

Fischer, Ingo; Hauser, Richard

Working Paper

The Relative Economic Status of One Parent Families in Six Major Countries

LIS Working Paper Series, No. 6

Provided in Cooperation with:

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)

Suggested Citation: Fischer, Ingo; Hauser, Richard (1985) : The Relative Economic Status of One Parent Families in Six Major Countries, LIS Working Paper Series, No. 6, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Luxembourg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/160679>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series

Working Paper No. 6

The Relative Economic Status of One Parent Families in
Six Major Countries

Richard Hauser and Ingo Fischer

December 1985

(scanned copy)



**The Relative Economic Status
of One-Parent Families in
Six Major Industrialized Countries**

by

Richard Hauser and Ingo Fischer

Working Paper No. 6

December 1985

Professor Dr. Richard Hauser is director
of Project C-1 "Social security";
Ingo Fischer is research associate
of this project.

A shorter version of this paper without an appendix will be published
in: T. Smeeding/M. O'Higgins, Poverty, Inequality and the Distribution
of Income in International Perspective, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. 1986

Summary

One-parent families are considered to be a social problem in many countries. Up to now comparative studies of the relative economic position of one-parent families were based upon hypothetical family types using average earnings or percentages thereof and calculating social transfers according to the social security regulations of the countries under review. A newly built data base (Luxembourg Income Study, called LIS) containing individual and household income data for seven major industrialized countries (Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Israel, United States, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany) referring to years around 1980 now enables researchers to compare the economic positions of various family types on an empirical basis and to analyse the determinants of differences among these countries in the relative positions.

This study on the one hand compares the economic position of one-parent families as indicated by their average net income per adult equivalent unit in six countries and on the other differences in the income distributions of one-parent and two-parent families. Differences in factor income, private transfers, public transfers, taxes and social security contributions are considered to be the main determinants of differences among countries in the relative economic positions of one-parent families. If countries are ranked by the relative economic position of their one-parent families, it is found that the first rank of Sweden is due to a high labor force participation of lone parents and generous and comprehensive public transfers. Germany's second rank results from high labor force participation but much less generous public transfers in favor of one-parent families. Israel and the UK mainly rely upon public transfers but can only secure a middle rank position. Canada and the USA show medium labor force participation, but rather low and mainly means-tested transfers thus reaching only low rank positions.

Considering distributional aspects, the welfare positions of one-parent families are generally less equally distributed than the positions of two-parent families. The ranking of countries by inequality measures for one-parent families is similar to that found by using the relative economic positions of these groups. By defining a "low welfare line" it is shown that high proportions of one-parent families with more than two minor children are in a very disadvantageous position, thus constituting an unsolved social problem.

The Relative Economic Status
of One-Parent Families in
Six Major Industrialized Countries.¹⁾

Summary

Zusammenfassung

I. Introduction

II. The Relative Economic Positions of One-Parent Families with Minor Children

1. The Framework of Comparison
2. Empirical Results
 - 2.1. Demographic Aspects
 - 2.2. Relative Economic Positions

III. Determinants of the Relative Economic Positions

1. Factor Incomes and Labor Force Participation
2. Private Transfers
3. Public Transfers
4. Income Taxes, Payroll Taxes and Social Security Contributions

IV. Distributional Aspects

Appendix

Bibliography

1) We should like to thank the Ford Foundation, the Government of Luxembourg, The Computer Resources Inc. and the German Research Foundation (DFG) for their financial support. We also should like to thank Guenther Schmaus for the basic calculations from the LIS data files, Doris Linder for her research assistance, Irene Becker for adjusting the German data file to the LIS conventions and Andy Steinmann for proof-reading. Grateful acknowledgement is due for valuable comments by Anita Pfaff (University of Augsburg) and Richard Hemming (OECD) who discussed a preliminary version at the LIS Conference in Luxembourg (July 1985).

Zusammenfassung

Ein-Elternteil-Familien werden in vielen Ländern als ein soziales Problem betrachtet. Bis jetzt beruhten vergleichende Studien ihrer relativen ökonomischen Position lediglich auf hypothetischen Familientypen, für die bestimmte Prozentsätze des durchschnittlichen Arbeitseinkommens unterstellt wurden; auf dieser Basis wurden dann die entsprechenden Sozialleistungen errechnet. Eine neu erstellte Datenbank (Luxembourg Income Study, abgekürzt LIS), die Individual- und Haushaltsdaten aus dem Einkommens- und Transferbereich für sieben wichtige Industrieländer (Schweden, Norwegen, Großbritannien, Israel, USA, Kanada und Bundesrepublik Deutschland) für Jahre um 1980 umfaßt, ermöglicht es nunmehr, die durchschnittliche ökonomische Position einzelner Familientypen auf empirischer Basis zu ermitteln und die Determinanten für Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern zu analysieren.

In der vorliegenden Studie werden einerseits die relativen ökonomischen Positionen von Ein-Elternteil-Familien und vollständigen Familien (gemessen am Verhältnis der gewichteten durchschnittlichen Nettoeinkommen der jeweiligen Haushaltsgruppen) und andererseits Unterschiede in den Einkommensverteilungen verglichen. Als wichtigste Determinanten für die Unterschiede in den relativen Positionen von Ein-Elternteil-Familien werden die Faktoreinkommen, die privaten und staatlichen Transfers sowie Steuer- und Sozialabgaben herausgearbeitet. Wenn man die untersuchten Länder entsprechend der relativen Position ihrer Ein-Elternteil-Familien in eine Rangfolge bringt, zeigt sich, daß die erste Rangstelle Schwedens sowohl durch eine hohe Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung dieser Gruppe als auch durch großzügige und umfassende staatliche Sozialleistungen bedingt ist. Der zweite Rangplatz der Bundesrepublik ergibt sich vor allem aus einer hohen Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung der Alleinstehenden mit Kindern, während die staatlichen Sozialleistungen weit weniger ins Gewicht fallen. Israel und Großbritannien gewähren bei geringerer Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung beträchtliche staatliche Sozialleistungen, können sich dadurch aber nur mittlere Rangstellen sichern. In Kanada und in den USA besteht zwar eine mittlere Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung, jedoch sind die Sozialleistungen sehr niedrig und größtenteils auch noch von Bedarfsprüfungen abhängig, so daß diese Länder nur die unteren Rangplätze erreichen.

Betrachtet man die Verteilung des Wohlstandes (gemessen durch ein mit der Haushaltgröße gewichtetes Nettoeinkommen), so zeigt sich bei den Ein-Elternteil-Familien eine größere Ungleichheit als bei den vollständigen Familien. Die Rangfolge der Länder im Hinblick auf das Ausmaß der Ungleichheit zwischen den Ein-Elternteil-Familien entspricht annähernd jener, die sich auf der Basis der relativen ökonomischen Positionen dieser Gruppe ergibt. Wenn man die Hälfte des durchschnittlichen pro-Kopf-Wohlstandes als eine Markierungslinie zur Abgrenzung von Niedrigeinkommensbeziehern festlegt, so zeigt sich, daß insbesondere ein sehr hoher Anteil der Ein-Elternteil-Familien mit mehr als zwei minderjährigen Kindern zu dieser Niedrigeinkommensgruppe gehört. Diese Familien stellen aufgrund ihrer benachteiligten Situation in allen verglichenen Ländern ein besonderes, noch ungelöstes soziales Problem dar.

I. Introduction

One-parent families are being considered a growing social problem in many developed nations. In 1971 the XIIth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Family Affairs in Stockholm chose it as the main theme of the Conference.

In 1974 the Finer Report¹⁾ investigated the situation in the UK and also made a thorough comparative study of several other European countries, namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. But the comparative part of the Finer Report was mainly restricted to the various institutional provisions for income maintenance of one-parent families, the administrative procedures and some complementary social services. Earnings and public transfers were compared only for a few standardized family types.

The Final Report of the Commission of the European Communities on the First Programme to Combat Poverty in 1981²⁾ showed on an empirical basis that one-parent families bear a very high risk of becoming poor, especially if they have two or more children. In 1982 a sequel to this study dealt especially with the situation of one-parent families in the EEC member countries.³⁾ It concluded that in most member countries the empirical information about these families is insufficient to make precise comparisons, but it confirmed that these groups bear a poverty risk far above average.

Another new comparative study by Kahn and Kamerman⁴⁾ reinvestigated

1) Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families (Finer Report), London 1975, HMSO Cmnd 5629-I.

2) Final Report from the Commission to the Council on the First Programme of Pilot Schemes and Studies to Combat Poverty, Brussels, 1981 (KOM (81) 769 endg.)

3) H. Frijs, L. Lauritsen, St. Scheuer, Die Familien mit nur einem Elternteil und die Armut in der EG, Bericht an die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Brüssel 1982 (vervielf. Dokument V/2541/82 und V/2541/2/82).

4) A. Kahn, Sh. Kamerman, Income Transfers for Families with Children. An Eighth Country Study, Philadelphia 1983. The countries chosen (continued on page 6)

the institutional provisions for families with children - among them one-parent families - in eight developed countries, but went further in distinguishing 15 family types and comparing their relative positions using the statutory provisions in each country for calculating the specific benefits. Only within-country comparisons of various family types were intended; no attempt was made to provide between-country comparisons of absolute standards of living.

To put it another way, even this new comparative study leaves us with several open questions:

- (1) the empirical frequency of each family type within each country
- (2) the relative economic position of each family type within each country
- (3) the influence of factor incomes, private transfers and public transfers on the relative economic position of each family type within each country
- (4) the relative living standards of each family type resulting from between-country comparisons.

The LIS data base is suited to deal with these questions. An exploratory analysis for one-parent families, restricted to questions 1-3, will be presented in this study. Between-country comparisons of living standards bring up a host of additional methodological problems and, therefore, no attempt is made to deal with the fourth question.

The countries selected are those for which sets of individual cross section data (referring to years around the end of the seventies) are integrated into the LIS data base; namely USA, Canada, UK, Sweden, Israel and Germany (Federal Republic)¹⁾. All these countries can be classified as major industrialized countries.

(continued from page 5)
for comparison were Sweden, USA, West-Germany, Canada, France, Australia; UK, Israel.

1) Although data for Norway are integrated into the LIS data base, this country has to be left out in this study because the data were not suited to distinguish one-parent families according to the same criteria that were used for other countries.

II. The Relative Economic Positions of One-Parent Families with Minor Children

1. The Framework of Comparison

The living conditions of one-parent families can be compared to several other groups within each country. Single persons or couples without children or two-parent families with minor children are the most obvious reference groups. But one could also think of all households with a head of household at working age or within even more narrow age brackets. For this exploratory analysis we have chosen two-parent families with minor children as the reference group in order to concentrate on the differences between family types with minor children. This means that the differences between countries in the relative positions of families with minor children compared to singles or to couples without children, either at working age or at pensionable age, are not taken into account. These relative positions of all families with minor children may vary from country to country for many reasons, one of the most important being differences in tax policies and social security provisions with respect to the elderly and to single persons and couples without children.

Compared to two-parent families, one-parent families with minor children are disadvantaged in many aspects. The lone parent has to raise the children without being able to share the duties of nursing, day care, education and providing a home with a second parent. In case of sickness, accident or another emergency, no spouse is available who could help out. So to speak, a very elementary form of risk-sharing is missing.

The single parent also has to maintain by himself the integration of his or her family into the social network of relatives, friends, neighbourhood and community, and to provide opportunities for the integration of the children. Finally, the lone parent has to be the sole breadwinner, if the family is not fully supported in cash or in-kind by private or public transfers.

A comparison between one-parent and two-parent families with respect

to all economic, social and psychological aspects of their living conditions within the framework of a comparative six-country study is not feasible at present. Therefore, a pragmatic reduction of the dimensions of comparison is necessary.

Three important economic dimensions of living conditions of families with children are net income, the availability of time for child care and household duties and the availability of real public transfers.¹⁾

If a lone parent works full time, there is less time left for child care and household duties than in a two-parent family with both spouses in full-time employment. This has to be considered as an unfavorable element of the living conditions. The difference in available time is even more to the disadvantage of a one-parent family if the lone parent works full-time, compared to the two-parent family where one spouse can spend all his/her time for child rearing and household duties. Only if a single parent does not need to spend time to earn an income, the balance of available time may be in his/her favor.

Therefore, a comparison of the positions of one-parent and two-parent families in principle ought to account for these differences in available time by using a wider concept of economic resources instead of net income only.

To a limited extent personal child care by parents can be substituted by public or private services from outside the family, usually at a cost, e.g. day care centers, nursing homes, boarding schools. These differences also ought to be taken into account in calculating the relative position of one-parent families. Similarly there may exist differences between one-parent and two-parent families with respect to the availability of real public transfers, especially in the areas of health care, housing, public transportation and education. Since these

1) A fourth economic dimension of living conditions consists of a family's net wealth. This factor is also not dealt with because of lack of wealth data in the LIS data base.

differences are not revealed in net incomes, modifications would be necessary.

At present it is not possible to account systematically and comprehensively for differences concerning available time, the use of services from outside the family and the availability of real public transfers. Therefore, we can only hint at these limitations of the comparisons to follow which are only based on net income.

Various theoretical concepts of one-parent and two-parent families exist, depending on the problem an analyst wants to tackle. With a legally oriented approach, institutional characteristics like marriage, blood relations and liabilities for maintenance are used to define families. A more functional approach emphasizes factual relations between persons, like cohabitation, factual income sharing and exchange of personal services within a household.

Given the differences of the legal systems among countries, a functional approach seems to be preferable for comparative studies. Following this line, an adult caring for one or more minor children (under 18), without another adult being present in the household, is considered to be a one-parent family. This definition includes a natural parent living with his/her own children, but also adopted children or foster children. For various reasons, one-parent families sometimes live together in the same household with other adults, like their parents or relatives or unrelated persons. These living arrangements may result in sharing household costs and in the exchange of personal services that are beneficial for all household members. Since these intra-household transfers are not known, we concentrate our analysis on the one-parent families with minor children who live in a household of their own. This definition is more narrow than definitions in official statistics so that we have to expect a smaller proportion of one-parent families within our data sets.¹⁾

According to this functional approach, two-parent families are defined

1) This definition fully corresponds to the definition used in the Swedish data set. Data sets of other countries had to be recalculated.

as husband and wife, living with minor children in the same household with no other adults present or two adults living with minor children in the same household.¹⁾ To bring out differences between one-parent and two-parent families more clearly, families with more than two adults are classified among "other units" as well as single persons and other household types.

The analysis will be based upon net income or elements thereof. Net income is defined as factor income plus employment related pensions plus public and private transfers, minus direct taxes and payroll taxes.²⁾

Mean values of net income will be defined alternatively as income per family or income per capita or income per adult equivalent unit of the respective groups. Net income per adult equivalent unit of a family is calculated by using a simple equivalence scale assigning a weight of 1 to the head of household and a weight of 0.5 to each further member of the household/family assuming that the net incomes of all family members are pooled and distributed such that each member attains the same welfare level. Therefore, we use the term "relative welfare position", if mean values of net income per adult equivalent unit of various groups are compared.³⁾ Between-country comparisons refer only to relative positions within countries, thus avoiding comparisons of absolute levels of living standards of various groups.

