Chen, Xuan; Flores, Carlos A.; Flores-Lagunes, Alfonso

Working Paper
Going beyond LATE: Bounding Average Treatment Effects of Job Corps Training

GLO Discussion Paper, No. 93

Provided in Cooperation with:
Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Suggested Citation: Chen, Xuan; Flores, Carlos A.; Flores-Lagunes, Alfonso (2017) : Going beyond LATE: Bounding Average Treatment Effects of Job Corps Training, GLO Discussion Paper, No. 93, Global Labor Organization (GLO), Maastricht

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163002
Going beyond *LATE*: Bounding Average Treatment Effects of Job Corps Training*  
Xuan Chen†  Carlos A. Flores‡  Alfonso Flores-Lagunes§  
May 15, 2017

Abstract

We derive nonparametric sharp bounds on average treatment effects with an instrumental variable (IV) and use them to evaluate the effectiveness of the Job Corps training program for disadvantaged youth. We focus on the population average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which are parameters not point identified with an IV under heterogeneous treatment effects. The main assumptions employed to bound the ATE and ATT are monotonicity in the treatment of the average outcomes of specified subpopulations, and mean dominance assumptions across the potential outcomes of these subpopulations. Importantly, the direction of the mean dominance assumptions can be informed from data, and some of our bounds do not require an outcome with bounded support. We employ these bounds to assess the effectiveness of Job Corps using data from a randomized social experiment with non-compliance (a common feature of social experiments). Our empirical results indicate that the effect of Job Corps on eligible applicants (the target population) four years after randomization is to increase weekly earnings and employment by at least $24.61 and 4.3 percentage points, respectively, and to decrease yearly dependence on public welfare benefits by at least $84.29. Furthermore, the effect of Job Corps on participants (the treated population) is to increase weekly earnings by between $28.67 and $43.47, increase employment by between 4.9 and 9.3 percentage points, and decrease public benefits received by between $108.72 and $140.29. Finally, some of our results point to positive average effects of Job Corps on the labor market outcomes of those individuals who decide not to enroll in Job Corps regardless of their treatment assignment (the so-called never takers), suggesting that these individuals would benefit from participating in Job Corps.

Key words and phrases: Training programs; Program evaluation; Average treatment effects; Bounds; Instrumental variables

JEL classification: J30, C13, C21

*Thoughtful comments by two anonymous referees and Coeditor DeLeire improved this work. We are grateful for comments from Joshua Angrist, Wallice Ao, Dan Black, Timothy Hubbard, Ying-Ying Lee, Ismael Mourifié, Jeff Smith, and seminar/conference participants at University of Miami, California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo, University of Central Florida, Queens College (CUNY), Queens University (Canada), University of Alabama, University of Rochester, University at Albany, the 2012 New York Camp Econometrics, the 2012 Midwest Econometrics Group Meetings at University of Kentucky, the 2014 Society of Labor Economists Meetings, the 13th IZA/SOLE Transatlantic Meeting of Labor Economists, the 2014 California Econometrics Conference at Stanford University, the 2014 Annual Meetings of the Southern Economic Association, and the 2015 Western Economic Association International Conference. Flores acknowledges funding from the Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activities Grant program and summer research support from the Orfalea College of Business at California Polytechnic State University. Previous versions of this paper circulated under the title “Bounds on Population Average Treatment Effects with an Instrumental Variable.” All the usual disclaimers apply.

†xchen11@ruc.edu.cn; School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China.
‡clore32@calpoly.edu; Department of Economics, California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo.
§afloresl@maxwell.syr.edu. Department of Economics and Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University, and IZA & GLO.
1 Introduction

Government-sponsored training programs are essential tools to help improve the labor market prospects of economically disadvantaged citizens and reduce their dependence on safety net programs. As such, the evaluation of the effectiveness of training programs is a critical issue that has generated a large empirical and methodological literature (e.g., Lalonde, 1986; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman et al., 1999). In the United States, Job Corps is the main training program targeted to disadvantaged youth. It delivers a comprehensive bundle of benefits to approximately 61,000 participants a year at a cost of about $1.5 billion (US Department of Labor, 2015). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this large-scale training program, the United States Congress authorized the National Job Corps Study (NJCS), a randomized social experiment. The randomized nature of the NJCS was intended to provide uncontroversial findings given its reliance on weak assumptions relative to other evaluation methods (e.g., LaLonde, 1986; Heckman et al., 1999). Nevertheless, the NJCS was subject to non-compliance (e.g., only about 73 percent of treatment-group individuals enrolled in Job Corps). Under non-compliance, researchers typically focus on the “intention-to-treat” (ITT) effect that takes the randomization as the treatment of interest, or on the “local average treatment effect” (LATE) that corresponds to the effect of the training program for a particular subset of individuals. Both of these effects fall short in measuring the average effect of the training program for the population or for those undergoing training—parameters of first order importance in the evaluation literature (e.g., Heckman et al., 1999). To the best of our knowledge, there are no estimates of the latter parameters using data from the NJCS. In this paper, we fill this gap.

Estimation of the LATE in experiments where subjects do not comply with their randomized treatment assignment is accomplished by using the treatment assignment indicator as an instrumental variable for the actual treatment receipt indicator. Instrumental variable (IV) methods have been widely used in the literature of program evaluation due to their high internal validity. An influential framework for studying causality using IVs was developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994), and Angrist et al. (1996). They show that, in the presence of heterogeneous effects, IV estimators point identify the local average treatment effect (LATE) for compliers, a subpopulation whose treatment status is affected by the instrument. Common criticisms of their framework are the focus on the effect for a subpopulation and the instrument-specific interpretation of the LATE (e.g., Heckman, 1996; Robins and Greenland, 1996; Deaton, 2010; Heckman and Urzua, 2010). As a result, a growing literature pursues the external validity of IV methods. Point identification of population treatment effects usually requires an instrument to be strong enough to drive the probability of being treated from zero to one (e.g., Heckman, 2010), which is hard to satisfy in practice. Another strategy relies on stable IV estimates—conditional on observed covariates—that are revealed empirically. This strategy relies on the use of multiple instruments for the same causal relationship (e.g., Angrist and Fernandez-Val, 2013). Unfortunately, finding multiple IVs can be challenging in practice.

An alternative to point identification of treatment effects other than LATE using IVs is partial
identification. Manski (1990) pioneered partial identification of the population average treatment effect (ATE) under the mean independence assumption of the IV. Since then, there has been a growing literature on partial identification of the ATE with IV methods. One strand of this literature endeavors to improve Manski’s (1990) bounds by imposing different monotonicity assumptions. Manski (1997) derived bounds under the monotone treatment response (MTR) assumption, which asserts monotonicity of the outcome in the treatment. Manski and Pepper (2000) introduced the monotone instrumental variable (MIV) assumption, which states that mean response varies weakly monotonically across subpopulations with different levels of the instrument (as opposed to being constant, like in the traditional mean independence of the IV assumption). Chiburis (2010a) added the mean independence of the IV assumption to both the MTR assumption and a special case of the MIV assumption to derive bounds on ATE that do not require specifying the direction of the monotonicity a priori. Another strand of the partial identification literature employs structural models on the treatment or the outcome to derive bounds. For instance, under the statistical independence of the IV assumption, Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) imposed a threshold crossing model with a separable error on the treatment. Focusing on a binary outcome, Bhattacharya et al. (2008, 2012) and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) imposed threshold crossing models on both the treatment and the outcome; while Chiburis (2010b) considered a threshold crossing model on the outcome. Instead of assuming a threshold crossing model with separable errors, Chesher (2010) derived bounds by imposing a non-separable structural model on the outcome and assuming the structural function is weakly increasing in the non-separable error.

Given the alternative assumptions for partial identification of the ATE with IVs, a comparison of their identification power is important. First, the monotonicity assumption of the treatment in the IV (e.g., Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996; Balke and Pearl, 1997; Huber et al., 2015) and the structural model assumptions on the treatment (e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000) do not improve on the informational content (i.e., width) of Manski’s bounds derived under the mean independence of the IV assumption. This result for the ATE was first highlighted by Balke and Pearl (1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), and later extended to the identification of the potential outcome distributions for the entire population by Kitagawa (2009). More specifically, Balke and Pearl (1997) and Kitagawa (2009) showed that while the bounds on the ATE derived under the statistical independence of the IV assumption can be strictly narrower than Manski’s bounds derived under the weaker mean independence of the IV assumption, when monotonicity of the treatment in the IV is also imposed the data are constrained in such a way that the former bounds reduce to Manski’s mean-independence bounds. Similar results for the ATT have also been discussed in the literature (e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000; Huber et al., 2015). Second, monotonicity assumptions of the outcome in the treatment (e.g., Manski, 1997; Manski and Pepper, 2000) and the structural model assumptions on the outcome (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2008, 2012; Chiburis, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Vytal (2002) shows that the assumptions of independence and monotonicity of the IV on the treatment in the LATE approach are equivalent to those of structural threshold crossing models on the treatment.
(2010b; Chesher 2010; Shaikh and Vytlacil, 2011) do improve on Manski’s bounds. Third, partial identification with IV methods usually requires bounded support of the outcome, which is a reason why most papers focus on binary outcomes (e.g., Balke and Pearl, 1997; Bhattacharya et al., 2008, 2012; Hahn, 2010; Chiburis, 2010b; Shaikh and Vytlacil, 2011). It is worth noting that for the case of a binary outcome several of the assumptions (and bounds) are equivalent. For example, Machado et al. (2009) showed the equivalence between the MTR assumption and the threshold crossing model on the outcome, while Bhattacharya et al. (2008) showed that, in the absence of covariates, the bounds for a binary outcome under the MTR and mean independence of the IV assumptions are equivalent to those derived using threshold crossing models on both the treatment and the outcome.

This paper contributes to two different literatures. First, it contributes to the partial identification literature by deriving nonparametric sharp bounds for the $ATE$ and the average treatment effect on the treated ($ATT$) by extending the work of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996). The proposed bounds improve on Manski’s (1990) bounds and, importantly, while some of our bounds require a bounded outcome assumption, others do not. We consider the setting of a binary instrument and a binary treatment, which is common in the existing literature on partial identification of treatment effects with IV methods. We contribute to the methodological literature two different sets of assumptions. The first is monotonicity in the treatment of the average outcomes of principal strata, which are subpopulations defined by the joint potential values of the treatment status under each value of the instrument. Similar to Bhattacharya et al. (2008, 2012) and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011), we do not require prior knowledge about the direction of the monotonicity. However, in contrast to most of the existing literature (e.g., Manski and Pepper, 2000; Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Shaikh and Vytlacil, 2011), we impose monotonicity on the average outcomes of strata rather than on the outcome of each individual. This is important as it makes the assumption more plausible in practice by allowing some individuals to experience a treatment effect that has the opposite sign to the $ATE$ or $ATT$. In addition, empirical evidence on its plausibility can be gathered by estimating bounds on the average effects of the different strata without imposing this assumption. The second set of assumptions involves mean dominance assumptions across the potential outcomes of different strata, which have been shown to have significant identifying power in other settings (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008; Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2010, 2013; Chen and Flores, 2015; Huber et al., 2015). We propose to inform the direction of these mean dominance assumptions by comparing average baseline characteristics across strata that are likely to be highly correlated with the outcome.

In concurrent work to ours, Huber et al. (2015) also derived nonparametric sharp bounds on average treatment effects within the $LATE$ framework. While both sets of work employ principal strata and consider mean dominance assumptions across these subpopulations, there are important differences between them. We consider the assumption of monotonicity in the treatment of the average outcomes of principal strata, which contains identifying power (thus narrowing the bounds) and can be justified by economic theory in certain applications. Furthermore, we consider additional variants of the mean dominance assumption across strata. On the other hand, we impose on our
bounds the assumption of monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument, while Huber et al. (2015) also consider bounds that do not impose this assumption.\footnote{In general, estimated bounds without the assumption of monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument are wide in practice (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008; Blanco et al., 2013; Huber et al., 2015).

The fact that the ATT differs from the LATE in this application implies that there were individuals in the experimental control group that managed to participate in Job Corps. They amount to 4.3 percent of our sample and 11.2 percent of the treated individuals. The reasons why this took place in the NJCS are explained in Section 3.1.}

The second literature to which this paper contributes is the evaluation of the effectiveness of Job Corps, the largest federally-funded job training program for disadvantaged youth in the United States. Due to non-compliance, most studies evaluating Job Corps using data from the NJCS concentrate on ITT effects or on the LATE for individuals who comply with their random assignment (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that assesses the effectiveness of Job Corps for eligible applicants (the target population) and program participants (the treated population) on three important outcomes: weekly earnings, employment, and the yearly amount of public benefits received. To this end, we employ the bounds on the $ATE$ and the $ATT$ derived herein.

Using randomization into the program as an instrument for Job Corps participation, the narrowest estimated bounds on the $ATE$ four years after randomization derived under our assumptions are [$24.61, $201.04] for weekly earnings, $[.042, .163]$ for employment, and $[-$142.76, $-$84.29] for public benefits, with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals ruling out a zero effect. These results imply that the average effect of Job Corps participation for eligible applicants is an increase of at least 11.6 and 7.2 percent on weekly earnings and employment, respectively, and a decrease of at least 9.9 percent in yearly dependence on public benefits. As compared to other bounds in the literature, our estimated bounds are significantly narrower than the estimated IV bounds proposed by Manski (1990), Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), and Kitagawa (2009) when applied to our setting, and the ones by Huber et al. (2015). Our estimated bounds are also narrower than those under the combination of the mean independence of the IV and MTR assumptions in Manski and Pepper (2000)—especially for public benefits—as well as those under the previous two assumptions plus a special case of the MIV assumption in Chiburis (2010a). Our estimated bounds on employment are also narrower than the ones proposed by Balke and Pearl (1997), Bhattacharya et al. (2008, 2012), Chesher (2010), Chiburis (2010b), and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) for the case of a binary outcome. The estimated bounds on the average effects of Job Corps on participants ($ATT$) are substantially narrower than those on the $ATE$, providing a very tight interval where the true value of this effect lies.\footnote{The narrowest estimated bounds for the $ATT$ under our assumptions are [$28.67, $43.47] (about [13.5%, 20.4%]) for weekly earnings, $[.049, .093]$ (about [8.4%, 16%]) for employment, and $[-$140.29, $-$108.72] (about [$-16.5%$, $-12.8%$]) for public benefits, with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals ruling out a zero effect. In sum, our results indicate that Job Corps has significant effects on the three outcomes analyzed, both for the population of eligible applicants ($ATE$) and for program participants ($ATT$). Importantly, estimated bounds that do not assume}
the sign of the average effect of Job Corps on the outcomes for specific subpopulations are able to statistically rule out zero or negative \( ATEs \) and \( ATTs \) for weekly earnings and employment, as their 95 percent confidence intervals exclude zero.

Finally, as a by-product of our analysis, we also estimate bounds on the effects of Job Corps participation for different strata. From these estimated bounds, our most informative results are for the stratum comprised of individuals who choose to never enroll in Job Corps regardless of their treatment assignment (the so-called never takers). This stratum can be seen as relevant from a policy perspective because these individuals are part of the target population of Job Corps but decide against enrolling in it. In our application, slightly more than one out of every four individuals belongs to this stratum. Thus, it seems important to analyze whether these individuals would benefit, on average, from enrolling in Job Corps. Our preferred estimated bounds suggest that the average labor market outcomes of these individuals would be improved by participating in Job Corps. In particular, without imposing assumptions on the sign of the effects for this stratum, we find that their average weekly earnings and employment four years after randomization would be improved by at least $13.03 (5.8 percent) and 2.5 percentage points (4.2 percent), respectively, with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals ruling out a zero effect. However, other estimated bounds on the effects for this stratum are unable to statistically rule out a zero effect with 95 percent confidence.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup and the partial identification results on the \( ATE \) and \( ATT \), with proofs relegated to the Appendix. Section 3 employs those bounds to analyze the effectiveness of the Job Corps program, while Section 4 concludes.

## 2 Bounds on Average Treatment Effects

### 2.1 Setup and Benchmark Bounds

Consider a random sample of size \( n \) from a population. Let \( D_i \in \{0, 1\} \) indicate whether unit \( i \) is treated (\( D_i = 1 \)) or not (\( D_i = 0 \)), and let \( Z_i \in \{0, 1\} \) be an instrument for treatment. In our case, \( Z_i \) represents individual \( i \)’s assignment to enroll (\( Z_i = 1 \)) or not (\( Z_i = 0 \)) in Job Corps, while \( D_i \) represents her actual enrollment. Let \( D_i(1) \) and \( D_i(0) \) denote the treatment individual \( i \) would receive if \( Z_i = 1 \) or \( Z_i = 0 \), respectively. Let \( Y \) be the outcome (e.g., weekly earnings), and denote by \( Y_i(1) \) and \( Y_i(0) \) individual \( i \)’s potential outcomes under treatment \( D = d \), i.e., the outcomes individual \( i \) would experience if she received the treatment or not, respectively. Finally, let \( Y_i(z, d) \) be the potential outcome as a function of the instrument and the treatment. Our parameters of interest are the population average treatment effect, \( ATE = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)] \), and the average treatment effect on the treated, \( ATT = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|D_i = 1] \). For each unit, we observe \( \{Z_i, D_i(Z_i), Y_i(Z_i, D_i(Z_i))\} \). This setting has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Angrist et al., 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 2008). In what follows, we omit the subscript \( i \) unless necessary for clarity.

