Development Bank Institute** 

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#### **Abstract**

This paper compares the extent and the nature of the higher prevalence of poverty among disadvantaged ethnic groups in six Asian countries using demographic surveys. We first estimate a composite wealth index as a proxy for economic status, and analyze the magnitude of the ethnic gap in absolute and relative poverty levels across six countries and different ethnicities in those countries. Then, we use regression-based counterfactual analysis for explaining these ethnic differentials in poverty. We compare the actual differential in poverty with the gap that remains after disadvantaged ethnic groups are given the distribution of characteristics of the advantaged ones (by reweighting their densities using propensity scores). Our results show that there is a substantial cross-country variability in the extension, evolution, and nature of the ethnic poverty gap, which is as high as 50 percentage points or more in some specific cases in Nepal, Pakistan, or India. The gap in the latter country increased over the analyzed period, while it was reduced in the Philippines. Our analyses indicate that factors that contribute to ethnic disadvantaged groups being poorer are the strongly persistent high inequalities in education (e.g., India, Nepal, and Pakistan), in regional development (e.g., the Philippines) and the large urban-rural gap (e.g., Pakistan).

JEL Classification: D63, I31, I32, J15

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

A large number of Asian countries have recently experienced significant economic growth that has led to an unprecedented reduction in poverty levels and to generallyimproved living conditions. In this context, however, it is crucial to investigate whether or not the benefits of this higher wellbeing have reached the entire population. An important issue is to know whether economic opportunities depend on given characteristics such as race or ethnicity because of the large history of economic and social disadvantage that many ethnic or indigenous groups face in many societies, of which Asian countries have remarkable examples. These groups are more likely overrepresented in those segments of the population that might not be reached by economic growth if, for example, they lack the most demanded skills or live in inaccessible remote areas. This could be the consequence of them being historically denied access to the proper education and basic infrastructure that would allow them to take advantage of the greater economic opportunities. Or it could be the consequence of segregation and wage discrimination in the labor market. Identifying the extent of the ethnic differentials in poverty is of extraordinary importance for implementing policies aimed at reducing this gap. Understanding its nature helps to evaluate what types of policies are expected to be more effective in closing the gap in each country.

The existence of ethnic and racial inequalities in wellbeing has long been an issue of concern all over the world but it has recently attracted considerable attention. This is the result of the combination of greater public concern about the situation of disadvantaged ethnic groups, and the growing availability of data and adequate methodologies for its research. Outstanding examples of this growing interest in the Asian and Pacific Region are the series of reports from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (see ADB 2002), including analysis of the situation of ethnic groups in Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and the Pacific region, or the books recently edited by Hall and Patrinos (2012)-including analysis for the People's Republic of China (the PRC), India, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam-and Bhalla and Luo (2013) about India and the PRC. A number of papers have also been published analyzing the situation of particular groups, areas and countries or focusing on specific dimensions such as labor market performance or educational gaps. The introduction, in recent years, of regression-based decomposition analysis. previously developed in labor economics, has allowed a more in-depth investigation of the nature of those inequalities. Ethnic inequalities have already been documented in some Asian countries using any of these regression-based techniques. 1 However, there has been very little comparative research so far on both the extent and the nature of ethnic inequalities in Asia to identify common and country-specific patterns.<sup>2</sup> Very often, the analysis has focused on the mean gap only, ignoring the existence of possible distributional patterns that make the disadvantaged poor differ from those of the most affluent.

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For example, in the PRC (Hannum and Wang 2012; Gradín 2015), India (Borooah 2005; Das et al. 2012; Gang, Sen and Yun 2008), the Lao People's Democratic Republic (King and van de Walle 2012) and, especially, Viet Nam (Baulch 2008; Baulch, Pham, and Reilly 2008; Baulch et al. 2004, 2007, 2010; Dang 2012; Hoang et al. 2007; Imai, Gaiha and Kanga 2011; Pham, Le Dang, and Nguyen 2010; Swinkels and Turk 2006; van de Walle and Gunewardena 2001).

For a comparison of ethnic inequalities among non-Asian countries (blacks and whites in the US, Brazil and South Africa), see Gradín (2014).

For this reason, the aim of this paper is to investigate the extent and the nature of the gap in poverty across ethnic groups in a selection of Asian countries. The emphasis on the comparative perspective and its focus on the poor are the main contributions of this paper. Data come from a highly comparable demographic dataset that uses similar surveys across many developing countries. Individual economic status is approximated with a synthetic index of wealth defined as the weighted average of a series of indicators of assets, utilities and housing conditions and equipment. For the sake of greater comparability, we use the same indicators and estimate a common set of weights across the selected countries using *multiple correspondence analysis* (MCA). We undertake the analysis in two steps.

In a first stage, we measure cross-country variability in the ethnic gap in absolute and relative poverty rates. For that, we compute the ethnic poverty gap as the difference in poverty rates between two ethnic groups (comparison and reference) in each country along all possible poverty lines. When the poverty lines are the same levels of wealth in all countries, we call this the *absolute ethnic poverty gap curve*. When the poverty lines are wealth percentiles of the reference group in each country, in line with the interdistributional inequality approach (Butler and McDonald 1987; Le Breton, Michelangeli, and Peluso 2012), we call it the *relative ethnic poverty gap curve*.

In a second stage, we investigate the main factors determining the ethnic poverty gap in four countries among the possible competing explanations, using regression-based counterfactual analyses. By comparing the actual differential in poverty with that remaining when the comparison group is given the same distribution of characteristics of the reference one, we estimate the characteristics and coefficients effects of the ethnic poverty gap. The characteristics effect provides an idea of how much of a given poverty differential is explained by the disadvantaged group having more prevalence of those attributes associated with lower wealth, what might be the result of discrimination, historical and cultural factors, etc. For example, because their members generally have lower attained education, their households tend to have more children, or they live in the least developed rural areas. The coefficients effect quantifies to what extent these factors have a stronger association with wealth in some groups. That is, one ethnicity might be obtaining lower returns to education due to prevailing wage discrimination in the labor market or because of the lower quality of the schools they attend. Similarly, one ethnic group might be more harmed by living in rural areas because of their poorer access to productive assets. This analysis is undertaken using the Gradín (2013, 2014) approach, in which the reweighting technique, based on the propensity score, proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) in the context of wage differentials.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 outlines the methodology; in Sections 4 and 5, we report the empirical results on measuring the extent of the ethnic poverty gap and explaining this poverty gap, respectively. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main findings and presents conclusions.

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MCA is an extension of correspondence analysis, which allows one to analyze the pattern of relationships of several categorical dependent variables and can be seen as a generalization of principal component analysis when the variables to be analyzed are categorical instead of quantitative (Abdi and Valentin 2007).

These approaches have been recently followed to analyze differences in wellbeing between blacks and whites in Brazil and South Africa, or among Chinese Han and minorities, among many other examples (e.g., Gradín 2009, 2013, 2015).

## 2. DATA

For the empirical analysis, we use data from the *Demographic and Health Survey* (DHS). This is a standardized nationally representative household-based survey that collects a wide range of data on population, health and nutrition in many different developing countries in the world. The DHS is implemented under the *Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use Results Demographic and Health Surveys* (MEASURE DHS) project, funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international agencies. Since 1984, it is implemented in overlapping five-year phases (e.g., DHS VI during 2008–13).<sup>5</sup> We use the most recent data for those Asian countries with information on ethnicity. These include Azerbaijan (2006, DHS V), India (1998/99 DHS IV and 2005/06 DHS V), Nepal (2011 DHS VI), Pakistan (2006/07 DHS V), the Philippines (2003 DHS IV and 2008 DHS V), and Viet Nam (2005 DHS V).<sup>6</sup>

DHS surveys are generally representative of the whole population for which it provides basic demographic and socioeconomic information. However, detailed information on other aspects, including ethnicity and labor market performance, is usually only provided for eligible subsamples. The common eligible subsample in all datasets used in the analysis is ever-married women between 15 and 49 years old. Thus, this is the target group for the study, but using also information reported about their partners and other members of their households.

The study uses the ethnic groups defined according to the information available in DHS surveys for each country. The reference group is the wealthiest among the outstanding groups in each country and the comparison groups are the rest of the population, except some advantaged minorities. Given that sample sizes for individual groups are generally small, for most of the analysis, we pooled disadvantaged ethnicities into one group in each country, but, in some cases, whenever the sample sizes allow, we analyze the situation of outstanding groups. Sample sizes of the eligible subsamples are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.

In Azerbaijan and Viet Nam, we distinguish the reference group as the majoritarian ethnicity (Azerbaijani and Vietnamese), whereas the comparison groups are the rest of the population, except Russian in Azerbaijan or Chinese in Viet Nam. In India and Nepal, ethnicity refers to caste or tribe. In India, the reference group refers to people not classifying themselves as any of the traditionally disadvantaged groups recognized as such by the Indian Constitution and protected by affirmative action policies: Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Class (OBC). The latter groups, ST, SC and OBC, make up the comparison groups. Those not classifying as belonging to any of these three groups (reporting the category "none of them") make up the reference group. In Nepal, the reference group is Hill Brahmin, a traditional elite caste in Hinduism, whereas the comparison groups are the rest of the castes: Hill Chhetri, Hill Dalit, Hill Janajati and Other. In Pakistan, ethnicity refers to the mother tongue, and the Urdu speakers are taken as the reference, with Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, Siraiki and Other being the comparison groups. In the Philippines, the reference is the major ethnic group, Tagalog, whereas the comparison groups include

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See the information provided in its web page (http://www.measuredhs.com) for details about available datasets, design, questionnaires and variables.

In all cases, we use the standard DHS survey, except in the case of Viet Nam, for which we use the standard AIDS Indicator (AIS) survey because it is the only one with data on ethnicity. Previous releases of the DHS survey for Nepal were not used given the difficulty to match ethnic groups in different years.

The main exception is Azerbaijan, which excludes two regions in the border with Armenia (Kalbajar-Lachin and Nakhchivan). The survey for India 1998/99 indicates that its coverage is more than 99%.

the major other ethnicities such as Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, and Other. Ethnicities in each country are listed in Table 1 reporting their shares of the eligible population. The shares of disadvantaged ethnic groups over the eligible population vary greatly across countries. Disadvantaged groups altogether are a minority of the population only in Azerbaijan (6%) and Viet Nam (16%), but make up the majority in the other countries, ranging from about 70% in India or the Philippines, to 92% in Pakistan.

**Table 1: Ethnic Groups by Country** 

Country	Reference Group	% Eligible	Comparison Groups	% Eligible
Azerbaijan, 2006	Azerbaijani	93.9	Other (except Russian): Tallish, Lesgin, Other.	5.6
India, 2005/06	None of Them	30.8	Scheduled Caste (SC)	19.6
			Scheduled Tribe (ST)	8.6
			Other Backward Class (OBC)	41.1
			All comparison groups	69.2
Nepal, 2011	Hill Brahmin	14.1	Hill Chhetri	19.5
			Hill Dalit	10.0
			Hill Janajati	24.0
			Other (Terai Brahmin/Chhetri, Terai Dalit, Terai Janajati, Other Terai Caste, Newar, Muslim, Other)	32.5
			All comparison groups	85.9
Pakistan, 2006/07	Urdu	8.0	Punjabi	41.3
			Sindhi	10.5
			Pushto	13.7
			Siraiki	15.6
			Other (Hindko, Kashmiri, Pahari, Potowari, Farsi, Balochi, Barauhi, Marwari, Other)	10.9
			All comparison groups	92.0
The Philippines,	Tagalog	28.8	Cebuano	22.4
2008			llocano	8.4
			llonggo	9.7
			Other (Bicolano, Waray, Kapampangan, Aklanon, Chavakano, Kankanaey, Panggasinense, Zamboangueno, Antiqueno, Boholano, Ifugao, Iraya, Maguindanawon, Mandaya, Maranao, Masbateno, Tausog, Other)	30.7
			All comparison groups	71.2
Viet Nam, 2005	Vietnamese	85.3	Other (except Chinese): Tay, Thai, Khmer, Muong, Nung, Phu La, E De, Dao, Cham, Hmong, Gia Rai, Ba Na, Xo Dang, san chay (cao lan - san chi), San Diu, Mnong, Ma, Ta Oi.	14.0

Note: Eligible population: Ever-married women, 15-49 years old.

In the literature on poverty, there are different ways to approximate individual wellbeing. The most common approach is to use income or expenditure, although more multidimensional approaches have been gaining popularity in recent years. The DHS surveys do not include information on income or expenditure, or on the market value of assets. The primary variable usually taken to capture people's economic status is the DHS Wealth Index. This index is estimated using Principal Components Analysis (PCA), based on all variables available in each sample describing household assets and utility services, plus whether there is a domestic servant and whether the household owns agricultural land. That is, wealth is computed as a weighted average of a number of categories, with weights obtained using the first dimension from the PCA. This approach has several advantages (Rutstein and Johnson 2004: 4): "It represents a more permanent status than does either income or consumption. In the form that it is used, wealth is more easily measured (with only a single respondent

needed in most cases) and requires far fewer questions than either consumption expenditures or income." The authors also point out some evidence showing that the wealth index actually performed better than the traditional consumption expenditure index in explaining differences in educational attainment and attendance or in health outcomes (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Rutstein and Johnson 2004).

In the presence of categorical variables, MCA is more appropriate to estimate economic status because PCA is designed for continuous variables. Furthermore, the set of variables used to estimate DHS wealth are sample-specific, and so are the weights estimated separately for each sample. For the sake of cross-country comparability, we prefer an index estimated using a common set of variables. This necessarily means restricting the information used to construct the index to only those variables available in all datasets although the loss of information is small. Furthermore, we believe that using the same weights for all countries has the advantage of making cross-country comparisons of wealth and poverty easier to interpret. The use of country-specific weights, although raising comparability issues, is an appealing alternative but this choice turned out to be of little empirical relevance because the overall correlation is about 0.94, with also high correlation within countries. Thus, by using common weights we gain comparability and pay only a small price in terms of loss of information and how meaningful the weights are in each country.