1) This definition fully corresponds to the definition used in the Swedish data set. Data sets of other countries had to be recalculated.

2) For details see T. Smeeding et al., An introduction to LIS, in: T. Smeeding/M. O'Higgins, Poverty, Inequality and the Distribution of Income in International Perspective, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. 1986, Table 3

3) The equivalence scale used is the same as the one used by T. Smeeding et al., Poverty in Major Industrialized Countries, in: T. Smeeding/M. O'Higgins, op. cit., multiplied by 2. Since we do not show absolute levels, this transformation is irrelevant.

2. Empirical Results

2.1. Demographic Aspects

We will start our analysis by presenting some demographic information.¹⁾

Table 1 shows total numbers and proportions of one-parent and two-parent families in all the countries. The proportions of one-parent families in relation to all units vary from 1.5% (Israel) to 6.1% (USA) with a lower middle group comprising Germany (2.5%) and the UK (3.3%) and an upper middle group consisting of Canada (4.3%) and Sweden (4.4%). Compared to Smeeding's calculations²⁾, our figures are lower for all countries, except for Sweden. This is the result of three effects: First, we only counted one-parent families living in a household of their own which reduces the number of one-parent families considerably. Second, we did not use an age limit of 65 for the parent which might result in a slight increase, and third, we did not restrict our analysis to natural parents, but counted all adults, living with children in their household. This also increases the number of one-parent families, but obviously the first effect dominates the other two. Similar effects explain the lower percentages of two-parent families in all countries, except Sweden. If we look at the ratios of one-parent to two-parent families, we find a similar ranking of countries. The top group consists of the USA (24.7%) and Sweden (21.8%), Israel has the lowest ratio of 3.9% and the other countries are in between (Germany 10.4%; UK 11.2%; Canada 15.5%).³⁾

1) Since the population coverage of the samples in the LIS data base varies slightly from country to country, the grossed up numbers of families and persons are smaller than the "true" figures for the whole population. For details compare T. Smeeding et al.. An Introduction to LIS, in: T. Smeeding/M. O'Higgins, op. cit.

2) T. Smeeding et al., Poverty in Major Industrialized Countries, in: T. Smeeding/M. O'Higgins, op. cit., Table 2

3) These ratios roughly correspond to information from other sources, if the more narrow definitions of our analysis are taken into account. Compare: Jane Millar, Lone Parents, Income Support and Living Standards: A Review of the Comparative Literature, University of York, Social Policy Research Unit discussion paper, DHSS 265, 1985

Table 1

One-Parent Families (1), Two-Parent Families (2), and Other Units
in Six Industrialized Countries
- Millions of Units -
- Percentage of All Units -

Country (Year)	One-Parent Families				Two-Parent Families				Other Units				All			
	Fam. abs.	%	Pers. abs.	%	Fam. abs.	%	Pers. abs.	%	Fam. abs.	%	Pers. abs.	%	Fam. abs.	%	Pers. abs.	%
Sweden (1979)	0.192	4.4	0.467	5.7	0.887	20.3	3.355	41.0	3.285	75.3	4.364	53.3	4.364	100	8.186	100
UK (3) (1979)	0.228	3.3	0.640	3.5	2.035	29.5	8.141	44.5	4.625	67.2	9.529	52.0	6.888	100	18.310	100
ISRAEL (4) (1979)	0.013	1.5	0.037	1.2	0.346	38.7	1.536	50.1	0.534	59.8	1.493	48.7	0.893	100	3.066	100
USA (1979)	5.061	6.1	14.803	6.8	20.867	24.7	83.159	38.2	58.055	69.2	119.731	55.0	83.983	100	217.693	100
CANADA (1981)	0.383	4.3	1.031	4.3	2.490	27.8	9.881	41.6	6.081	67.9	12.852	54.1	8.954	100	23.754	100
GERMANY (1981)	0.576	2.5	1.444	2.7	5.472	24.0	20.369	37.4	16.795	73.5	32.598	59.9	22.843	100	54.411	100

- 1) One adult living with one or more minor children (under 18) in his/her own household with no other adults present
- 2) Two adults (e. g. married couple, mother and daughter) living with one or more minor children (under 18) in their household with no other adults present
- 3) UK data are actual number of person or family records, not millions of persons
- 4) Israel figures for urban population only

The figures show considerable variation of the demographic composition of the populations. These discrepancies have to be kept in mind in evaluating the results of the following section which presents the relative economic positions of one-parent families since it clearly makes a difference whether an unfavorable relative position concerns only a small or a large proportion of all families with children.

2.2. Relative Economic Positions

The relative economic position of one group in relation to another group, as measured by the group averages of net incomes, can be considered as a rough overall measure of an important aspect of the living conditions of these groups. Since household size, household economies and differences in structure of need among members ought to be taken into account, net income per adult equivalent unit, called welfare position, is preferable to net income per family or net income per capita for a comparison. Table 2 presents the results for the six countries selected.

Table 2

Ranking of Countries According to Relative Positions of One-Parent Families Compared to Two-Parent Families Using Average Net Incomes

Countries	Net Income per Family		Net Income per Capita		Welfare Position	
	Rank	Mean Ratio	Rank	Mean Ratio	Rank	Mean Ratio
SWEDEN	1	0.63	1	0.97	1	0.87
GERMANY	2	0.59	2	0.87	2	0.78
UK	3	0.58	4	0.83	4	0.76
ISRAEL	4	(0.57)	2	(0.87)	2	(0.78)
CANADA	5	0.49	5	0.73	5	0.66
USA	6	0.45	6	0.62	6	0.57

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

As could be expected, the economic position of one-parent families in all six countries is worse than that of two-parent families by all measures of average net income. Although the levels of the mean ratios are different depending on the kind of averages used, the ranking of the countries is practically the same. Concentrating on the relative welfare positions, we find that Sweden is in a top position, meaning that the discrepancy between one-parent and two-parent families is rather small (13%). A middle group consists of Germany, the UK and Israel with a discrepancy of a little more than 20%. In Canada the welfare position of one-parent families is on an average about 34% below that of two-parent families, and in the USA the discrepancy is even 43%. Relating this result to the demographic figures, it appears that on the one hand Sweden, despite a rather high proportion of one-parent families, has managed to keep them fairly close to the two-parent families while on the other in the USA - the country under review with the highest proportion of one-parent families - they fall far behind the two-parent families.

These overall results give rise to a number of questions that will be dealt with in the following sections.

III. Determinants of the Relative Economic Positions

On an intermediate level of analysis, differences in the relative economic positions of one-parent families compared to two-parent families can be traced back to differences in

- factor income
- private transfers received
- public transfers received
- taxes and social security contributions paid
- household size, if income per capita or per adult equivalent unit is used for comparison.

These intermediate level determinants can in turn be related to differences in more basic causal factors that are specific for each country. Since our data base is limited in many ways we can only proceed a few steps along this line. The focus is mainly on explaining the rank-

ing of the countries as determined by the relative welfare positions of one-parent families.

1. Factor Incomes and Labor Force Participation

Factor incomes consist of three broad categories:

- wages and salaries
- self-employment income
- cash property income.

Of these categories, earnings are by far the dominating income source for the average family. Although we rely on information about factor income for the families in various countries, the analysis of its determinants is concentrated on earnings since no information about causal factors determining differences with respect to property income is available.

Earnings of a family depend upon its potential earnings capacity and the actual utilization of this capacity. The earnings capacity of a family can be measured by hours of work time available multiplied by the wage rate that corresponds with the qualifications and other labor market characteristics of the potential labor supplier. But the time available for the upbringing of children ("upbringing capacity") competes with earnings capacity for the total available time of the adults of a family.

The economic position of two-parent families is based upon the earnings capacity of at least one breadwinner. If household duties and child care obligations are shared by both spouses even both may be able to earn an individual income, the second breadwinner on a part-time basis, at least. On the other hand the adult person in a one-parent family can only take on a full-time job if the circumstances are very favorable, e.g. availability of full-time child care facilities. On an average, the earnings capacity of one-parent families can be expected to be lower.¹⁾ The reduction in family needs due to the ab-

1) In discussing the earnings capacity of a family, we have implicitly given priority to the duties of child care and treated the available work time as a residual. This is a simplification since the (continued on page 16)

sence of a spouse usually does not fully compensate for the reduction in earnings capacity since adults are supposed to contribute to the upbringing of their children, either by intra-household transfers from their income or by spending part of their time for the family.

We suppose that differences in earnings capacity between one-parent and two-parent families are the basic factor in all countries under review and we thus expect that the relative economic position of one-parent families compared to two-parent families - based on factor income - will reveal to be less favorable everywhere.

The utilization of earnings capacity by those actually working depends - among other factors - upon the availability of other income (e.g. private and public transfers), the availability of jobs and the wage rate, net of taxes and contributions. Differences between one-parent and two-parent families on the one hand and differences between these differences among the various countries on the other will consequently modify the results.

Differences in earnings capacity and in the utilization of earnings capacity among countries show up in overall and in specific labor force participation rates.

It is well-known that one-parent families are mostly headed by women. Thus, female labor force participation rates are of special significance. Depending on the cultural background, the educational opportunities, and the availability of jobs for women the overall female labor force participation rates differ among countries. A high overall female labor force participation rate will indicate higher earnings both of one-parent families and of two-parent families. The effect on the relative position of one-parent families compared to two-parent families thus is not unequivocal. Presumably, the better job opportunities for women - which are also indicated by a higher overall female labor force participation rate - can be used more easily by women of

(continued from page 15)

time necessary for child care can not be determined objectively. The utilization of time, however, is part of a family's decision. Hence, the time used for child care and the quality of child care ought to be a dimension for comparison, too.

two-parent families because they possess a larger range of alternatives to rearrange their household and their child care duties. This argument leads to the conclusion that in countries with a higher overall female labor force participation rate the relative economic position of one-parent families - based upon factor income - would be less favorable. This influence, however, can easily be dominated by other effects.

Apart from this fact, if one considers the specific female labor force participation rates of the female heads of one-parent families, it can be expected that the relative position of one-parent families - based upon factor income - will be better the higher this specific female labor force participation rate is. This effect can be modified if there are differences in the average working time of the female heads of one-parent families, e.g. if in one of these countries a high labor force participation rate of this group exists, but where most of its members only work part-time while in another country with a similar participation rate, full-time jobs are to be considered as normal.

Given a majority of female-headed one-parent families, additional differences among countries can be expected in the relative economic positions of one-parent families - based upon factor income - if the wage rate differentials between the breadwinners of both family types differ. Wage rate differentials can be found if

- wage discrimination exists against women regarding the same jobs
- jobs available for women are concentrated in low wage industries or sectors
- on an average, women show lower levels of qualification due to lower education or lower vocational training levels or to shorter periods of work experience
- there are fewer career opportunities for women in general or for those holding part-time jobs
- female heads of one-parent families seeking work on an average are younger than male breadwinners of two-parent families and thus have shorter periods of work experience
- there are higher unemployment rates for women in general or for those seeking part-time jobs.

The influence of differences in wage differentials on the relative economic positions of one-parent families is additionally modified if the proportions of one-parent families, headed by women, differ considerably among countries.

At present, it is not possible to disentangle the various determinants of inter-country differences. Merely a few elements can be highlighted.

Table 3

Ratio of Average Factor Income of Family Types to Overall Average Factor Income per Unit (except Sweden) (1)
- % -

Country	One-Parent Families	Two-Parent Families	Other Units	All Units	One-P-Fam./ Two-P-Fam. Ratio	Rank
GERMANY	64	148	86	100	43	1
CANADA	46	127	92	100	36	2
USA	43	134	93	100	32	3
UK	36	133	89	100	27	4
ISRAEL	(29)	132	81	100	22	5

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

1) Sweden is excluded because calculations were not possible within the first round of calculations

Table 3 shows averages of factor income of one-parent as well as of two-parent families in relation to overall average factor income (except Sweden). The ratio between one-parent and two-parent families is highest for Germany and lowest for Israel, with the UK ranging close to Israel, the USA and Canada ranging in between. This result is consistent with the basic hypothesis that the earnings capacity of one-parent families is considerably smaller than that of two-parent families, notwithstanding the various additional factors which have a modifying influence. Additionally, the discrepancy between one-parent and two-parent families is so large that it would not disappear if

averages per adult equivalent unit were used instead of averages per family.

If we consider overall male and female labor force participation rates and additionally the rates for heads of one-parent families (Table 4), we find that the one-parent rates generally are higher than the overall rates (except the male one-parent rate for the UK), indicating the economic pressure for one-parent families to utilize available earnings capacity. Additionally, the male one-parent rates generally are

Table 4

Labor Force Participation Rates

Country	Male					Female				
	Over-all Rate (1)		One-Parent Rate (2)		Relative Difference	Over-all Rate (1)		One-Parent Rate (2)		Relative Difference
	%	Rank	%	Rank		%	Rank	%	Rank	
GERMANY (1981)	80.6	4	84.0	3	+4.2	49.6	4	74.8	1	+50.8
CANADA (1981)	86.4	2	94.1	1	+8.9	58.9	1	68.5	3	+16.3
USA (1979)	85.7	3	93.9	2	+9.6	58.9	1	72.6	2	+23.3
UK (1979)	90.7	1	71.4	4	-21.3	58.2	3	66.5	4	+14.3

SWEDEN (1979)	87.9		95.3		+8.4	72.9		92.4		+26.7
ISRAEL (1979)	*		(100.0)		*	*		(63.5)		*

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

1) Overall labor force participation rate is defined as total labor force divided by population of working age (15-64) at mid-year; Source : OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris 1983, p. 18

2) One-parent labor force participation rate is defined as one-parent families with earnings divided by all one-parent families of the same sex

* No figures available

higher than the female ones. However, apart from the USA, the relative differences among overall and one-parent female rates are larger than those for male rates.

In the case of Germany, both the low female overall rate as well as the high female one-parent rate are consistent with their pertaining highest rank in earnings relations and vice versa for the UK. The middle position of the USA and Canada is also consistent.

Some additional information can be gained by looking at Table 5 which shows the proportions of male and female headed one-parent families and among those with earnings, subgroups with full-time and part-time jobs. Assuming that female wage rates - on an average - are lower than male wage rates, the high proportion of male headed one-parent families in Germany, most of them with a full-time job, explains part of the top ranking of this country.

Among the female headed one-parent families, the proportion of lone parents with earnings is also highest in Germany and lowest in Israel and the UK with the USA and Canada in between (compare Table 4), but with more than half of female heads working full-time in Germany and in Canada and less than half in the other countries. These higher proportions of full-time working female heads may also contribute to the higher ranks of Germany and Canada.

