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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 10619

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RCT in Indonesia**

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ABSTRACT

Scaling Up Sanitation: Evidence from an RCT in Indonesia*

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a widely used sanitation intervention, Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), using a randomized controlled trial. The intervention was implemented at scale across rural East Java in Indonesia. CLTS increases toilet construction, reduces roundworm infestations, and decreases community tolerance of open defecation. Financial constraints faced by poorer households limit their ability to improve sanitation. We also examine the program's scale up process which included local governments taking over implementation of CLTS from professional resource agencies. The results suggest that all of the sanitation and health benefits accrue from villages where resource agencies implemented the program, while local government implementation produced no discernible benefits.

JEL Classification: O12, I15

Keywords: scale up, sanitation, impact evaluation, development, health

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1 Introduction

It is estimated that about 1.1 billion people worldwide practice open defecation as a result of lack of access to sanitation facilities. Preventable diseases caused by open defecation result in a tremendous disease burden which is shouldered mainly by the poor. Millions of people contract fecal-borne diseases, most commonly diarrhea and intestinal worms, with an estimated 1.7 million people dying each year because of unsafe water, hygiene and sanitation practices (WHO/UNICEF, 2010). In Indonesia 110 million people lack access to proper sanitation and 63 million of them practice open defecation (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). Two of the four main causes of death for children under five in Indonesia (diarrhea and typhoid) are fecal-borne illnesses linked directly to inadequate water supply, sanitation, and hygiene issues (Ministry of Health, 2002). About 11 percent of Indonesian children have diarrhea in any two-week period and it has been estimated that more than 33,000 die each year from diarrhea (Curtis, 2004). By reducing normal food consumption and nutrient absorption, diarrheal diseases and intestinal worms are also a significant cause of malnutrition, leading to impaired physical growth (Guerrant et al., 1999), reduced resistance to infection (Baqui et al., 1993), and long-term gastrointestinal disorders (Schneider, Shiffman and Faigenblum, 1978). Inadequate sanitation is associated not only with adverse health effects, but also with significant economic losses. Inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene in Indonesia is estimated to cost approximately US\$6.3 billion, or more than 2.4 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) (Napitupulu and Hutton, 2008).

Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) is a program now being widely implemented in more than 60 countries throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Pacific and the Middle East to address the sanitation burden (Wells and Sijbesma, 2012). CLTS aims to create demand for sanitation by facilitating graphic, shame-inducing community discussions of the negative health consequences of existing sanitation practices, rather than through the more traditional approach of providing sanitation hardware or subsidies. The Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank is implementing CLTS widely. As part of a

learning agenda to address the burdens associated with poor sanitation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded randomized controlled trial (RCT) evaluations of sanitation and hygiene interventions in seven locations around the world.¹ This paper presents the results of the Indonesian evaluation.

An important component of the intervention is that it sought to create a large-scale sustainable program and so was evaluated at scale while implemented by local governments under real-world conditions. The evaluation of the project at scale is in contrast to many evaluations that are carried out on small scale pilot interventions under more controlled circumstances. Evaluating smaller scale trials, analogous to efficacy trials in the field of medical research which provide a test of proof of concept, is a seemingly valid approach as it attempts to avoid large sums of money being spent on implementing programs at scale that never have a chance of succeeding. However, scaling up development programs is far from straight forward and so it is not clear that the results achieved in small scale interventions will be replicable at scale.

In this paper we first present the results of the randomized evaluation of Community-Led Total Sanitation. We report the impact of CLTS on outcomes of interest along the causal chain as improvements in sanitation have the potential to lead to a decrease in parasitic infestations, a decrease in anemia, and an increase in weight and height for young children. We rely on objective measures of impact—physical inspection of sanitation facilities, blood and fecal samples, and physical anthropometric measures. We then conduct an explicit examination of the scale up process. Resource agencies hired by WSP to train local government staff implemented the project in approximately half the treatment communities, while local government staff implemented it in the other half. Although not officially randomly allocated across implementing teams, discussions with WSP suggest there was no systematic process of assignment. In addition, tests of household and village baseline characteristics by implementer status show no significant differences.

¹CLTS was implemented in Indonesia, India and Tanzania, and handwashing interventions were implemented in Peru, Vietnam, and Tanzania.

We are aware of only a small number of studies that conduct rigorous quantitative evaluations of the scaling up process, all of which highlight the many unforeseen difficulties in scaling up projects and the need to carefully evaluate the scale up process. Bold et al. (2013) find that an educational intervention increased student test scores when implemented by an NGO in Western Kenya but failed to increase scores when replicated at scale by the government. Grossman, Humphreys and Sacramont-Lutz (2015) finds that the high take-up by marginalized populations of new low-cost technology that allows constituents to engage with their local politicians could not be replicated when scaled to comprehensively cover half the country. A more promising outcome is reported in Banerjee et al. (2016*a*) and Banerjee et al. (2016*b*) who build on knowledge gained through previous failed attempts to effectively scale up the “Teaching at the Right Level” program.²

The evaluation results show that CLTS increases the rate of toilet construction, reduces the prevalence of roundworm infestation, and decreases community tolerance of open defecation. There is no discernible impact on the other health measures. Allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects shows that poorer households were constrained in their ability to build toilets. In terms of scale up, while significant benefits accrue in resource agency communities, local government implementation produced no discernible benefits.

The findings demonstrate the potential for CLTS to improve access to sanitation and improve child health. However, these findings also illustrate the difficulty of scale up, even when industry best-practice is followed and there is little deviation from the prototype (as will be documented below). A traditional pilot-style evaluation of the professional implementation of the program would have led to significant overestimates of the benefits arising

²Other studies that examine large scale interventions point to similar scalability problems. For example, Bouguen et al. (2014) examine the impact of a large scale preschool construction program in Cambodia and find no positive impacts, and some negative impacts, on early childhood cognition, even though smaller scale projects proved promising. Duncan and Magnuson (2013), in a review of the impacts of pre-school programs, note that the results from programs implemented for large and representative populations are generally much smaller than those found for small-scale pilot programs. A number of studies have highlighted a tendency for RCTs to estimate interventions’ abstract efficacy rather than their effectiveness in practice (Barrett and Carter, 2010). Ravallion (2009) also raises concerns about the usefulness of evaluations of NGO-implemented programs when deciding whether and how to scale up a program. Vivalt (2015) uses 15,021 results from 647 impact evaluations and finds that past results have limited ability to predict results of other interventions.

from the government-implemented program. The findings also suggest that measures to address the challenges poorer households face in terms of the affordability of sanitation deserve attention.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides details on the intervention and the experimental design. Section 3 explains the data and the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main impact evaluation results, and how they vary by poverty status. The scale up process and results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Intervention and Study Design

CLTS was initially developed in Bangladesh in 1999 by Kamal Kar in partnership with WaterAid Bangladesh. It is now being widely implemented in more than 60 countries throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Pacific and the Middle East (Wells and Sijbesma, 2012), having been adopted by many international NGOs (for example, Plan International, UNICEF, Care, World Vision) and the World Bank. Governments are increasingly taking the lead in scaling up CLTS with many having adopted CLTS as national policy. CLTS is viewed by many in the water and sanitation sector as the most promising approach to improving sanitation currently available.