For all these reasons, we estimate a new wealth index using MCA based on a common set of variables reflecting economic status in all countries (using the most recent sample data) involving common weights. Despite all these differences, the new index is highly correlated within countries with the DHS index: 0.80 in Azerbaijan, 0.88 in India, and around 0.96–0.97 in the other countries. However, in our view, the values of the new index better reflect cross-country differences in wealth. Instead of normalizing the index to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in each sample (as in the DHS index), we normalize it to have a value between zero and one, reflecting the lowest and highest possible wealth profiles, respectively. The next section explains, in more detail, how we constructed this new index.

## 3. METHODOLOGY

## 3.1 The Composite Index of Wealth

In this subsection, we explain how we construct the wealth index using a set of categorical variables that associate with the economic status of a household. Note that we do not aim to construct an index of multidimensional poverty, which would call for using additional dimensions of wellbeing, but to estimate a proxy for the unobserved wealth (or economic status). Thus, the weights have no normative values, they just reflect the extent to which each category is associated with the latent economic status. For that, we use 17 variables that account for the conditions of dwellings (materials used in the roof, floor, and walls; and the number of people per room used for sleeping), basic assets owned by the household (such as vehicles and

The use of common weights for all countries might be criticized on the basis that the implication of a household falling in a given category might differ across countries. For that reason, we also computed a country-specific index of wealth estimating separately the MCA scores for each country. The linear correlation between the indices constructed using common weights and country-specific weights is above 0.94 in Azerbaijan, and above 0.97 in the other countries. So we would not expect this choice to have a significant impact on the results.

domestic appliances), cooking fuel, and type of access to water and sanitation. All the variables are categorical. The only originally non-categorical variable (the number of household members per sleeping room) has been discretized in different intervals. Given that this information refers to basic items, we expect the index to discriminate better among the poor than among the rich, which is consistent with our focus on poverty. These categorical variables are listed in Table 2, whereas Table A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution by country and comparison/reference groups across the different categories.

Table 2: Variables Used to Construct the Wealth Index

Source of drinking water	Has television	Main floor material
Type of toilet facility	Has refrigerator	Main wall material
Share toilet with other households	Has bicycle	Main roof material
Has electricity	Has motorcycle/scooter	Household members/ Rooms used for sleeping
Has telephone	Has car/truck	Type of cooking fuel
Has radio	Has an animal-drawn cart	

Note: See Table A1 in the Appendix for more details.

We estimate the index using data from the most recent sample for all six countries, in which each country has the same weight (1/6). This allows us to interpret differences in wealth values across countries as reflecting differences in their economic status using a common framework (an average of the selected countries).<sup>9</sup>

Let  $c_1, \ldots, c_Q$  be the set of categorical variables associated with the economic status of a population of size N, where  $c_q$  is coded with consecutive integers,  $1, \ldots, n_q$ . Let  $Z^q$  be the  $N \times n_q$  binary indicator matrix associated with  $c_q$ , where  $Z_{ij}^q = 1$  if and only if the  $q^{\text{th}}$  categorical variable for the  $I^{\text{th}}$  individual  $c_{iq} = I$ . Let  $I^{th} = I^{th}$  indicator matrix of the set of variables, where  $I^{th} = I^{th}$  is the total number of categories.

For each variable  $c_q$ , we estimate scores (coordinates)  $s_1^q,...,s_{n_q}^q$  using the first extracted dimension with MCA. Let  $\overline{s}=\overline{s}^1,...,\overline{s}^Q$  and  $\underline{s}=\underline{s}^1,...,\underline{s}^Q$  be, respectively, the vectors with the highest and lowest scores associated with the Q categorical variables. Given that higher scores are associated with higher wealth,  $\underline{s}$  and  $\overline{s}$  represent the worst and best possible wealth profiles.

We define  $y_i$  to be a wealth composite index that summarizes the economic status profile for the  $\emph{i}^{th}$  person as a weighted average of the categories for this individual. The index is normalized to range between 0 and 1, the values corresponding to the worst and the best possible profiles, respectively. Thus, the weights represent the relative marginal contributions to the individual wealth of being in each category, compared with being in the worst category, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible contribution:

We do not aim here at producing results representative of Asia as a whole or of a specific region. We want a comparable wealth index to be meaningful in each country. In the case that each country were weighted according to its population, the index would be strongly influenced by the Indian survey.

This index is just a linear transformation of the predicted value, usually standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one.

$$y_i = \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \sum_{j=1}^{n_q} Z_{ij}^q w_j^q, i = 1, \dots, N; \text{ with } w_j^q = \frac{s_j^q - \underline{s}^q}{\sum_{q=1}^{Q} (\overline{s}^q - \underline{s}^q)}.$$

In particular, this means that the weights attached to the worst categories of each variable are all zero, whereas the weights attached to the best categories sum to one. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the estimated scores and the corresponding normalized weights. <sup>11</sup> Given that all categorical variables refer to the household, all individuals within a household will share the same wealth.

To analyze the evolution of poverty among ethnicities in the Philippines and in India, we also construct two new wealth indices based on the two-year pool for each of these countries. We do so because the information of earlier samples is more restrictive, so we cannot reproduce the same set of variables used for the other samples. Thus, given that we are only interested in the time trend, we estimate country-specific indices using the common information in both years (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the list of variables used). 12

# 3.2 The Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves

To measure the extent to which disadvantaged ethnic groups tend to have more poverty than advantaged groups across countries, we first estimate (nonparametrically) their corresponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs).

We call  $F_0(y)$  and  $F_1(y)$  the CDFs of wealth  $y \in [0,1]$  for the reference (advantaged) and comparison (disadvantaged) groups. We define the absolute ethnic poverty gap curve  $\gamma(y) = F_1(y) - F_0(y)$  as the difference in the cumulative distribution (headcount ratio) between the comparison and the reference group for each possible wealth level used as a poverty line. For example,  $\gamma(.25)$  indicates the differential in poverty rates between both groups when the wealth poverty level is fixed at y = 0.25. We interpret  $\gamma(y)$  as the ethnic differential in absolute poverty levels because the poverty threshold used is the same wealth level for all samples (across countries or over time). This curve is not invariant to changes in the scale of wealth. Then comparisons across samples would be influenced by differences in average wealth, e.g., the differential in poverty at lower wealth levels would tend to be higher in the poorest countries.

Similarly, we define the *relative ethnic poverty gap curve*,  $\varphi(t) = F_1(F_0^{-1}(t)) - t$ , where  $F_0^{-1}(t)$  is the  $t^{\text{th}}$  quantile of the reference distribution,  $t \in [0,1]$  with  $F^{-1}$  denoting the quantile (right-inverse) function attached to the distribution F. In other words,  $\varphi(t)$  is the differential between the observed proportion of poor people in the comparison group for each quantile of the reference group taken as the poverty line, and the value one would expect if both groups had a similar distribution (i.e., the proportion corresponding to the quantile). For example,  $\varphi(.5)$  is the difference between the

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The index, estimated using the first dimension, explains 58% of total variability (inertia). Given the high correlation of this index with a similar country-specific index (which explains a much higher proportion of each country's inertia), we expect most of the unexplained inertia being variability between countries. As expected, the index assigns a zero weight (poorest profile) to households using an unprotected well as their main source of drinking water, using natural materials for their floor and roof and having no walls in the dwelling. They are overcrowded (more than 10 people per sleeping room), use animal dung for cooking fuel and lack any facility for a toilet as well as most assets (all but a bicycle and a cart).

The variability (inertia) explained by the first dimension used to construct the wealth index was 86% in India and 90% in the Philippines. The within-country correlation with the main index (with common weights across all six countries) was 0.93 in India (2005/06) and 0.94 in the Philippines (2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The corresponding densities are estimated using Gaussian kernels with adaptive optimal bandwidth, computed with the *akdensity* STATA routine, written by P. Van Kerm.

proportion of people in the comparison group below the median of the reference group and 50% (the value expected if both distributions were identical). This provides an idea of the differential in relative poverty because the wealth threshold used as a poverty line is country-specific. It is indexed to the percentiles of the reference group in each country. Similarly, it is year-specific in comparisons over time. <sup>14</sup> This makes the curve, and thus the comparison across samples, invariant to changes in the scale of wealth for all individuals in each sample.

The construction of  $\varphi(t)$  is, in the spirit of the interdistributional Lorenz curve, of the first type proposed by Butler and McDonald (1987), also called the first-order discrimination curve in the extended approach of Le Breton, Michelangeli, and Peluso (2012). This curve is a representation of the CDFs of the reference and comparison groups,  $\phi^1(t) = F_0(F_1^{-1}(t))$ , where the vertical distance between the 45° line and the interdistributional Lorenz curve,  $t - \phi^1(t)$ , is a measure of the economic disadvantage of members of the comparison group. <sup>15</sup> In our context, we prefer the poverty line to be indexed to the reference group because then the wealth threshold used as a poverty line is the same for the various ethnicities in the country.

Note that, by construction,  $\varphi(t) = \gamma(F_0^{-1}(t))$ . For example,  $\varphi(.5) = \gamma(p_0^{50})$  if  $p_0^{50}$  is the corresponding median of the reference group (see Figure 1). The difference between both curves is that in the cross-sample comparisons the differential is associated either with a common wealth threshold (absolute comparison) or with a sample-specific wealth threshold (a percentile of the corresponding reference group, relative comparison). Both curves would be constructed by joining the points estimated non-parametrically at several values of respectively  $\gamma$  and t.




Figure 1: Illustration of  $\gamma(y)$  and  $\varphi(t)$ 

Whenever the ethnic poverty gap is always non-negative, this means that  $F_0$  dominates  $F_1$  at the first-order of stochastic dominance. This has strong implications because it implies dominance in higher orders (cf. Foster and Shorrocks 1988a,b) and means that, for whatever poverty line and index, among the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)

This relative threshold deviates from that most commonly used in the literature (e.g., 60% of the country's median income is used in the European Union) in that it is indexed to the entire distribution (not only one specific quantile). Furthermore, the reference here is a specific ethnic group, the most advantaged one. Obviously, one could alternatively define the reference to be the rest of the groups or the society as a whole, having different implications.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> As Butler and McDonald (1987) pointed out, this approach was implicit in the notion of economic advantage of one group over another in Vinod (1985).

class, the reference group has more poverty than the comparison group. The FGT class of indices, in this context, can be written for any group and for any  $t \in [0,1]$ , as: 16

$$FGT(t;\alpha) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ max \left\{ \frac{F_0^{-1}(t) - y_i}{F_0^{-1}(t)}, 0 \right\} \right]^{\alpha}, \alpha \ge 0.$$

# 3.3 Decomposing the Ethnic Poverty Gap

After estimating the poverty rates by ethnic group for different thresholds, we provide an aggregate decomposition of these gaps into the explained (characteristics effect) and unexplained (coefficients effect) parts. For this, we estimate a counterfactual distribution, in which we give members of the comparison group the same distribution of the relevant characteristics of the reference group, using the adaptation of a propensity-score technique (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996) in Gradín (2014). This procedure also produces a *detailed* decomposition of the characteristics effect by quantifying the contribution to the gap by the different potential explicative factors mentioned above (such as region, area, demographic structure, labor market performance and education).

We assume that each individual observation is drawn from some joint density function f over (y, x, g), where y indicates the vector of wealth, x is a vector of observed characteristics, and g identifies whether the individual is in the reference group (g = 0) or the comparison (g = 1) group.

The marginal distribution of wealth for group *g* is given by the density:

$$f_g(y) = f(y | g) = \int_x f(y, x | g) dx = \int_x f(y | x, g) \cdot f(x | g) dx.$$

This can be obtained as the product of two conditional distributions, where

$$f(x \mid g) \equiv \int_{y} f(y, x \mid g) dy.$$

In other words, each wealth density is determined by the marginal wealth density of members of the group having each combination of characteristics (a high level of education, living in the poorest regions, etc.) times the proportion of group members having this set of characteristics.

Then, we define the counterfactual wealth distribution  $f_c(y)$  as the distribution of y that would prevail if the comparison group kept their own conditional wealth distribution (the probability of having a certain wealth given their characteristics) but had the same characteristics (marginal distribution of x) of the reference group. We produce this counterfactual distribution by properly reweighting the actual wealth distribution of the comparison group:

$$f_c(y) = \int_x f(y \mid x, g = 1) \cdot f(x \mid g = 0) dx$$
  
=  $\int_x f(y \mid x, g = 1) \cdot \psi_x \cdot f(x \mid g = 1) dx = \int_x \psi_x f(y, x \mid g = 1) dx$ 

Note that, by construction,  $\varphi(t) = FGT_1(t; \alpha = 0) - FGT_0(t; \alpha = 0)$ , with  $FGT_0(t; \alpha = 0) = t$ . Similarly, one could construct ethnic poverty curves of higher order that would be related to other members of the FGT class.

where  $F_c$  is the corresponding CDF. Based on Bayes' theorem, the reweighting scheme  $\psi_x$  can be expressed as the product of two ratios:

$$\psi_x = \frac{f(x \mid g = 0)}{f(x \mid g = 1)} = \frac{\text{Prob}(g = 1)}{\text{Prob}(g = 0)} \frac{\text{Prob}(g = 0 \mid x)}{\text{Prob}(g = 1 \mid x)}$$

where the ratio  $\frac{\text{Prob}(g=1)}{\text{Prob}(g=0)}$  is constant and indicates the share of people that belongs to

each group in the pooled sample with individuals from both groups. We estimate the ratio  $\frac{\text{Prob}(g=0\,|\,x)}{\text{Prob}(g=1\,|\,x)}$  using the predictions from a logit model of the probability of belonging

to the reference group, conditional on x, in the pooled sample.