Although we could not calculate results for Sweden along the lines of Table 3 the results of Tables 4 and 5 give reason to expect this country also to be in the top group with respect to the ratio of earnings of one-parent to two-parent families. This section consequently can be concluded with the finding that one-parent families in Sweden and in Germany are strongly work-oriented while in the UK and in Israel work orientation is considerably weaker, Canada and the USA taking a middle position.

2. Private Transfers

Private transfers in favor of one-parent families can be a substitute for earned income. Apart from private transfers which are based upon

Table 5

Earnings and Working Time of One-Parent Families
by Sex of Head of Household

Country	Sex		
	Male	Female	All
Earnings			
Working Time			
<u>GERMANY</u>			
All	29.34	70.66	100.00
No Earnings	4.69	(17.71)	22.40
With Earnings	24.65	52.95	77.60
Full Time	16.49	28.99	45.48
Part Time	8.33	23.90	32.22
<u>CANADA</u>			
All	13.28	86.72	100.00
No Earnings	(0.78)	27.34	28.12
With Earnings	12.50	59.38	71.88
Full Time	9.38	36.53	44.30
Part Time	(3.13)	27.12	30.97
<u>USA</u>			
All	12.37	87.63	100.00
No Earnings	0.75	23.97	24.72
With Earnings	11.62	63.66	75.28
Full Time	7.77	36.53	44.30
Part Time	3.85	27.12	30.97
<u>UK</u>			
All	12.28	87.72	100.00
No Earnings	(3.51)	29.39	32.90
With Earnings	8.77	58.33	67.10
Full Time	(7.46)	25.00	32.46
Part Time	(1.32)	33.33	34.65
<u>ISRAEL</u>			
All	(8.33)	(91.66)	100.00
No Earnings	-	(33.33)	(33.33)
With Earnings	(8.33)	(58.33)	(66.67)
Full Time	(8.33)	(8.33)	(16.66)
Part Time	-	(50.00)	(50.00)
<u>SWEDEN</u>			
All	10.94	89.06	100.00
No Earnings	(0.52)	6.77	7.29
With Earnings	10.42	82.29	92.71
Full Time	8.33	35.94	44.27
Part Time	(2.09)	46.35	48.44

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample
Lines and rows may not exactly add up due to rounding errors

legal obligations of maintenance, there may also exist voluntary transfers. However, we are unable to distinguish both types statistically.

Since maintenance liabilities differ in most countries with respect to the marital status of the parent who is head of household, we have to distinguish at least seven types of (standard) one-parent families:

- (a1) head of household never married and second parent still alive and known
- (a2) head of household never married and second parent deceased or without sufficient income or unknown¹⁾
- (b) head of household widowed
- (c1) head of household divorced and former spouse still alive and known
- (c2) head of household divorced and former spouse deceased or without sufficient income or unknown¹⁾
- (d1) head of household permanently separated and spouse still alive and known
- (d2) head of household permanently separated and spouse without sufficient income or unknown¹⁾

If a parent has married several times, additional types could be distinguished. However, these cases are neglected just like those of non-standard one-parent families (e.g. adults with a foster child).

Without presenting a detailed analysis of the legal regulations for all of these countries²⁾, the existence of a claim to maintenance payments for these types of one-parent families can be represented in a stylized form as follows:

1) "Unknown" means that name and/or address of second parent are not known for legal procedures to enforce maintenance liabilities.

2) Compare: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (ed.), Unterhaltsrecht in Europa, Tübingen 1983, pp. 602-664

Table 6

Claims to Maintenance Payments for Various Types of
One-Parent Families (OPF)

Type of OPF	a1	a2	b	c1	c2	d1	d2
Type of Claim							
Claim to maintenance payments for the parent				x		x	
Claim to maintenance payments for the children	x			x		x	

It becomes obvious that only types c1 and d1 might receive private maintenance payments sufficient for a living standard comparable to a two-parent family, provided that the maintenance liabilities are actually fulfilled by the absent parent. This means that we can expect the following ranking of one-parent families if the ranking is only based on income from private transfers:

- (1) types c1 and d1
- (2) type a1
- (3) types a2, b, c2, d2.

Differences among countries with respect to the same type of one-parent families might depend upon:

- different legal regulations for both kinds of maintenance payments with respect to the preconditions, the amount as well as the duration of the payments
- the income of persons who are liable to pay maintenance
- the actual fulfillment of maintenance liabilities which eventually depend on the sanctions imposed by law for not fulfilling these obligations.

Since legal obligations for private transfers in favor of two-parent

families only exist in exceptional cases¹⁾, we can expect that private transfers are far more significant for one-parent families than for two-parent families. This expectation is supported by the results of Table 7.

Table 7

Ratio of Average Private Transfers Received by Family Types to Overall Average Private Transfers per Unit (except Sweden and Canada (1))

- % -

Country	One-Parent Families	Two-Parent Families	Other Units	All Units
	Average Ratio	Average Ratio	Average Ratio	Average Ratio
GERMANY	1437	80	61	100
USA	594	104	56	100
UK	1382	50	59	100
ISRAEL	(282)	105	92	100

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

1) For Sweden and Canada no information available

Although there are also a few private transfers in favor of a small proportion of two-parent families and other units, the average amount going to one-parent families is a high multiple of the overall average. If the composition of the group of one-parent families - according to the types mentioned above - were similar in each country, the results of Table 7 would indicate that the fulfillment of maintenance obligations on the one hand and the amounts paid on the other are much more favorable for one-parent families in Germany and in the UK than they are in the USA and in Israel. However, it also could be possible that the differences between the two groups of countries result from a far higher proportion of one-parent families without any maintenance claims in the USA and in Israel. Unfortunately, the LIS data base contains too few cases of one-parent families and does not allow a clear

1) e.g. if a divorcee with children remarries, maintenance claims of the children against their natural parent usually do not cease. In this case the new two-parent family might receive private transfers.

distinction among lone parents who are either never married, separated, divorced or widowed, pertaining to all countries. Consequently, a more detailed analysis is precluded. Tentative results for Germany show a ranking of one-parent family types with parents "separated" ranking top, followed by "divorced", "never married" and "widowed", as was to be expected.

The significance of private transfers for one-parent families in relation to other income types is also revealed by Table 8 (below).

3. Public Transfers

Monetary public transfers in favor of one-parent as well as two-parent families are a significant element of their economic position in each country. Differences among the relative economic positions of one-parent families are partly due to differences in the public transfer systems of the various countries.

Among public transfers in favor of families, three types can be distinguished according to their main purpose:

(1) Public transfers to substitute private maintenance obligations.

Here several sub-types can be found:

- transfers in favor of children whose second parent is alive, but who does not fulfill his/her maintenance obligation
- survivor's benefits to orphans
- transfers in favor of the lone parent (except survivor's benefits) whose claim to maintenance is not fulfilled or who has no maintenance claim and who is not able to or not supposed to earn a full income through work
- survivor's benefits to widows/widowers

On the one hand these benefits may be means-tested or universal (non-means-tested) and tax-financed. On the other they could be social security benefits based on former contributions.

It is obvious that in countries where these benefits exist the re-

lative economic position of one-parent families is improved, the magnitude of this improvement depends on the level of benefits.

(2) Public transfers to reduce child costs for all families.

These transfers can either be universal for all children without any means-test or they are subject to means-tests. They may be restricted to children of higher order of birth or they could be increasing with the number of children in the family. There can be additional programs to support children in higher education. Usually these transfers are tax-financed.

Although these benefits equally improve the economic position of one-parent as well as of two-parent families, one-parent families who - on an average - have lower factor incomes gain relatively more and consequently improve their relative position. It can be expected that in countries with generous transfers of this type the relative economic position of one-parent families is more favorable.

(3) Public transfers to secure a minimum income for all members of society or - at least - for certain groups, among those one-parent families. These transfers usually are an element of social assistance regulations which are strictly means-tested and usually financed by taxes.

Since the income of one-parent families from other sources often is very low, the relative economic position of one-parent families tends to be more favorable in countries with generous social assistance levels.

The following charts present a general outline of significant public transfer programs in favor of one-parent and of two-parent families.

The main characteristics of the public transfers concerning the various countries can be summarized as follows:

(1) Benefits to substitute the income of persons leaving work to care for children or to substitute private maintenance liabilities

CHART 1 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN SWEDEN (1979)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT		3. BENEFITS 4. FUNDING				
SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
Parental Insurance	Child Allowance	(see Parental Insurance)	Basic Pension	Child Pension	Social Assistance	Study Assistance
1. Working parents 2.a) Child-birth; contribution conditions of working parent b) Upbringing of children c) Illness of children 3.a) Pregnant mother leaves job 60 days prior to birth; altogether 6 month vacation for both parents until child is 270 days old; payment of 90 % of usual income of parents b) Right to leave job without specifying reasons for 180 days or optionally 360 days at reduced working hours (by one half); leave for 720 days at reduction by a quarter of regular working hours for both parents together until child reaches 8 years of age; special cash payment somewhat less than 90 % of usual income for 180 days bb) Vacation of parents until child is 18 month old or	1. Every family with children 2. - No income assessment - child is under 16 or still at school (extended child allowance) 3. Flat rate payment for every child 4. Non-contributory Advance Payment of Maintenance Allowances 1. Single parents 2. - Child 18 or younger - insufficient maintenance payments by liable person 3. Regularly up to 40 % of a base amount; has to be paid back by the liable person; sometimes grant; pensions for children of deceased parent 4. Non-contributory	reduction of working hours by a quarter without economic compensation until child reaches 8 years of age c) Up to 60 days of paid vacation for each child per year; payment of 90 % of normal income 4. Contributory	1. Swedish widows 2. - Marriage of at least 5 years - widow at least 36 years old - custody of child under 16 3. - 95 % of the base amount (full pension) if widow is under 50 and has custody of child - reductions depending on age if childless and under 50 4. Contributory General Supplementary Pension (ATP) 1. Widows 2. - Deceased had received an ATP pension - deceased would have been entitled to an ATP pension - marriage at least 5 years; contracted not later than 60th birthday of husband 3. Certain percentage of ATP pension of the deceased depending on type (i.e. old-age, disability pension) 4. Contributory	1. Children of Swedish deceased up to 18th birthday 2. See widows pensions 3. At least 25 % of base amount for every child if one or both parents are deceased; further specific rules according to higher guaranteed amount 4. Contributory General Supplementary Pension (ATP) Child Pension 1. Children of deceased up to 19th birthday 2. See ATP for widows 3. If one parent is still alive: 15 % of deceased ATP pension for first child and 10 % for each further child 4. Contributory	1. Entire population 2. - Insufficient income - availability for work except illness, old-age etc. 3. Means-tested payment in relation to a base amount depending on type of family; covering difference between assessed needs and income 4. Non-contributory	1. Students at the secondary level 2. - Means-test of student's income and capital - student younger than 45 3. Payment consisting of a study grant and a repayable assistance; grant paid for 9 months annually 4. Non-contributory

Source: Kannerman, Sheila B./Kahn, Alfred J. (eds.), Essays on Income Transfers and Related Programs in Eight Countries, Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York 1983, pp. 1-83

CHART 2 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN GERMANY (1982)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT

3. TYPES OF BENEFITS
4. FUNDING

SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
	Child Allowance (Kindergeld)	Maternity Allowance (Mutterschaftsgeld)	Statutory Pension Fund (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung)	Statutory Pension Fund (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung)	Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe)	Educational Allowance (Bundesausbildungsförderung)
	1. Persons with dependent children; universal 2. - Qualifying child - child's age up to 16/27 (if at school) - living in Germany - not means-tested 3. - Flat-rate payment for each child increased by order of birth 4. Non-contributory; tax-financed	1. Pregnant women and mothers contributing to the statutory health insurance plus working non-contributing women 2. - Qualifying contribution period or similar period - no earnings or special benefits of unemployment insurance 3. Cash payment from 6th week prior to birth until 8th week after birth; earnings-related benefits with lower and upper limits for non-contributing women 4. Contributory and non-contributory	1. Widows of deceased contributors and pensioners 2. - Deceased contributor/pensioner - qualifying period of contributions 3. Widow aged 45 and older or with dependant children: "big" widow pension = 60 % of invalidity pension of deceased; widow aged 45 and younger: "small" widow pension = 60% of disability pension of deceased 4. Contributory	1. Children of deceased contributors and pensioners 2. - Qualifying child - age of child below 18 or 25 (if full-time student) - further requirements (see widows) 3. Deceased of one parent: orphans pension = 10 % of invalidity pension of deceased plus a flat rate basic benefit; decrease of both parents = 20 % of invalidity pension of deceased plus a flat rate basic benefit 4. Contributory	1. Entire Population 2. - Insufficient income and capital; means-tested - availability for work unless disabled or looking after a child or old-age - no possibility of support from relatives 3. General assistance: cash payments to meet normal requirements (food, shelter, etc) depending on individual needs; standardized rates; special assistance: cash or in-kind benefits to meet needs in special circumstances (i. e. illness, pregnancy, blindness) 4. non-contributory	1. Pupils and students of low-income families aged over 16 years 2. - Qualifying education - first education of applicant - start of education before age of 30 - means-tested; income of applicant and/or parents/husband below specified level 3. Cash payments according to level of education and needs; part of the benefit on loan base 4. Non-contributory
	Advance Payment of Maintenance Allowance					
	1. Children of single, divorced, widowed or separated single-parent families 2. - Age of child younger than 6 - child living with parent - existence of alimony title against parent child not living with 3. Cash payment up to 36 months; 4. Non-contributory	Maternity Leave combined with Maternity Allowance 1. See above 2. See above 3. Right to leave job between 9th and 26th week after birth; cash payment related to former earnings;	different benefit limits for non- and contributing women 4. Contributory and non-contributory			

Source: Luber, Franz: Deutsche Sozialgesetze, Kempfenhausen 1982

CHART 3 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN CANADA (1979)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT

3. BENEFITS
4. FUNDING

SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
Family Allowance Program	(see Family Allowance Program)		Canada and Quebec Pension Plan	Canada and Quebec Pension Plan	Canada Assistance Plan	
1. Canadian families			1. Widows of deceased contributors	1. Dependent children of deceased contributors	1. Entire population	
2. - Dependent children under 18			2. - 10 years of contributory time or at least one third of possible contributory time with contributions	2. - Minimum qualifying contributory period (see widows) of deceased	2. - Means-tested	
- at least one parent/guardian must be Canadian			- widow aged over 35 years or disabled or with dependent children	- child younger than 18 or 25 (if full-time student) and never married	- different rules of qualification depending on provincial authorities;	
3. Different benefits in different districts; usually flat rate for each child regardless of age or order of birth; combination with refundable tax credit for low income families			3. - Lump sum death benefit - widow with dependent children or aged over 65 or disabled : 60% of retirement pension of spouse	3. Monthly benefit	3. Various benefits depending on provincial authorities;	
4. Non-contributory; taxable			- widow aged between 45 - 65 : flat-rate amount plus 35 % of spouse's retirement pension	4. Contributory	3 types : - general assistance - social services - work adjustment programs	
			- widow aged between 35 and 45 : further reduction of pension		4. Non-contributory	
			4. Contributory		Several Provincial Assistance Plans	