Angrist et al. (1996) partition the population into four strata based on the values of \( \{D_i(0), D_i(1)\} \): \( \{1, 1\} \), \( \{0, 0\} \), \( \{0, 1\} \) and \( \{1, 0\} \). Angrist et al.(1996)—and the subsequent literature—refer to these
strata as always takers ($at$), never takers ($nt$), compliers ($c$), and defiers ($d$), respectively. Angrist et al. (1996) impose the following assumptions, which we adopt hereafter:

**Assumption 1** (Randomized Instrument). \{\(Y(0,0), Y(0,1), Y(1,0), Y(1,1), D(0), D(1)\}\} is independent of \(Z\).

**Assumption 2** (Exclusion Restriction). \(Y_i(0,d) = Y_i(1,d) = Y_i(d), d \in \{0, 1\}\) for all \(i\).

**Assumption 3** (Nonzero First Stage). \(E[D(1) - D(0)] \neq 0\).

**Assumption 4** (Individual-Level Monotonicity of \(D\) in \(Z\)). Either \(D_i(1) \geq D_i(0)\) for all \(i\), or \(D_i(1) \leq D_i(0)\) for all \(i\).

Assumptions 1 through 3 are standard in the IV literature (e.g., Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996). Assumption 1 requires the instrument to be as good as randomly assigned, Assumption 2 requires that any effect of the instrument on the outcomes is through the treatment status only, and Assumption 3 requires the instrument to have a non-zero effect on the probability of receiving treatment. Assumption 4 rules out the existence of defiers (compliers) when the monotonicity is non-decreasing (non-increasing). The direction of the monotonicity can be inferred from the data given the independence of \(Z\). Following Bhattacharya et al. (2008), we order \(Z\) so that \(E[D|Z = 1] \geq E[D|Z = 0]\) to simplify notation in the rest of this section.

As discussed in Angrist et al. (1996), Assumptions 1 and 2 can be combined into one: \{\(Y(0), Y(1), D(0), D(1)\}\} is independent of \(Z\), which requires independence of the IV with respect to both the potential outcomes (as a function of the treatment) and the potential treatment statuses (as a function of the IV). The independence of the IV assumption we employ is equivalent to that used, for example, in Balke and Pearl (1997) and Kitagawa (2009). By the results in Vytlacil (2002), when monotonicity of \(D\) in \(Z\) is added, this assumption is also equivalent to that used, for example, in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and Bhattacharya et al. (2008). However, the assumption is stronger than the mean independence assumption in Manski (1990), which only requires mean independence of the potential outcomes from the instrument: \(E[Y(d)|Z] = E[Y(d)]\). An alternative to the IV Assumptions 1 and 2 would be to assume that the instrument is mean independent of the potential outcomes \(Y(0)\) and \(Y(1)\) within strata and also independent of the stratum proportions, as in Assumption 2 of Huber et al. (2015). Following results in Kitagawa (2009) and Huber et al. (2015), under this alternative assumption plus Assumption 4, the bounds presented below would be unchanged.

Let \(LATE_k = E[Y(1) - Y(0)|k]\) and \(\pi_k\) denote, respectively, the local (i.e., stratum-specific) average treatment effect and the stratum proportion in the population for stratum \(k\), with \(k = at, nt, c\). Let \(Y^{zd} = E[Y|Z = z, D = d]\) and \(p_{d|z} = Pr(D = d|Z = z)\). Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the following quantities are point identified (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996): \(\pi_{at} = p_{1|0}, \pi_{nt} = p_{0|1}, \pi = p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}, E[Y(1)|at] = Y^{11}, E[Y(0)|nt] = Y^{00}\) and \(LATE_c = (E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0])/p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}\). Thus, in this setting the conventional IV estimand point identifies \(LATE_c\), the local average treatment effect for compliers—units whose treatment status is affected
by the instrument.\footnote{Point identification of the rest of the quantities follows from Assumptions 1 and 4, as the latter implies that those observations with \( \{Z = 0, D = 1\} \) are always takers, and those with \( \{Z = 1, D = 0\} \) are never takers. For completeness, note that observations with \( \{Z = 0, D = 0\} \) are either never takers or compliers, while those with \( \{Z = 1, D = 1\} \) are either always takers or compliers.}

We start by partially identifying the \( \text{ATE} \). To this end, we write it as a function of the \( \text{LATE} \)s for always takers, never takers, and compliers:

\[
\text{ATE} = \pi_{at}\text{LATE}_{at} + \pi_{nt}\text{LATE}_{nt} + \pi_c\text{LATE}_c
\]

\[= p_{1|1}Y_{11} - p_{0|0}Y_{00} + p_{0|1}E[Y(1)|nt] - p_{1|0}E[Y(0)|at]; \tag{2}
\]

where \( E[Y|Z = z] = E[E[Y|Z = z, D = d]|Z = z] \) is used in the second line.

By equation (2), since \( Y(1) \) for never takers and \( Y(0) \) for always takers are never observed in the data, additional assumptions are needed to bound the \( \text{ATE} \). The most basic assumption considered in the previous literature (e.g., Manski, 1990) is the bounded support of the outcome.

**Assumption 5** (Bounded Outcome). \( Y(0), Y(1) \in [y^l, y^u] \).

This assumption states that the potential outcomes under the two treatment arms have bounded support. Replacing \( E[Y(1)|nt] \) and \( E[Y(0)|at] \) in equation (2) with either \( y^l \) or \( y^u \), sharp bounds on the \( \text{ATE} \) under Assumptions 1 through 5 can be obtained.

**Proposition 1** Under Assumptions 1 through 5 the bounds \( LB \leq \text{ATE} \leq UB \) are sharp, where

\[
LB = Y_{11}p_{1|1} - Y_{00}p_{0|0} + y^lp_{0|1} - y^up_{1|0} \\
UB = Y_{11}p_{1|1} - Y_{00}p_{0|0} + y^up_{0|1} - y^lp_{1|0}.
\]

The bounds in Proposition 1 are given here for reference since they represent a natural benchmark for the subsequent results. These bounds on the \( \text{ATE} \) coincide with the IV bounds in Manski (1990), Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), and Kitagawa (2009) when applied to the present setting; and with those in Huber et al. (2015). When the outcome is binary, these bounds also coincide with those in Balke and Pearl (1997).

### 2.2 Bounds on the \( \text{ATE} \) under Weak Monotonicity of Local Average Outcomes in the Treatment

The following is the first set of assumptions we consider to improve the identification power of the bounds in Proposition 1.

**Assumption 6** (Weak Monotonicity in \( D \) of Average Outcomes of Strata). (i) Either \( E[Y(1)|k] \geq E[Y(0)|k] \) for all \( k = at, nt, c \); or \( E[Y(1)|k] \leq E[Y(0)|k] \) for all \( k = at, nt, c \). (ii) \( E[Y(1) - Y(0)|c] \neq 0 \).
Assumption 6(i) requires that the LATEs of the three existing strata are all either non-negative or non-positive. Empirical evidence on its plausibility can be gathered by estimating bounds on LATE$_{at}$ and LATE$_{nt}$ under the mean dominance assumptions presented below, as illustrated in Section 3.5. Assumption 6(ii) is used to identify the direction of the monotonicity from the sign of the IV estimand (LATE$_c$) under the current assumptions. Note that, since we ordered $Z$ so that $E[D|Z = 1] \geq E[D|Z = 0]$ (i.e., $p_{1|1} - p_{1|0} \geq 0$), the ITT effect $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]$ and LATE$_c$ share the same sign.

Assumption 6 is similar to that in Bhattacharya et al. (2008), with the important distinction that we impose the restriction on the sign of the LATEs rather than on the sign of the individual-level treatment effects, which renders our assumption more plausible in practice by allowing some individuals to have a treatment effect of opposite sign to that of the ATE. In subsequent work, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) relaxed the individual-level restriction on the sign of the treatment effects in Bhattacharya et al. (2008) and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) by using the rank similarity assumption of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005). This assumption requires instead that the sign of the effect $Pr(Y(1) = 1|X,v) - Pr(Y(0) = 1|X,v)$ does not vary with $v$, where $v$ is the error term from the threshold crossing model on the treatment and $X$ is a set of observed exogenous variables determining the outcome. For a binary or non-binary outcome, and in the absence of covariates (or within subpopulations with the same values of the covariates), the rank similarity assumption in Bhattacharya et al. (2012) imposes that the sign of $E[Y(1) - Y(0)|v]$ does not vary with $v$. Given the known relation between $v$ and our three strata (e.g., Vytlacil, 2002; Angrist, 2004), this requirement implies—but is not implied by—the requirement in our Assumption 6 that the sign of $E[Y(1) - Y(0)|k]$ for all $k = at, nt, c$ does not vary with $k$, making the latter requirement weaker. In other words, Assumption 6 allows the sign of $E[Y(1) - Y(0)|v]$ to vary with $v$, as long as the LATEs of the three existing strata are all either non-negative or non-positive. This is important since the rank similarity assumption may be too strong in some applications (e.g., Frandsen and Lefgren, 2015).

The following proposition presents sharp bounds on the ATE under the additional Assumption 6.

**Proposition 2** Under Assumptions 1 through 6 the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

$$LB = E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]$$
$$UB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + y_u p_{0|1} - y_u p_{1|0};$$

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + y'_u p_{0|1} - y'_u p_{1|0}$$
$$UB = E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0].$$
Depending on the sign of $LATE_c$, either the lower or the upper bound in Proposition 2 improves upon the corresponding bound in Proposition 1. If $LATE_c > 0$, the lower bounds on $LATE_{at}$ and $LATE_{nt}$ become zero; otherwise, their upper bounds become zero. Consequently, depending on the sign of $LATE_c$, equation (1) implies that either the lower or upper bound on the $ATE$ equals the $ITT$ effect (which equals $\pi_c LATE_c$ since $\pi_c = p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}$). When the outcome is binary, the bounds in Proposition 2 coincide with those in Bhattacharya et al. (2008, 2012), Chesher (2010), Chiburis (2010b), and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) when applied to the current setting. Moreover, if $LATE_c$ is positive (negative) and Assumptions 1 to 6 hold, then the bounds in Proposition 2 equal the bounds obtained by imposing the mean independence of the IV assumption and the increasing (decreasing) MTR assumption in Manski and Pepper (2000). Importantly, MTR imposes monotonicity of the outcome in the treatment at the individual level, and it requires one to know the direction of the effect a priori. Similarly, depending on the sign of the individual effect, Bhattacharya et al. (2008) showed the equivalence of their bounds to those under the mean independence of the IV assumption and the MTR assumption for the case of a binary outcome. Thus, in the present setting, our results can be seen as an extension of those in Bhattacharya et al. (2008) to the case of a non-binary outcome.5

2.3 Bounds on the $ATE$ under Weak Mean Dominance across Strata

In practice, some strata tend to have characteristics that make them more likely to have higher mean potential outcomes than others. In general, the assumptions to be postulated below imply a ranking of some of the three strata in terms of their mean potential outcomes. Intuitively, given that some of those mean potential outcomes are point identified, this ranking will imply bounds on the unidentified mean potential outcomes $E[Y(1)|nt]$ and $E[Y(0)|at]$. Often times, the postulated ranking of strata can be informed by economic theory (see, e.g., Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2013) and, if pre-treatment characteristics are available, the empirical soundness of the ranking can be assessed, as illustrated in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.6,7

The three alternative assumptions below formalize the notion that, under the same treatment status, never takers have the highest average potential outcomes among the three strata, while always takers have the lowest. Alternative rankings across strata, which may be more appropriate for other applications, are certainly possible. The particular direction of the weak mean dominance assumptions we employ is consistent with our analysis of the effectiveness of Job Corps, as we discuss

5See Bhattacharya et al. (2008) for a discussion of the trade-off between the MTR assumption of Manski and Pepper (2000) and the assumption of monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument at the individual level.

6Assumptions 7a-7c below are implied by single index models in the context of linear selection models, which can be useful in linking the specific postulated ranking of the strata to the relevant economic theory (see, e.g., Angrist (2004) for an example relating principal strata to a single index selection model).

7Assumptions similar in spirit to—but fundamentally different from—our weak mean dominance across strata have been proposed in the literature, such as the monotone treatment selection in Manski and Pepper (2000), the stochastic dominance assumption in Blundell et al. (2007), and the positive quadrant dependence assumption in Bhattacharya et al. (2012). The main difference is that our assumptions are imposed at the average level of principal strata.
in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. We consider three alternative mean dominance assumptions to provide more options to applied researchers wanting to implement our bounds, as some of them may be more plausible than others in certain applications.

Assumption 7a. \( E[Y(d)|\text{at}] \leq E[Y(d)|\text{nt}] \) for \( d = 0, 1 \).

Assumption 7b. \( E[Y(0)|\text{at}] \leq E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] \) and \( E[Y(1)|\text{nt}] \geq E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] \).

Assumption 7c. \( E[Y(0)|\text{at}] \leq E[Y(0)|c] \) and \( E[Y(1)|\text{nt}] \geq E[Y(1)|c] \).

The always takers and never takers are likely to be the most “extreme” strata in many applications, so Assumption 7a may be viewed as the weakest of the three. Assumption 7b compares the mean \( Y(0) \) and \( Y(1) \) of the always takers and never takers, respectively, to those of a weighted average of the other two strata, while Assumption 7c compares them to those of the compliers.\(^8\) Note that it is possible for Assumption 7b to hold even if either Assumption 7a or 7c does not hold, providing a middle ground between Assumptions 7a and 7c in some applications. For instance, it is possible to have \( E[Y(0)|\text{at}] > E[Y(0)|c] \) and \( E[Y(0)|\text{at}] \leq E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] \), if \( E[Y(0)|\text{nt}] \) and the proportions of compliers and never takers are such that the latter inequality holds. Huber et al. (2015) consider an assumption similar in spirit to Assumption 7c, but they do not consider assumptions similar to 7a or 7b (nor Assumption 6).\(^9\) Although none of these assumptions is directly testable, it is possible to obtain indirect evidence about their plausibility by comparing relevant average pre-treatment characteristics—e.g., pre-treatment outcomes—of the different strata (e.g., Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2010, 2013; Bampasidou et al., 2014; Chen and Flores, 2015). For Assumption 7c, the direction may also be informed by comparing point identified quantities, \( E[Y(1)|\text{at}] \) to \( E[Y(1)|c] \) and \( E[Y(0)|\text{nt}] \) to \( E[Y(0)|c] \), to the extent that the inequalities in Assumption 7c also hold under the alternative treatment status.

We present bounds under Assumptions 1 through 5 and each of the three versions of Assumption 7. Due to the direction of the mean dominance inequalities in Assumption 7, in each case the lower bound is higher than that in Proposition 1, while the upper bound is the same. Each lower bound below follows by substituting in equation (2) the unidentified terms with the point-identified bounds implied by the corresponding version of Assumption 7—for example, Assumption 7a implies \( E[Y(1)|\text{nt}] \) is bounded below by \( Y^{01} \) and \( E[Y(0)|\text{at}] \) is bounded above by \( Y^{10} \).

**Proposition 3** Let \( UB = Y^{11}p_{1|1} - Y^{00}p_{0|0} + y^ap_{0|1} - y^f p_{1|0} \). Then,

(a) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7a the bounds \( LB \leq ATE \leq UB \) are sharp, where

\[
LB = Y^{11}p_{1|1} - Y^{00}p_{0|0} + Y^{01}p_{0|1} - Y^{10}p_{1|0};
\]

\(^8\)Note that \( E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] = \frac{E_{c_0+c_n}}{E_{c_0+c_n}} E[Y(0)|c] + \frac{E_{c_0+c_n}}{E_{c_0+c_n}} E[Y(0)|nt] \), with an analogous equation holding for \( E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] \).