In parallel with the conventional Oaxaca-Blinder procedure (see Oaxaca 1973; and Blinder 1973), widely used in labor economics to estimate wage discrimination, we add and subtract the counterfactual distribution to produce the following decomposition of the relative ethnic poverty gap:

$$\varphi(t) = F_1\left(F_0^{-1}(t)\right) - t = \left[F_1\left(F_0^{-1}(t)\right) - F_c\left(F_0^{-1}(t)\right)\right] + \left[F_c\left(F_0^{-1}(t)\right) - t\right].$$

The first term in the last expression represents the part of the poverty differential by ethnicity that is explained by characteristics (or characteristics effect) because it measures the change in poverty due to shifting the distribution of characteristics (after re-weighting the comparison group). The second part is the unexplained part (or coefficients effect) because it is the gap that remains when both the comparison and the reference group have the same distribution of characteristics but differ in the conditional wealth distributions. Given the correspondence between  $\varphi(t)$  and  $\gamma(y)$  discussed above, the same decomposition applies to the latter.

In the detailed decomposition, we quantify the impact on the poverty differential of changes in a single covariate (or set of covariates)  $x_j$  instead of the whole vector. For that, we use the Shapley decomposition that results from averaging over all possible sequences of factors (Chantreuil and Trannoy 2012; Shorrocks 2012).

For example, to compute the contribution of education, we have to estimate first the impact of education when it is the only factor equalized between both groups. That is, we estimate the gap between the comparison group and the counterfactual when the latter is estimated using only the coefficients of education-related variables in the logit regression (while the rest of the coefficients are replaced by zeros). To estimate the contribution of education when it is the second equalized factor, we need to measure the gap between the counterfactual in which we only use the coefficients of education jointly with another factor (e.g., region), and the counterfactual using only the coefficients of this other factor. Then, we repeat the same exercise replacing region by each of the other three factors (area, demographics, and labor variables). Similarly, we estimate the contribution of education when it is the third, fourth and fifth factor equalized between both groups. The overall contribution of education is the average of all these estimated contributions. Using this same procedure, we compute the contributions of each of the five factors. The resulting individual effects are path independent and add up to the overall effect. <sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Sastre and Trannoy (2002) for a general formalization of the procedure to get the Shapley decomposition.

## 4. ESTIMATION OF ETHNIC POVERTY GAPS

### 4.1 Ethnic Differences in Mean Wealth

First of all, Table 3 reports the estimates and standard errors of the mean and median values of the wealth index (ranging between 0 and 1) in each country for the entire population. Table 3 also shows the values for the eligible subpopulation (15-49 years old ever-married women), which are very similar to the estimates for the population. Clearly, there is a large difference between Azerbaijan, where the population is, on average, at 0.76, and the rest of the countries. Among them, India and Nepal are the poorest, below 0.4, whereas Viet Nam and the Philippines are richer, about 0.56, with Pakistan in the middle, 0.49. Table 3 also reports average and median wealth values for the comparison and the reference groups within the eligible subpopulations. In all six countries, the mean values of wealth for the disadvantaged groups are less than those of the corresponding reference groups, although the magnitude of the ethnic wealth gap differs across countries. It is just 0.044 in Azerbaijan, but rises to 0.262 in Pakistan or 0.205 in Viet Nam. With intermediate levels of this gap, we find the Philippines, India and Nepal, respectively, at 0.121, 0.154 and 0.170. It is interesting to note that the Pakistani Urdu report a median wealth similar to that of the Azerbaijani, despite the large mean differential in wealth between their two countries.

Table 3: Mean and Median Wealth by Country and Group

		Mea	an wealth		
Country	All	Eligible population	Comparison group	Reference group	
Azerbaijan, 2006	0.762	0.765	0.722	0.767	
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	
India, 2005/06	0.3888	0.394	0.346	0.501	
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Nepal, 2011	0.388	0.396	0.372	0.542	
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	
Pakistan, 2006/07	0.494	0.497	0.476	0.738	
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	
The Philippines, 2008	0.565	0.568	0.533	0.654	
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Viet Nam, 2005	0.561	0.565	0.388	0.593	
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	
Indian-specific wealth index					
1998/99	0.2989	0.300	0.250	0.379	
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
2005/06	0.3381	0.344	0.297	0.450	
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Philippine-specific Wealth Index					
2003	0.440	0.443	0.390	0.568	
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
2008	0.493	0.496	0.453	0.602	
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	

continued on next page

Table 3 continued

		Med	ian Wealth	
Country	All	Eligible Population	Comparison Group	Reference Group
Azerbaijan, 2006	0.772	0.774	0.721	0.777
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)
India, 2005/06	0.342	0.350	0.296	0.517
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Nepal, 2011	0.366	0.376	0.347	0.535
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Pakistan, 2006/07	0.506	0.511	0.480	0.772
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
The Philippines, 2008	0.588	0.591	0.550	0.673
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Viet Nam, 2005	0.553	0.556	0.377	0.583
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(800.0)	(0.005)
Indian-specific Wealth Index				
1998/99	0.244	0.245	0.195	0.353
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
2005/06	0.288	0.296	0.245	0.453
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Philippine-specific Wealth Index				
2003	0.438	0.443	0.366	0.580
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)
2008	0.507	0.511	0.463	0.613
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.

The lower panel of Table 3 reports the average and median values using country-specific wealth indices for India and the Philippines to analyze the trends over time. It shows that there was a large improvement in the average and median wealth of people living in both countries, compared with the level in the previous survey. The increase in the average wealth was larger for the reference group in India and for the comparison group in the Philippines. As a consequence, the ethnic gap in average wealth increased in the former (from 0.129 to 0.152) whereas decreased in the latter (from 0.178 to 0.150).

# 4.2 The Distribution of Wealth by Groups

The inter-ethnic difference in average wealth is a summary measure of the economic disadvantage of one group over another. But the information it provides is limited because it does not take into consideration how wealth is concentrated within the two populations. In this context, it is much more informative to consider the entire distribution of the comparison and reference groups. This is what we do in this subsection.

Figure 2 displays the nonparametric densities of wealth estimated separately for the reference and comparison groups in each country. It is clear that, in every country, there is an unequal distribution of wealth along ethnic lines, with the reference group being generally overrepresented at the upper end of the wealth index. In some cases, the distributions are so different as if they were obtained from two different countries. Disadvantaged ethnic groups tend to be overrepresented at the lowest levels of wealth. The exception to this is Azerbaijan, where both groups are concentrated at the upper end of the wealth index. The distribution of the reference groups are generally to the left of the comparison groups, although In India, there is a high within-group heterogeneity, with a large proportion of the reference group (those not ST/SC/OBC) having low wealth levels as well.




Figure 2: Wealth Densities by Ethnic Groups in Six Countries

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

Figure 3 displays the corresponding CDFs. It shows the headcount ratios (the share of each group's poor population) for every possible poverty line. In every country, the cumulative distribution of the comparison group tends to be above that of the reference group. <sup>18</sup> This means that there generally is first-order stochastic dominance that, as we know, also implies higher-order stochastic dominance. As a result, for a large range of poverty lines and all members of the FGT class of poverty indices, poverty will be systematically higher among disadvantaged ethnic groups, although the intensity at which this happens varies across countries. We analyze this in more detail in the next subsection.




Figure 3: Wealth CDFs by Ethnic Groups in Six Countries

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For very low levels of wealth, the estimated proportion of poor is slightly higher for the reference group in India (wealth below 0.036, where we find about 0.5% of the population of each group) and Nepal (below 0.025, a level only about 0.2% of the population of each group does not reach).

# 4.3 The Absolute Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves in Six Countries

The comparison of inter-ethnic poverty across countries is better summarized in Figure 4, which displays each country's absolute and relative poverty gap curves,  $\gamma(y)$  and  $\varphi(t)$ . On the left graph, the absolute ethnic poverty gap curve  $\gamma(y)$  projects the differential between the poverty rates of the comparison and reference groups for each possible wealth cut-off. Which country shows the largest ethnic poverty gap depends on the specific threshold used. Nepal shows the largest ethnic gap in severe poverty, up to a level of wealth of about 0.370. Then, the differential becomes largest in Viet Nam (until wealth is about 0.545), and after that level in Pakistan (up to 0.849). Azerbaijan joins Pakistan with the largest poverty differential only when the threshold is fixed at the very top of the wealth distribution, which does not seem very reasonable for a poverty line.

The largest differential in poverty rates is as much as 50 percentage points in Viet Nam and Pakistan, about 40 in Nepal and 30 in the Philippines and India. The lowest, 20 percentage points, is the maximum achieved in Azerbaijan.




Figure 4: Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves  $\gamma(y)$  and  $\varphi(t)$  across Six Countries

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

# 4.4 The Relative Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves across Countries

The previous comparison of absolute poverty differentials across the six countries is obviously influenced by their differences in average wealth. For that reason, the graph on the right in Figure 4 displays the relative ethnic poverty gap curve,  $\varphi(t)$ , the same ethnic poverty gap as a function of each percentile of the reference group. This is a better measure of relative poverty or how well the comparison groups in each country perform relative to their reference groups. We can distinguish basically three clubs of countries in terms of the level of the relative ethnic poverty gap. Clearly, Azerbaijan outstands for having the smallest differential among the six countries all over the distribution of the corresponding reference group. Thus, this country shows the smallest ethnic differential in both absolute and relative poverty. Below the median of the reference group, the relative ethnic gap in poverty is the largest in Pakistan, Viet Nam and Nepal. India and the Philippines show intermediate levels. Above the median, Nepal tends to converge with the latter countries.

Poverty indices of the FGT family (for  $\alpha$  =0, 1, and 2) computed using the 10<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the reference group (t = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5) as poverty lines, are reported for all groups in Table 4. By definition, the FGT(0) or headcount ratio is 10%, 25% and 50%, respectively, for the reference group in each country. Thus, the gap depends on by how much the comparison groups deviate from those figures. FGT(1), the poverty gap ratio, additionally takes into account the average gap in wealth between the poor and non-poor in each case. The FGT(2) also incorporates inequality among the poor. But both indices provide a significantly similar picture of the gap (in some cases exacerbating the inter-ethnic differentials). For simplicity, we concentrate on the gap in the headcount ratio from now on.

Table 4: Poverty Measures by Country and Ethnic Group for Different Quantiles of the Reference Group

	Head	FGT(0) Count		Pove	FGT(1) rty Gap		Seve	FGT(2)	overty
Country	10th	25th	50th	10th	25th	50th	10th	25th	50th
Azerbaijan 2006									
Reference: Azerbaijani	10.0	25.0	50.0	1.0	2.6	6.4	0.16	0.46	1.28
	(0.5)	(8.0)	(1.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Comparison: Minorities	16.4	38.7	69.9	1.6	4.3	9.9	0.3	8.0	2.1
	(2.0)	(3.0)	(2.9)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
India 2005/06									
Reference: None of Them	10.0	25.0	50.0	3.2	9.1	20.9	1.4	4.6	11.7
	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Comparison	23.6	51.2	77.4	7.5	20.6	39.4	3.3	10.9	24.3
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
SC	25.8	53.4	80.4	8.8	22.3	41.5	4.0	12.1	26.0
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)
ST	39.3	74.9	90.6	11.3	32.1	53.9	4.7	16.9	35.5
	(8.0)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
OBC	19.3	45.2	73.1	6.0	17.4	35.4	2.6	9.0	21.1
	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Nepal 2011									_
Reference: Hill Brahmin	10.0	25.0	50.0	2.1	5.0	12.0	0.7	1.7	4.2
	(1.0)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Comparison	48.6	63.9	77.5	18.7	26.2	35.6	9.5	14.2	20.6
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Hill Chhetri	37.4	55.1	71.8	12.6	19.3	28.7	5.8	9.4	15.0
	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.5)
Hill Dalit	55.5	74.7	87.3	20.0	29.0	40.1	9.8	15.1	22.6
	(1.9)	(1.8)	(1.3)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(8.0)
Hill Janajati	42.6	59.4	74.8	15.1	22.2	31.8	7.3	11.4	17.4
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(8.0)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)
Other	57.7	69.3	79.9	24.6	32.4	41.2	13.2	18.8	25.7
	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(8.0)	(8.0)	(8.0)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)

continued on next page

Table 4 continued

	Head	FGT(0)   Count	Ratio	Pove	FGT(1) rty Gap	Ratio	FGT(2) Severity of Poverty		
Country	10th	25th	50th	10th	25th	50th	10th	25th	50th
Pakistan 2006									
Reference: Urdu	10.0	25.0	50.0	1.9	4.4	8.4	0.6	1.5	2.6
	(1.3)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Comparison	58.5	75.7	88.9	24.8	32.7	39.1	14.0	19.1	23.2
	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Punjabi	47.6	69.2	85.9	16.0	23.9	30.8	7.9	12.0	15.7
	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Sindhi	68.8	83.1	92.7	34.4	42.3	48.2	21.3	27.1	31.5
	(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Pushto	59.9	75.5	88.8	24.7	32.6	39.1	13.0	18.3	22.6
	(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(8.0)
Siraiki	75.4	87.5	95.3	35.7	44.4	50.5	21.2	27.7	32.5
	(1.7)	(1.3)	(8.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(8.0)	(0.9)	(0.9)
Other	63.6	76.2	87.8	33.5	40.3	45.7	21.5	26.8	30.7
	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.0)
The Philippines 2008									
Reference: Tagalog	10.0	25.0	50.0	2.4	5.2	9.8	0.9	1.9	3.3
	(0.7)	(1.0)	(1.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Comparison	34.4	55.0	75.1	10.2	16.8	23.9	4.4	7.6	11.1
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Cebuano	34.1	54.3	75.5	9.6	16.2	23.4	3.9	7.1	10.5
	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Ilocano	23.0	49.4	70.1	5.7	11.4	18.5	2.2	4.3	7.2
	(1.3)	(1.9)	(1.7)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.4)
llonggo	32.2	53.3	73.7	9.0	15.6	22.6	3.8	6.8	10.1
	(1.7)	(1.9)	(1.7)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(8.0)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.5)
Other	38.5	57.6	76.5	12.3	19.2	26.2	5.6	9.1	12.8
	(0.9)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Viet Nam 2005									· ·
Reference: Vietnamese	10.0	24.9	50.0	1.9	5.1	9.9	0.6	1.7	3.2
	(0.6)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Comparison: Minorities	53.9	77.4	92.1	15.8	26.1	34.9	6.7	12.2	17.2
Companson. Willondes	00.0				-				

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15-49 years old. FGT values multiplied by 100. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Bootstraps standard errors in parentheses (300 replications).