Source: Kamenman, Sheila B./Kahn, Alfred J. (eds.), Essays on Income Transfers and Related Programs in Eight Countries, Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York 1983, pp. 385-501

CHART 4 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN THE USA (1979)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT

3. BENEFITS
4. FUNDING

SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)			Old Age, Survivor and Disability Benefits (OASDI)		General Assistance	
1. One-parent families and complete families with an unemployed father			1. Dependents of covered workers		1. Population segment not covered by other programs or limited to certain categories of persons (varies from state to state)	
2. Low income and assets; means-tested; different requirements for entitlement varying from state to state			2. Contributions to the scheme		2. Means-tested	
3. Different benefits; mostly cash maintenance; flat basic allowance plus shelter allowance up to certain maximum			3. Pensions related to former earning levels		3. Cash payments; benefits in kind (i.e. vouchers); depending on state and local jurisdiction	
4. Non-contributory			4. Payroll taxes; contributory		4. State and local funds; non-contributory	
					Food Stamps	
					1. Low income households (group of people living together)	households in the very lowest income brackets
					2. - Means-tested	4. Non-contributory
					- work registration requirement for all household members with specified exemptions (e. g. taking care of a child below age of 12)	
					3. Monthly allotment of coupons to purchase food at a price below its market value; provision of food stamps at no cost to	

Source: Kannerman, Sheila B./Kahn, Alfred J. (eds.), Essays on Income Transfers and Related Programs in Eight Countries, Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York 1983, pp. 502-559

CHART 5 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1983/84)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT		3. BENEFITS 4. FUNDING				
SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
Family Income Supplement	Child Benefit	Maternity Allowance	Widow's Allowance	Industrial Death Benefit Child Allowance	Supplementary Benefits (SB)	Educational Maintenance Allowance
1. Complete and incomplete families with a full-time worker 2.- Family income falling below a specified limit - full-time paid work of at least 30 hrs (couple)/ 24 hrs (single parent) per week 3. Amount payable half the difference between family's income and the appropriate limit; same benefits for complete and one-parent families 4. Non-contributory; tax-financed	1. Families with children 2. - Existence of a qualifying child under 16/19 (if at school) - living with or supporting a child 3. Weekly lump-sum payment for each child regardless of family's income 4. Non-contributory One-Parent Benefit 1. One-parent families 2. - Receiving child benefit - claimant living alone - no claim of special other benefits (e.g. child's special allowance) 3. Single weekly flat rate payment regardless of no. of children 4. Non-contributory Child's Special Allowance 1. Divorced woman of deceased National Insurance contributors	1. Women contributing to National Insurance 2. - Special contribution conditions - last weeks of pregnancy or birth of a baby 3. Weekly flat-rate payment; may be added to by increases for dependents; paid for 18 weeks 4. Contributory Maternity Grant 1. Every woman with a specified period of residency in UK 2. - Birth of a child 3. Single lump-sum 4. Non-contributory 2.- Ex-husband contributing to child's support - receipt of child benefit - child lives with claimant - special contribution conditions of claimant's ex-husband 3. Weekly flat rate payment 4. Contributory	1. Widows 2. - Widow of a husband except he and she over pensionable age and he received retirement pension when he died - sufficient contribution record of husband 3. Weekly flat rate benefit for the first 26 weeks of widowhood; increases for dependent children 4. Contributory Widowed Mother's Allowance 1. Widows with children if widow's allowance runs out 2. - Qualifying child - widow must look after child under 19 - sufficient contribution record of deceased husband 3. Weekly flat rate benefit; increases for each child; no deductions in case of additional pensions 4. Contributory (Widow's Pension not described)	1. Children of persons deceased by an industrial accident 2. - Employment of the deceased in UK - death as result of an industrial accident or prescribed industrial disease - entitlement to child benefit or living with the child of the deceased 3. Weekly flat-rate allowance for each child as long as child benefit is received 4. Non-contributory	1. Entire Population not in full time work (less than 30 hrs/week) 2.- No full-time work - means-tested - age over 16 - capital less than 3000 L - availability for work unless looking after a child or other dependent if age under 60 3. Cash benefit covering difference between weekly net income and recognized needs assessed under specific rules a) SB allowance for persons aged under 60; lower short-term payments b) SB pension for claimants aged over 60; higher long-term payments; special deductions from earnings for one parent families; before 1983 payment of housing costs 4. Non-contributory	Means-tested allowances for school-children under 16; not nation-wide Student Grant 1. Students 2. - Insufficient other income - period of residency in UK - designated course 3. Cash award for all college fees and living expenses; increases for dependents; minimum and maximum amounts 4. Non-contributory Free School Meals 1. Low income families and recipients of Supplementary Benefits 3. Free school meals 4. Non-contributory

Source: Matthewman, J./Lampert, N.: Tolley's Social Security and State Benefit 1983/84, Surrey 1984

CHART 6 : IMPORTANT INCOME TRANSFERS AND OTHER SELECTED BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES IN ISRAEL (1979)

1. COVERAGE OF PERSONS
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTITLEMENT

3. BENEFITS
4. FUNDING

SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES			SURVIVOR BENEFITS		SOCIAL ASSISTANCE	EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
FAMILY	CHILD	MATERNITY	WIDOW/ER	ORPHANS		
Alimony (Guarantee of Payments) Law	Child Allowance	Maternity Grant	Old Age And Survivors Insurance	see widow/er	Social Assistance Program	Preschool Kindergartens
1. Lone parents (or guardians) holding award of alimony by a court for themselves and/or for the children	1. Every child below age of 18 years	1. Entire female population	1. Entire population over 18 years of age; immigrants aged 60 or over	2. - Pensionable age is 70 for men/65 for women	1. Population segment not covered by other income maintenance programs	Program participating in cost of placement of children in day care centers and Kindergartens for working mothers and low-income families
2. - Income-tested; considering overall income from all sources	3. Increasing allowance for every child according to order of birth; amount of allowance depends on the sum of credit points (= parameter of income tax with varying value)	2. Birth in Israel	2. - Pensionable age is 70 for men/65 for women	- partial retirement for men (age 65-69) and women (age 60-65) if income below a prescribed level	4. Non-contributory	
- partial disregard of income from employment	4. Non-contributory	3. Grant for covering hospital delivery expenses and direct cash payment for child's layette	3. Survivor pension: 16 % of average wage for single person; 5 % for first and 5 % for second child	4. Non-contributory		
3. Level of payment either the one determined in the court rule or the one determined in the regulations :		4. Non-contributory				
on any case the lower one; if determined payment by court exceeds payment of regulations: difference collected from the debtor		1. Employed and self-employed women				
4. Non-contributory		2. - Qualifying insurance period				
		3. Right to leave job; benefit payable up to 12 weeks; 75 % of earnings for which contributions where paid; max. three times of national average wage				
		4. Contributory				

Source: Kamerman, Sheila B./Kahn, Alfred J. (eds.), Essays on Income Transfers and Related Programs in Eight Countries, Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York 1983, pp. 203-268; Shamai, Mira: Child Support and One-Parent Families in Israel, National Insurance Institute Israel, Discussion Paper, April 1985

which are not fulfilled or to cover income loss due to maternity have not developed until the last decades. Maternity allowances exist in the UK, in Sweden, Germany and in Israel. In Israel and in the UK each mother receives a small grant while in Sweden and in Germany only working mothers on maternity leave receive benefits. Sweden has the most generous plan (Parental Insurance), enabling both parents to participate in various forms of paid and unpaid partial job leave. The special situation of one-parent families is recognized in different ways in four of the countries. The UK grants an extra child allowance to these families. Sweden, Israel and Germany have established a new benefit: Advance Maintenance Allowance (under certain stipulations repayable by the liable absent parent).

Transfers to compensate for income loss due to the death of the breadwinner can be considered as "old" benefits which have a long tradition. Survivor's benefits exist in all countries although benefits for younger widows/widowers and orphans sometimes are missing or are very meager.

- (2) Universal benefits to partly meet the costs for small children plus educational benefits for older children (and young adults as well) exist in five of the six countries:

The UK, Germany, Israel and Sweden grant each family with minor children a universal child allowance which is not means-tested. Sometimes the amount per child increases with the number of children. Canada's Family Allowance Plan includes child benefits which vary from district to district. Educational benefits and programs for free school meals or reduced rates for day care centers which are means-tested can be found in the UK, Germany, Sweden and Israel. Means-tested student grants for adult students are available in the UK, in Germany, and in Sweden.

- (3) Each country has a social assistance scheme, securing a minimum income either for the whole population or at least for certain groups, although the minimum may be far below an acknowledged poverty line. The UK, Germany, Canada and Israel apply common rules nationwide, whereas in the USA and in Sweden, different rules are

applied by state, district or local authorities. As far as the USA is concerned, only the Food Stamp program is a universal means-tested program which applies the same rules nationwide. Special arrangements for providing a minimum for subgroups can be found in the USA, the UK and in Canada. Aid to Families with Dependent Children in the USA is a means-tested program, focussed on one-parent families and families with an unemployed father as well, the requirements and levels, however, vary from state to state. In the UK the Family Income Supplement is a means-tested program, directed only to families with an adult working full-time. Canada's Family Allowance Program also provides means-tested benefits for low income families which take the form of a refundable tax credit.

These functionally defined categories of public transfers could not completely be reproduced with the available LIS data. Hence, we merely distinguish Social Insurance Transfers, Means-tested Transfers and Child and Family Allowances. Table 8 presents the results as percentages of average gross income for three family types.

Column 1 represents similar information as Table 3, but from a different angle. The ratio of market income and other cash income between one-parent and two-parent families is rather high in Germany, Canada, the USA (and presumably Sweden) while it is much lower for the UK and for Israel.

Focussing on the percentages of all monetary public transfers (col. 5), two groups are revealed: Israel, the UK and Sweden heavily rely upon public transfers for their one-parent families while in Canada, Germany and in the USA these percentages are only roughly one half of those of the other groups. The top rank of Sweden with respect to the relative welfare position of one-parent families consequently is mainly explained by high public transfers in combination with high labor force participation. The medium rank of the UK and of Israel is mostly due to high public transfers (and very high private transfers in the UK). Germany's second rank depends much more upon labor force participation than upon generous public transfers. Ranks 5 and 6 of Canada and the USA are the result of medium ranks with market incomes,

Table 8

Market Income, Monetary Public and Private Transfers and Taxes as Percentage of Average Gross Income by Family Types

Country	Market Income and Other Cash Income	Monetary Public Transfers				Private Transfers	Taxes	
		1	2	3	4			5
Type of Family								
			Social Insurance Transfers (except Child and Family Allowances)	Means-Tested Income	Child and Family Allowances	All Public Transfers		
<u>Sweden</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	*		*	*	*	*	*	*
One-Parent Fam.	63.4	15.3	16.6	16.6	4.7	36.6	-	21.3
Other Units	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<u>GERMANY</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	94.3	2.1	0.2	0.2	3.3	5.6	0.1	27.2
One-Parent Fam.	78.2	10.3	2.3	2.3	4.3	16.9	4.9	21.2
Other Units	78.4	20.2	0.7	0.7	0.5	21.4	0.2	20.4
<u>UK</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	86.3	7.2	1.4	1.4	4.7	13.3	0.4	16.9
One-Parent Fam.	45.4	7.1	16.5	16.5	8.5	32.1	22.5	7.2
Other Units	80.4	16.4	2.0	2.0	0.5	18.9	0.7	17.2
<u>ISRAEL</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	93.6	1.1	0.3	0.3	4.1	5.5	0.9	32.6
One-Parent Fam.	(47.7)	(33.5)	(5.7)	(5.7)	(7.6)	(46.8)	(5.5)	(10.9)
Other Units	88.4	8.7	0.4	0.4	1.4	10.5	1.1	25.2
<u>CANADA</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	94.2	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.9	5.8	-	16.5
One-Parent Fam.	79.7	4.6	12.1	12.1	3.5	20.3	-	10.8
Other Units	89.7	8.9	1.1	1.1	0.3	10.3	-	14.7
<u>USA</u>								
Two-Parent Fam.	96.8	1.8	0.9	0.9	-	2.7	0.5	21.6
One-Parent Fam.	76.9	2.1	14.3	14.3	-	16.4	6.7	12.9
Other Units	89.6	9.3	0.8	0.8	-	10.1	0.3	21.0

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

* No figures available due to technical reasons

but rather low public transfers.

With the exception of Germany, the percentages of public transfers are highest for one-parent families, showing a considerable public concern toward these groups. Germany's public concern seems to be more toward pensioners who are the largest group among "other units".

Looking at the structure of monetary public transfers in favor of one-parent families (col. 2, 3, 4), we find a strong reliance on means-tested benefits in Canada and in the USA, a balance between means-tested and non-means-tested benefits in the UK as well as Sweden and a clear dominance of social security benefits in Israel and in Germany. The strong reliance on means-tested benefits (presumably in connection with low income limits) and the absence of universal child allowances in the USA might contribute to the unfavorable relative welfare position of one-parent families in Canada and in the USA.

4. Income Taxes, Payroll Taxes and Social Security Contributions

Income taxes, payroll taxes and social security contributions can be considered as negative monetary transfers which influence net income and thus the welfare positions of family types. Preferential treatment of one-parent families compared to two-parent families results in implicit transfers which contribute favorably to the welfare position of one-parent families. Implicit transfers can partly be a substitute for explicit public transfers. Therefore, both types have to be taken into account since some countries rely more than others on implicit transfers, especially with respect to children. The definition of tax regulations without any implicit transfers and without any preferential treatment as a point of reference, however, is an extremely difficult normative problem that can not be tackled in this study. This means that we can not separately measure differences in implicit transfers between countries, even though they are a part of net incomes.

As can be seen from col. 7 of Table 8, the percentages of taxes and contributions of one-parent families are somewhat lower in all countries. This fact could possibly result from lower average factor incomes, preferential treatment of one-parent families, non-taxability

of some components of gross income (as for instance public or private transfers) or from exemption of certain income types from social security contributions. Differing institutional regulations in the various countries additionally contribute to the inter-country differences in percentages.

IV. Distributional Aspects

Up to now, the economic status of one-parent families has only been discussed by using relative positions, based upon group averages. The LIS data base enables the supplementation of this analysis by some distributional information for five countries. Israel has to be excluded because the group of one-parent families contained in the sample is too small to be disaggregated much further. The analysis will again be restricted to comparing one-parent and two-parent families in each country by their welfare positions, using net income per adult equivalent unit as a welfare measure.