\(^9\)They assume the mean potential outcomes of compliers are not lower than those of always and never takers.
(b) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7b the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11} - \bar{Y}^{00};$$

(c) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7c the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + \frac{\bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{01}p_{1|0}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}}p_{0|1} - \frac{\bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} - \bar{Y}^{10}p_{0|1}}{p_{0|1} - p_{1|0}}p_{1|0}.$$

We now consider the combination of Assumption 6 with Assumptions 7a through 7c. In this case, if $LATE_c < 0$, there are testable implications because the following inequalities are expected to hold: $\bar{Y}^{01} \leq \bar{Y}^{10}$ (under Assumption 7a); $\bar{Y}^{01} \leq \bar{Y}^{00}$ and $\bar{Y}^{11} \leq \bar{Y}^{10}$ (under 7b); $\bar{Y}^{01} \leq E[Y(0)|c]$ and $E[Y(1)|c] \leq \bar{Y}^{10}$ (under 7c). If any of these inequalities is rejected in a given application, then the data provide statistical evidence against the validity of the corresponding assumptions. The following three propositions provide the resulting bounds when Assumptions 6 and each one of Assumptions 7a through 7c are combined.

**Proposition 4** Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7a the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0,$

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + \max\{\bar{Y}^{10}, \bar{Y}^{01}\}p_{0|1} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{10}, \bar{Y}^{01}\}p_{1|0}$$

$$UB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + y^u p_{0|1} - y^l p_{1|0};$$

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0,$

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + \bar{Y}^{01}p_{0|1} - \bar{Y}^{10}p_{1|0}$$

$$UB = E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0].$$

**Proposition 5** Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7b the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0,$

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + \max\{\bar{Y}^{10}, \bar{Y}^{11}\}p_{0|1} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{01}, \bar{Y}^{00}\}p_{1|0}$$

$$UB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + y^u p_{0|1} - y^l p_{1|0};$$

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0,$

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11} - \bar{Y}^{00}$$

$$UB = E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0].$$

**Proposition 6** Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7c the bounds $LB \leq ATE \leq UB$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0,$

$$LB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + \max\{\bar{Y}^{10}, \frac{\bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{01}p_{1|0}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}}\}p_{0|1} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{01}, \frac{\bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} - \bar{Y}^{10}p_{0|1}}{p_{0|1} - p_{1|0}}\}p_{1|0}$$

$$UB = \bar{Y}^{11}p_{1|1} - \bar{Y}^{00}p_{0|0} + y^u p_{0|1} - y^l p_{1|0};$$
and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$LB = \sum_{i=0}^{1} Y^{i} p_{1|i} - \sum_{i=0}^{0} Y^{0} p_{0|i} + \sum_{i=0}^{1} \frac{Y^{1} p_{1|i} - Y^{0} p_{1|i}}{p_{0|i} - p_{1|i}} - \sum_{i=0}^{0} \frac{Y^{0} p_{0|i} - Y^{1} p_{0|i}}{p_{0|i} - p_{1|i}}.$$

$$UB = E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0].$$

If $LATE_c < 0$, the bounds in Propositions 4 through 6 do not require boundedness of the outcome because Assumption 6 improves upon the upper bound in Proposition 1, while Assumption 7 improves upon the lower bound. These are the three instances in which our bounds dispose of the bounded-outcome assumption (Assumption 5). In contrast, if $LATE_c > 0$, Assumptions 6 and 7 each improves only upon the lower bound in Proposition 1, which introduces minimum and maximum operators. These operators arise because in this case there are two possible bounds for each of the unidentified objects $E[Y(1)|nt]$ and $E[Y(0)|at]$, and one must choose the larger or smaller of them (depending on whether in equation (2) the object enters with a positive or negative sign, respectively) to obtain a tight lower bound. For instance, take $LB$ under Proposition 4 when $LATE_c > 0$: $E[Y(1)|nt]$ is bounded from below by $\max \{ \sum_{i=0}^{1} Y^{i}, \sum_{i=0}^{0} Y^{0} \}$ because it can be bounded from below by the average outcome of the $at$ under treatment ($\sum_{i=0}^{0} Y^{0}$) following Assumption 7a, or by the average outcome of the $nt$ under control ($\sum_{i=0}^{1} Y^{i}$) such that $LATE_{nt} > 0$ following Assumption 6. Similar intuition applies to the lower bounds when $LATE_c > 0$ under Propositions 5 and 6.

The bounds in Propositions 4 through 6 are narrower than the bounds in Proposition 2 and the corresponding bounds in Proposition 3. This is because, under the combined assumptions, the weak monotonicity assumption on the local average outcomes (Assumption 6) improves further upon either the lower or upper bound in Proposition 3, depending on the sign of $LATE_c$, while the weak mean dominance assumptions further improve upon the lower bound in Proposition 2. Hence, relative to the bounds in Huber et al. (2015) that use all their assumptions, the addition of Assumption 6 results in narrower bounds.

The bounds in Proposition 5 coincide with the bounds derived by Chiburis (2010a) under the MTR assumption (without specifying the direction a priori), the decreasing monotone treatment selection or MTS assumption (a special case of the MIV assumption, where the instrument is the realized treatment), and the mean independence of the IV assumption. This is because Assumption 7b coincides with the decreasing MTS assumption imposed on the counterfactual average outcomes of always takers and never takers (i.e., $E[Y(0)|at]$ and $E[Y(1)|nt]$). For a binary outcome, the bounds in Proposition 5 also coincide with the bounds in Bhattacharya et al. (2012) derived under the assumptions of independence of the IV, rank similarity, and negative quadrant dependence between the error terms from threshold crossing models on the treatment and the outcome.

As a final note, the bounds in Proposition 6 are also the sharp bounds for the $ATE$ if we replace Assumption 7c with the assumption $E[Y(d)|at] \leq E[Y(d)|c] \leq E[Y(d)|nt]$ for $d = 0, 1$. Interestingly, however, since $E[Y(d)|c]$ may be more difficult to estimate in practice than $E[Y|Z = d, D = d]$ (e.g., if the IV is weak and $p_{1|i} - p_{1|0}$ is close to zero), the estimated bounds in Proposition 5 (using
Assumption 7b) could produce narrower confidence intervals in practice than the estimated bounds based on Proposition 6.

2.4 Bounds on the ATT

This subsection motivates the construction of bounds on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Since the treated subpopulation is a mixture of the compliers and always takers strata (e.g., see footnote 4), the ATT equals a weighted average of \( LATE_{at} \) and \( LATE_c \) (see also, e.g., Angrist, 2004, or Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Section 4.4.2). Letting \( q_z \equiv \Pr(Z = z) \) and \( r_1 \equiv \Pr(D = 1) \), we write the ATT using iterated expectations as:

\[
ATT = \sum_{z=0,1} Pr(Z = z|D = 1) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Z = z, D = 1]
\]

\[
= \frac{q_1}{r_1} (\pi_c LATE_c + \pi_{at} LATE_{at}) + \frac{q_0 \pi_{at}}{r_1} LATE_{at}
\]

\[
= \frac{q_1 \pi_c}{r_1} LATE_c + \frac{\pi_{at}}{r_1} LATE_{at}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{r_1} [q_1 (E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\overline{Y}^{01} - E[Y(0)|at])].
\]

The second line uses Bayes’ rule to rewrite the conditional probabilities, along with the fact that those treated under \( Z = 0 \) are always takers, and those treated under \( Z = 1 \) are either always takers or compliers (e.g., see footnote 8). Equation (3) expresses the ATT as a weighted average of \( LATE_c \) and \( LATE_{at} \), whose weights can be shown to add to one. The last equation is obtained by substituting the expressions for the stratum proportions, \( LATE_c \), and the point-identified term \( E[Y(1)|at] \). It writes the ATT as a weighted average of the ITT effect and \( LATE_{at} \).

Based on equation (4), only assumptions on \( E[Y(0)|at] \) are required to bound the ATT. We employ similar assumptions to those used to derive bounds on the ATE. The expressions for such bounds are presented in the Appendix under propositions labeled Proposition 1’ to Proposition 6’, in parallel to those previously presented for the ATE.\(^{10}\)

2.5 Estimation and Inference

The objects in the expressions of the bounds derived above can be estimated with sample analogs. However, complications for estimation and inference arise in the bounds that involve minimum (min) or maximum (max) operators. First, because of the concavity (convexity) of the min (max) function, sample analog estimators of the bounds can be severely biased in small samples. Second, closed-form characterization of the asymptotic distribution of estimators for parameters involving min or

\(^{10}\)In general, the previous discussions on our ATE bounds (e.g., those on whether each assumption improves the lower or upper bound) apply in an analogous way to the ATT bounds. Other work that derives bounds on the ATT under mean independence assumptions is Huber et al. (2015). Under monotonicity of \( D \) in \( Z \) (Assumption 4), those bounds coincide with our bounds in Proposition 1’ in the Appendix. Like for the ATE, given that the weak monotonicity assumption on local average outcomes (Assumption 6) also has identifying power for the ATT, adding this assumption results in narrower bounds relative to the ATT bounds in Huber et al. (2015) that use all their assumptions.
max functions are very difficult to derive and, thus, usually unavailable. Furthermore, Hirano and
Porter (2012) showed that there exist no locally asymptotically unbiased estimators and no regular
estimators for parameters that are nonsmooth functionals of the underlying data distribution, such
as those involving min or max operators.

To deal with those issues, for bounds containing min or max operators we employ the methodology
proposed by Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) to obtain confidence regions for the true parameter
value, as well as half-median unbiased estimators for the lower and upper bounds. The half-median-
unbiasedness property means that the upper (lower) bound estimator exceeds (falls below) the true
value of the upper (lower) bound with probability at least one half asymptotically. This is an
important property because achieving local asymptotic unbiasedness is not possible, implying that
bias-correction procedures cannot completely remove local bias, and reducing bias too much would
eventually make the variance of such procedure diverge (Hirano and Porter, 2012). For details on our
implementation of Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen’s method see Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2013).
For the bounds without min or max operators, we use sample analog estimators and construct the
confidence regions for the true parameter value proposed by Imbens and Manski (2004).11

3 Bounds on Average Treatment Effects of Job Corps Training

3.1 The Job Corps Program and Data

Job Corps is the largest and most comprehensive education and job training program in the United
States. It serves economically disadvantaged youth through the delivery of academic education, voca-
tional training, residential living, health care and health education, counseling, and job placement
assistance. Since its creation in 1964, Job Corps has served over 2 million young people (U.S. De-
partment of Labor, 2015). Eligibility into the program is based on age (16 to 24), being economically
disadvantaged, being high school dropout or in need of additional education or vocational training,
not being on probation or parole; and being free of serious medical or behavioral problems. Approx-
imately 70 percent of Job Corps enrollees are members of minority groups, and 75 percent are high
school dropouts (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015). The average length of stay for participants is 8.2
months, with an average number of academic and vocational hours received in Job Corps comparable
to that of a regular year of high school education (Schochet et al., 2001).

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Labor funded the National Job Corps Study (NJCS)
to assess the program effectiveness. We use data from the NJCS, whose main feature was the
randomization of eligible applicants into a treatment group allowed to enroll in Job Corps and a
control group barred from receiving Job Corps services for three years. Eligible applicants were
taken at random from the 48 contiguous U.S. states, making this social experiment one of the few
with nationally representative character. From a randomly selected research sample of 15,386 first

11The Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence regions we employ are valid for situations where the width of the bounds
on the parameter of interest is bounded away from zero (Stoye, 2009).
time eligible applicants, 61 percent (9,409) were assigned to the treatment group and 39 percent (5,977) to the control group. These individuals were interviewed at baseline (randomization) and followed with surveys at weeks 52, 130, and 208 after randomization (Schochet et al., 2001).

Randomization in the NJCS took place before participants’ assignment to a Job Corps center. As a result, there is an important degree of non-compliance as only about 73 percent of individuals in the treatment group actually enrolled in Job Corps, while about 1.4 percent of individuals in the control group managed to enroll in Job Corps during the three-year embargo due to staff errors (Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008). Counting individuals in the control group that enrolled in Job Corps after the embargo was lifted, the latter percentage increases to 4.3 percent. Non-compliance is a very common occurrence in randomized experiments, which typically forces researchers to change their original goal of estimating the causal effect of receiving treatment for the population (e.g., eligible applicants) or those receiving treatment (e.g., Job Corps participants), to that of estimating effects for a different treatment or subpopulation. For example, in order to take full advantage of randomization, most of the previous evaluations of Job Corps using the NJCS data estimate the \textit{ITT} effect or the \textit{LATE}_c (e.g., Burghardt et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008; Lee, 2009; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2010). In the case of the \textit{ITT} effect, the randomization indicator is employed in lieu of the actual treatment receipt indicator, which implies that the effect being estimated is that of being offered participation in Job Corps, rather than the effect of actual Job Corps participation. As a result, focusing on \textit{ITT} effects tends to dilute the impacts of Job Corps (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Chen and Flores, 2015). In the case of the \textit{LATE}_c, the randomization indicator is used as an IV for actual program enrollment, identifying the effect of Job Corps participation for the subpopulation of compliers. In our application, the results below show this effect is representative of only about 69 percent of eligible Job Corps applicants, which equals the percentage of individuals who enrolled in the program during the four years after randomization because of being assigned to enroll (i.e., the compliers).

To our knowledge, the previous literature on the effectiveness of Job Corps using data from the NJCS has not analyzed the effects of Job Corps participation on the population of eligible applicants (\textit{ATE}) or the group of participants (\textit{ATT}), both of which are very important populations from a policy perspective. We fill this gap by undertaking inference on these two parameters. The outcome variables we consider are weekly earnings and employment at week 208 after random assignment, and public assistance benefits received during the fourth year after randomization.\textsuperscript{12}

To conduct our analysis, we start with the original NJCS sample of individuals that responded to the 48-month interview (11,313 individuals, 4,485 in control and 6,828 in treatment groups) and drop cases with missing information on three key variables: the outcomes, the randomization indicator, and the indicator for actual enrollment in Job Corps. Given that the cases with missing information

\textsuperscript{12}The public benefits included in our outcome are: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Retirement, Disability, or Survivor (SSA), and General Assistance. These programs are also the ones primarily analyzed in Schochet et al. (2001), and the total amount of public benefits received from them is directly available in the NJCS data.
on labor market outcomes (weekly earnings and employment) and receipt of public benefits are different, we construct two samples. The first sample, for labor market outcomes, consists of 10,520 individuals (4,187 in control and 6,333 in treatment groups), while the second sample, for receipt of public benefits, consists of 10,976 individuals (4,387 in control and 6,589 in treatment groups). Throughout the analysis, we employ NJCS-provided design weights, since due to both design and programmatic reasons some subpopulations had different sampling probabilities (Schochet et al., 2001).

Table 1 reports a selection of average baseline characteristics for both samples by random assignment status (Z), along with the proportion of missing values for each variable. As one would expect given the randomization in the NJCS, and consistent with the original NJCS reports, the differences in average pre-treatment characteristics between treatment and control groups are statistically insignificant in both samples. Thus, both samples maintain the balance of baseline variables between treatment and control groups. The means of the variables are also in line with the characteristics of eligible Job Corps applicants in other studies (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008; Lee, 2009; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2010). For instance, the typical individual is 18 years old, a minority, never married, without a job in the previous year, with low weekly earnings (about $110), and received public benefits (59 percent of eligible applicants did).

3.2 Assessment of Assumptions and Preliminary Estimates

In this subsection we undertake an assessment of our assumptions in the context of evaluating the effects of Job Corps, and also discuss some preliminary estimates of objects that are point identified.

3.2.1 Assumption 1 to Assumption 4

Assumption 1 is random assignment of the instrument, which in our context is satisfied by design. Assumption 2 is the exclusion restriction assumption, which states that random assignment (the instrument) has an effect on the outcomes exclusively through enrollment in Job Corps (the treatment). This assumption is likely satisfied in the present context, and has been widely used in the Job Corps literature (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015). However, there could be threats to its validity. For instance, this assumption could be violated if some individuals become overly discouraged by receiving the random control assignment that their labor market outcomes or public benefits are affected. This type of responses may directly affect the short run outcomes of those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that assignment to Job Corps has a negligible effect on long run outcomes like the ones we consider through channels other than Job Corps participation, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015).
The top panel of Table 2 shows some relevant estimates for our two analysis samples (each sample in a vertical panel of the table). The first two rows show estimated averages for the groups with $Z = 1$ (randomly assigned to treatment group) and $Z = 0$ (randomly assigned to control group). By looking at the columns “Enrollment” (in Job Corps) in both the labor market outcomes sample and the public benefits sample, it is clear that non-compliance behavior is similar across the two samples: 73 percent of individuals in the group with $Z = 1$ enrolled in Job Corps, while 4.3 percent of individuals in the group with $Z = 0$ enrolled in Job Corps at some point during the 208 weeks after randomization. The entries in the other columns show the mean outcomes in each of the groups with $Z = 1$ and $Z = 0$. Assumption 3 states that random assignment has a non-zero average effect on enrollment in Job Corps. This is clearly the case in each sample by looking at the $\text{ITT}$ estimates on “Enrollment” (third row). The estimated effect of random assignment on Job Corps enrollment is a highly statistically significant 0.69 in both samples. The other estimated $\text{ITT}$ effects on that row pertain to the outcomes and are highly statistically significant as well. They are $22.19, 0.038$ percentage points, and $-84.29$ for weekly earnings, employment (both at week 208 after randomization), and public benefits during year 4 after randomization, respectively.