# 4.5 The Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves for Outstanding Groups in Selected Countries

The situation described above in the selection of countries conceals a high degree of heterogeneity within disadvantaged ethnic groups in each country, which is explored in Figure 5, displaying the CDFs and the corresponding ethnic poverty gaps for outstanding groups in India, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines. In these four

countries, the ethnic poverty gaps tend to be systematically higher for some groups. India is probably the country with the largest diversity among ethnic groups; poverty tends to be substantially larger for Scheduled Tribes, achieving a differential with the reference group of 50 percentage points, followed by Scheduled Castes (30 percentage-point differential at its maximum), with Other Backward Class showing the smallest gap with respect to the population classifying as not being in any of these groups. In Nepal, the gap tends to be largest for most poverty lines for Hill Dalit and Other groups (also reaching 50 percentage points) than for Hilt Chhetri or Hill Janajati. In Pakistan, Punjabi generally show smaller poverty rates than Sindhi, Siraiki, and other groups (whose maximum ethnic poverty gap is about 60 percentage points), with Pushto having intermediate gaps. In the Philippines, the heterogeneity in ethnic poverty gaps is the smallest among the six countries; the gap for Ilocano tends to be the smallest, whereas the gap for those in the "Other" category tends to be the largest.




Figure 5: CDFs and Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves,  $\gamma(y)$  and  $\varphi(t)$ , for Groups in Four Countries

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

The situation of selected ethnic groups (that tend to have largest ethnic poverty gaps) across countries is summarized in Figure 6. It reveals that Indian Scheduled Tribes face the largest absolute poverty gap among all considered ethnic groups in this study for a large range of low poverty thresholds, although its relative gap is smaller for lower percentiles as a result of the large proportion of poor people in the reference group. Pakistani Siraiki report the largest ethnic gap at higher levels of wealth (also at extremely low levels), and for the relative ethnic poverty gap. Vietnamese minorities and Nepalese Hill Dalit also show ethnic poverty gaps substantially larger than most disadvantaged ethnicities in the Philippines and Azerbaijan.

de Azerbaijan — India (ST) — Nepal (Hill Dalt) — Pakistan (Siraiki) — Philippines (Other) — Vist Nam

Figure 6: Ethnic Poverty Gap Curves,  $\gamma(y)$  and  $\varphi(t)$ , for Specific Groups in the Six Countries

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

# 4.6 Trends in the Ethnic Poverty Gaps for India and the Philippines

To grasp the evolution of the ethnic poverty gap over time, Figure 7 reproduces the previous analysis for India and the Philippines in two different years (respectively, 1998/99–2005/06 and 2003–2008). In these periods of strong growth in average wealth levels, both countries followed divergent trends. Both the absolute and the relative ethnic poverty gaps were generally lower in the Philippines. Especially relevant is the reduction of the ethnic gap in severe poverty. However, although there was also a reduction in the ethnic gap in severe poverty in India, this was much smaller and contrasts with an increase when we use higher poverty lines (above 0.2) and a relative approach, indicating that the improvement in wealth was larger for the reference group than for the comparison group along the entire distribution of wealth. Figure 8 shows the change in the ethnic poverty gap in both countries for the most outstanding groups, and reveals that the reduction in the ethnic poverty gap benefited all Filipino disadvantaged ethnicities but especially the llonggo. In India, the increase in the ethnic poverty gap was largest for the Scheduled Tribes, thus aggravating the relative situation of the most disadvantaged group. Similarly, the reduction in the ethnic gap in extreme poverty was largest for the Scheduled Castes.




Figure 7: Ethnic Poverty Gap Trends for India and the Philippines

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.




Figure 8: Change in the Ethnic Poverty Gap Curve  $\gamma(y)$  by Groups in India and the Philippines

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Nonparametric densities with adaptive optimal bandwidth and Gaussian kernels.

# 5. EXPLAINING THE ETHNIC POVERTY GAP

# 5.1 Competing Explanations

The previous section shows that there are substantial poverty gaps by ethnicity in Asian countries. We look at what might be the determinants of those gaps in four countries. There are a few possible explanations.

First, there is one possible geographical explanation. Some ethnic groups live in the least-developed provinces of their countries or in rural or mountainous areas, in which people's wealth is generally lower regardless of their ethnicity. A second possible explanation comes from disadvantaged ethnic groups having different demographic structures, for example, with more children or elderly people in their households

as the consequence of higher fertility rates or migration flows. By increasing their needs, this reduces their ability to accumulate wealth. A third possible explanation is socioeconomic; it comes from the different levels of education and performance in the labor market. Disadvantaged groups might have lower attained education or a weaker attachment to the labor market, significantly reducing their ability to earn income. All these explanations have in common that disadvantaged groups have "worst" characteristics, that is, a higher prevalence of those attributes typically associated with higher poverty, either because they imply lower income or higher needs. Note that in some cases the causality might go in both directions, giving that higher poverty of one group, for example, might also help to explain its higher fertility rates or its lower school enrollment.

Alternatively, higher poverty of some ethnic groups might be the direct consequence of unobserved factors such as earnings discrimination in the labor market, or the lower quality of some attributes, such as education or location (e.g., living in more inaccessible rural areas), producing lower returns in the labor market. In the conventional analysis of wage differentials, wage discrimination is usually identified as being part of the unobserved gap (or coefficients effect), once wage gaps coming from inter-group differences in productivity have been already considered. However, it is important to note that discrimination might affect higher poverty either directly by reducing the returns to their characteristics (captured by the unexplained or coefficients effect) or, indirectly, through the accumulation of lower education, exclusion from the labor market, lack of geographical mobility, etc. (the characteristics effect). That is, discrimination might be at the root of the lower endowments that ultimately explain the ethnic poverty gap. Disadvantaged groups might live in remote areas as the consequence of their traditional communities being historically denied basic infrastructure by the government, or them being excluded from the most profitable lands. Disadvantaged groups might have higher fertility rates, not as the consequence of having different cultural views about family, but different access to family planning. Also, they might have lower education and labor-force participation as the result of their lower opportunities for schooling or their anticipation of segregation and lower returns in the labor market due to discrimination.

In this section, we aim at disentangling what explanations (geographical, demographic, socioeconomic, or unobserved factors) are relevant and significant in explaining the poverty gaps for the selected Asian countries. More detailed research on which of these are the result of discrimination or how, and by how much, they are producing this, is beyond the scope of this paper and needs a much more thorough country-specific analysis.

For our purposes, we include several variables that might determine household wealth as explanatory variables in the logit regression. We measure location by a dummy variable indicating whether the area is urban or rural, and by the region of residence. In Nepal, *region* refers to each of the 13 subregions. In India and in the Philippines, states and provinces, respectively, were grouped by deciles according to their average wealth. Similarly, districts in Pakistan were grouped into wealth quartiles.

We also consider some demographic factors such as marital status (currently versus formerly married), teenage marriage (if age of first marriage was below 18), household type (two related adults, three or more related adults, rest of the households), the number of household members, the number of children below five years old in the household, and the total number of living children. Age is collected for each individual and the householder (also its squared value). The sex of the latter is also included. Immigration status reflects whether the individual was immigrant or not, and, in the affirmative case, whether they arrived less than five years ago, and were from rural or

urban areas. Education is captured by the completed level of education (incomplete primary, primary, incomplete secondary, secondary, or higher) for the householder, for each eligible individual, and for their partner, in the case of married women. Individual literacy is also considered. Regarding labor-related variables, we use information about occupation (1-digit level) for each eligible individual (and their partner), whether they worked during the last 12 months, or had a non-paid job. <sup>19</sup> All other factors, including direct wage discrimination or differences in the quality of education, are captured by the unobserved component that remains unexplained. Summary statistics of the explanatory variables, and regression coefficients and standard errors of the logit probability, estimated for reweighting the comparison's distribution, are reported in Tables A4-7 in the Appendix.

## 5.2 Decomposition of the Ethnic Poverty Gap

We now present the results of the decomposition of the relative ethnic poverty gap in the four countries, India, Nepal, the Philippines and Pakistan, at three different percentiles (10<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, and 50<sup>th</sup>) of the corresponding reference group, applying the methodology described in Section 3.3. These results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 and the share explained by each factor is summarized in Figures 9 to 11. Tables 7 to 9 report the distribution of some relevant characteristics.

In all countries, a large part of the observed ethnic poverty gap is associated with the divergence of the distribution of observable characteristics by ethnic group (characteristics effect). Regarding the underlying factors, we distinguish three different patterns. India and Nepal outstand for socioeconomic factors being at the root of the higher poverty of disadvantaged ethnic groups. The Philippines outstand for the higher poverty of disadvantaged ethnic groups being associated with their location. Both location and socioeconomic factors play a substantial role in shaping ethnic inequalities in poverty levels in Pakistan. We now discuss these matters in more detail.

#### India

The characteristics effect in India is able to account for about 80% of the ethnic poverty gap (the remaining 20% remains unexplained). The extent of the gap varies with the percentiles of the reference group used as the poverty line, as seen before, but the determinant factors are rather stable. Socioeconomic factors jointly account for 56–57% of the ethnic gap in poverty rates. The lower education of ethnic disadvantaged groups alone accounts for more than 40% of the gap. This means about 11 percentage points of higher poverty (at the 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentiles) among disadvantaged groups and does not come as a surprise. For example, about two thirds (65%) of the eligible population in the disadvantaged groups (SC/ST/OBC) are illiterate, and only the households heads of 46% of the eligible women completed primary education (see Table 7). These figures sharply contrast with 39% and 65%, respectively, for the reference group.

Although questionnaires are very similar across countries, they still are country-specific and come from different phases and survey types and, thus, some variables were not available in specific samples.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This result implies a smaller unexplained proportion of the ethnic poverty gap than that reported in Borooah (2005) for income poverty: 27% and 46% when the coefficients effects use the average characteristics of Hindu (Hindu treated as SC or ST). In that paper, the poverty rates are 29% for Hindu, and 46% and 47% for SC and ST. Differences in the decomposition technique, in the set of characteristics used, or in the wellbeing variable might account for the divergence. Gang, Sen and Yun (2008) also provide a similar decomposition (with 40% and 51% of the gap unexplained) but focused on rural poverty and with the coefficients effects obtained with the average characteristics of SC/ST.

Table 5: Decomposition of the Ethnic Poverty Gap for Different Percentiles of the Reference Group

	Ethnic			E	xplained Gap			- 11
Country	Poverty Gap	Total	Region	Area	Demographic	Education	Labor	Unexplained Gap
India 2005/06								
10 <sup>th</sup>	13.6	10.8	0.4	8.0	1.6	5.9	2.1	2.8
	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)
25 <sup>th</sup>	26.2	21.2	1.8	1.5	2.8	10.8	4.3	5.0
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Scheduled Caste	28.4	22.0	2.9	0.5	4.0	12.5	2.1	6.4
	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.6)
Scheduled Tribe	50.0	42.7	3.7	9.1	3.7	16.6	10.5	7.3
	(8.0)	(1.3)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(1.3)
Other Backward	20.2	18.5	3.9	1.2	2.2	7.4	3.6	3.7
Class	(0.6)	(8.0)	(0.7)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.5)
50 <sup>th</sup>	27.4	22.4	1.5	1.8	3.2	11.6	4.4	4.9
	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.5)
Nepal 2011	()	( /	( /	( /	( /	(- )	()	( /
10 <sup>th</sup>	38.6	26.5	1.3	-1.2	3.2	23.0	0.1	12.2
	(1.3)	(1.1)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(1.3)	(1.0)	(1.3)
25 <sup>th</sup>	39.0	28.0	0.3	-1.7	3.6	26.3	-0.6	10.9
20	(1.7)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.6)
50 <sup>th</sup>	27.5	24.3	-0.8	-2.0	3.4	24.6	-1.0	3.2
	(1.8)	(1.7)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(1.7)	(1.2)	(1.9)
Pakistan 2006	(1.0)	( )	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	()	(1.2)	(1.0)
10 <sup>th</sup>	48.6	43.0	6.2	18.9	0.0	15.3	2.6	5.7
10	(1.5)	(1.3)	(0.9)	(1.5)	(0.6)	(1.7)	(1.1)	(1.2)
25 <sup>th</sup>	50.7	45.8	7.3	19.3	-0.2	17.3	2.2	4.9
25	(2.1)	(1.6)	(1.0)	(1.6)	(0.7)	(1.8)	(1.1)	(1.79
50 <sup>th</sup>	39.0	34.2	6.4	13.5	-0.6	13.6	1.4	4.8
50	(2.6)	(1.9)	(0.9)	(1.2)	(0.7)	(1.6)	(0.9)	(2.7)
The Philippines 2008	(2.0)	(1.9)	(0.9)	(1.2)	(0.7)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(2.1)
10 <sup>th</sup>	24.4	23.3	20.0	-2.0	-1.6	5.1	1.8	1.2
10								
25 <sup>th</sup>	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)
20	30.1	27.9	25.4	-2.6	-2.5	5.6	1.9	2.1
coth	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(1.4)
50 <sup>th</sup>	25.1	17.7	16.3	-2.1	-2.4	4.5	1.3	7.4
	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(1.0)	(8.0)	(1.7)

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Reweighting decomposition described in Section 3.3. Bootstraps standard errors in parentheses (300 replications).