Based upon a priori reasoning very little can be said about the distribution of one-parent and two-parent families, because the main determinants (labor force participation, private transfers, public transfers and taxes) influence families on each income level in a different way. These dependencies do not lend themselves easily to generalizations. The only imminent hypothesis is based upon differences in earnings capacity and needs of various family types, and upon the general conclusion, which follows from our discussion of the public transfer systems, namely that public transfers do not fully compensate for any reductions of earnings capacity and for increases in need with an increasing family size. Thus we expect the percentages of one-parent and two-parent families which are below the average welfare position to increase with family size. Additionally we should expect that this increase is greater for one-parent families than it is for two-parent families because of the greater reduction in earnings capacity.

The analysis will focus on the question as to whether the ranking of countries with respect to the inequality of welfare positions among their one-parent and their two-parent families differs from their

ranking by the relative economic positions of one-parent families. The countries, therefore, are ranked implicitly in all the following Tables according to the relative position of one-parent families, as in Table 2. Ranks according to inequality measures are given separately.

Table 9 presents Gini-coefficients as an overall measure of inequality.

Table 9

Gini-Coefficients (1) of the Welfare Positions of Persons in One-Parent Families and Two-Parent Families for Five Countries (except Israel)(2)

Country	One-Parent Families		Two-Parent Families	
	Gini	Rank	Gini	Rank
SWEDEN	0.1749	1	0.1911	1
GERMANY (3)	0.3450	3	0.2685	4
UK	0.2896	2	0.2294	2
CANADA	0.3658	4	0.2585	3
USA	0.3825	5	0.2728	5

1) Gini-coefficients were calculated on a person basis; each person was assigned the welfare position of its family derived from the family's net income per adult equivalent unit

2) Countries implicitly ranked according to the relative welfare positions of one-parent families as in Table 2

3) The results for Germany are based on a sample that contains one-parent families and two-parent families which did not reveal their net income; the Gini-coefficients, therefore, are slightly biased upwards.

Regarding the inequality among their one-parent families, the ranking of the five countries is almost equal as to the relative welfare positions, the only exception being the exchange between the UK and Germany. The discrepancy between the least unequal (Sweden) and the most unequal (USA) is very large, considering the generally low sensitivity of Gini-coefficients. With respect to two-parent families, the whole middle group changes its ranks, the discrepancy between the top and the bottom position, however, reveals to be much smaller. Except for Sweden, the inequality among one-parent families is considerably greater than among two-parent families. Judging from this data base, Swe-

den succeeds in securing a high relative position for its one-parent families and also in reducing inequality between both family types to a large extent. Germany can secure a rather high relative position of one-parent families, but combined with much greater inequality among its one-parent and two-parent families. The UK reduces inequality between both family types considerably, but to a larger extent for two-parent families, whereas it merely secures a middle rank for the relative position of its one-parent families. Canada and the USA reveal rather low relative positions as well as considerable inequality, especially as to their one-parent families.

As is well known, Gini-coefficients only are an imperfect measure of inequality and thus need to be supplemented by additional information. Table 10 presents results about the distribution of our welfare

Table 10

Distribution of Welfare Positions of One-Parent Families and Two-Parent Families by Quintiles of Persons for Five Countries (except Israel) (1)

- % -

Country Type of Family	Quintiles of Persons				
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
<u>SWEDEN</u>					
Two-Parent Families	10.93	16.58	19.53	23.00	29.96
One-Parent Families	11.76	16.50	20.19	22.90	28.66
<u>GERMANY</u>					
Two-Parent Families	10.43	14.14	17.11	20.97	37.34
One-Parent Families	6.28	12.57	17.82	23.65	39.68
<u>UK</u>					
Two-Parent Families	10.43	14.98	18.68	22.68	33.23
One-Parent Families	9.72	12.83	16.39	22.58	38.49
<u>CANADA</u>					
Two-Parent Families	8.68	14.77	18.52	23.41	34.62
One-Parent Families	5.88	11.19	16.07	24.99	41.86
<u>USA</u>					
Two-Parent Families	7.76	14.31	18.89	24.11	34.93
One-Parent Families	4.86	11.47	16.02	24.49	43.15

1) Countries implicitly ranked according to the relative welfare position of one-parent families as in Table 2

measure by quintiles of persons, living either in one-parent or in two-parent families.

Looking at the share of "welfare" among the persons from one-parent families in the bottom as well as in the top quintiles, the ranking by Gini-coefficients is confirmed. Considering the small differences among the shares of the fifth quintile for all countries, except Sweden, it is supposed that the differences in rank are mainly due to differences in welfare positions of the lowest quintile.

For members of two-parent families, the ranking by the share of the bottom or the top quintiles is somewhat different from the ranking by Gini-coefficients. While Sweden and the UK get the same rank by all measures, the ranks for the other countries differ. Germany's rank is better for the first quintile (3) compared to its Gini-rank (4) and worse for the fifth quintile (5), thus indicating less inequality among the lowest welfare position group and more inequality among the highest. Canada changes its rank only as to the lowest and the USA to the highest group. Finally, it should be noted that differences among the shares of the first quintile are much smaller in the case of members of two-parent families than for those of one-parent families, thus indicating a greater diversity among countries as regards one-parent families.

If classes of our welfare measure (defined as percentages of an overall average of this welfare measure) are used, differences of the distributions are revealed from a different angle.

As can be gathered from Table 11, in each country far more than 50% of members of both family types are below the average welfare position and the proportions of members of one-parent families are always greater (77.7% - 89.8%) than those of two-parent families (59.7% - 78.0%), thus indicating their worse relative position. Ranking countries by these proportions reproduces the Gini-ranks for one-parent families but not for two-parent families. While Sweden maintains its top rank, Germany changes to fifth and the UK to fourth rank.

If we consider one half of the overall average welfare position as a

Table 11

Distribution of Persons in One-Parent Families and Two-Parent Families by Welfare Position Classes for Five Countries (except Israel) (1)

- % of respective subgroup -

Country - Type of Family - Persons living in	Welfare Position Class as Percentage of Overall Welfare Position			
	- 50 %	50 % - 100 %	100 % - 150 %	150 % -
<u>SWEDEN</u>				
in Two-Parent Fam.	5.43	54.37	35.38	4.82
in One-Parent Fam.	10.71	67.02	20.34	(1.93)
<u>GERMANY</u>				
in Two-Parent Fam.	12.50	65.53	17.89	4.08
in One-Parent Fam.	36.35	48.34	11.43	3.88
<u>UK</u>				
in Two-Parent Fam.	22.10	50.17	22.41	5.32
in One-Parent Fam.	40.63	43.44	11.41	4.52
<u>CANADA</u>				
in Two-Parent Fam.	15.53	52.63	24.36	7.48
in One-Parent Fam.	53.25	32.20	12.12	2.43
<u>USA</u>				
in Two-Parent Fam.	18.00	46.63	26.98	8.39
in One-Parent Fam.	60.93	28.90	8.21	1.96

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

1) Countries implicitly ranked according to relative welfare positions of one-parent families as in Table 2

"low welfare line", we can compare the size of the corresponding "low welfare groups". We again find that the group of members of one-parent families is much greater (10.7% - 60.9%) than the group of members of two-parent families (5.4% - 22.1%) as to all countries and that the discrepancies between countries regarding one-parent families are much larger. Ranking countries by their proportions of members of one-parent families below the "low welfare line" results in the same ranking as in the case of relative welfare positions of one-parent families, i.e. a slight divergence from the Gini-ranks is revealed.

Looking at the distribution of persons, the overall picture thus is confirmed whereas slight differences between the UK and Germany are revealed in the lower part of the distribution.

At the beginning of this section, we presented the hypothesis that due to reductions in earnings capacity, the relative positions of families decrease with an increasing number of children, and even more so for one-parent families. Table 12 reveals a few tendencies which support this hypothesis:

- the proportions of members of one-parent families below the "low welfare line" (50%) are always higher than those for members of two-parent families
- the proportions of members of both family types below the "low welfare line" (50%) are increasing with an increase in the number of children (except Canada for two-parent families with one and two children, respectively)
- the increase in the proportions of members of one-parent families below the "low welfare line" (50%) generally is greater.

From Table 12, we can finally conclude that the relative position of most of the one-parent families with three and more children is extremely miserable. The public transfer system in any of the countries is obviously not suited to keep all of these families at least at the "low welfare line", defined as 50% of the overall average welfare position. This is the more an unsolved social problem in so far as most of the members of these families obviously are children.

Table 12
Distribution of Persons in One-Parent And Two-Parent Families by
Number of Children and Welfare Position Classes For Five Countries
(except Israel)(1)
- % of respective subgroup -

Country - Type of Family	Welfare Position Class as Percentage of Overall Average Welfare Position			
	- 50 %	50 % - 100 %	100 % - 150 %	150 % -
<u>SWEDEN</u>				
Two-P. Fam./1 child	(3.6)	32.5	53.8	10.1
One-P. Fam./1 child	(7.4)	61.3	29.9	(1.4)
Two-P. Fam./2 childr.	5.3	59.2	32.8	(2.7)
One-P. Fam./2 childr.	(10.9)	76.6	(12.5)	(-)
Two-P. Fam./3 and more	(8.6)	76.6	(13.2)	(1.2)
One-P. Fam./3 and more	(28.0)	(64.0)	(-)	(8.0)
<u>GERMANY</u>				
Two-P. Fam./1 child	5.31	59.87	28.35	6.45
One-P. Fam./1 child	30.70	42.09	21.05	5.85
Two-P. Fam./2 childr.	13.56	71.28	11.74	3.48
One-P. Fam./2 childr.	38.76	57.30	(3.93)	(-)
Two-P. Fam./3 and more	23.23	63.39	12.37	(1.14)
One-P. Fam./3 and more	47.37	45.62	(-)	(7.02)
<u>UK</u>				
Two-P. Fam./1 child	3.77	50.32	34.60	11.32
One-P. Fam./1 child	31.25	45.83	(15.63)	(7.30)
Two-P. Fam./2 childr.	7.11	61.15	26.64	5.09
One-P. Fam./2 childr.	37.36	41.76	(10.99)	(5.49)
Two-P. Fam./3 and more	22.10	61.48	14.22	(2.19)
One-P. Fam./3 and more	56.09	(36.59)	(7.31)	(-)
<u>CANADA</u>				
Two-P. Fam./1 child	14.56	34.82	55.05	22.02
One-P. Fam./1 child	42.34	34.18	19.39	(4.68)
Two-P. Fam./2 childr.	11.59	55.90	25.96	6.54
One-P. Fam./2 childr.	50.39	37.98	(9.30)	(2.32)
Two-P. Fam./3 and more	25.93	59.68	11.54	(2.66)
One-P. Fam./3 and more	75.86	(20.69)	(1.72)	(-)
<u>USA</u>				
Two-P. Fam./1 child	10.95	35.83	36.66	16.56
One-P. Fam./1 child	40.96	39.21	15.50	4.32
Two-P. Fam./2 childr.	13.64	48.70	30.09	7.56
One-P. Fam./2 childr.	57.69	32.84	7.81	1.66
Two-P. Fam./3 and more	28.91	53.01	15.33	2.70
One-P. Fam./3 and more	82.32	15.56	(1.94)	(-)

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample
 1) Countries implicitly ranked according to relative welfare position of one-parent families as in Table 2

A P P E N D I X

Table A-1

Indexes of Income Distribution for Different Definitions of
Average Net Income and Types of Family

Country	Net Income Per Family		Net Income Per Capita		Welfare Posi- tion - Net In- come Per Adult Equivalent Unit	
	Mean Ratio	Gini Coef- ficient	Mean Ratio	Gini Coef- ficient	Mean Ratio	Gini Coef- ficient
Type of Family						
<u>USA</u>						
All	100.00	0.3709	100.00	0.3514	100.00	0.3250
Two-Parent Fam.	122.49	0.2515	79.30	0.2827	88.24	0.2728
One-Parent Fam.	55.01	0.3473	49.14	0.4036	50.03	0.3825
Other Units	95.92	0.3998	120.68	0.3385	114.36	0.3195
<u>UK</u>						
All	100.00	0.3434	100.00	0.2868	100.00	0.2731
Two-Parent Fam.	122.25	0.2137	81.23	0.2385	88.83	0.2294
One-Parent Fam.	70.88	0.2853	67.12	0.3026	67.40	0.2896
Other Units	91.65	0.3884	118.25	0.2810	111.73	0.2817
<u>SWEDEN</u>						
All	100.00	0.2922	100.00	0.2329	100.00	0.2052
Two-Parent Fam.	158.65	0.1759	78.70	0.2025	94.87	0.1911
One-Parent Fam.	99.39	0.1693	76.63	0.1920	82.64	0.1749
Other Units	84.19	0.2696	118.88	0.2005	105.80	0.2106
<u>GERMANY</u>						
All	100.00	0.4092	100.00	0.3817	100.00	0.3551
Two-Parent Fam.	119.41	0.2612	76.41	0.2769	85.80	0.2685
One-Parent Fam.	69.88	0.3218	66.44	0.3579	66.98	0.3450
Other Units	94.71	0.4513	116.23	0.4055	110.34	0.3889
<u>CANADA</u>						
All	100.00	0.3480	100.00	0.3253	100.00	0.2992
Two-Parent Fam.	118.13	0.2398	78.99	0.2681	87.20	0.2585
One-Parent Fam.	58.22	0.3485	57.45	0.3807	57.38	0.3658
Other Units	95.21	0.3802	119.56	0.3178	113.26	0.2981
<u>ISRAEL</u>						
All	100.00	0.3376	100.00	0.3631	100.00	0.3328
Two-Parent Fam.	116.85	0.2515	90.42	0.3058	96.42	0.2923
One-Parent Fam.	(66.58)	(0.2068)	(78.88)	(0.3008)	(75.52)	(0.2655)
Other Units	89.87	0.3846	110.37	0.4057	104.28	0.3693

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-2

Rank Order of Countries by Relative Position of One-parent Families and by Overall Female Labor Force Participation Rates (except Israel)

Countries (Year of Reference)	Relative Position Net Income Per Family Rank	Relative Position Net Income Per Capita Rank	Relative Welfare Position Rank	Overall Female Labor Force Parti- cipation Rate (1) Rank Rate in %	
SWEDEN (1979)	1	1	1	1	72.9
GERMANY (1981)	2	2	2	4	49.6
UK (1979)	3	3	3	3	58.2
CANADA (1981)	4	4	4	2	58.9
USA (1979)	5	5	5	2	58.9

1) Overall labor force participation rate is defined as total labor force divided by population of working age (15-64) at mid-year; Source : OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris 1983, p. 18

Table A-3

Relative Average Proportion of Gross Factor Income and Private Transfers Among Different Family Types (except Sweden)

Country - Family Type	Gross Factor Income	Private Transfers	Gross Factor Income + Private Transfers
Relation to overall average of each Income Type			
<u>GERMANY</u>			
Two-Parent Families	1.48	0.80	1.47
One Parent Families	0.64	14.37	0.68
Other Units	0.86	0.61	0.86
<u>ISRAEL</u>			
Two-Parent Families	1.32	1.05	1.32
One Parent Families	(0.29)	(2.82)	(0.32)
Other Units	0.81	0.92	0.81
<u>UK</u>			
Two-Parent Families	1.33	0.50	1.32
One Parent Families	0.36	13.82	0.53
Other Units	0.89	0.59	0.88
<u>USA</u>			
Two-Parent Families	1.34	1.04	1.34
One Parent Families	0.43	5.94	0.46
Other Units	0.93	0.56	0.93
<u>CANADA</u>			
Two-Parent Families	1.27	-	1.27
One Parent Families	0.46	-	0.46
Other Units	0.92	-	0.92

