Lin, Justin Yifu

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AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
INDUCED AND IMPOSED CHANGE

Justin Yifu Lin
Postdoctoral Fellow
Yale University
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Abstract

This paper applies the demand-and-supply approach to the process of institutional change. Both the induced, voluntary change and the imposed, government-instituted change are discussed. The induced institutional change is a response to the profitable opportunities that arise from institutional disequilibrium. The sources of institutional disequilibrium are identified in this paper. Since an institutional arrangement is a public good, the supply of new institutional arrangements by the induced process will be less than the social optimum. To rectify the undersupply, government initiatives are often required. However, for the reasons that are discussed under the title of policy failures, the government may not have incentives to take such action.
Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. The Functions of Institutions
   The Needs for Institutions
   An Economic Inquiry into Institutions

III. An Economic Approach to Induced Institutional Change
   The Sources of Institutional Disequilibrium
   The Dynamics of Induced Institutional change

IV. The Political Economy of Imposed Institutional Change
   An Economic Approach to the State
   The Sources of Policy failures

V. Concluding Remarks

Footnotes

References
I. Introduction

This article draws on recent progress in economics, especially in the economics of information, property rights, transaction costs, induced innovations, household production, and the theory of the state, to analyze the functions and choices of social institutions, and the mechanism of institutional change. My purpose is to show that institutions provide useful services and that their choices and changes can be analyzed under the demand and supply framework. Special attention will be given to the role of the state in the process of institutional change in an economy.

The study of the institution and its evolution is one of the focuses of Marxist economists. In contrast, the conventional neoclassical economics takes the existing institutions of the modern Western economies for granted (Sweezy, 1970). In the construction of economic models, well-defined property rights, perfect information, and frictionless transactions are in general implicitly assumed. With some additional assumptions about the characteristics of production and utility functions which are termed as the "classical environment," the two well-known optimality theorems on welfare economics are then shown to be attainable in the market economy: first, the resource allocation is Pareto-optimal, if there is perfect competition; second, any specified Pareto-optimal resource allocation that is technically feasible can be achieved by establishing free markets and an appropriate pattern of factor ownership. A firm in this context is reduced to a synonym of a production function.
Alternative institutional arrangements are irrelevant because the market performs the function of resource allocation more efficiently. Government interventions are warranted only when market failures occur due to the violation of the "classical" environment.

Nevertheless, different institutions exist side by side with the markets even in the most advanced economies. Large, modern hierarchical business enterprises compete with the markets as alternative institutions in coordinating production and allocating resources. It is noted that the innovation of the modern hierarchical business enterprise was one of the major sources of economic growth in the United States, and this innovation cannot simply be attributed to the desire for extending monopoly power (Williamson, 1975). The government is also far from the "minimal state," which is limited to the functions of providing law and order, and protecting property rights. Different institutions are competing in the institutional market. As noted by Schultz (1968, p. 1114), "it is obvious that particular institutions really matter, that they are subject to change and are, in fact, changing, and that people are trying to clarify social choices with regard to alternative institutional change to improve the economic efficiency and the welfare performance of the economy." Taking the existing market institutions as given critically limits the applicability of the conventional economics in coping with a varieties of economic issues.

The assumptions of frictionless transactions, perfect information, and well-defined property rights are particularly inadequate in dealing with many economic problems in underdeveloped areas where factor and output markets are imperfect and in understanding the evolution of
history. In the past several years, a number of economists have attempted to extend the neoclassical framework in order to endogenize the institution. Attentions have been increasingly given to the role of costs of information and transactions in determining efficient institutions in market economies (Arrow, 1974; Williamson, 1975, 1985), in primitive societies (Posner, 1980), and in rural economies (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). The same analytical framework has also been extended to explain the change of institution over time (Schultz, 1968; Davis and North, 1970; North and Thomas, 1970; North, 1981; Hayami and Ruttan, 1971; Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981). This paper attempts to make a contribution to this growing literature.

My basic thesis is as follows: individuals in any society, primitive and capitalist alike, face uncertainty and the possibility of disasters, in addition to the life cycle of their working abilities. They hope to survive and to achieve a high level of satisfaction. Institutions can be defined as the behavior rules that are observed by the individuals of a society. They are human devices designed to cope with uncertainty and to increase individual utility. Institutions, be they market or nonmarket, provide useful services in this regard. As any other kind of service, institutional services are obtained with certain costs. Given technology, transaction costs are the core in the choice of competitive institutional arrangements in a society. The institutional arrangement with the least costs in providing a given amount of service will be desirable. The change from an existing institutional arrangement to another alternative is a costly process; unless the net gains to individuals from changing to the new arrangement outweigh the costs of the change, a voluntary
institutional change will not occur. Institutional changes often require collective action. Free riders are thus an innate issue in institutional change. Furthermore, an institution arrangement once innovated becomes a public good. Therefore, the supply of new institutional arrangements by the voluntary process will be less than the optimal supply. Institutional arrangement are interrelated in a society. The efficiency of a particular institutional arrangement cannot be assessed without referring to the other related institutional arrangements in that society. Therefore, an institutional arrangement which is efficient in one society may not be efficient in other societies. Among all the institutional arrangements in a society, the government is the most important one. The government can take actions to rectify the under-supply of institutions. However, a theory of the state is required to understand if the government has incentives to do so. The state will institute a new institution only to the extent that the benefits to the state are higher than the costs. The failure of the state to institute the most efficient arrangements has several sources. They can occur because of ideological reasons, group interest conflicts, or the limitation of social science knowledge, and so on. Economic growth will render some existing institutional arrangements obsolete due to the shifts in the demand or supply of institutional services. New institutional arrangements will thus be innovated to capture the profitable opportunities accompanying the economic growth. Institutional change is thus inevitable in the process of development.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains why the world of Robinson Crusoe is only a fiction. The behavioral assumptions and the environment that individuals face are explicitly postulated. The
determinants of institutional arrangements in a society are also specified. Section III applies the demand and supply framework to analyze induced institutional change. The sources of institutional disequilibria are identified and the dynamics of induced changes are discussed. In Section IV, a theory of the state is presented. Emphasis will be placed on explaining why government often fails to institute efficient institutional arrangements. In Section III and IV, induced and imposed institutional changes are distinguished. Whereas induced institutional change refers to the voluntary change by a group of individuals in response to profitable opportunities arising from institutional disequilibria, imposed change refers to change that is introduced by government fiat. Although a voluntary change in the institution often requires government action to facilitate the process, I separate these two types of changes for convenience of analysis. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section V.

II. The Functions of Institution

In the most general sense, an institution can be perceived as a set of behavioral rules that is observed by individuals in a society. It is unfortunate that one of the most often told stories in the economic textbooks is that of Robinson Crusoe. Although this story illustrates the choices and constraints facing every decision maker, to start the inquiry into economic behavior with this story is actually misleading. In Crusoe's world no institution is needed, but from the very beginning of their history human beings have always lived in a society and have had to interact with each other. It is also a traditional view to say that human beings are "social animals" or that men have an "instinct" to join in a
Neither do these statements increase our knowledge about institutions. Institutions are not needed because human beings have to live in groups, rather it is "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another" (Smith, 1937, p. 13) that makes institutions indispensable. If "two or more persons exchange goods with each other, then the result for each one will depend in general not merely upon his own actions but on those of the others as well" (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, p. 11); therefore, to make exchanges possible, behavioral rules that govern the way in which individuals can cooperate and compete are required. I shall investigate below the functions and the determinants of institutions; but first it is essential to specify the individual behavioral and environmental characteristics that lead to the existence of institutions.