To point identify the average effect of Job Corps participation for compliers ($\text{LATE}_c$), individual-level weak monotonicity of Job Corps enrollment in the instrument (Assumption 4) is needed (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996). This assumption has considerable identifying power for $\text{LATE}_c$ (allowing point identification), and for our bounds on $\text{ATE}$ and $\text{ATT}$ (see footnote 2). In our context, Assumption 4 requires that no individual enrolls in Job Corps if assigned to the control group but does not enroll if assigned to participate in Job Corps. This assumption has been used previously in the Job Corps literature (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Frumento et al., 2012; Chen and Flores, 2015), and seems plausible since it is unlikely that eligible applicants would enroll in Job Corps only if denied access to it.

The fourth row in the top panel of Table 2 presents $\text{LATE}_c$ estimates under Assumptions 1 to 4. The estimates are $32.29, 0.055$, and $-122.28$ for weekly earnings, employment, and public benefits, respectively; and are all highly statistically significant. As usual, the $\text{LATE}_c$ estimates are larger in absolute value than the corresponding $\text{ITT}$ estimates because the former equal the latter divided by the effect of random assignment on enrollment. These results on the $\text{ITT}$ and $\text{LATE}_c$ are consistent with the findings from the NJCS in Burghardt et al. (2001) and Schochet et al. (2008).

Under Assumptions 1 to 4 it is also possible to point identify the proportion of each stratum in the population. These point estimates are shown in the second panel of Table 2. In both samples, the proportion of compliers is the largest (69 percent), followed by never takers (27 percent) and always takers (4 percent). Hence, 69 percent of the individuals would enroll in Job Corps if offered the opportunity to do so, and would not enroll otherwise. About 1 in 4 eligible individuals—the never takers—decides not to participate in Job Corps regardless of whether or not they are offered the opportunity to do so. This can be a subpopulation of interest from a policy perspective, as these
individuals are part of the target population of Job Corps but would not participate in the program even if given the opportunity. If their outcomes could be improved by participating in Job Corps, there may be gains from finding ways to encourage them to enroll. Below, we gather evidence on the average effects of Job Corps for never takers ($LATE_{nt}$), and consider the characteristics of the individuals in this stratum to shed light on the possible reasons why they decide not to participate in Job Corps.

### 3.2.2 Assumption 5 and Assumption 6

The next assumptions to consider are those added to the usual IV assumptions to construct our bounds. Assumption 5 is that the outcome is bounded, which is required in all but three instances of our bounds. Employment is naturally bounded in $[0, 1]$. For variables without natural bounds, a common practice in the bounding literature, which we also adopt here, is to use the observed in-sample maximum and minimum values for outcomes such as earnings and public benefits.\(^{15}\)

In turn, Assumption 6 imposes weak monotonicity in the treatment (Job Corps participation) of the mean outcomes of each stratum. Since under Assumptions 1 to 4 $LATE_c$ is point identified, Assumption 6 becomes an assumption on the signs of $LATE_{at}$ and $LATE_{nt}$. Under this assumption, those signs are identified from the sign of $LATE_c$ for each outcome. Given the $LATE_c$ estimates in Table 2, Assumption 6 imposes non-negative $LATE$s for weekly earnings and employment, and non-positive $LATE$s for public benefits. Based on the characteristics of Job Corps and its stated goals (see Section 3.1), along with the long-term nature of the outcomes we consider (which mitigate potential “lock-in” effects—van Ours, 2004), we expect that, on average, the effects of Job Corps on always and never takers will have the postulated signs in Assumption 6 for each outcome. Put differently, we would not expect that, on average, Job Corps would harm the outcomes of always or never takers. For labor market outcomes, this assumption seems consistent with conventional human capital models. Empirical evidence on the plausibility of Assumption 6 can be gathered by analyzing estimated bounds on $LATE_{nt}$ and $LATE_{at}$ that do not impose this assumption. Below we present cases in which such bounds are able to determine the sign of these parameters in our application, with the results being consistent with the directions implied by Assumption 6.

### 3.2.3 Assumption 7

Assumption 7 imposes weak mean dominance of potential outcomes across different strata. As mentioned in Section 2.3, the (weak) ranking of the average potential outcomes of strata can be informed by the estimates of mean outcomes point identified under Assumptions 1 through 4. The third panel of Table 2 reports a number of estimated mean outcomes for different strata and observed

\(^{15}\)Specifically, in our application, weekly earnings and public benefits are bounded in $[0, 865.67]$ and $[0, 7871.2]$, respectively. These bounds are calculated using the transformed outcome measures described below in footnote 17.
groups, and the last panel shows relevant average outcome differences.\textsuperscript{16,17} The estimated means follow a certain pattern in each of the samples: under the treatment status (enrolling in Job Corps), the mean outcome for always takers \( (E[Y(1)|at]) \) is the smallest, followed by the mean outcome for the mixture of always takers and compliers \( (E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1]) \), and the mean outcome for compliers \( (E[Y(1)|c]) \). Under the control status (not enrolling in Job Corps), the mean outcome for compliers \( (E[Y(0)|c]) \) is the smallest, followed by the mean outcome for the mixture of never takers and compliers \( (E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0]) \), and the mean outcome for never takers \( (E[Y(0)|nt]) \). This ordering is consistent with the general notion of Assumption 7—that the compliers have better average potential outcomes than the always takers, but worse than the never takers.

We now employ these point estimates to inform the plausibility of the different versions of Assumption 7. Although it is not possible to compare the mean of the same potential outcomes for all three strata, the estimated mean outcomes in Table 2 suggest that never takers and always takers are the two “extreme” groups pertaining to their mean outcomes. Thus, Assumption 7a that compares these two strata under the same treatment status seems plausible. Regarding Assumption 7b, given that the never takers appear to have the more favorable outcomes, followed by the compliers and then the always takers, it seems plausible in our application. Moreover, for the labor market outcomes under Assumption 6 (so \( LATE_{at} \geq 0 \)), the fact that \( Y^{00} = E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] \) is (statistically) significantly larger than \( Y^{01} = E[Y(1)|at] \) implies that the first inequality in Assumption 7b \( (E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] \geq E[Y(0)|at]) \) holds.\textsuperscript{18} Regarding Assumption 7c, the inequalities \( E[Y(1)|at] \leq E[Y(1)|c] \) and \( E[Y(0)|c] \leq E[Y(0)|nt] \) can shed light on the plausibility of this assumption to the extent that these relationships also hold under the alternative treatment status. As shown in Table 2, \( E[Y(1)|c] \) is statistically greater than \( E[Y(1)|at] \) for both labor market outcomes, providing indirect evidence in favor of the first inequality of Assumption 7c \( (E[Y(0)|at] \leq E[Y(0)|c]) \). Similarly, for weekly earnings, \( E[Y(0)|nt] \) is statistically larger than \( E[Y(0)|c] \) with a 0.10 significance level, offering indirect evidence in favor of the second inequality of Assumption 7c \( (E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y(1)|c]) \). The rest of the comparisons are not statistically different from zero, providing no indirect evidence against Assumption 7c. Lastly, recall that for the case of public benefits, in which the estimated \( LATE_{c} \) is negative, there are testable implications under Assumptions 1 through 7 (see Section 2.3). They are shown in the last five rows of Table 2, with

\textsuperscript{16} Remember that the non-identified quantities in equation (2) are \( E[Y(0)|at] \) and \( E[Y(1)|nt] \).

\textsuperscript{17} We follow Lee (2009) and use a transformed measure of weekly earnings and public benefits to minimize the effect of outliers in the estimation of sample means. Specifically, the observed outcome distribution for each of those two outcomes is split into 20 percentile groups \((5^{th}, 10^{th}, \ldots, 95^{th})\), and the mean outcome within each of the 20 groups is assigned to each individual. The use of this transformation is inconsequential for the main conclusions of the analysis below. The main impact of the transformation occurs on the upper or lower bounds in which Assumption 5 (bounded outcome) is necessary, since in those cases the extreme values are directly used in the estimation of those bounds. The results using the raw data are available from the corresponding author upon request.

\textsuperscript{18} A similar argument could be made for the second inequality in Assumption 7b if \( Y^{10} = E[Y(0)|nt] \) were statistically larger than \( Y^{11} = E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] \), but for the labor market outcomes they are not statistically different from each other. Note, however, that this does not contradict the assumptions, as it is still possible to have \( E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y(0)|nt] \) (Assumption 6) and \( E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] \) (Assumption 7b).
the first of them corresponding to Assumption 7a, the next two to Assumption 7b, and the last two to Assumption 7c. All five testable implications are soundly satisfied in our application. Overall, the estimated average outcomes in Table 2 do not provide evidence against the different versions of Assumption 7, and their ordering conforms to that implied by Assumption 7.

### 3.2.4 More on Assumption 7: Analysis of Average Baseline Characteristics of Strata

An additional way to gather indirect evidence on Assumption 7 is to compare average baseline characteristics of the strata that are likely to be highly correlated with the outcomes considered (e.g., Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2010, 2013; Bampasidou, et al., 2014). For instance, Assumption 7c would be less likely to hold for a particular outcome if the average baseline characteristics likely to be highly correlated to that outcome would make compliers more likely to have higher mean potential outcomes than never takers, or lower mean outcomes than always takers. Similarly, Assumption 7a would be less likely to hold if those average baseline characteristics for the always takers would make them more likely to have higher mean potential outcomes than the never takers.\(^{19}\) In addition, comparing the average baseline characteristics of the different strata can help to gain intuition on the results from Table 2 that suggest that never takers may have the highest average potential outcomes for the labor market outcomes (earnings and employment) but also for the public benefits outcome (in both cases followed by compliers and then always takers), which at first may seem counterintuitive.

Tables 3 and 4 (for each analysis sample, respectively) show estimated averages of selected pre-treatment characteristics by stratum, along with differences in averages across strata.\(^{20,21}\) The estimates are similar in the two samples. We start by considering the labor market outcomes of never and always takers. The stratum of never takers appears to have average pre-treatment characteristics that are highly related to better labor market outcomes, as individuals in this stratum are more likely to be older, have higher level of education at baseline, have personal income above $9,000 (and less likely to have personal income below $3,000), and, importantly, to have better labor market outcomes the year prior to randomization and at baseline (e.g., earnings). By contrast, individuals in the always takers stratum are more likely to be younger, have lower level of education at baseline,

\(^{19}\)For Assumption 7b, one can also compute the average baseline characteristics of the groups \(\{Z = 0, D = 0\}\) and \(\{Z = 1, D = 1\}\). While we omit these results for brevity, the results shown below for the different strata are also informative of Assumption 7b.

\(^{20}\)Under Assumptions 1 and 4 the average baseline characteristics of all strata are point identified from the observed means of those characteristics for the four groups given by the values of \(\{Z, D\}\), as each of them is a weighted average of the mean characteristics of different strata (see footnotes 4 and 8), with the weights being point identified. We employ a GMM approach to estimate the average baseline characteristics of the strata because the number of moment conditions exceeds the number of parameters. See the Appendix for details.

\(^{21}\)We impute missing values for each of the pre-treatment variables with the mean of the corresponding variable, as in Lee (2009). If observations with missing values of pre-treatment variables are completely random, the imputed means will tend to bias the estimates of the average baseline characteristics by stratum towards their population mean, thus making it more difficult to find differences across strata. Note that for most of the selected pre-treatment variables in Tables 3 and 4, including most of the labor market characteristics, the proportion of missing values is zero or no larger than 0.034. With the exception of the household income variables, this proportion is no larger than 0.129 for all of the variables in Tables 3 and 4 (see Table 1 for the proportion of missing values for each variable). Importantly, this imputation method does not affect the estimation of our bounds since they do not employ pre-treatment variables.
lower personal income, and lower earnings in the year prior to randomization—all characteristics that are arguably highly related to worse labor market outcomes. Moreover, looking at the differences in average pre-treatment characteristics between these two strata (last column in each table), all the differences documented above have the expected sign (according to Assumption 7a) and most of them are statistically significant. Particularly notable are the statistical significance of pre-treatment outcomes such as the earnings measures, which are expected to be highly correlated with the labor market outcomes at week 208 after randomization. This indirect evidence favors the plausibility of Assumption 7a for the labor market outcomes.

The previous evidence is consistent with standard models in the training program literature that assume individuals maximize their expected present value of earnings to make their program participation decisions (e.g., Heckman et al., 1999). In the basic model of this kind, individuals use the information available to them at the time of their decision to compare their expected present value of their earnings under participation in the training program to the expected present value of their cost, which consists of the direct cost of the program plus their earnings under no participation in the program (which include foregone earnings during participation in the program). This model predicts that individuals with higher foregone earnings will be less likely to participate in the program (Heckman et al., 1999). This is consistent with the previous evidence, since never takers—who decide not to enroll in Job Corps regardless of treatment assignment—have higher pre-treatment average earnings (and thus higher foregone earnings) than always takers, who always decide to enroll in Job Corps regardless of treatment assignment.

We now turn our attention to the public benefits outcome. Interestingly, as compared to always takers, never takers also have average baseline characteristics that would make them more likely to receive higher levels of public benefits. In particular, relative to always takers, never takers are more likely to be female, have children, be married, and have household income below $3,000 (and less likely to have household income above $18,000), with all these differences being statistically significant. Similarly, never takers are more likely to receive public benefits at baseline, and to have received them for more months, although these differences are not statistically significant.22

It is known that the variables previously mentioned are highly correlated to the receipt of public assistance (e.g., Moffitt, 2003). For instance, AFDC/TANF benefits are specifically directed towards families with children. Likewise, the outcome variable public benefits received includes assistance that the individuals, their spouse, or children who lived with them received; hence, individuals who are married with children are likely to receive higher public benefits than single individuals without children. Moreover, Schochet et al. (2001) report that females with children had very different experiences with public benefits—both at baseline and post-randomization—than males and females without children. They indicate that, while 51 percent of males and 67 percent of females received public benefits the year prior to randomization, 88 percent of females with children did. They also report that after randomization females with children continued to receive public benefits at a higher

22Unfortunately, there is no information on the dollar amount of public benefits received prior to randomization.
rate than males and females without children, and that their average amount received was also the largest among the three groups (by a considerable amount). In sum, the average of baseline characteristics highly correlated to the receipt of public benefits for the never takers and always takers provide indirect evidence in favor of Assumption 7a for the public benefits outcome.

In addition, the average baseline characteristics of the strata previously discussed shed light on the results in Table 2 that suggest never takers may have the largest average potential outcomes for both the labor market and public benefits outcomes, which is also the intuition behind Assumption 7. The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, while never takers are an homogeneous group with respect to compliance behavior, they are a heterogeneous group in other regards: as compared to the other strata, this stratum is comprised of individuals who, at baseline, are on average better educated and have better labor market histories, but also of individuals who are more likely to be female, married, and have children. Consequently, as compared to the other strata, never takers may indeed have higher average potential outcomes for both labor market and public benefits outcomes. This evidence also seems to be consistent with models of training program participation in which individuals who have higher participation costs (e.g., foregone earnings or childcare costs) or face constraints that make it more difficult for them to enroll (e.g., family obligations) are less likely to enroll in Job Corps.

Turning attention to the stratum of compliers, their estimated averages for the pre-treatment characteristics previously discussed are generally in-between the magnitude of the corresponding ones for never takers and always takers. This is consistent with the proposed strata ordering implied in Assumptions 7b and 7c. The fourth and fifth columns in Tables 3 and 4 show estimated differences in average pre-treatment characteristics between compliers and never takers, and compliers and always takers, respectively. Most of the differences between never takers and compliers are of the expected sign for the corresponding outcomes, and are often statistically significant; for example, those regarding education and earnings at baseline for the labor market outcomes, and female and having children for public benefits. While the differences between compliers and always takers are sometimes of the opposite sign to the one conjectured in Assumptions 7b and 7c, in no instance are those opposite-signed differences statistically significant. Importantly, for the labor market outcomes, the differences in earnings in the year prior to randomization and education at baseline are of the expected sign and statistically different; while for the public benefits outcome the female and household income variables are of the expected sign and statistically different.

In sum, based on the evidence from average pre-treatment characteristics, we conclude that the data do not provide indirect evidence against the different versions of Assumptions 7, and that the majority of this evidence suggests that these assumptions are plausible for all the outcomes considered. In addition, the average baseline characteristics of the strata suggest that the ranking of the mean potential outcomes in Assumption 7 for the labor market outcomes is consistent with standard economic models of training program participation.

