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Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly

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Abstract

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

**JEL codes:** C73, L13, O31

**Keywords:** R&D, spillovers, dynamic games
1 Introduction

According to Chesbrough (2003), the economic system is entering a new era of Open Innovation (OI), where OI is defined as "the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively". This fact is a logical consequence of a fast growing and highly competitive market for new technologies. At this rate of growth, the companies' internal resources are not sufficient to meet the new challenges, and they have to access external sources. What drives firms towards OI is the fact that many companies are obliged to innovate and develop new products under extremely tough time and resource constraints in order to stay in the market and keep being competitive.

Open Innovation is vital for companies whose products have short life cycles (for example software and consumer electronics) and extremely demanding criteria regarding quality, price and customers' expectations. The complexity and diversity of the knowledge structure, like nanotechnologies and biotechnologies, is another important factor. As long as "not all smart people work for you" (Chesbrough 2003), there is an increasingly dispersed distribution of useful knowledge in companies of all sizes. The amount of available information is heterogeneously spread and companies cannot access and monitor all necessary networks. Those networks are built on several factors, including governmental and private organizations, academic research, synthetic knowledge, know-how and highly specialized knowledge based on experience and interaction among the agents. Hence, OI provides an access to these networks. Thus, in a fast developing and expanding environment, relying on the Closed Innovation approach is both insufficient and risky.

The OI policy allows the company to use external technologies and share its own knowledge with outside partners at a strictly managed and controlled level. The company boundaries become "permeable" (Mortara et al., 2009). The process of learning, accumulation of outside knowledge and competence enables the company to be not only more innovative, but also innovate at a higher speed. It creates linkages among companies that stimulate the share of ideas, technology and experience. These strategies, as presented by Monica Beltrametti, Vice President of the Xerox Research Centre Europe (XRCE) at Grenoble Innovation Fair (GIF) on October 2010, help share the risk, and reduce costs by using more suppliers. This also opens the
way to new markets and explorations (ideas from new external participants, such as governmental organizations, universities, other large companies and individual representatives).

Furthermore, Open Innovation is an innovation in itself (Mortara et al., 2009). It stimulates innovation by distributing the cost and risk, offering access to new contact networks through ”intermediaries” (Mortara, 2010) and information pools, and also internalizes the unintended byproducts of innovation process, spillovers (Bogers, 2011).

The Closed Innovation model based on the traditional patent system discards unintended or irrelevant research results; however, it has long been considered as a necessary cost for enhancing technical progress. Conversely, the OI policy allows the company to sell those products that do not meet the firm’s capacity and development possibilities (in form of IP licenses) to other companies. If observed from this new angle, the firm turns out to have two functions: one is learning from the environment and the other is constructing it by sharing its own knowledge via a systematic spillover flow. Hence, no proof exists that OI generates less spillovers. The company must spend in order to innovate, it must create and achieve itself the new technologies or find them on the market in the opposite case. Thus, there should be a balance between the level of internal R&D and external knowledge resources accrued by the firms. Otherwise, due to spillover’s negative effect, that reduces the gains, the firms have a lower investment level than socially desired (as in Arrow, 1962, inter alia). In other cases firms may not take into account the positive level their spillovers have on other firms’ R&D and vice versa, leading again to suboptimal level of R&D (Romer, 1990). On the other hand, firms may be trapped into patent racing and overinvest, thus significantly affecting their profits levels. Moreover, they can disclose too much internal information by adopting a purely Open Innovation approach (Enkel et al., 2009).

An important issue about OI is the complementarity between the internal and external knowledge used for innovation in a given company (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2007). In order to maximize the profits and achieve better results, the company should be able to efficiently scan the environment so as to identify relevant value added (i.e. technology and knowledge). Hence, it should correctly assess the degree of complementarity between its R&D program and externally available technology in order to take advantage from the OI policy. This aspect of a firm’s overall strategy can be thought of as a dynamic capability which is built over time (Helfat et al., 2007). Moreover,
it is worth stressing that OI can be achieved through different routes. One possibility is that the firm implements the policy as a "conscious" movement due to its internal necessities (Mortara et al., 2009). Another possibility is that firms are pushed towards OI by some external factors, like globalization, knowledge-intensive environment, markets, or customer preferences.

What happens if the firms are able to optimally determine the spillover delivered to others in the industry, and - in turn - rationally grab the spillovers created by other firms? The effect is an increase in their gains, and a decrease in unnecessary competitiveness. According to Jaffe (1986), who analyzed the relevance of external R&D to individual companies, spillovers have a positive impact on productiveness of own R&D, and a negative effect on competitiveness.

We are going to investigate this issue in a duopoly model describing OI by means of a differential game approach, intending to highlight its equilibrium structure and provide insights for the effects of dynamic OI diffusion over time in the industry under examination. The model we adopt builds upon Cellini and Lambertini (2005, 2009), and extends it by admitting the possibility that knowledge spillovers be endogenously determined during the R&D process. We prove the existence of multiple steady state, including an asymmetric one where, interestingly, the firm investing less in R&D enjoys higher profits than the rival, thanks to the combining effects of savings upon investment costs and exploiting information transmission.