The Need for Institutions

The reasons why institutions are indispensable for human beings need to be explained in terms of both the limitation of human ability and the environment in which human beings live.

One of the most robust assumptions in economics is that "men are rational." By rationality, economists mean that individuals, when confronted with real choices in exchange, will choose "more" rather than "less." This approach to human behavior, according to Becker, distinguishes economics from other social sciences (Becker, 1976, chap. 1). Actually, most advances in economics in recent decades can be attributed to the reinterpretation and integration into the rational framework of those kinds of behavior that used to be taken as "nonrational" and thus were outside the purview of economic inquiry. This
reinterpretation has been achieved by taking into account the costs of information, enforcement, and so forth. Following Becker's approach, I assume that individuals have stable preferences "that are defined over fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy," which are denoted as commodities (Becker, 1976, p. 5). An individual use purchased goods as well as his own time to produce these commodities to maximize his own preference. Therefore, an individual is not solely concerned with material gains or money income. Pursuing health, prestige, pleasure, and other nonmaterial commodities may induce individuals to forgo the maximum material gains that are available to him. An individual is not necessarily selfish; however, he will be altruistic only to the extent that the returns to his altruism exceed the costs of being an altruist. Rationality does not mean an individual will not make mistakes. A rational man, nevertheless, will cease to do the same mistake if he discovers it and the costs to eliminate the mistake is smaller than the benefits therefrom (Downs, 1957, p. 9). Although an individual is rational, his rationality is limited by his neurophysiological ability to receive, store, retrieve, and process information and by his language ability to make knowledge or feelings understood by others (Williamson, 1975, chap. 2). Because of bounded rationality, global maximization of individual preference will not be guaranteed in a complex environment. The other reason for the failure to achieve global maximization is that information is costly. It takes time, effort, and sometimes money to obtain data and comprehend their meaning. Therefore, it is rational not to have perfect information if the expected gains from additional information are higher than the
costs of obtaining this additional information.

Bounded rationality alone is not a sufficient condition for the indispensability of institutions. Robinson Crusoe is also rational in making his decisions about production and consumption. The cycle of individual life, uncertainties from health and the production process, and disasters from nature, on the one hand, and the gains from technological economies of scale, and externality, on the other hand, are also necessary conditions for the existence of institutions. Because of the life cycle and exposure to uncertainty and because human beings are "limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time" (Simon, 1957, p.199), men need institutions to facilitate cooperation with others, to make provisions for security when they are young and old, to even out income and consumption over time, and to insure against the consequence of risks and disasters. I will refer to these functions as security functions. The other reason for the existence of institutions is the gains from economies of scale and externality. An individual as a unit of production is too small to internalize much of these economies. To exploit these gains, collective actions are required. These functions will be referred to as economy functions. It is for security reasons and economy reasons that men need to exchange goods and services with each other and make behavior rules indispensable.

An Economic Inquiry into Institutions

Before going into any further investigation, the distinctions between two related concepts concerning institutions are in order.

An institutional arrangement is defined as a set of behavioral rules that governs a specific pattern of action and relationships. An
institutional arrangement can be formal or informal. Examples of formal institutional arrangements are families, firms, labor unions, hospitals, universities, governments, money, future markets, and so on. In contrast, values, ideologies, and customs are just a few examples of informal institutional arrangements.\textsuperscript{10} When the term "institution" is used by economists, they are generally referring to an institutional arrangement.

A second concept is the institutional structure, which is defined as the totality of institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, in a society.\textsuperscript{11} As will become clear in the next section, an institutional change, in most cases, only refers to the change of a particular institutional arrangement with other arrangements in the structure unchanged, not to the change of every arrangement in the whole structure. Failure to distinguish between these two concepts has caused some controversy in the literature about the possibility of endogenizing the institutional change (Field, 1981).

Security and economy are the two fundamental reasons for the existence of institutional arrangements and thus the institutional structure. Examples of institutional arrangements for the purpose of security are families, cooperatives, insurance, and social security programs. Institutional arrangements that perform the economy function are firms, irrigation systems, highways, schools, agricultural experiment stations, to name just a few. It is worthwhile to notice that an institutional arrangement, like a family and a cooperative, may at the same time perform several functions.

Institutional arrangements are means of achieving the benefits of collective actions. Since individual rationality does not necessarily
imply group rationality, it is in the interest of each individual to seek the most favorable result for himself. Conflicts of interest may arise. Individuals often have to assess the quality of other people's work or contributions. Information about quality is in many circumstances very costly, uncertain, or even impossible to obtain. Collective actions thus create some problems that do not exist when individuals work alone. Among these problems are cheating, shirking, free riders, and moral hazards. These issues are emphasized by the property-rights economists, transaction-costs economists, and public-choice economists (see Olson, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; and Williamson, 1975, 1985). To alleviate these problems, some institutional arrangements are created to perform the functions of monitoring, enforcement, and so forth. Hierarchies, contracts, and laws are institutional arrangements in this regard. The problems of shirking, free riders, and moral hazards also increase the costs of supplying the service of fundamental institutional arrangements. There will also be some institutional arrangements that aim to reduce the costs of supplying the services of fundamental institutional arrangements. Private property rights, money, contracts, customs, ethics, mores, and ideologies are a few examples. The existence of private rights, legal system, money, and so on presumes the existence of a state. The discussion of institutions is not complete without a theory of the state. However, I will suspend the investigation of the state until Section IV.

The most important institutional arrangement that exists to reduce the costs of providing the services of other institutional arrangements is ideology. Ideology has long been a subject of concern for Marxian
economists. Perhaps because of this, it has not received much attention from the mainstream economists until very recently. However, as noted by Arrow (1974, p. 72), "Employees follow instructions, and citizens obey law to a much greater extent than can be explained on the basis of control mechanisms." To close this gap, a positive theory of ideology is required.

Ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs about the world that tend to judge morally the division of labor, income distribution, and the existing institutional structure of a society. As North succinctly summarizes, ideologies have three stylized features:

1. Ideology is an economizing device by which individuals come to terms with their environment and are provided with a "world view" so that the decision-making process is simplified.

2. Ideology is inextricably interwoven with moral and ethical judgments about the fairness of the world the individual perceives....

3. Individuals alter their ideological perspectives when their experiences are inconsistent with their ideology. In effect, they attempt to develop a new set of rationalizations that are a better "fit" with their experiences. However, it is important to stress ... inconsistencies between experience and ideologies must accumulate before individuals alter their ideology (North, 1981, p. 49).

Ideology is mentioned in the literature mostly for its function in legitimating the existing institutional structure or solidifying a group. It is true that a society or group can not exist for long if the majority of its members do not share the same feeling about the justice of the system. And in a society if the differences in ideology between different classes are deep enough, revolution will follow. A society or an organization is formed to exploit the gains that an individual is unable
to capture; however, the rationality assumption of individual behavior also implies that any large organization is inherently beset by free-rider problems (Olson, 1965). A successful ideology must thus also overcome the free-rider problem. Since an ideology is an economizing device for the recognition of the world, for an ideology to be effective, it must conform reasonably well with an individual's experience of the world. As the world changes and individuals' experiences accumulate, their perceptions of a fair world also change. A successful ideology must also be flexible enough to capture the loyalty of new groups and retain the loyalty of older groups (North, 1981, chap. 5).