The program is a community-led approach that focuses on creating demand for sanitation, in contrast to the traditional approach of supplying sanitation hardware (Sah and Negussie, 2009). CLTS facilitators are sent to villages to initiate a community analysis of existing sanitation practices and a discussion of the negative health consequences of such practices. The community actively participates in the facilitated meeting and is then left to forge its own plan to improve village sanitation with only limited follow-up support and monitoring from the program. These discussions, or “triggerings” are held in public places and are open to all. They involve a “walk of shame,” during which the facilitator helps people analyze how fecal contamination spreads from exposed excreta to their living environments and food and drinking water. A map of the village is drawn on the ground and villagers are asked to

indicate where they live, where they defecate, and the routes they take there and back. This illustrates that everyone is ingesting small amounts of each other's feces which is intended to lead to individual and collective decisions to improve community health by becoming an open defecation free (ODF) community. ODF status is verified by local government agencies and community members.³

In contrast to other approaches that have been used widely in the past in Indonesia and elsewhere, no funding for infrastructure or subsidies of any kind is provided. CLTS founders believe that CLTS is far less effective when subsidies are available (Kar and Pasteur, 2005). They argue that the existence of subsidies causes people to postpone investing in sanitation in the hope that they will receive a subsidy and that subsidies instill a culture of dependency rather than self-determination. The lack of subsidies also makes the program much less expensive and savings can be utilized to spread and scale up the program.⁴

2.1 Randomization Design and Data Collection

In Indonesia CLTS was rolled out across rural areas in the province of East Java. East Java is Indonesia's second most populous province with approximately 38 million residents. Eight of the 29 rural districts in East Java were involved in the impact evaluation. In each district ten villages were randomly selected to participate in CLTS and ten were randomly selected to act as comparison villages. Randomization was conducted at the village level, stratified by sub-district.⁵ There was only partial compliance with the randomization assignment.

³In Indonesia the program is called Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing (TSSM) or in Indonesian Sanitasi Total & Pemasaran Sanitasi (SToPS). It consists of a CLTS demand-side component and also a supply-side component which seeks to support the development of the local sanitation market. The supply-side component was however not well developed at the time of the evaluation (Cameron, Shah and Olivia, 2013). For more information on CLTS see <http://www.communityledtotalsanitation.org/page/clts-approach>.

⁴Patil et al. (2014) and Pattanayak et al. (2009) evaluated India's Total Sanitation Campaign which uses a CLTS approach with subsidies. They find significant increases in access to improved sanitation but no robust health impacts. Hammer and Spears (2013) also study the Total Sanitation Campaign in the Indian state of Maharashtra and find the program has a large positive impact on children's heights. Guiteras, Levinsohn and Mobarak (2015) show that in Bangladesh, subsidies to the poor increased toilet ownership both among subsidized households and their unsubsidized neighbors, which suggests that investment decisions are interlinked across neighbors.

⁵The districts are spread across East Java, and include Probolinggo, Bonodowoso, Situbondo, Banyuwangi, Ngawi, Madiun, Jombang and Blitar. For a more in-depth description of the geographic

Of the 80 treatment villages, the endline survey data reports that 53 villages (66 percent) were triggered and 13.8 percent of the control villages were exposed to the program. Non-compliance was largely a result of district governments changing their target communities after the randomization plan had been agreed upon. Program administrative data collected as part of the TSSM program reports a higher percentage of treatment villages (83 percent) and a smaller percentage of control villages (4%) received the treatment. Below we estimate the average treatment effect across villages that were assigned to treatment, that is Intention-to-Treat (ITT) estimates.

Two waves of household data were collected. The baseline survey was conducted just prior to program implementation in August-September 2008. Within each village, approximately thirteen households were randomly selected to be surveyed. The endline data collection was conducted approximately 24 months later, between November 2010 and February 2011. The surveys collected a wide variety of information on the households including demographic information, a detailed sanitation module (including physical observations of household sanitation facilities which are used to verify household reports), and a child health module (including fecal samples to allow testing for parasitic infestations, blood tests for anemia, and anthropometric measurements). To enable an examination of impacts on child health, households with children under the age of two were prioritized, with all surveyed households required to have at least one child under the age of five at baseline. Community level demographic data and information on infrastructure were also collected.

Our sample thus consists of approximately 2000 households spread across 160 rural villages in eight districts.

context, see Cameron and Shah (2015). For further detail on the randomization design and process see Cameron, Shah and Olivia (2013).

3 Empirical Strategy

Our empirical approach is to present ITT estimates of program impact on the outcomes of interest. This is done by estimating equation (1) below:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_j + \gamma X_{ij} + \delta_K + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ij} is the outcome measure for household i in village j ; T_j is the treatment dummy, which equals 1 for households in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise; δ_K is a set of sub-district (*kecamatan*) dummy variables which are included because the randomization was stratified at this level. The sub-district effects also control for any differences in implementation across the eight districts. In some specifications, we also include a vector of household and village characteristics (X_{ij}) as additional right-hand side controls. ϵ_{ij} is the error term, and β_1 is the main parameter of interest. All specifications cluster the standard errors at the village level.

The causal average treatment effect is given by β_1 if the randomization was effective. We use the 2008 baseline survey data to compare characteristics of treatment and control groups. Table 1 compares the means of selected key variables across treatment and control groups. It shows that the means of the variables are similar in magnitude for the two groups and we cannot reject that they are equal for most of the variables. For the key outcome variables (toilet construction, child health outcomes, etc.), balance is achieved. The demographic and socio-economic characteristics are also similar across treatment and control groups. The baseline report provides tests of balance on a more extensive set of variables (Cameron and Shah, 2010).