The structure of the paper includes Section 2, where the setup of our model is outlined, Section 3, containing the analytical study of the optimal strategies, and separately featuring the symmetric and the asymmetric case. Section 4 includes our conclusions and supplies hints for future developments.

2 The Setup

We consider an infinite horizon differential game modeling a duopoly with single-product firms in continuous time $t \in [0, \infty)$. For simplicity, assume firms supply homogeneous goods. Define the inverse market demand function as

$$ p(t) = A - q_1(t) - q_2(t), \quad (1) $$
where $A > 0$ is the constant reservation price and $q_i(t)$ is the quantity produced by the $i$-th firm at time $t$.

Production takes place at constant returns to scale, with marginal cost $c_i(t)$ evolving other time according to the following dynamic equation:

$$
\frac{dc_i}{dt} \equiv \dot{c}_i(t) = -k_i(t) - \beta_i(t)k_j(t) + \delta c_i(t), \quad i, j = 1, 2; i \neq j
$$

(2)

where $k_i(t)$ is the R&D effort exerted by firm $i$ at time $t$, and $\beta_i(t) \in (0, 1)$ is the level of positive technological spillover or the level of OI enjoyed by firm $i$ (and transmitted by firm $j$).\(^1\) Parameter $\delta \geq 0$ is a constant depreciation rate that results in decreasing returns due to aging of the technology.

Our approach to spillovers is precisely the feature of the model where we depart from Cellini and Lambertini (2005, 2009). Here, we allow for the spillover to be endogenously determined by the firms’ instantaneous R&D efforts, whereby Open Innovation made available to firm $i$ changes over time according to the following dynamic equation:

$$
\frac{d\beta_i}{dt} \equiv \dot{\beta}_i(t) = \alpha k_j(t) - \eta \beta_i(t)
$$

(3)

where $\alpha$ and $\eta$ are positive parameters. The above equation refers to a situation where firm $i$ has access to an amount of OI (a state variable) that deteriorates if firm $j$ ceases to carry out any R&D.

The cost of creating R&D by firm $i$ is described by the convex function:

$$
\Gamma_i(k_i(t)) = \frac{b[k_i(t)]^2}{2}, \quad \text{where } b \text{ is a positive parameter.}
$$

We are also assuming that, in order for a firm to be able to absorb positive externalities from the environment, it has to bear some appropriation cost, which can be represented as $C_i(\beta_i(t)) = \frac{\epsilon[\beta_i(t)]^2}{2}$, where $\epsilon$ is a positive parameter. For example, it can be generated by the process of searching and assimilating new knowledge, and subsequently adapting it to the firms necessities and standards.

Accordingly, the instantaneous profit function of the $i$-th firm will be written as follows:

$$
\pi_i(t) = (p(t) - c_i(t))q_i(t) - \Gamma_i(k_i(t)) - C_i(\beta_i(t)) =
$$

$$
= [A - q_i(t) - q_j(t) - c_i(t)]q_i(t) - \frac{b[k_i(t)]^2}{2} - \frac{\epsilon[\beta_i(t)]^2}{2}.
$$

\(^1\)In this model, productive technologies are perfect substitutes. For an alternative approach where complementarity is considered, see Scotchmer (2010).
We shall analyze a fully noncooperative game in which each firm sets independently its own level of R&D (determining thus their productive efficiency and the respective degrees of information sharing), as well as the level of output it wants to sell. Hence, the problem of firm $i$ is to

$$\max_{q_i, k_i} \Pi_i \equiv \int_0^\infty \pi_i(t) e^{-\rho t} dt$$

subject to

$$\dot{c}_i(t) = -k_i(t) - \beta_i(t)k_j(t) + \delta c_i(t)$$

$$\dot{c}_j(t) = -k_j(t) - \beta_j(t)k_i(t) + \delta c_j(t)$$

$$\dot{\beta}_i(t) = \alpha k_j(t) - \eta \beta_i(t)$$

$$\dot{\beta}_j(t) = \alpha k_i(t) - \eta \beta_j(t)$$

The set of initial conditions is \{c_i(0), \beta_i(0)\}, for $i = 1, 2$. Along the game firms will discount the future profits, hence $\rho > 0$ is an intertemporal discount rate common to both firms.

3 The game

The Hamiltonian of the $i$-th player is a function depending on the arguments: $t, q_1, q_2, k_1, k_2, c_1, c_2, \beta_1, \beta_2$ and on all the related costate variables. In turn, all arguments are depending on time, but from now on we will omit the time arguments whenever possible to simplify notation. The current value Hamiltonian function $H_i$ takes the following form:

$$H_i(t) = e^{-\rho t} \left\{ [A - q_i(t) - q_j(t) - c_i(t)]q_i(t) - \frac{b[k_i(t)]^2}{2} - e[\beta_i(t)]^2 + \lambda_{ii}(t)[-k_i(t) - \beta_i(t)k_j(t) + \delta c_i(t)] + \lambda_{ij}(t)[-k_j(t) - \beta_j(t)k_i(t) + \delta c_j(t)] + \mu_{ii}[\alpha k_j(t) - \eta \beta_i(t)] + \mu_{ij}[\alpha k_i(t) - \eta \beta_j(t)] \right\}$$

where $\lambda_{ii}(t)$ and $\lambda_{ij}(t)$ are the current value co-state variables respectively associated to the state variables $c_i(t)$ and $c_j(t)$, and $\mu_{ii}(t)$ and $\mu_{ij}(t)$ are the current value co-state variables respectively associated to the state variables $\beta_i(t)$ and $\beta_j(t)$.