Ideologies exist because the world is complex, and the rationality of a human's mind is bounded. If the world were simple or an individual's rationality were unbounded, an individual would judge the fairness of the reality around him without taking a short-cut in the form of an ideology. An ideology's primary function is thus serving as a device for economizing information costs. But by what mechanism does an ideology perform the functions of checking free riders and reducing the costs of enforcing law and order? I submit that a successful ideology performs these functions by providing selective incentives to individuals.¹⁶ As argued forcefully by Becker, individuals use market goods and services, their own time, human capital, and other inputs to produce a set of commodities that are defined over fundamental aspects of life in order to maximize their preferences. Piety, which Jeremy Bentham maintained as one of the fifteen simple pressures, should be one of the commodities that enters an individual's preference function. The ability to produce this piety commodity, among others, depends on an individual's ideological
capital. When an individual's ideological conviction is strong, it implies that his ideological capital is large, and then the shadow price of producing piety is low. His marginal utility of time allocated to piety is high; therefore, he allocate more time to the consumption of piety. Olson (1965) is right in pointing out that for any large organization to be viable, it should be able to provide selective incentives to its members. But Olson defines the arguments in the utility function narrowly, therefore, he cannot explain why most people vote. North notes that many people vote for ideological reasons, but he fails to recognize that voting is an activity that produces a commodity that an individual consumes. An individual will vote because voting produces a piety commodity that he values. However, he will vote only if the benefits are larger than the costs. This is the reason why the number of voter falls greatly if it rains.

An ideology is human capital that helps an individual make a moral judgement about his and others' roles in the division of labor, the distribution of income, and the existing institutional structure. This human-capital theory of ideology has the following implications. (A) A larger ideological endowment reduces the shadow price of consuming piety. Therefore, an individual is less likely to free ride or violate the rules, the higher his ideological conviction about the morality of the institutional arrangements and the structure surrounding him. (B) An individual's ideology is relatively stable. A change in the distribution of income, the division of labor, or other institutional arrangements will not change an individual's ideology immediately. This is because an individual cannot tell immediately this change is a temporary or a
permanent one. If this change is permanent, it will take time for the individual to divest the old ideological capital. (c) If a permanent change occurs, young people are more ready to invest in acquiring a new ideology than old people, even if they have the same preference, for the following two reasons. First, old people in general have more ideological capital to divest. It takes time and effort to do so. Second, they have less incentives to invest because the years remaining to collect the returns are relatively few. (D) Opportunistic behavior is attenuated by the ideological conviction of the legitimacy of the existing institutional arrangements. An ideology is thus human capital that produces great externality from the authority's point of view; therefore, any government will subsidize the individual's accumulation of ideological capital by investing in ideological education. However, resembling advertizement (Stigler and Becker, 1977), it affect people's behavior not by changing tastes, but by changing the relative prices.¹⁷

III. An Economic Approach to Induced Institutional Change

For any desired institutional service, there are always a number of institutional arrangements that can perform this function. The choice of an institutional arrangement thus involves the calculus of costs and benefits. In the conventional cost-benefit analysis, only the production costs are taken into account. Optimality is obtained when the values of marginal products of each input are equalized. The costs in the choice of an institutional arrangement, nevertheless, also include the costs of organizing, maintaining, and enforcing the rules of this particular arrangement. The second category of costs is referred to as transaction costs. In addition to technical factors, the transaction costs of an
institutional arrangement also depend on the perceived legitimacy of this arrangement, which we have mentioned in the discussion of ideologies. Theoretically, it is easy to say, abstracted from the role of the state, that with given production and transaction costs, one institutional arrangement is more efficient than another, if it provides more services. Alternatively, for two institutional arrangements that provide the same amount of service, the one with lower costs is a more efficient arrangement. Therefore, there are two different types of factors that can affect the efficiency of an institutional arrangement. The first type affects production efficiency. The other type involves those factors that determine the transaction efficiency. Fundamentally, these two types of factors are all functions of technology. However, assessing the efficiency of an institutional arrangement is extremely complicated in reality. Since an institutional arrangement is embedded in the institutional structure, its efficiency also depends on how well the other institutional arrangements perform their functions. For example, in a barter system there is great inconvenience and cost in searching for someone who has what you want and wants what you have. This inconvenience alone, nevertheless, does not indicate that it is necessarily inefficient. Since the costs of having an agreed-on commodity serve as a generally acceptable means of exchange or of establishing and maintaining a monetary authority are very high, a barter system can be more efficient than a money-exchange system if people rarely exchange goods. This is the situation in a primitive society. It is, therefore, fruitless to single out a particular institutional arrangement and to discuss its efficiency in absolute terms. The study of an institutional arrangement requires
specific knowledge of the historic time, region, and the institutional structure that this arrangement situates. In the absence of such understanding, a discussion of the efficiency of a particular institutional arrangement is without substance.\textsuperscript{19} As we will find, the direction and scope of institutional change are not random: they can be subject to rigorous economic analysis. A more profitable approach, therefore, is to investigate why new institutional arrangements are innovated and how they are adopted.

There are two types of institutional change, induced and imposed. An \textit{induced} institutional change refers to a modification or replacement of an existing institutional arrangement or the innovation of a new institutional arrangement that is voluntarily initiated, organized, and executed by an individual or a group of individuals in response to profitable opportunities. An \textit{imposed} change, in contrast, is introduced and executed by governmental orders or laws.\textsuperscript{20} The induced institutional change must be caused by a profitable opportunity that is not attainable under the original institutional arrangement. The imposed institutional change, however, can occur purely for the purpose of redistributing existing income among different groups of constituents. Although a voluntary change in an institutional arrangement, especially a formal arrangement, often requires governmental action to facilitate the process, I separate these two types of change for the convenience of analysis. The discussion of imposed institutional changes will be deferred until Section IV.

\textbf{The Sources of Institutional Disequilibrium}

An institutional arrangement will be chosen from a set of possible
arrangements if it is more efficient than the other arrangements in this choice set, taking both production and transaction costs into account. As already mentioned, the transaction costs of a particular arrangement also depend on other arrangements, such as laws, customs, ideologies; the most efficient institutional arrangement is a function, among other things, of the other arrangements in the institutional structure. For an induced institutional change to occur, there must be some profitable opportunities that arise from institutional disequilibrium, that is, for some reason the existing institutional arrangement is no longer the most efficient one in the choice set.

Starting from an original equilibrium point, institutional disequilibrium can arise from four different sources: (a) changes in the institutional choice set, (b) changes in technology (c) changes in the demand for institutional services, and (d) changes in the other institutional arrangements. Each of these four sources, in turn, consists of several different factors.

(A) Changes in the institutional choice set

Just as the set of feasible production technology is a function of our knowledge in physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences, the set of feasible institutional arrangements for a particular institutional service also depends on our knowledge in the social sciences. Ruttan (1984) has argued forcefully that the demand for knowledge in economics and the other social sciences as well as in related professions such as law, business, and social services is a demand derived primarily for institutional change and improvements in institutional performance. The advances in the social sciences improve the bounded rationality of the
human mind and therefore not only increase individuals' ability to manage
the existing arrangements but also increase the ability to perceive and
innovate new institutional arrangements.