When examining heterogeneity of impact, we include interactions of T_j with the relevant variables. For example we will investigate whether treatment has differential impacts by poverty status of the household. In addition when we investigate the success of scale up we interact T_j with whether the village was assigned to be treated by a resource agency (RA)

or by the local government (LG).

Finally, as we are examining the impact of the program on several outcome measures across the causal chain, to deal with concerns about over-rejection of the null associated with multiple inference, we also construct an index of these program outcomes and use it as a dependent variable following Anderson (2008). This approach is discussed in more detail below.

4 Empirical Results

Tables 2 and 3 report the main ITT estimates. In Table 2 we quantify the impact of treatment on toilet construction. Table 3 examines impacts on child health outcomes, knowledge and attitudes toward open defecation. Odd-numbered columns report results from regressions that do not include controls, and the even-numbered columns include additional controls.

We first examine whether CLTS was successful in stimulating demand for sanitation. Table 2 shows that treatment increases toilet construction by 3.3 percentage points.⁶ This coefficient is stable with or without controls (column 1 vs column 2). This is a moderate sized effect and constitutes a 26 percent increase in toilet construction relative to control communities.

The ultimate aim of CLTS is to improve sanitation so as to improve community health, particularly child health. We examine the health impacts along the causal chain to roundworm infestation, hemoglobin blood concentrations (with low hemoglobin indicating anaemia) to weight and height.⁷ The dependent variables in Table 3 are the concentration of roundworm eggs, concentration of hemoglobin in blood samples, and weight and height z-scores. While all other regressions are estimated at the household level, the health regressions are estimated at the child level. The sample of children is those aged 0 to 5 at endline.

⁶Households report whether they built a toilet. This report is verified at the end of the interview by an inspection of the household's sanitation facilities.

⁷The faecal samples were also tested for hookworm and whipworm. Prevalence of these two types of worm were extremely low in our sample. Less than 1% of the sample had either of these types of worms.

Table 3 shows that treatment is associated with an approximately 44% decrease in round-worm infestation. This is a large decrease with the potential to have significant impacts on nutritional impacts. However, treatment does not have a significant impact on hemoglobin concentrations, weight or height z-scores.⁸ In other work we find that program impacts on child height operate via village open defecation rates, suggesting that there might be a critical level of community sanitation that needs to be met before heights increase (see Gertler et al. (2015); Cameron, Olivia and Shah (2015)).

CLTS is hypothesized to stimulate the demand for sanitation by inducing shame associated with lack of access to sanitation. It also imparts information on the negative health consequences of poor sanitation. Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of tests of an attitudinal index reflecting the degree to which the respondent agrees (disagrees) with negative (positive) views of open defecation and a score representing the extent of the respondent's knowledge about the causes of diarrhea (unclean water, not washing hands, open defecation, etc.).⁹ Table 3 shows that there is a decrease in the community's tolerance of open defecation in treatment communities relative to control communities (0.2 of a standard deviation). The program does not impact knowledge of the causes of diarrhea (which may be due to knowledge being quite high already, with the mean score in control communities being 4.9 out of 6).

To this point we have ignored the problem of multiple inference which leads to over-

⁸In addition to the biological and anthropometric health indicators, we also collected carer-reported diarrhea prevalence in the 7 days prior to the endline survey. Diarrhea prevalence decreased in treatment villages by 1 percentage point (26%) relative to control villages. We do not report the diarrhea results in Table 3 as our preference is to rely on objectively measured indicators, rather than those that could reflect reporting bias resulting from exposure to treatment.

⁹For the knowledge of the causes of diarrhea the caregiver is asked to indicate whether the following activities cause diarrhea: drinking dirty water; using dirty latrines; other people defecating in the river; other people defecating in another open space (yard/rice field/beach/etc); not washing hands with water; not washing hands with soap. For the attitudinal index the respondents is asked whether s/he agrees, strongly agrees, disagrees or strongly disagrees with: Having a toilet of our own will stop my family becoming a target of gossip; Sanitation facilities in this village improves the community as there is no longer environmental pollution; Most people that I know defecate in a toilet; It is OK to defecate in the open as our ancestors did; Having our own toilet will reduce the likelihood of family members getting diarrhea; It is OK to defecate in the river as others do it; It is acceptable for children to defecate in the open; It is acceptable to defecate in the open if you don't have a toilet; People who defecate in the open will not be accepted by the community.

rejection of the null hypothesis. A way to address this problem is to construct a summary index of all dependent variables from Tables 2–3 which is then used to conduct a single test of whether the program has a “general effect” on this set of outcomes. Following Anderson (2008), we construct the index by orienting all variables so that the positive direction indicates a better outcome; demeaning all re-oriented outcomes and dividing each variable by the control group standard deviation; and constructing a weighted average of these variables where the weight is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the transformed outcomes. This generates an efficient generalized least squares estimator. The procedure uses all available data and weights outcomes with fewer missing values more heavily (Anderson, 2008). We then use this variable as the dependent variable. The results presented in Panel B (columns 9 and 10) of Table 3 show that the index of program impact is significantly greater in treatment communities.

4.1 Results by Poverty Status

To examine the heterogeneity of program impact with poverty status, we generate an indicator to identify poor households. A household is deemed poor if they are in the bottom quartile of the distribution of non-land assets.¹⁰ We include this variable in the regressions and also its interaction with treatment status. The results in Table 2 column 3-4 indicate that less poor households are building toilets. None of the toilet construction is coming from the poorest households. This makes sense given toilet construction requires a significant outlay of capital. At endline households were asked to estimate how much it would cost to build their own toilet and also to state the maximum amount they would be willing to pay. Approximately half of all households that had not built a toilet reported that the amount they would have to pay is more than the maximum amount they were willing to pay. This finding is further borne out by the reporting by households that did not build toilets about the main obstacle to building one. The most frequently reported obstacle (reported by 47%

¹⁰Note that most households in our sample are poor in the sense of being below the national poverty line. Here we are defining “poor” to capture the poorer households within our sample.

of households) was the high cost of construction (see Figure 1).