We are going to determine the open-loop information structure of this game by applying the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. The procedure we
are going to implement is standard in differential game theory applied to industrial economic models (analogous techniques can be found in Cellini and Lambertini, 1998, 2002, 2009).

The first-order conditions (FOCs) are

\[
\frac{\partial H_i}{\partial q_i} = 0 \implies A - 2q_i - q_j - c_i = 0 \tag{10}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial H_i}{\partial k_i} = 0 \implies -bk_i - \lambda_{ii} - \beta_j \lambda_{ij} + \alpha \mu_{ij} = 0 \tag{11}
\]

Note that the linear-quadratic structure of the Hamiltonian function ensures the concavity w.r.t. the control variables, and then the existence of a maximum point; indeed, the second order conditions read as:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 H_i}{\partial q_i^2} = -2 < 0 \tag{12}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 H_i}{\partial k_i^2} = -b < 0 \tag{13}
\]

Before carrying out the standard procedure, we must point out that this game has degenerate features, in that (10) do not contain any costate variable. Hence, (10) represent a couple of policy functions which will be employed to subsequently determine the equilibrium structure.

Differentiating (10) w.r.t. time we obtain:

\[
\dot{c}_i(t) = -2\dot{q}_i(t) - \dot{q}_j
\]

\[
\dot{c}_j(t) = -2\dot{q}_j(t) - \dot{q}_i
\]

Plugging the expressions obtained from the latter relations and from (10) into (5) and (6), we achieve the dynamic equations:

\[
-2\dot{q}_i(t) - \dot{q}_j = -k_i(t) - \beta_i(t)k_j(t) + \delta c_i(t) \tag{14}
\]

\[
-2\dot{q}_j(t) - \dot{q}_i = -k_j(t) - \beta_j(t)k_i(t) + \delta c_j(t) \tag{15}
\]

From (14) and (15) we deduce the following output dynamics:

\[
\dot{q}_i(t) = \frac{1}{3}[(2 - \beta_j(t))k_i(t) + (-1 + 2\beta_i(t))k_j(t) + \delta(c_j(t) - 2c_i(t))] \tag{16}
\]
\[ \dot{q}_j(t) = \frac{1}{3} [ (-1 + 2\beta_j(t))k_i(t) + (2 - \beta_i(t))k_j(t) + \delta(-2c_j(t) + c_i(t)) ] \quad (17) \]

By construction, (16) and (17) depend linearly on (5) and (6), so they are not going to provide any further information about equilibrium.

The adjoint equations and transversality conditions for the costates \( \lambda_{ij} \) amount to:

\[ \begin{cases} 
\dot{\lambda}_{ii}(t) = (\rho - \delta)\lambda_{ii}(t) + q_i(t) \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-\rho t} \lambda_{ii}(t)c_i(t) = 0
\end{cases} \quad (18) \]

\[ \begin{cases} 
\dot{\lambda}_{ij}(t) = (\rho - \delta)\lambda_{ij}(t) \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-\rho t} \lambda_{ij}(t)c_j(t) = 0
\end{cases} \quad (19) \]

For \( i \neq j \), (19) admit the solutions \( \lambda_{ij} \equiv 0 \). The adjoint equations and transversality conditions for the costates \( \mu_{ij} \) are:

\[ \begin{cases} 
\dot{\mu}_{ii}(t) = \epsilon\beta_i(t) + \lambda_{ii}(t)k_j(t) + (\rho + \eta)\mu_{ii}(t) \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-\rho t} \mu_{ii}(t)\beta_i(t) = 0
\end{cases} \quad (20) \]

\[ \begin{cases} 
\dot{\mu}_{ij}(t) = \lambda_{ij}(t)k_j(t) + (\rho + \eta)\mu_{ij} \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} e^{-\rho t} \mu_{ij}(t)\beta_j(t) = 0
\end{cases} \quad (21) \]

Plugging the solutions to (19) into (21) implies that \( \mu_{ij}(t) \equiv 0 \) are solutions to (21), for \( i \neq j \).

Before proceeding any further, some technical aspects are to be explained in detail. The peculiarity of this game relies upon the fact that, since the costate variables \( \mu_{ii} \), for \( i = 1, 2 \), do not enter the FOCs, they are not actually relevant for equilibrium. The standard procedure, i.e. the differentiation w.r.t. time of (10) and of (11) can only yield a system of control equations originated from (18). The corresponding policy implication suggests that the diffusion of the spillover does not affect the optimal policy of the \( i \)-th firm, so that the spillover effects are completely exogenous with respect to the producer’s strategy. In other words, although the beneficial consequences of OI on profit flows are obviously affecting both firms, the dynamics of its evolution is irrelevant on the strategic decisions.
Therefore, we will only take into account the transversality conditions for $\lambda_{ii}$. Since the involved optimal states and costates are:

$$c^*_i(t) = \left(c_i^*(0) - \int_0^t (k_i^*(s) - \beta_i^*(s)k_j^*(s))e^{-\delta s}ds\right) e^{-\delta t},$$

$$\lambda_{ii}^*(t) = \left(\lambda_{ii}^*(0) + \int_0^t q_i^*(s)e^{(\delta-\rho)s}ds\right) e^{(\rho-\delta)t},$$

then the transversality conditions hold if and only if:

$$\lim_{t \to +\infty} \left(\lambda_{ii}^*(0) + \int_0^t q_i^*(s)e^{(\delta-\rho)s}ds\right) \left(c_i^*(0) - \int_0^t (k_i^*(s) - \beta_i^*(s)k_j^*(s))e^{-\delta s}ds\right) = 0,$$

i.e.

$$\lambda_{ii}^*(0) = -\int_0^\infty q_i^*(s)e^{(\delta-\rho)s}ds,$$

then the optimal costates must be:

$$\lambda_{ii}^*(t) = -\left(\int_t^\infty q_i^*(s)e^{(\delta-\rho)s}ds\right) e^{(\rho-\delta)t}.$$

The output control equations will follow from the differentiation of (10), entailing that they are linearly dependent on the dynamic constraints. Subsequently, we achieve the simple identity:

$$\dot{\lambda}_{ii}(t) = -bk_i(t), \quad (22)$$

then, exploiting (11) and (22) in (18) we have:

$$\dot{k}_i(t) = (\rho - \delta)k_i(t) - \frac{q_i(t)}{b}, \quad (23)$$

$$\dot{k}_j(t) = (\rho - \delta)k_j(t) - \frac{q_j(t)}{b}, \quad (24)$$

leading to the following state-control dynamical system, consisting in eight
ordinary differential equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{c}_i(t) &= -k_i(t) - \beta_i(t)k_j(t) + \delta c_i(t) \\
\dot{c}_j(t) &= -k_j(t) - \beta_j(t)k_i(t) + \delta c_j(t) \\
\dot{\beta}_i(t) &= \alpha k_j(t) - \eta \beta_i(t) \\
\dot{\beta}_j(t) &= \alpha k_i(t) - \eta \beta_j(t) \\
\dot{k}_i(t) &= (\rho - \delta)k_i(t) - \frac{q_i(t)}{b} \\
\dot{k}_j(t) &= (\rho - \delta)k_j(t) - \frac{q_j(t)}{b} \\
\dot{q}_i(t) &= \frac{1}{3}[(2 - \beta_j(t))k_i(t) + (-1 + 2\beta_i(t))k_j(t) + \delta(c_j(t) - 2c_i(t))] \\
\dot{q}_j(t) &= \frac{1}{3}[(-1 + 2\beta_j(t))k_i(t) + (2 - \beta_i(t))k_j(t) + \delta(-2c_j(t) + c_i(t))].
\end{align*}
\]

(25)

We are now going to search for the possible steady states of (25) by letting all its equations vanish, but the aforementioned linear dependence of \(\dot{q}_i(t)\) and of \(\dot{q}_j(t)\) leaves us with only six equations and eight unknowns. Consequently, we will make use of (10), thus expressing all state variables depending on the R&D efforts as follows:

\[
c_i = A - b(\rho - \delta)(k_j + 2k_i),
\]

(26)

\[
c_j = A - b(\rho - \delta)(k_i + 2k_j),
\]

(27)

\[
\beta_i = \frac{\alpha}{\eta}k_j,
\]

(28)

\[
\beta_j = \frac{\alpha}{\eta}k_i.
\]

(29)

By replacing the resulting expressions for \(c_i\), \(c_j\), \(\beta_i\) and \(\beta_j\) in the last two equations of (25) and imposing stationarity, we obtain the following two nonlinear equations in \(k_i\) and \(k_j\):

\[
-k_i - \frac{\alpha}{\eta}k_j^2 + \delta [A - b(\rho - \delta)(k_j + 2k_i)] = 0
\]

(30)

\[
-k_j - \frac{\alpha}{\eta}k_i^2 + \delta [A - b(\rho - \delta)(k_i + 2k_j)] = 0
\]

(31)

Then, subtracting (31) from (30) and subsequently factoring the equation:

\[
k_j - k_i - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \left( k_j^2 - k_i^2 \right) + \delta b(\rho - \delta) [k_j - k_i] = 0 \iff
\]

10
\[(k_j - k_i) \left[ 1 - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \left(k_j + k_i\right) + \delta b(\rho - \delta) \right] = 0,\]

we obtain two kinds of different zeros:

\[k_i = k_j \quad \text{and} \quad k_i = \frac{(1 + b \delta(\rho - \delta))\eta}{\alpha} - k_j. \quad \text{(32)}\]

In the following subsections, we shall investigate both the symmetric and the asymmetric equilibrium cases.