An institutional choice set may also be enlarged by contacts with
the other economies; just as contacts with the other economies may
increase the available technological choice set. Bauer has emphasized the
roles of individual traders in bringing new technology and institutional
arrangements and, as a result, in encouraging people to "question
existing habits and mores, and promoted the uncoerced erosion of
attitudes and customs uncongenial to material progress" (Bauer, 1984, P.
12). The possibility of institutional change through borrowing the other
society's institutional arrangement greatly decreases the costs of
investment in basic social science research. However, the institutional
transfer may be more difficult than the technological transfer, as the
efficiency of an institutional arrangement crucially depends on the
existence of other related arrangements. Schiller (1969, chap. 7)
reported a case in which the Burmese government sent some people to the
Israeli "Kibbutzim" for practical training. These trainees came to the
conclusion after a year that this extreme form of collectivism would not
be acceptable to them because it required so much public spirit and self-
restraint. More adaption is required for a transferred institutional
arrangement to perform its functions. 21

Finally, the institutional choice set can also be enlarged or
contracted by the change in government policies. For reasons that will be
discussed in the next section, the government may exclude some
institutional arrangements from the choice set. Therefore, removing a
restrictive government policy has the same effect as enlarging the choice set. One recent example is the shift in the government policy in China concerning the farming institution in rural areas. Before recent changes, a household farming arrangement was prohibited; the only acceptable mode was collective farming. However, because of the shift in government policy, about 95% of households in China changed to the new household-based farming system between 1980-1983 (Lin, 1987a). On the other hand, when the government institutes a new constraint in the institutional choice set and this constraint is binding, institutional disequilibrium will be a result, and originally less efficient arrangement may become a dominant one in the restricted choice set. The emergence of subtenancy in the Philippine villages surveyed by Hayami and Kikuchi (1981) is a result of the restriction of rent by the land reform law.

(B) Changes in technology

I share Marx's view that the institutional structure of a society is fundamentally conditioned by technology. In an authoritative statement expressed in his 1859 preface to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx writes the following:

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. . . . At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces come in conflict with the existing relations of productions, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the production forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. . . . No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. (Marx and
In addition to its determinant role on the institutional structure, the change in technology will also alter the relative efficiencies of particular institutional arrangements and make some other arrangements inoperative. The impacts of technological change can be analyzed from its effects on production and on the transaction.

On the production side, new institutional arrangements are often required to take advantage of new potential externalities or to modify the partitioning of new income streams among factor owners and economic sectors. The dominance of modern firms over the traditional family workshops in the manufacturing industry, which is a response to the size demanded by the use of machinery in the production process, is an example of the first case (Brewster, 1950). In the Philippines, the introduction of modern high-yield varieties of rice and the increase in the availability of labor have resulted in the replacement of the traditional hunusan contract in which all villagers have the right to participate in harvesting and receive one-sixth of the yield by the gama contract that gives an exclusive right of harvesting for the same share to the workers who do weeding without receiving a wage (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, chap. 5). Clearly, the innovation of the gama system is induced by the desire to modify the new income stream between landowners and laborers.

Changes in the technology may also affect the transaction costs and make some institutional arrangements operative that were originally inoperative. The establishment of private property rights requires, among other things, that the benefits for the owner that are derived from the rights are greater than the costs of excluding others from using this
property. When the costs are too high, the property will be commonly owned. For example, grazing land in general is commonly owned because of the cost of fencing. However, the innovation of low-cost barbed-wire fencing has resulted in the private ownership and leasing of public grazing land in the American West (Anderson and Hill, 1975). The innovation of tractors and other farm machinery greatly reduces the cost of supervision as it is easier to supervise one driver than a large number of manual workers. As a result, there is a tendency to shift from sharecropping to owner operating or to change from sharecroppers to wage workers (Day, 1967; Binswanger, 1978).

(C) Long-run changes in relative factor and product prices

The long-run changes in the relative prices of factors and goods are some of the major reasons behind many of the changes in the property-rights arrangement in history. The rise in the relative price of a factor will make the ownership of that factor relatively more profitable compared with the other factors. The rise in the price of a product will also make the exclusive use of the factors that are used to produce this product more attractive. The shift from the property rights in man to the property rights in land in medieval Europe, according to North and Thomas (1973), was a result of an increase in the population and in the scarcity of land which increased the relative prices of land. Feeny (1982) also finds that in Thailand the transfer from the property rights in man to the property rights in land between the mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century can be explained by the increases in the population and in the export demand for rice during that period. In England the increase in the price of food made open fields and common
pasture enclosed into private units profitable. McCloskey (1975) estimates that, despite the high costs of fencing, the enclosure yielded a yearly rate of return on the order of 17 percent.

(D) Changes in other institutional arrangements

The performances of institutional arrangements in a structure are interdependent, as argued before. A change in a particular arrangement, therefore, may result in corresponding changes in the demand for the services of other arrangements. As Lewis observes, "Once institutions begin to change, they change in ways which are self-enforcing. The old beliefs and institutions are altered, and the new beliefs and institutions gradually become more consistent with each other and with further change in the same direction" (Lewis, 1955, p. 146). It is argued that sense of honor, which was such a prominent trait in primitive and ancient societies, can be explained by the lack of a formal law-enforcement arrangement. Sense of honor increases the probability of retaliating. It is, therefore, an important device to keep society in order (Posner, 1980). In modern states, honor is still valued; however, the state becomes the sole institutional arrangement that keeps society in order. Retaliation and duels are forbidden. The existence of a "subsistence ethic" in the preindustrialized society can be explained by the low level of agricultural productivity and the limited potential size of a market. The patron-client relationship is a transaction-cost saving device. It substitutes for a set of specialized markets for labor, land, credit, insurance, and so on (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, chap. 2). The expansion of markets thus weakened the mutual help and patron-client relationship (Polanyi, 1944). Lin (1987b) finds that the rural factor
markets were very limited in their existence before the recent change in rural farming arrangements in China. The shift from collective farming to the household-based farming system has resulted in the reemergence of labor, land, and credit markets in rural China.

The Dynamics of Induced Institutional Change

Profitable opportunities will arise from the institutional disequilibrium discussed above. New institutional arrangements will be innovated to take advantage of these profitable opportunities. Since the institutional structure is composed of individual arrangements, one particular institutional arrangement in disequilibrium thus means that the whole structure is in disequilibrium. Many institutional arrangements are closely related. The change in one particular institutional arrangement will also result in other related institutional arrangements being in disequilibrium. If the rationality of the human mind is unbounded and setting up the new institutional arrangements is costless and timeless, then, in response to any institutional disequilibrium, the society will instantly go from one equilibrium structure directly to another equilibrium structure. However, the rationality of the human mind is bounded. It is beyond the capacity of human mind to perceive all the necessary changes and to design all the optimal arrangements at the same time. The setting-up of a new institutional arrangement is also a time-, effort-, and resource-consuming process. Furthermore, individuals with different experiences and roles in the structure will have different perceptions of the degree and source of disequilibrium. They will also seek different ways of partitioning the gains from the change. For a new set of behavior rules to be accepted and adopted, negotiation and
agreement among individuals is required. Therefore, when disequilibrium occurs, the process of institutional change will most likely start from one arrangement and spread only gradually over to the other arrangements. The processes thus take place in a historically determined structure and are conditioned by this existing structure. Consequently, some arrangements may be favorable from an abstract theoretical point of view but are not viable because of incompatibility with the other existing arrangements in the structure. During the process of an institutional change, most of the institutional arrangements are inherited from the previous structure. Although the fundamental properties of a structure will be altered when the accumulation of changes in individual arrangements reaches a certain critical point, the process of institutional change resembles an evolutionary process (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982).