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-4

Relative Average Net Income And Welfare Position of
One-Parent Families by Marital Status
in Germany (1)

Country.	Mean Ratio (2)	
	Family Net Income	Welfare Position
GERMANY (2)		
Single	0.88	0.84
Separated	0.76	0.77
Divorced	0.95	0.95
Widowed	1.27	2.29

1) Due to technical problems 17 % of the overall weighted figure for one-parent families could not be recognized

2) Relation to overall mean of each income type of one-parent families

Table A-5

Distribution of One-Parent Families by Marital Status and
Welfare Position Classes

- % -

		Welfare Position Class as a Percentage of Overall Welfare Position			
Country		0.50	1.00	1.50	
-	- 0.50	-	-	-	
Marital Status		1.00	1.50		All (1)
<u>GERMANY</u>					
Widowed	(35.51)	(35.51)	(6.54)	(22.43)	100
Not Widowed	33.64	51.95	14.87	-	100

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

1) Totals may not equal sums across rows due to rounding errors

Table A-6 a

Distribution of Two-Parent Families and One-Parent Families by Number of Children
and Welfare Position Classes

UK

- 2 -

No. of Children	Welfare Position Class						All
	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50 -	
Type of Family	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50	
<u>All</u>							
Two-Parent Families (0.34)	9.09	28.40	29.43	18.23	8.11	6.34	100.00
One-Parent Families (2.19)	35.96	28.07	16.23	0.88	(3.51)	(5.26)	100.00
<u>1 Child</u>							
Two-Parent Families (0.31)	3.46	18.87	31.45	22.02	12.58	11.32	100.00
One-Parent Families (1.04)	30.21	26.04	19.79	(12.50)	(3.13)	(7.30)	100.00
<u>2 Children</u>							
Two-Parent Families (0.42)	6.69	28.98	32.17	19.11	7.53	5.09	100.00
One-Parent Families (0.11)	3.50	2.97	(1.48)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	100.00
<u>3+ Children</u>							
Two-Parent Families (0.22)	21.88	40.48	21.00	11.16	(3.06)	(2.19)	100.00
One-Parent Families (7.31)	48.78	(26.83)	(9.76)	(7.31)	(-)	(-)	100.00

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-6 b

Distribution of Two-Parent Families and One-Parent Families by Number of Children
and Welfare Position Classes

CANADA

- % -

Welfare Position Class								All
No. of Children		0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25		
-	- 0.25	-	-	-	-	-	1.50 -	
Type of Family		0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50		
<hr/>								
<u>All</u>								
Two-Parent Families	2.73	11.61	25.90	24.90	17.39	9.00	8.47	100.00
One-Parent Families	13.84	36.29	19.32	14.36	8.62	(4.44)	(2.87)	100.00
 <u>1 Child</u>								
Two-Parent Families	3.73	10.83	2.49	32.33	33.03	22.02	22.02	100.00
One-Parent Families	11.22	31.12	17.86	16.32	12.76	(6.63)	(4.68)	100.00
 <u>2 Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(2.11)	9.48	27.26	28.64	18.32	7.64	6.54	100.00
One-Parent Fam.	(14.73)	35.66	22.48	15.50	(6.20)	(3.10)	(2.32)	100.00
 <u>3+ Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	3.91	22.02	37.12	22.56	8.70	(2.84)	(2.66)	100.00
One Parent Fam.	(22.41)	53.45	(17.24)	(3.45)	(1.72)	(-)	(-)	100.00

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-6 c

Distribution of Two-Parent Families and One-Parent Families by Number of Children
and Welfare Position Classes

ISRAEL

- 1 -

		Welfare Position Class						All
No. of Children		0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25		
-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	1.50 -	
Type of Family		0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50		
<u>All</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(0.87)	13.00	21.66	18.77	15.89	12.72	16.76	100.00
One-Parent Families	(-)	(23.08)	(30.77)	(23.08)	(-)	(15.38)	(7.69)	100.00
<u>1 Child</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(-)	(6.38)	(11.70)	(15.96)	(17.02)	(19.15)	(30.85)	100.00
One-Parent Families	(-)	(16.67)	(33.33)	(16.67)	(-)	(33.33)	(16.67)	100.00
<u>2 Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(-)	(9.40)	18.80	17.95	19.66	(15.38)	18.80	100.00
One-Parent Families	(-)	(-)	(66.67)	(33.33)	(-)	(-)	(-)	100.00
<u>3+ Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(0.74)	20.74	30.37	22.22	(11.85)	(6.67)	(2.66)	100.00
One Parent Fam.	(50.00)	(50.00)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	100.00

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-6 d

Distribution of Two-Parent Families and One-Parent Families by Number of Children
and Welfare Position Classes

USA

- 1 -

		Welfare Position Class						All
No. of Children		0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25		
-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	1.50	-
Type of Family		0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50		
<u>All</u>								
Two-Parent Families	3.96	12.43	21.73	23.36	18.22	10.66	9.64	100.00
One-Parent Families	21.12	34.30	19.46	12.55	6.68	3.36	2.53	100.00
<u>1 Child</u>								
Two-Parent Families	2.59	8.36	16.18	19.65	21.27	15.39	16.56	100.00
One-Parent Families	15.28	25.68	21.66	17.55	9.39	6.11	4.32	100.00
<u>2 Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	3.18	10.46	20.84	27.86	20.02	10.07	7.56	100.00
One-Parent Families	20.41	37.28	21.54	11.30	6.09	1.72	1.66	100.00
<u>3+ Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	7.25	21.66	31.44	21.57	10.74	4.59	2.70	100.00
One-Parent Families	34.54	47.78	11.67	3.89	1.85	(0.09)	(0.09)	100.00

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Table A-6 e

Distribution of Two-Parent Families and One-Parent Families by Number of Children
and Welfare Position Classes

GERMANY

- 1 -

		Welfare Position Class						All
No. of Children		0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25		
-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	1.50 -	
Type of Family		0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50		
<u>All</u>								
Two-Parent Families	1.31	9.90	39.53	25.48	13.61	5.70	4.46	100.00
One-Parent Families	10.07	25.00	24.30	22.74	5.73	7.99	4.16	100.00
<u>1 Child</u>								
Two-Parent Families	1.82	3.49	33.83	26.04	20.73	7.62	6.45	100.00
One-Parent Families	(4.09)	26.61	18.12	23.97	7.60	13.45	5.85	100.00
<u>2 Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	1.04	12.51	42.17	29.11	8.31	3.43	3.48	100.00
One-Parent Families	12.92	25.84	32.58	24.72	(3.93)	(-)	(-)	100.00
<u>3+ Children</u>								
Two-Parent Families	(0.63)	22.60	49.75	13.64	6.44	5.93	(1.14)	100.00
One-Parent Families	36.84	(10.53)	35.09	(10.53)	(-)	(-)	(7.02)	100.00

Figures in parentheses are derived from less than 20 households in the sample

Bibliography

Buchhofer, Bernd: Die soziale Lage der Ein-Eltern-Familie, Weinheim und Basel 1980, Beltz Verlag

Bundesminister für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit (Hrsg.): Familien mit Kleinkindern, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministers für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit Bd. 84, Bonn 1980

Bundesminister für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit (Hrsg.): Zur Situation von Alleinstehenden mit Kindern, Bonn 1978

Bradshaw, J./Piachaud, J./Parker, H./Schulte, B.: Familienleistungen in den Mitgliedstaaten der europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1982, pp. 129-150

Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft: Die Familien mit nur einem Elternteil und die Armut in der EG, Kopenhagen 1982, U/2541/82 and U/2541/2/82-DE (Annexes)

Frijs, H./Lauritsen, L./Scheuer, St.: Die Familien mit nur einem Elternteil und die Armut in der EG, Bericht an die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Brüssel 1982 (vervielf. Dokument VI/2541/82 und U/2541)82

Final Report from the Commission to the Council on the First Program of Pilot Schemes and Studies to Combat Poverty, Brussels 1981

Garfinkel, Irwin (ed.): Income-Tested Transfer Programs. Case For and Against, New-York 1982

Garfinkel, Irwin: The Role of Child Support in Anti-Poverty Policy, Paper presented at Clark Luxembourg Conference on Poverty, Worcester/Mass. USA, August 9-13 1982

Institute for Research on Poverty: Social Child Support: An Antipoverty Program for the Eighties, in: IRP Focus, Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall and Winter 1982, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Jungk, Wolfgang: Die Einkommensposition von Arbeitslosen im internationalen Vergleich, in: Sozialer Fortschritt, Heft 8, 1984, S. 182-187

Kahn, Alfred J./Kamerman, Sheila B.: Income Maintenance, Wages and Family Income, in: Public Welfare, Fall 1983, pp. 23-30

Kahn, Alfred J./Kamerman, Sheila B.: Income Transfers For Families With Children. An Eight Country Study, Philadelphia 1983, Temple University Press

Kahn, Alfred J./Kamerman, Sheila B.: Social Assistance: An Eight-Country Overview, in: Journal of The Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, December 1983, pp. 93-112

Kamerman, Sheila B.: Child care and family benefits: policies of six industrialized countries, in: Monthly Labour Review, November 1980, pp. 23-28

- Kamerman, Sheila B./ Kahn, Alfred J.: Einkommenstransfers, Arbeit und das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen von Familien mit Kindern: Eine vergleichende Studie, in: Internationale Revue für soziale Sicherheit, No. 3, 1982, pp. 376-417
- Kamerman, Sheila B./ Kahn, Alfred J. (eds.): Essays on Income Transfers and Related Programs in Eight Countries, Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York 1983
- Kamerman, Sheila B./ Kahn, Alfred J.: Income Transfers and Mother-only-Families in Eight Countries, in: Social Service Review, September 1983, pp. 448-464
- Luber, Franz: Deutsche Sozialgesetze, Kempfhausen 1982
- Matthewman, J./Lambert, N.: Tolley's Social Security and State Benefits 1983/84, Surrey 1984
- Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (ed.): Unterhaltsrecht in Europa, Tübingen 1983
- Millar, Jane : Lone Parents, Income Support and Living Standards : A Review of the Comparative Literature, University of York, Social Policy Research Unit, Discussion Paper 1985
- Napp-Peters, A.: Ein-Elternteil-Familien. Soziale Randgruppe oder neues familiales Selbstverständnis? Weinheim, München 1985
- Netzler, A./Pfaff, Anita B.: Internationaler Vergleich familienpolitischer Leistungen, Leitershofen 1982
- OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris 1983
- Plaschke, Jürgen: Zwischen sozialen Transfers und unzumutbarer Arbeit: Zum Stand der Einkommenssicherung von Einelternfamilien in der Bundesrepublik und im internationalen Vergleich, in: Sozialer Fortschritt, No. 7, 1984, pp. 154-160
- Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families (Finer report), London 1975, HMSO CMND 5629
- Rückert, G.-R. Votteler, M.: Die Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern und die Betreuung ihrer Kinder in Baden-Württemberg, Materialien und Berichte der Familienwissenschaftlichen Forschungsstelle u. d. Leitung von M. Wingen, H. 13, Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart 1985
- Schwarz, Karl: Eltern und Kinder in unvollständigen Familien, in: Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft, Vol. 10 (1984), No. 1, pp. 3-36
- Shamai, Nira : Child Support and One-Parent Families in Israel, National Insurance Institute Israel, Discussion Paper, April 1985
- Smeeding, Tim/ O'Higgins, Michael: Poverty, Inequality and the Distribution of Income in International Perspective, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. 1986, forthcoming
- Watts, Harold W./ Jakobson, George/ Skidmore, Felicity: Single Parent Households under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems, in: Garfinkel, Irwin (ed.), opt. cit., pp. 405-431

Bd. Nr.

Sfb3 - BUCH - Publikationen

(nur über Buchhandel)

(nach Ablauf des SPES-Projekts):

Eike B a l l e r s t e d t:

Die Verkehrsversorgung in der Bundesrepublik

Erschienen in der Reihe: Campus Forschung - Band 93;

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1979; 262 S.

Neu bearbeitet von Helga Cremer-Schäfer und

Erich Wiegand: die 3. Auflage von:

Ballarstedt / Glatzer:

Soziologischer Almanach, Handbuch gesellschaftspoliti-

scher Daten und Indikatoren für die Bundesrepublik

Deutschland. - Unter Mitwirkung von Karl-Ulrich Meyer

und Wolfgang Zapf. - Campus Verlag Frankfurt 1979; 615 S.

Schriftenreihe des Sonderforschungsbereich 3:

Bd. Nr.

(nur über Buchhandel)

1 Wolfgang G l a t z e r:

Wohnungsversorgung im Wohlfahrtsstaat

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1980; 275 S.

M 1 Christian S. S i a r a:

Komponenten der Wohlfahrt - Materialien zu Lebens-

bedingungen und Lebensqualität in der Bundesrepub-

lik Deutschland - Materialienband 1.

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1980; 426 S.

2 Heinz G r o h m a n n:

Rentenversicherung und Bevölkerungsprognosen

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1980; 222 S.

3 Almut S t e g e r:

Haushalte und Familien bis zum Jahr 2000 - Eine mikro-

analytische Untersuchung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1980; 329 Seiten

4 Christof H e l b e r g e r:

Bildung und Einkommensverteilung

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, (in Druckvorbereitung)

5 Joachim M e r z:

Die Ausgaben privater Haushalte - Ein mikroökonometri-

sches Modell für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1980; 252 Seiten

6 H.-J. Krupp, H.-P. Geller, H. Grohmann, H. Hauser, G. Wagner (Hg.):

Alternativen der Rentenreform 1984

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1981; 751 Seiten

7 Helmut K n e p e l:

Sozioökonomische Indikatormodelle zur Arbeitsmarkt-

analyse

Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1981; 278 Seiten

- II -

8 R. Hauser, Helga Cremer-Schäfer, Udo Nouvertne:
Armut, Niedrigeinkommen und Unterversorgung in der
Bundesrepublik - Bestandaufnahme und sozialpoli-
tische Perspektiven
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1981; 352 S.9 Heinz-Herbert N o l l:
Beschäftigungschancen und Arbeitsbedingungen
in der Bundesrepublik
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1982; 330 S.10 Erich Wiegand, Wolfgang Zapf:
Wandel der Lebensbedingungen in Deutschland - Wohl-
fahrtsentwicklung seit der Industrialisierung
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1982; 472 S.11 Wolfgang G l a t z e r, Wolfgang Z a p f:
Lebensqualität in der Bundesrepublik - Objektive
Lebensbedingungen und subjektives Wohlbefinden
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1984; 445 S.12 Richard H a u s e r, Bernhard E n g e l (Hg.):
Soziale Sicherung und Einkommensverteilung - Empiri-
sche Analysen für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1985; 443 S.13 Helmut K n e p e l, Reinhard H u j e r (Hg.):
Mobilitätsprozesse auf dem Arbeitsmarkt
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1985; 360 S.