### 3.1 The symmetric equilibrium structure

The following Proposition illustrates the properties of the symmetric equilibrium point:

**Proposition 1.** If

1. \(\rho > \delta;\)
2. \(\alpha < \frac{\eta}{\delta A} [2 + 3 b \delta(\rho - \delta)],\)

the game admits a symmetric steady state \(P = (c_1^*, c_2^*, \beta_1^*, \beta_2^*, k_1^*, k_2^*, q_1^*, q_2^*),\)

where:

\[k_1^* = k_2^* = k^* = \frac{-\eta[1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \sqrt{\eta^2(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 + 4\alpha\eta\delta A}}{2\alpha},\]

\[c_1^* = c_2^* = c^* = A - 3b(\rho - \delta)k^*,\]

\[\beta_1^* = \beta_2^* = \beta^* = \frac{\alpha}{\eta} k^*,\]

\[q_1^* = q_2^* = q^* = b(\rho - \delta)k^*.\]

**Proof.** Consider the symmetric case, i.e. \(k_i = k_j = k\) and substitute in (30):

\[-k - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} k^2 + \delta (A - b(\rho - \delta)(k + 2k)) = 0,\]

whose zeros are:

\[k_{1,2}^* = \frac{-\eta[1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)] \pm \sqrt{\eta^2(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 + 4\alpha\eta\delta A}}{2\alpha}.\]
If \( \rho > \delta \), it can be easily observed that the smallest solution is negative, whereas the remaining one is positive, and consequently feasible.

Since the level of spillover \( \beta^* \) is supposed to belong to the interval \((0, 1)\), we need to find suitable assumptions so that this property be satisfied:

\[
\beta^* = \frac{\alpha}{\eta} k^* = -\eta [1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \frac{\sqrt{\eta^2(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 + 4\alpha \eta \delta A}}{2\eta} < 1 \iff
\]

\[
(\eta(3 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)))^2 - \eta(4A\alpha \delta + \eta(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2) > 0 \iff
\]

\[
\alpha < \frac{\eta}{\delta A} [2 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)],
\]

hence if \( \alpha < \frac{\eta}{\delta A} [2 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)] \), then \( \beta^* \in (0, 1) \).

Moreover, since the remaining coordinates of \( P^* \), achieved by the relations originated by the vanishing of \((25)\), are positive for \( \rho > \delta \), then \( P^* \) is a feasible steady state for the system \((25)\).

The expression of profit evaluated at \( P^* \), expressed by means of \( k^* \), is

\[
\Pi^* = (A - 2q^* - c^*)q^* - \frac{b(k^*)^2}{2} - \frac{\epsilon(\beta^*)^2}{2} =
\]

\[
= (A - 2b(\rho - \delta)k^* - A + 3b(\rho - \delta)k^*)b(\rho - \delta)k^* - \frac{b(k^*)^2}{2} - \frac{\epsilon \alpha^2(k^*)^2}{2\eta^2} =
\]

\[
= (k^*)^2 \left[ b^2(\rho - \delta)^2 - \frac{b}{2} - \frac{\epsilon \alpha^2}{2\eta^2} \right]. \quad (33)
\]

The next Proposition will fix the assumptions for the positivity of \((33)\).

**Proposition 2.** If

1. \( \rho > \delta \);
2. \( b > \frac{1}{2(\rho - \delta)^2} \);
3. \( \alpha < \min \left\{ \frac{\eta}{\delta A} [2 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)]; \frac{\eta}{\epsilon} \left[ b^2(\rho - \delta)^2 - \frac{b}{2} \right] \right\} \),

then the profit function evaluated at \( P^* \) is positive.
Proof. A sufficient condition for the positivity of (33) is given by:

\[ b^2(\rho - \delta)^2 - \frac{b}{2} - \frac{\epsilon \alpha^2}{2\eta^2} > 0, \]

which can be arranged by isolating \( \alpha \) as in Proposition 1:

\[ \alpha^2 < \frac{2\eta^2}{\epsilon} \left[ b^2(\rho - \delta)^2 - \frac{b}{2} \right]. \]

Thus, combining this condition with the one stated in Proposition 1 ensuring the existence and feasibility of \( P^* \), we can conclude that if \( b > \frac{1}{2(\rho - \delta)^2} \) and

\[ \alpha < \min \left\{ \frac{\eta}{\delta A} [2 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta)]; \frac{2}{\epsilon} \sqrt{\frac{b^2(\rho - \delta)^2 - \frac{b}{2}}{\eta^2}} \right\}, \]

then \( \Pi^* > 0. \)

The following figure, sketched with Mathematica 5.0, is the outcome of a numerical simulation performed to illustrate the shape of \( \Pi^*(\alpha) \). It is worth noting that \( \Pi^*(\alpha) \) is concave w.r.t. \( \alpha \), which can be explained on the basis of the balance between two opposite effects, i.e., the desirable gain generated by the transmission of technological knowledge through an increase in the spillover level, on the one hand, and the undesirable increase in the intensity of competition that the same fact brings about via a decrease in marginal costs and the resulting output expansion, on the other.