Interestingly there is no heterogeneity by poverty status for the health or the attitudinal and knowledge outcomes examined in Table 3 (results are available upon request). This heterogeneity only exists only for the initial toilet construction. That poorer households are no more likely to build toilets in treatment communities than in control communities, and that the cost of construction is reported as a main obstacle to improving sanitation, calls into question CLTS's strategy of not providing subsidies for toilet construction. The reason for eschewing subsidies is that they create dependence and inhibit household investment in sanitation. Although these arguments may have some validity, recent empirical evidence suggests a crucial role for subsidies (Dupas, 2014). In fact, Patil et al. (2014) find much greater rates of toilet construction in India, which uses an approach similar to CLTS but paired with subsidies for the poor. Guiteras, Levinsohn and Mobarak (2015) also find the same in Bangladesh.

5 Scale Up

CLTS forms part of the Indonesian government's national strategy to improve environmental and health outcomes in rural areas. Ensuring sustainability of the project by embedding implementation into district governments was the key element of the scale up strategy. In terms of scale up methodology, the process was pretty much a textbook example. The World Health Organization, on the basis of evidence gathered over years of experience in scaling up public health interventions, recommends several steps for developing a successful scale up strategy (WHO, 2010). These include identifying, documenting and assessing the nature of the innovation to be scaled up; increasing the capacity of the implementing agency; assessing the broader environment in which the project is to be scaled up; supporting the resource team which will support the scale up; embedding the project within the institutions of the target country; and documenting the scale up strategy. WSP followed these steps.¹¹

¹¹Owing to it forming part of a Gates Foundation global learning agenda, the program itself and the scale up strategy are unusually well-documented. For example, see Kar and Chambers (2008); Rosenzweig and

The scale up plan involved WSP providing technical assistance to local government officers during the initial phase. The scale up model used was the widely-employed “Training of Trainers” (Binswanger and Nguyen, 2004). WSP trained staff at resource agencies (RA) which had successfully bid for the work and then these resource agencies trained local government (LG) officials in CLTS (Rosenzweig and Kopitopoulos, 2010) with the local government then taking over and scaling up the program to all villages. A portion of this training was done by demonstration or “learning-by-doing”, as LG officials observed RAs triggering in some villages.¹² This process took place at the time of the RCT. Hence, amongst the treatment villages in our sample, we have 39 villages triggered by the RAs and 41 villages triggered by the LGs.

Successful scale up rarely involves a mechanical repetition of smaller-scale innovations as the project normally needs to be adapted to operate at scale and in different environmental contexts within a country (WHO, 2010). There are thus a number of reasons why program impacts may differ when conducted at scale:

1. *Demographic context.* Different characteristics of target populations when operating at scale.
2. *Design effects.* Differences in program design that are necessary when operating at scale.
3. *Scale effects.* General equilibrium effects associated with the scale of the project.
4. *Implementation agent effects.* The identity of the implementing agency, which may

Kopitopoulos (2010); Mukherjee (2009, 2011); Pinto (2013); for a global discussion see Chambers (2009).

¹²Two RAs – one responsible for the Eastern districts and another for the Western districts – were contracted to help local governments implement CLTS in at least 30 communities per district (World Bank, 2008). The district governments worked in coordination with the sub-district health centers *puskesmas* and village level actors (sanitarians, health cadres etc). The project was governed by a steering committee coordinated by the National Ministry of Planning (*Bappenas*) with a Program Secretariat based in the Ministry of Health supporting program operations. District government Departments of Health Services held primary responsibility for implementation. Sub-district coordinating teams led by health centers were involved in training facilitators and monitoring. Elected village committees also monitored and helped organize triggerings. WSP supported the capacity of the local government implementation via the provision of extensive technical support. It however did not support local governments financially.

alter incentives.¹³

In our context, many of these effects are not present. For example, as the program was implemented simultaneously by both RAs and LGs, any general equilibrium effects will be common to both treatment types. In addition, the geographic and demographic context did not differ systematically and the project design is identical. Hence, it is a situation where there is a reasonable likelihood of successful scale up being achieved. The only potential difference between RA and LG implementation is in the *implementation agent* effect. That is the implementing actors and their associated administrative constraints differed, which could lead to differences in implementation and differential impacts.

5.1 Scale Up Estimation and Results

To examine whether program impacts vary with the identity of the triggering agency we regress the outcome measures in Tables 2 – 3 on two treatment variables, T_j^{RA} which equals one if the village was assigned to be triggered by an RA and zero otherwise; and T_j^{LG} which equals one if the village was assigned to be triggered by a local government and zero otherwise. That is, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_j^{RA} + \beta_2 T_j^{LG} + \gamma X_{ij} + \delta_K + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

The coefficient β_1 , captures the impact of the village being triggered by the resource agency and β_2 captures the impact of the village being triggered by the local government. A comparison of these coefficients reveals the differential impact.

¹³The categorization here draws from and augments Grossman, Humphreys and Sacramont-Lutz (2015). Grossman, Humphreys and Sacramont-Lutz (2015) attribute the lower uptake in the scaled up version of the intervention they study to a *design effect*—invitations to participate were given over the radio, rather than in person during a survey and an *implementation agent effect*—implementation by parliament and promoted by politicians which may have altered incentives. The lack of replicability found in the teaching intervention in Bold et al. (2013) is slated to a combination of general equilibrium effects arising from political economy forces associated with union resistance to the hiring of a large number of contract teachers, and implementation agent effects. A further related study, Berge et al. (2012), examines implementation agency effects but in the context of a small-scale business training program in Tanzania. It finds that the training is much more effective when implemented by professional trainers rather than by a local NGO.

Program administrative data identifies whether a village was triggered by a RA or by LG. Villages were not randomized into LG vs RA status, though discussions with WSP suggest there was nothing systematic about how these decisions were made with the allocations being largely random. If this is not the case, we could falsely ascribe differences in program effectiveness to LG versus RA triggering. Tests of whether villages that were triggered by local governments are otherwise similar to the villages that were triggered by resource agencies are presented in columns 4-6 of Table 1. Table 1 shows the villages are remarkably similar. There are no observable differences in the demographic and socio-economic composition of the villages. Per capita incomes and household assets also do not differ significantly, neither does eligibility for Indonesia’s cash transfer program (which reflects poverty status). Housing is also similar in both cases. There are also no significant differences in access to sanitation or open defecation rates at baseline. This is important because if local governments are cherry-picking villages so as to work with communities that are most likely to become open defecation free then we would expect to see differences in baseline sanitation. Table 1 shows that there is no difference in the probability of households having a toilet at baseline. There are similarly no differences in access to piped water and no differences in baseline sanitation behavior (handwashing).