Before concluding this subsection, we note that the average characteristics of the different strata
can in principle provide relevant information to policy makers and Job Corps administrators (e.g., Frumento et al., 2012; Bampasidou et al., 2014). The never takers stratum may be of particular interest as these individuals always decide against enrolling in Job Corps regardless of treatment assignment (even though they initially applied to Job Corps). In this case, the average baseline characteristics of the never takers may provide information on the possible reasons why they decide against enrolling in Job Corps. For example, relative to the other strata, never takers are more likely to be female, married, and have children, suggesting that some of these individuals may decide against enrolling in Job Corps due to higher participation cost (e.g., related to childcare) or family obligations. Job Corps administrators could use this information to increase the participation rate of these individuals. A first step, however, would be to evaluate whether or not never takers would indeed benefit from Job Corps, as it might be the case that they do not enroll because Job Corps does not improve their outcomes. If they would benefit from Job Corps, then administrators could, for example, focus on relaxing some of the family constraints that may prevent some of these individuals from participating—for instance, by extending Job Corps’ childcare services (which are available at some centers). On the other hand, if never takers would not benefit from Job Corps, administrators could try to find better ways to serve them (e.g., through alternative services or education programs). In Section 3.5 we analyze the effects of Job Corps for this stratum.

3.3 Results on the Bounds on the ATE

Table 5 shows estimated bounds on the ATEs on labor market outcomes (weekly earnings and employment) at week 208 after randomization and on public welfare benefits received during the fourth year after randomization. The vertical panels correspond to each of these outcomes. The ATE is interpreted as the average effect of Job Corps participation for the population of eligible applicants (the target population in the NJCS). Estimated bounds are presented under Assumptions 1 to 4 plus the additional assumptions corresponding to Propositions 1 through 6. Under each pair of estimated bounds in Table 5, we report a 95 percent confidence interval for the true value of the parameter (ATE).

3.3.1 Weekly Earnings

We begin by discussing the estimated bounds on the ATE for weekly earnings. The estimated bounds under Proposition 1 represent a benchmark for subsequent bounds. They use the IV assumptions in Angrist et al. (1996) (Assumptions 1 to 4) plus the bounded-outcome assumption (Assumption 5). The estimated bounds are wide and fail to identify the sign of the ATE. Thus, it is desirable to consider additional plausible assumptions to tighten them. Recall that these bounds coincide with the IV bounds proposed by Manski (1990), Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), and Kitagawa (2009) when

---

23 An important characteristic of Job Corps is that most of its participants (around 88 percent) reside at a Job Corps center while in training. Even nonresidential participants spend most of each weekday at the center (Schochet et al., 2008). This can impose a heavy burden on families with children.
applied to our setting. The estimated bounds on the $ATE$ under Proposition 2 use the additional assumption of weak monotonicity in $D$ of average outcomes of strata (Assumption 6). For weekly earnings, the $ATE$ is bounded within the interval [$22.19, $201.02], and its corresponding 95 percent confidence interval excludes zero. Thus, the bounds obtained by assuming non-negative $LATE$s for always and never takers imply strictly positive average effects of Job Corps on weekly earnings for eligible applicants. Relative to the estimated bounds under Proposition 1, adding Assumption 6 increases the lower bound to $22.19, which equals the value of the $ITT$. Recall that the bounds under Proposition 2 are equivalent to those under the MTR assumption in Manski and Pepper (2000), with the important distinction that Assumption 6 is imposed at the stratum level rather than at the individual level, making it easier to hold in practice.

Table 5 also presents the estimated bounds under each of the three weak mean dominance assumptions across strata (Assumptions 7a to 7c), corresponding to Propositions 3a to 3c. Each one of these assumptions improves upon the lower bound in Proposition 1. Importantly, Assumptions 7a to 7c do not impose restrictions on the signs of the $LATE$s (and thus $ATE$). The estimated bounds under Proposition 3a are not able to identify the sign of the $ATE$ on weekly earnings. However, in each set of estimated bounds under Propositions 3b and 3c, negative $ATE$s on weekly earnings are statistically ruled out with 95 percent confidence. Therefore, we are able to pin down the sign of the average effect of Job Corps on weekly earnings for eligible applicants without imposing restrictions on the sign of this effect (since Assumption 6 is not used). Moreover, the different identifying power of Assumptions 7a to 7c is evident in this application—while adding Assumption 7a is not enough to identify the sign of the $ATE$, Assumptions 7b and 7c are. Of the three, Assumption 7c yields the tightest estimated bounds, which are also tighter than the estimated bounds under Proposition 2.

Lastly, Table 5 shows estimated bounds when combining Assumptions 1 to 6 with each one of Assumptions 7a to 7c (Propositions 4 to 6, respectively). Given the positive $ITT$ effect on weekly earnings, in each of the bounds only the lower bound is improved relative to the benchmark bounds in Proposition 1.24 Each of the three sets of estimated bounds—and the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals—identify the sign of the $ATE$ on weekly earnings. The estimated bounds in Proposition 6 are the narrowest, [$24.61, $201.04]. They imply that the percentage increase in average weekly earnings from participating in Job Corps for eligible applicants is bounded between 11.6 and 94.4 percent.25 For these estimated bounds, the lower bound is 10 percent higher than the $ITT$ effect ($22.19), while $LATE_c$ ($32.29) falls within the bounds, with both estimated effects falling inside the 95 percent confidence interval for the $ATE$. However, note that our estimated

Note that sometimes the estimated upper bound changes very slightly. This is the result of the application of the Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) procedure to compute half-median unbiased estimates and valid confidence intervals. Recall that the bounds under Propositions 4 to 6 contain min and/or max operators, which require the use of this procedure to conduct valid statistical inference. Another finite-sample consequence of the implementation of this procedure is that it makes it possible for estimated bounds under more assumptions (and that contain min and/or max operators) to be wider than the corresponding ones using fewer assumptions. For instance, this occurs when comparing the estimated bounds under Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 for weekly earnings in Table 5.

These percentages are calculated using $E[Y|D = 0] = 212.98$, since $E[Y(0)]$ is not point identified.
bounds are for the average effect of actually enrolling in Job Corps (as opposed to the effect of being allowed to enroll in Job Corps—the ITT) for all eligible applicants (as opposed to being only for compliers—the LATE). Lastly, ATEs of Job Corps on weekly earnings that are lower than $16.01 (7.5 percent) and larger than $210.59 (98.9 percent) can be ruled out with 95 percent confidence.

3.3.2 Employment

The second vertical panel in Table 5 presents the estimated bounds for employment. In contrast to weekly earnings, employment is binary and thus bounded in [0, 1]. A similar pattern to the estimated bounds for weekly earnings is found in the bounds for employment. The estimated benchmark bounds under Proposition 1 are [−0.15, 0.163], which are wide and unable to identify the sign of the ATE on employment. In the binary-outcome setting, these bounds also coincide with those in Balke and Pearl (1997). When adding the assumption of weak monotonicity in D of average outcomes of strata (Assumption 6), the estimated bounds (and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals) in Proposition 2 identify the sign of the ATE on employment: [0.038, 0.163]. These bounds are also equal to those proposed by Bhattacharya et al. (2008), Chesher (2010), Chiburis (2010b), and Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011), all of whom analyze a binary outcome.

Replacing Assumption 6 with each of Assumptions 7a to 7c (Propositions 3a to 3c) produces estimated bounds that generate a pattern similar to that of weekly earnings. Specifically, Assumption 7a by itself is not enough to identify the sign of the ATE, while Assumptions 7b and 7c are. Thus, as for weekly earnings, we are able to statistically rule out a negative or zero average effect of Job Corps on the probability of employment four years after randomization for eligible applicants without making assumptions about the sign of this effect. Turning to the estimated bounds when combining all assumptions (Propositions 4 to 6), Proposition 6 employing Assumption 7c provides the tightest bounds on the ATE for employment: [0.042, 0.163]. As percentage increases with respect to \( E[Y \mid D = 0] = 0.582 \), these estimated bounds are [7.2%, 28%]. As for weekly earnings, while the lower bound is 10 percent higher than the ITT effect (0.038), both the ITT effect and \( LATE_c \) (0.055) fall within the 95 percent confidence interval corresponding to these bounds. Lastly, with 95 percent confidence, we can rule out ATEs of Job Corps on employment that are lower than 0.023 (4 percent) and larger than 0.18 (30.9 percent).

3.3.3 Public Benefits

The final vertical panel in Table 5 reports the estimated bounds on the ATE for dependence on public benefits. Besides its public policy relevance, this outcome is important from an illustrative point of view because the ITT effect of assignment to Job Corps on public benefits dependence is negative, and thus the bounds under Propositions 4, 5, and 6 do not require the bounded-outcome assumption (this is the only outcome under which those propositions do not require Assumption 5). The estimated benchmark bounds under Proposition 1 are wide and largely uninformative. When Assumption 6 is added, the estimated bounds are [−$632.86, −$84.29], identifying the sign
of the \( ATE \) and providing much narrower bounds relative to the benchmark bounds. In this case, Assumption 6 imposes non-positive average effects of Job Corps on public benefit dependence for always takers and never takers, which is informed by the point identified negative \( LATE_c \) under the current assumptions. Propositions 3a to 3c present the estimated bounds under each one of the Assumptions 7a to 7c. Note that, for public benefits, Assumption 6 has stronger identification power than the mean dominance assumptions. In particular, none of the estimated bounds under Assumptions 7a to 7c allow us to identify the sign of the \( ATE \). However, note that these assumptions do have identifying power as they substantially improve the lower bound relative to the one in Proposition 1. For instance, the estimated lower bound under Assumption 7c is \(-$142.76\), ruling out \( ATEs \) of Job Corps on public benefits received below \(-16.8\) percent (using \( E[Y|D = 0] = $852.12 \) as reference point).

Lastly, for public benefits both the upper and lower bounds are improved (relative to those in Proposition 1) when considering the combination of Assumption 6 and each of Assumptions 7a to 7c (Propositions 4 to 6), with the former assumption improving the upper bound and the latter ones improving the lower bound. Importantly, this allows dropping Assumption 5 when deriving bounds on the \( ATE \) for this outcome. The width of the estimated bounds under Propositions 4 to 6 shrinks considerably relative to the estimated bounds under the previous propositions. The estimated bounds on the \( ATE \) for public benefits under the combined assumptions identify the sign of the \( ATE \). The estimated bounds under Proposition 6—employing Assumption 7c—are the narrowest at \([-142.76, -84.29]\), implying bounds in percentage terms (relative to \( E[Y|D = 0] \)) of \([-16.8\%, -9.9\%]\). For this outcome, the upper bound equals the estimated ITT effect, and the \( LATE_c \) (\(-$122.28\)) falls within the bounds. Finally, with 95 percent confidence we are able to rule out \( ATEs \) of Job Corps on public benefits received below \(-$210.62 \) (\(-24.7\) percent) or above \(-$22.13 \) (\(-2.6\) percent).

To summarize, we find statistically positive average effects of Job Corps on weekly earnings and employment four years after randomization for the population of eligible applicants, and statistically negative average effects on the yearly amount of public benefits received.

### 3.4 Results on the Bounds on the \( ATT \)

Table 6 presents estimated bounds on the \( ATTs \)—interpreted as the average effects of Job Corps for its participants—on the labor market outcomes and the amount of public benefits received. While, in general, the estimated bounds on the \( ATT \) show similar patterns to those for the estimated bounds on the \( ATE \), the former are considerably more informative. This is because to bound the \( ATT \) we only need to bound the \( LATE_{at} \) (see equation (4)) and, in our Job Corps application, always takers account for a relatively small proportion of Job Corps participants \((0.043/0.385 = 11.2\) percent, where \( Pr(D = 1) = 0.385)\).\(^{26}\) In contrast, for the \( ATE \) we need to bound both \( LATE_{at} \) and \( LATE_{nt} \), where always and never takers account for 31 percent of the \( ATE \) population.

\(^{26}\)Recall from Section 3.1 that always takers come from two sources: youth in the control group who managed to enroll in the program while the 3-year embargo was in place, and youth who enrolled after the embargo was lifted.
The estimated bounds on the \( ATT \) for weekly earnings are shown in the first vertical panel of Table 6.\(^{27} \) Under the bounded-outcome assumption (Assumption 5), the estimated bounds fail to identify the sign of the \( ATT \). However, the width of the estimated identification region is significantly narrower than that of the corresponding \( ATE \) bounds in Table 5. All remaining estimated bounds for weekly earnings in Table 6 identify a statistically positive sign for the \( ATT \). Under Assumption 6 (Proposition 2'), the \( ATT \) is bounded between \([\$28.67, \$43.47]\), where Assumption 6 imposes a non-negative \( LATE_{at} \) (informed by the positive \( LATE_c \) estimate for weekly earnings). The estimated bounds for the \( ATT \) under each of the mean dominance assumptions (Assumptions 7a to 7c) in Propositions 3’a to 3’c improve upon the lower bound in Proposition 1’ by a smaller amount relative to the estimated bounds under Assumption 6. Importantly, however, all three estimated bounds under Assumptions 7a to 7c are able to (statistically) pin down the sign of the \( ATT \) for weekly earnings without imposing restrictions on the sign of \( LATE_{at} \). Interestingly, in this case the estimated bounds on the \( ATT \) combining Assumptions 6 and each of 7a to 7c (Propositions 4’ to 6’) do not improve upon the estimated bounds using Assumption 6 only (Proposition 2’). This is a finite sample result in that the implementation of the Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) procedure to obtain half-median unbiased estimates yields the former estimated bounds slightly wider than the estimated bounds under Assumption 6 only (which do not contain min or max operators). Consequently, the narrowest estimated bounds for the average effect of Job Corps participation on weekly earnings for Job Corps participants are \([\$28.67, \$43.47]\). Using the weekly earnings of non-participants as reference (since \( E[Y(0)|D = 1] \) is not point identified), these bounds imply that the percentage increase in average weekly earnings is between 13.5 and 20.4 percent. Moreover, with 95 percent confidence, we can rule out \( ATT \)s of Job Corps on weekly earnings lower than \$18.32 (8.6 percent) and larger than \$54.03 (25.4 percent).

A similar pattern to that of the estimated bounds on the \( ATT \) for weekly earnings is found for employment. Excluding the estimated benchmark bounds (Proposition 1’), all the other estimated bounds identify a statistically positive \( ATT \) on employment—including those that do not impose restrictions on the sign of \( LATE_{at} \). The narrowest estimated bounds are obtained under Assumption 6 (Proposition 2’), \([0.049, 0.093]\), implying bounds on the percentage effects (using \( E[Y|D = 0] \) as reference) of \([8.4\%, 16\%]\). These bounds allow us to discard \( ATT \)s on employment lower than 0.027 (4.5 percent) and larger than 0.116 (19.9 percent) with 95 percent confidence.

The estimated benchmark bounds on the \( ATT \) for public benefits received identify a negative sign for the \( ATT \), which is in stark contrast to the results for the \( ATE \), although the 95 percent confidence interval includes positive values. All the other estimated bounds for public benefits are narrower than the benchmark bounds, as expected. Like for the \( ATE \) for public benefits, Assumptions 7a to 7c improve only the lower bound relative to the benchmark bounds, while Assumption 6 improves

\(^{27}\) For reference, the estimated values of \( Pr(D = 1) \) and \( Pr(Z = 1) \)—used to estimate the \( ATT \) bounds (see equations (3) and (4))—are (standard errors in parenthesis): 0.385 (0.005) and 0.498 (0.005), respectively, for the labor market outcomes sample, and 0.385 (0.005) and 0.496 (0.005), respectively, for the public benefits sample.
upon the upper bound (since in this case \(LATE_c < 0\)). Contrary to the estimated \(ATT\) bounds for the labor market outcomes, the estimated bounds under Assumption 6 (imposing \(LATE_{at} \leq 0\)) are wider relative to all other estimated bounds employing any of the versions of Assumption 7. However, since the upper bound is substantially improved by Assumption 6, these bounds are able to statistically rule out a positive or zero \(ATT\) of Job Corps on the receipt of public benefits for its participants with 95 percent confidence. Combining Assumptions 6 with any of Assumptions 7a to 7c (Propositions 4’ to 6’) results in narrower estimated bounds relative to those using just one of those two assumptions. In particular, the estimated bounds combining Assumptions 6 and 7c are the narrowest at \([-140.29, -108.72]\) (or, relative to \(E[Y|D = 0]\), \([-16.5\%, -12.8\%]\)), with their corresponding 95 percent confidence interval discarding \(ATT\)s below \(-237.89\) (−27.9 percent) and above \(-20.18\) (−2.4 percent).

In sum, we find statistically positive average effects of Job Corps on weekly earnings and employment four years after randomization for Job Corps participants—even without imposing restrictions on the average effect of Job Corps on these outcomes for always takers—as well as statistically negative effects on the amount of public benefits received during the fourth year after randomization.