As far as the dynamic features of the trajectories are concerned, we can evaluate the eigenvalues of a \( 4 \times 4 \) Jacobian matrix, that is:

\[
\mathcal{J}(P) = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial \delta}{\partial c} & \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial \beta} & \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial k} & \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial q} \\
\frac{\partial \beta}{\partial c} & \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \beta} & \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial k} & \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial q} \\
\frac{\partial k}{\partial c} & \frac{\partial k}{\partial \beta} & \frac{\partial k}{\partial k} & \frac{\partial k}{\partial q} \\
\frac{\partial q}{\partial c} & \frac{\partial q}{\partial \beta} & \frac{\partial q}{\partial k} & \frac{\partial q}{\partial q}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
\delta & -k^* & -1 - \beta^* & 0 \\
0 & -\eta & \alpha & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \rho - \delta & -\frac{1}{b} \\
-\frac{\delta}{3} & \frac{k^*}{3} & \frac{1+\beta^*}{3} & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]
Figure 1: We chose the following values for parameters: \( \delta = 0.01 \), \( \rho = 0.77 \), \( \epsilon = 0.05 \), \( A = 1 \), \( \eta = 0.001 \), \( b = 2.5 \), verifying the conditions of Proposition 1. \( \Pi^*(\alpha) \) keeps positive as \( \alpha \in (0.002, 0.01) \). In particular, for \( \alpha = 0.006 \), \( P \) is feasible:

\[
P = (0.9359, 0.9359, 0.0674, 0.0674, 0.0112, 0.0112, 0.0213, 0.0213)
\]

whose characteristic polynomial is given by:

\[
p_J(P)(\lambda) = \lambda \left[ (\delta - \lambda)(\eta + \lambda)(\rho - \delta - \lambda) + \frac{\alpha k^*}{3b} + \frac{(\beta^* + 1)(\eta + \lambda)}{3b} \right],
\]

thus admitting the null eigenvalue.

**Proposition 3.** \( J(P) \) admits at least one negative eigenvalue.

**Proof.** Since the known term of the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian evaluated at the symmetric steady state \( P \) is:

\[
\rho \eta (\rho - \delta) + \frac{\alpha k^*}{3b} + \frac{\beta^* + 1}{3b},
\]

and taking into account that such polynomial vanishes at a negative value of \( \lambda \) if such quantity is positive, then \( \rho > \delta \), a necessary condition for feasibility of \( P \), is a sufficient condition to admit a negative eigenvalue.

The latter result ensures that there exists a stable manifold associated to the steady state, hence there exist trajectories heading towards that equilibrium point.
3.2 The asymmetric equilibrium structure

Here we focus on the possible arising of asymmetric outcomes. We are going
to prove the following result:

**Proposition 4.** If the following parametric hypotheses hold:

1. $\rho > \delta$,
2. $b < \frac{1}{\delta(\rho - \delta)}$,
3. $\alpha \in \left( \eta\left[3 + 7b\delta(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]\right], \frac{\eta(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2)}{A\delta} \right)$,

the game also admits a non-symmetric steady state

$$Q = (c_{1NS}, c_{2NS}, \beta_{1NS}, \beta_{2NS}, k_{1NS}, k_{2NS}, q_{1NS}, q_{2NS}),$$

where:

$$c_{1NS} = A - b(\rho - \delta) \left[ \frac{3\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha} \right],$$

$$c_{2NS} = A - b(\rho - \delta) \left[ \frac{3\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha} \right],$$

$$\beta_{1NS} = \frac{\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\eta},$$

$$\beta_{2NS} = \frac{\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\eta},$$

$$k_{1NS} = \frac{\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha},$$

$$k_{2NS} = \frac{\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha},$$

$$q_{1NS} = b(\rho - \delta) \left[ \frac{\eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha} \right].$$
\[
q_2^{NS} = b(\rho - \delta) \left[ \eta [1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] + \frac{\sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha} \right],
\]

and where
\[
\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A) := \eta^2(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 - 4[(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2)\eta^2 - \alpha\eta\delta A].
\]

**Proof.** Consider the non-symmetric case, consisting in the following relation between the R&D optimal strategies:
\[
k_i = \frac{(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))\eta}{\alpha} - k_j.
\]

We substitute \(k_i\) into (30) to obtain an equation having \(k_j\) as an unknown:
\[
- \frac{(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))\eta}{\alpha} + k_j - \frac{\alpha k_j^2}{\eta} \\
+ \delta \left[ A - b(\rho - \delta)(k_j + 2\frac{(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))\eta}{\alpha} - 2k_j) \right] = 0,
\]
which can be arranged as follows:
\[
\alpha^2 k_j^2 - \alpha\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))k_j + [1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2]\eta^2 - \alpha\eta\delta A = 0.
\]

The two roots of the latter equation are:
\[
k_{1,2}^{NS} = \frac{\eta [1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] \pm \sqrt{\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)}}{2\alpha}
\]
where
\[
\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A) := \eta^2(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 - 4[(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2)\eta^2 - \alpha\eta\delta A].
\]

To check whether the \(k_{1,2}^{NS}\) are feasible we need to assess the positivity of the function \(\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)\):
\[
\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A) > 0 \iff \\
\iff \eta^2(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 > 4[(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2)\eta^2 - \alpha\eta\delta A] \iff \\
\iff \ldots \iff -7(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 - 10b\delta(\rho - \delta) - 3 + \frac{4\alpha\delta A}{\eta} > 0,
\]