Table 6: Decomposition of the Change in the Ethnic Poverty Gap for Different Percentiles of the Reference Group

	Change		Unexplained					
Country	in EPG	Total	Region	Area	Demographic	Education	Labor	Gap
India 1998/1999-2005/06 (Indian-specific wealth index)								
10 <sup>th</sup>	4.5	4.3	1.1	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.0	0.1
	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.5)
25 <sup>th</sup>	4.5	5.7	1.8	0.4	1.3	8.0	1.3	-1.1
	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.6)
50 <sup>th</sup>	3.0	3.3	0.7	0.2	1.5	0.1	0.8	-0.3
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.7)


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Table 6 continued

			Unexplained					
Country	Change in EPG	Total	Region	Area	Demographic	Education	Labor	Gap
The Philippines 2003–2008 (Philippine-specific wealth index)								
10 <sup>th</sup>	-7.1	-4.4	-3.8	-2.7	0.1	0.4	1.6	-2.7
	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(8.0)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.09	(1.3)
25 <sup>th</sup>	-5.0	-5.1	-3.5	-3.0	-0.4	0.3	1.3	0.1
	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(8.0)	(1.1)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(2.0)
50 <sup>th</sup>	-0.4	-4.0	-2.1	-2.4	0.0	-0.1	0.7	3.6
	(1.9)	(1.8)	(1.6)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(2.3)


Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1. Reweighting decomposition described in Section 3.3. Bootstraps standard errors in parentheses (300 replications).

Figure 9: Decomposing the Ethnic Poverty Gap (Proportion (%) of the Relative Ethnic Poverty Gap Explained by Each Characteristic)




Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15-49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

Figure 10: Decomposing the Ethnic Poverty Gap in India (25<sup>th</sup> Percentile) (Level and Proportion of the Relative Ethnic Poverty Gap Explained by Each Characteristic)



Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

Figure 11: Trends in Ethnic Poverty Gap (Change in Absolute Values between Both Surveys)



Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

**Table 7: Education and Ethnicity** 

	Individual		Household Head		Ind	Household Head	
Country	Illiterate	Primary Completed	Primary Completed	Country	Illiterate	Primary Completed	Primary Completed
India 2005/06				India 1998/99			
None of them	38.6	62.1	65.1	None of them	41.7	50.6	59.6
SC	69.5	31.9	41.7	SC	70.9	23.0	37.7
ST	78.4	22.1	32.7	ST	76.9	16.5	30.6
OBC	60.9	41.0	51.4	OBC	58.8	35.4	49.5
SC/ST/OBC	65.5	36.1	46.4	SC/ST/OBC	65.1	28.9	43.1
Nepal 2011				Pakistan 2006			
Hill Brahmin	22.2	67.0	64.4	Urdu		31.5	44.9
Rest of groups	54.0	34.9	36.8	Rest of groups		74.3	21.8
The Philippines 2008				The Philippines 2003			
Tagalog	2.8	95.6	88.7	Tagalog	2.8	93.9	87.8
Rest of groups	11.1	85.4	76.2	Rest of groups	11.2	82.5	74.3

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

Table 8: Area of Residence and Ethnicity

Country	Rural	Country	Rural
India 2005/06		India 1998/99	
None of them	57.9	None of them	65.8
SC	72.6	SC	78.9
ST	89.9	ST	89.3
OBC	71.1	OBC	76.0
SC/ST/OBC	73.9	SC/ST/OBC	78.8
Nepal 2011		Pakistan 2006	
Hill Brahmin	82.7	Urdu	15.4
Other	87.5	Other	71.1
The Philippines 2008		The Philippines 2003	
Tagalog	27.9	Tagalog	22.9
Other	55.9	Other	55.3

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15–49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

Table 9: Location and Ethnicity: The Philippines

	2008			2003		
Region	Wealth	Tagalog	Other	Wealth	Tagalog	Other
I – Ilocos Region	0.543	1.3	6.2	0.472	1.3	6.3
II – Cagayan Valley	0.487	1.0	4.1	0.418	1.3	4.7
III – Central Luzon	0.568	20.9	6.8	0.527	18.7	7.6
IV-a – Calabarzon	0.594	36.3	3.6	0.567	36.4	3.7
IV-b – Mimaropa	0.369	5.2	1.9	0.291	4.1	2.4
V – Bicol Region	0.424	1.3	7.3	0.366	1.8	6.7
VI – Western Visayas	0.423	0.3	10.1	0.320	0.5	9.2
VII – Central Visayas	0.467	0.2	9.9	0.406	0.3	10.7
VIII – Eastern Visayas	0.388	0.1	5.5	0.303	0.2	5.8
IX – Zamboanga Peninsula	0.393	0.2	5.3	0.279	0.2	5.4
X – Northern Mindanao	0.410	0.1	6.1	0.388	0.1	5.9
XI – Davao Peninsula	0.414	0.1	6.7	0.417	0.3	6.8
XII – Soccsksargen	0.377	0.3	5.4	0.323	0.4	5.7
XIII – Caraga	0.406	0.2	3.4	0.346	0.1	3.5
National Capital Region	0.643	32.2	10.1	0.599	34.2	8.4
Cordillera Administrative Region	0.493	0.4	2.2	0.461	0.3	2.1
Arm	0.269	0.1	5.5	0.199	0.0	5.3
Urban	0.592	72.0	44.1	0.550	77.1	44.7
Rural	0.391	27.9	55.9	0.316	22.9	55.3

Notes: Eligible population: ever-married women, 15-49 years old. Ethnic groups as listed in Table 1.

The majority of the population from disadvantaged groups living in rural areas (74% compared with 49% of the reference group, see Table 8) and in the poorest states, respectively, explain about 7% and between 2–7% (depending on the threshold) of the gap. Demographic factors are at least as important as geographical variables to explain the ethnic gap in poverty rates, about 12% (for example, there is a higher prevalence of immigration from rural areas, 9% higher, and for teen marriage, 16% higher).

These features of the ethnic (caste) gaps in poverty levels in India apply to all three disadvantaged groups: SC, ST and OBC (see Table 5 and Figure 10). We now consider the case when the poverty line is fixed at the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of the reference group. The ethnic gap in poverty rates, as mentioned in the previous section, is larger for ST (51 percentage points), and much smaller for SC (28 percentage points) and OBC (20 percentage points). The proportion of the poverty gap explained by characteristics is also largest among ST (86%) and smallest among SC (77%), and, after controlling for characteristics, the remaining gap is similar for SC and ST (6–7 percentage points) and still smaller for OBC (4 percentage points).

In all three groups, the socioeconomic explanation accounts for more than half the observed gap. In absolute terms, the gaps explained by education, labor and location are larger for ST (associated with 17, 11 and 13 percentage points of higher poverty, respectively). Only the demographic gap is a bit higher for SC.

The distribution of the importance by factor shown in the overall results basically reflects what happens with OBC. The largest contribution to the characteristics effect, 39% of the gap, comes from education, followed by 15% from labor variables, 13% from demographics, and 9% from living in rural areas. In the case of the most disadvantaged group, ST, education is relatively less relevant (33%) but labor variables

(21%) and their overrepresentation in rural areas (18%) are much more important than in any other group. For SC, education (44%) and the region where they live (10%) are more relevant than in the other two groups.

Regarding the change over time in the contribution of each factor in India (see Table 6 and Figure 11), we observe that the increase in the gap between 1998/99 and 2005/06, discussed above (4 percentage points at the 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles), was driven by an increasing contribution from all factors.

#### Nepal

The proportion of the ethnic poverty gap that is explained by characteristics in Nepal is smaller at the bottom, about 68%, but sharply increases for higher poverty lines. The proportion explained by education is even larger than in India, 60% at the 10<sup>th</sup> quantile, and goes up to 90% at the median. This implies that education is associated with between 23 and 26 percentage points of higher poverty among ethnic disadvantaged groups in this country. This, again, does not come as a surprise considering that inequality in education turns out to be even stronger in Nepal than in India because of the higher education, in average, of the reference group. In the disadvantaged groups, 54% of eligible women are illiterate, whereas, for only 37% of them, the household head had completed primary studies, compared with 22% and 64% in the case of the reference group. Demographic factors are also of some relevance (3 percentage-point differential) especially for explaining moderate poverty (about 12% of the gap). Location and labor variables here are of little relevance, in general.

#### **Pakistan**

The characteristics effect also explains the largest part (near 90%) of the observed gap in poverty rates by ethnicity in Pakistan. A large part of this gap is associated with location. In this case, it is the over-representation in rural areas (71% of the eligible population of disadvantaged ethnic groups compared with only 15% of Urdu), the main factor behind the ethnic poverty gap. This explains 35%–39% of the differential, that is, about 19 percentage points of higher poverty at the 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles. The district of residence also matters. The fact that about 60% of Urdu reside in the richest quartile of districts, compared with only 19% of disadvantaged groups, explains about 13%–16% of the poverty differential (about 6–7 additional percentage points). However, the educational gap is also responsible for about one third of the overall gap in poverty (14–17 percentage points). Again, this is due to a huge gap in attained education. Similar to what was shown for Nepal, 74% of eligible women in disadvantaged ethnicities are illiterate, whereas, for only 45% of them, the household head had completed primary studies, compared with 31% and 73% in the case of Urdu.

### The Philippines

In contrast with the socioeconomic explanation dominant in India and Nepal, the Philippines is a remarkable case in which location turns out to be of extraordinary importance. Due to historical reasons, minorities are strongly linked to specific regions and there is large inequality in wealth across regions that are along ethnic lines (see Table 9). The wealth decile of the region of residence explains more than 80% of the gap at the 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles (having 20 and 25 percentage points of differential, respectively). For these two percentiles, the characteristics effect globally accounts for more than 90% of the gap. The proportion explained by region goes down to 65% at the median, where a larger proportion of the gap (29%) remains unexplained. Education is also important, about 20% of the differential (5 percentage

points) but much less than in India and Nepal because the educational gap is also smaller (see Table 7). Looking at the trend over time reveals that the reduction of the ethnic poverty gap in the Philippines between 2003 and 2008 was driven by a lower contribution from location (region and area) due to the larger increase in wealth in rural areas and in regions with proportionally more population from ethnic minorities (e.g., regions IX, VI, or VIII, see Table 9) and lower in urban areas and in regions where Tagalog are disproportionally represented (e.g., IV-a, III, and the National Capital Region).

## 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Ethnicity is definitely a matter of concern in Asian countries. The results of this study showed that in the six selected countries there are some ethnic groups facing higher poverty risk than others when an index of wealth is used to measure economic status. There is, however, an important level of cross-country heterogeneity in both the extent of the ethnic poverty gap and the main explanatory factors, as well as in the evolution over time.

The poverty gap between some ethnic groups and their country's reference is astonishingly large. In some cases, the differential in poverty rates is above 50 or even 60 percentage points for some wealth cut-offs. This is especially the case of Siraiki and other linguistic groups in Pakistan, Scheduled Tribes in India, Hill Dalit in Nepal, or ethnic minorities in Viet Nam. Clearly, ethnic minorities surveyed in Azerbaijan enjoy, not only higher levels of wealth, but also a smaller poverty gap with respect to Azerbaijani (about 20 percentage points at its maximum). To a lesser extent, the ethnic poverty gap in the Philippines also tends to be smaller, around 30 percentage points in its peak, similar to Scheduled Cates in India or Hill Chhetri and Hill Janajati in Nepal.

Regarding the reasons for this ethnic inequality in poverty rates, we know that some ethnic groups usually accumulate a number of disadvantages across different dimensions such as having lower education, higher unemployment, larger families, or lower development of their communities that help to explain their higher poverty. Among the studied cases, this is probably a good description of the higher poverty gap of Scheduled Tribes in India, the group showing the largest absolute poverty rates among all those included in our analysis.

We have, however, found significant cross-country differences in what factors are more strongly associated with the ethnic poverty gap in the four countries we have analyzed in more detail. We show that the higher poverty rates of disadvantaged groups in India and Nepal are mostly driven by the extraordinarily high inequality in attained education by ethnicity prevailing in these two countries. As mentioned before, in the specific case of the Scheduled Tribes in India, their higher concentration in rural areas and their poorer performance in the labor market are also remarkable determinant factors. On the contrary, the Philippines outstands for having regional wealth inequalities as the main factor associated with most of the ethnic poverty gap of their disadvantaged ethnicities. Pakistan resembles India and Nepal in the remarkable importance of the poorer education of the disadvantaged groups, but it also outstands for their concentration in rural areas being associated with their higher poverty.