We also examine differences at the village level which might influence the population’s interest in sanitation (Table 1, with additional village level characteristics being tested in Table A1). There is no difference in the accessibility of the villages (having a paved road to the nearest town and the distance to the city), nor in the percentage of the population which is Muslim. There is also no difference in whether a river runs through the village. Defecating in rivers is common practice in Indonesia and CLTS field workers report that motivating households to build toilets in villages that are on a river is more difficult (Mukherjee, 2011). There is also no difference in the percentage of households in the village that open defecate at baseline. The only difference we observe is that the RA-assigned villages have a significantly smaller population than LG-assigned villages. We control for village population

in the specifications below. Population is not a significant determinant of the probability of building a toilet nor of any of the health outcomes. The empirical results reported below are fairly similar with and without household and village level controls, further suggesting that differences in characteristics by triggerer identity are unlikely to be driving the results.¹⁴

Columns 5-6 in Table 2 present the results for toilet construction. Households in RA triggered villages are 5.2 percentage points more likely to build a toilet than in control communities (statistically significant), compared to 1.2 percentage points more likely in LG triggered villages (and not statistically significant). Although the coefficients on RA triggerings and LG triggerings are different in size, F-tests of the equivalence of the coefficients are unable to reject the hypothesis of equality ($p=0.12$). In columns 7-8 we additionally interact RA/LG with poor/non-poor. The results are interesting in that they suggest that most of the increase in toilet construction (8.1 percentage points) is occurring in non-poor households in RA triggered villages. However there is some toilet construction occurring in non-poor households in LG triggered villages, but a much smaller amount (2-3 percentage points) and not statistically significant once controls are included. For poorer households, it does not matter if their village was triggered by the RA or LG—there is no significant increase in toilet construction.

We now examine whether these differential improvements in sanitation infrastructure by triggerer identity are also apparent in health improvements. Table 3 shows a very large (93%) and significant reduction in roundworm concentration in RA villages. In contrast the coefficient on treatment in LG villages is insignificant (and positive). The difference between RA and LG villages is significant at the 10% level without controls (5% level with controls). We continue to find no effect on hemoglobin concentrations, weight and height, regardless of the implementing agency. We do not further interact LG/RA with poor/non-poor in Table 3 as the treatment impacts did not vary with poverty status, unlike for toilet construction. In

¹⁴We also examine differences in social capital and find none. The social capital data were collected in a separate module and are only available for 6 of the 8 districts due to budgetary constraints. The index reflects participation in community groups, trust amongst community members, perceptions of community safety, corruption and crime. For more detail see Cameron, Olivia and Shah (2015).

addition, Table 3 shows that RA implementation is significantly associated with a decreased tolerance of open defecation, whereas LG implementation is not.

Finally, while we find that the coefficient on RA treatment is often significant while the coefficient on LG treatment is not, we cannot always reject the equality of these two coefficients. The systematic finding of significance for RA implementation and insignificance for LG implementation across the range of outcome variables is however strongly suggestive of RA implementation being superior to that of LG. To test this formally, we regress the index of program impact on treatment interacted with RA and LG implementation. Columns 11-12 of Table 3 (panel B) show that treatment by RA is associated with a positive and strongly significant impact on the summary index, whereas the coefficient on treatment by LG is smaller and not statistically significant. We are able to reject that RA treatment and LG treatment is equivalent ($p\text{-value} < 0.01$ without controls; $p\text{-value} = 0.02$ with controls).

5.2 Mechanisms

CLTS aims to stimulate demand for sanitation via attitudinal change. We saw above that RAs appear to be more effective at reducing tolerance to open defecation. Table 4 compares other facets of program implementation across treatment villages triggered by RA and LG—the way information was disseminated to the community; the extent of program engagement with village staff; the extent of community participation; the intensity of implementation and the use of rewards or competitions.

There is no significant difference in the way the RAs and LGs disseminated information about the project (via TV, radio, print media, notices in shop windows or on village notice boards). Column 2 indicates however that the RAs are more likely to engage with village staff. The breakdown in Table A3 in the appendix shows that this is being driven by greater engagement with village health officers and village office staff. RA implementation also results in significantly greater community participation (in terms of knowledge of the program, the triggering event and attendance at the event). Respondents in RA-triggered

treatment villages are 9 percentage points more likely to have heard about the program, 10 percentage points more likely to have known about the triggering event, and 6 percentage points (60%) more likely to have attended the triggering than in LG villages. The intensity of implementation is also greater in RA villages (driven by facilitators making more visits).¹⁵

In the field one hears a lot about the importance of the “quality” of the facilitator. In order to test whether the RA facilitators are “better” than the LG facilitators, we collected information from respondents on their perceptions of how charismatic/persuasive the facilitators were. Column 4, Panel B in Table A3 shows that there is no significant difference in the average reported persuasiveness of the facilitators (mean=2.8 on a 4 point scale). In fact, an examination of various program reports reveals that there was general satisfaction of WSP staff with the quality of the RA training of the master trainers (Rosenzweig and Kopitopoulos, 2010).

5.3 Adherence to treatment assignment

Another possible reason for the estimated poor performance of LGs relative to RAs may reflect less adherence by the local governments to the treatment assignment. Triggerings were confirmed by village informants as having occurred in only 51% of villages that were allocated to local governments versus 87% of RA treatment villages.¹⁶ Local governments may hence not be less effective per se, but just appear less effective in our sample as they did not trigger as many treatment villages as the resource agencies. To investigate this possibility we estimate two stage least squares regressions where we instrument for whether a triggering was confirmed to have taken place (by either an RA or LG) with whether the village was assigned to be a treatment village (T_j), and treatment interacted with whether the village was assigned to be triggered by an RA ($T_j * assigned_j^{RA}$). Triggerings are classified

¹⁵Most villages received only one visit from the team, some villages received two visits and a small number received three. RA facilitators made 0.43 (47%) more visits to villages than LG teams (significant at the 5% level).