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implying that \( \alpha \) should exceed the level denoted by \( \tilde{\alpha} \):

\[
\alpha > \tilde{\alpha} \equiv \frac{\eta}{4A\delta}[(3 + 7b\delta(\rho - \delta))(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta))]
\]

As in the asymmetric case, the feasibility of the steady state requires that

\( 0 < \beta^{NS}_1 < 1 \) and \( \beta^{NS}_1 > \beta^{NS}_2 \), we have to determine sufficient conditions such that the following system of inequalities holds:

\[
\begin{cases}
\beta^{NS}_1 < 1 \quad \iff \quad \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} < \eta[1 - b\delta(\rho - \delta)] \\
\beta^{NS}_2 > 0 \quad \iff \quad \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} < \eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]
\end{cases}
\]

hence the sufficient conditions can be expressed by the following system:

\[
\begin{cases}
b < \frac{1}{\delta(\rho - \delta)} \\
\sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} < \eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]
\end{cases}
\]

Rearranging the latter inequality, we have that:

\[
2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 1 - \frac{\delta\alpha A}{\eta} > 0 \iff
\]

\[
\iff \ldots \iff \alpha < \tilde{\alpha} \equiv \frac{\eta(1 + 3b\delta(\rho - \delta) + 2(b\delta(\rho - \delta))^2)}{A\delta}.
\]

If we compare the two levels, a direct computation yields that \( \tilde{\alpha} < \tilde{\alpha} \) irrespective of all the remaining parameters' values, therefore a sufficient condition for \( \alpha \) is \( \alpha \in (\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\alpha}) \). Combining this last constraint with the one for the feasibility of \( q^{NS}_1 \) and \( q^{NS}_2 \), i.e. \( \rho > \delta \), we obtain the three assumptions for all the coordinates of \( Q \) except \( c^{NS}_1 \) and \( c^{NS}_2 \), whose expressions follow from the relations (26) and (27). Since \( c^{NS}_1 > c^{NS}_2 \), it suffices to prove that \( c^{NS}_2 > 0 \) under the same three assumptions. To begin with, we can rewrite it as follows:

\[
c^{NS}_2 > 0 \iff 2\alpha A - 3b\eta(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - b(\rho - \delta)\sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} > 0.
\]

Then, employing the above inequality

\[
\sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} < \eta[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] \iff -b(\rho - \delta)\sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} > -\eta b(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)],
\]
the previous expression can be estimated:

\[
2\alpha A - 3b\eta(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - b(\rho - \delta)\sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)} > \\
> 2\alpha A - 3b\eta(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] - \eta b(\rho - \delta)[1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)] = \\
= 2\alpha A - 4b\eta(\rho - \delta) - 2b^2\delta\eta(\rho - \delta)^2 > 0
\]

if and only if the following condition on \(\alpha\) holds:

\[
\alpha > \tilde{\alpha} := \frac{b\eta(\rho - \delta)[2 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]}{A}.
\]

Consequently, now it is sufficient to prove that \(\tilde{\alpha} < \hat{\alpha}\) in order that \(\alpha \in (\tilde{\alpha}, \hat{\alpha})\) yields \(c_2^{NS} > 0\). By using some algebra, we obtain that

\[
\tilde{\alpha} < \hat{\alpha} \iff \frac{b\eta(\rho - \delta)[2 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]}{A} < \frac{\eta[3 + 7b\delta(\rho - \delta)][1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)]}{4A\delta} \iff \\
\iff \ldots \iff 3 + 3b^2\delta^2(\rho - \delta)^2 + 2b\delta(\rho - \delta) > 0,
\]

and this completes the proof of the feasibility of \(c_1^{NS}\) and \(c_2^{NS}\) and finally of the asymmetric steady state \(Q\).

\qed

The profits of firm \(i\) at asymmetric equilibrium are:

\[
\Pi_i^{NS} = \left[ A - q_i^{NS} - q_j^{NS} - c_i^{NS} \right] q_i^{NS} - \frac{b(k_i^{NS})^2}{2} - \frac{\epsilon_i^{NS}}{2}. \quad (34)
\]

In order to check that \(\Pi_i^{NS} > 0\) for both firms, when the asymmetric equilibrium is feasible, we shall prove the following Proposition:

**Proposition 5.** If

1. Proposition 4 holds with the further hypothesis \(\rho > \frac{3\delta}{2}\);

2. \(b > \frac{1}{2(\rho - \delta)^2}\);

3. \(\epsilon < \frac{b(2b(\rho - \delta)^2 - 1)\alpha^2}{\alpha^2} \left( \frac{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) - \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}}{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) + \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}} \right)^2 \),
then both players’ profits are positive at the steady state $Q$.

Proof. Plugging the coordinates of $Q$ into the expressions (34) and imposing positivity, we obtain two different inequalities which can be expressed by isolating parameter $\epsilon$, i.e.:

$$
\Pi_{NS_1} > 0 \iff \epsilon < \frac{b(2b(\rho - \delta)^2 - 1)\eta^2}{\alpha^2} \left( \frac{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) - \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}}{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) + \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}} \right)^2,
$$

(35)

$$
\Pi_{NS_2} > 0 \iff \epsilon < \frac{b(2b(\rho - \delta)^2 - 1)\eta^2}{\alpha^2} \left( \frac{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) + \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}}{\eta(1 + b\delta(\rho - \delta)) - \sqrt{\Omega(\cdot)}} \right)^2,
$$

(36)

where $\Omega(b, \eta, \delta, \rho, \alpha, A)$ is defined as in Proposition 4.