We also showed that, in a period of generally strong economic growth in the region, the wealth of all ethnic groups in India and the Philippines has increased. This implies a reduction of the ethnic poverty gap only in the Philippines (driven by diminishing interregional inequality), whereas some ethnicities in India, especially the Scheduled

Tribes, took less advantage of growth than the reference group and the relative ethnic poverty gap increased (driven by the contribution of all factors).

The nature of this study does not allow us to make very specific policy recommendations because there is no causal analysis and because that would need a more in-depth analysis of the mechanisms that work to keep each particular ethnicity with higher poverty in each country. However, we can draw a few lessons that might be of help in orienting policy when it comes to reduce the ethnic poverty gap.

The significant extent of the ethnic poverty gap for many groups in Asian countries, as described in this paper, suggests that the situation of their ethnic disadvantaged groups should be taken very seriously. Ethnicity should definitely be a matter of concern and be part of any agenda of poverty reduction in the region for the next years. This calls for a higher visibility of ethnicity in statistics to be able to monitor the progress made during these years of intense economic growth in the region, establishing specific goals of poverty reduction, and designing appropriate strategies to achieve them. The fact that most of the ethnic poverty gap seems to be associated with a set of basic observed characteristics suggests that it should not be difficult to identify what policies are generally expected to have a larger impact on reducing the poverty gap in each case. The indicated factors associated with the ethnic poverty gap point in the direction of policies aimed at closing the gap, which should be addressed for improving the basic endowments of the poorest ethnic groups.

In Nepal and India, where education is identified as the main factor associated with the ethnic poverty gap, we expect little improvement in the relative situation of ethnic disadvantaged groups (castes and tribes) without addressing this extraordinarily high inequality in the attained levels of education. We note that the inter-ethnic difference in education starts at the elementary level, with a large gap in literacy rates and in the proportion of the population that has completed primary-level education. Thus, it is at these basic levels that most efforts should be addressed improving and enhancing the existing infrastructure as well as promoting the enrollment among the poorest ethnic groups. For example, there exists wide empirical evidence of the success of conditional cash transfers in promoting schooling jointly with improvements in incomes among the poor in many countries (e.g., the meta-analysis in Saavedra and García 2012) that suggests enhancing this type of transfers might have a formidable impact on reducing the ethnic gap too. The fact that India has a long tradition of affirmative-action guotas in politics, public employment and education has probably prevented the gap from being even higher. However, India has been unable so far to substantially close the poverty gap for ethnic groups or, as shown here, to prevent an increase over time.

A similar conclusion applies to Pakistan, a country that, along with India and Nepal, has high ethnic inequality in access to basic education, which is a determinant factor of the large poverty rates of linguistic disadvantaged groups. In Pakistan, we might also expect a significant reduction in the ethnic gap by reducing the urban-rural gap through development of rural communities where disadvantaged groups overwhelmingly live, something that is also extremely important in India, especially for Scheduled Tribes. In the Philippines, any policy that aims at reducing the large geographical inequality, thereby, increasing the economic opportunities in the least-developed provinces, is also expected to have an extraordinary impact on closing the ethnic gap. In fact, we have shown that a reduction in geographical inequalities between 2003 and 2008 account for the reduction in the ethnic poverty gap, both absolute and relative, that occurred during that period in this country.

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## **APPENDIX**

Table A1: Components of the Wealth Index and Distribution by Country and Group

	MCA Score	Normalized Weight	by	Country a	tion: Distr and Group on R = Refe	(%)
			Azer	baijan	In	dia
Variables and Categories	$s_j^q$	$w_j^q$	С	R	С	R
Source of drinking water						
Piped into dwelling	1.514	0.08	17.5	32.2	8.4	21.7
Piped to yard/plot	0.513	0.05	16.8	19.8	10.3	13.4
Public tap/standpipe	-0.942	0.02	5.9	3.8	18.1	12.1
Tube well/borehole	-0.932	0.02	9.5	9.9	46.1	40.9
Protected well	-0.317	0.03	22.5	5.4	2.0	3.0
Unprotected well	-1.770	0.00	0.0	0.2	11.2	6.6
Surface water	-0.623	0.03	26.1	15.9	2.7	1.2
Rainwater	0.215	0.05	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Tanker truck	1.687	0.08	1.7	10.3	0.4	0.4
Cart with small tank	0.541	0.05	0.0	1.0	0.1	0.2
Bottled water	1.558	0.08	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3
Other	-0.003	0.04	0.0	1.4	0.2	0.1
Type of toilet facility						
Flush to piped sewer system	1.760	0.09	16.6	42.7	5.6	17.3
Flush to septic tank	0.571	0.06	0.0	1.1	17.1	32.2
Flush to pit latrine	-0.543	0.04	0.0	0.0	5.0	8.3
Flush to somewhere else	0.145	0.05	0.5	0.7	1.5	1.1
Ventilated improved pit latrine	0.146	0.05	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4
Pit latrine with slab	0.437	0.06	59.4	40.2	2.0	3.8
Pit latrine without slab/open pit	0.073	0.05	22.9	14.6	1.0	1.9
No facility/bush/field	-2.165	0.00	0.6	0.3	66.7	33.9
Composting toilet	-1.285	0.02	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Bucket/dry toilet	-1.328	0.02	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.9
Hanging toilet/latrine	-0.480	0.04	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	0.017	0.05	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.2
Share toilet with other households						
No	0.849	0.07	96.4	91.2	23.8	49.9
Yes	0.094	0.05	2.8	8.3	9.5	15.8
No facility/unknown	-2.129	0.00	8.0	0.5	66.7	34.3
Has electricity						
No	-2.413	0.00	0.4	0.6	36.4	21.0
Yes	0.421	0.07	99.6	99.5	63.6	79.0
Has telephone				-		
No	-0.659	0.00	43.7	42.1	90.2	74.2
Yes	1.593	0.05	56.3	57.9	9.8	25.8
Has radio						
No	-0.374	0.00	54.1	53.9	71.2	58.7
Yes	0.449	0.02	45.9	46.1	28.8	41.3

Table A1 continued

	MCA	Normalized	by	Country a	tion: Distr	(%)
	Score	Weight		•	n R = Refe	
V. 1.11	$s_i^q$	$w^q_i$		baijan		dia
Variables and Categories	s <sub>j</sub>	w <sub>j</sub>	С	R	С	R
Has television	4.750	0.00	4.0	4.4	FO 4	20.0
No	-1.750	0.00	4.2	4.1	59.1	38.0
Yes	0.845	0.06	95.8	95.9	40.9	62.0
Has refrigerator						
No	-0.866	0.00	30.1	23.8	90.2	69.9
Yes	1.711	0.06	69.9	76.2	9.8	30.1
Has bicycle						
No	0.097	0.01	89.8	91.4	43.6	42.3
Yes	-0.129	0.00	10.2	8.6	56.4	57.7
Has motorcycle/scooter						
No	-0.270	0.00	94.2	99.1	85.0	70.2
Yes	0.929	0.03	5.9	0.9	15.0	29.8
Has car/truck						
No	-0.168	0.00	82.0	77.0	98.5	94.5
Yes	2.013	0.05	18.0	23.0	1.5	5.5
Has an animal-drawn cart						
No	0.049	0.02	96.3	96.6	93.2	93.3
Yes	-0.802	0.00	3.7	3.4	6.8	6.7
Main floor material						
Natural	-1.812	0.00	1.1	2.8	53.2	33.0
Rudimentary (wood planks, palm)	0.906	0.06	87.0	78.6	6.5	7.1
Parquet, polished wood	2.433	0.10	6.5	10.0	0.1	0.1
Vinyl, asphalt strips	1.095	0.07	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.1
Ceramic tiles	1.203	0.07	0.0	0.0	3.5	7.6
Cement	0.454	0.05	0.7	1.5	31.1	39.0
Carpet/mats	1.325	0.07	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.4
Other finished (polished stone, marble)	1.323	0.07	2.7	3.9	5.2	11.7
Other	1.446	0.08	2.1	2.8	0.0	0.1
Main wall material	1.440	0.00	2.1	2.0	0.0	0.1
No walls	-2.134	0.00	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cane/palm/trunks/grass	-2.13 <del>4</del> -1.570	0.00	0.0	0.1	3.8	2.5
Dirt/mud/sand	-1.570 -2.077	0.01	0.2	2.5	3.6 27.2	14.3
Bamboo with mud	-2.077 -1.800	0.00	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.9
Stone with mud	-1.297	0.02	10.7	5.5	3.2	2.1
Plywood/reused wood	-0.433	0.04	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2
Cardboard	-1.380	0.02	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uncovered adobe/unburnt	-0.529	0.04	5.4	1.0	1.7	1.1
Cement	0.676	0.07	0.7	0.6	32.8	50.4
Stone with lime/cement	0.317	0.06	11.7	4.3	5.8	5.9
Baked bricks	0.200	0.05	5.3	3.7	19.2	16.1
Cement blocks	0.980	0.07	1.7	0.3	2.7	3.8
Covered adobe	1.008	0.07	8.5	3.7	0.0	0.0
Wood planks/shingles	-0.725	0.03	1.7	0.5	0.1	0.1
Other finished	1.955	0.09	52.6	76.8	0.3	0.4
Other	-0.680	0.03	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.2

Table A1 continued

	MCA Score	Normalized Weight	by	le Populat Country a Compariso	ind Group	(%)
			Azer	baijan	In	dia
Variables and Categories	$s_j^q$	$w_j^q$	С	R	С	R
Main roof material						
No roof	-0.881	0.03	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Natural	-2.015	0.00	0.0	0.1	17.7	8.9
Rudimentary	-1.872	0.00	0.4	0.3	7.2	4.2
Metal	0.290	0.05	3.0	4.3	9.2	11.5
Wood	-0.150	0.04	0.0	0.1	8.0	1.1
Calamine/cement	-0.122	0.04	0.0	0.0	8.0	1.1
Cement	0.913	0.07	2.5	6.3	29.7	45.4
Ceramic tiles	-0.766	0.03	4.7	3.4	13.8	13.1
Other finished	1.224	0.08	87.7	84.0	20.5	14.5
Other	-0.104	0.04	1.7	1.4	0.3	0.2
Household members/Rooms used for sleeping						
<1	0.720	0.05	2.5	1.3	0.7	0.9
1–2	0.667	0.05	20.9	15.6	9.0	14.6
2–2.5	0.515	0.05	28.3	27.0	14.3	18.5
2.5–3	0.370	0.04	16.7	14.8	9.1	11.2
3–4	-0.052	0.03	15.9	20.3	21.0	20.0
4–5	-0.331	0.03	9.3	13.3	18.0	15.8
5–10	-0.998	0.01	6.5	7.5	27.0	18.2
>=10	-1.432	0.00	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.8
Type of cooking fuel						
Electricity	1.437	0.07	20.0	22.6	0.3	0.5
Gas	1.665	0.08	54.9	68.4	17.4	38.1
Biogas	-0.077	0.04	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.7
Kerosene	0.302	0.05	0.0	0.4	2.1	2.9
Coal/lignite	0.508	0.05	0.3	0.1	1.7	2.8
Charcoal	0.278	0.05	2.0	0.5	0.3	0.5
Wood	-1.039	0.02	22.8	7.5	55.7	34.2
Straw/shrubs/grass	-1.217	0.01	0.0	0.0	4.7	6.3
Agricultural crop	-1.505	0.01	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.2
Animal dung	-1.789	0.00	0.2	0.3	13.5	9.7
No food cooked in house	-0.069	0.04	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	-0.571	0.03	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0

Table A1 continued

	Eligible Population: Distribution by Country and Group (%) (C = Comparison R = Reference)									
	Ne	epal	Pak	istan		he opines	Viet Nam			
Variables and Categories		R	C	R	C	R	C	R		
Source of drinking water										
Piped into dwelling	4.1	9.5	26.4	63.5	19.5	33.4	4.1	21.8		
Piped to yard/plot	14.7	24.7	6.1	5.3	6.4	5.1	0.0	0.0		
Public tap/standpipe	23.6	24.6	2.2	3.3	6.1	2.9	2.0	1.1		
Tube well/borehole	43.8	29.0	15.0	11.0	21.8	19.2	0.0	0.0		
Protected well	1.7	2.8	41.9	8.7	6.1	1.4	34.2	54.0		
Unprotected well	2.4	0.7	1.3	0.0	5.1	1.1	5.2	1.9		
Surface water	8.6	6.9	4.2	0.7	11.6	3.4	53.9	7.5		
Rainwater	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5	12.8		
Tanker truck	0.7	0.7	0.9	3.0	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.8		
Cart with small tank	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.0	0.0		
Bottled water	0.5	1.1	0.2	3.7	19.4	31.5	0.0	0.1		
Other	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.7	1.6	0.7	0.2	0.1		
Type of toilet facility	0.0	0.0								
Flush to piped sewer system	5.2	9.3	27.7	80.6	1.3	8.4	4.2	35.3		
Flush to septic tank	32.3	59.1	18.9	8.4	62.4	85.0	0.0	0.0		
Flush to pit latrine	4.0	6.6	0.0	0.0	14.1	1.7	0.0	0.0		
Flush to somewhere else	0.3	0.1	9.3	5.4	0.8	1.0	0.0	0.0		
Ventilated improved pit latrine	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.1	1.4	0.2	3.5	9.8		
Pit latrine with slab	8.4	11.7	1.1	1.6	2.6	0.3	47.5	42.2		
Pit latrine without slab/open pit	7.1	5.4	3.1	0.3	3.1	0.2	0.0	0.0		
No facility/bush/field	41.6	6.2	30.5	1.0	12.1	3.1	44.9	12.7		
Composting toilet	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Bucket/dry toilet	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Hanging toilet/latrine	0.0	0.0	6.7	2.6	1.4	0.2	0.0	0.0		
Other	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Share toilet with other households										
No	40.7	74.9	59.4	88.5	65.1	78.4	49.6	79.2		
Yes	17.6	18.8	9.6	10.1	21.3	17.2	5.1	7.7		
No facility/unknown	41.8	6.3	31.1	1.5	13.7	4.5	45.3	13.2		
Has electricity										
No	26.2	4.8	11.0	0.5	19.9	5.5	15.4	2.5		
Yes	73.8	95.3	89.0	99.6	80.1	94.5	84.7	97.5		
Has telephone										
No	92.4	78.3	52.9	26.6	91.4	80.6	94.7	63.9		
Yes	7.6	21.7	47.1	73.4	8.6	19.4	5.3	36.1		
Has radio										
No	51.3	30.7	65.8	73.5	36.4	27.4	66.4	57.3		
Yes	48.7	69.3	34.2	26.5	63.6	72.6	33.7	42.7		
Has television		, <b>.</b>	<del>-</del>				2 = 2 *			
No	53.3	27.0	44.6	10.3	32.4	11.4	42.3	9.8		
Yes	46.7	73.0	55.4	89.7	67.6	88.6	57.7	90.3		