¹⁶Note that absenteeism overall does not seem to be higher amongst local government staff as they also triggered more control villages (13 villages or 16% of control villages) so fell only 7 villages short of target, similar to the resource agencies shortfall of 5 villages.

as having been confirmed if any respondent to the village questionnaires (the village head, health cadre and/or another local leader) reports that a triggering occurred. We use two stage least squares to estimate:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{triggered}_j^{RA} + \beta_2 \text{triggered}_j^{LG} + \gamma X_{ij} + \delta_K + \epsilon_{1,ij} \quad (3)$$

where we instrument for whether a resource agency triggered a village (triggered_j^{RA}) or whether local government triggered a village (triggered_j^{LG}), as follows:

$$\text{triggered}_j^{RA} = \eta_0 + \eta_1 T_j + \eta_2 T_j * \text{assigned}_j^{RA} + \eta_3 X_{ij} + \delta_K + \epsilon_{2,ij} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{triggered}_j^{LG} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 T_j + \phi_2 T_j * \text{assigned}_j^{RA} + \phi_3 X_{ij} + \delta_K + \epsilon_{3,ij} \quad (5)$$

All other variables are defined as previously. This strategy allows for the differential effect on the probability of a village actually being triggered depending on whether it was to be triggered by a resource agency or local government.

Table A2 in the appendix presents the first stage results and shows that the instruments are strongly predictive of both instrumented variables. Table 5 presents the second stage results. The instrumental variable results are very similar to the previous ITT results. The results for toilet construction (like the ITT results) show that the RA-triggered villages are more successful in getting households to build toilets. In RA-triggered villages toilet construction increases significantly by 6 percentage points, whereas in LG-triggered villages the increase is not statistically significant. As in Table 2 we cannot reject the hypothesis that these two coefficients are significantly different from one another. Intolerance of open defecation increases in RA villages but not in LG villages (p=value<0.01).

Table 5 also reports the two stage least squares results for health impacts. The results for roundworm infestations confirm the ITT results in Table 3 that there were large and strongly statistically significant decreases in roundworm infestations in RA-triggered villages, but not

in villages triggered by local governments, with the difference being statistically significant at the 10% level ($p=0.06$). As was the case for the ITT results, there are no significant impacts on child hemoglobin levels, weight and height regardless of the implementing agency.

Finally, Column 8 presents the IV results using the index of program outcomes as the dependent variable. This clearly shows a strongly significant positive effect of the program when implemented by a RA but no impact (coefficient is very close to zero, negative and insignificant) when implementation is by LG. We are able to strongly reject that the impact of RA and LG implementation are equal ($p=0.003$).

6 Conclusion and Discussion

We find that CLTS significantly increases the rate of toilet construction, reduces worm infestations, and reduces community tolerance of open defecation. Although the rate of toilet construction increased by approximately 5 percentage points amongst less poor households, the poorest households were unable to afford to build toilets. This highlights the potential for the provision of finance for poor households and/or subsidies for the poor to play an important role in producing open defecation free communities (and the concomitant health benefits).

The examination of the scale up process shows that CLTS had relatively large positive impacts in villages where the program was implemented by RAs. In contrast, with the identical program design, the same demographic composition of participating households, and common general equilibrium effects, implementation by local governments failed to produce any discernible positive impacts.

Understanding what makes for a successful scale up is of prime importance to the development sector. Currently there are very few studies that explicitly examine the scale up process through the lens of a rigorous quantitative evaluation and the studies that exist find either a lack of replicability at scale or that successful scale up is not straightforward and involves considerable learning from failure. Studies that examine large scale interventions

point to similar scalability problems. However evaluations of scaling up using the regular array of quantitative tools are not very effective in pinpointing the reasons for a lack of impact at scale.¹⁷ The integration of quantitative evaluation, qualitative research, and high quality monitoring data is likely to improve researcher and program implementers ability to identify program impact *and* understand the causes of success and failure, so as to increase the likelihood of successful scale up in the future.

¹⁷CLTS was subject to both the rigorous causal evaluation and extensive qualitative “action research” but these were not integrated, and do not allow a conclusive identification of failures in government implementation. In fact, CLTS has on the basis of the qualitative research been put forward as a case study of effective scale up (Deak, 2008; Perez, 2012). For discussion of data collection efforts to identify implementation and scale up difficulties see Bamberger, Rao and Woolcock (2010); Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2013); Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2012); Woolcock (2013); Kruk et al. (2016); Brown, Cameron and Wood (2014). Banerjee et al. (2016*b*) used process data to identify the keys to scale up success.

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Table 1: Tests of Balance

Variable	All Villages			Treatment Villages		
	Treatment	Control	p-value	RA Facilitator	LG Facilitator	p-value
<i>Baseline Household Characteristics:</i>						
No sanitation	0.52	0.48	0.44	0.52	0.52	0.95
Open defecation	0.40	0.40	0.93	0.40	0.39	0.89
Access to Unimproved Sanitation	0.11	0.12	0.76	0.12	0.10	0.66
Access to Improved Sanitation	0.49	0.48	0.74	0.48	0.51	0.69
Wash hands after defecation	0.99	0.99	0.20	0.99	0.99	0.80
Access to piped water	0.05	0.08	0.39	0.05	0.05	1.00
Believes open defecation causes diarrhea	0.69	0.67	0.50	0.69	0.69	0.89
Knowledge of causes of diarrhea	4.73	4.73	0.94	4.81	4.66	0.39
Household head's age	40.36	40.35	0.99	40.18	40.54	0.68
Household head male	0.95	0.96	0.31	0.95	0.94	0.53
Household head's educational attainment:						
Elementary	0.52	0.48	0.27	0.53	0.51	0.68
Lower Secondary	0.20	0.21	0.46	0.19	0.21	0.68
Upper Secondary	0.18	0.21	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.74
Tertiary	0.04	0.04	0.78	0.04	0.05	0.76
Household size	4.92	4.82	0.29	5.00	4.83	0.20
Per capita household income	2.81	3.02	0.37	2.84	2.79	0.86
Household assets	56.68	60.23	0.55	54.68	58.68	0.60
House has a dirt floor	0.22	0.23	0.91	0.25	0.20	0.33
House has a tiled floor	0.05	0.07	0.23	0.05	0.05	0.83
House has walls of brick or wood	0.88	0.89	0.86	0.87	0.90	0.30
Household uses wood as a cooking fuel	0.57	0.52	0.21	0.56	0.59	0.57
Cash transfer program (BLT) recipient	0.24	0.23	0.72	0.26	0.23	0.36
Max Observations:	922	936		462	460	
<i>Baseline Child Characteristics:</i>						
Age in months	11.83	12.14	0.30	12.09	11.57	0.24
Male	0.50	0.52	0.44	0.49	0.51	0.48
Hemoglobin (g/l)	101.54	101.76	0.81	100.72	102.38	0.22
Weight (kgs)	8.23	8.28	0.61	8.19	8.27	0.49
Height (cms)	71.23	71.60	0.34	71.38	71.09	0.58
Max Observations:	946	940		471	475	
<i>Baseline Village Characteristics:</i>						
Village population	1,041.90	1,299.84	0.14	824.31	1,248.88	0.02**
Paved road to nearest city	0.94	0.95	0.73	0.95	0.93	0.69
% of the village population that are muslim	97.64	95.42	0.19	97.36	97.90	0.67
River runs through village	0.72	0.71	0.86	0.72	0.73	0.89
% of households in village that open defecate	33.64	36.37	0.52	32.77	34.48	0.78
Max Observations:	80	80		39	41	