Society as a whole will gain from the innovation of an institutional arrangement that captures the profitable opportunity arising from institutional disequilibrium. Whether this innovation will take place, however, depends on the expected gains and costs to the individual innovators. The gains and costs to the innovators are more complicated than the calculus of social gains and costs. These problems are different for different types of arrangements. For the purpose of this paper, institutional arrangements will be classified into two types, namely, a formal institutional arrangement and an informal institutional arrangement.

A formal institutional arrangement refers to the type of arrangements where a change or modification of rules requires the
sanction of the group of individuals whose behavior is governed by the arrangement. That is, unanimity is a precondition for a voluntary change of a formal institutional arrangement. The change in a formal arrangement, therefore, requires that innovators take time and effort to organize, negotiate, and obtain the consensus of the group of individuals. The emergency of subtenancy and the shift from the traditional hunusan contract to the gama contract in the Philippine villages studied by Hayami and Kikuchi are just two examples of this type of institutional change. In contrast, an informal institutional arrangement refers to the type of arrangement where the modification or change of rules is carried out purely by individuals without and impossible by group action. Initially, the individual innovators will be considered by others as violating the existing rules. The institutional arrangement will be transformed only when the majority of the individuals in the society abandon the original arrangement and adopt the new one. Examples of such an institutional arrangement are values, ethic norms, mores, customs, ideologies, and so on.

Changing a formal institutional arrangement will generally encounter both the externality and free-rider problems. The externality problem arises because an institutional arrangement is not patentable. When an institutional arrangement is innovated, other groups of individuals can imitate the innovation and dramatically reduce their costs of organizing and devising the new arrangement. Therefore, the returns to the innovator will be less than the returns to society as a whole. The implication of this problem is that the intensity and frequency of innovations in the formal institutional arrangement will be less than the optimal number for
the society as a whole. Persistence of institutional disequilibria may occur as a result. The free-rider problem may arise because an institutional arrangement is a public good. Once it is innovated and instituted, every individual that is governed by the arrangement will receive the same service no matter he does or does not take on the initial trouble of this innovation. As argued before, the free-rider problem will be attenuated by the ideological convictions of the individuals. If the new arrangement is in conformity with their ideas of a fair world, the premium required for them to free ride will be larger. The severity of the free-rider problem also depends on how the group of individuals are related. If the mobility of the members of the group is high, free riding is more likely to happen because an individual's behavior is less likely to be detected. The other consideration is how tightly the group is structured. In a tightly structured community, Hayami and Kikuchi argue that "people are less individualistic and conform to social norms more closely" (1981, p. 36); the free-rider problem will thus be less severe.

Because of the free-rider problem, the role of political or institutional entrepreneurs is especially crucial in the innovation of a formal arrangement. A political entrepreneur is someone "who is generally trusted (feared), or who can guess who is bluffing in the bargaining, or who can simply save bargaining time, can sometimes work out an arrangement that is better for all concerned than any outcome that could emerge without entrepreneurial leadership or organization" (Olson, 1965, p. 176). Institutional disequilibrium may affect different individuals differently. Therefore, the success of a political
entrepreneur depends, among other things, on his ability to design a partitioning of the potential profits that seems to make everyone better-off and to convince the members that this partitioning is in conformity with their own ideologies. The political entrepreneur will make an effort to articulate the new goals and set up the new rules, if he believes the gains are greater than the costs to him. The gains need not be material, they can also be nonmaterial, such as those of social prestige or political support (Eisenstadt, 1965, 1968). The costs to the entrepreneur will be smaller if he can mobilize political support from government agencies or ally with the local vested-interest groups. (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, chap. 2). However, this consideration implies that the new institutional arrangement may be detrimental to some individuals because, once the coercive power is applied, the consensus is not a necessary condition for the innovation anymore.

The problems that may arise from the innovation process involving the informal institutional arrangements have characters very different from the innovation of formal arrangements. Since the innovation of an informal arrangement does not involve group action, there will be no free-rider problems, although externality problems still exist. The adoption of new rules completely depends on the individual calculation of the benefits and the costs that may arise from this innovation. The costs for the innovation also do not take the forms of time, effort, and resources spent on the process of innovation. As the enforcement of informal institutional arrangements depends on social interactions, the costs to an innovator come primarily from the social pressures around him. This cost will be extremely high if the profitable opportunity is
not equally distributed among the members of the community. For those people who are left behind, they may feel that the sacred mores are offended and customary rights are stripped. Gossiping and even violence may follow. This is the situation that often happens when a subsistence-oriented peasant economy is penetrated by the market system (Scott, 1976). For fear of social opprobrium and ostracism, an individual may be reluctant to violate the informal arrangements, even if the material gains from this violation appear to be very large. For this reason, the informal institutional arrangements tend to be harder to change than the formal arrangements. Even with governmental action the changes will not be easy.27

Nevertheless, the criteria and characters of the change in informal arrangements are not altered. Values, customs, and social mores, like ideologies, have all been changed and changing in the process of human history. The crucial issue for the innovators is still the same as that for other economic decision-makers. When institutional disequilibrium gives rise to large enough expected benefits to cover the potential costs, individuals will make the effort to adopt new values, mores, and customs no matter how deeply rooted these rules seem to be.

The enforcement of the informal institutional arrangements mainly depends on the social interactions. Therefore, the higher the mobility of the members in a group or community, the less effective this enforcement mechanism is. Hence, the higher the mobility, the easier it is for the members to give up traditional arrangements and adopt new ones. This explains why values and mores are, in general, in flux in a market economy and fixed in a traditional economy. Young persons in a market
economy will also be more likely to be innovators than old persons for the same reasons that have been argued for ideological changes. This phenomenon is the so-called "generation gap."

IV. The Political Economy of Imposed Institutional Change

Because an institutional arrangement is a public good and the free-rider problem is innate to the innovation process, the supply of institutional arrangements in a society will be less than socially optimum if the induced innovation is the only source of new institutional arrangements. A persistent institutional undersupply can be remedied by state interventions. Since state interventions also incur costs and benefits to the state, whether the state has the incentive to take the appropriate actions is an issue that can be subject to economic analysis. This section presents an economic model of the state. Decision making by the state will be discussed from the point of view of a ruler. The ruler can be a king, chief, premier, or elected president. It will be shown that a rational ruler may fail to rectify the undersupply of institutional arrangements for reasons that will be discussed under the title of policy failure.

An Economic Approach to the State

The state, according to Weber's definition, is that institutional arrangement that has a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion in a given area. The basic functions of the state are to provide law and order, and to protect property rights for the exchange of tax revenue. Since there are great economies of scale in using the coercive power, the state belongs to the category of natural monopoly. The state as a monopolist can provide the above-mentioned services much cheaper than a
competitive organization. Total income in the society is thus higher when the state exists than when individuals have to provide the services themselves or obtain them from other competitive organizations. Normatively, it may be argued that the most desirable state is the minimal state that is "limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on" (Nozik, 1974, p. ix). However, in reality, it is irrelevant. Being a monopolist in the legitimate use of coercive power, the state can extend its spheres of influence much more than those of a minimal state. Although the state cannot determine how an institution will work, as noted by Mill, it has "the power of deciding what institutions shall exist" (Mill, 1848, p. 21). A more interesting question is whether the state has the incentive and ability to design and impose a suitable institutional arrangement, which the induced institutional change process fails to provide.