Sfb3-S-Reihe: (Sonderreihe)

(nur über Buchhandel)

S 1 Gernold F r a n k:
Rentenversicherungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land - Mikroökonomischer Modellansatz und empirisch-
statistische Analyse
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1981; 199 SeitenS 2 Klaus K o r t w a n n:
Verknüpfung und Ableitung personen- und haushalts-
bezogener Mikrodaten
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1982; 324 SeitenS 3 Arno W e i g e n d:
Lohndynamik und Arbeitsmarktstruktur
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1982; 258 Seiten

- III -

SONDERFORSCHUNGSBEREICH 3
MIKROANALYTISCHE GRUNDLAGEN DER GESELLSCHAFTSPOLITIK
J. W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt und Universität Mannheim

- Forst. Sfbj - S - Reihe :
- S 4 Christof Heibeger, Gabriele Noll (Hg.) :
Die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau in der Alterssicherung
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1982 ; 294 S.
- S 5 Karin Gress :
Transfers zur Förderung der Vermögenspolitik aus verteilungs-
und sozialpolitischer Sicht
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1983 ; 430 S.
- S 6 Irene Stolz :
Einkommensumverteilung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
- Eine theoretische und empirische Untersuchung -
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1983 ; 329 S.
- S 7 Dieter Göbel :
Lebenseinkommen und Erwerbsbiographie
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1983 ; 364 S.
- S 8 Gert Wagner :
Umverteilung in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1984 ; 434 S.
- S 9 Sabine Lang :
Lebensbedingungen und Lebensqualität von Kindern
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1985 ; 209 S.
- S 10 Rolf Schulte zur Surlage :
Qualifikationsstruktur der Arbeitsnachfrage
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1985 ; 260 S.
- S 11 Christian Siara :
Untypische Statuspassagen - Bildungs- und Berufsfindungs-
prozesse im Zweiten Bildungsweg
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1986 ; 488 S.
- S 12 G. H. Orcutt, J. Mez, H. Quinke (Eds.) :
Microanalytic Simulation Models to Support Social and
Financial Policy -- (mit Beiträgen von 7 Sfbj-Autoren) --
Edition North Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1986 ; 523 S.

Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 1 b Grundlagenforschung für eine aktive Gesellschaftspolitik- (mit
Ausgüssen aus dem Antrag für die 3. Forschungsphase 1985-1987)
- 2 Lebensbedingungen und wahrgenommene Lebensqualität
Wolfgang Zapf
- 3 Schulische Bildung und Heiratsverhalten
Heinz P. Gallier
- 4 Komponenten der Wohlfahrt - Versuch eines Beschreibungssystems
Maria Volker und Sabine Lang
- 5 Erziehungsgeld: Soll die Erziehungsleistung der Familie ent-
lohnt werden? -- Wolfgang Glazer
- 6 Die Wohlfahrtsentwicklung in Deutschland seit der Mitte des
19. Jahrhunderts -- Wolfgang Zapf
- 7 Kriterien und Mechanismen der beruflichen Platzierung - Ein
Aspekt der Wohlfahrtsproduktion
Heinz-Herbert Noll
- 8 Mikroanalytische Arbeitszeiterklärung
Gert Wagner
- 9 Die Umverteilung der personellen Einkommen durch den Staat -
Eine Literaturstudie -- Irene Stolz
- 10 Literaturbericht zu methodischen Problemen und Varianten von
Retrospektivbefragungen bei der Erfassung von Lebensgeschichten
Angelika Tölk
- 11 Price Determination in a Disaggregated Econometric
Model for West Germany
Meinhard Jansen u. Karl-Heinz Tödter
- 12 Berechnung von Sterbewahrscheinlichkeiten nach Geschlecht,
Alter und Familienstand
Almut Steger
- 13 Zur Aktualisierung einer Input-Output-Matrix unter Beachtung
sensitivitätsanalytischer Erkenntnisse
Hans-Joachim Sieler

** = bereits veröffentlicht ; fertige über Ver- und Bibliothek ffr. möglich

Anfragen an :

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 14 Übergänge zwischen privaten Haushalten - Eine mikro-analytische Untersuchung
Almut Stöcker
- 15 Die Abhängigkeit der Renten von der Lohnentwicklung bei unterschiedlichen Renten Anpassungs-Modalitäten
Heinz Grohmann
- 16 An Overview of the International Development in Macro-social Indicators
Wolfgang Glätzle
- 17 Bestimmung von objektiven und subjektiven Gesundheitsmaßen
Claus-Peter Rossmeyer
- 18 Zur historischen Entwicklung der Löhne und Lebenshaltungskosten in Deutschland
Erich Wiegand
- 19 The Functionalized Extended Linear Expenditure System FELES - Theory and Application to Individual Household Consumption Expenditures involving Socioeconomic and Sociodemographic Characteristics
Joachim Merz
- 20 Mikroanalytische Untersuchungen alternativer Rentenmodelle - Beschreibung des Simulationssystems und erste Ergebnisse
Winfried Hain, Gabriele Rolf, Gert Wagner
- 21 Eine mikroökonomische Untersuchung der Steuern auf das Einkommen - Maße und Ergebnisse zur Quantifizierung der Progressivität und der Umverteilung
Gernold Frank
- 22 Lebensbedingungen und Lebensqualität alter Menschen
Wolfgang Glätzle und Maria Volker
- 23 Der Politikverlauf zur Neuordnung der beruflichen Erstausbildung - Schritte der Implementierung einer Gesetzesreform
Roswitha Seifinger
- 24 Einstellungen und Verhaltensmuster von Gewerkschaftsmitgliedern
Maria Volker u. Sabine Lang
- 25 The Welfare State and Welfare Production
Wolfgang Zapf
- 26 Die Entwicklung der Einnahmen- und Ausgabenstrukturen privater Haushalte seit der Jahrhundertwende
Erich Wiegand
- 27 A Restricted Maximum Likelihood Estimator of the Functionalized Extended Linear Expenditure System FELES
Joachim Merz

... bereits verfügbar; fertige über Bel-fülletheat für möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 28 Zur Theorie und Messung von 'side effects'
Wolfgang Zapf
- 29 Zur Güte von retrospektiven Daten - Eine gedächtnispsychologische Anwendung und empirische Ergebnisse einer Nachbefragung Georgios Papastefanou
- 30 Zuverlässigkeit retrospektiver Verlaufsdaten - Qualitative Ergebnisse einer Nachbefragung Angelika Tölk
- 31 Möglichkeiten der Kontrolle und Korrektur bei der Sekundär-analyse von anonymisierten Daten
Ute Hanel
- 32 Armut, Gesundheitsbeschwerden und Inanspruchnahme von Gesundheitsleistungen
Ralph Brennecke
- 33 System Sozialer Indikatoren als Datengeber für Sozialprognose und gesellschaftliche Planung
Wolfgang Glätzle
- 34 Ein Compiler zum Erstellen von Lese-/Schreibprogrammen für Masendateien
Iris Lempert
- 35 Zum aktuellen Stand der Einstellungs-Verhaltens-Forschung: Literaturübersicht und Diskussion survey-bezogener Anwendungen
Maria Volker
- 36 Modelle mit unbeobachtbaren Variablen - Der PLS-Ansatz -
Helmut Knepel
- 37 Soziale Probleme und Zufriedenheit
Wolfgang Glätzle
- 38 Gesellschaftlicher Wandel und soziale Struktur des Lebensverlaufs
Karl-Ulrich Mayer
- 39 Poverty in Rich Countries - The Case of Germany (FRG) Compared with the U.K., Norway, Australia and Belgium
Richard Hauser u. Udo Mover
- 40 Die Vorschläge der Sachverständigenkommission für die soziale Sicherung der Frau und der Hinterbliebenen
Helmut Meinhof
- 41 Probleme und Ansatzpunkte einer gemeinsamen Politik zur Bekämpfung der Armut in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
Richard Hauser
- 42 Multiple Klassifikationsanalyse - Grundlagen und Anwendung am Beispiel der Erklärung individueller Berufseinkommen
Regina Berger

... bereits verfügbar; fertige über Bel-fülletheat für möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 43 Konzeption einer ex-post-Unterteilungsanalyse
Irene Stolz
- 44 Alterssicherung von Frauen
Hans-Jürgen Krupp
- 45 Frauen-Erwerbstätigkeit und Ziele der Alterssicherung
Hans-Jürgen Krupp
- 46 Socioeconomic Influence on Individual Private Demand for Durable Goods - An Application of Discrete Choice Models :
The LOGIT- and TOBIT-Approach
Joachim Merz
- 47 Subventionierung der Eigentumsbildung durch explizite Transferzahlungen und Steuervergünstigungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Inkonsistenzen der gegenwärtigen Vermögensbildungsförderung und Ansatzpunkte einer zieladäquaten Förderungspolitik - von Karin Gress
- 48 Die Inanspruchnahme von expliziten Transferzahlungen und Steuervergünstigungen zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung - Kritische Würdigung bisher vorliegender Ergebnisse -
Karin Gress
- 49 Die Auswirkungen der Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung
Heinz Grohmann
- 50 Parallel Computing for Socioeconomic Simulation
Pavle Alpar und Gerriet Müller
- 51 Veränderungen der bildungsspezifischen Einkommensunterschiede zwischen 1969/71 und 1973
Christof Heiberg
- 52 Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Gesundheitsbeschwerden und Inanspruchnahme von Ärzten
Ralph Breunnecke
- 53 Die Verteilung impliziter Transfers zugunsten von Eigennutzerhaushalten im Jahr 1969 - Eine mikroökonomische Analyse auf Basis von Individualdaten der EVS-69
Richard Hauser und Glennie Heidmann
- 54 Arbeitslosigkeit, Einkommensverlust und Armut - Ergebnisse der Sozialhilfestatistik und einer Sekundärbefragung von Arbeitslosen durch INFRAEST-Sozialforschung 1978 -
Helga Cremer-Schäfer
- 55 Zur Wohnsituation von Arbeiterhaushalten zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts
Elisabeth Grahmann, Erich Wilogand

.. bereits veröffentlicht; ferner über Uni-Bibliothek ffa. möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 56 Strukturierung und Auswertung von Mikrodateien mit Hilfe von Datenbanksystemen
Günter Lenhardt
- 57 Arbeitslosigkeit - Bestimmung von Betroffenheit und Abgangsraten für die Jahre 1969 - 1977
Iris Lempert
- 58 Spezifikation und Schätzung sozioökonomischer Indikatormodelle
Reinhard Huser u. Helmut Knepel
- 59 Theoretische und empirische Analyse der Arbeitsnachfrage - Ansätze zur disaggregierten ökonomischen Erklärung im Warenproduzierenden Gewerbe
Gerhard Bauer
- 60 Lebenszusammenhang und Bewältigung von Krankheit - Einige Perspektiven zur Untersuchung von Gesundheit und Krankheit -
Claus-Peter Rossmeyer
- 61 Arbeitseinkommen im Lebensverlauf - Eine konzeptuelle Annäherung und einige deskriptive Ergebnisse
Georgios Papastefanou
- 62 Bibliographie zur historischen Wohlfahrtseinkommensentwicklung in Deutschland
Elisabeth Grahmann
- 63 Finanzierungsaspekte der Rentenversicherung - Mittel- und langfristige Probleme
Winfried Hain und Iris Lempert
- 64 Versorgungskonzepte für Alter und Invalidität - Überlegungen zur Quantifizierung
Gernold Frank
- 65 Das Sozio-ökonomische Panel - Eine Kurzinformation
Ute Hanefeld
- 66 Longitudinal Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Greg J. Duncan u. James N. Morgan
- 67 Sozialwissenschaftliche Anwendungen des relationalen Datenmodells: Eine Anwendung des Datenbanksystems "System 1022"
Günter Lenhardt
- 68 Hochrechnungen personeller- und haushaltsbezogener Massendaten für das Sfb3-Mikrosimulationsmodell
Joachim Merz
- 69 Ausgewählte Ergebnisse des Mikrosimulationsmodells (Querschnittversion 81.6)
Iris Lempert und Robert Helm
- 70 Ansätze zur exakten Verknüpfung von Mikrodaten, dargestellt am Beispiel des Mikrozensus 1969 und der Mikrozensuszusatz-erhebung 1971 - Klaus Kortmann
- 71 Lebensbedingungen und Lebensqualität von Kindern - Ein Literaturbericht
Sabine Lang

.. bereits veröffentlicht; ferner über Uni-Bibliothek ffa. möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 72 Grundlagen und Anwendung mikroanalytischer Modelle
Hans-Jürgen Krupp und Gert Wagner
- 73 The Sfb 3 - Macroeconometric Model - Theoretical Aspects,
First Simulation and Forecasting Results
R. Hujer, G. Duer, H. Knepel
- 74 Die 78er ABH-Stichproben - Eine kritische Beschreibung der
bevolkerungsrepräsentativen Zufallsstichproben für die IHD
Ute Hufeld
- 75 Die Reutengrößen und ihre zeitliche Entwicklung im Mikro-
simulationssystem - Robert Heilm
- 76 Zur Dimensionalität von Wohlfahrtsuntersprüchen
Bettina Westle
- 77 "Voll Eigenständiges System" - Das Frankfurter Wissenschafts-
lernmodell zur 80er Reform
Beate Prasse
Hans-Jürgen Krupp und Gert Wagner:
Zur Notwendigkeit einer Strukturreform der gesetzlichen Ren-
tenversicherung: Das Beispiel des Voll Eigenständigen Systems
- 78 Die Ausgangsdatenbasis des Sfb3-Mikrosimulationsmodells - Ver-
knüpfung von Mikrodaten für die Simulation alternativer Renten-
reformmodelle - Franz Dörsch und Joachim Herz
- 79 Prototypische Auswertungen einer Panel-Studie
Günter Lehardt und Peter Neuser
- 80 Zur Fortschreibung von Erwerbseinkommen in Mikrosimulationen
Jellen - Das Beispiel des Sfb 3-Modells
Franz Dörsch und Gert Wagner
- 81 Determinanten der Wiederbeschäftigungschancen von Arbeitslosen -
Eine multivariate Analyse von Surveydaten - Heinz-Jerbert Nolte
Hanna Rasch und Pia Zöllmann
- 82 Arzneimittelkonsum in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Hanna Rasch und Pia Zöllmann
- 83 Rentenreform 84: Die finanziellen Auswirkungen einer beding-
ten Hinterbliebenenrente - Winfried Hain u. Iris Lemper
- 84 On the Evaluation of Social Security Programs - The Case of the
Reform of the German System of Old Age Pensions -
Heinz P. Galle
- 85 Welfare Production: Public versus Private
Wolfgang Zapf
- 86 Haushaltsproduktion in der modernen Gesellschaft - Repräsentative
Daten zum Lebensstil in der Bundesrepublik - W. Glätzle
- 87 Zur Problematik von Gruppengesprüchen bei der Analyse von Politi-
sierungs- und Depolitisierungsprozessen - Bettina Westle
- 88 Antipoverty Policy in Germany (West) since the Beginning of the
Sixties - Success and Failures - Klaus Körtmann
- 89 Einige Probleme bei Einkommensuntersuchungen in der empirischen Sozial-
forschung und Schlussfolgerungen für die Transferumfrage
Bernhard Engel