Note: Information on roundworm prevalence and intolerance of open defecation is not available at baseline.

Table 2: ITT Estimates – Toilet Construction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	.033 (.013)**	.033 (.013)**						
Poor			.006 (.021)	.006 (.022)			.008 (.022)	.009 (.022)
Treatment*Poor			-.023 (.026)	-.02 (.027)				
Treatment*Non-poor			.053 (.016)***	.049 (.016)***				
RA Treatment					.045 (.024)*	.052 (.023)**		
LG Treatment					.022 (.012)*	.012 (.012)		
RA Treatment*Poor							-.033 (.033)	-.019 (.033)
RA Treatment*Non-poor							.077 (.028)***	.081 (.027)***
LG Treatment*Poor							-.012 (.033)	-.024 (.035)
LG Treatment*Non-poor							.031 (.016)**	.021 (.015)
Mean DV (Treat=0)	.125	.125	.125	.125	.125	.125	.125	.125
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Tests of Equality (p-values):								
Non-Poor=Poor			0.02	0.04				
RA=LG					0.40	0.12		
RA*Non-Poor=LG*Non-Poor							0.15	0.05
RA*Poor=LG*Poor							0.62	0.92
No treatment differences							0.07	0.08
Observations	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858

Notes: We report results from OLS regressions (equations 1 and 2). The dependent variable equals 1 if the household built a toilet since baseline and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects. Even numbered columns also include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). ***indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.

Table 3: ITT Estimates—Health, Attitudes, Knowledge, and Overall Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Panel A: Health Outcomes																
	Roundworm (eggs/g)			Hemoglobin (g/l)			Weight z-score			Height z-score						
Treatment	-58.92 (35.52)*	-68.6 (39.65)*		.07 (.45)	-16 (.47)		.02 (.03)									
RA Treatment			-127.57 (62.5)**	-146.44 (64.88)**		.08 (.7)	-06 (.71)		.04 (.05)							
LG Treatment			8.41 (33.92)	12.55 (38.67)		.06 (.58)	-27 (.61)		-008 (.04)							
Mean DV (Treat=0)	156.7	156.7	156.7	156.7	111.0	111.0	111.0	111.0	-1.39	-1.39	-1.39	-1.39	-1.65	-1.65	-1.65	-1.65
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value (RA=LG)			0.06	0.03		0.98	0.82		0.43							
Observations	1780	1780	1780	1780	1443	1443	1443	1443	1886	1886	1886	1886	1872	1872	1872	1872

Panel B: Attitudes, Knowledge and Overall Index

	Intolerance of Open Defecation			Knowledge of Causes of Diarrhea			Covariance-weighted Index									
Treatment	.275 (.285)	.566 (.235)**		-012 (.051)	-003 (.055)		.03 (.02)**	.04 (.02)**								
RA Treatment			1.1 (.383)**	1.154 (.318)**		.039 (.069)	.027 (.072)		.08 (.02)**	.07 (.02)**						
LG Treatment			-528 (.394)	-045 (.327)		-061 (.074)	-033 (.079)		-01 (.02)	-001 (.02)						
Mean DV (Treat=0)	32.9	32.9	32.9	32.9	4.85	4.85	4.85	4.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
p-value (RA=LG)			0.004	0.009		0.33	0.56		0.006							
Observations	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1842	1842	1842	1842	1842	1842	1842	1842

Notes: We report results from OLS regressions (equations 1 and 2). Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects. In Panel A, the dependent variables are roundworm prevalence (eggs/g), hemoglobin (g/l), weight and height z-scores of all children 0-5. In Panel B, *Intolerance of Open Defecation* is the sum of responses to 9 questions about attitudes toward open defecation (45 is the maximum score possible and is the highest level of intolerance while 9 is the minimum score possible and reflects total acceptance of open defecation). *Knowledge of Causes of Diarrhea* is a score out of 6 based on six questions about possible causes of diarrhea. A score of 6 indicates that the respondent got all of the questions correct. These variables are reported at the household level. In columns 9-12 of Panel B, the dependent variable is a weighted index of toilet construction, roundworm, hemoglobin, weight z-scores, height z-scores, intolerance of open defecation, and knowledge of causes of diarrhea. Even numbered columns include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). In Panel A, even numbered columns also include the sex of the child, dummy variables for age in months of the child, and the % of households with no sanitation at baseline. ***indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.

Table 4: Did RA Implementation Differ from LG Implementation?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Information Dissemination	Local Engagement	Extent of Community Participation	Implementation Intensity	Use of Rewards or Competitions
RA Treatment	-.05 (.05)	.09 (.05)**	.24 (.10)**	.35 (.19)*	.01 (.08)
Mean DV	0.932	0.49	0.90	-0.07	0.10
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	922	922	922	922	922

Notes: The sample is restricted to observations in treatment villages. *Information Dissemination* equals 1 if any of TV, radio, print media, video, notices in shop windows or village notice boards were used to disseminate information about the program, 0 otherwise. *Local Engagement* equals 1 if the program engaged with any of village health officers, midwives, health cadres or village officials, 0 otherwise. *Extent of Community Participation* is the sum of indicators of whether the household had heard of CLTS, knew about the triggering and had attended the triggering. *Implementation Intensity* is an unweighted standardized index of the number of facilitators at the triggering session, the number of visits made by the facilitators to the village and rankings of the facilitators' charisma. *Use of Rewards or Competitions* equals 1 if one or more respondents in the village reported that the program involved rewards for villages becoming open defecation free and/or competitions between villages with regard to decreasing open defecation. We report the coefficient on the indicator that the village was assigned to be triggered by an RA. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects. All specifications include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). Standard errors are clustered at the village level. ***indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.