Since $\epsilon > 0$, a necessary condition for (35) and (36) to hold is given by: $b > \frac{1}{2(\rho - \delta)^2}$, which must be compliant with the assumption on $b$ of Proposition 4. That can occur if we replace the assumption $\rho > \delta$ with $\rho > \frac{3\delta}{2}$.

Since the right hand side of (36) is larger than the right hand side of (35) irrespective of all parameters’ values, the most restrictive inequality is (35). Hence, combining all the previous parametric assumptions, the positivity of both profits is verified.

Also in this case, we may carry out some numerical simulations for illustrative purposes. Choosing the parameter values $\delta = 0.05$, $\rho = 0.5$, $\epsilon = 1.2$, $A = 1$, $b = 2.5$, $\eta = 0.0005$, $\alpha = 0.011$, we can list the equilibrium levels of states, controls and profits in the next table and proceed to a comparison between the players’ performances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$c_{NS}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{NS}$</th>
<th>$k_{NS}$</th>
<th>$q_{NS}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{NS}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st firm</td>
<td>0.942068</td>
<td>0.979609</td>
<td>0.00348368</td>
<td>0.00391914</td>
<td>0.575781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd firm</td>
<td>0.895894</td>
<td>0.0766409</td>
<td>0.0445277</td>
<td>0.0500936</td>
<td>0.00355528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of the two firms’ profits as functions of $\alpha$. A general appraisal of the comparative performance of firms is that firm 1 attains higher profits by virtue of the following mechanism: a lower R&D
effort yields a higher production cost, which in turn brings about an output restriction; hence, firm 1 essentially aims at reducing its own investment costs while free-riding over the rival’s R&D activity. Overall, the cost-saving effect of shrinking the R&D investment more than offset the negative consequences of operating at a higher marginal cost and selling a lower quantity (which always amounts to bad news under Cournot competition, all else equal).

Figure 2: The upper graph represents $\Pi_1(\alpha)$ and the lower one represents $\Pi_2(\alpha)$ as $\alpha \in (0.009, 0.011)$. In this range of parameters, the difference between profits (and the prevalence of $\Pi_1$ is particularly evident.

As we stated in Section 3, the linear dependence of $\dot{q}_1(t)$ and of $\dot{q}_2(t)$ on the remaining kinematic equations does not provide us with additional information on dynamics. Therefore, we are going to neglect them and construct the Jacobian matrix in the 6-equation case, evaluated at $Q$:

$$\mathcal{J}(Q) = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial q_1}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial k_2} \\
\frac{\partial q_2}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial k_2} \\
\frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial k_2} \\
\frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial \beta_2}{\partial k_2} \\
\frac{\partial k_1}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial k_1}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial k_1}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial k_1}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial k_1}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial k_1}{\partial k_2} \\
\frac{\partial k_2}{\partial c_1} & \frac{\partial k_2}{\partial c_2} & \frac{\partial k_2}{\partial \beta_1} & \frac{\partial k_2}{\partial \beta_2} & \frac{\partial k_2}{\partial k_1} & \frac{\partial k_2}{\partial k_2}
\end{pmatrix} = 20
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\delta & 0 & -k_2^{NS} & 0 & -1 & -\beta_1^{NS} \\
0 & \delta & 0 & -k_1^{NS} & -\beta_2^{NS} & -1 \\
0 & 0 & -\eta & 0 & 0 & \alpha \\
0 & 0 & 0 & -\eta & \alpha & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & (\rho - \delta) & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & (\rho - \delta)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\(J(Q)\) is an upper triangular matrix. Thus, its entries on the main diagonal coincide with its eigenvalues: \(\delta, -\eta, \rho - \delta\), all of them being double roots of the associated characteristic polynomial. The negative eigenvalue \(-\eta\) ensures that \(Q\) is a saddle point too, hence there exist optimal trajectories heading towards \(Q\).

4 Concluding remarks

We have described the dynamic properties of a Cournot duopoly treated as a differential game with cost-reducing R&D. The main goal was to investigate the nature of Open Innovation and make an analogy to extant economical and managerial issues. To do so, we have nested the endogeneity of knowledge spillovers into the setup dating back to Cellini and Lamberti (2005, 2009). By doing so, we have achieved multiple equilibria, with both symmetric and asymmetric steady states. In particular, the asymmetric solution is quite interesting as it is generated by a setup which, a priori, is fully symmetric. Numerical simulations show that the firm with a higher private R&D investment level has a considerably smaller level of OI absorption effort, and vice versa. Moreover, profits increase as OI absorption increases, even in presence of a lower level of production.

In view of the growing relevance of OI, research on this issue will plausibly intensify in the near future. Possible developments include investigating (i) the possibility of selling R&D spillovers in the market, taking into account the issue of property rights; and (ii) the feedback equilibrium structure.
References