### 3.5 Results on Bounds on other Average Treatment Effects

To close Section 3, we present results for bounds on other average effects of interest, \(LATE_{nt}\) and \(LATE_{at}\). As discussed in Section 2, the bounds on these parameters are the building blocks for our bounds on the \(ATE\) and \(ATT\). The formulas for the bounds on \(LATE_{nt}\) and \(LATE_{at}\) corresponding to the assumptions in Propositions 1 to 6 are shown in the Appendix in the analogous Propositions 1” to 6”. The estimated bounds and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals for the three outcomes are shown in Table 7. For brevity, we focus here on the estimated bounds for the average effects of Job Corps participation for never takers (\(LATE_{nt}\)), as this stratum accounts for 27 percent of the population and is potentially relevant from a policy perspective.\(^{28}\) As previously discussed, the individuals in this stratum are part of the target population of Job Corps but decide against participating in the program, even if offered the opportunity to enroll. From a policy perspective, it is of interest to analyze if, on average, these individuals would benefit from Job Corps participation.

Table 7 shows that, under Assumptions 1 to 4 and the mean dominance assumption in 7c (Proposition 3”c), there is a statistically positive average effect of Job Corps participation on weekly earnings four years after randomization for never takers, with estimated bounds equal to \([13.03, 641.87]\). Given the point estimate for \(E[Y(0)|nt]\) of \(223.79\) in Table 2, these bounds imply that Job Corps participation increases the average weekly earnings of never takers by at least 5.8 percent. Importantly, these results are found without imposing restrictions on the sign of this effect. The estimated bounds based on Propositions 3”b (under Assumption 7b), 5”, and 6” (the last two using Assumption

\(^{28}\)In addition, as can be seen from Table 7, the estimated bounds on \(LATE_{at}\) for all three of the outcomes considered are not as informative as those on \(LATE_{nt}\), although they indeed provide valuable information (e.g., by ruling out large but plausible effects for always takers).
6) also rule out negative and zero values of $LATE_{nt}$, although their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals include zero. However, the 90 percent confidence interval for $LATE_{nt}$ corresponding to Proposition 6”, [1.36, 649.5], excludes zero.\footnote{As explained in footnote 24, the estimated bounds under Proposition 3”c are narrower than those under Proposition 6” (which adds Assumption 6) because the latter bounds employ the Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) procedure since they contain min and/or max operators.}

The estimated bounds on $LATE_{nt}$ for employment follow a similar pattern to that for weekly earnings, with the estimated bounds under Propositions 3”b, 3”c, 5”, and 6” pointing to positive effects of Job Corps on employment four years after randomization for never takers. While the 95 percent confidence interval under Proposition 3”c excludes zero, the corresponding ones for the other propositions do not. However, the 90 percent confidence intervals under Propositions 3”b and 6” do exclude zero ([0.006, 0.416] and [0.001, 0.416], respectively). The narrowest bounds on $LATE_{nt}$ in this case are [0.025, 0.4] under Proposition 3”c (without imposing restrictions on the sign of $LATE_{nt}$), implying that Job Corps participation increases the probability of employment for never takers by at least 4.2 percent. For receipt of public benefits, the bounds on $LATE_{nt}$ are not able to pin down the sign of this effect. However, some of the estimated lower bounds are informative, with the largest of them ruling out decreases greater than $172.85$ (19.6 percent) for never takers.

In sum, we find some evidence of statistically positive average effects of Job Corps participation on labor market outcomes four years after randomization for never takers. This evidence is based on bounds that do not impose restrictions on the sign of these effects. Hence, these findings provide statistical evidence in favor of Assumption 6 for never takers (i.e., that $LATE_{nt} \geq 0$) for earnings and employment (under Assumption 7c). In addition, these results suggest that never takers could benefit from participating in Job Corps, at least with respect to their labor market outcomes.

At first, it may seem at odds with economic intuition that never takers do not enroll in Job Corps even though our results suggest they would benefit from doing so in terms of better labor market outcomes. It is important to remember, however, that $LATE_{nt}$ simply reflects the average comparison of potential outcomes under participation and no participation in Job Corps for never takers at week 208 after randomization. Thus, positive values of $LATE_{nt}$ do not imply, for example, that the individuals’ net expected benefits are positive (i.e., after all the individuals’ costs and benefits over time have been taken into account). Although determining the exact reasons why never takers do not enroll in Job Corps even if participating could improve their future labor market outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, we offer here some possible reasons why this may be the case. These reasons are partly based on the never takers’ baseline average characteristics estimated in Section 3.2.4, where we found that this stratum is comprised of individuals who, as compared to those in the other two strata, are on average more educated and have better labor market histories at baseline, and also of individuals who are more likely to be women, be married, and have children.

First, based on the discussion in Section 3.2.4, some never takers may decide against enrolling in Job Corps even if $LATE_{nt} > 0$ because participation costs (e.g., related to childcare) outweigh
potential benefits, or family obligations prevent them from enrolling in it (e.g., see footnote 23). A second possible reason involves incomplete information on the benefits of Job Corps. Economic theory posits that individuals base their program participation decisions on the maximization of their expected present value of their earnings, where the expectation is the individuals’ private expectation with respect to the information available to them at the time the decision is made (Heckman et al., 1999). Hence, incomplete information on the benefits of Job Corps could lead those expectations to differ from expectations taken over the true (ex-ante) distribution of potential outcomes. Moreover, even if information on the potential benefits of a given program is provided to potential participants (e.g., by outreach and admission counselors in Job Corps), they would have to believe the information is relevant before it affects their decisions, as discussed by Santillano et al. (2015) in the context of a Bayesian learning process. They hypothesize that potential trainees with more education and work experience are likely to have stronger priors, which would decrease the value of the information received. This would seem to be consistent with our application, since never takers have on average more education, experience (in terms of months employed before randomization), and better labor market outcomes at baseline relative to the other strata. Another related possible reason why some never takers decide not to enroll in Job Corps may be, as discussed by Frumento et al. (2012), that they believe they would not benefit from it: they may consider themselves to be “too good” for the program. In the language of behavioral economics, they may be “overconfident” about their own abilities to succeed (e.g., DellaVigna, 2009).

Finally, preferences may play a role in some never takers’ decision not to participate in Job Corps. More general models of training program participation (and education) posit that individuals maximize the expected present value of utility, rather than just earnings (e.g., Heckman et al., 1999; Card, 1999; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999). In the spirit of Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), we can think of an individual’s utility as including consumption (or earnings), leisure, and the individual’s “consumption” value of participating in Job Corps, which may include the value given to learning and other Job Corps activities, as well as the effort required to accumulate human capital and satisfy Job Corps’ requirements (e.g., counseling). In our context, the potential disutility coming from Job Corps may not be trivial for some individuals, which would add to the (non-pecuniary) cost of participating in Job Corps. For example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) find that two general characteristics of individuals who drop out of high school are that they place a high value on leisure and a low consumption value on attending school (recall that most of Job Corps applicants are high school dropouts). It is also possible that there is differential disutility from Job Corps across strata. For instance, given that never takers are more likely to be married and have children, they may be more likely to find some of the activities within Job Corps (e.g., social activities related to the residential nature of the program) as generating disutility, while individuals in other strata may be more likely to find the same activities more attractive. Note that even if there were no differences across strata in the possible disutility coming from Job Corps, the fact that never takers have better average labor market outcomes at baseline relative to the other strata—and thus higher forgone
earnings—would make them more likely not to enroll in Job Corps. In a sense, some never takers may be able to avoid incurring in the possible disutility derived from participating in Job Corps by doing “well enough” in the labor market at baseline.

4 Conclusion

This paper derived sharp nonparametric bounds on the population average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) within an IV framework, and employed them to evaluate the effectiveness of the Job Corps training program. The bounds, derived by extending the work of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996), improve upon the benchmark bounds—those using the standard IV assumptions plus a bounded-outcome assumption—and other bounds available in the literature. We introduced two sets of assumptions. The first is monotonicity in the treatment of the average outcomes of never takers and always takers, which is novel to the literature on partial identification of the ATE and ATT. It improves upon similar assumptions that are more difficult to justify in practice because of imposing said monotonicity at the individual level (e.g., Manski and Pepper, 2000). The second set of assumptions imposes mean dominance on potential outcomes across strata. We proposed three such mean dominance assumptions, some of which appear to be new to the literature. An important feature of our bounds is that, when invoking the two sets of assumptions above and under a negative effect of the instrument on the outcome, their derivation does not require an outcome with bounded support.

The proposed bounds are used to analyze the average effects of Job Corps for its eligible applicants (ATE) and its participants (ATT). In addition to being a substantive topic, this application of the proposed bounds helps to illustrate the informational content of the different assumptions considered. Job Corps was evaluated during the mid-nineties through a large-scale, nationally representative social randomized experiment. However, due to extensive non-compliance, estimates of the program effectiveness to date concentrate on intention-to-treat (ITT) effects, or local average treatment effects for the compliers subpopulation (LATEc). Thus, we provide new inference on average effects of actual participation in this important program for other policy-relevant populations under relatively weak assumptions, concentrating on three outcomes: weekly earnings, employment, and public benefits dependency. The original NJCS (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008), along with several papers analyzing different aspects of Job Corps using the NJCS data (e.g., Lee, 2009; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2010; Blanco et al., 2013; Chen and Flores, 2015), reported statistically positive estimates of the ITT and LATEc on weekly earnings and employment, and statistically negative effects on public benefits received. Our results indicate that those statistically significant effects

---

30The magnitudes of the ITT and LATEc estimates reported in those papers are close to the ones we report in Table 2. The estimates are not exactly the same because of the use of different samples and definitions of the outcomes. For example, Schochet et al. (2001) and Schochet et al. (2008) define the labor market outcomes in quarter 16 (rather than at week 208) after randomization and use a sample of size 11,313. Their estimates of the ITT (LATEc) are: $18.1 ($25.2) for average weekly earnings, 0.024 (0.033) for employment, and -$80.1 (-$111.3) for public benefits. Using a sample of size 9,108, Flores-Lagunes et al. (2010) report ITT (LATEc) estimates on average weekly earnings in
of Job Corps participation are also present for the policy-relevant populations of eligible applicants and program participants. This is important because, given Job Corps’ yearly cost of about $1.5 billion, its benefits and costs are under constant scrutiny (e.g., USA Today, 2011).

Our preferred estimated bounds on the $ATE$ indicate that Job Corps increases weekly earnings of eligible applicants by at least $24.61 (about 11.6 percent) and employment by at least 4.2 percentage points (about 7.2 percent), both measured at week 208 after randomization. Importantly, we are able to find statistically positive $ATE$s of Job Corps on these two labor market outcomes without imposing restrictions on the signs of these average effects for never and always takers. We also find that Job Corps decreases dependence on public welfare benefits by at least $84.29 (about 9.9 percent), and by no more than $142.76 (about 16.8 percent), during the fourth year after randomization. Given that always takers are a relatively small share of Job Corps participants (11.2 percent), our preferred estimated bounds on the $ATT$ are narrower than those on the $ATE$. They indicate that the average effect of Job Corps for its participants is to increase weekly earnings and employment by at least $28.67 (about 13.5 percent) and 4.9 percentage points (about 8.4 percent), respectively, and at most by $43.47 (about 20.4 percent) and 9.3 percentage points (about 16 percent), respectively. Like for the $ATE$, we are able to find statistically positive $ATT$s for these two outcomes without imposing assumptions on the sign of the average effect for always takers. In addition, we find that Job Corps decreases the average amount of public benefits received by Job Corps participants by at least $108.72 (about 12.8 percent) and at most $140.29 (about 16.5 percent). When comparing these results to the corresponding $ITT$ and $LATE_c$ estimates, in all cases these two estimated effects fall within the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals from our estimated bounds. Importantly, however, our results apply to the effects of actual Job Corps participation (contrary to the $ITT$) for all eligible applicants or participants (contrary to the $LATE_c$), and thus are also relevant for policy purposes.

Our estimated bounds are consistent with previous findings on the effects of Job Corps. For example, Flores et al. (2012) estimate average effects on earnings of different lengths of exposure to academic and vocational instruction in Job Corps under a selection-on-observables assumption. In particular, they use generalized-propensity-score methods to estimate an average dose-response function on the treated based on a sample of 3,715 trainees who completed at least one week of instruction in Job Corps. For average weekly earnings at quarter 16 after randomization, they report a statistically significant average derivative of the dose-response function over the different levels of instruction of $0.80 per week. Given that in their sample the average participant receives 30.4 weeks of instruction, this implies an average effect of Job Corps instruction on the earnings of the treated of $24.3$, which is similar in magnitude to our estimated bounds on the $ATT$ and falls inside our corresponding 95 percent confidence interval (note this is so even though their definition of the outcome and treatment—as well as their sample—are slightly different form the ones used herein).
More generally, our estimated bounds on the $ATT$ and $ATE$ look consistent with the general finding (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Schochet et al., 2008; Flores et al., 2012) that the effect of Job Corps on earnings is comparable to estimates of the returns to one additional year of schooling. For example, in the survey of the literature by Card (1999), these estimates range from about 6 to 15.3 percent, with most of them above 9 percent.\textsuperscript{31}

Lastly, we analyzed the average effect of Job Corps for never takers. This subpopulation can be seen as relevant for policy purposes because it is comprised of individuals who are part of the target population but decide not to participate in Job Corps even when offered the opportunity to enroll. Slightly more than one out of every four individuals in our sample belongs to this stratum. Our preferred estimated bounds, which do not impose restrictions on the sign of this effect, indicate that the average weekly earnings and probability of employment of this group would be improved by at least $13.03$ (5.8 percent) and 2.5 percentage points (4.2 percent), respectively, with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals ruling out a zero effect. Although the 95 percent confidence intervals from the rest of the estimated bounds for never takers (including those for public benefits) include zero, some of them for weekly earnings and employment do exclude zero at the 90 percent level. Therefore, some of our evidence on the effects for never takers suggests that it may be in the interest of Job Corps administrators to encourage the enrollment of these individuals. Based on our analysis of their baseline characteristics, some strategies that might help include making it more accessible for individuals with children to enroll in Job Corps (e.g., by expanding Job Corps’ childcare services), and providing more information on the benefits of Job Corps for individuals with relatively good labor market histories and education (as compared to other eligible applicants). Such policies, however, would need to be based on further analysis of the specific reasons why never takers decide not to enroll in Job Corps, which may include family constraints, incomplete information on Job Corps’ benefits, overconfidence, and a possible individual preference for not enrolling in Job Corps. The analysis of the never takers’ average baseline characteristics presented herein could be seen as a first step in that direction.

Beyond our Job Corps analysis, this paper illustrates the usefulness of the proposed bounds in making inferences about effects that are not point identified with an IV. Clearly, the approach and methods used herein are not restricted to the problem of addressing non-compliance in randomized social experiments, as they can also be applied to similar settings where a randomized IV (e.g., from a natural experiment) is used to address other identification issues, such as endogeneity. Finally, this paper also illustrates the insights that can be gained by analyzing the average baseline characteristics and effects of the different strata.