Table A1 continued

	Eligik	ole Popu	llation: [ (C = Co			country a		up (%)
	Ne	epal	Pak	istan		he opines	Viet	Nam
Variables and Categories		R	C	R	C	R	C	R
Has refrigerator								
No	90.7	79.8	64.4	26.4	65.3	47.2	95.2	75.9
Yes	9.3	20.2	35.6	73.6	34.7	52.8	4.8	24.1
Has bicycle								
No	55.1	55.7	56.9	64.1	75.4	74.5	41.9	16.4
Yes	44.9	44.4	43.1	35.9	24.6	25.5	58.1	83.6
Has motorcycle/scooter								
No	89.8	77.5	80.2	61.0	76.1	75.3	56.3	35.6
Yes	10.2	22.6	19.8	39.0	23.9	24.7	43.7	64.4
Has car/truck								
No	98.4	97.0	92.9	87.7	92.0	84.0	99.7	98.8
Yes	1.6	3.0	7.1	12.3	8.0	16.0	0.3	1.2
Has an animal-drawn cart								
No	95.3	99.1	88.3	97.0	95.4	99.1	95.8	95.7
Yes	4.7	0.9	11.7	3.0	4.6	0.9	4.2	4.3
Main floor material								
Natural	71.4	44.2	52.6	6.3	9.2	6.9	35.3	11.9
Rudimentary (wood planks, palm)	1.5	1.3	0.0	0.0	29.3	6.5	29.5	3.4
Parquet, polished wood	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5
Vinyl, asphalt strips	1.3	2.3	0.0	0.0	3.1	6.3	0.0	0.0
Ceramic tiles	0.2	1.3	0.9	1.7	8.1	16.2	9.6	54.9
Cement	19.5	36.0	28.0	54.3	48.6	60.9	25.3	29.3
Carpet/mats	5.7	13.9	1.0	3.5	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1
Other finished (polished stone, marble)	0.0	0.0	17.6	34.0	0.9	2.7	0.0	0.0
Other  Main wall material	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
No walls	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Cane/palm/trunks/grass	0.0 2.5	0.8	8.5 0.0	0.8 0.0	2.0	0.0 1.3	17.9	10.0
Dirt/mud/sand	6.6	2.2	23.1	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.4
Bamboo with mud	23.8	5.7	0.0	0.0	20.3	4.5	13.2	1.3
Stone with mud	26.9	27.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.9	0.1
Plywood/reused wood	1.0	2.0	0.1	0.0	12.9	9.6	19.6	3.5
Cardboard	0.0	0.0	6.1	0.5	1.1	0.7	0.2	0.1
Uncovered adobe/unburnt	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1
Cement	24.5	48.2	0.0	0.0	21.2	38.5	0.1	0.2
Stone with lime/cement	0.9	1.6	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.6	1.4	1.2
Baked bricks	7.8	6.1	21.6	14.4	0.1	0.1	15.7	76.9
Cement blocks	0.8	1.9	39.5	79.1	29.0	39.8	0.1	0.4
Covered adobe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	2.6	0.7
Wood planks/shingles	4.6	3.3	0.0	0.0	11.6	3.6	20.9	3.2
Other finished	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	0.9	0.0	0.0
Other	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.3	3.9	1.9

Table A1 continued

	Eligible Population: Distribution by Country and Group (%) (C = Comparison R = Reference)									
	Ne	pal	Pak	istan		he opines	Viet Nam			
Variables and Categories	С	R	С	R	С	R	С	R		
Main roof material										
No roof	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0		
Natural	19.2	4.7	35.5	6.1	16.6	2.8	15.3	6.2		
Rudimentary	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0	0.4	3.1	0.3		
Metal	28.0	38.3	2.8	6.4	80.4	94.4	13.1	29.2		
Wood	0.2	0.2	39.3	24.9	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0		
Calamine/cement	2.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	15.8	10.8		
Cement	18.9	33.8	22.1	62.2	0.9	1.5	4.0	16.9		
Ceramic tiles	29.4	21.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	48.8	36.2		
Other finished	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	0.2	0.0	0.4		
Other	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0		
Household members/Rooms used for sleeping										
<1	2.5	6.6	0.9	2.3	1.1	0.9	0.4	1.6		
1–2	24.6	42.6	5.6	8.9	14.6	14.7	14.9	23.2		
2–2.5	21.6	22.5	9.1	11.4	16.9	19.0	16.1	26.1		
2.5–3	10.6	8.7	8.3	8.0	11.1	12.5	8.7	13.1		
3–4	18.7	11.6	23.2	23.1	22.2	22.2	18.1	17.5		
4–5	10.3	5.1	18.1	16.1	13.9	11.6	14.5	11.3		
5–10	11.4	2.8	32.0	28.1	19.3	18.9	25.2	7.0		
>=10	0.4	0.2	2.8	2.3	1.0	0.3	2.3	0.2		
Type of cooking fuel										
Electricity	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	1.0	1.1	0.2	0.5		
Gas	15.5	32.1	25.9	82.8	24.3	53.7	3.3	35.4		
Biogas	2.3	13.0	2.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7		
Kerosene	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.9	0.0	0.0		
Coal/lignite	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.9	11.1		
Charcoal	0.1	0.7	0.5	0.0	16.1	16.4	0.0	0.0		
Wood	70.7	53.5	55.3	14.0	56.4	23.8	94.7	38.7		
Straw/shrubs/grass	3.5	0.1	4.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	1.0	12.5		
Agricultural crop	1.1	0.2	4.1	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.0	0.0		
Animal dung	6.2	0.2	7.5	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
No food cooked in house	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Other	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1		

Note: Eligible population: Ever-married women, 15–49 years old.

Table A2: Variables Used for the Indian- and Philippine-specific Wealth Indices

	Ir	ndia 1998/99–2005/06		
Source of drinking water	House	Motorcycle	Water pump	Cot or bed
Type of toilet facility	Acres of land under cultivation	Car	Thresher	Chair
People/sleeping rooms	Electricity	Telephone	Tractor	Mattress
Main cooking fuel	Radio	Clock or watch	Fan	Pressure cooker
Purify water	Refrigerator	Bullock cart	Television (b/w)	Table
Separate room used as a kitchen	Bicycle	Household owns livestock	Television (color)	Sewing machine
	The	Philippines 2003-2008	}	
Source of drinking water	Main wall material	Refrigerator	Has landline telephone	Cd/vcd/dvd player
Time to get to water source	Electricity	Bicycle/trisikad	Cellphone	Component/karaoke
Type of toilet facility	Radio	Motorcycle/scooter/ tricycle	Personal computer	Owns a tractor
Main floor material	Television	Car/truck	Washing machine	Tenure status of lot

**Table A3: Sample Sizes** 

Sample	Reference		Co	Comparison (All)	Total			
	Azerbaijani	Other						
Azerbaijan 2006	5,318	458					458	5,776
	None of Them	sc	ST	ОВС				
India 2005/06	31,763	15,814	11,789	0,318			57,921	89,684
India 1998/99	37,467	15,256	10,906	26,028			52,190	89,657
	НВ	нс	HD	HJ	Other			
Nepal 2011	1,359	2,528	1,154	2,241	2,555		8,478	9,837
	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindh	Pushto	Siraiki	Other		
Pakistan 2006/07	735	3,098	1,318	2,057	1,372	1,437	9,282	10,017
	Tagalog	Cebuano	Ilocano	llonggo	Other			
The Philippines 2008	2,131	2,186	897	841	3,139		7,063	9,194
The Philippines 2003	2,342	2,410	1,014	834	2,724		6,982	9,324
	Vietnamese	Other						
Viet Nam 2005	4,220	785					785	5,005
All								221,753

Table A4. Summary Variables and Logit Regression: Probability of Belonging to the Reference Group, India 2005/06

	Refe	Reference		Comparison		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
State Decile 1	9.5	29.3	13.3	34.0	Ref.	
State Decile 2	6.2	24.2	13.5	34.1	-0.336	0.055
State Decile 3	12.7	33.3	16.6	37.2	0.006	0.053
State Decile 4	15.3	36.0	4.6	21.0	1.491	0.059
State Decile 5	6.6	24.9	8.2	27.4	0.189	0.056
State Decile 6	7.5	26.4	9.4	29.1	0.203	0.059
State Decile 7	3.8	19.1	15.5	36.2	-1.412	0.058
State Decile 8	19.9	39.9	9.9	29.8	0.918	0.052
State Decile 9	7.2	25.8	5.0	21.8	0.560	0.058
State Decile 10	11.3	31.7	4.1	19.8	0.823	0.051
Rural	57.9	49.4	73.9	43.9	-0.144	0.028

Table A4 continued

	Refe	rence	Comp	parison		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
2 related adults	28.9	45.3	32.9	47.0	Ref.	
3+ related adults	67.4	46.9	62.8	48.3	0.015	0.031
Other household type	3.6	18.7	4.3	20.4	0.177	0.071
Female head	12.6	33.2	12.6	33.2	0.190	0.047
HH age	46.5	13.5	44.1	12.9	-0.019	0.006
HH age square x 100					0.026	0.006
Age	32.4	8.3	31.3	8.4	0.085	0.012
Age squared x 100					-0.095	0.017
N Members	5.6	2.9	5.8	3.0	0.004	0.007
N children (5yo)	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.1	-0.063	0.017
N living children	2.3	1.6	2.6	1.7	-0.019	0.009
Primary education (incomplete)	37.9	48.5	63.9	48.0		
Primary education (complete)	7.9	27.0	6.9	25.3	0.346	0.046
Secondary education (incomplete)	36.6	48.2	23.3	42.3	0.225	0.050
Secondary education (complete)	6.1	24.0	2.7	16.2	0.381	0.070
Higher education	11.5	31.9	3.2	17.5	0.721	0.071
Illiterate	38.6	48.7	65.5	47.5	-0.338	0.045
Head's Primary (incomplete)	34.9	47.7	53.6	49.9	Ref.	
Head's Primary (complete)	6.8	25.2	8.0	27.1	0.099	0.049
Head's Secondary (incomplete)	37.3	48.4	29.5	45.6	0.273	0.040
Head's Secondary (complete)	6.7	25.0	3.6	18.6	0.501	0.062
Head's Higher education	14.3	35.0	5.4	22.5	0.439	0.068
No immigrant	15.7	36.4	17.8	38.2	Ref.	
Immigrant (<=5 years/visitor)	27.1	44.5	23.9	42.7	0.153	0.039
Immigrant (6+ years)	57.2	49.5	58.3	49.3	0.198	0.037
Immigrant from countryside	53.5	49.9	62.6	48.4	-0.073	0.028
Currently married	94.7	22.4	93.9	23.9	Ref.	0.020
Formerly married	5.3	22.4	6.1	23.9	-0.041	0.051
Teen marriage	49.2	50.0	65.1	47.7	-0.189	0.024
No working/other	74.1	43.8	57.1	49.5	Ref.	0.02.
Professional, clerical	4.3	20.2	2.1	14.5	0.347	0.078
Services, Skilled	10.8	31.1	13.3	33.9	0.386	0.058
Agriculture	10.8	31.0	27.4	44.6	-0.248	0.064
Worked last 12 moths	70.9	45.4	48.5	50.0	0.892	0.052
Not paid work	6.9	25.3	13.8	34.5	0.217	0.051
Partner: did not work/no partner	2.3	14.8	1.7	13.0	Ref.	
Partner: professional/technical/managerial	11.1	31.4	5.0	21.9	-0.111	0.083
Partner: clerical	6.0	23.7	3.5	18.3	-0.188	0.087
Partner: sales	17.1	37.7	10.3	30.4	0.027	0.078
Partner: agricultural	25.7	43.7	35.2	47.8	0.059	0.076
Partner: services	5.9	23.5	5.4	22.6	-0.372	0.084
Partner: skilled and unskilled manual	31.7	46.5	38.7	48.7	-0.255	0.075
Partner: unknown occupation	0.2	4.9	0.2	4.8	0.177	0.222
Partner: no education/don't know	17.4	38.0	32.7	46.9	Ref.	V.LLL
Partner: primary education	13.2	33.9	17.1	37.7	0.090	0.038
Partner: secondary education	49.9	50.0	42.4	49.4	0.030	0.039
Partner: higher education	19.4	39.5	7.8	26.8	0.158	0.062
Intercept	10.4	00.0		20.0	-2.986	0.002
N observations					89,684	V. <u>L</u> TI
Wald chi2					8,010	
Pseudo R2					0.177	
I JOUGU INA					0.177	