.. bereits vergriffen; fache über Uni-Bibliothek ffe. möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 90 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Edition bei retrospektiven
Verlaufdaten. - Dargestellt an der Lebensverlaufsbefragung
des Sfb 3.
Angelika Tölke
- 91 Veränderungen der Bemessungsgrundlage des Arbeitgeberanteils
in der Rentenversicherung aus verteilungspolitischer Sicht
Winfried Schmalz
- 92 Income Analysis based on Longitudinal Data from Social Security
Earnings Records: The Relative Earnings Position (Age-Earnings
Profile) and the Individual Replacement Rate of German Workers
Winfried Schmalz
- 93 Disaggregation der Arbeitsnachfrage nach Qualifikationsmerk-
malen - Datenbasis und erste empirische Ergebnisse -
Rolf Schulte zur Surfrage
- 94 Die Verlässlichkeit von Angaben 8-10jähriger Kinder über den
Beruf des Vaters
Sabine Lang und Sigrid Breuer
- 95 Organizational Effects in the Wage Attainment Process
Glenn R. Carroll and Karl Ulrich Mayer
- 96 Organisation und Retrieval von Life-History-Daten - Eine
Anwendung des Datenbanksystems SIR
Georgios Papastefanou
- 97 Developmental Dilemmas and Innovative Potential in Modern Societies
Wolfgang Zapf
- 98 Die Portfoliotheorie als Erklärungsansatz für das Anlageverhal-
ten von Personen und Haushalten
Robert Helmer
- 99 Theorie und Empirie ökonomischer Ungleichgewichtsmodelle -
Ein Vergleich alternativer Schätzmethoden am Beispiel der Arbeits-
marktentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Reinhard Hujer und Gerhard Bauer
- 100 Probleme des Berufseintritts von Jugendlichen im Kontext der
Entwicklungen auf dem Lehrstellenmarkt
Heinz Herbert Nolte
- 101 Zur Verteilung individueller Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken - Neuere
Arbeitsmarkttheorien als Grundlage für empirische Untersuchungen -
Iris Lemper
- 102 Household Production, Consumption and Savings - A FELES Analysis
of the Effects of Household Characteristics, Operating Assets
and Human Capital
Lawrence H. Nitze and Joachim Herz

.. bereits vergriffen; fache über Uni-Bibliothek ffe. möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

103 Berufliche Wertorientierungen, Stellenfindung und Wohlfahrtserträge
Roland H a b i c h

104 Zur Erklärung des individuellen Arbeitsangebots
Heinz Peter G a l l e r

105 Data Structure Requirements of Microanalytic Simulation Models
Garriet M ü l l e r

106 Interactive Support for Method-Oriented Data Exploration
Rudolf G r a u s a m, Pavle A l p e r, Gerriet M ü l l e r

107 Mindestleistungen im System der sozialen Sicherung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland außerhalb der Sozialhilfe
Richard H a u s e r

108 Zur Konzeption von Gruppengesprächen bei der Analyse von Politisierungs- und Depolitiserungsprozessen
Bettina W e s t l e

109 Ein modifiziertes Newton-Verfahren zur Lösung des Hochrechnungsproblems nach dem Prinzip des minimalen Informationsverlustes
Joachim M e r z

110 On Comparing Alternative Income Maintenance Strategies
Jack H a b i b

111 Transferumfrage und Lebenslagenstudie: Methodische Analysen zur Validierung - Bernhard E n g e l u. Hans-Jürgen S t u b i g

112 Arbeitsangebotseffekte einer Arbeitszeitverkürzung
Heinz P. G a l l e r und Gert W a g n e r

113 Erste Ergebnisse der Lebenslagenstudie
Winfried H a i n und Walter K i e l

114 Überlegungen zur Veränderung des Anpassungsverfahrens für Renten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der bruttolohn- zur nettolohnbezogenen Anpassung? - Winfried S c h m a h l

115 Erste Ergebnisse der Zusatzbefragung zur Ermittlung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung im Rahmen der Lebenslagenstudie
Gernold F r a n k

116 Problems of Antipoverty Policy in Germany (FRG)
Richard H a u s e r

117 Grundlagen und Methoden der Wahlforschung - Ein einführender Überblick - Bettina W e s t l e

118 Problems of Harmonization of Minimum Income Regulations among EC Member Countries - Richard H a u s e r

bereits veröffentlicht; ferner über die Arbeitspapiere, möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

119 Some Problems of Defining a Poverty Line of Comparative Studies
Richard H a u s e r

120 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Vergleichs von Einkommensverläufen aus unterschiedlichen Datenquellen - Dargestellt am Beispiel der "LVAH-Stichprobe und der "Franken-Daten" -
Dieter G ö b e l, Klaus J a c o b s, Rüdiger M e i e r j ü r g e n

121 Abgangschancen aus der Arbeitslosigkeit - Eine Kombination von Bestands- und Bewegungsdaten
Iris L e m p e r t

122 The Adjustment of Microdata Using the Kalman Filtering Procedure and Optimal Control Theory
Joachim M e r z

123 Strukturelle Anpassung in statischen und dynamischen Mikrosimulationsmodellen --
Joachim M e r z

124 Statische mikroanalytische Simulation - Anforderungsprofil und Lösungsmöglichkeiten --
Joachim M e r z

125 Die Bedeutung der Haushaltsproduktion für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft ---
Wolfgang G l a t z e r

126 Erwerbskarriere und Arbeitseinkommen - Eine vergleichende empirische Auswertung der Mannheimer Lebensverlaufstudie
Ute M e r b e r

127 Die Längsschnittversion 82.w des Sfb3-Mikrosimulationsystems - Dokumentation und Diskussion der Modellierungsprobleme
Gert W a g n e r

128 Ein neues Einkommensmodul auf Basis des Arbeitnehmer surveys 1980 für die Längsschnittversion 82.w des Sfb3-Mikrosimulationsmodells
Gert W a g n e r

129 Humankapital, Berufsbiographie und die Einkommen von Männern und Frauen ---
Christof H e l b e r g e r

130 "Prozessproduzierte" Längsschnittinformationen zur Einkommensanalyse - Anmerkungen zu den Datenquellen -
Winfried S c h m a h l

131 Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Interviewmerkmalen und Intervieweffekten - Wenn Deutsche Ausländer befragen -
Franz D w o r s c h a k

132 The Changes of the Way of Life between Generations and Classes as seen through Life Histories ---
J. P. R o o s

133 Child Support: An Addition to our Social Security Menu
Irvin G a r f i n k e l

-- - bereits veröffentlicht

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 134 Die Inanspruchnahme ausgewählter Sozialleistungen durch Ausländer - Ergebnisse der Ausländerumfrage 1982
Erich Wi eg a n d
- 135 Haushaltsanierung durch den Vorrubstand ? - Berechnung der finanziellen Auswirkungen des Vorrubstandmodells der Bundesregierung auf die öffentlichen und privaten Haushalte
Christof He l b e r g e r
- 136 The State and the Structure of the Life Course
Karl Ulrich M a y e r und Walter M ü l l e r
- 137 Ein Zweistufen-Ansatz zur Schätzung der Inanspruchnahme ambulanter ärztlicher Leistungen
Pia Z o l l m a n n und Ralph B r e n n e c k e
- 138 Gesundheitsleistungen 1981 - Ergebnisse der Transfer-Umfrage 1981
Ralph B r e n n e c k e und R. H i e r s e m e n z e l
- 139 Political Mobilization and Democratic Politics : Strains and Promises
Max K a a s e
- 140 Lohnentwicklung im Lebensablauf - Zur Gestalt der Alters-Lohn-Profile von Arbeitern in Deutschland. Ergebnisse auf der Grundlage von Längsschnittdaten - Winfried S c h m a h l
- 141 Postmaterialismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ?
Hans-Michael M o h r
- 142 Demographische Entwicklung und Finanzierung der Alterssicherung
Heinz G r o h m a n n
- 143 Zur datenanalytischen Problematik von Alters-, Kohorten- und Periodeneffekten
Hans-Rainer S t o r k
- 144 Erfragtes Haushaltsnettoeinkommen (Income Screener) als Hintergrundvariable in Repräsentativerhebungen
Bernhard E n g e l
- 145 Zur Konstruktion des Gesundheitsmoduls im Mikrosimulations-system des Sonderforschungsbereichs 3
Ralph B r e n n e c k e
- 146 Dokumentation und Berichtswesen der stationären Versorgung
Dirk Rainer E n g e l k e
- 147 Lebensphase und gesundheitliches Befinden als Aspekte der Lebenslage
Ulrike H ü t t e r
- 148 The Future of the Welfare State : the Case of Germany
Wolfgang Z a p f
- 149 Konzeption und Ergebnisse von Anwartschaftsberechnungen bei Lebensversicherungen
Burkhardt M ü l l e r
- 150 Das "SPES-Indikatoren-Tableau 1976" - Portschreibung bis zum Jahr 1982
Martin D i e w a l d

.. bereits vergriffen ; Fortsetzungen über Mikrosimulationen ffa, möglich

Sfb3-Arbeitspapiere

Nr.

- 151 Zur makroökonomischen Erklärung der Erwerbsbeteiligung - Theoretische Grundlagen und Konzeption des Arbeitsangebotsmoduls im Makromodell des Sfb 3
Rahel M. T ö d t e r
- 152 Konstruktionsprinzipien von Aggregationsfiles - Methodische Überlegungen und Darstellung einer Realisation des DIM-Aggregationsfiles aus der EVS 1973
Günther S c h m a u s
- 153 Die Zufallszahlengeneratoren im Sfb 3- Mikrosimulationsmodell
Michael L u t t e r b e c k
- 154 Verarmung durch Arbeitslosigkeit ?
Richard H a u s e r, Ingo F i s c h e r, Thomas K l e i n
- 155 Die Erklärung der sektoralen Produktion im makroökonomischen Modell des Sfb 3 - Datengrundlage und Schätzergebnisse
Helmut K n e p e l und Gerhard B a u e r
- 156 Alternative Faktornachfragesysteme im aggregierten Frankfurter Modell - Erste Simulationen und Dokumentation des Modells
Gerhard B a u e r und Helmut K n e p e l
- 157 Analyse der Haushaltsmobilität 1975 - 1980
Notburga O t t
- 158 Langfristige Entwicklungstendenzen der Wohnverhältnisse in Deutschland 1861 - 1910
Elisabeth G r a n s c h e und Franz R o t h e n b a c h e r
- 159 Der Verlauf der individuellen Einkommensposition im Lebenszyklus in Abhängigkeit von unterschiedlichen Durchschnittseinkommen
Dieter G ö b e l
- 160 Arbeitsteilung im Haushalt - Empirische Befunde
Maria M ü l l e r - A n d r i t z k y
- 161 Berufseintritt und Berufsverlauf - Eine Kohortenanalyse über die Bedeutung des ersten Berufs in der Erwerbsbiographie
Peter B l o s s e l d
- 162 Soziale Sicherung und Schattenwirtschaft - Ein Problemüberblick
Winfried S c h m a h l
- 163 Zur Repräsentativität der Sfb3-Lebensverlaufsstudie - Ein Vergleich mit Daten aus der amtlichen Statistik
Peter B l o s s e l d
- 164 Übergangsratemodelle bei intervalldatierten Ereignissen
Heinz P. G a l l e r
- 165 Report on a Symposium on Poverty Statistics in the European Community (Berlin, December 1984)
P. Bernd S p a h n

.. bereits vergriffen

- Nr. 166 Zentrale Lebensereignisse von Frauen - Veränderungen im Lebensverlaufsmuster in den letzten 30 Jahren
Angelika Tölke
- 167 Multiple Discrepancies Theory (MDT)
Alex C. Michalos
- 168 The Process of Leaving Home: A Comparison of three Cohorts in West Germany
Karl Ulrich Mayer
- 169 Soziale Ungleichheit des Wohnens in Deutschland im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert
Franz Rothbacher
- 170 Umfang und Strukturen der Armut unter dem Einfluß von Zweitverdiensten
Ch. Thomas Klein
- 171 Berufseinstieg und Segregationsprozeß - Eine Kohortenanalyse über die Herausbildung von geschlechtsspezifischen Strukturen im Bildungs- und Berufsverlauf
Hans-Peter Blossfeld
- 172 Die Generierung von Bruttoeinkommen aus Angaben zum Nettoeinkommen im Arbeitnehmersurvey 1980/81
Axel Leidewig
- 173 The Challenge of the Welfare State - An Appraisal and some new Directions ---
Robert Haveman
- 174 Die Entwicklung der Wohnungspolitik bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg
Elisabeth Gransche
- 175 Die Wohnverhältnisse im 19. Jahrhundert - dargestellt anhand von Autobiographien -
Hildegard Stemler
- 176 Das statische Sfb 3-Mikrosimulationsmodell - Konzeption und Realisierung mit einem relationalen Datenbanksystem
Joachim Merz
- 177 Weiterbildung und Berufsverlauf - Empirische Analysen zum Weiterbildungsverhalten von Erwerbstätigen in der Bundesrepublik
Heinz-Herbert Noll
- 178 Lebenszufriedenheit und Bereichszufriedenheiten - Eine Anwendung der LISREL-Methode ---
Jürgen Hampel
- 179 Betriebliche Altersversorgung - Umfang, Struktur und sozialpolitische Perspektiven ---
Gernold Frank
- 180 Heirat und der Auszug von Kindern aus dem elterlichen Haushalt. Ein Erklärungsmodell für die Geburtsjahrgänge 1929-31, 1939-41 und 1949-51 ---
Karl Ulrich Mayer und Michael Wagner
- 181 Räumliche Mobilität im Lebenslauf. - Bedingungen altersselektiver Migrationen ---
Michael Wagner
- 182 Stand und Entwicklung der Sozialen Indikatoren in der VR Polen
Alojzy Melich

- Nr. 183 Soziale Differenzierung und Haushaltsstruktur
Franz Rothbacher
- 184 Wohnbedingungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit
Franz Rothbacher und Elisabeth Gransche
- 185 Institutional Welfare and State Interventionism in the Scandinavian Countries ---
Erik Allardt
- 186 Struktur und Verteilung von Anwartschaften bei Lebensversicherungen
Burkardt Müller
- 187 The Relative Economic Status of One-Parent Families in Six Major Industrialized Countries
Richard Hauser and Ingo Fischer