There are several approaches that have been proposed to study decision making by the state. The first approach views the state as an organic entity. The state in this view is personalized. It has its own values, motivations, and objectives that are independent of the individuals of which the state is composed. Becoming an integrated cell of the state, an individual loses his own identity. The state acts to maximize its own welfare or utility. Although this view is simple methodologically, it does not have much substance because, as commented by Downs (1957, p. 17), "It is based upon a mythical entity: a state which is a thing apart from individual men." On the other extreme, the second approach, initiated by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), conceives the state as an instrument of achieving collective action. It is merely a set
of processes, a machine by which individuals can satisfy some of their wants. Individuals buy services from it and pay only the costs for the services they receive. This view is incomplete because it neglects the incentives of the persons who actually make decisions and run the state apparatus. The third approach, proposed by Downs (1957) in his germane study of the government, views decision making by the state from the point of view of a political party, which is defined as a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means. The members of a political party are assumed to agree on all their goals instead of on just a part of them. The political party is thus viewed as a single person with consistent preference ordering. This approach is also unrealistic, as admitted by Downs himself: "In reality not even the key officials of any government have exactly the same goals" (Downs, 1957, p.26).

Since in any society the ultimate authority of the state is in the hands of a politician who is more or less shielded from the preferences and pressures of the citizen, a more satisfactory approach is to view decision making by the state through behavior of the ruler of the state, be he a king, president, prime minister, or behind-the-curtain supreme leader (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1974; North, 1981, chap. 3). The ruler, like any individual with bounded rationality, is concerned with his own survival, prestige, power, wealth, position in history, and so on. Within the constraints of possible revolt, and the threats of potential rulers within or without. The ruler will do whatever he deems adequate to maximize his own utility. The ruler, however, will at least maintain a set of rules to reduce the transaction costs of ruling the
state. These rules include those of uniform weights and measurements, and the judicial system to settle differences. The power, prestige, and wealth of the ruler ultimately depend on the wealth of the state; therefore, the ruler will also provide a set of property rights that facilitates production and trade and a set of enforcement procedures to enforce contracts. The compliance costs of the political system depend on the perceived legitimacy of the ruler; the ruler, therefore, will invest in ideological education to convince constituents of the legitimacy of his authority.

As the economy grows, institutional disequilibria emerge. Some of the disequilibria will be removed by the induced innovations. However, some of them will persist because of the divergence between private and social benefits and costs. The ruler will take actions to remove the disequilibrium if the expected profits for the ruler are higher than the expected costs of imposing this change. An inefficient disequilibrium, nevertheless, may also be maintained by the state if the change in the institutional arrangement lowers the obtainable utility or threatens the survival of the ruler. That is, the ruler will take actions to remedy the undersupply of institutional innovation only to the extent that the estimated marginal benefits of imposing a new arrangement equal the estimated marginal costs to the ruler in terms of net tax revenue, political supports, and other commodities that enter the ruler's utility function. There is no guarantee that the utility-maximizing ruler has the incentives to implement policies to facilitate the supply of institutional arrangements to the socially optimal point that maximizes the wealth of the society as a whole.
Being a positive study, the following subsection focuses on the reasons that the state fails to institute the socially desirable institutional arrangements. However, its normative implication is that removing these sources of failures will improve the efficient supply of imposed institutional change.

The Sources of Policy Failures

Maintaining an inefficient arrangement and the failure of the state to take actions to remove institutional disequilibria both will be referred to as policy failures. The policy failures have the following origins: the preferences and bounded rationality of the ruler, ideological rigidity, the bureaucracy, group interest conflicts, and the limitation of social science knowledge.

The preferences and bounded rationality of the ruler -- The efficiency of an institutional arrangement is defined by its impact on the total wealth of the nation. If the ruler is a wealth maximizer and his personal wealth is proportional to the wealth of the nation, the ruler will have incentives to institute the arrangement, within the limit of his authority, that is most efficient. However, if the new institutional arrangement brings higher income to the nation but lower benefits to the ruler because of the transaction costs to the ruler, in comparison with those of the original arrangement, the ruler may find that it is not in his interest to institute the new arrangement. Furthermore, wealth is only one of the many commodities that the ruler values. If the ruler, for example, is concerned more about his prestige in the international political arena, he may institute the arrangement that strengthens the military power at the cost of the nation's wealth.
From the utility-maximizing model of the ruler, we can also predict that
the ruler will be more concerned about his prestige as the wealth of the
nation increases. There are so many observations in history that an
example is unwarranted for supporting this argument. Finally, even if
the ruler is a wealth maximizer, he may still fail to rectify the
undersupply of institutional arrangements due to his bounded rationality
and the complexity of information required to recognize and comprehend
the institutional disequilibria, and to design and institute a new
arrangement.

**Ideological rigidity** -- The transaction costs of ruling the state
are reduced if the constituents have a strong conviction toward the
legitimacy of the authority of the ruler and the fairness of the existing
institutional arrangements. Therefore, the ruler will develop an ideology
that serves his purposes and invest in education to inculcate the
constituents with this ideology. The ruler is thus personally identified
with the ideology that he promotes. As institutional disequilibrium
emerges, the gap between the ideology and reality grows. Imposing new
institutional arrangements to restore equilibrium and changing the
original ideology, however, very likely undermine the legitimacy of the
authority of the ruler. Therefore, instead of innovating new
institutional arrangements, the ruler may maintain the old inefficient
arrangements and battle to purify the ideology for fear that his
authority may otherwise be shaken. New arrangements, hence, often become
possible only after the old ruler is replaced by a new ruler. A recent
example is the change from the collective system to the household farming
system in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaopin who is a victim
under Mao's rule (Lin, 1987a).

The agency problem -- By definition, the ruler must have some bureaucratic apparatus at his disposal to implement law and order, collect taxes, inflict punishment, secure national sovereignty, and provide other services. Each of the bureaucrats in these government agencies is himself a rational individual. His interests never completely coincide with the ruler's. Of course, the ruler will attempt to monitor the behavior of his agents, implement a reward system that promotes the loyalty to the ruler, and inculcate an ideology that encourages honest and unselfish commitment to one's office. However, these bureaucrats will not be perfectly controlled, and bureaucratic discretionary behavior cannot be completely eliminated. The result is that a policy designed to maximize the ruler's preference will more or less be distorted to favor the bureaucrats themselves. The ability of the ruler to maximize his own utility and institute an efficient arrangement depends on how much the bureaucrats take the ruler's goals as their own goals. The agency problems exacerbate the bounded rationality of the ruler and increase the transaction costs of ruling the state. A new institutional arrangement will not be instituted if the additional profits from so doing will be dissipated by bureaucratic discretionary behavior.

Group interest conflicts -- As noted by Schultz, "The individuals who govern are politically dependent on the support of particular population groups that make the regime viable. Economic policies are in this context a means to maintain political support" (Schultz, 1978, p. 10). Changes in an institutional arrangement often redistribute wealth, income, and political power between various groups of constituents. If
the losers in the change do not receive compensation, and in most cases they do not, they will definitely oppose this change. Therefore, the ruler will be reluctant to institute a change for fear of eroding his own political support, if the losers in the institutional change are the groups whose support the ruler relies on. Feeny (1982, chap. 7) finds that, in Thailand between 1880 and 1975, because the elite stood to gain little from the technical and institutional changes, necessary actions were not taken by the government; as a result, the development of agriculture was retarded. A powerful group may also promote new arrangements that redistribute income to this group, although this change would be detrimental to the growth of the economy (Olson, 1982; Muller, 1983). Furthermore, the monopoly power of the ruler is constrained by potential rivals, within or without the state, who will provide the same set of services. The groups of constituents that have good access to the rivals of the ruler will have high bargaining power. The ruler will hence provide greater services to these groups. A change will not be instituted if this change drives these groups of constituents to the ruler’s rivals and if the benefits that the ruler gains from the remaining constituents cannot compensate for the harm that the ruler incurs due to the loss of these groups of constituents (North, 1981, chap. 3).