Table A5: Summary Variables and Logit Regression: Probability of Belonging to the Reference Group, Nepal 2011

	Refe	rence	Comp	arison	<u> </u>	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
Eastern Mountain	1.1	10.3	1.8	13.5	Ref.	
Central Mountain	2.1	14.4	1.9	13.8	1.075	0.237
Western Mountain	0.5	7.1	3.2	17.7	-0.762	0.350
Eastern Hill	2.5	15.6	8.1	27.3	-0.548	0.262
Central Hill	11.6	32.0	11.4	31.8	0.335	0.225
Western Hill	25.9	43.8	10.0	30.0	1.528	0.207
Mid-Western Hill	4.0	19.7	5.5	22.8	0.575	0.241
Far-Western Hill	2.9	16.8	3.3	17.9	1.071	0.242
Eastern Terai	14.9	35.7	14.6	35.4	0.550	0.219
Central Terai	13.0	33.6	21.0	40.7	0.517	0.229
Western Terai	13.2	33.8	8.3	27.6	1.192	0.216
Mid-Western Terai	3.4	18.1	5.5	22.9	0.501	0.239
Far-Western Terai	4.9	21.6	5.2	22.2	0.947	0.246
Rural	82.7	37.9	87.5	33.1	0.286	0.106
2 related adults	29.1	45.4	29.4	45.5	Ref.	
3+ related adults	58.9	49.2	57.4	49.4	0.170	0.119
Other	12.1	32.6	13.2	33.9	-0.203	0.172
Female head	28.8	45.3	28.1	45.0	0.167	0.135
Head's age					-0.001	0.020
Head's age squared x 100					0.020	0.019
Age	33.2	8.6	31.1	8.7	0.052	0.041
Age squared x 100					-0.010	0.060
N members	4.5	1.9	5.3	2.6	-0.151	0.033
N children (5yo)	0.5	0.7	8.0	0.9	-0.104	0.069
N living children	2.2	1.4	2.5	1.7	0.067	0.040
Primary education (incomplete)	33.0	47.0	65.1	47.7	Ref.	
Primary education (complete)	5.7	23.2	6.5	24.7	-0.042	0.206
Secondary education (incomplete)	23.7	42.5	18.1	38.5	0.299	0.147
Secondary education (complete)	18.5	38.8	6.5	24.7	0.906	0.175
Higher education	19.1	39.3	3.8	19.1	1.336	0.205
Illiterate	22.2	41.6	54.0	49.8	-0.691	0.137
Head's Primary (incomplete)	35.6	47.9	63.2	48.2	Ref.	
Head's Primary (complete)	5.6	23.0	7.4	26.1	0.371	0.199
Head's Secondary (incomplete)	23.3	42.3	18.2	38.6	0.525	0.149
Head's Secondary (complete)	16.6	37.2	6.5	24.6	0.760	0.181
Head's Higher education	18.9	39.1	4.8	21.4	0.668	0.212
Currently married	96.0	19.6	96.5	18.4	Ref.	
Formerly married	4.0	19.6	3.5	18.4	-0.033	0.201
Teen marriage	41.1	49.2	61.4	48.7	-0.173	0.090
No working/other	35.8	48.0	38.7	48.7	Ref.	
Professional, clerical	8.8	28.3	2.2	14.5	-0.184	0.211
Services, skilled	13.4	34.1	11.2	31.5	-0.389	0.163
Agriculture	41.8	49.3	46.0	49.8	0.024	0.188
Unskilled manual	0.3	5.1	1.9	13.8	-1.322	0.521
Worked last 12 moths	23.2	42.2	22.6	41.9	-0.274	0.145

Table A5 continued

	Refe	rence	Comp	arison		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
Not paid work	41.4	49.3	42.5	49.4	0.065	0.156
Partner: professional/technical/managerial	18.2	38.6	5.0	21.8	Ref.	
Partner: clerical	9.7	29.6	11.5	31.9	-0.457	0.169
Partner: agricultural	22.0	41.4	28.1	44.9	-0.303	0.158
Partner: services	36.1	48.1	23.7	42.5	-0.127	0.136
Partner: skilled manual	6.5	24.6	16.2	36.8	-0.836	0.191
Partner: unskilled manual	7.4	26.2	15.5	36.2	-0.637	0.192
Partner: no education/don't know	7.2	25.9	24.0	42.7	Ref.	
Partner: primary education	11.5	31.9	25.4	43.5	0.179	0.171
Partner: secondary education	49.1	50.0	42.0	49.4	0.562	0.172
Partner: higher education	32.2	46.8	8.7	28.2	0.899	0.214
Intercept					-4.524	0.871
N observations					9,837	
Wald chi2					1,000	
Pseudo R2					0.228	

Table A6: Summary Variables and Logit Regression: Probability of Belonging to the Reference Group, Pakistan 2006/07

	Reference		Comparison			
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
District Quartile 1	8.2	27.4	27.1	44.4	Ref.	
District Quartile 2	15.3	36.0	27.1	44.4	0.488	0.191
District Quartile 3	16.6	37.2	26.4	44.1	0.209	0.193
District Quartile 4	59.9	49.0	19.5	39.6	1.116	0.170
Rural	15.4	36.1	71.1	45.3	-1.621	0.141
2 related adults	25.1	43.4	21.5	41.1	Ref.	
3+ related adults	72.4	44.7	75.5	43.0	-0.237	0.163
Other	2.5	15.7	3.0	17.2	-0.026	0.391
Female head	8.3	27.6	9.7	29.5	-0.279	0.262
Head's age	46.0	12.3	47.4	14.7	0.036	0.029
Head's age squared x 100					-0.045	0.029
Age	33.3	7.9	32.2	8.7	0.058	0.054
Age squared x 100					-0.072	0.078
N members	7.9	4.2	8.6	4.8	0.026	0.027
N children (5yo)	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	-0.098	0.067
N living children	3.3	2.4	3.5	2.5	0.050	0.036
Primary education (incomplete)	28.7	45.3	73.5	44.1	Ref.	
Primary education (complete)	10.7	30.9	9.2	28.9	0.700	0.216
Secondary education (incomplete)	12.6	33.2	6.6	24.8	0.716	0.245
Secondary education (complete)	21.6	41.2	6.1	23.8	1.254	0.259
Higher education	26.4	44.1	4.7	21.2	1.768	0.285
Illiterate	31.5	46.5	74.3	43.7	-0.188	0.209
Head's Primary (incomplete)	26.8	44.3	54.8	49.8	Ref.	
Head's Primary (complete)	10.2	30.3	11.5	31.8	0.176	0.218
Head's Secondary (incomplete)	16.3	37.0	11.1	31.4	0.324	0.245
Head's Secondary (complete)	18.8	39.1	13.0	33.6	0.022	0.229

Table A6 continued

	Reference		Comparison			
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
Head's Higher education	27.8	44.8	9.7	29.6	0.105	0.265
Currently married	95.6	20.5	95.3	21.1	Ref.	
Formerly married	4.4	20.5	4.7	21.1	0.243	0.259
Teen marriage	32.8	47.0	47.9	50.0	-0.078	0.125
No working/other	83.9	36.8	74.3	43.7	Ref.	
Professional, clerical	4.8	21.4	2.0	14.0	-0.408	0.337
Services, skilled	9.0	28.6	9.8	29.8	0.156	0.272
Agriculture	0.6	7.6	12.3	32.8	-1.367	0.509
Unskilled manual	1.8	13.3	1.5	12.3	0.638	0.456
Worked last 12 moths	79.8	40.2	68.8	46.3	0.199	0.222
Not paid work	1.1	10.7	3.6	18.6	0.368	0.411
Partner: did not work	2.9	16.8	4.0	19.5	Ref.	
Partner: professional/technical/managerial	16.3	36.9	8.4	27.7	0.118	0.314
Partner: clerical	3.7	18.8	3.8	19.0	-0.586	0.363
Partner: sales	23.4	42.4	12.4	33.0	0.271	0.301
Partner: agricultural	4.5	20.7	22.9	42.0	-0.223	0.343
Partner: services	11.7	32.1	10.2	30.2	0.038	0.314
Partner: skilled manual	20.1	40.1	15.4	36.1	0.119	0.296
Partner: unskilled manual	17.5	38.0	23.0	42.1	0.222	0.294
Partner: no education/don't know	18.2	38.6	36.9	48.3	Ref.	
Partner: primary education	11.1	31.4	16.5	37.2	0.043	0.202
Partner: secondary education	38.3	48.7	33.3	47.1	0.012	0.201
Partner: higher education	32.4	46.8	13.2	33.9	-0.098	0.263
Intercept					-4.834	1.171
N observations					10,017	
Wald chi2					666	
Pseudo R2					0.276	

Table A7: Summary Variables and Logit Regression: Probability of Belonging to the Reference Group, the Philippines 2008

	Refe	Reference		Comparison		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err.
Province Decile 1	2.7	16.4	14.8	35.6	Ref.	_
Province Decile 2	2.6	16.0	14.0	34.7	-0.021	0.164
Province Decile 3	1.8	13.2	14.2	34.9	-0.512	0.179
Province Decile 4	6.6	24.8	13.7	34.4	0.781	0.157
Province Decile 5	3.0	17.2	13.5	34.2	-0.020	0.176
Province Decile 6	6.6	24.9	9.4	29.2	1.230	0.166
Province Decile 7	21.5	41.1	6.1	23.9	2.877	0.154
Province Decile 8	23.3	42.3	4.3	20.2	3.479	0.167
Province Decile 9	16.6	37.2	4.7	21.2	2.997	0.169
Province Decile 10	15.2	36.0	5.3	22.3	2.802	0.174
Rural	27.9	44.9	55.9	49.7	0.326	0.090
2 related adults	33.9	47.3	40.4	49.1	Ref.	
3+ related adults	55.4	49.7	50.5	50.0	0.096	0.094
Other	10.7	30.9	9.1	28.7	-0.187	0.131
Female head	15.0	35.7	11.0	31.3	0.114	0.110

Table A7 continued

	Reference		Comparison		_	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Coef.	Std. Err
Head's age	43.5	12.5	42.8	12.1	0.013	0.018
Head's age squared x 100					-0.011	0.018
Age	33.7	8.5	34.3	8.5	-0.056	0.034
Age squared x 100					0.057	0.048
N members	5.7	2.3	5.7	2.4	0.002	0.022
N children (5yo)	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	-0.022	0.047
N living children	2.5	1.8	3.0	2.2	0.013	0.025
Primary education (incomplete)	4.4	20.6	14.6	35.3	Ref.	
Primary education (complete)	10.8	31.1	15.6	36.3	0.227	0.167
Secondary education (incomplete)	12.3	32.8	16.4	37.0	0.116	0.178
Secondary education (complete)	35.3	47.8	26.6	44.2	0.376	0.171
Higher education	37.2	48.3	26.8	44.3	0.432	0.181
Illiterate	2.8	16.4	11.1	31.4	-0.594	0.190
Head's Primary (incomplete)	11.3	31.7	23.8	42.6	Ref.	
Head's Primary (complete)	15.4	36.1	16.8	37.4	0.306	0.127
Head's Secondary (incomplete)	11.4	31.8	13.0	33.6	0.056	0.158
Head's Secondary (complete)	26.4	44.1	22.0	41.4	-0.014	0.148
Head's Higher education	35.4	47.8	24.4	42.9	0.027	0.150
No immigrant	29.1	45.4	31.3	46.4	Ref.	
Immigrant (<=5 years/visitor)	32.4	46.8	29.6	45.6	-0.456	0.093
Immigrant (6+ years)	38.5	48.7	39.2	48.8	-0.279	0.088
Immigrant from rural area	25.8	43.8	33.8	47.3	-0.090	0.087
Currently married	91.2	28.3	93.5	24.6	Ref.	
Formerly married	8.8	28.3	6.5	24.6	0.038	0.122
Teen marriage	18.8	39.0	22.6	41.8	0.282	0.094
No working/other	53.5	49.9	52.7	49.9	Ref.	
Professional, clerical	20.4	40.3	17.7	38.1	0.017	0.118
Sales, services, skilled	21.6	41.2	16.4	37.0	0.318	0.115
Agriculture	2.3	14.9	11.6	32.0	-0.196	0.192
Unskilled manual	2.3	14.8	1.7	12.9	0.193	0.248
Worked last 12 moths	38.9	48.8	38.4	48.6	0.061	0.103
Not paid work	0.6	8.0	5.6	22.9	-1.857	0.302
Partner: did not work/no partner	4.7	21.1	2.9	16.8	Ref.	0.002
Partner: professional/technical/managerial	16.9	37.5	10.6	30.8	0.189	0.175
Partner: clerical	2.6	15.9	1.4	11.7	0.296	0.256
Partner: sales	7.6	26.6	5.2	22.2	0.314	0.197
Partner: agricultural	10.5	30.6	29.9	45.8	-0.030	0.182
Partner: domestic	2.1	14.3	1.0	10.0	0.380	0.269
Partner: services	8.0	27.2	6.6	24.8	-0.142	0.189
Partner: skilled manual	34.4	47.5	27.9	44.8	-0.008	0.162
Partner: unskilled manual	13.1	33.8	14.6	35.3	0.125	0.174
Partner: no education/don't know	0.3	5.6	2.6	16.0	Ref.	J.117
Partner: primary education	17.8	38.2	32.3	46.8	0.897	0.433
Partner: secondary education	43.2	49.5	38.3	48.6	1.079	0.435
Partner: higher education	38.8	48.7	26.8	44.3	1.217	0.437
Intercept	55.5	.0.7	20.0	17.0	-3.189	0.457
N observations					9,194	0.000
Wald chi2					1,823	
vvaid chiz Pseudo R2					0.287	