\textsuperscript{31}Our results are also consistent with other evidence on the effectiveness of Job Corps, such as its distributional effects on earnings (Eren and Ozbeklik, 2014) and its effects on wages (e.g., Lee, 2009; Frumento et al., 2012; Blanco et al., 2013; Chen and Flores, 2015). Conversely, Schochet et al. (2008) document that, using administrative records, the long term effects of Job Corps on labor market outcomes are small or inexistent, except for the oldest participants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assigned Prop. to Treatment Group (Z = 1)</th>
<th>Assigned Prop. to Control Group (Z = 0)</th>
<th>Diff. (Std.Err.)</th>
<th>Assigned Prop. to Treatment Group (Z = 1)</th>
<th>Assigned Prop. to Control Group (Z = 0)</th>
<th>Diff. (Std.Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>0 .417</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.009 (.010)</td>
<td>0 .415</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.009 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age at Baseline</strong></td>
<td>0 18.42</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>.035 (.042)</td>
<td>0 18.41</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>.031 (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White, Non-Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>0 .273</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.007 (.009)</td>
<td>0 .274</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.005 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black, Non-Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>0 .483</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.005 (.010)</td>
<td>0 .477</td>
<td>.474</td>
<td>.003 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>0 .171</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>-.008 (.008)</td>
<td>0 .172</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>-.008 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Race/Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td>0 .073</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>-.005 (.005)</td>
<td>0 .076</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.000 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Never Married</strong></td>
<td>.017 .916</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.001 (.006)</td>
<td>.020 .914</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>-.001 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married</strong></td>
<td>.017 .020</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.020 .020</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living Together</strong></td>
<td>.017 .040</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>-.001 (.004)</td>
<td>.020 .040</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>-.001 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Separated</strong></td>
<td>.017 .024</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.020 .025</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.003 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Has Child</strong></td>
<td>.007 .181</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>-.003 (.008)</td>
<td>.008 .181</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>-.002 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Children</strong></td>
<td>.011 .253</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.005 (.012)</td>
<td>.012 .251</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.004 (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Education</strong></td>
<td>.018 10.08</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>-.008 (.031)</td>
<td>.021 10.08</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>-.019 (.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother’s Education</strong></td>
<td>.194 11.50</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td>-.011 (.058)</td>
<td>.197 11.49</td>
<td>11.53</td>
<td>-.047 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Father’s Education</strong></td>
<td>.391 11.43</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>-.110 (.073)</td>
<td>.394 11.45</td>
<td>11.57</td>
<td>-.127 (.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ever Arrested</strong></td>
<td>.017 .258</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>-.005 (.009)</td>
<td>.019 .259</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>-.007 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Inc.: &lt;3000</strong></td>
<td>.368 .252</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>-.006 (.011)</td>
<td>.371 .250</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>-.005 (.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>.368 .201</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>-.004 (.010)</td>
<td>.371 .198</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>-.010 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6000-9000</strong></td>
<td>.368 .116</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.006 (.008)</td>
<td>.371 .117</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.008 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9000-18000</strong></td>
<td>.368 .245</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.001 (.011)</td>
<td>.371 .246</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.005 (.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&gt;18000</strong></td>
<td>.368 .187</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.003 (.010)</td>
<td>.371 .189</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.002 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Inc.: &lt;3000</strong></td>
<td>.083 .786</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>-.004 (.008)</td>
<td>.086 .783</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>-.006 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3000-6000</strong></td>
<td>.083 .129</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.000 (.007)</td>
<td>.086 .130</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>-.000 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6000-9000</strong></td>
<td>.083 .055</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.009** (.005)</td>
<td>.086 .056</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.010** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&gt;9000</strong></td>
<td>.083 .031</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.005 (.004)</td>
<td>.086 .031</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>-.004 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have Job</strong></td>
<td>.031 .216</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.007 (.008)</td>
<td>.034 .219</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.009 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weekly Earnings</strong></td>
<td>0 110.35</td>
<td>104.29</td>
<td>6.06 (4.48)</td>
<td>0 110.66</td>
<td>104.53</td>
<td>6.14 (4.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Had Job, Prev.Yr.</strong></td>
<td>.016 .651</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.008 (.010)</td>
<td>.019 .653</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>.007 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Months Employed, Prev.Yr.</strong></td>
<td>0 3.575</td>
<td>3.516</td>
<td>.058 (.085)</td>
<td>0 3.582</td>
<td>3.518</td>
<td>.064 (.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earnings, Prev.Yr.</strong></td>
<td>.081 2991.8</td>
<td>2873.1</td>
<td>118.65 (109.10)</td>
<td>.084 3020.7</td>
<td>2893.8</td>
<td>126.84 (107.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Received Public Benefits</strong></td>
<td>.115 .590</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>-.005 (.010)</td>
<td>.118 .582</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>-.008 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Months Received Benefits</strong></td>
<td>.127 6.554</td>
<td>6.542</td>
<td>.012 (.125)</td>
<td>.129 6.469</td>
<td>6.493</td>
<td>-.024 (.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Numbers of Observations</strong></td>
<td>10520 6333</td>
<td>4187</td>
<td></td>
<td>10976 6589</td>
<td>4387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $Z$ denotes whether the individual was randomly assigned to participate ($Z = 1$) or not ($Z = 0$) in the Job Corps program. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labor Market Outcomes Sample</th>
<th>Public Benefits Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for $Z = 1$</td>
<td>0.730**</td>
<td>228.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(3.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for $Z = 0$</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
<td>206.60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(3.552)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ITT$</td>
<td>0.687**</td>
<td>22.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(4.652)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$LATE_c$</td>
<td>32.29**</td>
<td>747.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.067)</td>
<td>(23.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stratum Proportions (under Assumptions 1 and 4)**

- Fraction of Never Takers ($\pi_{nt}$) = 0.270** (.006)
- Fraction of Compliers ($\pi_c$) = 0.687** (.007)
- Fraction of Always Takers ($\pi_{at}$) = 0.043** (.003)

**Selected Point Identified Average Outcomes (under Assumptions 1 to 4)**

- $E[Y(1)|at] = 132.10** (.1494)
- $E[Y(0)|nt] = 228.78** (.5967)
- $E[Y(1)|c] = 236.82** (.4022)
- $E[Y(0)|c] = 204.53** (.5655)
- $E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] = 236.82** (.4022)
- $E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] = 204.53** (.3614)

**Relevant Average Outcome Differences (under Assumptions 1 to 4)**

- $E[Y(1)|at] - E[Y(1)|c] = -104.72** (.1637)
- $E[Y(0)|nt] - E[Y(0)|nt] = 19.26* (.9902)
- $E[Y(1)|at] - E[Y(0)|c] = -91.70** (.1637)
- $E[Y(1)|at] - E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] = -77.86** (.1566)
- $E[Y(1)|at] - E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] = -72.43** (.1624)
- $E[Y(1)|at] - E[Y(0)|nt] = 13.03* (.7067)

Note: $Z$ denotes whether the individual was randomly assigned to participate ($Z = 1$) or not ($Z = 0$) in the Job Corps program. $D$ denotes whether the individual ever enrolled in the program ($D = 1$) or not ($D = 0$) during the 4 years (208 weeks) after randomization. $nt$, $c$, and $at$ denote never takers, compliers, and always takers, respectively. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors calculated using 5000 bootstrap repetitions. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
Table 3: Average Baseline Characteristics by Stratum in the Labor Market Outcomes Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Never Takers (nt)</th>
<th>Compliers (c)</th>
<th>Always Takers (at)</th>
<th>nt – c</th>
<th>c – at</th>
<th>nt – at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.467** (.011)</td>
<td>.397** (.007)</td>
<td>.324** (.035)</td>
<td>.070** (.015)</td>
<td>.073** (.037)</td>
<td>.143** (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Baseline</td>
<td>18.74** (.052)</td>
<td>18.32** (.029)</td>
<td>17.64** (.033)</td>
<td>.428** (.063)</td>
<td>.674** (.137)</td>
<td>1.102** (.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>.284** (.011)</td>
<td>.263** (.006)</td>
<td>.296** (.034)</td>
<td>.021* (.013)</td>
<td>-.033 (.036)</td>
<td>-.012 (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>.473** (.012)</td>
<td>.484** (.007)</td>
<td>.488** (.037)</td>
<td>-.012 (.015)</td>
<td>-.004 (.036)</td>
<td>-.016 (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.035** (.004)</td>
<td>.016** (.002)</td>
<td>.005 (.005)</td>
<td>.019** (.005)</td>
<td>.011** (.005)</td>
<td>.030** (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Child</td>
<td>.237** (.010)</td>
<td>.162** (.005)</td>
<td>.148** (.028)</td>
<td>.075** (.012)</td>
<td>.015 (.005)</td>
<td>.089** (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Education</td>
<td>10.27** (.035)</td>
<td>10.05** (.020)</td>
<td>9.637** (.095)</td>
<td>.224** (.044)</td>
<td>.408** (.101)</td>
<td>.632** (.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Inc.: &lt;3000</td>
<td>.267** (.008)</td>
<td>.255** (.005)</td>
<td>.187** (.021)</td>
<td>.012 (.010)</td>
<td>.068** (.022)</td>
<td>.080** (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;18000</td>
<td>.181** (.007)</td>
<td>.233** (.027)</td>
<td>.000 (.009)</td>
<td>-.052* (.028)</td>
<td>-.052* (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Inc.: &lt;3000</td>
<td>.750** (.010)</td>
<td>.799** (.005)</td>
<td>.843** (.026)</td>
<td>-.049** (.012)</td>
<td>-.044 (.027)</td>
<td>-.093** (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;9000</td>
<td>.042** (.005)</td>
<td>.015* (.008)</td>
<td>.012* (.006)</td>
<td>.015* (.009)</td>
<td>.027** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Job at Baseline</td>
<td>.224** (.010)</td>
<td>.208** (.006)</td>
<td>.216** (.031)</td>
<td>.015 (.012)</td>
<td>-.008 (.033)</td>
<td>.008 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Hours Worked</td>
<td>22.07** (.048)</td>
<td>21.29** (.272)</td>
<td>20.44** (1.652)</td>
<td>.775 (1.585)</td>
<td>.833 (1.734)</td>
<td>1.629 (1.709)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Earnings</td>
<td>113.79** (2.889)</td>
<td>102.76** (2.041)</td>
<td>92.63** (7.986)</td>
<td>11.03** (3.989)</td>
<td>10.13 (8.328)</td>
<td>21.15** (8.562)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had Job, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>.667** (.010)</td>
<td>.640** (.006)</td>
<td>.651** (.035)</td>
<td>.027** (.013)</td>
<td>-.010 (.036)</td>
<td>.016 (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months Employed, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>3.684** (.102)</td>
<td>3.527** (.057)</td>
<td>3.120** (.310)</td>
<td>.157 (.125)</td>
<td>.407 (.324)</td>
<td>.563* (.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>3246.88** (101.80)</td>
<td>2831.55** (63.58)</td>
<td>2302.9** (251.57)</td>
<td>415.30** (127.99)</td>
<td>528.64** (263.42)</td>
<td>943.94** (273.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Public Benefits</td>
<td>.607** (.011)</td>
<td>.588** (.006)</td>
<td>.596** (.037)</td>
<td>.020 (.013)</td>
<td>-.009 (.038)</td>
<td>.011 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months Received Benefits</td>
<td>6.744** (.122)</td>
<td>6.503** (.073)</td>
<td>6.518** (.414)</td>
<td>.240 (.153)</td>
<td>-.014 (.437)</td>
<td>.226 (.424)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Averages are estimated with the overidentified nonparametric GMM procedure described in the Appendix. nt denotes never takers, c denotes compliers, and at denotes always takers. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. Missing values for each of the baseline variables were imputed with the mean of the variable. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
Table 4: Average Baseline Characteristics by Stratum in the Public Benefits Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Never Takers</th>
<th>Compliers</th>
<th>Always Takers</th>
<th>nt – c</th>
<th>c – at</th>
<th>nt – at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(nt)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(at)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.464**</td>
<td>.396**</td>
<td>.330**</td>
<td>.069**</td>
<td>.066*</td>
<td>.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Baseline</td>
<td>18.75**</td>
<td>18.31**</td>
<td>17.68**</td>
<td>.435**</td>
<td>.635**</td>
<td>1.070**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.049)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.126)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>.289**</td>
<td>.265**</td>
<td>.289**</td>
<td>.024*</td>
<td>-.024*</td>
<td>-.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>.461**</td>
<td>.480**</td>
<td>.503**</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.036**</td>
<td>.016**</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td>.010**</td>
<td>.030**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Child</td>
<td>.234**</td>
<td>.163**</td>
<td>.164**</td>
<td>.072**</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.071**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Education</td>
<td>10.27**</td>
<td>10.05**</td>
<td>9.663**</td>
<td>.225**</td>
<td>.382**</td>
<td>.607**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Inc.: &lt;3000</td>
<td>.262**</td>
<td>.253**</td>
<td>.198**</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.055**</td>
<td>.064**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.184**</td>
<td>.184**</td>
<td>.233**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.050*</td>
<td>-.049*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Inc.: &lt;3000</td>
<td>.746**</td>
<td>.797**</td>
<td>.840**</td>
<td>-.051**</td>
<td>-.043*</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.042**</td>
<td>.030**</td>
<td>.015**</td>
<td>.012**</td>
<td>.015*</td>
<td>.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Job at Baseline</td>
<td>.227**</td>
<td>.211**</td>
<td>.213**</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Hours Worked</td>
<td>21.80**</td>
<td>21.41**</td>
<td>20.63**</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.774</td>
<td>1.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.400)</td>
<td>(.291)</td>
<td>(1.426)</td>
<td>(.394)</td>
<td>(1.548)</td>
<td>(1.494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Earnings</td>
<td>112.60**</td>
<td>103.55**</td>
<td>94.21**</td>
<td>9.025**</td>
<td>9.342</td>
<td>18.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.880)</td>
<td>(2.180)</td>
<td>(7.94)</td>
<td>(4.094)</td>
<td>(7.954)</td>
<td>(7.804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had Job, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>.667**</td>
<td>.642**</td>
<td>.668**</td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months Employed, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>3.644**</td>
<td>3.553**</td>
<td>3.060**</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>.584*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.282)</td>
<td>(.130)</td>
<td>(.302)</td>
<td>(.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings, Prev.Yr.</td>
<td>3241.9**</td>
<td>2863.6**</td>
<td>2390.4**</td>
<td>378.31**</td>
<td>473.14**</td>
<td>851.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.19)</td>
<td>(65.20)</td>
<td>(233.19)</td>
<td>(130.21)</td>
<td>(250.73)</td>
<td>(249.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Public Benefits</td>
<td>.601**</td>
<td>.581**</td>
<td>.583**</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months Received Benefits</td>
<td>6.684**</td>
<td>6.433**</td>
<td>6.395**</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td>(.158)</td>
<td>(.408)</td>
<td>(.385)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Averages are estimated with the overidentified nonparametric GMM procedure described in the Appendix. nt denotes never takers, c denotes compliers, and at denotes always takers. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. Missing values for each of the baseline variables were imputed with the mean of the variable. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Earnings</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Public Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 1</td>
<td>-69.86</td>
<td>-.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[78.34, 210.61]</td>
<td>[.167, .179]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3a (A7a)</td>
<td>-6.507</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-16.65, 210.61]</td>
<td>[-.050, .179]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3b (A7b)</td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[11.97, 210.61]</td>
<td>[.015, .179]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3c (A7c)</td>
<td>22.57</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 4 (A6, A7a)</td>
<td>20.43</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[13.01, 210.58]</td>
<td>[.018, .180]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 5 (A6, A7b)</td>
<td>22.97</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 6 (A6, A7c)</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Outcomes are measured four years after randomization. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. The bounds that do not involve minimum or maximum operators are estimated with sample analog estimators, and the confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter are obtained with the Imbens and Manski (2004) procedure. For the bounds that involve minimum or maximum operators, the table shows half-median unbiased estimates of the bounds and 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter, both based on the method proposed by Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013). This method is implemented using 5000 bootstrap replications for the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated bounding functions, and 100,000 draws from a normal distribution. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001).
Table 6: Estimated Bounds on the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weekly Earnings</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Public Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds under Assumptions 1 to 4 and Bounded Outcome Assumption (A5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 1'</td>
<td>-53.53</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-67.48, 54.03]</td>
<td>[-.042, .116]</td>
<td>[-1045.36, 35.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Monotonicity of Local Average Outcomes Assumption (A6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2'</td>
<td>28.67</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[18.32, 54.03]</td>
<td>[.027, .116]</td>
<td>[-1045.36, -25.63]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Different Mean Dominance Assumptions (A7a, A7b, A7c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3'a (A7a)</td>
<td>18.39</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[8.32, 54.03]</td>
<td>[.005, .116]</td>
<td>[-227.18, 36.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3'b (A7b)</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3'c (A7c)</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Both A6 and Each of A7a, A7b, and A7c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 4' (A6, A7a)</td>
<td>27.86</td>
<td>43.48</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[16.00, 55.65]</td>
<td>[.023, .119]</td>
<td>[-230.68, -21.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 5' (A6, A7b)</td>
<td>27.96</td>
<td>43.48</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[16.08, 55.67]</td>
<td>[.023, .119]</td>
<td>[-235.62, -20.73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 6' (A6, A7c)</td>
<td>27.98</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[16.11, 55.64]</td>
<td>[.023, .119]</td>
<td>[-237.89, -20.18]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Outcomes are measured four years after randomization. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. The bounds that do not involve minimum or maximum operators are estimated with sample analog estimators, and the confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter are obtained with the Imbens and Manski (2004) procedure. For the bounds that involve minimum or maximum operators, the table shows half-median unbiased estimates of the bounds and 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter, both based on the method proposed by Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013). This method is implemented using 5000 bootstrap replications for the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated bounding functions, and 100,000 draws from a normal distribution. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001).
Table 7: Estimated Bounds on LATEs of Never Takers and Always Takers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weekly Earnings</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Public Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$LATE_{nt}$</td>
<td>$LATE_{at}$</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds under Assumptions 1 to 4 and Bounded Outcome Assumption (A5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 1&quot;</td>
<td>-223.79</td>
<td>641.87</td>
<td>-733.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-233.61, 651.70]</td>
<td>[-758.51, 157.03]</td>
<td>[-.620, .421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Monotonicity of Local Average Outcomes Assumption (A6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2&quot;</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>641.87</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.000, 651.70]</td>
<td>[.000, 157.03]</td>
<td>[.000, .421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Different Mean Dominance Assumptions (A7a, A7b, A7c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3&quot;a (A7a)</td>
<td>-91.70</td>
<td>641.87</td>
<td>-91.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-118.63, 651.70]</td>
<td>[-118.63, 157.03]</td>
<td>[-.272, .421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3&quot;b (A7b)</td>
<td>6.834</td>
<td>641.87</td>
<td>-77.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3&quot;c (A7c)</td>
<td>13.03</td>
<td>641.87</td>
<td>-72.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds Adding Both A6 and Each of A7a, A7b, and A7c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 4&quot; (A6, A7a)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>641.88</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.000, 651.70]</td>
<td>[.000, 158.98]</td>
<td>[.000, .421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 5&quot; (A6, A7b)</td>
<td>3.032</td>
<td>641.89</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.000, 651.70]</td>
<td>[.000, 159.07]</td>
<td>[.000, .421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 6&quot; (A6, A7c)</td>
<td>9.119</td>
<td>641.88</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.000, 651.70]</td>
<td>[.000, 159.07]</td>
<td>[.000, .421]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: nt and at denote never takers and always takers, respectively. Outcomes are measured four years after randomization. Public benefits include AFDC/TANF, food stamps, SSI/SSA, and General Assistance. The bounds that do not involve minimum or maximum operators are estimated with sample analog estimators, and the confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter are obtained with the Imbens and Manski (2004) procedure. For the bounds that involve minimum or maximum operators, the table shows half-median unbiased estimates of the bounds and 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) for the true value of the parameter, both based on the method proposed by Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013). This method is implemented using 5000 bootstrap replications for the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated bounding functions, and 100,000 draws from a normal distribution. Computations use weights that account for sample design, interview design, and interview non-response (Schochet et al., 2001). For weekly earnings, the 90 percent confidence interval on $LATE_{nt}$ under Proposition 6" equals [1.362, 649.53]. For employment, the 90 percent confidence intervals on $LATE_{nt}$ under Propositions 3"b and 6" equal [.006, .416] and [.001, .416], respectively.
References


Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 2

Under Assumptions 1 through 4, Angrist et al. (1996) show that \( LATE_c = (E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0])/(p_{11} - p_{10}) \). By Assumption 6(ii), and since we have ordered \( Z \) such that \( p_{11} > p_{10} \), the direction of the monotonicity in Assumption 6(i) is identified from the sign of \( LATE_c \). Here we consider only the case when \( LATE_c > 0 \), as the sharp bounds when \( LATE_c < 0 \) are constructed in the same way. From equation (1) we can write \( ATE = \pi_{at}(E[Y|Y(1)|at] - E[Y|Y(0)|at]) + \pi_{nt}(E[Y(1)|nt] - E[Y(0)|nt]) + \pi_c LATE_c \). Under Assumptions 1 through 4, the sampling process identifies each of the quantities to the right of this equation except for \( E[Y(1)|nt] \) and \( E[Y(0)|at] \), and thus equation (2) follows. Since there are no restrictions on these two means other than those imposed by Assumptions 5 and 6(i), these two assumptions directly imply the bounds \( y^u \geq E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y(0)|nt] = \bar{Y}^0 \) and \( Y^0 = E[Y(1)|at] \geq E[Y(0)|at] \geq y^l \). The lower (upper) bound on \( ATE \) in Proposition 2 is obtained from equation (2) by setting \( E[Y(1)|nt] \) at its lower (upper) bound and \( E[Y(0)|at] \) at its upper (lower) bound.

For sharpness, first, \( ATE \) attains its smallest value when \( E[Y(0)|at] = Y^0 \) and \( E[Y(1)|nt] = Y^0 \). Otherwise, always takers or never takers violate Assumption 6(i). Similarly, \( ATE \) attains its largest value when \( E[Y(0)|at] = y^u \) and \( E[Y(1)|nt] = y^u \). Otherwise, always takers or never takers violate Assumption 5. Next, we will show that \( \forall \alpha \in [LB, UB] \), there exist distributions consistent with observed data, and \( ATE = \alpha \) evaluated under such distributions. \( \forall \alpha \in [LB, UB] \), it can be written as \( \alpha = \bar{Y}^{11} p_{11} - \bar{Y}^{00} p_{00} + q_1 p_{01} - q_0 p_{10} \), where \( q_1 \in [Y_{10}, Y_{1u}] \) and \( q_0 \in [Y_{00}, Y_{01}] \). Let \( \bar{F}_{Y_1|Z,D}(y_1|1,d) \) denote the distribution of the potential outcome \( Y(1) \) conditional on \( Z = 1 \) and \( D = d \). Similarly, \( \bar{F}_{Y_0|Z,D}(y_0|0,d) \) denotes the distribution of the potential outcome \( Y(0) \) conditional on \( Z = 0 \) and \( D = d \). Then, define

\[
F_{Y_1|Z,D}(y_1|1,d) = \begin{cases} 
F_{Y_1|Z,D}(y_1|1,1), & \text{if } D = 1 \\
1[y_1 \geq q_1], & \text{if } D = 0
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
F_{Y_0|Z,D}(y_0|0,d) = \begin{cases} 
F_{Y_0|Z,D}(y_0|0,0), & \text{if } D = 0 \\
1[y_0 \geq q_0], & \text{if } D = 1
\end{cases}
\]

\[
ATE = E[Y(1) - Y(0)]
= E[Y(1)|Z = 1] - E[Y(0)|Z = 0]
= p_{11} E[Y(1)|Z = 1, D = 1] + p_{01} E[Y(1)|Z = 1, D = 0] - p_{10} E[Y(0)|Z = 0, D = 1] - p_{00} E[Y(0)|Z = 0, D = 0]
= p_{11} E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] + p_{01} E[Y(1)|Z = 1, D = 0] - p_{10} E[Y(0)|Z = 0, D = 1] - p_{00} E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0]
= p_{11} \bar{Y}^{11} + p_{01} \bar{q}_1 - p_{10} \bar{q}_0 - p_{00} \bar{Y}^{00}
= \alpha.
\]

The second line follows Assumption 1, the third line follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the fourth and fifth lines follow from the defined distributions.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 3

We present the proof of Proposition 3 and omit the proof for the rest of the Propositions, as those proofs are similar. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, under Assumptions 1 through 4, equation (2) is derived: \( ATE = p_{11} \bar{Y}^{11} - p_{00} \bar{Y}^{00} + p_{01} E[Y(1)|nt] - p_{10} E[Y(0)|at] \). Assumptions 5 and
7a directly imply the bounds $y^u \geq E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y(1)|at] = \bar{Y}^0_{11}$ and $\bar{Y}^{10} = E[Y(0)|nt] \geq E[Y(0)|at] \geq y^l$. Similarly, Assumptions 5 and 7b directly imply the bounds $y^u \geq E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y|Z = 1, D = 1] = \bar{Y}^{11}$ and $\bar{Y}^{00} = E[Y|Z = 0, D = 0] \geq E[Y(0)|at] \geq y^l$. Additionally, Assumptions 5 and 7c directly imply the bounds $y^u \geq E[Y(1)|nt] \geq E[Y(1)|c] = \frac{\bar{Y}^{11}_{p_{01} - p_{11} p_{01}}}{p_{11} - p_{11}^0}$ and $\bar{Y}^{00}_{p_{01} - p_{11} p_{01}} = E[Y(0)|c] \geq E[Y(0)|at] \geq y^l$. Thus, the upper bound on $ATE$ in Proposition 3 is obtained from equation (2) by setting $E[Y(1)|nt]$ at its upper bound, $y^u$, and $E[Y(0)|at]$ at its lower bound, $y^l$, while each lower bound on $ATE$ in Proposition 3 is obtained from equation (2) by setting $E[Y(1)|nt]$ at its lower bound and $E[Y(0)|at]$ at its upper bound under each of the corresponding Assumption 7.

For sharpness, the proof is similar to the one in Proposition 2. We take the bounds in Proposition 3(a) as an illustration. First, $ATE$ attains its smallest value when $E[Y(0)|at] = \bar{Y}^{10}$ and $E[Y(1)|nt] = \bar{Y}^0_{01}$. Otherwise, always takers or never takers violate Assumption 7a. Similarly, $ATE$ attains its largest value when $E[Y(0)|at] = y^l$ and $E[Y(1)|nt] = y^u$. Otherwise, always takers or never takers violate Assumption 5. Next, we need to show that $\forall \alpha \in [LB, UB]$, there exist distributions consistent with observed data, and $ATE = \alpha$ evaluated under such distributions. $\forall \alpha \in [LB, UB]$, it can be written as $\alpha = \bar{Y}^{11}_{p_{11} - p_{01} p_{01}} + q_1 p_{01} - q_0 p_{11}$, where $q_1 \in [\bar{Y}^0_{11}, y^u]$, $q_0 \in [y^l, \bar{Y}^{10}]$, which are determined by Assumptions 5 and 7a. Then, the proof is completed by defining $F_{Y_1|Z,D}(y_1|1,d)$ and $F_{Y_0|Z,D}(y_0|0,d)$ in the same way they were defined in the proof of Proposition 2.

A.3 GMM Moment Function

We write the moment functions for average baseline characteristics of all the strata based on the conditional expectation defined by $\{Z,D\}$. Let $\bar{\pi}_k$ denote the expectation of a scalar baseline variable for a certain stratum $k$. The moment function for this variable is defined as:

$$g(\{\bar{\pi}_k\}) = \begin{bmatrix} (x - \bar{\pi}_{at})(1 - Z)D \\
(x - \bar{\pi}_{nt})Z(1 - D) \\
(x - \bar{\pi}_c \bar{\pi}_{p_{01}} - \bar{\pi}_n \bar{\pi}_{p_{11}})ZD \\
(x - \bar{\pi}_c \bar{\pi}_{p_{01}} - \bar{\pi}_n \bar{\pi}_{p_{01}})(1 - Z)(1 - D) \\
(x - \sum_k \pi_k \bar{\pi}_k) \end{bmatrix}$$

where $\{\bar{\pi}_k\} = \{\bar{\pi}_{at}, \bar{\pi}_{nt}, \bar{\pi}_c\}$. By Law of Iterated Expectation, $E[g(\{\bar{\pi}_k\})] = 0$ when evaluated at the true value of $\{\bar{\pi}_k\}$.

Alternatively, we could also write the moment function for the proportions of all the strata and then estimate the model together with the average baseline characteristics simultaneously by GMM. However, such GMM estimators do not behave well in our data. Thus, in our application, we first identify the proportions of all the strata, and then estimate all the average baseline characteristics given the identified proportions. As seen in $g(\{\bar{\pi}_k\})$, for each variable, we have 5 equations (4 derived from the conditional expectations defined by $\{Z,D\}$ plus one from the expectation for the entire sample) to identify 3 means, i.e., $\{\bar{\pi}_k\}$. Since the standard errors obtained from this GMM model do not take into account the fact that the proportions of the strata are also estimated, we employ a 500-repetition bootstrap to calculate the standard errors of the estimated average baseline characteristics.

A.4 Bounds on ATT

The propositions below, labeled Proposition 1’ to Proposition 6’, present the bounds for the $ATT$
and parallel those presented in the main text for the $ATE$.

**Proposition 1’** Under Assumptions 1 through 5 the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where

\[ lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^u) \]
\[ ub = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^v) \]

The next proposition adds the assumption of weak monotonicity of average potential outcomes within the $at$ stratum, which corresponds to Assumption 6 as applied to this stratum (i.e., ignoring the $nt$ stratum).

**Proposition 2’** Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and Assumption 6 as applied to the $at$ stratum, the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

\[ lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) \]
\[ ub = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^u) \]

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

\[ lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^u) \]
\[ ub = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) \]

For the $ATT$, the three alternative mean dominance assumptions we consider are the same as those in Assumptions 7a to 7c with respect to the non-identified mean $E[Y(0)|at]$ (i.e., ignoring those inequalities involving $E[Y(1)|nt]$).

**Proposition 3’** Let $ub = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^v)$. Then,

(a) Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 7a as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where $lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \bar{Y}^{10})$;

(b) Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 7b as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where $lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \bar{Y}^{00})$;

(c) Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 7c as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where $lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \frac{\bar{Y}^{10} - \bar{Y}^{00}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}})$.

The last three propositions provide bounds on the $ATT$ combining Assumption 6 with each of Assumptions 7a to 7c (all these four assumptions as applied only to the non-identified mean $E[Y(0)|at]$).

**Proposition 4’** Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 6 and 7a as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $lb \leq ATT \leq ub$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

\[ lb = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{01}, \bar{Y}^{10}\}) \]
\[ ub = \frac{1}{r_1} q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^v) \]
and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{lb} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \bar{Y}^{10})] \\
\text{ub} &= \frac{q_1}{r_1}(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]).
\end{align*}
$$

Proposition 5’ Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 6 and 7c as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $\text{lb} \leq \text{ATT} \leq \text{ub}$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{lb} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{01}, \bar{Y}^{00}\})] \\
\text{ub} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^{'})];
\end{align*}
$$

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{lb} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{00} - \bar{Y}^{01})] \\
\text{ub} &= \frac{q_1}{r_1}(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]).
\end{align*}
$$

Proposition 6’ Under Assumptions 1 through 5, and 6 and 7c as applied to the term $E[Y(0)|at]$, the bounds $\text{lb} \leq \text{ATT} \leq \text{ub}$ are sharp, where, if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{lb} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - \min\{\bar{Y}^{01}, \frac{\bar{Y}^{00} - \bar{Y}^{10}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}}\})] \\
\text{ub} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{01} - y^{'})];
\end{align*}
$$

and if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{lb} &= \frac{1}{r_1}[q_1(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]) + p_{1|0}(\bar{Y}^{00} - \frac{\bar{Y}^{00} - \bar{Y}^{10}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}})] \\
\text{ub} &= \frac{q_1}{r_1}(E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]).
\end{align*}
$$

A.5 Bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$

This subsection presents the bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ under each set of assumptions considered in the paper. They are obtained by using the equations: $\text{LATE}_{nt} = E[Y(1)|nt] - \bar{Y}^{10}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at} = \bar{Y}^{01} - E[Y(0)|at]$. The propositions below, labeled Proposition 1” to Proposition 6”, show the bounds for those two parameters and are analogous to those previously presented for the $\text{ATE}$ and $\text{ATT}$.

Proposition 1” Under Assumptions 1 through 5, sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: $y^{'} - \bar{Y}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^{u} - \bar{Y}^{10}$, and $\bar{Y}^{01} - y^{u} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq \bar{Y}^{01} - y^{'}$.

Proposition 2” Under Assumptions 1 through 6, sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: If $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$, $0 \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^{u} - \bar{Y}^{10}$, and $0 \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq \bar{Y}^{01} - y^{'}$; if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$, $y^{'} - \bar{Y}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq 0$, and $\bar{Y}^{01} - y^{u} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq 0$. 

48
Proposition 3" Sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: (a) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7a, $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10}$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l$; (b) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7b, $Y_{11}^{11} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10}$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l$; (c) Under Assumptions 1 through 5 and 7c,

$$\frac{Y_{11}^{11} - Y_{01}^{01} p_{1|1} - Y_{10}^{10}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10},$$

$$\frac{Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{00}^{00} p_{0|0} - Y_{10}^{10} p_{0|1}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l.$$

Proposition 4" Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7a, sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: If $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$, $\max\{Y_{01}^{01}, Y_{10}^{10}\} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10}$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - \min\{Y_{01}^{01}, Y_{10}^{10}\} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l$; if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$, $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq 0$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq 0$.

Proposition 5" Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7b, sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: If $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$, $\max\{Y_{11}^{11}, Y_{10}^{10}\} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10}$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - \min\{Y_{01}^{01}, Y_{00}^{00}\} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l$; if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$, $Y_{11}^{11} - Y_{10}^{10} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq 0$, and $Y_{01}^{01} - Y_{00}^{00} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq 0$.

Proposition 6" Under Assumptions 1 through 6 and 7c, sharp bounds on $\text{LATE}_{nt}$ and $\text{LATE}_{at}$ are given by: If $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] > 0$,

$$\max\left\{\frac{Y_{11}^{11} - Y_{01}^{01} p_{1|1} - Y_{10}^{10}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}}, Y_{10}^{10}\right\} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq y^u - Y_{10}^{10},$$

$$\frac{Y_{01}^{01} - \min\{Y_{01}^{01}, Y_{00}^{00} p_{0|0} - Y_{10}^{10} p_{0|1}\}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq Y_{01}^{01} - y^l;$$

if $E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] < 0$,

$$\frac{Y_{11}^{11} p_{1|1} - Y_{01}^{01} p_{1|0} - Y_{10}^{10}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}} \leq \text{LATE}_{nt} \leq 0,$$

$$\frac{Y_{01}^{01} p_{0|0} - Y_{00}^{00} p_{0|1}}{p_{1|1} - p_{1|0}} \leq \text{LATE}_{at} \leq 0.$$