Limitation of social science knowledge -- As argued before, the choice set of institutional arrangements is bounded by the stock of social science knowledge. Even if the government has the intention of instituting an institutional arrangement to restore disequilibrium, the government may fail to institute the correct one because of the inadequacy of social science knowledge. Many underdeveloped countries
adopted Soviet-type central planning in the early fifties. It is hard to prove how much of this policy was a direct result of the prevailing social knowledge at that time; nevertheless, as summarized by Bauer (1984), the principal components of development literature of the early post-war years emphasized the necessary role of comprehensive government planning for underdeveloped countries in achieving economic growth. Drawing on the history of the last three centuries of England and other Western economies, Schultz (1977), nevertheless, finds that the alteration and establishment of various distinct political-economic institutional arrangements in a society were induced or shaped by the dominant social thoughts in those times. The dominant social thought may not be the "correct" one in the sense that the solution embodied in the thought will lead to a higher income growth rate and more desirable income distribution. Fundamentally, social thought is also limited by the bounded rationality of the human mind. Nevertheless, it is safe to predict that the damage will be smaller if the dominant social thought is a result of full interaction and consultation among a wide spectrum and various disciplines of social scientists and not a result of a handful of authorities.

V. Concluding Remarks

In concluding this paper, some remarks about the relationship between cultural endowments and economic growth and the role of government on economic growth are in order.

A nation's cultural endowments, such as its values and customs, are informal institutional arrangements. They, like formal arrangements, are man-made devices that satisfy men's needs. In a stationary economy,
cultural endowments will situate in an equilibrium and often become sacred. However, as the economy grows, some of the original arrangements will become obsolete because new arrangements are required to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in providing more services or reducing transaction costs. Although the process of institutional innovation is plagued with externality problems, some institutional entrepreneurs will eventually emerge, and new efficient arrangements will be innovated, as long as the expected profits grow to outweigh the costs. In this sense, values, customs, and other elements of cultural endowments are neutral in the process of economic growth. This does not mean that a nation's cultural endowments do not matter, but they do not determine a nation's future. A nation can not count on its cultural endowments for economic growth, no matter how favorable these endowments are to growth. A nation need not stop developing its economy until the establishment of a set of values or mores that are congruent to growth, either. A nation's cultural endowments will be changed, and actually they are changing once it is profitable to do so. The hard-working attitude of Japanese workers has been impressive and praised all over the world today. However, a quotation from a report written in 1915 by an Australian expert invited to visit by the Japanese government will suffice to illustrate the above point:

My impression as to your cheap labour was soon disillusioned when I saw your people at work. No doubt they are lowly paid, but the return is equally so; to see your men at work made me feel that you are a very satisfied easy-going race who reckon time is no object. When I spoke to some managers they informed me that it was impossible to change the habits of national heritage (emphasis added).32

The habits of national heritage, which are incompatible with an
industrial society and are supposed to be impossible to change, have been completely changed in just one or two generations. What is the key to the change? The key is the profits to individuals who contribute their efforts to work and to the innovations of new attitudes, values, and other formal and informal arrangements. No individuals are bounded by cultural endowments in seeking to improve their own lots. They are bounded only by the lack of opportunities that promise large enough profits for undertaking changes.

More important for a nation's economic growth than cultural endowments are the policies of the government. Since government provides the framework of order on which the rest of economy is built and rational behavior is impossible without the ordered stability that government provides, the importance of government policy for economic growth cannot be over-exaggerated. However, as noted by Lewis (1955, p. 376), "No country has made economic progress without positive stimulus from intelligent governments, ... On the other hand, there are so many examples of the mischief done to economic life by governments that it is easy to fill one's pages with warnings against government participation in economic life." So what distinguishes an intelligent government from a non-intelligent one? The answer probably lies in how the government guides individuals' incentives. Individuals will always seek opportunities to benefit themselves under any circumstance. However, for the development of an economy, it is necessary, at the risk of over-generalization, to have a system that encourages individuals to actively seek for and innovate new profitable productive income streams and the system also allows individuals who invest their time, effort, and money
on these activities to reap the profits for themselves. Institutional arrangements with such a character -- or more explicitly a system of clearly defined and well-enforced property rights in goods, factors of production, and ideals -- are inherently public goods. They cannot be established by the induced institutional innovation process. Without the whole-hearted support of the government, such institutional arrangements will not exist in a society.
Footnotes

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1The assumptions include the absence of external economies and diseconomies of scale, perfect divisibility of goods, convexity of the relevant sets and functions describing preferences and technology, and certain other mathematical features. Hurwicz (1972) calls these assumptions as "classical environment."

2Chandler (1977) observed that technological development could only explain half the substantial increase in railroad productivity between 1870 and 1910; the other half was due to an organizational innovation, namely the creation of a hierarchical apparatus to monitor, evaluate, and coordinate a complex system.

3Schultz presented his "Institutions and the Rising Economic Value of Man" in the first Fellow Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association in 1968. Subsequently, the published paper received an award as the outstanding article published by the American Journal of Agricultural Economics in that year. To my knowledge, Schultz is one of the first contemporary economists who attempts to extend the modern analytical approach to investigate institutions and institutional changes. In The Economic Organization of Agriculture, which was published in 1953, he wrote, "There are alternative forms of organization and none of these is achievable without effort, that is, inputs are required to establish and maintain any given organization" (pp. 249 - 50). He also commented that because of the lack of a meaningful theory of social organization that could handle the relevant
political and social variables, economists shied away from the analysis of institutions: "As a consequence, all too frequently the statements of economists leave the impression that markets and firms and households are sufficient in themselves to achieve a workable economic organization" (p. 254).

4This is the definition given by Schultz (1968) in his celebrated paper. See also Ruttan (1978), Field (1981), and North (1981, Chap. 15).

5See the discussion of traditional views by Olson (1965 pp. 16-22).

6A formal definition of rationality is given by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 50), from the game-theoretical prospect, as the following: "Of two alternatives which give rise to outcomes, a player will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome, or more precisely, in terms of the utility function he will attempt to maximize expected utility."

7Becker's approach to the allocation of time, household production, and social interactions is especially relevant for the study of institutions and institutional change. His papers about these subjects are collected in Becker (1976). The arguments that enter the utility function, according to Jeremy Bentham, consist of senses, riches, address, friendship, good reputation, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, knowledge, memory, imagination, hope, association, and relief of pain (See Becker, 1976, p. 137).

8The concept that a rational individual attempts to maximize utility not income is essential to understanding the human behavior in an economy without perfect factor and output markets. In subsistence agriculture, a peasant will adopt practices that maximize the security of food production instead of maximizing the output that has the highest expected
market value because a harvest failure may threaten his survival (Lipton, 1968).

9This rational approach to human behavior does not assume that an individual is necessarily conscious of his efforts to maximize his utility in a systematic pattern. This view is emphasized by Friedman (1953), Becker (1976), and Posner (1980).

10Families, firms, hospitals, universities, and so on are institutions not because of their physical buildings but because of the rules that organize the behavior of individuals within them (Field, 1979).