Table 5: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Toilet Construction	Intolerance of OD	Causes of Diarrhea	Roundworm (eggs/g)	Hemoglobin (g/l)	Weight z-score	Height z-score	Index
Village triggered by RA	.06 (.03)**	1.33 (.37)***	.06 (.08)	-167.89 (71.95)**	-.07 (.78)	-.004 (.05)	-.04 (.05)	.08 (.02)***
Village triggered by LG	.02 (.02)	-.09 (.61)	-.04 (.16)	23.25 (69.48)	-.49 (1.06)	.09 (.06)	-.005 (.07)	-.002 (.03)
Mean DV	0.125	32.9	4.85	156.7	111.0	-1.39	-1.65	0.00
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value (RA=LG):	0.29	0.002	0.71	0.06	0.90	0.31	0.77	0.001
F-stat (First Stage -RA triggering):	239.4	239.4	239.4	254.0	270.5	259.2	263.0	225.9
F-stat (First Stage - LG triggering):	43.8	43.8	43.8	46.4	48.7	46.5	47.2	43.8
Observations	1858	1858	1858	1780	1443	1886	1872	1842

Notes: We report estimates from two stage least squares regressions (equation 3). First stage results are shown in Table A2. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects. All specifications include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). Columns 4-7 also include the sex of the child, dummy variables for age in months of the child and the % of household with no sanitation at baseline. ***; indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.




Figure 1: Main reason reported for not building a toilet (%)

A Appendix Tables

Table A1: Additional Tests of Balance of Baseline Village Characteristics

Variable	All Villages			Treatment Villages		
	Treatment	Control	p-value	RA Facilitator	LG Facilitator	p-value
Years of education of village head	10.25	10.50	0.33	10.21	10.28	0.85
Village land area	42,816.11	34,929.66	0.70	42,377.08	43,233.73	0.98
Distance to nearest city in kms	22.23	20.85	0.60	20.74	23.63	0.49
TV reception	0.93	0.89	0.42	0.90	0.95	0.37
Percentage of households that are farmers	54.00	53.95	0.99	53.30	54.66	0.80
Gini coefficient of per capita income	0.40	0.39	0.62	0.39	0.41	0.36
More than one ethnic group in the village	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.69	0.68	0.93
Social capital index	0.03	-0.00	0.39	0.01	0.05	0.37
Max Observations:	80	80		39	41	

Table A2: First Stage From Table 5

	Second Stage Dependent Variable: Intolerance of Open Defecation Knowledge of Causes of Diarrhea				Roundworm (eggs/g)				Hemoglobin (g/l)				Weight z-score				Height z-score			
	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG	RA	LG
Treatment	.001 (.007)	.52 (.06)***	-.001 (.006)	.53 (.06)***	-.002 (.006)	.55 (.06)***	.0004 (.006)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***	.0003 (.007)	.53 (.06)***
RA Treatment	.87 (.04)***	-.52 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.54 (.06)***	.88 (.04)***	-.56 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.53 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.54 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.53 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.54 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.52 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.52 (.06)***	.87 (.04)***	-.52 (.06)***
F-stat on test of instruments:	239.4	43.8	254.0	46.4	270.5	48.7	259.2	46.5	263.0	47.2	225.9	43.8	263.0	47.2	225.9	43.8	263.0	47.2	225.9	43.8
R-squared	.92	.75	.93	.76	.93	.77	.93	.76	.93	.76	.92	.76	.93	.76	.92	.76	.93	.76	.92	.76
Observations	1858	1858	1780	1780	1432	1432	1886	1886	1872	1886	1842	1872	1872	1842	1842	1872	1872	1842	1842	1842

First Stage Dependent Variable: Village Triggered by:

Notes: We report results from the first stage estimation (equations 4-5) from Table 5. The dependent variable equals 1 if the village was triggered by an RA (LG) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parentheses. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects and include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support, and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). ** indicates significance at 5% level, * at 10% level.

Table A3: What was done differently between RA and LG?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A										
Had heard about sanitation program from:										
TV		Radio	Print Media	Video	Shop Window	Village Notice Board	Health Officer	Midwife	Health Cadre	Village Office
RA Treatment	-.06 (.07)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.004 (.01)	.03 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.1 (.05)**	.06 (.04)	.02 (.05)	.08 (.04)**
Mean DV	0.90	0.14	0.17	0.02	0.07	0.12	0.33	0.31	0.34	0.14
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	922	921	922	922	922	920	922	922	922	922
Panel B										
Heard of CLTS										
	Known about a triggering	Attended Triggering	Charisma	No. of Facilitators	Number of Visits	Reward or Competition				
RA Treatment	.09 (.04)**	.1 (.05)**	.06 (.04)*	.12 (.18)	.65 (.69)	.43 (.17)**	.01 (.08)			
Mean DV	0.65	0.16	0.10	2.84	3.19	0.91	0.10			
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Observations	922	922	922	579	922	922	922			

Notes: The sample is restricted to observations in treatment villages. We report the coefficient on the indicator that the village was assigned to be triggered by an RA. The dependent variables in Panel A equal 1 if the respondent heard about the sanitation program from the specified source, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, *Heard of CLTS*, *Knows about a triggering*, *Attended Triggering* are 0/1 indicators of whether the respondent has heard of the program, knew that there had been a triggering event in the community; and attended the triggering respectively. *Charisma* is the village average of respondent rankings from 1 to 4 of how charismatic/persuasive the facilitators was. *No. of Facilitators* is the village average of respondents reports of how many facilitators were at the triggering; *Number of visits* is the village average of respondent reports of how many visits the facilitators made to the village, and *Reward or Competition* equals 1 if one or more respondents in the village reported that the program involved rewards for villages becoming open defecation free and/or competitions between villages with regard to decreasing open defecation. All specifications include sub-district fixed effects. Even numbered columns also include household controls (household size, the household head's age, sex and educational attainment, household composition, log per capita household income, eligibility for low income support and dwelling characteristics) and village controls (the village population, the percentage of the village which is Muslim, whether there is a paved road to the nearest city, and whether a river flows through the village). Standard errors are clustered at the village level. ***indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.