11I borrow the term "structure" from Montias (1976, p. 20). He says that "the structure of the system ... consists of all the formal and informal rules constraining the actions of the participants." The concept of the institutional structure is broader than the institutional environment defined by Davis and North. The institutional environment they defined is "a set of fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that govern economic and political activity (rules governing elections, property rights, and the rights of contract are examples of these ground rules)" (Davis and North, 1970, p. 133). However, the institutional structure is narrower than the concept "structure" that North uses to denote "the political and economic institutions, technology, demography, and ideology of a society" (North, 1981).

12"Free riders" refers to the problem that occurs in a group when an individual automatically receives the service provided by the group even if he does not contribute to the costs. To overcome the problem, a group needs to be able to provide selective incentives to the member in order to maintain itself (Olson, 1965).
The original meaning of "moral hazard" refers to the case in which a person takes less than appropriate action to prevent risk when he is insured. In the principal-agent literature, moral hazards, however, refers to the case in which a worker contributes less effort than that he is paid because of asymmetrical information or imperfect monitoring.

As Arrow notes, "Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's words. ... Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling, ... are commodities; they have real, practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in high esteem." (Arrow, 1974, p. 23).


North (1981) correctly perceived the necessity of broadening the arguments in the utility function to explain the functions of ideology. However, because of his reluctance to accept fully Stigler and Becker's (1977) reformulation of the utility function, he is a step short of constructing a positive theory of ideology. In his formulation, individuals must act nonrationally when ideologies are involved. For example, he states that "any successful ideology must overcome the free rider problem, Its fundamental aim is to energize groups to behave contrary to a simple, hedonic, individual calculus of costs and benefits" (North, 1981, p. 53). He makes this position even more explicit in his review of Olson's new book: "People frequently act through conviction about the legitimacy or fairness of the set of rules of the game that
surrounds them. That is, if people are convinced the rules are fair, they may obey them even when at times they could be better off not obeying them" (North, 1983, p. 164). However, as maintained by Becker (1976, pp. 7-8), "the economic approach does not draw conceptual distinctions between major and minor decisions, ... ; or between decisions said to involve strong emotions and those with little emotional involvement, ... ; or between decisions by persons with different incomes, education, or family backgrounds." Then how will a rational individual be a simple hedonic, individual calculus of costs and benefits when ideological consideration is not involved but abstain from doing so when this consideration is present?

17 It should be clear that large interest groups, cooperations, and bureaus will also invest in ideological education to convince their members of their legitimacy. The analysis of ideology should be readily applicable to the other informal institutions, such as ethical codes, mores, and customs.

18 This point has long been recognized by sociologists. For example, Eisenstadt (1968, p. 412) notes that "the analysis of any concrete institutional pattern has to start from the existence of institutional arrangements as inherent in the very nature of human society." However, economists tend to ignore it, except for the institutional school economists.

19 This point is succinctly expressed by T. N. Srinivasan in his comments on a paper by Lord Bauer about the relative efficiencies of markets compared with those of planning: "A fuller understanding of their systemic role in concrete sociopolitical-economic contexts is essential
in devising development policies. In the absence of such understanding, a
discussion of the place of markets or, for that matter, central planning
cannot go very much beyond assigning totemic value to either" (Srinivasan, 1984, p. 55).

20 The terms "institutional change" and "institutional innovation"
are used interchangeably in this paper because a modification of an
existing arrangement is also an innovative activity, and the adoption of
a newly innovated arrangement must change the original one.

21 Although, in the very long run, the institutional arrangements and
structure in any society may converge, in the short run, the most
efficient institutional arrangements will be different in different
societies due to the difference in socio-political histories. It is a
pity that many journalists and politicians fail to see this point and use
the institutional arrangements in their own countries to judge the
institutional arrangements in other societies.

22 It is worth noting that my definition of the institutional
structure includes both production relations and the superstructure in
Marxian terminology. Since both the production relations and
superstructure are conditioned by the technology, my analysis is
consistent with Marx's view. However, there is one distinction here.
Marx's statement mainly refers to the change in the whole institutional
structure, that is, the dramatic change from the primitive to the feudal,
from the feudal to the capitalist system. My analysis is restricted to
the changes of particular institutional arrangements, taking other
arrangements in the structure as given.
Since the right to ownership is an exclusive right that is limited only by those restrictions that are imposed by the state, the change in the contents of property rights will necessarily involve government intervention. Therefore, a theory of the state is also required to explain the change in property rights.

In Lewis's words, "Change begins at some spot in the web of beliefs and relationships, and spreads outward from there" (Lewis, 1955, p. 144).

The change from the hunusan contract to the gama contract in the Hayami and Kikuchi study (1981), which was mentioned before, exemplifies this point. The actual wage is reduced in the gama contract. However, it is the gama arrangement, not a free labor market, that is adopted because the gama contract appears legitimate to villagers in terms of traditional moral principles of mutual help and income sharing in the village.

Some institutional innovations are purely motivated by the purpose of redistributing the existing social income. In addition to some individuals losing, the society as a whole may also lose because the innovation is a resource-consuming process. However, such an innovation will not be a voluntary process. It is in general imposed by the government. The discussion of this type of change will be discussed in the next section.

Forcing people to abandon their traditional beliefs, values, attitudes, mores, and modes of living may cause much unrest. As Bauer notes, "Governments of developing countries have in fact rarely attempted such enforced transformations. They generally recognize that attempts of this kind would invite strong resistance, possibly revolt. Even
substantial moves in such a direction, or suspicions that such attempts will be made, can elicit violent responses, as indeed has often happened in Asia and Africa." (Bauer, p. 31).

28 Weber’s definition of the state is quoted in Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1974).


30 As noted by Dahl and Charles (1953, p. 42), "Whoever controls government usually has the 'last word' on a question; whoever controls government can enforce decisions on other organization in the area" (quoted by Downs, 1957, p. 22). The constraints that are put on the absolute power of the ruler definitely differ from society to society, largely conditioned on their past histories; however, even a popularly elected president or prime minister has a large degree of freedom in pursuing his own goals because of the length between election periods and so on (Breton, 1974).

31 That is, as the wealth of the ruler increase, the marginal utility of the wealth declines and the marginal utilities of other commodities, such as prestige, position in history, and so on, increase. Therefore, the ruler will substitute away from pursuing the enlargement of wealth to pursue the prestige and other commodities.

32 This paragraph is quoted from Srinivasan (1984, p. 53). Srinivasan in turn quotes it from Jagdish Bhagwati, "Development Economics: What Have We Learned?" Distinguished Speakers Lecture, Manila, Asian Development Bank, October 1983.

33 For many other examples, see Bauer, 1984; Bauer and Yamey, 1957; Schultz, 1964; and Lewis, 1955.
A similar view is also expressed by North (1981, p. 20), "The existence of a state is essential for economic growth; the state, however, is the source of man-made economic decline."

The distinctions between two types of profit-seeking activities are in order. The first type is so-called rent seeking (Krueger, 1974) and directly unproductive profit seeking (Srinivasan, 1985). These activities include tariff-seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, seeking of revenues generated by given tariffs, premium seeking for given import licenses, and so on. Once a government starts to intervene in trade or other economic functions, individuals will engage in activities to influence government policies in their favor. These activities promise profits to those individuals engaging in them; however, these activities use up resources, shrink the production possibility frontiers, and produce no goods or services for the society as a whole. Such type of profit seeking will result in stagnation instead of growth. The second type is productive profit seeking, including investments in physical and human capital, innovating new technology and efficient institutional arrangements, and so on. These activities enlarge the production possibility frontier and increase the supply of goods and services to the society. The economic growth of a nation is impossible without such profit seeking.
Reference


Hurwicz, Leonid, "Organizational Structures for Joint Decision Making: A


